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EDITORIAL NOTE

This journal is a yearly philosophical journal published by the Dept. of Philosophy, University of North Bengal. As a CARE Enlisted Journal of UGC, *Philosophical Papers: Journal of the Department of Philosophy* welcomes contributions from all fields of philosophy. The editorial policy of the journal is to promote the study of philosophy, Eastern and Western in all its branches: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Logic, Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy, Continental Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, Mind, Religion and Language. However, it would like its contributors to focus on what they consider to be significantly new and important. The contributions should, as far as possible, avoid jargon and the author's contention should be stated in as simple a language as possible. *Philosophical Papers: Journal of the Department of Philosophy* is thus, devoted to the publication of original papers in any other of these fields. The Department hopes that followers and seekers of philosophy will receive much light and guidance in the field of philosophical research from these discussions. It is also expected that the contributions/papers in this academic journal will spark fruitful philosophical discussion of the vital issues raised in them.

The Department is happy to present *Philosophical Papers: Journal of the Department of Philosophy* Volume-17, March-2021, before the philosophical community. The Department thanks the esteemed members of the editorial board, Prof. Arvind Vikram Singh of University of Rajasthan, Prof. Kuntala Bhattacharyay of Rabindra Bharati University, Prof. Dillip Kumar Mahanta of Calcutta University, Prof. Gopal Sahu of Allahabad University, Prof. Ranjan Panda of IIT, Mumbai and all esteemed colleagues of the Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal for valuable review, suggestion, support to take extra mile for the accomplishment of the publication of this issue. The Department is also grateful to our Vice-Chancellor for the encouragement and support, the Finance Officer (Officiating), the University Grants Commission and the University Press, without which the publication of the journal would not have been possible.

LAXMIKANTA PADHI
Editor-in-Chief

ON K. C. BHATTACHARYYA'S REFLECTIONS ON THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

DILIP KUMAR MOHANTA

Reflections on the Bhagavadgītā, alternatively *Critique of the Bhagavadgītā*, is the English translation of a critical essay in Bengali *Bhagavadgītā-vicāra* penned by Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (12th May, 1875-11th December, 1949), one of the most celebrated and original thinker in Philosophy of the twentieth century India.¹ Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya (henceforth Bhattacharyya) is a rare combination of an 'acutely analytical mind' and 'a strong power of imagination'.² Bhattacharyya wanted to situate the issues in Indian philosophy in the 'the global philosophical perspective' and 'a full open-eyed struggle'.³ According to Bhattacharyya, "The most prominent contribution of ancient India to the culture of the world is in the field of philosophy and if the modern Indian mind is to philosophise at all to any purpose, it has to confront Eastern thought and Western thought with one another and attempt a synthesis or a reasoned rejection of either, if that were possible. It is in philosophy, if anywhere, that the task of discovering the soul of India is imperative for modern Indian: the task of achieving, if possible, for continuity of his old self with his present-day self, of realizing what is nowadays called the Mission of India, if it has any. Genius can unveil the soul of India in art, but it is through philosophy that we can methodically attempt to discover it."⁴ A philosopher, for Bhattacharyya, is a wise person who never gives any impression that the perennial nature of philosophic question has been solved by him. Philosophizing is an activity of 'freedom in thinking'.⁵ We if we want to unfold our freedom in philosophic enterprise we are to do it 'within a contexture laid down by the preceding generations' keeping in mind the changing needs of the time.⁶ As Bhattacharyya said

¹Gopinath Bhattacharyya's edited two volumes of K. C. Bhattacharyya's Philosophy titled as *Studies in Philosophy*, Volume 2, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1956, p. 103.

² See, Kalyankumar Bagchi, *The Philosophy of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya*, University of Calcutta, 2013, from the desk of the Head of the Department by Manidipa Sanyal, p. i.

³Ibid, p. 1.

⁴ K. C. Bhattacharyya, "Swaraj in Ideas" included in Kalyankumar Bhattacharyya edited *Prabandha-Sankalan (Collection of Essays by K.C. Bhattacharyya)*, Dey's Publishing, Kolkata, 2011, p. 113.

⁵ See, J. N. Mohanty, "Philosophy in the Twenty-first Century", *Prabuddha Bharata*, vol. 112, No. 8, p. 13. (459).

⁶Ibid, P. 16. (457).

in his celebrated work *Studies in Vedantism*,⁷ “... a true philosophic system is not to be looked upon as a soul-less jointing of hypothesis. It is a living fabric which, with all its endeavours to be objective, must have a well-marked individuality. Hence it is not to be regarded as special property of academic philosophy-mongers, to be hacked by them into technical view, but it is to be regarded as a form of life and is to be treated as a theme of literature of infinite interest to humanity.” Professor Kalyan Kumar Bagchi describes Bhattacharyya’s philosophy and the philosophical method adopted by him as “one of hermeneutical exercise through which an entire system of thought flashes anew before one’s mind’s eye.”⁸ About the characteristics of Bhattacharyya’s writing his son Kalidas Bhattacharyya says, “K. C. Bhattacharyya’s writings are extraordinarily terse, though pointing every time straight to what he intends. It is only because what he intends is always of profound depth, and also because his analyses are almost baffling subtle, that readers often find difficult to follow him.”⁹ But his writings contain original ideas, critical observations and ‘insightful comparisons’ as we see in the beginning of his essays titled *The Concept of Philosophy* and *Kāṅṭ-darśaner Tātparyya* (in Bengali).¹⁰

We read an interesting remark about K.C. Bhattacharyya’s philosophical writing in *Translator’s Introduction* to the English translation of K.C. Bhattacharyya’s Bengali Essay *Kant-darśaner Tātparyya* titled *Implication of the Philosophy of Kant* by J. N. Mohanty and Tara Chatterjee that I am tempted to quote here: “It is very difficult to have a proper understanding of K.C. Bhattacharyya’s philosophy because the writing is terse, pithy and he seldom provides examples to elucidate a point. He uses many familiar terms, but assigns to them additional layers of meaning. He has used extensively the typical philosophical terms common in Indian philosophy. His language is close to that used in later Sanskrit writings on philosophy, especially that of Navya-Nyāya and that of Advaita Vedānta. This helps him to condense his thoughts and express himself with a minimum of words. But, this

⁷GopinathBhattacharyya edited two volumes of K. C. Bhattacharyya’s Philosophy titled as *Studies in Philosophy*, Volume 1, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1956, p. 6.

⁸*Ibid*, p. 2.

⁹ See, Kalidas Bhattacharyya, *The Fundamentals of K. C. Bhatattacharyya’s Philosophy*, Saraswat Library, Calcutta, 1975, p. Preface (i).

¹⁰*Kāṅṭdarśaner Tātparyya* (*An Introduction to the Philosophy of Kant*) published as an *Epilogue* to *Kāṅṭer Darśanaby* Rashvihary Das, West Bengal State Book Board, Kolkata, 1979, pp. 229-306.

economy of words makes his writings more difficult to decipher, unless one is already familiar with his language. His style of presentation makes him unapproachable to many readers even in his native language.”¹¹

Bhattacharyya’s essay on the *Gītā* written in Bengali with the title *Bhagavadgītā-vicāra* is no exception to this style. Here also his style of expression is extremely terse. He does not restrict his exercise of ‘the freedom to differ on details’¹² but never ignores the broad outlines of the *Gītā*. His is a different presentation of the broad outlines of the contents of the *Gītā* keeping in mind ‘the current philosophical doctrine’ ... in the line of constructive criticism.”¹³ Bhattacharyya in his study of the *Gītā* identifies the various layers of meaning. It is a unique approach to the philosophical problem of the *Gītā*. His Bengali essay titled *Bhagavadgītā-vicāra* is unique being very different from the usual sense of the term ‘exposition’; it is rather a ‘constructive interpretation’ and an extension in new ‘direction’ for contextualizing the ancient text. “The major task of this kind of interpretation was, in author’s view, to render esoteric doctrines intelligible in terms of the contents of common consciousness”, says Gopinath Bhattacharyya.¹⁴ The word ‘reflection’ has been used as the translation of the Bengali word *vicāra* with ‘innovation’ as an underscoring connotation. It is rather “a kind of introspective insight to unravel the nature”¹⁵ of the main issue of the *Gītā*, which according to Bhattacharyya, is contained in the first four chapters of the Scripture. But he has given no reason in the essay why he has not included *Bhakti-Yoga* as one of the main force of the *Gītā*. The nature of self as ‘essentially willing’ seems to occupy a central position in the essay. This is evident in his analysis of the second chapter of the *Gītā* called *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* when he says that the self as the performer of action is universal good and this is the true nature of the self and in no way this essentially willing self is different from the self as such (*kāmanāhinakarmirnikāṣṭreyaḥnityavartaman.*

Karmiātmārnikāṣṭreyaḥnityavartaman. *ātmāhaitebhinna* *nay*). For

¹¹ J. N. Mohanty and Tara Chatterjee, *Implication of the Philosophy of Kant*, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 2.

¹² *Ibid*, p. (ii)

¹³ *ibid*.

¹⁴ Gopinath Bhattacharyya’s edited two volumes of K. C. Bhattacharyya’s Philosophy titled as *Studies in Philosophy*, Volume 1, “Editors’ Introduction to volume one”, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1956, p. xi.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p.xiii.

Bhattacharyya, the agent of action is the self and this self is the eternal good (*nityaśreyah*). This view may not have affinity with any modern interpreters of the *Gītā*. According to Tilak, *Karmayoga* is the main thrust in the *Gītā* and the other two - *Jñānayoga* and *Bhaktiyoga*- are supplementary. K.C. Bhattacharyya has used the Bengali word *vicāra* in the sense of ‘critique’ or ‘reflections’. Again, the word ‘*dharmagrantha*’ is often translated as ‘religious scripture’; however, Bhattacharyya does not seem to confine himself to this meaning.¹⁶ One who blindly follows the rituals only for heavenly pleasure in the next world is a stupid fellow in his view. Perhaps, the concept of ‘duty’ occupies the foremost place in his understanding of the *Gītā*. The traditional sense of use of the word *dharma* does not stand for ‘religious faith’. Bhattacharyya’s use of *dharma* in his analysis of the *Karma-Yoga* appears to retain the traditional sense of the term. “The notion of *dharma* is a very pervasive and significant notion enriched precisely by its ambiguity. It encompasses religious as well as social and ethical duties. To work for the benefit of others is the Moral Law in the *Gītā*. It etymologically means that which holds things and in the case of inanimate objects it stands for their essential nature. In the case of humans, this essential nature is expressed in his moral duties. There are terms like *nṛpadharma*, *gārhashtyadharmā*, *āpaddharma*, etc. which mean ‘duties of the king’, ‘duties of a householder’, ‘duties at the time of emergency’, respectively. *Dharma* in philosophical literature or early Sanskrit does not stand for religion (as it is nowadays used to mean).”¹⁷ Disinterested action is the cause of this enduring world. *Karma-Yoga* contains both prohibitive (*niṣedha-jñāna*) and prescriptive (*vidhi-jñāna or yajña*) instructions. Righteousness is the expression of compassion (*karuṇā*) of the Supreme Lord (*parameswara*) to the ordinary human beings. According to Bhattacharyya, the meaning of *śraddhā* (reverence) in the context of *niṣkāma-karma* is abandoning one’s ego of being the agent of action. The metaphysical status of the

¹⁶ Because of Eurocentric dominance Indian philosophy, particularly is wrongly classified as *religion* in the West. J. N. Mohanty has argued against this interpretation. It is contended that “in the process of *sadhana*, *shravana* is hermeneutical, *manana* is philosophical, *nididhyasana* is meditative. None is religious. *Moksha*, the goal of this process, is not supernatural, otherworldly, and soteriological. It is not salvation. It is discovery of the identity between the innermost truth of one’s “psyche” and the innermost being of the world: of psychology and physics. What is religious about it?” See the *Editorial: Reflections on Philosophy, Prabuddha Bharata*, vol. 112, No. 8, p. 11 (457).

¹⁷ In the Notes on Krishnachandra’s *Implications of the Philosophy of Kant* (English translation of *Kāntdarśaner Tātparyā*) the translators J. N. Mohanty and Tara Chatterjee said. “We have translated the term ‘*dharma*’ as duty.” Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2011, p. 157-8.

ultimate *dharma* is not of much importance in the *Gītā*. Its concern centres round the *dharma* of man and society. A conscious effort can be seen in the dialogue between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa that both of them in any case are interested to preserve the law of society. When Arjuna does not want to fight the Kauravas in war and prefers to ‘retire to the forest as an ascetic’ Kṛṣṇa points out that Arjuna “is indulging in psychological rationalization. In the name of preserving social order, he is going to violate that very order, by refusing to perform the duties of a warrior and defender of justice. Every man should perform the duties incumbent on his station in society. Even Kṛṣṇa, the Absolute, has his duties. He performs them, although he has nothing to gain. If he does not perform his duties, men will imitate him and the worlds will go to naught.”¹⁸

However, in reading the *Gītā* philosophically, a general question may confront us: How to understand the scriptural texts? Bhattacharyya has laid down a very insightful way to understand scriptural texts. According to him, if we are to appreciate truly the proper instruction as indicated by the Scriptures we are to be open-ended. In other words, it is not necessary to believe that scriptural texts are infallible. However, we should adopt a reverential “attitude of critical reflection about what deep insights the Scriptures are supposedly intending to convey. Though there are some descriptions in the Scriptures that are hard to believe, yet it is not so hard to imagine that the depictions are a part of a literary composition. The sections devoted to instructing on some value-oriented directive principles (*upadeśātmakeśā*) need to be internalized after adequate critical examination (*mīmāṃsā-pūrvaka*).”¹⁹ There are many subtle commentaries on the *Gītā* and none should be accepted uncritically. In other words, we should not have any blind faith in any one of them. However, in case we fail an understanding of the scriptural texts through critical reflection, we will fail to arrive at rich the deeper significance and relevance of instructions embedded in them and not be able to realise its significance for our time. In other words, the deeper significance of such recommendations cannot be truly grasped unless we compare them within the theoretical basis of our contemporary norms of morality (*dharma-buddhi*). If we follow them without reflection and treat as mere rituals like our recitation of hymns (*stotra-pāṭha*), it will

¹⁸ P. T. Raju, *Structural Depths of Indian Thought*, South Asian Publishers: New Delhi, 1985, p.533.

¹⁹ First paragraph of the essay *Bhagvadgītā-vicāra* (English translation mine).

only add to our dogmatism and arrogance regarding *Dharma* (*dharmābhimāna*), which may then end up as fanaticism, bigotry, and conflict. Be that as it may, his *Reflection* (*Vicāra*) is not simple elucidation of the *Gītā*, but ‘constructive interpretation’.

The *Bhagavadgītā* is said to be the quintessence of *Dharma* as discussed in the *Mahābhārata*. Bhattacharyya’s reflections on the *Gītā* consist of an approach to study the ancient text with a modern mind in order to offer a unifying structure of universal relevance.²⁰ It is in the form of a dialogue between Śrīkrṣṇa and Arjuna where the former is the main speaker and the latter is the listener. But he was not a dumb listener. He raised many questions from human consideration and it is philosophically important to analyse these questions and Śrīkrṣṇa’s answers to these with critical reflection. The text represents a long dialogue between Śrīkrṣṇa and Arjuna. Just before the commencement of the war of *Kurukṣetra* Arjuna, comparing heroism and humanity, was under a mental state of indecision and was grief-stricken and sought the guidance of Śrīkrṣṇa. He said, “I am filled by supreme pity and distress, my body is trembling and the *gāṇḍīva* is slipping from my hands, I am seeing conflicting portents. I do not wish victory; there will be great sin in killing my people.”²¹

The nature of *dharma* even in the sense of duty is also elusive. What is *dharma*, according to one theorist, is *a-dharma*, according to others. We face moral doubt when mutually contradictory features characterize a certain course of action.²² It seems that Bhattacharyya keeps in his mind the inner spirit of Kant and gives a new interpretation of the term *dharma*. Bhattacharyya’s philosophical reflections on the problematic of *dharma* in the *Gītā* present an exposition that leads to universalism

²⁰ Sri Aurobindo speaks of the relevance of the *Gītā* in his interpretative work *Essays on the Gita*. For him, the *Gītā* contains ‘the actual living truth’ in addition to ‘metaphysical form’ and we may find the teaching of the *Gītā* is ‘helpful to the spiritual needs of our present day humanity’. See, Sri Aurobindo’s *Essays on the Gītā*, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1989 (1922), P. 3.

²¹ Minati Kar, *Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna In the Mahābhārata*, Shajpaath, Howrah, 2014, p. 81;

“sīdanti mama gātrānimukhaṃcapariśuṣyati/ vepathuścaśarīre me romaharṣaścajāyate// ... gāṇḍīvaṃstramaṣṭasatehastāttvakacaivaparidahyate/ nacaśaknomyavasthātumbhramatīvaca me manaḥ// ... nimittānicapaśyāmi viparītānikeśava. Na caśreyo’nupaśyāmi hatvāsvajanamā have. // -*Bhagavadgītā*, Verse Nos 1/29-31.

²² For details, one may see Prabal Kumar Sen’s paper titled “Moral Doubts, Moral Dilemmas and Situational Ethics” included in *Mahābhārata Now*, ed. A. Chakrabarti and S. Bandyopadhyaya, Routledge, New Delhi, 2014, Pp. 153-202.

and is markedly different from school-based commentaries on the *Gītā*. This attitude of philosophical reflections of Bhattacharyya on the *Gītā* has some affinity as well as contrasts with the views of Sri Aurobindo and B. N. Seal. Sri Aurobindo said, “I hold it therefore of small importance to extract from the *Gita* its exact metaphysical connotation as it was understood by the men of the time,--- even if that were accurately possible. That is not possible, is shown by the divergence of the original commentaries which have been and are still being written upon it; for they all agree in each disagreeing with all the others, each finds in the *Gita* its own system of metaphysics and trend of religious thought. Nor will even the most painstaking and disinterested scholarship and the most luminous theories of the historical development of Indian philosophy save us from inevitable error.”²³ According to B. N. Seal, “Each commentator accepts those passages of the *Gītā* which support his own preconceived dogma (*siddhānta*) and distorts the meaning of the conflicting passages to harmonize them with his dogma. On the other hand, if one studies the *Gītā* independently, one is hopelessly puzzled at first by internal contradictions of a serious character as well as irrelevancies and meaningless repetitions.”²⁴ There is difference between the two interpretations. Bhattacharyya’s understanding of the *Gītā* differs vastly from the philosophical based commentaries on it. His independent philosophical reflection on the problematic of *Dharma* (Duty) in the *Gītā* gives us a kind of self-evident symbolism that leads to universalism. This attitude of philosophical reflection of Bhattacharyya on the *Gītā* has affinity with B. N. Seal who conceived the main philosophical spirit of the *Gītā* “ not only ... as synthesis, synthetic interpretation, of varied contents of the *Gītā*, but also a synthesis of various schools of interpretation themselves.”²⁵ There is difference between the two interpreters. In Bhattacharyya’s reflections on the *Gītā* the reader will not be acquainted either with any attempt to synthesise the conflicting views on the doctrine of *niṣkāmakarma* or the synthesis of different *yoga*-s, the so-called paths of spirituality, but with pure critical reflection and analysis of the issue of Duty with reference to the first four chapters of the *Gītā*. For him, *sāṃkhya-buddhi* is ‘pure reason’, the theoretical aspect of our way of living and *yoga-buddhi* is the ‘practical

²³Sri Aurobindo’s *Essays on the Gītā*, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1989 (1922).P. 3.

²⁴ B. N. Seal, “The Gītā : A Synthetic Interpretation”, *The Modern review*, Calcutta, July, 1930, p. 1.

²⁵*Ibid*, p. 17.

reason’, the practical aspect of our living and when both are conjoined we have a reflective way of living. When we act without the former, our work is blind and without the latter again, our work is empty. A kind of ‘practical idealism’ may be read in Bhattacharyya’s *Reflections on the Gītā*.

Bhattacharyya considers the *Bhagavadgītā* as the most outstanding treatise on *Dharma* (*utkr̥ṣṭadharmagrantha*) ever produced by the Hindus. By the word *dharma-grantha* we ordinarily mean a book containing *religious* instructions. But a close reading of the essay would show that Bhattacharyya has no concern for such theological understanding of the theme of the *Gītā*. Again, the use of the word ‘Hindus’ does not seem to confine him to the connotations of the term relating to the followers of a faith usually called ‘Hinduism’ today.²⁶ Considering the time of composition of the *Bhagavadgītā*, he, perhaps with all probability, means the culture of the people who inhabited the entire Indian subcontinent. The *Bhagavadgītā* begins with a narration of the movement of armies for the war. Just before the start of Kurukṣetra war Śrīkṛṣṇa gave this advice/instruction to Arjuna after briefly stopping the chariot on a spot in the middle of two armies from where Arjuna could clearly see both the Kaurava army and also the Pāṇḍava army. For Bhattacharyya, the historical contextuality and authenticity of the incident is of little concern in today’s context, since the message of the *Gītā* is universal and beyond all kinds of sectarianism. It is above partisans and one-sided extremes. The profundity of its philosophical instruction on some directive moral principles makes it a unique text. It is precisely for this reason that the overall orientation of the *Gītā* can offer a broadly accommodative optimal common platform for serious discussions on Scriptures and also for deliberations about righteousness (*Dharma*) or religious matters. It is above any kind of ‘doctrinaire-ism’. Later on, there came about various commentaries in consonance with divergent schools of philosophy. However, for each the distinctive feature of the source text is its thematic universality. Since its origination predates different schools of philosophy, the chief concern of the text, according to Bhattacharyya, is not to harmonize the different interpretative traditions or to

²⁶ K. C. Bhattacharyya, “A Definition of Hinduism” included in Kalyankumar Bhattacharyya edited *Prabandha-Saṅkalan* (*Collection of Essays* by K.C. Bhattacharyya), Dey’s Publishing, Kolkata, 2011, pp. 133-141.

synthesise among *karma*, *bhakti* and *jñāna*. Bhattacharyya is interested in working out a conceptual scheme for understanding *Dharma*. No other mundane topic (*prākṛtakathā*) finds place in the *Gītā*. In this context it may be noted that here Śrīkr̥ṣṇa introduces himself as the God-incarnate. But we can examine the inner significance of this claim neither by taking it merely as a good piece of poetic metaphor nor by justifying its factual correctness from a historical perspective. Obviously, the task of working out a conceptual scheme for a comprehensive understanding of it is formidable one.

Bhattacharyya discourages the ritualistic desired action as the moral injunction in order to get heavenly pleasure. Believer of such an action is condemned as a ‘stupid fellow’ or a ‘fool’. Even religion, in the sense of faith, does not mean ‘mere ritualism’. Mere ritualism without spirituality, the apparent meaning of sacrifice (*yajña*) has no appeal to him. An act is called sacrifice (*yajña*) if it is done for the sake of sacrifice, a duty for duty’s sake. The implication of such an action lies in giving up the sense of possession or ego of being the agent of action. And the performance of such an action is possible in our ordinary life. During the crisis in society we see people of ordinary walks of life do such self-less service for the benefit of others. He considers this type of action as a righteous duty of citizens in society. The *Gītā* speaks of correct or right action. Each individual faces the problem of decision making regarding the duty (*kartavya*) in a given situation or context. What does the *Gītā* suggest to address the problem of duty? Instead of suggesting a list of ‘do this and do not do that’ the *Gītā* gives one single clue. It states, ‘the power that pervades the entire cosmos’ is to be worshipped through the sincere performance of one’s duty and this will lead to spiritual competency (*siddhi*).²⁷ The name of all the chapters is suffixed by the word ‘yoga’, the right path. Yoga sometimes means skills or technique or the process leading to the ultimate state and not necessarily ‘to unite’ only as suggested by its etymological meaning derived from the root *yuj*. That is why *jñānayoga*, *karmayogabhaktiyoga* etc. are conceived as complete and independent process of arriving at the goal. We see that the words *dharma* and *yoga*

²⁷Sve-svekarmanyabhirataḥsamsiddhimlabhatenarah/
svakarmanirataḥsiddhimyathavindatitacchūnu.//yataḥpravṛtṛirbhūtānāmyenasarvamidaṁtatam/
svakarmanā tam abhyarcyasiddhimvindatimānavah// -- The *Gītā*, 18/45-46.

have the widest possible meaning in the *Gītā* and it covers our entire life in context ‘duties of social ethics understood at that time’.²⁸

By ‘Dharma’ Bhattacharyya seems to mean ‘Duty’ and the role of ‘practical Reason’ to overcome the apparent paradoxical appearance of it and not necessarily religious faith, though there is no exclusive indication to the exclusion of this sense. Here the reader will be acquainted neither with any attempt to synthesise the conflicting views on the doctrine of *niṣkāma-karma* nor the attempt at synthesis of different *yoga*-s, the so-called paths of spirituality, but with pure critical reflection and analysis of the issue of Duty with reference to the first four chapters of the *Gītā*. The message of the path of action in the *Gītā*, for Bhattacharyya, is both negative and positive. What we ought not to do (*niṣedha*)? – has become our first consideration, and our subsequent consideration is the obligation (*vidhi*): how our work ought to be done. “Do not work with any craving for its fruits” is a statement of prohibition (*niṣedha*) that is given first, and afterwards is given the prescriptive statement (*vidhi*) “Work for the sake of sacrifice.” Thus there are both prohibitive and prescriptive instructions in *Karma-yoga*, the practical path of action. In *Karma-yoga* the work with attachment is prohibited and work without attachment is obligatory (*āśaktipūrvaka karma niṣedha o kartavyakarmevidhi—eiubhayalaiyāniṣkāma karma valāhaiyāche*). Here Bhattacharyya differs from Śāṅkara. For Śāṅkara, though the *Gītā* contains the quintessence of the Vedic teachings, its reading apparently puts before us several puzzling situations and paradoxical ideas. So writing a brief commentary on the *Gītā* by Śāṅkara is motivated by the desire to bring out the implication of issue of *Dharma* in its proper context and appropriate sense of discrimination.²⁹ A kind of synthetic approach of *karma*, *bhakti* and *jñāna*, *asamanvaya* or synthesis with the primacy of *jñāna* may be seen in Śāṅkara’s interpretation. For him, *jñāna*(knowledge) is the ultimate way to *mukti* (liberation). Action and devotion are meant for purification of mind. Rāmānuja also speaks of synthesis of knowledge and action. Tilak differs from both Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja

²⁸ P. T. Raju, *Structural Depths of Indian Thought*, South Asian Publishers: New Delhi, 1985, p.534.

²⁹“ tadidaṅgītāśāstraṁsamastavedārthasāra-saṁgrahabhūtavimdurvijñeyārthaṁ tadarthāviṣkaraṇāyā-nekairvivṛta-padārthavākyaṛthanyāyamaṇyatyaṅta-viruddhānekārthatve laukikairgṛhyamāṇamupalabhyāhaṁviveko’rthanirdhāraṇārthasāṅkṣepatovivaraṇamkarīṣyāmi.”-- Śāṅkara’s *Commentary on the Bhagavadgītā*, ed. WāsudevaLaxmanShastriPaṇisīkar, Delhi, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, 1999, pp. 5—6.

when he says that *karmayoga* is the main tenet in the *Gītā* and the other two are supplementary. Bhattacharyya does not seem to have any such conscious motive. What seems to be important in Bhattacharyya's interpretation is the conversation between Śrīkṛṣṇa and Arjuna and here Bhattacharyya shows us how historicity can be transcended. That is why in the beginning of the *Essay* he says that he is not interested in whether this was a historical happening or whether it was true or false. From the text of the *Essay* by Bhattacharyya, it is clear that he has not simply given the *summary* of the text, the *Bhagavadgītā*, but also seen the text in its *historicity*, transcending the time. To use the phrase of Paul Ricoeur we may call his approach a kind of "distanciation" where the distance between the text and the reader has been bridged by Bhattacharyya and by this kind of interpretation of the *Gītā*, he has made the tradition a living one. It is not at all a merely repetition of the past, but it contains the needed interpretation taking into account the present history, time and tradition. From Bhattacharyya's interpretation of the *Gītā* it is evident that though he inherits the tradition, he claims freedom from the orthodox way of understanding it.

In the introductory part of the essay Bhattacharyya discusses the problem that would arise out of the killing of one's kith and kin and its despair. For Arjuna, the killing of one's kith and kin would end up committing a heinous act of immorality. Śrīkṛṣṇa says that Arjuna's anti-war stance is only an indication of his faint-heartedness (*kṣudramhṛdayadaurbalyam*). But Arjuna has reiterated his decision to refrain from joining the war by saying that he is still in doubt whether there is any genuine point in aspiring a kingdom that is acquired through a blood-bath. Arjuna apprehends the necessary sin that accrues from this killing and he is in a *dilemma* about what he ought to do now. Its answer has been discussed in three parts: (1) *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, (2) *Karma-Yoga*, and (3) *Karma-Yajña*, the first two constitutes the second and the third chapters of the *Bhagavadgītā*. But the manuscripts received by me stops with the introduction of *Karma-Yajña*. If anybody tries to read the intention of the philosopher hinted in the beginning of the *Essay* and follows the development of his philosophical analysis with different possible layers of meaning, it would be evident that the philosophical discussion of *Jñāna-Yoga* (the fourth chapter of the *Gītā*) is contained in the intention of the author (K. C. Bhattacharyya). A careful reading of the essay shows that the author also had the intention to include his philosophical reflections on

Dhyāna-Yoga in this essay. This indicates that his intention was to give a comprehensive philosophical analysis of the main issues of the *Gītā*. But unfortunately the essay remains incomplete (so far as the Bengali manuscript is concerned) for reasons unknown to us. Different sections of this *Essay* by Bhattacharyya are devoted to critical analysis of the different chapters of the *Gītā*. A close reading of this essay may enable the reader to get some clues for a rejoinder to Euro-centric mis-interpretation of the *Gītā* by Hegel and others.³⁰ Max Muller also gave caution and advised for special care regarding the translation of ancient Indian philosophical texts in modern English words.³¹

If we carefully read the introductory portion of the *Essay* it would be evident that Śrīkr̥ṣṇa tries to dispel Arjuna's doubt with his deeply philosophical instruction. In short, what he says is that Arjuna should not have grief, because the nature of the self is imperishable and it is our body that is afflicted by death. It is not desirable for a wise person of stable disposition to lament for any ephemeral thing. This means, if the self itself is perishable like any mundane thing, "...then given the fact that death is inevitable for whatever happens to be born, there is no point in grieving for such inevitability."³² Again, with a view to dispelling Arjuna's apprehensive feeling of guilt supposedly for committing a moral sin, Śrīkr̥ṣṇa advised him steadfastly to stick to his non-negotiable moral responsibilities relative to Arjuna's station in the society as a Kṣatriya. Now "shying away from it would invite heaps of moral indignity and infamy, and would carry with it the liability to bear blame for moral deviancy

³⁰ Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger believe that Indian philosophy is not rational but mystical and spiritual. Hegel understands the term *ātmā* as spirit (*geist*) and misinterpreted the *Gītā*. His antagonistic and disrespectful attitude seems to be rooted in his idea of freedom. Unlike Kant who thought 'freedom' as a normal ability to act in accordance with the Moral Law, Hegel thought that because of fear of his master's punishment a person of slave mentality obeys law. A person is free if he voluntarily does an action as a moral being which requires the existence of a 'reasonable state'. Hegel dogmatically believed that there was lacking of such 'reasonable state' in Indian (oriental) thought and historically only such a maturity of civilization reached in Germany. See, *On the episode of the Mahabharata known by the name Bhagavadgita* by Wilhem von Humboldt, G. W. F. Hegel, (ed. and tr.) Herbert Herring, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1995.

³¹ "Let it not be supposed that a text, three thousand years ago, ... can be translated in the same manner as a book written few years ago in French or German... Modern words are round, ancient words are square, and we may as well hope to solve the quadrature of the circle, as to express adequately the ancient thoughts of the Veda in modern English."—see, Max Müller's *Preface of The Sacred Books of the East*, Oxford University Press, 1910.

³² Tushar K. Sarkar's personal correspondence with Dilipkumar Mohanta.

(*pratyavāya*), both here and in the world hereafter.”³³ It implies that a person of Arjuna’s stature should not stand to lose in any way by living in strict conformity to his specific stationed duty, *svadharmā*. But soon we see that this instruction (*upadeśa*) is not a sufficient condition to dispel Arjuna’s ‘apprehensiveness of having committed a sin’. Śrīkr̥ṣṇa at this point changes the mode of his discourse and switches over to explaining the inner significance of the principles enunciated earlier. He has then discussed the nature of eternality of the self (*Sāṃkhya-buddhi*). We have the awareness of the self not as an ordinary object (*viśaya*) but as ‘practical willing’. When the self is called a non-object (*aviśaya*), it means that it is above all kinds of theoretical cognition. It is not a contingent object which is meant by the Sanskrit term *viśaya*. The status of *viśaya* is *apparent* and sometimes *imagined*. But the true significance of the instruction of *Sāṃkhya-buddhi* cannot be understood unless the instructions regarding the requirement of following one’s *svadharmā* in practice which is called *yoga-buddhi*. Whatever beneficial outcomes accruing from a righteous action there be, all those are covered under ‘the observance of *yoga*’.³⁴ Our awareness of the self as the reality is self-evident. *Sāṃkhya-buddhi* and *yoga-buddhi* are integrally connected. *Yoga*, however, is completely devoid of any desire for fruits that may accrue from performing such act. And from here Arjuna comes to realize that the intellectual ability of discrimination of what is *ultimately real* from what is *apparent* is also the outcome of *karma-yajña*. In other words, *karma* with the spirit of detachment finds its culmination in *jñāna*. The *Gītā* does not teach ‘inaction’ (*akarma*). A state of total inaction is not even possible to think of. It is logically inconceivable, for it is neither desirable nor even possible to remain ‘inactive’ for a single moment. The *Gītā* does not preach ‘desire-less’ action as we see in the inorganic world. We neither can nor remain alive without breathing and eating. It only instructs that there should be absence of attachment for enjoying the fruits of one’s action. In other words, we should work for the welfare of the society and in that way we can sacrifice our selfishness although we do not give up to do our duty. This is called *yoga*, the skilful moral way of doing action. Such an action is glorified by the word *yajña*, sacrifice, according to Bhattacharyya. *Karma-yoga* ends with *karma-*

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

yajña. It would be an act of hypocrisy (*mithyācāra*) to say that a person has desires in mind (*vāsanā*) and there is renunciation of *karma* in him. A person, who sacrifices his *karma-phala*, can act as a trans-moral agent for benefit of others in the society (*lokasaṃgraha*). Even when in the *Īsopniṣad* (v.1) the instruction given to ‘enjoy through giving up (*tyaktena*)’ it means work without attachment is obligatory. An ideal moral agent has to perform duty for its own sake which is shaped by both existential situation and one’s inner *guṇa* (disposition) and *karma* (capability). By doing one’s duty for its own sake one participates in promoting the cause of collective wellbeing and with this the individual wellbeing is also taken care of. So a person can perform his *svadharma* without any *vāsanā* or attachment and this is the significance of saying ‘Duty is for Duty’s sake’. An act is immoral if it is done with selfish motive, and an act is moral if it is done with the spirit of detachment. The notions of *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* are pertinent here. When an act is done with the spirit of detachment for the sake of common good, or for the benefit of humanity, it is known as *nivṛtti* karma. The opposite is the *pravṛtti* karma. But question arises: Whether it is psychologically possible to act with the spirit of detachment? For Bhattacharyya, this is very possible as the common people do perform this type of action. He has narrated some cases (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) in the main body of the essay. It does not teach renunciation of action, but renunciation *in* action. Moral obligation is a necessary condition for any action to be Karma.³⁵ It also involves responsibility for action. The agent of action here must be free to choose. Consideration of *varṇa-dharma* (social duty), and *āśrama-dharma* (stationed duty) is important in the context of choice. “Whenever action, right or wrong, that a man does by his body, mind, and speech, is caused by five factors, namely, the living base (body), the agent, the sense-organs, the movements of vital air and the over-natural factor.”³⁶ Performance of *dharma* in the sense of duty is relative to the concerned individual’s social class and station orientation of life. Bhattacharyya has his own interpretation of *karma* and

³⁵ *Karma* (action) is different from *kriyā* (event). An ‘event’ is caused whereas ‘action’ is willed. We explain an event in terms of causal connection, where as our action is a purposive act on the part of us as agents of action —(translator).

³⁶ The Gita (18/14—15); see, Swami Bhajanananda, *Selfless Work*, Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda University, Belur Math, Howrah, 2006, P. 5

lokasamgraha, which involves spiritual values.³⁷ “The detachment of a *karma-yogi* is based on *Dharma* or morality. Detachment has a spiritual value only for a person who lives a virtuous life. The detachment of an impure and selfish man is only cruel indifference. Secondly, the detachment of a *Karma-yogi* is based on love. He knows that only a person who is detached and stands on his own self can love all people equally.... The *Karma-yogi* constantly practises discrimination between what is to be done and what is not to be done, and between the eternal and the impermanent.”³⁸ In the *Gītā* Bhattacharyya does not see any genuine moral dilemma for Arjuna. A dilemma involves a state of indecision on the part of the agent of action, because he fails to choose between two or more possible alternatives.³⁹ Arjuna suffered existential indecision because he was reflecting on possible consequences of war – defeat or victory. Neither of the consequences was morally palatable to him and he was overtaken by despair.

³⁷ Even we cannot talk of ‘freedom’ in a meaningful way unless we act. When we act without any personal motive in view, it is a state of *karmasannyāsa*. *Vikarma* stands for wrong action— (Translator).

³⁸ Swami Bhajanananda, *Selfless Work*, Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda University, Belur Math, Howrah, 2006, p.53.

³⁹ An interested scholar may undertake a comparative study of the views of B.K. Matilal and Sitansu S. Chakravarti with Bhattacharyya. See, B.K. Matilal (ed.), “Moral Dilemmas” included in *Moral Dilemmas in the Mahabharata*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1989, Pp 1—34 ; Sitansu S. Chakravarti, *Ethics in the Mahabharata*, MunshiramManoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2006.

UNQUINING QUALIA: FROM AN AESTHETIC POINT OF VIEW

ABHISHEK YADAV & RANJAN K PANDA

The woods are lovely, dark and deep, But I have promises to keep, And miles to go before I sleep, And miles to go before I sleep. – Robert Frost, *Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening*

Introduction

What kind of things are *promises*? What about *miles*? What is the ontological status of phenomena denoted by *promises, sake, miles, woods and sleep* and other similar terms that appear in everyday life? They sure exist! People make promises, assure others that they would fulfil them, or *break* promises, cover *miles* to complete a journey, sometimes we too cross a *wood*, like Frost, on our journey, and we take rest *sleeping* for a while or longer hours. Can one give the same ontological status to miles as to roads, woods, and to sleep; or to promises and sake, as we do to cakes? Furthermore, what about one's experiences? When Frost called woods 'lovely, dark or deep,' was he referring to something objective available out there in the woods? The fact that some other individual may not find those same woods lovely or deep, tells us that such responses to a sight are subjective in nature. What causes these verbal, non-verbal, voluntary or non-voluntary instinctual responses is our experience of something out there. In other words, it is through experience that we realise and confirm whatever is given to us. This experience could be subjective, phenomenal or qualitatively different from others' experience. The poet's experience here is therefore unique and phenomenal, in comparison to someone who had possibly travelled through the woods, but never stood by its impressive darkness to share its beauty. This qualitative or phenomenal aspect of experience in technical terms of philosophy of mind is called *qualia*¹.

As qualia have been explained in the literature of Philosophy of Mind, we have the most intimate, immediate and incorrigible access to them and we may also find it hard to report exactly what they are, making them ineffable. Qualia are strictly subjective by definition, and therefore, posit the last line of defence against reductionists' theory of mind, in brief, reductive materialism. There have been different kinds of arguments put forth by different philosophers to bring out the

¹ C.I. Lewis (1929) is credited for the coinage of the word Qualia. It is defined as the plural of the word 'Quale'.

nature of qualia viz. The most important ones are Thomas Nagel (1974), Saul Kripke (1980), Frank Jackson (1982), Joseph Levine (1983) and David Chalmers (1996) among others, to show what is left out by all versions of reductive materialism. The underlying claim of the pro-qualia philosophers is that any theory of (reductive) materialism cannot claim to have explained conscious experiences unless it provides a clear and indisputable account of qualia within its framework. On the other hand, there have been philosophers like Daniel Dennett, Paul Churchland (2004) and David Lewis (2004) who have put forth arguments to show that either the way qualia are defined is self-contradictory or it is accounted for within a strict materialist framework. Daniel Dennett (1988) argues that the way the concept of Qualia has been defined and formulated is irregular and incoherent. He argues that on closer scrutiny, the defining properties of qualia vanish and do not hold grounds. Dennett undertakes the study of qualitative subjective experience in an objective manner, what he calls a heterophenomenological approach. As per the heterophenomenological approach, the qualitative experiences are not denied outrightly but only the subjective authority and therefore, they are subjected to an objective third person analytical treatment. In this schema, the subject has as much authority to describe the experience, as a novelist has on the fiction of his novel. Just like the authority of the novel cannot be said to be absolute, similarly the authority of a subject about his phenomenal experience cannot be claimed to be absolute, according to Dennett.

Metaphorically speaking, we, in this paper, take a *road less travelled by*. We take an aesthetic response approach to attempt to show that phenomenal experiences are subjective and may not be available to a third person objective study. If we take aesthetic categories to be categorically or objectively determined, we would be driving into a version of Plato's idealism. That is to say, we would have to accept some version of the objective available standard of every category, including the aesthetic categories like, beautiful, pleasant so forth and so on. And if we don't, then there is an element of subjectivity that cannot be done away with a third person explanation of aesthetic categories. The main contention of this paper therefore is discussed in five sections, excluding the conclusion. The section after introduction deals with the concept of qualia as it has been discussed in the literature with the help of some examples. The following section deals with the major arguments given by

anti-qualia philosophers to dismantle the qualia and to show its incoherency. The next section thereafter provides an exposition and analysis of the arguments provided by pro-qualia philosophers. The penultimate section of the paper presents the view taken from an aesthetic response point of view, to show how some of the arguments fail to quine qualia.

Qualia and Aesthetic Response

When Robert Frost, the poet, stopped by the woods on a snowy evening, he found woods to be *lovely* (it seemed to him that the sight in front of him was a pleasant one), just like one finds a flower lovely or a scent or a drink. It seemed to him that the woods were dark and the point from where he was observing the woods, they appeared deep to him. All these experiences were known to him *immediately* (he didn't experience this through an intermediary channel), *intrinsically* (his experience was not marred by or based upon some scientific fact) and were also *subjective* and *ineffable*. Although the poet was able to ascribe labels such as 'lovely, dark and deep' to his experiences, the raw-feels/sensations that make up the sight remained indescribable. For, one can call a sight lovely and one can also call a poem lovely, yet his experience of both may be completely different and that description does not express every aspect of what he experienced, or so is the claim of pro-qualia philosophers. These labels such as lovely, beautiful and pleasant are known as aesthetic responses. Aesthetic responses can be understood simply as reactions of an individual to an object based on certain physical characteristics of the object.

Suppose another poet named Robert *Burst* passed by those woods some other day. On the one hand, Frost had found woods to be so *lovely* that he needed to remind himself of the promises he had to keep, on the other hand, when Burst passed by those woods, he found that sight to be *grotesque, despicable and gloomy*. He also experienced all these immediately, intrinsically so on and so forth. His experience of the sight would again be constituted by the raw-feels or the sensations that are defined as qualia. Both of these experiences experienced by two different individuals are constituted of their respective qualia. In a nutshell, qualia are the raw sensations that are an elementary, atomic part of how the world or external reality seems to us, the way we experience it. It can be paraphrased to use the famous phrase of Nagel, that there is *something it is like to* experience something. What we ascribe the

aesthetic categories, like lovely or grotesque, to is more of a large-ish category as opposed to atomic raw feels. One can state that aesthetic responses, on the other hand, arise in response to a collection of raw feels that constitute an experience.

What those raw-feels are, they are, by definitive proposal, available only to the subject of that experience and therefore as a corollary, it can be claimed that there can be no objective account of it. There is no objective way in which one can claim what qualia that scene of the woods generates in two individuals. It is interesting to note that there is also *no objective way* in which one can claim how those woods would seem, aesthetically, to different individuals. Alternatively, if we try to describe what it must be like to someone who happens to walk by those woods, in terms of his qualia, and in terms of an aesthetic response; we can find a parallel. Based on their aesthetic response, we can assume that Frost may wish to visit those woods once again because of what it was like for him to look at them for the first time and Burst may never want to take that road again.

Since these subjective experiences differ from individual to individual, or there is no way possible for these to be compared and contrasted with, they may not precisely correspond to the external objective reality, and this is the reason why *an explanatory gap* is said to arise here.² The way qualia are defined, they create an ontological problem for a reductive materialist because by definition they evade objective scrutiny of any sort. For any materialist, therefore, qualia become a pertinent problem to be tackled. There are some of the ways in which an adherer of materialism can go about in treating the problem; they can either provide a satisfactory physicalist account in a way that shows that qualia are compatible with a strictly material picture, or it could be shown that there is no referent to the way qualia are characterized and defined. Qualia qualified by the distinct characteristics of innateness, infallibility and ineffability carry an intuitive appeal in their favour. However, as we would discuss in the next section, Dennett maintains that these distinctive characteristics are not distinct, and instead, they have muddied the water for what could be the basic theory of subjective experience. We would also look at

² The explanatory gap is between the scientific(objective) and the manifest image (phenomenal) of the world. This distinction was first pointed out by Sellers (1963).

some of the positions that show the irreducibility of the concept. In our defence of qualia, we are proposing an aesthetic basis to argue for the non-reducibility of subjective experiences.

Quining Qualia

Daniel Dennett (1988) has a problem with the way the subjective nature of experience has been treated in the literature in general. Dennett maintains that such a characterization of phenomenal experience is not valid. He proposes a method to approach the subjective phenomenal experience from a third person objective point of view, called heterophenomenology, to understand qualia. According to him, the confusion around the problem of qualia arises from the *pre-theoretical assumptions* that experiences are unique and intrinsic to consciousness. We have not scrutinized the concept properly to be able to shake off those assumptions. Dennett, as he has elsewhere (1995 and 2009) argued that what may feel intuitively right, may not be so; Darwin and Turing are the two important examples of the same. Charles Darwin (1859) advocated biological evolution as opposed to creationism. On a similar note, Alan Turing (1950) conceptualized the possibility of having artificial intelligence which would be at par with human intelligence. Dennett accepted both Darwin and Turing's theoretical positions and further in his attempt to *quine*³ qualia, he tries to show how the basic definitive properties of qualia vanish on closer scrutiny. (1988) For Dennett, qualia are not real things, not in a sense they have been defined by those who argue in favour of qualia. Dennett argues that if one gathers from Nagel (1974, 1986), Block (1978), Shoemaker (1982) and Jackson (1982), qualia are said to have the following properties:

- a) Ineffable: An individual cannot explain precisely the way he or she is experiencing things. There will always be something which is left out in the verbal explanation of one's phenomenal experience.
- b) Intrinsic: Qualia are simple, atomic, unanalysable, homogenous, un-substitutable and cannot be broken further.
- c) Private: Qualia cannot be shared and are limited to the individual whose qualia they are. Therefore, there is no possibility of any kind of interpersonal comparison between the qualia of the two individuals.

³ "Quine, V. to deny resolutely the existence or importance of something real or significant." (Dennett, 1987) the approach Dennett follows in dismantling qualia is *quining*. i.e., he is trying to show by argument that the initial assumptions of what qualia are, lose ground on closer examination.

- d) Directly or immediately comprehensible: They are directly accessible to the individual whose consciousness they are a part of.

Dennett, thus argues that if we scrutinize these descriptive properties defining phenomenal experience closely with the help of some thought experiments, these pre-theoretic intuitions will not hold ground and it can be established that the concept of qualia is as counterintuitive as *elan vital* in Biology. More importantly, he is trying to clarify that qualia as defined in terms of these properties, do not exist. However, he is not arguing that conscious experiences do not have intentional properties. Further, Dennett also maintains that most of the accounts provided by different philosophers on qualia are vastly vague, equivocal and confused. In his attempt to explain qualia, he takes into account the most liberal and the strongest version of the pro-qualia view so that it brings out the strangeness of the concept more clearly. Dennett (1988) considers a number of thought experiments (intuition pumps) for debunking these properties of qualia, and we would discuss a few important ones here:

- i) The Neurosurgical Prank: The inverted spectrum case is one of the very famous examples used by pro-qualia philosophers to show that qualia are innate and no interpersonal comparison between the qualia of two individuals is possible. The inverted spectrum case can be described with the help of the following example; suppose there is an individual Ramesh, who when sees an object that he calls yellow feels as another individual Suresh feels when he sees another object what he calls green, and vice versa. So, when both of them are standing together and see something that both of them call yellow, Ramesh is experiencing what Suresh would have if both of them were looking at what they call green. Since they use the same name for that subjective experience, there is no way that they can ever compare what they experience differently. This is called the inverted spectrum qualia case, and it shows how qualia are subjective and innate. This argument was explicitly used by Shoemaker (1982) to explain the innateness and subjectivity of qualia.

Dennett considers the following thought experiment as a response to the inverted qualia argument. Dennett elucidates with an example in which an evil scientist rewires a person X's brain in such a manner that X sees the sky as red, grass and leaves as yellow. So what X is said to be experiencing

is a case of a shift in qualia. Given the innate nature of qualia, this shift can and should be accessible only to X. Now, if X, who has been pranked by this evil scientist, tries to understand what has happened to him, Dennett argues that there are at least two ways in which X can understand and explain this shift in his experience, however, both of these explanations will lead us to two different conclusions?

- a) What that evil scientist has done to prank X is to change the neural channels in the optic nerve, and as a result, the neural events downstream are of the opposite values than their regular and normal one.
- b) Or that evil scientist has left the visual system intact as it was and has inverted memory access links and therefore the visual system of X is sending the same signals as it was doing earlier, but that does not match with what X remembers about how grass and sky looked.

Dennett argues that since the subject of this prank X can never of his/her own figure out what actually has happened to cause this perceived shift in his qualia. As it is clear that there can be more than one plausible explanation for the same, hence if the subject wants to ascertain the reason for this shift in qualia, he will have to take help from another (morally good) scientist to help him understand whether the shift is due to a) or b). In other words, no amount of introspection on part of X (from the vantage point of X's first-person subject) can help him ascertain the reason for the shift in his qualia. This, according to Dennett, shows that qualia are not private or innate and therefore refutes the properties of being privately, immediately accessible.

- ii) The Coffee Tasters: Dennett considers another thought experiment where there are two coffee tasters, let's call them P and Q, who are employed in a coffee company and their job is to ensure that the taste of the coffee remains the same throughout. So, they come in every day for work and taste the coffee from the latest batch to make sure it tastes the same as it did the day before or the day before that, going back to when they joined the company. One day when they come in for work, P says in confidence to Q that even though the taste of the coffee is the same as it has been throughout their period of work in the company, however, he (P) thinks that his tastes have

changed and as a result of that change he no longer likes the taste of the coffee. Hearing that P has confessed to him, Q says to P that he (Q) thinks that although his tastes have remained the same and also the taste of the coffee is also the same as it was when they had joined. However, there is something that has happened with his taste receptors, and therefore he (Q) finds the taste of coffee to be bad or unpleasant. At this point, if we look at this coffee tasting scenario, we know that both P and Q no longer like the taste of the coffee and they believe that the taste of the coffee has been the same as it was when they had started working for this coffee company. According to Dennett, P and Q both appeal to their memory when they claim that the taste of the coffee has remained the same. (and also, their job description on a daily basis requires them to appeal to their memory to make sure that the taste of the coffee is the same.)

Following this thought experiment, Dennett further raises a question, whether either of them can be said to be wrong in their conclusions? As per P, his preferences have changed, and hence he doesn't like the coffee anymore and as per Q, his taste receptors have some issue causing him to dislike the coffee. If the answer to the question raised above is affirmative, that is, one considers that P or Q could be wrong to draw the conclusion that they have, then that would undermine the basic conditions of qualia such as it is immediate, privileged, incorrigible and directly known. If qualia are any of these things, then P or Q could never be wrong. However, following their conversation, one would infer that either one or both of them may be wrong. Therefore, Dennett claims that the way qualia have been defined is inconsistent.

The inconsistency arises because, since P doesn't like the taste anymore and he claims that the taste of the coffee has remained the same and his preferences have changed, then one of the following things happened with him:

- a) P's analysis is actually right and his qualia have been the same as they were, but what has changed is his preferences and reactions. As a result, he doesn't like the taste of the coffee anymore despite the taste being the same as it was before.
- b) Or it is also a possibility that P is mistaken about his qualia being the same. What has happened is that his qualia have changed over a period of time at a very slow pace.
- c) Or it is also possible that P has undergone both (a) and (b)

Dennett argues that if qualia were directly known, immediate and privileged, then P could just introspect to know for sure what has happened to him. And it is clear that if P is asked to differentiate between (a) and (b), it would not be possible for him to make out the difference. Similarly, in case of Q, as he reports that his taste receptors have undergone changes, so either of the following could be the case for him:

- a) Q is right about the shift in his qualia
- b) Or it is possible that his preferences have shifted without him realizing.
- c) Or he is not able to remember correctly how coffee tasted to him earlier.
- d) Or a combination of all (a) (b) and (c).

What Dennett is trying to show here with these and some other similar thought experiments is that if qualia were to be included in our ontology, they ought to have some stable, distinguishable and identifiable properties. As philosophers in favour for qualia argue them to be ineffable, intrinsic, private, atomic and directly and immediately accessible by the individual in his phenomenal experience of them, Dennett argues that these thought experiments show that these properties are neither stable description of them nor do they make qualia distinguishable. In addition to the above viewpoint there is no such thing that fits the description provided by the philosophers who argue in favour of qualia. Hence, the materialists and reductionists accounts do not leave out anything in their explanation of mind or consciousness. In other words, there is nothing in the consciousness which is unexplainable in physical terms. With the explanation of qualia in neuropsychological or heterophenomenological terms nothing remains intrinsic to consciousness. Dennett challenges the pro-qualia thesis stating what else could be included in consciousness? He draws an analogy claiming that an astrophysicist cannot be blamed for being not able to provide a theory of *ether* because there is no such thing in the first place. So, also the notion of qualia as described by the pro-qualia theorists, for Dennett, does not exist. In corroboration with this argument, it is suggested that before the invention of modern medical sciences, the common assumption for the cause of sickness and illness was considered to be demons and magic, and now it is viruses and bacteria. In this regard, medical sciences cannot be blamed for not having to account for those pre

theoretic intuitions. Thus, internal experience or how things seem to us are not qualia in the sense it has been defined by those who argue for it, as Dennett writes,

the simple reason that one's epistemic relation to them [internal experience] is exactly the same as one's epistemic relation to such external, but readily – if fallibly – detectable properties as room temperature and weight... the idea that one should consult an outside expert, and perform elaborate behavioural tests on oneself in order to confirm what qualia one had, surely takes us too far away from our original idea of qualia as properties with which we have a particularly intimate acquaintance. (Dennett 1988, 396)

For Dennett, if qualia are to be anything, they must be a third person, public, intersubjectively verifiable phenomena. Qualia are heterophenomenological objects and scientifically observable. As it is clearly the case that tastes are subjective to external factors and are not intrinsic. In Dennett's narrative, no one would drink beer a second time if he *finds* its taste to be the same as when that person tried it for the first time. Beer still tastes the same however, the person likes it more. Same can be said about a lot of different tastes, which are also called acquired tastes, like dark chocolate, black coffee, green tea and so on and so forth. There are rare cases where anyone likes these tastes the first time, they try them. The argument basically suggests that if the qualia of an individual are same and not dependent on external factors, then every time a person tries them, he should feel the way he felt the first time and since it is not the case as we know people as an empirical fact that they start liking things after having tried it enough number of times therefore Dennett draws the conclusion that the taste of things must be dependent on the extrinsic factors. However, one could point out that if the taste was entirely dependent on extrinsic factors, then it should be the same for everyone tasting that.

Why Qualia cannot be quined?⁴

The anti-reductionists like Nagel (1974), Jackson (1982) and Chalmers (1996) maintain that there is something about consciousness that cannot be reduced to a strict physical explanation and cannot be accounted for using heterophenomenology. That *something* which evades physical explanations, according to these philosophers, is the subjective aspect, often dubbed also as the 'hard problem of consciousness'.(Chalmers 1996) Subjectivity provides an ontological ground to

⁴ The name of this section is borrowed from Pradhan (2002).

qualia. The reductionists, like Dennett, not only have charged qualia but also have nullified the ontological status of subjectivity.

Thomas Nagel has aptly brought this notion of subjectivity as an irreducible feature of reality in his seminal paper “What is it like to be a bat?” (1974). So far as human experience is concerned, the notion of what *it is like to be* an experience, for Nagel, exposes the poverty of conceptual apparatus necessary for understanding the phenomenal property of conscious experience from an objective, third person point of view. Nagel conceptualizes his thesis of irreducible subjectivity by illustrating an example of the experience of bats. A bat has its own way of experiencing the world which constitutes the lifeworld of the bat. Hence, it is hard to imagine the way a bat flies and navigates in the darkness of the night. The physical mechanism of the bat can at best give an objective functional mechanism of explaining its movement, but that is not sufficient to explain its subjective experience. Given the evolutionary history of human beings we *cannot* experience life the way bats do. So, to imagine or conceive what it is like to be a bat will be a perspective of human experience of a bat, but not identical with it. Thus, it lacks objectivity in its explanation. To use another example, we can imagine *what it would be like* if we could fly, yet we cannot imagine *what it is like* for birds to fly. A subjective experience, according to Nagel, is always about being in a state of *what it is like to be* in that state of experience.

Nagel (1986) reiterates the notion of subjectivity showing that most of human knowledge is from a certain point of view. This is often termed as first-person point of view in juxtaposition to the third person point of view that the thesis of quining qualia brings forth. The Nagelian framework highlights the first-person subjective experiences as the constitutive factor for common knowledge, but if neglected and forced by reducing it to a third person account detached from any point of view then it might lead to false reduction and forced generalization. (Nagel 1986, 18) Hence, Nagel rejects the very idea of quining qualia. Nevertheless, this thesis does not deny the notion of objectivity, rather only claims to show that even in the case of scientific objectivity there is room for subjectivity which systematically provides ground for objective knowledge. Insisting on deconstructing subjectivity in the name of objective scientific inquiry might erode the very foundation of knowledge where we may travel far from the starting point, but that may never be adequate. Nagel’s proposal could be

elucidated by following an example; it is a common knowledge among school children that the earth is spherical and its pictures that are seen in the atlas taken from outer space/artificial satellites seems to confirm that. But a student studying geography at the advanced level may immediately confirm that in reality, the shape of the earth is an irregularly shaped ellipsoid because it is flattened at the poles and bulges at the equator. This is true for almost all the celestial bodies that we study that none of them have a perfect spherical shape. This example so far simply shows the objective knowledge for different groups may vary, given their understanding of *concepts* concerning the study of the earth. It could be further emphasized that to map the places on earth on a three-dimensional globe, we shift a little bit from *what is the case*, that is, in actuality the globe does not represent the earth as it *is*. Rather the globe is an indicator but to refer to the real point we need to take into account several other factors concerning the earth which provides an objective knowledge about a place. This objective knowledge could be used while launching a missile or a satellite. When we compare this notion of objectivity concerning direction and locality determined by the migratory birds; they will have their way of measuring the direction for their safe travelling. In the case of migratory birds, the distance covered between two localities on the earth is objective from the birds' point of view. On the contrary, a map is a forcefully generalized objective representation of the earth from a human subjective point of view.

While advancing the argument of subjective knowledge, one can relate it to Frank Jackson's knowledge argument that does not completely disregard qualia as an epiphenomenon. Jackson's thought experiment is worth mentioning to illustrate the possibility of conceptualising subjective knowledge from a physicalist point of view. (1982, 130) In this thought experiment, Mary, a brilliant scientist, has been confined in a space where everything is black and white and also viewed through a black and white monitor. Since Mary specialises in neurophysiology of vision, she has all possible knowledge about colours in the physicalist terms. For instance, she knows the neurophysiological processes that she undergoes when a certain wavelength of light would enter into the retina and the signals it would send to the brain through which she determines the colour. However, Jackson postulates that Mary herself has never experienced any coloured object as most of us do in our everyday lives. The

conclusion of the thought experiment poses a question about the scenario where Mary comes out of her confined space and sees something coloured for the first time, will she have gained new knowledge? Intuitively, one feels that she would, in fact, learn something new when she gets to see the coloured object for the first time. In other words, this thought experiment can be presented as a case where a visually challenged person is being explained everything that is there about colours. She learns every scientific, objective, material fact about colours and then she gets her eyesight back, would she learn something new?

Strengthening the Negelean perspective of subjectivity and subjective experience, it could be said that Jackson's thought experiment favours that whenever Mary comes out from her closed chamber, she would experience and learn something new. On the other hand, Dennett (1988) argues that Jackson's Mary thought experiment fails to give a scientific explanation possible rather it commits a fallacy of circularity. We cannot appeal to mere intuition about something to prove what we believe because our intuition already flows from our belief. To say that objective facts can capture all the aspects of consciousness, we should be a bit careful about what may intuitively feel right. Dennett maintains that Mary will not learn anything new when she comes out of her confined space if she *really and truly* knows everything there is to know about colours. Dennett responds stating that heterophenomenology can better explain any colour sensibility or qualia and nothing new can be learnt from the perception of a coloured object. For instance, Robomary, a robot, if filled with all the material and objective knowledge about colours, and if a screen is placed in front of its light receptors; this screen makes Robomary receive only black and white light, however when that screen is lifted it would receive the light of all colours. But, that would not, in any case, increase the information that Robomary already has.

Justifying the above theoretical position concerning the absence of any new knowledge for Mary as well as Robomary, David Lewis (1988) mentions that knowledge can be looked at in two different lights, *knowledge that* and *knowledge how*. The illustration of these two viewpoints about knowledge shows that *knowledge that* is about information, whereas *knowledge how* represents a case of ability. According to Lewis, Mary would not learn any new information or acquire a new knowledge; rather she would acquire the ability to recognize the colour. So, this

thought experiment does not, according to Lewis, pose any challenge to physicalism. This is evident in Jackson's thesis that Mary *knows everything* about colour. To say that Mary knows everything about colour, what extra or new could be added! Dennett in one of his recent writings also highlights the puzzle of *knowing everything*. rather, he wonders about the very possibility of knowing everything. (2013, 348). It is needless to say that Dennett's heterophenomenological explanation will be in conformity with Lewis's ability hypothesis.

David Chalmers invokes a thought experiment of philosophical zombies against Dennett's heterophenomenology. He argues that there is a logical possibility of physical twins of human beings who do not have a phenomenal experience, yet they are indistinguishable on the basis of their physical form and activity. In this regard, Chalmer's thought experiment also responds to Lewis' ability hypothesis. For Chalmers (1996), if qualia are to be captured in a physical or material explanation, there must be another fundamental property (like space and time) that captures these or these phenomenal properties themselves could be the basic physical properties and hence not explainable in terms of other physical properties. Chalmers also invokes the inverted qualia thought experiment proposed by Shoemaker (1982) and argues that even in the case of inverted spectrum; it is not possible to draw an intersubjective comparison. Hence, reductive theories fail at capturing the hard problem of consciousness⁵.

The notion of qualia or phenomenal experience is central to the discourse of hard problems of consciousness. Chalmers believes that it is *hard* to explain the phenomenal or the subjective element of consciousness with the physical explanation. Consciousness is entirely irreducible to the neurophysiological process of the brain which is favourably explained by heterophenomenology. However, the irreducible subjective character/property of the experience remains a concern for the physicalists' theory of mind. The non-reductive account of the phenomenal consciousness shows that conscious subjective experiences are ineffable but not *private* in the

⁵ Tye (2006) holds a view that one can uphold qualia realism without having to adhere to either the inverted spectrum problem or the absent qualia argument. Absent qualia argument is propounded by Block (1978) in his attempt to show how a functionalist account may fail to account for the qualitative experience.

Wittgensteinian sense. (Pradhan, 2002). Subjective experience can still be a part of interpersonal communication and therefore, not private in terms of ineffability.⁶ The reason why reductive accounts of qualia feel intuitively incoherent comes from the aesthetic response that different people (may) have different responses for the same objectively available stimulant. To deny the subjectivity of phenomenal experience would amount to the denial of the aesthetic categories such as appreciation of beauty. A reductive theory needs to explain why a physical pattern of vibrations in the air (music) or a trail of differential reflections from a surface made of material atoms (a painting) would generate different responses in two human beings whose material brain is composed of the same proteins and tissues. Thus, the heterophenomenological explanation based on the brain function will not be adequate to explain qualia. Qualia is indubitably a subjective phenomenal experience. Being subjective is intrinsic to the person's consciousness. This intrinsic relation is not devoid of intentionality. The qualia theorists maintain the view that phenomenal experience per se is formed by the intentional feature of the consciousness, contrary to this view the physicalists like Dennett, as we have discussed, uphold those qualia as non-intentional, non-intrinsic features of consciousness. It is nothing more than the function of brain processes. Hence, the physicalists' argument to quine qualia does not accept the phenomenal content of consciousness. Dennett in this connection relies on a heterophenomenological explanation of qualia. Hence, quining qualia has been a popular slogan for the reductionists.

Un-quining Qualia

The non-reductionist philosophers of mind certainly express their strong resentment against the reductionist notion of explaining qualia from the objective third person account. Qualia being intrinsic to experiences has first person accessibility which implies *what it is like* to have an experience. (Langsam 2000, 270) The experience is about a subjective feeling and here in our discussion Robert Frost, the poet, knows *what he feels like* while passing through the woods. It is therefore obvious that Frost knows or is aware of *what it feels like* to him. The content of this experiential state of the Poet is only disclosed to us when he says that 'the woods are

⁶ There are other works like Levine (1983), Searle (1992) where one can find arguments in favour of qualitative character of experience.

lovely, dark and deep'. This lovely experience of Frost could be characterized as intentional as he finds the experience enjoyable. The intentional characterization here shows his involvement in the perceptual experience of the woods and narrating its beauty to us.

However, one might say that the 'experiential content' is different from the 'the content of thought', as maintained by Langsam (2000, 273) The content of thought is about what could be shared by the experiencer that comes out as his judgment or understanding about the given experience. For us the relationship between the act of experiencing and having a thought concerning the experience is intentional because there are no two different forms of intentionality. Rather, intentionality of consciousness has a unifying feature. While explaining the structure of experience, John Searle (1992) refers to a dozen structural features, and the feature of unity is one among them. Consciousness has a characteristic feature that unifies the experience horizontally and vertically. The horizontal unification refers to organization of experience over a period of time, whereas the vertical unification signifies experiencing multiple things simultaneously. (1992, 130) Certain experiences are gathered eventually, meaning thereby that they do not remain in the forms of bits and pieces, rather are unified so far as their association with the self is concerned. Frost's experience of the woods might have resulted from his experience of walking and his general attitude towards nature. Burst may not have that attitude at all and he might find the woods disgusting. The point here is experiences are essentially related to the self, whether it is a disgusting experience concerning the walking on a forest side, or a beautiful one as Frost describes. It only suggests in the discourse of qualia that the subjectivity of experience is something unique.

Dennett has shown in his various thought experiments that the concept of qualia is vague mainly the way it has been defined and known. He calls qualia as an *elan vital* to the philosophy of mind. (Dennett 1988) The vagueness of the explanation of qualia lies in its mode of accessing through introspection as well as the person's infallible claim about having phenomenal experience. It is often found that the person might pretend to have some experience, but assume here that Frost is not pretending, rather genuinely believing what he experiences while walking by the woods as he tells us there are miles to walk. Even if his words are taken literally, it

only justifies his pleasant experience of being there on the sight of the woods. Thus, qualia are known to us immediately and directly, and we would like to show this with the help of the following arguments.

As we have discussed two cases of poet Frost and another person named Burst, they both had different experiences when they passed by the woods. The woods out there in both the cases are one and the same. Moreover, for the sake of the argument, let us consider that both individuals, though passed the woods on different days, happened to be at the same point at the same time of the day. To put it differently, both of those individuals were at point X in front of the woods at 6:00 PM on Tuesday and Wednesday respectively. Let us further consider that the sunlight, the wind speed and other factors that affect light are exactly the same on both the days. Given these physically measurable and calculatable factors were exactly the same on both the days, so the light falling on the eyes of both the spectators should have the same effect, at least the physical effect.

However, we know this as an empirical fact that two individuals can have a different aesthetic response to the same stimulus; therefore, one can argue that there must be something subjectively different in the experience of both the individuals. John Hyman (2002) argues in similar lines in his defence about the aesthetic categories, if beauty was a result of something out there in the world, then it could be proved by a mathematical theorem. But this is not the case, as one could claim in the same breath that Frost finds the sight of woods to be lovely because of its darkness and that Burst finds woods to be grotesque because of its darkness, and it would not be self-contradictory. The reason for this lies in the fact that any such reason is not a conclusive proof. As Hyman writes, "...root of beauty lies in an individual person's sensibility, and hence that beauty is relative [subjective] to every individual." (2002, 89) A person experiences beauty and shares these experiences for making others feel *what it is like*. The fulfilment of experience not only lies in experiencing something but also in sharing it.

Going back to the coffee taster example presented by Dennett, one could argue that even if the coffee tasters are not able to figure out by introspection why they no longer like the taste, they are sure about how coffee is tasting to them, so one

could see a distinction between ‘how’ and ‘why’ of subjective experience also reiterates Searle’s treatment of the phenomenal experience. Searle (1992, 1997) argues that any attempt to understand the phenomenal experience from a strictly objective third-person point of view may at best be seen as a category mistake. This category mistake is a result of the confusion about how one understands the subjective-objective distinction⁷. According to Searle, there are two ways one can draw the subjective-objective distinction, one is *epistemic*, and the other is *ontological*. (Searle 1997, 122) What Dennett was able to show with the help of his proposed thought experiments, is that phenomenal experiences may not be subjective in the *epistemic* sense, and what we have tried to show through our analysis of aesthetic response theory is that qualia are subjective in the *ontological* sense. The ontology of qualia is associated with the ontology of experience. To deny the subjectivity of experience and more importantly the uniqueness of that subjective experience, is to strongly reject the aesthetic thoughts and experiences.

Searle explains that if a knowledge claim cannot be settled without taking a third-person point of view, then it is objective in the *epistemic* sense, and if it can be, then it is subjective. In cases where an experience or an entity needs a subject for its existence then it is subjective in the ontological sense, if the existence is not contingent upon any subject, then it is objective in the ontological sense. So, when X and Y failed to settle the fact by introspection, *why they no longer like the taste of the coffee*; it showed that this is an objective fact in the epistemic sense because in any case they need outside help to arrive at the actual reason. And at the same time, their subjective experience that *they no longer like the taste of the coffee* (or the fact that they no longer like the way the coffee tastes to them) is a subjective fact in the ontological sense.

The subjective experience, so far as accessibility conditions are concerned, signifies an epistemic relation. In other words, it is about the experience of experiential content. For Frost, this is an epistemic expression about the beauty of a snowy evening in the woods. This is not about how the world appears to a person,

⁷ The idea of category mistake was originally proposed by Gilbert Ryle (1949) as a critique of Descartes’ mind-body dualism.

instead how one *understands* or interprets the given situation. Here, the notion of understanding is about understanding the content of experience, which is necessarily *lovely* for the poet. The irreducibility thesis of qualia here not only emphasizes on the epistemic relation but also points out that it is an objective fact about human life. Searle (1992) emphatically suggests that this subjectivity is an objective fact. However, for him, the objectivity of experience is conditioned by irreducibly subjective intentionality. Since intentionality is an evolutionary feature and functionally depends on the brain processes, one might question whether such a view on the intentionality of experience is compatible with Dennett's quining qualia. There is a direct incompatibility so far as the irreducibility thesis is concerned, but when it comes to naturalist's metaphysics of qualia, then both Searle and Dennett believe in one ontology that is the ontology of the brain or the matter. This is a limitation in Searle's thesis. (Searle 1983, 1992 and Dennett 1969) However, the most important point of study in this context is how qualia remain an irreducible first-person experience.

No doubt, Searle remains an anti-reductionist while suggesting that intentional subjective experiences are qualitatively different from person to person. Similarly, Pradhan's argument against quining qualia does not confine to the naturalistic consideration, rather it goes beyond and argues in favour of metaphysics of consciousness in the line with Kant and Husserl. Consciousness, which is the basis of all kinds of experiences, is transcendental. The transcendental thesis maintains a non-causal account of experience. Since we are arguing in favour of unquining qualia, the irreducibility thesis strengthens our viewpoint and also helps in explicating the inadequacy that Pradhan's thesis encounters. Hence, we will try to expound his thesis a little further with reference to the notion of experience and understanding which has some Kantian implications.

Frost's expressions such as 'lovely woods', and 'the darkness in the woods' are expressions of qualia, so is the case with 'coffee tasters'. All experiences such as these are experiences concerning qualia. These experiences are expressed sometimes in a negative manner, for instance, the coffee taster does not like the tastes of the coffee. Rather the coffee taster gives his judgement about the quality of coffee served. Here it is a case of aesthetic judgement. The epistemic content is much more explicit

if it comes in the form of a judgement that discloses the knower's understanding explicitly. Similarly praising beauty explicitly has epistemic content. In these cases, the act of description is not fictional, rather involves descriptions that *actually* match with the reality that is experienced. It is a matter of accuracy based on expertise – that is the ability to interpret how something is the case. That is about the ability to evaluate the *purposiveness* of the object of experience. Immanuel Kant, while explaining the nature of aesthetic judgement, tries to show that aesthetic taste also has a purpose. Beauty is defined as a form of purposiveness and that is mostly judged on the basis of how it is being presented. (Korner 1955, 184) The presentation is about the given and how the given is being experienced and shared in the form of representation. The representation is about *seeing as*. There is a sense of subjectivity associated with the representation. There could be some difference between the way things are and how they are being experienced. The challenges lie in minimizing this difference so far as accuracy is concerned, because all seeing must aspire for *seeing as it is*.

However, the qualitative nature of these expressions has aesthetic significance; they are *responses to* aesthetic experience. They are not ordinary perceptual experiences. No doubt they could make qualia which are non-aesthetic. For instance, the suffering of poverty for a person of a poor background would differ from the experience of someone who has suddenly been bankrupted. The qualitative nature of experience is thus about how one undergoes an experience and feels about it. The feeling is not merely an appearance, rather it is shared in the form of an evaluative judgement. Frost's experience of beauty on a snowy evening in the woods is not only about feeling good, but it also reminds him about his commitment in life. Hence, he responds by showing the difference between what is given and how one has to look beyond the given. There is an epistemic element to aesthetic expressions that is expressed when the subject feels 'it is good or lovely'. The expression of this feeling is not to ascribe any property. Love is not a property - in naturalistic terms as beauty is not a property.

Similarly, the expression 'miles to go' shows how symbolically these expressions are used and refer to 'a way of looking' or as Ludwig Wittgenstein calls '*seeing things as something*'. To say it is symbolic, in Kantian terminology, is to refer

to ‘a mode of seeing and grasping the aesthetic content of aesthetic experience that is based on the aesthetic intention of the perceiver.’ (Roy 1991, 36) The intentionality of the experience constitutes the ‘presence of a being’ and how it is disclosed to the subject – the experiencer – in the way of living in the presence of the experiential object. Seeking an ontology for phenomenal experience may refer to the subjectivity that is very much part of one’s way ‘looking at things which is about a pre-predicative *looking as*’ (Roy 1991, 42) By saying this, it does not imply that it is non-cognitive, rather in Kantian terminology this is about aesthetic awareness that involves an interplay of imagination and understanding. When the poet expresses his experience, he is sharing it. It is because, ‘being beautiful concerns the sharable or public features of aesthetic experience.’ (Korner 1955, 184) Sharing is an important part of human subjective experience. The objectivity question follows from the notion of sharing and communication. In our day-to-day life as well, one can find instances where people can be sure about what seems pleasant, lovely or delicious to them without being able to provide a reason for why it is so. So, it is not just that the thought experiments, which describe in-principle the possibility of a situation, where the irreducibility thesis of subjective qualitative experience can be upheld; it can also be shown by theorizing the examples that are available to us, in practice.

Conclusion

To conclude, we can see how Dennett using his ingenious thought experiments tries to show that an individual who is claimed to be the authority on his or her own subjective qualitative experience fails to decipher on his or her own whether his or her qualia receptors or neural connections have been changed. This brings into question the immediacy and direct accessibility characteristics/properties of qualia. Dennett argues from this that the pre-theoretic intuitions cloud the concept of qualia, and if they are correctly scrutinised, most of them disappear. We have also seen some of the significant arguments provided by philosophers who argue for non-reducibility of the subjective qualitative experience into the strict physicalist account.

Based on the thought experiment proposed by Dennett, we added a few more scenarios. We try to show with reference to Searle, that there can be two ways to look at the subjective qualitative experience, one could be about *why* one is experiencing what he is experiencing and the other is about *how* one is experiencing, and we

concluded that the subjective aspect is more concerned with the latter. The subjectivity of experience is central to the discourse of qualia having a content that has epistemic, aesthetic and moral significance. The causal explanation of the content in terms of certain artificial or biological mechanisms will not only *explain away qualia* but also will deny the presence of self and its subjectivity. The scientific explanation of subjective tastes, likeness and dislikes, pleasure, etc. in terms of neural and other bodily functions and dispositions will indeed disclose the complex constitutive elements of human organisms. But whether it will be able to explain human subjectivity, the ability of imagination and understanding, is difficult to conclude at this point. However, Dennett's thesis tries to highlight the significance of physicalists' approach having an objective explanation of qualia. This is a method of objectification of the epistemic-aesthetic and moral content of qualia.

However, some of the important philosophical explanations of human consciousness, creativity concerning aesthetic taste and judgment shows that human consciousness transcends the realm of the given. Transcending the intentionality of consciousness shows a newer dimension of creativity that is imagined and expressed to communicate and the qualia is shared in the language of everyday life. In this context, there is a need to explain the structure of conscious experience while referring to the notion of *presentation* and *representation*. While addressing the problem of qualia, this also leads us to the question how the representationalists' thesis of experience constitutes and explains experience or phenomenal consciousness; however, this remains beyond the analytical scope of the current paper. Our central argument in conclusion is that even if the thesis of incorrigibility of qualia is disproved by Dennett, it does not weaken the thesis of qualia being strictly subjective.

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THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AESTHETICS AND ETHICS: AN APPRAISAL

SABITA SAMANTA & SAPTAPARNI SARKAR

The inter-relation between aesthetics and ethics is a persistent issue which has long been an object of scholarly debate. The very notion of beauty and morality has acquired new meanings, specific uses due to ongoing societal shifts. With a careful consideration of these new dimensions, this article is concerned primarily to outline the spheres where the unbound inventiveness of our aesthetic notion and rigorous regularity of our moral response meet, from an analytic perspective. There are significant connections between Aesthetics and ethics. With increased focus on its general philosophical underpinnings, it has come to be seen that this issue is not only as significant within the sphere of aesthetics and ethics but indeed also relevant to contemporary discussions in other related areas. The idea that a full understanding of aesthetics and ethics as two branches of study, is becoming increasingly widely accepted and that's why in the first section the author(s) are intended to clarify these concepts first. The connection between aesthetics and morality, the role of aesthetics in shaping and supporting human moral values has been emphasized by the philosophers. In this contribution, the views of some Western and Indian philosophers on the moral responsibility of art as an aesthetic endeavour is explored minutely. In a way of conclusion, it is subtly examined that how the feelings of disinterested pleasure and universality is initiated by Aesthetics. These two notions exhibit the central ideology of morality and by lucidly exhibiting these concepts Aesthetics becomes an inextricable part of morality.

I

Aesthetics and Ethics: A Subtle Analysis

The word "Aesthetics" found its origin from the Greek word 'aisthetikos' which indicates the inter-connection between the object and the sense organs. Alexander Baumgarten first used the word 'Aesthetics' in his *Philosophical Meditations on Some Requirements of the Poem* to illustrate the sensory perception, although eventually this word was attached to our sensation of beauty. Aesthetics is generally defined as 'the philosophical study of beauty and good taste'. As one of the branches of philosophy Aesthetics is concerned with the nature and appreciation of

art and also with the concepts which are used to interpret and evaluate the individual work of art. But it should be noted here that the scope of Aesthetics is broader than the philosophy of art. Sometimes Aesthetics is also defined as “critical reflection on art, culture and nature”. Art manifests itself as an inevitable consequence, when the endless beauty of the external world catalyses our aesthetic consciousness.

Aesthetics as separate field of study has been developed in 18th century Germany, though there was considerable evidence that Ancient Greek and Indian philosophers also undoubtedly contributed to the development of the traditions of Aesthetics. In the ancient Greek philosophical tradition, Epicurus, the famous Greek philosopher, explained Aesthetics as “highly developed quality of senses which enables a person to be informed by the “good life” through the intelligent enjoyment of physical, moral and spiritual beauty”. Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle have contributed a lot in the field of Aesthetics and surprisingly we see that what issues and problems regarding Aesthetics raised by these two prominent philosophers are also discussed even today.

Similarly, there is also a very rich tradition of Eastern Aesthetics, where art and everyday life have been inseparably intertwined. Ancient India was highly advanced in all spheres of life - in Philosophy, Ethics, and Aesthetics etc. The development of Art and Aesthetics has been reached to the high level of sophistication in ancient India. The *Natyashastra* of *Bharat*, written in the sixth century AD, as acknowledged by many people as *Pancama Veda*, occupies central position in the field of art. The main content of this Treatise is the theory of *Rasas*. Nine kinds of *Rasa* are explained here. These are *Śṛṅgāra* (beauty, eroticism), *Hāsya* (comic), *Karūṇa* (pathos), *Raudra* (anger), *Bībhatsa* (disgust), *Adbhuta* (marvelous, awe, inspiring), *Bhayānaka* (terrible, odious), *Vīra* (heroic), and *Shānta* (silent, peaceful). According to *Bharat*, all human emotions can be experienced through these nine *Rasas*. In Indian Aesthetic tradition, these nine *Rasas* are very fundamental of all human experiences and by evoking these *Rasas* in the mind (*Citta*) of the audience, the artist can create heightened dramatic and aesthetic feelings or experiences.

Aesthetic object is very important in case of any kind of aesthetic experience. This object does not simply stimulate an aesthetic sense in the individual but it uplifts the audience from the level of sense to the level of imagination, by which in turn, the individual reaches to the next level of Aesthetic experience. This imaginary level, this new world, is the new creation of the individual. In this new world, the individual meets with the 'dramatic personality, who contains within himself all possible heroic qualities, may be called the marks of a *mahapurusa* , say for example, like *Ram* or *Krishna*'. So, from Eastern perspective it can be said that, a true aesthetic object does not simply stimulate the aesthetic sense of the spectator but at the same time it improves his/her the ethical sense too. Aesthetics is concerned with the questions of "what is beauty, what is ugliness? Why do we consider certain things as beautiful and some other as ugly? Is there really any connection between art and morality? How beauty can improve our practical lives, and so on. Ethics or morality, on the other hand, concerns with the questions of right or wrong, good or bad concerning the deeds of persons. Both Ethics and Aesthetics are that two important parts of axiology, which is known as the study of value and also the value judgments. The essential role of morality or Ethics is to promote social consciousness regarding moral values for our harmonious existence with society. That is to say, 'Ethics or Morality is based first and foremost in social relations.'

II

Rethinking the Inter-relation between Aesthetics and Ethical Sentiments

While discussing the relation between Aesthetics and Ethics, we should consider the important point that, whether all works possess moral value or not? In the course of the analysis, we can ask the question that, "whether having moral value means that a work has Aesthetic value too, or to put the issue more precisely, whether moral value in a work contributes in some way to its aesthetic value too? Now, considering the issue regarding the inter-relation between Aesthetics and Ethics, we can mark out several alternatives. E.g., it can be argued that there is no relation between these two, and moral value and aesthetic value are completely independent. A particular activity might be high in moral value but same work may bear low aesthetic value. To address the issue, one may further argue that 'moral value and aesthetic value are related but that relation is neither important nor necessary. That is,

‘a work having high moral value is more likely to have aesthetic value but considering other related factors we compel to conclude that the work lacks aesthetic value’.

Question may arise that, whether sense of the morality of an artist is relevant to our judgment of the aesthetic value of his work itself. So far as Hitler was an immoral/unethical person, does it lead to lower our judgment of the aesthetic value of the painting done by that immoral person? Similarly, as Mother Theresa bears a highly moral character, does it mean that any artwork done by her would be aesthetically better for her higher moral character? In this way we may judge, if any action inspires people to be better with good moral character, then does it mean that the work has higher aesthetic value? These are some relevant questions in this context. Jürgen Habermas, German philosopher & sociologist and also a strong defender of modernity, in his “Theory of Modernity: An Unfinished Project”, pointed out that in modern thought the ‘formal separation of aesthetic and morality is deeply anchored’. According to him “Modernity is the child of enlightenment. It is anchored in reason and Democracy. And therefore, Habermas sees modernity as an unfinished project. It means that much more has to be done in the realm of modernity before thinking about the possibility of a postmodern world”. According to Habermas, “modernization is a process where society is increasingly separated into autonomous domains, each having their own ‘rationality’. Thus, science is about truth (or rather a specific version of truth), and therefore not about beauty or Ethics. Art is about beauty, and therefore not about morality or truth. Morality is central to religion, law and politics. In all three domains, people try, with varying success and levels of ambition, to separate morals from truth and beauty”. But, for Habermas for a wellbeing society Aesthetics and Ethics should be brought together.

Aesthetics and Ethics, two stimulating and insightful branches of study of human intelligence, are often seen to go hand in hand, not only practically but also theoretically, since they are both forms of value. For decades several controversies have been gathered around an archaic question that is, whether it is possible for our perception of beauty to unfold the notion of morality. From the dawn of human civilization our sense of sublime has shaped our emotions, imaginations and

experiences in magnificent ways which are reflections of our internal expressions. Our aesthetic consciousness vividly depicts every minute detail of our lives and the unique manifestations of these elements are entitled as art. Although Aesthetics as a humanitarian theory has a deep interconnection with human existence, it is still a matter of debate whether it is morally valuable as a human endeavour. Ethics elucidates the moral impacts of the actions; the individuals consciously perform in the social context, on the other side our aesthetic conceptions which are revealed through artistic gestures are also considered as intentional human activity. The question may arise that, whether it is possible to interpret aesthetic functions in the same way in which different moral practices are interpreted by the notion of right and wrong?

On the other hand, morality represents the rightness or wrongness of human action. In the sphere of Ethics, the good or bad outcome of a specific human action decides its moral value and aesthetic value of a content is judged by its ability to stimulate our senses. While Aesthetics emphasizes the elevation of human emotions, morality confines itself to the judgement of the goodness or badness of human behaviour. The aesthetic sentiments of the individual are expressed in various forms like literature, architecture, music, painting etc., but there are many artistic patterns which do not evoke any kind of positive or negative impact in terms of social morality. Although oil painting of a particular person or a great architectural masterpiece can be considered as a spectacular instance of art, it is not possible to judge them by any ethical criteria. For example, in spite of the fact that the aesthetic value of the self-portrait of Pablo Picasso is immeasurable in the context of artistic judgement, it is difficult to apprehend whether it has any effect on the moral lives of people. Picasso painted this portrait on 1906 in which he tried to highlight his features in a unique way. This portrait introduces his appearance with an innovative style which gives it a new dimension, it is impossible to attach any kind of moral liability with such a work of art.



From this perspective, it seems that Ethics and Aesthetics are poles apart in terms of theoretical and functional attitude, but morality and Aesthetics complement each other as an incomparable subsistence of human wisdom. All the moral behaviours are not expressions of beauty and not all the feelings of beauty inevitably lead to morality but, it is necessary to comprehend the fact that the vibrant components of art are able to flawlessly and distinctly elucidate the need for moral principles in one's life. Although our aesthetic wisdom is not compelled to analyse the ethical norms, still it can be considered as a way to understand the appropriateness of these moral rules. Many have thought by colouring the imagination with ethical vibes our aesthetic repercussions are capable of depicting morality; however, many thinkers have strongly opposed to this notion. We will discuss the relevance of Ethics in the domain of Aesthetics through a comparative discussion of some of these views in this section.

There has been a great dispute since the ancient times about the worth artistic expressions. Geek philosopher Plato indicated that our aesthetic experiences are completely devoid of any kind of factual knowledge, instead of providing truth, artists through their fictitious imaginary propensity deliberately wheedle people. This mundane world which is only a replication of the perpetual ideas is already imperfect. An artist only duplicates those incomplete constituents hence; according to Plato art is only a futile gesture of emulation. To illustrate this intention Plato in his Republic mentioned that- 'Therefore, imitation is surely far from the truth; and, as it seems, it is due to this that it produces everything because it lays hold of a certain small part of

each thing, and that part is itself only a phantom'.² With clear ambivalence towards artistic propensities Plato mentioned that, an individual who is profoundly infatuated with art, becomes indifferent towards the rest of the world and due to this asymmetrical feelings that exist in their minds they failed to properly comprehending the notion of morality. According to him artists are only driven by their blind emotions and passions, so, it is implausible for such self-indulged people to convey the real value of ethical norms through their work. Every artist expresses a surge of impetuous emotions through their art, which is similar to madness; hence Plato claims that such passionate individuals are unable to make the equitable choices, which evidently proves art to be irrelevant from the moral aspect.

We find the most important modern exposition of this query in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant's view on Aesthetics is explained in the first part of his book "*Kritik der Urteilskraft*", translated as "Critique of Judgement". In Kant's explanation 'an aesthetic judgment is that which based on feelings and in particular on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure'. The most important and also interesting part of Kant's theory of Aesthetic judgment is his 'theory of judgments of beauty' and commentators are mostly concerned with this part. In the first section of the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" Kant distinguishes the judgments of beauty or judgments of taste from cognitive judgments. According to him, judgments of beauty are based on feelings, either on feelings of pleasure or feeling of displeasure. But this pleasure, for Kant, is disinterested in nature, where the term "disinterested" stands to mean that" - it does not depend on the subject's having a desire for the object nor does it generate such a desire". This peculiar characteristic of Aesthetic judgments distinguishes these from the judgments of the agreeable, i.e. judgments which expressed some sort of desire for some objects like food or drink or any other things.

Secondly, according to Kant, 'Judgments of beauty' have "universal communicability" meaning that when one makes a judgment seeing a beautiful object presented before him, he expects that whoever else will perceive the object, also judge the object as beautiful. Though, it should be borne in mind that this universality is not same "based on concepts". It means that though the judgments of beauty are

universal in character in one sense, yet these cannot be proved; since ‘beauty’ is not a predicate of an object as Kant puts “beauty is not a concept of the object”.

Thirdly, judgments of beauty are free or pure of any such interest. Interest is defined as a link to real desire and action and thus also to a determining connection to the real existence of the object. In the judgment of beauty, the real existence of the object is quite irrelevant, so these ‘do not presuppose any end or purpose’ According to Kant “Aesthetic judgment must concern itself only with form (shape, arrangement, rhythm, etc.), not sensible content (colour, tone etc.) since the later has a deep connection with the agreeable, and thus to interest”. This provides the main evidence in favour of Kant’s formalism in Aesthetics. The inter-connection between aesthetics and morality is a persistent theme of Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*. As Kant has admitted the universal validity of the judgment of beauty, the commentators argued that “the demand for universal validity made by a judgment of beauty amount to a moral demand so that Kant’s argument for the universal validity of such judgments depends on an appeal to morality.” If we go through the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgement”, we see that the interconnections between aesthetic and morality have been expressed in many ways. Aesthetic experience serves as preparatory ground for morality. “The beautiful prepares us to love something, without interest; the sublime, to esteem it, even contrary to our (sensible) interest”.

According to Kant, Beauty serves as the symbol of Morality; “*On Beauty as the symbol of Morality*”³ Aesthetic judgment stands in fundamental proximity to moral judgment and this is integral to human nature as they are moral agents. For Kant aesthetic judgments are objective and universal, as to say that certain objects are to be treated as beautiful for everyone. But here one may argue that in some cases, say for example, that of taste is absolutely subjective, since it varies depending on the class, cultural background, education of particular individual. Some researchers also argued that “all aesthetic judgments are culturally conditioned to some extent and can change over time”. I broadly agree with them and should like to add the point that it is a problem for us to make generalization regarding unification between aesthetic judgments.

According to Kant possession of rationality is the uniqueness of human being and being rational they have the sense of aesthetic interest, aesthetic experience. The faculty of Reason is the guiding principle of rational beings and reason had both the theoretical and practical applications. Kant argued that, “the guiding law of rational conduct is that of morality, enshrined in the Categorical Imperative, which enjoins us to act only on that maxim which we can at the same time will as a universal law”. In Kant’s philosophy “beauty is the symbol of morality”.

Many philosophers have attempted to explore the relation between Aesthetics and moral evaluations. They thought that Aesthetics and moral evaluations play the most vital role in shaping our social life but these two functions in the context specific ways. To speculate on the convergence between Ethics and Aesthetics we need to explain two extremely divergent ideologies, one of these views preaches that our aesthetic activities are not subordinate to any kind of moral compulsions. Art, that provides an impeccable aesthetic flavor to our senses should not be fettered with shackles of morality. The expression ‘Art for art’s sake’ came in existence when in 19th century French philosopher Victor Cousin formulated this slogan, which indicated that it is not necessary for art to consummate some higher purpose, the main objective of art should be the realization of sublime. According to this phrase art is not obligated to reflect any social, political or moral agendas, artistic exertions should be appreciated for their aesthetic affluence. For example, the color combinations, shapes or specific structures of an art object grasps our attention and fills our souls with an eternal bliss. Beautiful objects can move us only through its presence as it possess a certain intrinsic ability which embellishes the entire fabric of our imagination. So, the effectuation of certain objectives cannot be considered as the part of artistic wisdom. This particular doctrine which dis-articulates art from ethical liabilities is known as ‘Aestheticism.’ In support of this ideology Oscar Wild in the preface of his book ‘*The Picture of Dorian Gray*’ stated that “there is no such thing as a moral or immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all ...”⁴ these words reflect that he considered sheer joy to be the center of aesthetic observation.

Likewise, A.C. Bradley discussed that this particular phrase ‘Art for art’s sake’ exhibits that just as religion and culture, poetry may have an underlying

monumental value as it has the power to express great lessons and propagate commendable works, however its poetic value is not confined to fulfillment of all these purposes. To explicate the indubitable glory of poetry Bradley mentioned that "... this experience is an end in itself, is worth having on its own account, has an intrinsic value ...its poetic value is this intrinsic worth alone."⁵ According to Bradley, whenever a poet or the reader ascribes certain values on poetry it loses its natural form as every poetry is an expression of unrestrained contemplation. Poetic gestures are able to construct an exceptional, fictional world of glory which is not just a futile replica of this mundane world and to preserve the actual merit of poetry one has to participate in this realm of poetry. His observations on poetry ascertain that he believed autonomy and liberal observations to be the essence of every work of art.

British essayist Walter Pater in his book *'The studies in the History of Renaissance'* endorsed this concept and in the preface, he reminded us that there is no congruent universal formula to describe the notion of beauty. To appreciate the consciousness of beauty we need to discover the uniqueness of every object which is manifested through their quintessential forms. Pater's notion of beauty makes us realize that our tremulous wisps of passion are brightened by the artistic approaches; they evolve our dormant flux of desire and liberate our soul from the depths of infirmity. To corroborate the independence of our aesthetic wisdom Pater in the conclusion of this book stated that "... the poetic passion, the desire of beauty, the love of art for art's sake has most; for art comes to you professing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moment's sake."⁶ So, according to him art only enlivens our faded moments which are its soul objective.

On the other hand, English thinker Clive Bell has provided an extraordinary explanation of unrestrained beauty, he holds that it is not possible to examine an artistic activity in the same way in which the ordinary human actions are judged to be moral or a-moral. According to Bell, the internal structure of the ethical terms is complex and ambiguous, it is impossible to explain them through a certain definition. Although we can understand the transcendental notion of good, we cannot specify it as an object of the external world. Bell clarifies that the notion of good indicates a state of mind and from this aspect art can be considered as moral because

art stimulates our perception and provides unprecedented pleasures. Art as an intellectual process which enhances our introspective capacity, the mesmerizing enchantment of the aesthetic endeavors directly affects our minds and engenders in our hearts a stream of eternal joy. This joy symbolizes that goodness which is the main source of morality and art is considered to be an ethical activity as it transmits these benevolent feelings. To explicate the independent value of art Bell stated that "... the only relevant qualities in a work of art, judged as art, are artistic qualities: judged as a means to good, no other qualities are worth considering; for there are no qualities of greater moral value than artistic qualities, since there is no greater means to good than art."⁷ Arts influences our minds and shapes our imaginations, by uniting our scattered emotions. In this way some of the renounced critics of art have tried to disassociate art from morality but on the other hand some Western and Indian aesthetic thinkers have tried to explore the deep connection that exists between morality and art. It is true that art, the uninterrupted flow of consciousness, can never be explained by some inanimate ethical norms, but some basic responsibilities of art as a coherent human behavior must be acknowledge. To elucidate this concept British writer John Ruskin expounded that our artistic approaches should be able to gratify the spiritual, moral and objective requirements of human beings. It must be the primal goal of our every aesthetic exertion.⁸

Leo Tolstoy argued that art is a medium which is able to unite people irrespective of their diversities. He emphasized that art cannot be described as mere coruscation of external beauty, constructing pleasing objects or producing pleasure cannot be deemed as the sole purpose of art, it is not an exposition of dispersed emotions, art for Tolstoy is a combining force which can unite the whole human society. To express his observations Tolstoy in his book '*What is Art?*' stated that "Art, all art, has this characteristic, that it unites people. Every art causes those to whom the artist's feeling is transmitted to unite in soul with the artist, and also with all who receive the same impression."⁹ Art is a reflection of socially saturated human lives, so, it is impossible to disassociate art from our social existence. Some of the Indian aestheticians have also ascribed grave importance on art as a guiding principle of human life. Not only as an instrument to glorify our indolent movements, artworks as a medication which heals our spiritual and moral wounds. Bharat in his

'Nāṭyaśāstra' delineated the purpose of art in human life. He clarified that when *Devraj Indra* asked *Lord Brahma* to create something joyful which can be seen and heard at the same time, *Lord Brahma* at that time composed 'Nāṭyaśāstra' but, 'Nāṭyaśāstra' is not just a means of entertainment; it revives every delicate aspect of our lives. To illustrate how *Nāṭyaśāstra* can influence our worldly existence *Bharat* mentioned that,

धर्म्यमर्थ्यं यशस्यं च सोपदेशं ससंग्रहम् ।
भविष्यतश्च लोकस्य सर्वकर्मानुदर्शकम् ॥ १४ ॥
सर्वशास्त्रार्थसंपन्नं सर्वशिल्पप्रवर्तकम् ।
नाट्याख्यं पञ्चमं वेदं सेतिहासं करोम्यहम् ॥ १५ ॥

10

According to this verse 'Nāṭyaśāstra' enlightens the core objectives of our lives, it unravels the implicit ways to acquire the everlasting desires like virtue, wealth and glory. 'Nāṭyaśāstra' conveys some well-conceived advises which are uniquely depicted through the idiosyncratic manifestation of humanitarian emotions and actions. *Bharat*'s proclaimed that since 'Nāṭyaśāstra' can dismantle profound meanings of all scriptures, it must be considered as the precursor of all arts. From our daily needs to the stringent path of our eternal salvation, 'Nāṭyaśāstra' produces a quintessential meaning to exfoliate the uneven ages of our lives. In this way *Bharat* claims that our aesthetic experiences at its best is not just another theory which narrates the do's and don'ts of certain artistic practices. It is a synthesis of human imagination and emotions which can shape our life by encouraging the anthropocentric values. Many other Indian rhetoricians have supported this concept; one of them is *Bhāmaha* who in his *Kābyālaṅkāra* said that -

धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।
प्रीतिं करोति कीर्तिं च साधुकाव्यनिबन्धनम् ॥ २ ॥

11

In this verse *Bhāmaha* also confirms that an excellent poetry can tie all the loose ends of our lives. Not only happiness and beauty but it also paves the way for pursuing virtue and wealth by elevating our consciousness to a new level. By exercising the art of poetry one can gain proficiency in all other arts which helps a

person to gain pleasure and reputation in his life. From the explanation of this verse, it may seem that art indoctrinates only the methods to attain the personal goals, but it is an incomplete picturization of artistic intelligence. Through rejuvenating the fragmented aspects of our lives art ameliorates our spiritual forces which strengthens our understanding of morality.

The concept of beauty and the notion of absolute good are the two inseparable aspects of the same entity and this perception of absolute good is the driving force of morality, which consolidates our faith in the admissibility of the ethical norms. Contemporary Indian philosopher Swami Vivekananda identified the concept of absolute beauty with this idea of ultimate good and truth. To comprehend Swami Vivekananda's reflections on Aesthetics we need to realize that as an *Advaita Vedantin* he considered the *Brahman* to be the sole Reality of this creation and this phenomenal world to be an illusion. He emphasized that *Brahman* who is the ultimate truth, symbolizes the absolute good and unbound beauty. According to him through the truth which exists in the art, the artists are able to gain the grace of the Supreme Being, when the artist comes to the brink of his pursuit; he becomes able to realize the ultimate beauty through self-realization. In support of his observation, he stated that the person who perceives a picture to discern its subtle beauty becomes more joyful than the seller of the picture as there is no barrier of profit and loss attached to him.¹² In the same way by overcoming all the obstacles of ignorance, a person becomes one with the Ultimate Good or Brahman. Art paves the way to enhance our internal abilities which enriches our moral attributes.

From the above discussion we can understand that, there is a difference of opinion between various Indian and western philosophers as whether the moral responsibilities of art exist at all. However, in an effort to maintain the uniqueness of art, those who have tried to detach art from morality, in many cases turned art into an insignificant fantasy, disassociated from the corporal existence of human beings. Aesthetics as the critical study of beauty can originate humanitarian values in us which lays a durable foundation for moral upliftment; it can restore the disintegrated social and ethical esteem. Aesthetic pleasure is a refined feeling of excellence and wonder and Ethics is described as a study which leads us to excellence by removing the veil of a-morality from our supreme self, but it is an extremely tenacious work to

perceive their underlying interdependence through their external details. Although it is usually imagined that moral influence suffocates artistic consciousness but the notion of ultimate good which is the central idea of morality, is presented by aesthetic efforts. We need to contemplate on how they collaborate with each other and to relate the aesthetic intelligence to ethical approaches we have to discover all the hidden traits that are engraved in artistic expressions.

III

Aesthetics and Ethics: Two Analogous Aspects of Human Wisdom

In this concluding section, we will try to find the latent attributes which accumulates the moral ethos with our aesthetic notion. As our aesthetic wisdom is enriched, we become aware of our surroundings and a healthy environment reflects our ethical sustainability. Social and moral harmony becomes fruitful when the person in society is entitled with a healthy mind. Aesthetic pleasure produces pellucid ripples of joy in our monotonous life which clears our vision of life. However, it is necessary to explain how our moral attitude comprises out of aesthetic intelligence. To point out the depth of relationship between Aesthetics and Ethics Joseph Brodsky says that “on the whole, every new aesthetic reality makes man’s ethical reality more precise, for aesthetics is the mother of ethics.”¹³ Brodsky analytically articulated his comments on this remarkable inter-relationship. To explain his observations through some arguments he stated that,

- “Mothers are valuable to their children when and because the relationship that exists between the mother and child provides the child with something of value.
- Aesthetics is the mother of ethics and does relate to it in a way that provides it with something of value.

Therefore, aesthetics is valuable to ethics.”¹⁴

In the light of these arguments what Brodsky wanted to state is that the lessons which are preached by a mother are always very valuable to the child. She prepares her child for the future with her care and affection, in the same way Aesthetics also provides some dynamic facts that can assist to properly establish moral principles in our society. Brodsky thus sought to discover the underlining link between Morality and Aesthetics, but there are some notions by which they become

valuable in our lives. The feeling of disinterestedness and the sense of universality are the values that are transmitted by artistic approaches and these values purify the notion of morality existent in the human mind. In recent times the modern society prefers material abundance to their moral development, the structure of our life is gradually crumbling due to the loss of moral trust. To reintegrate our ethical conviction, we have to take resort to a kind of selfless and holistic approach. Art can transmit some altruistic values in us, a glimpse of the sublime can unveil the obscure shadows of prejudices from our minds, which enables us to adopt a universal outlook.

Aesthetic delight is a feeling, in which there is no compulsion of desire, but it is important to understand, how our brain processes these feelings of pleasure and what kind of aesthetic pleasure can be acquired from artistic expression. We can clarify this aspect with the help of Neuro - Aesthetics. Human behavior is mainly navigated through our experience of pleasure. At the very beginning our pleasure - related activities were centralized around nourishment and cohabitation, but as we evolved the sensation of our pleasure expanded to more complicated inter-courses. The whole discourse of pleasure is handled by our nucleus accumbens and ventral striatum and opioids and cannabinoids are the chemical currencies in these nucleus structures which work together when we experience pleasure. The receptors are flooded whenever we get in touch with something pleasant. Generally, our pleasures are related to our desires. The chemical dopamine stimulates our striatum and influences us to fulfil these desires. When we perceive a thing of our liking, we start to gain pleasure from it and it becomes an object of our interest. To acquire these objects of our longing we begin to learn new strategies. However, not all the things, we desire can provide everlasting pleasure or a sensation of absolute bliss. In that case the neural structures such as the amygdala, the anterior cingulate cortex, the insula and the orbitofrontal cortex warn us about the upcoming unpleasant situations, and accordingly our functions are regulated by the prefrontal and as well as the parietal cortex. In this way we have learned to detach our feelings of pleasure from our cravings. We have to keep in mind that although in many cases our pleasure is followed by our blind desires but in the case of artistic pleasure it is an object of pure pleasure which is not governed by any kind of desire.¹⁵ Aesthetic activity provides us a kind of disinterested wisdom which can stimulate moral endeavours. Human being

as a self-indulged agent judges everything in terms of interest, but aesthetic intelligence removes the conservative conceptions from our mind and awakens the consciousness of the eternal unity.

It is already mentioned that Immanuel Kant explained that our conception of beauty should not involve any longing or desire. Kant portrays an overall impersonal form of beauty which can be considered as the base of conventional moral good. Our lives are plunged into misery due to the worldly allurements and dis-satisfactions; it is our conception of grace and beauty which steers our consciousness to a new horizon. The true perception of artistic notion propagates a sense of universality among us and this sense of disinterested beauty establishes the foundation of morality as the core quality of human life. Compassion, empathy, benevolence these basic traits of morality are vitalized by the impartial selfless feeling of aesthetic pleasure. Although some people think that our aesthetic expressions should never be bounded by moral chains but our moral involvement is indispensably related with our aesthetic senses. It is true that social repression incarcerates the spirit of art, however it is not possible to isolate art from the circle of human life. It cannot be denied that art plays an important role in stimulating human wisdom and encouraging social development. Through the transparent currents of thought aesthetic notion amplifies our dormant feelings of creativity and through this robust creative force we gain a universal outlook which removes all our mental parochiality and produces moral generosity.

To explain the nature of the universal feeling produced by our aesthetic passion, Indian rhetorician Avinavagupta explicated that when we watch a drama, the melodious songs and the remarkable acting mesmerizes us by removing all the worldly impurities from our minds. Our insight becomes blur because of all the mundane desires and affections which conceals the true nature of soul, that is pure bliss, but whenever we enjoy a spectacular dramatic presentation, our mind ignores all those futile and agitating emotions and becomes unblemished. Our mind discards the idea of specific time, place, environment etc. It only contemplates on a single aesthetic attitude which is cognized as the state of universalization (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*). Although not just drama, any kind of artistic representation can evoke this feeling in our mind. It is this conception of universalization which motivates us to realize the ultimate facts of our moral life. There are several concepts

which are not easily perceivable. Art helps us to realize these notions to our best. Such as the concept of peace is an abstract conception which is not easily accessible. One may use the word “peace” correctly or knows the theories regarding how to establish peace but actually attaining the feeling of peace is completely another experience. In 1949 Pablo Picasso painted ‘The Dove’ which was used by the Paris Peace Congress as a poster.



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This very picture originates a lenient and delightful feeling in our soul, which we cannot find only by examining the word ‘peace’ vividly. Art establishes a bridge between the sensation and the sentient being that facilitates our faculty of understanding to grasp the complex conception of our lives. People may exist, who are not even familiar with the word ‘peace’, but this very picture awakens a notion of mutual understanding among us by which they can realize the concept of peace. Art unites the society by conveying the essence of morality and empowers our inner capability to form a better world. Although it is not compulsory for an aesthetically sound person to be moral but to contemplate on the central notion of morality one needs to have an aesthetic over view. A famous artist can surely have self-conceited mentality; however it does not damage the intrinsic value of art.

Human being as an incomplete life-form always seeks perfection. They always try to grow into a superior being and art is another way of reaching that pinnacle of perfection. Realization of the true significance of art in our lives helps us to overcome all our weaknesses and expand our inner moral abilities. It is true that, the question of morality or immorality is not applicable for the content of every art but every artistic creativity helps us to transform ourselves to a higher being. Every aesthetic activity gives us an opportunity to reveal our prudence. Our sense of beauty gives rise to a certain notion of aesthetic knowledge which includes the conception of moral good. In this way by reinstating the basic pillars of our ethical life, our

aesthetic notion redefines the concept of morality. So, it is not possible for us to dis-articulate the moral facts from the Aesthetics as they are two inseparable aspects of human life.

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**ARTHA: IT'S MEANING AND AETIOLOGY OF ITS EMERGENCE AS
CENTRAL *PURUṢĀRTHA***

JYOTISH C. BASAK

I

The expression '*puruṣārtha*' is a very familiar jargon in Indian Philosophy and we often come across this term and also use this term without knowing well the debates that centre around it. It is also interesting to note that we do not find many books which deal exclusively with this concept and current debates. The only book that I found which exclusively deals with this issue is P. Nagaraja Rao's *The Four Values in Indian Philosophy and Culture: A Study of the Puruṣārthas*. However, there are many essays on this concept and also scattered brief illuminations in many classical sources. Perhaps one reason for the non-availability of concentrated and elaborate discussion is that it has been taken as a phraseology that is clear and understandable to us. But in the recent past many controversies about the nature of *puruṣārtha*, number of *puruṣārthas*, their interrelations, *puruṣārtha-sādhana*, etc. have come to the fore. An enquiry into the genesis of this fierce debate makes us feel that many contemporary scholars equipped with analytical tools and the western paradigm of reasoning dissected the concept and tried to understand the concept with a blend of Indian as well as the Western model of philosophizing.

The common definition we find of *puruṣārtha* is '*puruṣasya artha*'. But then crops up the question who is *puruṣa* and what is *artha*. Recent interpretations make us feel that the term '*puruṣa*' denotes human beings or embodied souls. The term '*artha*' has also been interpreted in various ways like 'need', 'goal' etc. M. Hiriyanna transliterated it (i. e. *puruṣārtha*) as 'what is sought by man'¹. Such construal also requires further explanation as *puruṣārtha* is not merely seeking ordinary objects. It is a pursuit of a higher level. We can say that it is a conscious pursuit of a *rational* being with some elevated goal that is commensurate with his rationality along with pursuing the path mindfully. Another issue that is spiritedly debated is the number of *puruṣārthas*. Some reduce it to one, some to two, many think it three, a considerable number of people fix it at four, sometimes it is said to be five and sometimes even

¹ Hiriyanna, M.: *Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy*, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1952, p. 48.

more. Contemporary writers such as D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Dayakrishna, Rajendra Prasad and some other scholars ignited this debate. The classical debate about the number of *puruṣārthas* that mostly centered around was regarding the question: Was it *trivarga* or *caturvarga*? However, recently we find thinkers who are even ready to interpret it as *ekavarga*. Other *puruṣārthas* are considered as means and the only one is admitted as an end or the ultimate good. Thus we find lively controversies revolving around the concept of *puruṣārtha*. Another polemic hinges around the concept in question is the correct ordering of *puruṣārthas*. This issue has also attracted considerable attention from scholars. However, we will not focus on these controversies rather our centre of attention will be to show the centrality of *artha puruṣārtha*. I intend to discuss various meanings of *artha* as we find in literature, how it occupied a central position, and how can we attain *artha*. The last point has significance, as to my mind, any comprehensive theory of *puruṣārtha* must explain the concept of *puruṣārtha* as well as means of realizing them, i. e. *puruṣārtha-sādhana*.

II

Artha as a *puruṣārtha* belongs to any set of human goals - whether we accept *trivarga* or *caturvarga*. Its inclusion in either set shows its pivotal role in human life. The most interpretation shows its importance as means. The tradition which primarily established its primacy is the *Arthaśāstra* tradition. Later on, the *Nītiśāstra* tradition fortified it with further much-required reasoning.

Before we plunge into discovering the covert meaning of *artha* we need to state that *puruṣārthas* are considered as a value in Indian philosophy. Hence, they are desirable. Therefore, if we seek *artha*, we seek it as we attach value to it. *Artha* is not sought for its own sake. If we impart a certain sense to it and following this we seek it (i. e. *artha*), only then does its seeking enhances itself to a level of value and it becomes our duty to strive for it. Furthermore, *Artha* is worthwhile when it is achieved following the approved path of *dharma*. This is the issuance of some sort of injunction that *artha* should be obtained in a moral way only. Such rightful attainment imparts value to *artha* and becomes genuine human seeking. Such pursuance of *artha* elevates it to the level of *puruṣārtha*. If *artha* is earned by taking recourse to immoral ways then such attainment cannot confer it the label of

puruṣārtha. Indian philosophers distinguish between *śreya* and *preya*. Following this, some scholars hold that *Artha* belongs to the segment of *preya*. However, there are thinkers who consider it to be *śreya*. For instance, G. C. Pande taking a clue from *Kaṭhapaniṣad* considers it to be *śreya*. He justifies his stance by saying that “the moral end - *artha* - is an ideal or rational end (*śreyas*), not an empirical satisfaction (*preyas*). ...’Man cannot be satisfied by wealth or gain...’. Hoping to preserve and add to his satisfaction the fool chooses *preyas*.... The wise man, the man endowed with Reason, chooses *śreyas* after due distinction.... *Śreyas*, thus, has both the characteristics of an ideal end - it is rationally determined and not ephemeral; satisfactions, on the other hand, are instinctive and momentary. The ideal end continues and grows. Empiric satisfactions keep slipping, however much we may seek to preserve and increase them....”²

We find a number of interpretations of the import of the term ‘*artha*’. On occasions, *artha* is rendered as wealth. Wealth is a means for achieving other *puruṣārtha*. It is accepted almost by all that wealth is an essential requirement of a human being. In the Indian epic, the *Mahābhārata*, non-possession of *artha*, i. e. a state of poverty, has been considered to be a sinful state. In the West Bertrand Russell admitted that some amount of wealth is required for cultivating creative impulse though he denigrated possessive impulse. Hence, very often *artha* has been recognized as means for achieving some other desirable end/s. It can also be shown that it is a direct means of *kāma* and indirect means to those where *kāma* is the direct means, i. e. in the case of *dharma* and *mokṣa*. Such a view can be justified as without *artha* we cannot perform sacrificial rituals, i. e. perform dharma. Again, as the performance of *dharma* leads us to *mokṣa*, *artha* functions as fulcrum here also, i. e. in attaining *mokṣa*. Sometimes it has also been held that it is a *puruṣārtha* in the secondary sense and not in the primary sense. If something is desired for its own sake then it is said to have primary value. *Dharma*, *kāma*, and *mokṣa* have been held to have ends in themselves. Holding such views entail that there is grading in *puruṣārthas*. However, the moot question is: Is such grading justifiable?

² Pande, G. C.: *Foundations of Indian Culture*, Vol. II, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, Delhi, 2007, pp. 132-133.

Artha though has been used in a narrow sense when it has been considered as a constituent of *trivarga* or *caturvarga*, but the term is also part of the compound of *puruṣārtha*. In this compound ‘*artha*’ seems to have been used in a different sense such as significance, purpose, meaning, etc. Again, it is intriguing to note that the term ‘*artha*’ when combined with other words sometimes it can have the import of desire, i. e. yearning for having something. For example, when it is said that ‘*putrārtham yajeta*’ the combined word ‘*putrārtham*’ can be transcribed as ‘desirous of having son’. Further, when applied to an individual, it means something which is different from when it is ascribed to institutions. In the latter case, it is resource or wealth that predominates. In discipline-wise also its meaning may vary. For instance, in philosophy, it carries an overtone of value, whereas in economics, it is economic prosperity or wealth that gets primary importance. As this term is used in India very widely, hence it is a natural consequence of this that with the passage of time it has acquired many meanings.

Now let us focus on the term’s (*artha*’s) meaning when used as a unit of the phraseology ‘*puruṣārtha*’. In Śrīdhara’s *Nyāya kandalī* the term ‘*artha*’ has been used to mean *padārtha*, i. e. *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma* etc. The *Kāmasūtra* of Vātsyāyana defined *artha* “as the acquisition and increase of things as intangible as learning, as personal as friends and as concrete as land, gold, cattle, grain, household goods and furnishing, or, as we might say, intellectual, social and material capital.”³ Vātsāyana’s definition falls almost in Kauṭilya’s line as he held that *artha* implies the acquisition of wealth, protection of it and also augmentation of that acquired wealth. It is indeed true that human beings need wealth for living and also for thriving. It is on wealth creation, its protection and growth that human life survives and political success becomes a reality.

It is indeed fascinating to note that in one sense *artha* is reduced to *kāma*. For example, Madhusudana Svraswati in his exposition of the *Gīta* held that “... *kāmanta iti kāma*.”⁴ It can be transcribed as an object that is desired is *kāma*. If it is so, and it is indeed a fact that men desire *artha*, then *artha* can be reduced to *kāma*. Such a

³ Trautmann, T. R.: *Arthashastra: The Science of Wealth*, Penguin Random House, 2016, p. 2 (This view was held by Gurucharan Das who authored the Introduction of the book)

⁴ Svaraswati, Madhusudana: *Gūdārthadīpika on the Gīta*, Nababharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1986, p.1019.

reductionist approach has become a fashion in the recent past with the availability of the analytical device. Some scholars, for example, Karl Potter, in his *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* considered it as an 'attitude' and also capability which facilitates a free person to spend his life and also to prosper.⁵ Potter even brings health of a person and of others for whom he is responsible and even security within the fold of *artha*. Giving it a wide meaning he brings everything in one's surroundings that let one survive under its fold. For Potter, in human life, it is an essential demand.

According to Rajendra Prasad the term '*artha*' stands for "all kinds of material possessions, including everything that one can own, loose or gift, etc. *Artha* includes all types of material things, irrespective of their potentiality for rightful or wrongful uses. It includes the material means for the performance of religious, social, legal, and moral duties, as well as those required for normal living subsistence."⁶ He considers *artha* as a prerequisite for the attainment of *kāma*. All the *puruṣārthas* are interrelated. *Aartha* has a social objective; it is also imperative for the attainment of *kāma*. Such attainment in turn has to be controlled or regulated by *dharma*. Contemporary Indian thinker Daya Krishna dismisses *puruṣārthas* as myth and *artha* is not an exception to this. The rationale for such dismissal of the concept of *puruṣārthas* in general and *artha*, in particular, is that there is no unanimity of views about this in sourcebooks rather disagreements and debates dominate the scene. About *artha* he notes that some considered it wealth, some power, some a few as instruments or means. Hence, he rather holds that it is a subset of *kāma*.⁷

Arthaśāstra as a treatise is usually translated as the science of political economy. We get a number of definitions/interpretations of the component '*artha*', which is a constituent of the compound term '*Arthaśāstra*', given by its translators and interpreters. L. N. Rangarajan holds that it (*artha*) is a compendious term having multiple meanings. Some of the meanings he lists down are 'material well-being',

⁵ Potter, K. H.: *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies*, Prentice Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963, p. 7.

⁶ Prasad, R.: *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality: Conceptual Essays in Ethics and Metaethics*, ICPR, 2004, p. 278.

⁷ Krishna, Daya: 'The myth of the *puruṣārthas*' in *Theory of Value* (Edited by Roy Perrett), Vol. 5, pp. 11-24.

‘livelihood’, ‘and economically productive activity’ and in general ‘wealth’.⁸ It is understandable that Kautily’s aim was to promote a kind of ruler he termed *vijigīshu*. Such a ruler in internal administration had to keep eye on three things which are *rakshā*, *pālana* and *yogakṣhema*. So, the king’s duty was to protect the state from the hands of external aggressors, within the state the king had to maintain law and order very justly and having done this he had to secure the welfare of his subjects. All these objectives can only be accomplished if the king has amassed sufficient wealth, acquires more territory and so on. Thus it might appear that here *artha* is mainly required by the king. If it is so, the moot point is what about individual beings. Kautilya seems to hold the opinion that a prosperous state's focal point would be the wellbeing of its people as he advocated a sort of paternalism. A thriving state will ensure by various measures its subjects material prosperity. In the closing section, having asserted that the root of livelihood of people is wealth, the *Arthaśāstrakāra* tells us that the wealth of a state includes both its territory as well as its populace who may have the choice to adopt a range of professions. Thus a state has to play a key role in ensuring the material wellbeing of the state as well as its people. Hence, he prepares the prince by imparting certain key training. He talks about four types of learning which are *anvīkṣkī*, *trayī*, *vārttā* and *daṇḍanīti*. A trained ruler with all this learning is competent to ensure the above two objectives. Then may arise the question: Is *artha* merely for material prosperity? It is not exactly that. He even advised the king to use *artha* for various purposes. For instance, he suggested it for testing his ministers’ integrity. Moreover, the *Arthaśāstra*, as well as *Nītiśāstras*, tell us that this material thriving will usher in spiritual prosperity

R. Shamasastri holds that “The subsistence of mankind is termed *artha*, wealth; the earth which contains mankind is termed *artha*, wealth; that science which treats of the means of acquiring and maintaining the earth is the *Arthaśāstra*”⁹. Interpreting the significance of this *Śāstra* he says “Thus, this *Śāstra* - is composed as a guide to acquire and secure this and the other world. In the light of this *Śāstra* one

⁸ Rangarajan, L. N.: *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, Penguin Books, 1992, p. 3.

⁹ Shamasastri, R.: English translation of *Arthaśāstra*, Mysore, 1932, p. 1.

cannot only set on foot righteous, economical and aesthetical acts and maintain them but also put down unrighteous, uneconomical and displeasing acts.”¹⁰

V. P. Varma points out that Kauṭilya even explains *artha* as the *vṛtti* of human beings. By doing this he seems to have widened the notion of *artha*. *Vṛtti* is translated as activity/means/ instinct, etc. Further to specify *artha* he (Kauṭilya) compares it with *anartha* (i. e. non-wealth) which is of six types. Wealth if after attainment “increases the prosperity of the enemy, or which causes loss of people and money, is dangerous wealth. *Anartha* or provocative wealth is that which causes fear from one’s own people or from the enemy.”¹¹ At one place the *Arthaśāstrakāra* seems to attach a special meaning to *artha* by combining it with *āpdārtha*. An acquisition which is fraught with peril is, according to Kauṭilya, *āpdārtha*. *Āpdārthas* are also of different types¹². The term ‘*anartha*’ means wrong acquiring. Explaining risky acquisition and wrong acquisition Rangarajan says that “A risky acquisition is one which carries the danger of a risk in the future and a wrong acquisition is one which provokes either an internal rebellion or external wrath.”¹³ Kauṭilya is of the opinion that as the *artha* is the basis of other *puruṣārthas*, human beings need to gain wealth which is useful for the promotion of all three goals and he considers such attainment as comprehensive success. Varma talks about two meanings of *artha* - one in a narrow sense and one in a broad sense. In the narrow sense "it is equivalent to wealth" and in the broad sense, "it is equivalent of all the means necessary for the acquisition and preservation of an all-Indian imperial system.”¹⁴ The discussion in the entire book centres on this sense.

Mark McClish and Patrick Olivelle renders *Arthaśāstra* as “treatise (*śāstra*) on success (*artha*) and tells us that the title of the treatise when begins in uppercase (i. e. *Arthaśāstra*) means ‘a specific treatise on *artha*’ while begins with lower case ‘refers to the body of knowledge concerning statecraft communicated through such

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 494.

¹¹ Varma, V. P.: *Studies in Hindu Political Thought and its Metaphysical Foundations*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1974, p. 72.

¹² Basak, Radhagobinda: *Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra*, Kakali Prakashan, 2016, Kolkata, pp. 472-473. (in Bengali)

¹³ Rangarajan, p. 587.

¹⁴ Varma, p. 73.

authoritative texts.”¹⁵ They admit that the term ‘*artha*’ has a number of meanings but they prefer to construe it as ‘success in worldly affairs, such as gaining wealth, land, power, or fame.’¹⁶ This success is political as well as the material success of *Swāmi*. *Swāmi* was given more importance among all the seven constituents as he possessed unparalleled power and wealth. However, by implication, it can be shown that even subjects are the creator of wealth as it is they who cultivate, harvest and do other activities for wealth generation. The meaning of *artha* in *Arthaśāstra* has also been rendered sometimes as ‘the livelihood of men’, ‘the earth inhabited by men’ and Kautily’s *śāstra* tells us how to master the art of attaining as well as protecting the earth. Thus we find numerous efforts of scholars of repute to transcribe the term ‘*artha*’ in a number of ways to bring out its full import. The entire *śāstra* is devoted to its (*artha*) significance, means of acquiring it, augmenting it, its economic use and so on.

III

Responding to the debate why *artha* has been given the central place in the *Arthaśāstra* famous historian Upinder Singh writes that *Arthaśāstra* being a theoretical work on *artha* “the author was *obliged* to discuss statecraft from the specific perspective and goals of *artha* in the broad sense of material gain.”¹⁷ Singh further says that for Kautilya we need to carefully balance human goals thereby implying that the other two *puruṣārthas* mentioned in *trivargas* should not be ignored. However, out of these *puruṣārthas* *artha* is central as other two *puruṣārthas* are dependent on it. The necessity of balance-making among *puruṣārthas* is an important issue which Vātsyāna also stresses in his *Kāmasūtra*. Having talked about balancing-making, *Kāmasūtrakāra* tells that “*artha* is the most important goal for the king and the prostitute, because it is the basis of social life.”¹⁸ Thus we find that in according supremacy to *artha puruṣārtha* from the standpoint of a king and state Kautily’s and Vātsyāna’s views coincide. R. Śāmāśāstri is of the opinion that Vātsyāyana has designed his “*Kāmasūtra* on the *Arthaśāstra*, as he has used,

¹⁵ McClish, Mark and Olivelle Patrick: *The Arthaśāstra: Selections from the Classic Indian Work on Statecraft*, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis, 2012, p. xxxiv.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. xxxiii.

¹⁷ Singh, Upinder: *Political Violence in Ancient India*, Harvard University Press, 2017, pp. 98-99.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 507.

wherever possible, many of its phrases and sentences.”¹⁹ We also need to note that Kautilya wrote his *śāstra* not keeping in mind the specific needs of any particular state or king but rather for all kings/states even for later generations. His *śāstra* presents a blend of theoretical knowledge as well as its practice. He prepared the *śāstra* after going through *Arthaśāstras* which were written before him. Hence he had mastered the art of acquiring and safeguarding the earth from his own experience and also from experts who preceded him.

If we try to place Kautilya in historical context we get the impression that he wrote his *Arthaśāstra* at a time when Upanishadic absolutism was facing a tough challenge from different quarters. The materialistic school sought to show the senselessness of the entire moral code developed within the Hindu religious tradition and affirmed the need for sensual pleasure only. On the other hand sceptics and some other religions that grew out of Hinduism on account of its internal rebellion challenged Vedic norms and sacrificial rituals. The rise of Jainism and Buddhism not only denounced Vedic thought but also tried to demolish prevalent social cohesion by way of putting emphasis on asceticism and renunciation of domestic life. On account of these contesting claims, there was a tumultuous situation in society. In order to arrest such tendencies, Kautilya advocated several strong measures. He gave royal authority immense power to stave off further social disorganization. *Arthaśāstrakāra* recommended strict imposition of the ideal of *Varnāśrama* systems prevalent at that time. He could realize that exaltation and promotion of asceticism and monastic life would engender social disruption.

By now it has become clear that though the *Arthaśāstra* tradition gave paramountcy to *artha* among all the human goals, still it also admits the role of *dharma*. It becomes evident when Kautilya holds that the king is the defender of *varṇāśrama dharma*. However, in the domain of politics he, in fact, ushered an era where politics freed itself from *dharma*. He reordered human preference in holding that in case of a clash between *artha* and *dharma* the former must outweigh. By holding this Kautilya accords a supreme status to *artha* among all the human goals and brought it at centre-stage. In addition to this, he established his identity as a pragmatic

¹⁹ Śāmāśāstri, R.: *Kautilya's Arthaśāstra*, Vol I, Parimal Publications, Delhi, 2019, R. p. xiii.

and also a political realist. Though he extricated *artha* from the shackles of *dharma* but made room for *dharma* in various ways as otherwise there was a possibility that his king could become a despot. His king is required to lead a sage-like life. “Carrying out his duties and protecting his people according to *dharma* leads to king’s attainment of heaven; if he fails to protect them or inflict unjust punishment, hell awaits him.”²⁰ Kauṭilya even makes a distinction between *Dharmasthīya* and *Dharmaprvtakah* and stressed that Swāmi’s role should be *Dharmaprvtakah* and not only *Dharmasthīya*. A *Dharmasthīya* Swāmi merely ensures law abidance, but a *Dharmaprvtakah* king does not remain content with ensuring existing laws’ obedience, rather he takes initiative for the enactment of new laws and also takes care for the promotion of these laws. Writes M. V. Krishna Rao: “The Swami was the foundation of society, and it was his *Dharma* to provide for the very basic foundations of civilized existence even in conquered countries, and to make good life possible.”²¹

The *Arthasāstra*’s envisioned state has been anatomized into prakritis (components) which according to it are seven. The *Dharmasāstras* did it (society) on the basis of *varna* and *āśrama*. The two categories of *sāstras* in giving social ethics though address different sides still are connected and complementary to each other. As Pande says: “The performance of duty as determined by one’s station in terms of *varna* and *āśrama* is not the same thing as the performance of actions successfully though even the performance of duty in a purely moral sense requires the help of prudence and conditions of security and adequacy of resources. The world of *artha* is more extensive than that of *Dharma*, and in part functions as the precondition for its realization. *Dharma* is prior to *artha* in an ideal sense, but *artha* is necessary for its implementation. Further, the actual social order being far more complex than that visualized in the *Dharmasāstras*, the interpretation of *Dharma* in practice necessarily requires the study of means and ends at a secondary level.”²²

²⁰ Ibid. p. 123.

²¹ Rao, M. V. Krishna: *Studies in Kauṭilya*, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1979, p. 35.

²² Pande, p. 158.

Max Muller in his *India, What can it teach us?* tells us that India's civilization was unique in many respects. One such aspect was that Indians believed that their nation was made with an aim that was spiritual in nature. It will actuate spiritual evolution. The *varṇa dharma* and *āśrama dharma* were advocated for assisting this evolution. Kauṭilya was under the impression that this process of evolution has degenerated on account of Buddhist influences. The Buddhists prescribed a different paradigm of life that advocated life negation and put an extreme emphasis on asceticism. Hence, they gave little importance to *Grihastha āśrama* of life. As a direct consequence of this and people's non-performance of duties and obligations attached to this stage of life, i. e. social and economic life of people, was greatly impeded. Hence, Rao says: "The defective function of the second and of the secular stage of existence and the deviation from the prescribed duties and obligations, starved secular well-being and reduced and impoverished the candidates who were zealous in the pursuit of secular duties and upon whom depended principally on the material welfare of the country."²³ It was directly responsible for the fall in material prosperity. People on account of extreme religious proneness paid scant attention to the fact that *artha* was the bedrock on which other *puruṣārthas* depend. Hence, people ignored *yogakshema sadhana*, i. e. acquisition-preservation-augmentation methodology, which was an essential requirement for pursuing all goals of human life. Each stage of *āśramas* was well-planned, for each stage there was assigned duties, each stage had a specific share in the advancement of human life and serving the demands and needs of that society. Once a link of the chain was broken, the entire system came to a halt. Hence, denouncing the tendency of giving extreme importance to the religious mode of life and thereby weakening the secular aspect of life Kauṭilya vowed to re-establish the Hindu method of life as it addressed all aspects of a human being. Rao says, "the Hindu social organization which served to maintain the regular supply of a large number of persons with opportunities to enter the higher life under the direction of adepts, who again could thus obtain greater opportunities of lifting a large number of persons from among the initiated to the higher rung of spiritual life, was disrupted. Kauṭilya accordingly sounded a note of warning to the generation, that the dissolution of society would follow on the total absorption of society in rapturous

²³ Rao, p. 155.

contemplation of spiritual matters to the neglect of *Artha* which was the foundation of Dharma.”²⁴ *Artha* and *Dharma* are inseparable collections and separation of them results in *Mātsya Nyāya*. As Rao says: “the consequence of a divorce of action from contemplation, or of temporal power from spiritual authority, is a state of *Mātsya Nyāya* with no conscience and ideals, leading to an imbecile and unprincipled tyranny of Theocracy.”²⁵

Well before Kauṭilya *varṇāśrama dharma* already got shaped in society. *Varṇa* as social order was most likely functional in nature and social value was attached to this division. Division of labour was required in society as a state had to fulfil the aspirations of its subjects in this world and also 'in the next'. Therefore, material well-being was accompanied by another important requirement, i. e. moral purpose of the state. It is not that Kauṭilya was the only political philosopher who felt the need for a social order with fitting duties and responsibilities. Even in the West, we find in Plato's Ideal State such order. He talks about three classes: the Statesmen, the Warriors and the Artisan labourers. All of these classes were assigned particular duties. Explaining the philosophy of division of labour of society Rao writes: “The essence of social justice was to be found in the view that the individual was no isolated self, but part of an Order, and that he was intended not to pursue the pleasures of that isolated self but to fill an appointed place in the social order.”²⁶ Therefore, Kauṭilya asserts: “The people, of the four *varṇas* and in the four stages of life, protected by the king with Rod, (and) deeply attached to occupations prescribed as their special duties, keep to their respective path.”²⁷

Even in the *Mahābhārata*, in *Śāntiparva*, we find that there is an expression of doubt about the path of renunciation as its end is unknown to us and unsure too. There we find two Pandavs differ with Yudhishtira in deciding human goals. For Yudhishtira, the goal of human life should be following *dharma*, but Arjun underscored the need of pursuing *artha*, and Bhima held that it should be *kāma*. For Arjuna, *artha* is central as its plays a pivotal role in pursuing other goals of life.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 155.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 55.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 71.

²⁷ R. P. Kangle's translation: *The Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra*, Part-II, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, Delhi, 2019, p. 1.

Without wealth man becomes weak. It is through a human endeavour that people earn their livelihood. For a monarch, the knowledge of *varttā* helps to earn wealth and through *Dandanīti* he establishes the order in society which in turn facilitates earning wealth. Thus we find Arjuna's stance on *artha*. Even Draupadi, we find, reasoning with Yudhishtira against sticking solely to *dharma* at very critical junctures. In the discussion we find Draupadi quoting from a Lokāyata thinker to justify her point in favour of wealth.

Again, that mere performing *dharma*, sacrifices, thoughtlessly can bring danger to a king was pointed out by a priest to king Mahavijita. We find this in the *Kootdanta Sutra* in the *Digha Nikaya*. The priest who was proficient in *Lokāyata Vidyā* went against the king's desire to perform a grand sacrifice. Rater he advised the king to spend this money for enabling his people to earn their livelihood. It will usher in peace and prosperity in the state, he asserted. In all these, we find a stance where it is life-affirmation and not life negation that dominates. This life-affirmation attitude brought *artha* to the leading position.

Roger Boesche asserts that *Kauṭilya* defended *varṇāśrama dharma* to achieve a different end. For him, "Kauṭilya's highest aspiration was political, even heroic, greatness for the king that Kauṭilya sought to use religion and any other of what he would call superstitions to attain this goal, that he regarded the state as superior to religion... Kauṭilya readily gave way to customs and the rules of religion on minor issues of behavior and ritual, but he subtly promoted state power, the king's supremacy, over the demands of class and religion."²⁸ Kauṭilya, as we have argued, could realize that economic strength is instrumental to achieve many ends such as happiness for subjects, political might and so on. An economically *weak* state cannot assert its power and hence an economically *powerful* state imposes its will on it. Wealth or *artha* is, therefore, the chief source of securing happiness and success. For Kauṭilya, *artha* or wealth is "a means to acquire superiority and a successful persuasion of the six-fold-policy. The presence of resources in one's territory is a factor for powerhood deciding the fate of the kingdom in pursuit of its policy of

²⁸ Boesche, Roger: *Kauṭilya: The First Political Realist*, HarperCollins Publishers, India, 2017, p. 30.

acquiring a superior position in the council of state.”²⁹ Therefore, he assertively declares: “Material well-being alone is supreme.... For, spiritual good and sensual pleasures depend on material well-being.”³⁰ R. Śāmāsāstri puts it thus: “Kauṭīliya holds that wealth, and wealth alone, is important, inasmuch as charity and desire depend upon wealth for their realization.”³¹ “Not violating righteousness and economy, he shall enjoy his desires. He shall never be devoid of happiness. He may enjoy in an equal degree the three pursuits of life: charity, wealth, and desire, which are interdependent on each other. Any one of these three, when enjoyed to an excess, hurts not only the other two, but also itself.”³²

It is held by some scholars that before Kauṭīliya Lokāyata thinkers, which advocated extreme materialistic doctrines, held immense sway in society. As they did not believe in an afterlife and many other doctrines of *Brāhminism*, they considered their aim as the fulfilment of this-worldly desires. It is believed that Brhaspati began this movement of pursuance of materialistic pleasure and this name figures in Kauṭīliya’s *Arthaśāstra*. Kauṭīliya though was influenced by Lokāyatas, still, did not accept it in verbatim. He attempted to synthesize extreme views of life and in doing that he also held that *artha* as an aim of life can moderate two extremes, i. e. *dharma* (which represents rigorism) and *kāma* (which stands-in-for sensualism). He was not a complete hedonist and hence he did not believe in mere pleasure-seeking. He realized that it cannot be the sole end of life. For him, life is not confined "within the narrow compass of the momentary present," he had faith in the afterlife and hence, for him, pleasure cannot be the alpha and omega of life. He did not like sacrificing "the present for the future or the future for the present joys." Both lives have their distinctive significance. In spite of limitations posed by an invisible power, man has the freedom to act freely. His endeavour can modify and drive his life in his desired direction. Hence, he urges his reader to discriminate between *artha* and *anartha*. He identifies three evils - *anartha*, *adharmā* and *śoka*. Thus we need to pursue *artha* and avoid *anartha* (i. e. the pursuance of which gives rise to fear), choose *dharma* and

²⁹ Prasad, Rajendra: *Politico-Geographical Analysis of the Arthashastra*, Inter-India Publications, New Delhi, 1989, p. 143.

³⁰ Kangle, p. 14.

³¹ Śāmāsāstri, p. xxix.

³² Ibid, p. xxix.

reject *adharmā* (which engenders despair) and *śoka* which means suffering. Thus Kauṭilya gives importance to human will but he also asks for its moderation with reason. “He must live for his happiness in society and in order that he may be happy, his happiness must be something which will not stand in the way of others. To attain such a state of existence, individuals must have recourse to a moral standard of life. This moral standard consists in showing due respect to the happiness and prosperity of others, and refraining from injury or perfidy to others or the adoption of such lines of action which may give rise to Anarthas to others....”³³

For Kauṭilya, will unmodified by reason cannot govern a good life and is bound to lead to devilry. Thus he makes proper room for the application of reason in life. To attain a balance between reason and pleasure-seeking he gives emphasis on regimenting life. Such regimentation will bring sensuality under control and elevate man's moral sense. Hence, he asks for bringing within grip the cravings of our sense-organs. “Without discipline, everything will come to nought but when this is attained everything is realized. The sole end and aim according to him of the śāstras is to enable man attain a control over the senses.”³⁴ *Kamasūtra*, which is considered to be of the same period, also speaks for reasonable temperance. N. C. Bandopadhyaya also holds such view in saying that “Vatsāyana does for *Kamasūtra* school what Kauṭilya does for raising or improving the end and aim of the *Arthasāstra*. Like Kauṭilya, he advises men to enjoy, and strive for the attainment of the prospects of the life or Artha, ... without detriment to the other two of the *Trivarga*.”³⁵

The introduction of the concept of *prajā-hita* and emphasis on its centrality is indeed a new dimension. If followed rightly, people will remain content with the ruler. Kauṭilya even though supported the long-established *varṇāśrama dharma*, a study of his *Treatise* make it evident that he imparted it some novelty and ennobled it. For example, for giving recognition and lawful protection to the Śūdras he prescribed several measures. Even in certain offences, *Brahmins* were brought within the ambit of capital punishment. Many such measures make it evident that he considered

³³ Bandopadhyaya, N. C.: *Kauṭilya or An Exposition of His Social Ideal and Political Theory*, Low Price Publications, Delhi, 2005 (Reprint), p. 37.

³⁴ Ibid. pp.38-39.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 32.

varṇāśrama dharma not only essential but also a dynamic one. As Pande says: “The development of an economic policy based on detailed empirical knowledge was one of the most important contributions of the *Arthaśāstra*. The economic welfare of the people and the resources of the state are sought to be systematically promoted. ... The task of administration in the *Arthaśāstra* is not the collection of customary taxes or dispensation of rough and ready justice but the sensitive and multiform adjustment of a complex and diversified social and economic order. In the process, an elaborate administrative structure of rules and policies was evolved. Royal orders and edicts as well as usage and precedents came to be important elements in the decision of legal matters. ... ‘Equity, testimony, usage and royal orders constituted the four parts of a legal dispute where the latter over-ruled the former (or vice versa). Where custom is opposed to canonical or secular law, law should take precedence. If law should appear unjust, equity should be upheld.’”³⁶

U. N. Ghosal is of the opinion that Kauṭilya “deliberately dissociates himself from those radical schools that eliminated the Vedas from the list of success. ... he urges the king not to upset the canonical scheme of duties relating to the castes and the orders, on the ground that the performance of these leads to heaven and salvation, while their violation would result in intermixture and destruction of the people.”³⁷ A scrutiny of literature makes us feel that in ancient India political economy was envisioned from two stances - utilitarian in conjunction with the ethical frame of reference. It was utilitarian as it was considered an indispensable means for public welfare and also for attaining happiness. Again, it was part and parcel of moral order as it enjoins certain duties and obligations to a human being. It has been widely held that the utilitarian viewpoint crept into the system on account of the influence exercised by *Lokāyata* teachers. It was under their influence that *vārtā* developed as a useful science to take lives forward.

Thus we can say that Kauṭilya accorded priority to *artha* considering its seminal impact. As we have seen, it is on this that observance of *dharma* and *kāma* hinge on. Writes Pande: “The priority which Kauṭilya has in mind rests on the fact

³⁶ Pande, p. 157.

³⁷ Ghosal, U. N.: *A History of Hindu Political Theories*, Scholar Select, p. 150.

that the politico-economic order is the pre-condition of virtue and happiness. The instrumental character of *artha* is recognized within the scheme of values. Nevertheless, within the scheme of political science, *artha* is the principal value, and political science itself is as fundamental a science as the state is foundational to social ethics."⁴⁰ The *Nītiśāstra* tradition held almost the same view about human goals as we find in the *Arthaśāstra*. Though with the passage of time *mokṣa* has gained more attention and has come to be regarded as the ultimate good of life, *Nītiśāstrakāras* take a very circumspect view in this regard. On the one hand, they show their loyalty to *Arthaśāstra* on the other they adapt with time by taking cognizance of the emergence of *mokṣa* as a leading *puruṣārtha*. Somadeva Suri, a *Nītiśāstrakāra*, who authored *Nītivākyamītram*, held such view. Prof. V. R. Mehta wrote an Introduction of the *Nītivākyamītram*, translated by Sudhir Kr. Gupta. There he writes: "Somadeva insists that one must endeavour to enjoy all these (i. e. all the four *puruṣārthas*) simultaneously. Somadeva, however, does not give much importance to *mokṣa* in relation to the state. He confines his discussion to the other three activities only. In fact, so great is the importance attached to the task of the fulfilment of needs and pursuit of prosperity of that he declares 'that anyone who neglects this object and resorts to righteousness alone tills a barren field abandoning a ripe crop.' He adopts the same attitude even with regard to pleasure. He is realistic enough to concede that a person devoid of wealth is abandoned even by his wife and children."⁴¹ However, in order to create a balance between three goals he considers the principle of rightness as the main guiding force. Such a balanced pursuit is always accompanied by happiness. There is no gainsaying the fact that the Lokāyata philosophers played a key role in bringing the need and importance of *artha* and *kāma puruṣārthas* as they held that *artha* brings in material prosperity and paves way for enjoyment in life, i. e., *kāma*. Thus life on this planet's turf could be turned into a happy life. In such an ordered society, there will be no deception, anarchy or *mātsya-nyāya* will end and *yoga-kṣhema* will be ensured.

⁴⁰ Pande, p. 155.

⁴¹ V. R. Mehta wrote it in the Introduction to *Nītivākyamītram* translated by Sudhir Kr. Gupta, Prakriti Bharti Academy, Jaipur, 1987, p. 15.

The preceding discussion makes it clear that *artha* has emerged as a central *puruṣārtha* and if we want to pinpoint one single person whose contribution to its emergence is paramountly important, then that name is none other than Kauṭilya who perhaps was motivated by Lokāyata teachers. Before him, it was considered necessary only as a means for achieving other ends. He also considered it as a means but this means is the *sine qua non* for all other ends. If we lack this, we shall not be able to achieve any other goal, be it *dharma*, *kāma* or whatsoever. In the domain of philosophy, we often find a debate - is it means or is it end which is more important. Such a debate seems to be an endless one. It is also true that means, what is sometimes labelled as having only instrumental value, is less important than those that have intrinsic value. But the moot question is: If we do not have means, how can we achieve the end? Hence means is no less important than the end. Has the time come to put them on an equal footing? The entire *Arthaśāstra* is devoted to showing *artha's* importance as well as its *sādhana*. As Kauṭilya envisaged state is a welfare-oriented state and he advocated father-like protection by the king of his subjects, it cannot be accomplished without *artha*. He shows in numerous ways that the greatest asset of a monarch is the loyalty of his subjects. How can an *artha*-starved ruler earn this loyalty and also retain that? As we have seen his follower Somadeva held the same view when he said that a person having a dearth of wealth is abandoned even by his children and wife. In Swami Vivekananda's writing, we find an effort to synthesize social welfare with individual liberation. Hence, he is advocating a Vedantism which is a bit less spiritual and gives attention to practical needs. Actually social welfare and individual emancipation are not mutually exclusive. That both can be pursued harmoniously has been shown by scholars. One such scholar was S. K. Maitra who showed it in his *The Ethics of the Hindus*. What is held is that we need to live our social life in a way so that it does not stand in the way of striving to our higher ends. To state it more clearly such social life prepares us for pursuing our higher goal. It becomes more evident if we read the systematic plan of *puruṣārtha* in conjunction with *varṇa* and *aśrama* theory. I would like to end with an optimistic note by saying that the debate, discussion that is going on about the centrality of *artha puruṣārtha* is a welcoming one. We can hope that it is through

debate and discourse that we shall have more clarity about the notion and its relation with other goals of human lives.

LAW OF CONTRADICTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN BUDDHIST LOGIC AND CLASSICAL TWO-VALUE LOGIC

KANTI LAL DAS

Prelude

The main contention of this paper is to compare and contrast LOC between East and West in the light of Buddhist Logic and Two-value (bivalence) classical logic. The history of Indian logic is broadly divided into three periods, namely, *Prāchīna Nyāya* (250 BC), Buddhist Logic (Sixth Century AD), and *Navya Nyāya*. The Buddhist logic text *Nyāyapraveśa* (Introduction to Logical Method) had a great influence upon Indian and Chinese Buddhism and also among the Jainas. Buddhist logic bears very close similarities to syllogistic form and it can be represented and analyzed by standard deductive techniques. In Buddhist logic there we have two different perspectives, such as *pramāṇa-vāda* (doctrine of Proof) and *Hetu-vidyā* (the science of causes). *Pramāṇa-vāda* deals with the epistemological study of the nature of knowledge and *hetu-vidyā* is associated with the system of logic. Vasubandhu first in his *Vāda-vidhi* (A Method for Argumentation) was dealing with the logical and epistemological issues analytically and systematically. In this regard, he was influenced by the Hindu work *Nyāya-sūtra*. Thus to understand Indian logic and Buddhist logic properly, we have to refer to the Indian tradition of inference (*anumāna*), epistemology (*pramāṇa*), and science of causes (*hetu-vidyā*). In a sense, classical Indian logic was based on *Nyāya* and Buddhist logic. Matilal remarks, “Logic in classical India is the systematic study of informal inference-patterns, the rules of debate, the identification of sound inference vis-a-vis sophistical argument, and similar topics.”¹ Thus, according to Matilal, Indian Logic should be comprehended as being a different system of logic than modern two-value first-order classical logic as well as modern predicate calculus. Having said the so-called *anumāna –theory of Indian logic has its own logical merit.*² The other important point that has been raised by Motilal was that Indian logic was influenced by the *study of*

¹ Motilal, B. K., “Introducing Indian Logic” in Generi, included in *Indian Logic: A Reader*, 1998, p.184.

² Mohanty, J. N., *Reason And Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking*, New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 1992, p.106.

grammar,³ whereas the so-called Classical Logic or modern Western logic was influenced by the study of mathematics.

The Role of LOC

LOC (Inconsistency) has played a pivotal role in every philosophical system in general and logic in particular. It is regarded as one of the Fundamental Laws of Thought. In Western classical two-value logic it has a distinctive connotation, unlike the Indian logic. LOC is the basic and fundamental principle of First Order two-value logic. It is purely formal in its application. However, when I look at Indian logic I find something different. Most of the Indian logical systems apply LOC either in the epistemological sense or on the basis of sciences of causes. In Indian logic, LOC functions under the Law of Contradictory Predication (*viruddha-dharma-samsarga*). This is the Buddhist view of LOC. If I go to the Vaisesika system I observe that it takes LOC as *a real relation between two opposed real facts*.⁴ As it contains two opposed real facts, it is called *dynamical opposition*. According to the Vaisesika system, it depends on *a variety of causation*. However, they did not say anything about logical contradiction. Buddhist logic differs from Vaiśeṣika in the sense that unlike the latter the former mentioned LOC. If I examine the aphorism of the Nyaya system, I observe that *they neglect contradiction as a relation between real facts*. Instead of that, they affirm a contradiction of *two judgments* where the one denying what the other affirms. The Sāṅkhya system also contained the relation of contradiction among the varieties of the relation between real facts. The Sāṅkhyas system in this respect has the same level as the Vaiśeṣika system. Even though the Sāṅkhya system has the allies of the Buddhists in their fight against the *Category of Inherence*, but unlike the latter, the former was noncommittal about the logical theory of contradiction. I think the Naiyāyikas approach of LOC is closely allied with the classical two-value logic. According to the Naiyāyikas, the meaning of contradiction is that “two things cannot coexist together at the same place and at the same time.” However, Jainas flatly deny LOC because for them both affirmation and denial, which are essential for LOC, are untrue. The real relation was something halfway between *affirmation and denial*.

³ Matilal, B. K., *The Character of Logic in India*, Albany, NY, USA: State University of New York Press, 1998, p.14.

⁴ *Vaisesika System*, III, 1., 10-12.

Objective

In this paper, I propose to make *a naive attempt* to focus on the LOC in the light of classical bivalence logic and Buddhist logic. This attempt perhaps may not be something radical or new, but I do engage with the hope that my interpretation will depict the issue differently. I think that Western logic, in general, has a different implication in comparison to Eastern logic. If the logic of West and East would remain the same, it would then indeed be *a futile exercise to compare*. Further, I strongly believe that there is no point in one as authentic and the other as inauthentic. Every system has its own merit. When I take this issue, I had in mind various implications of LOC, such as *formal and informal, casual and other than causal, complete, and other than complete, epistemic, and other than epistemic*. I do think that the aforesaid comparison does not bear any sense if LOC has no various implications or senses. Thus in a sense, this paper appears as a comparative study between West and East on LOC. Of course, there is nothing exaggeration to assume that LOC is an effective principle of Laws of Thought without which human life in general and logic, in particular, remains incomplete. When we find the relevance of LOC in human life, we are predominantly concerned with the informal uses of LOC. Except for some technical uses of LOC in Nyāya logic, the overall applications of LOC in Indian thought are content-based or theoretical-based. Indian logic, I do presume, is primarily *an epistemic logic*. Thus in a sense, Indian logic is more theoretical and informal than formal. As it is theoretical, it works under *the purview of causal connection*. On the contrary, classical two-value logic is formal. As it is formal, it is contentless. As it is contentless, it is not theoretical, but structural. As it is structural, it functions in the light of forms but not in the light of matters. As a result, it does not work under the purview of *causal connection*. As it ignores causal connection (*hetu-vidyā*) it is not epistemic-logic. In logic, there are three different interpretations of implications, such as *causal, material, and entailment*. The informal inference is guided by causal connection, the formal inference is guided by material implication, and the modal implication is guided by entailment. It is the admixture of both causal and material. If the aforesaid distinction stands, then from where the relevance of the comparative study of LOC comes? The relevance of comparison still holds because, to me, the sense of LOC, I do reckon, remains the same both in the classical two-value logic and Buddhist logic.

Different Senses of LOC

What then is the *sense of LOC*? The unique sense of LOC hinges on the various interpretations of its *sub-senses*. First, in the case of LOC, the basic components are complimentary with each other. The basic form of LOC is *p and not p*, (i.e., in symbol: $p.\sim p$). Here p and $\sim p$ are two distinct components having different senses. They are complimentary with each other. They are polar components. They are complementary or polar in the sense that they *cannot co-exist with each other*. Here one component appears as the denial of the other and vice-versa. Second, when two complementary terms are conjoined with each other, *it leads to contradiction formally as well as theoretically or informally*. Third, LOC in the negative sense *contains the whole*. As it contains the whole, it says nothing. It is *transcendental* according to Wittgenstein. In this regard, Wittgenstein remarked, “Contradiction ...vanishes outside all propositions... Contradiction is the outer limit of propositions...”⁵ I think Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* has developed the modern interpretation of truth-functional logic. Here he claimed that every logical proposition has two senses, i.e., either the proposition is true or false. Thus when I attempt to compare the LOC of Buddhist logic with its Western counterpart, I must take Wittgenstein's interpretation of bivalence (two-value) logic most than any other.

For example, when I say without any intermission that *I am six feet tall and I am not six feet tall*, my statement leads into contradiction both conceptually and formally. A contradiction is false without exception because according to Wittgenstein it vanishes outside all propositions. As it is false without exception, it says nothing. It says nothing because it lacks participation. It contains the whole. Anything about the whole remains *non-participatory*. The formal sense of LOC, such as “ $p.\sim p$ ” and the informal sense of LOC, such as “I am six feet tall and I am not six feet tall at 10 am on 15th August 2020” remains the same, even though unlike the latter the former is non-committal about matters or contents of p . Fourth, the form of LOC cannot be obtained without the concept of Negation, i.e., ‘ \sim ’. The sense of Negation remains the same in formal and informal applications. The negation of p is not- p and the negation of not- p is p . For example, in Buddhist logic, the negation of

⁵ Wittgenstein, L. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by Pears, D. F., and B. F. McGuinness, Routledge, London and New York, 1991, p.40.

light is dark and the negation of dark is light. As there are only two senses of the proposition, it hovers within these. It is only for the sense of ‘~’, we can develop bivalence or two-value logic. Every proposition has two senses. We cannot have different senses of a proposition without the help of Negation. For example, if the proposition p is true, then its negation would be false and *vice-versa*. Thus the concept of LOC would remain a far cry if we give up the concept of Negation. The Principle of Tautology, such as “ $P \vee \sim P$ ” and the Principle of Contradiction (LOC in my sense), such as “ $p \cdot \sim p$ ” cannot be grasped without the concept of negation. Even to know that two propositions, such as p and q are not identical, we take the help of Negation, expressing it in the form of the symbol: $p \neq q$. Wittgenstein takes Negation as an operation and then remarked “Negation reverses the sense of a proposition.”⁶ One operation can encounter the effect of another. Operations can cancel one another. It retains the same in Buddhist logic as well.

Buddhist Logic

Let me delve into Buddhist logic to delineate the sense of LOC. It is a general perception that the origin of every judgment in Buddhist logic lies *in an act of running through*. In Buddhism, the manifold of objects is divided into two unequal parts, such as a limited number of similar things and a less limited number of dissimilar things. It then says *similar will be other than the dissimilar and the dissimilar will be other than the similar*. They mutually represent the *absence of each of the other*. That means they cannot co-exist. We have the same sense of LOC in classical two-value logic. In Buddhist terminology, I can say that the proposition p and the proposition $\sim p$ are dissimilar. They cannot co-exist with each other. *They mutually represent the absence of each of the other*. LOC in Buddhist logic represents a dichotomy. As an active part of consciousness, it begins with an active part of dichotomy. “As soon as our intellectual eye begins to glimmer, our thought is already beset with contradiction.”⁷ Unlike Western traditional logic, Buddhist logic offers a conceptual exposition of LOC. In this regard, it asserts that LOC is nothing but the expression of the fact that all cognition is *dichotomizing and relative*. It essentially means that here we can cognize a thing only *by opposing it to what it is not*. Thus

⁶ Ibid., p.42.

⁷ Stcherbatsky, Th., *Buddhist Logic*, Matilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, Delhi, 1994, p.404.

there are two components involved in the LOC of which one is the positive and the other consists of the negation or non-existence of the positive. Dharmottara says, “The different and the contrary cannot be conceived so long as the non-existence of the similar is not realized.”⁸ While illuminating LOC, Buddhists logicians used some corollary concepts, such as *similar, dissimilar, existence, non-existence, opposition, otherness, etc.* At times otherness and opposition are realized as representing the negation of the similar. Negation is conceived as the absence of the similar directly, whereas otherness and opposition are conceived of the absence of the similar indirectly. For example, the dissimilar class of fire will embrace (a) the simple absence of fire, (b) the presence of something other than fire, (c) the presence of something incompatible with fire, (d) the presence of something opposed to fire. Here the terms incompatible and different presuppose the *idea of simple absence*.

It should be kept in mind that that the concept of incompatibility (opposition) may have different logical connotations. It may be either *efficient or simply logical*. For example, the *hot* and the *cold* are efficient repugnancies of two things because they cannot co-exist without collision. What is hot cannot be cold and vice-versa. As per the simple logical opposition of two things are concerned, one is the *complete negation* of the other. For example, the blue and the non-blue. It is conceptually a *logical contradiction*. It is Antiphrasis, i.e., *laksaniko virodhah*. I think Buddhist logic deals with the former and Aristotelian logic deals with the latter. But where lies the difference? To me, the *sense* remains the same in both cases. However, I do presume that *efficient repugnancy* is slightly indistinct than *complete negation*. In Buddhist logic, the negation at a particular moment cannot be complete, but it is unlikely in the case of classical two-value logic. The distinction between blue and non-blue is *logically exhaustive* and it can be asserted objectively. However, the distinction between hot and cold is not objective because hot and cold can be measured in *terms of degrees*. Particularly what is hot and what is cold at the minimal level is *subjectively determined*. Moreover, the issue of intermediary matters most in the case of *efficient repugnancy*.

However, when we read Dharmakriti we have the logical interpretation of LOC. According to Dharmakriti, in LOC there are two parts *of which the one is the*

⁸ Dharmottara, *Nyayabindutika*, p.21.

complete negation of the other. More succinctly, he asserts that there remains a contradiction in a couple whose essence is posited in a complete mutual exclusion. For example, *existence and non-existence* are a case in point. What does he mean by complete mutual exclusion (*parihāra, pari-tyāga, atyanta-tyāga, tritiya-prakāra-abhara*)? It essentially means exclusion *without anything intermediate*. From the ontological point of view, it will be called existence and non-existence, and from the logical point of view, it will be affirmation and negation of the same thing. It is not only a mutual reciprocated relation, it is *complete reciprocation*. In the case of complete mutual exclusion, one part is complimentary with the other. The conjunction of two complementary terms leads to LOC and the disjunction of two complementary terms leads to the Law of Excluded Middle (*henceforth: LOEM*). There are two different logical senses of LOEM, namely, *exclusive and inclusive*. In formal truth-functional logic, we apply the inclusive sense of LOEM, whereas, in the case of informal sense, we apply exclusive sense. What is the intended meaning of the sentence: either Ram will come or Shyam will come? It does not essentially mean that both Ram and Shyam will come. Therefore, if both will come, then the sentence would be false because it goes against the intended meaning of the sentence under consideration. But in truth-function logic, it is reckoning as true.

It thus seems that the term *opposition* that plays a significant role to cognize LOC may be different. It may be *real or dynamic*. Therefore, in Buddhist logic when we deal with the concept of *complete mutual exclusion* or *mutual repulsion* which interpreting LOC, we ascribe it metaphorically. Unlike the two-value logic, in Buddhist logic, the contradictory parts of a couple which are used metaphorically “can peacefully exist in close contiguity without interfering with the existence of one another, without the one encroaching upon the territory occupied by the other”.⁹ Is it not logical? If it is not logical, then where lies the relevance of Buddhist logic in LOC? I have categorically stated that when I deal with Buddhist logic, I emphasize the sense of LOC. I have already pointed out that there are various *sub-senses* of the sense of LOC. The sub-senses of the sense of LOC are extremely relevant while addressing a comparison between Buddhist logic and two-value classical logic. Moreover, I do presume that the aforementioned sub-senses have not degenerated

⁹ Stcherbatsky, Th., *Buddhist Logic*, op. Cit. P.402.

from the fundamental sense of LOC. In Buddhist logic, the concept of *Contrapugnant causality* plays a pivotal role. In such cases, both the opposed parts are *mutually endeavoring* to oust one another out of their mutual positions. For example, light and darkness are the ones the complete negation of the other, and vice-versa. In the case of Contrapugnant Causality, the logical relation of contradiction is retained as light is the complete negation of darkness and vice-versa. However, they cannot peacefully co-exist in *close contiguity* as the blue and the non-blue. According to Stcherbatsky, “There is a constant warfare between them; the one will be constantly striving to occupy the territory of the other.”¹⁰ I think the term “constantly striving to occupy the territory of the other” as used in the aforesaid remark of Stcherbatsky gives ample evidence in what sense the use of LOC in Buddhist logic differs from the use of the same in bivalence logic. When we say that p and $\sim p$ are complimentary with each other and their conjunction leads to LOC formally, the issue of “constantly striving to occupy the territory of the other” simply does not arise. However, the same matters most in Buddhist logic when we deal with LOC.

In this regard, the definition of LOC of Dharmakirti is extremely relevant. Dharmakirti says, “If a phenomenon is produced by the totality of its causes (and therefore) endures, but (suddenly) disappears on the approach of another phenomenon, there is between both these phenomena a (real) opposition, as, for instance, between cold and hot.”¹¹ I think in the aforesaid definition “*the totality of its causes...endures*” certainly refers to Contrapugnant Causality, which I think is completely foreign in Classical two-value logic. In Buddhist logic, the intended meaning of the terms associated with LOC matter most. The same is unlikely in the case of two-value logic. Thus to me, it would be a prerequisite to conceive the meaning of the “totality of causes of the opposed phenomena”. It is true to say that the denial of hot leads to cold and the denial of cold leads to hold. Does it then lead us to assume that the denial of hot causes to have a cold and vice-versa? Does the light, which in some junctures invariably follow on darkness effect of that darkness and vice-versa? These are some knotty philosophical questions that very often perplex philosophers. However, in Buddhist logic, we find a definite answer. In

¹⁰ Ibid., p.405.

¹¹ I quoted it from Stcherbatsky, Th., *Buddhist Logic*, Matilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, Delhi, 1994, p.404.

Buddhist logic, it is affirmed that the cause of having something as cold lies in the denial of hot and vice-versa. It is reflected in the Buddhist theory of causation. It states that “every point of genuine reality is arising in functional dependence on a sum-total of preceding factors, which all are its causes.”¹² Here the term “totality” contains both positive and negative magnitudes. They jointly help to have something as hot from something as cold. If one part is opposed to the other, it is at the same time doing something, i.e., it indirectly partakes in its production.

In Buddhist logic, one cannot rule out the cases of efficient repugnancy and it is unlikely in classical Aristotelian logic. However, this does not make sense to say that in all cases LOC is used in Buddhist logic in the aforesaid sense. For example, there is no question of doubt that light is the complete contradiction of non-light as there remains nothing intermediate between light and non-light. It is very similar to classical Aristotelian logic. It fulfills the LOEM principle as well. What do we think of light and darkness? Can we say that there is no intermediate between them? According to Buddhist logic, if light and darkness are considered real phenomena, then there always remains *something in the middle*. Even if the change is abrupt, even if the light appears all of a sudden with full swing on the very place, nevertheless we cannot rule out at least *one intermediate moment of twilight*. According to Buddhist logic in a normal situation, it requires at least three moments: *the ultimate moment of darkness, the initial moment of light, and at least one moment between them, for the change to take place*. That means the change from darkness to light is *a running through the process where we find at least three moments as an intermediary*. Now, if the three moments are taken as an intermediary, then LOC, as well as LOEM, cannot hold as per bivalence logic. I think this is one of the major differences between classical two-value logic and Buddhist logic about the application of LOC. Here the opposition is not complete concerning time. The same is not complete concerning space as well. For example, when the light is produced in a large room, darkness is annihilated only in that part of it that is nearest to the lamp. But in the remaining part, there is either twilight or darkness. According to Buddhist logic, “light is produced only as far the efficient forces producing it are capable of doing it.”¹³ Having said we

¹² Ibid., p.405.

¹³ Ibid., p.406.

have different interpretations even in Buddhist logic if we consider the logical opposition between *light and non-light*. Here the opposition between light and non-light is complete, exhaustive, and there is no twilight because *twilight is included in the non-light*. There is no intermediate between light and non-light either in time or in space. Here the relation between light and non-light is characterized by logical necessity and it is at par with the classical two-value interpretation of LOC.

Thus, we have two different interpretations of LOC in Buddhist logic of which one *may be considered* at par with the classical two-value logic and the other is non-classical two-value. The point is of course, what makes the difference? Western classical logic, being a formal logic, *essentially ignores the relevance of causality*. However, when we examine the same issue in Buddhist logic, it seems that Buddhist logic takes causal implications (*hetu-vidya*) while elucidating LOC. Buddhist logic, I have already mentioned on more than one occasion, identifies two different applications of LOC, such as *complete mutual exclusion* and *efficient repugnancy*.

What then do we think of pleasure and pain? In what sense they are interpreted in Buddhist logic under LOC? Hinayana observed that between pleasure and pain there is an indifferent feeling in the middle. Even careful study would reflect that in Buddhism there was considerable debate relating to the indifferent feeling. But we have a definite response in Buddhist logic about pleasure and pain. It states that if there is an indifferent feeling in the middle between pleasure and pain, then the indifferent feeling may be conceived either as not pleasure or not pain. If it is conceived as not pleasure then it must be included in the category pain. If, on the contrary, it is conceived not pain, then it must be included in the category pleasure. As a result, there are only two mutually exclusive parts, pleasure, and displeasure. Thus the debate is solved by assuming the fact that there are just two oppositions between pleasure and pain where the one is logical *without a middle term* and the other is *real with a transition part*.

Let us explain the point of *time duration* by citing *light and darkness*. There are efficient point- instants both in the case of light and also in the case of darkness. The transition from light to darkness and also from darkness to light *endures for some time* and during the endurance or so-called transition, there are *series of moments* in which the real causation exists between *efficient point-instants*. Among the series of moments, there is the last moment and the last moment of the series called darkness is

the real cause in the sense of dependent origination, and the first moment of the series is called light. As light and darkness are opposite and one is *transformed into the other through a series of moments*, there is the first (beginning) moment and the last (end) moment. When light is transformed into darkness, light is the beginning or first moment and the last moment of the series is called darkness. It is the cause of the first moment and it can be understood by dependent origination. According to Buddhist logic, even though light and darkness are two different moments of which one is the cause of the other when one transforms into the other, but they are not *mere moments*. They are different from other moments as they become *what they are*. They become the phenomena of light and darkness and unlike other moments they are *endured for some moments*. This is where the significance between *efficient opposition* and *real causation* essentially hinges.

What then is the distinction between *real causation* and *efficient opposition*? According to Buddhist logic, real causation like real existence belongs to *single moments only*; whereas efficient opposition is “between one assemblage of moments and another assemblage”. Thus, unlike real causation, efficient opposition is *constructed just as the assemblages themselves* are constructed by the intellect. “In other words, the relation of efficient opposition is not an ultimate fact; it does not belong to the *Things-in-Themselves*, but only to constructed phenomena.”¹⁴ According to Buddhist logic, LOC does not apply to the Things-in-Themselves because logic is thought and thought is imagination. On the contrary, Things-in-Themselves is the ultimate reality. Logic thus cannot reach up to ultimate reality, i.e., *Things-in-Themselves*. However, this position of Buddhist logic cannot be accepted without begging questions. It was reflected from the words of Dharmottara. The debate was centered on whether the relation of efficient opposition was real or merely logical; whether it was transcendently real or only phenomenal. Dharmattara attempted to solve this debate by assuming two different kinds of efficient opposition. He then goes on to say that just there are two kinds of causality, namely, transcendental and real, obtaining between point-instants and the other, being a category, metaphorical, obtaining between phenomena, just so there are two kinds of efficient opposition. In ultimate reality, there is however no relation of opposition

¹⁴ Ibid., pp.407-8.

between entities as *things-in-themselves*. According to Dharmakirti, “When one fact has duration as long as the sum-total of its causes remains unimpaired, and it then shrinks as soon as another fact (being opposed to it) appears; it follows that both are (dynamically) opposed, (just as the sensations of heat and of cold).”¹⁵ As it is constructed by our intellect, it is not ultimately real.

Concluding Remarks

It seems from the above observation that there are different interpretations of LOC in Buddhist logic. Let me specify first the stringent modern logical definition of LOC. It is *entirely formal and necessary*. The atomic form of LOC is $p \sim p$. It is the fundamental structure of LOC. Any proposition that fulfills this form would be regarded as a contradiction. Here the two components, namely, p and $\sim p$ are *mutually exclusive and exhaustive* without anything intermediate. It functions in a *logical space* where every possible situation is available at the very outset. In logical space, no new information will appear later on. In logical space, everything is available at the very outset. This is where the distinction between epistemology and logic hinges. In the case of epistemic logic, there remains the possibility of having new information that would vitiate or at least weaken the earlier epistemic conclusion. Moreover, epistemic logic functions in the empirical space. Logical space differs from empirical space in the sense that unlike the latter the former goes beyond *causal principle*. It is exhaustive in the sense that it contains *the whole and there remains nothing intermediate to add something or make off with anything*. Thus in a sense, *it says nothing*. It is, in Wittgenstein’s sense, *transcendental*. What is transcendental goes beyond the purview of causal connection or causal efficacy.

A Relook after Strawson

Many logicians interpreted LOC in terms of *inconsistency*. Strawson (1976) for example, prefers the term inconsistency instead of contradiction. According to Strawson, one involves inconsistency if he utters two propositions *at the same time and same breath* of which one is the complete negation of the other.¹⁶ For example, if John says at the same time and in the same breath that *he is a bachelor and he is not a bachelor*, he involves in inconsistency. This essentially suggests that in the case of

¹⁵ Dharmakirti, *Nyayabindu*, p.68.

¹⁶ Strawson, P.F., *Introduction to Logical Theory*, B.I. Publications, Bombay/Calcutta. Delhi. Madras, 1976, p.3.

LOC or inconsistency in the Strawsonian sense, any interval or so to speak temporal gap is ruled out. However, Strawson inclines to say that if there is a *time gap* of saying between two contradictory remarks, then it would violate LOC. In Strawsonian sense, the statement like “I am a bachelor on 15th August and I am not a bachelor on 16th August 2021” may not be contradictory because it is both empirically and logically possible that the person, who was a bachelor on 15th August, might be a married person on the 16th August 2021.

Thus, for Strawson, LOC of classical logic cannot work if we are allowed to justify it from descriptive content where epistemic issues involve. If I am asked by a student that Sir, how did you enjoy the marriage ceremony of my (his) friend that you (I) had attended? If I am replied in the form that “It was good and not good”, then my student might say that Sir you are involved in *a plain contradiction*. How did the same ceremony be good and not good at the same time? Following Strawson, I can retort to the student by saying that if you allow me to justify then you can recognize that I am not involving in contradiction. I then say that the reception component of the ceremony was extremely good and the food quality and cuisine of the same was not good. So “it was good and not good”. This position of Strawson may be closer to Jainas’s position. Thus for Strawson, if we are allowed to take the descriptive content to appraise LOC, then we can overcome the *apparent contradiction*. The statement that I am over six feet tall and I am less than six feet tall can be overcome by saying that *I am just six feet tall*. Thus both LOC and LOEM can be violated if we are allowed to take help from descriptive content. I find propinquity between Strawson and Buddhist logic. As the fundamental assumption of Buddhism is momentariness, we cannot rule out a temporal gap between two moments. In Buddhist logic as every moment is different, therefore to say that he is a bachelor in one moment and to say that he is not a bachelor in another moment would vitiate LOC. The point then is: if we rule out the point instant (moment) and the Buddhist general position that every moment is different from every other moment, then to me Buddhist logic surely cannot work. On the other hand, if we admit the Buddhist position of the same then following Strawson I can say that the classical concept of LOC does not work at par with the Buddhist logic. However, the point, I do surmise, is that Buddhist logic attempts to overcome the charge at least from the causal point of view that every moment depends on the subsequent moment and there remains *a continuity and*

contiguity among the series of moments as I have mentioned after Buddhist logic in the case of light and darkness. Strawson does not accept the theory of dependent origination. Strawson would say that every moment is completely different from other moments. The world of facts is happening at every moment. Therefore, the classical principle of LOC cannot retain its sanctity, if the temporal gap is allowed. My position in this regard is that from a Strawsonian perspective, the LOC of Buddhist logic cannot reach up to retain the dignity of LOC of two-value classical logic. However, by saying so, I do not subscribe that Buddhist logic is irrelevant and if anyone thinks so, I am certainly not belonging to this camp. My position here is very simple and clear. *As Buddhist logic is not formal and classical two-value logic is formal, therefore to attempt to find out the formal implication in Buddhist logic in particular and even the whole Indian logic, in general, would be a futile exercise.* Having said the comparison is still praiseworthy because to me the sun-senses of the sense of LOC remain intact in both systems.

Other Insights

The basic problem with Buddhist logic, is that it cannot ignore the fundamental theory of *momentariness*. To me, Buddhist philosophy in general and Buddhist logic, in particular, has paid for that. If every moment is different from every other moment, then how can we interpret the continuity? In this regard, Buddhism brings the concept of dependent origination (*pratityasamudpada*). I am not entering into the debate. But I intend to say that the theory of momentariness and the principle of dependent origination appear as a serious threat to retain the logical dignity and logical sanctity of LOC. If I subscribe to the modern interpretation of LOC as a paradigm and evaluate the Buddhist interpretation of LOC in the light of that then surely cannot accommodate the Buddhist interpretation of LOC as logically genuine. In such a case it would not only violate the Strawsonian paradigm of inconsistency, it equally violates and overlaps the classical two-value paradigm of LOC. This position perhaps may be taken as *a narrow interpretation of LOC* as it puts emphasis only on the formal aspect of LOC. The question is of course: Can we overcome this hurdle and make the comparison *more viable and fruitful*? If so, how it can be justified? This is the crux of the problem where I have a point to say. My position is very simple and clear. I do not think at all that Buddhist logic interprets LOC very similarly to classical Western logic because the former acts under the

purview of causal law and principle, whereas the latter acts under the purview of logical space and strictly abided by the formal structure. As Buddhist logic is guided by the causal rule and principle, it functions in the empirical space. To me, logical space differs from empirical space because it is known that what is empirically impossible is logically possible. That means it can assess the possible situations which remained uncaused from ordinary causal principles.

Thus one point is clear that Buddhist logic deals with the theoretical interpretation of LOC, whereas Aristotelian logic or bivalence logic deals with the formal interpretation of LOC. However, I do reckon that the sense of LOC remained the same in both interpretations. So if we make the comparison more viable and fruitful, we must rely on the sense of LOC. I have already mentioned various senses of LOC and claimed that there are various sub-senses of the sense of LOC which remained common both in the classical two-value interpretation of LOC and in the Buddhist logical interpretation of LOC. For example, the sense of double negation remained intact in both systems. The negation of p is $\sim p$ and the negation of $\sim p$ is $\sim \sim p$, i.e., p . Buddhist logic like the bivalence logic acknowledges that in the case of complete negation, the terms blue and non-blue are mutually exclusive as they cannot co-exist with each other. It is at par with logical contradiction. Having said that, to interpret LOC in terms of the principle of dependent origination and causal efficacy is altogether a different interpretation than to interpret the same from a purely formal structure. Thus I can say that the sense of LOC remains the same but the methods are different in both interpretations. Buddhist logic applies the theoretical method associated with *causal efficacy* whereas classical two-value logic or modern two-value propositional logic applies the formal method. The former depends on *causal efficacy*, whereas the latter depends on *formal efficacy*.

Let us re-examine the issue where it has been affirmed in Buddhist logic that there are two oppositions between pleasure and pain of which *one is logical without a middle term* and the other is *real with a transition part*. It affirms that what is logical is not real and what is real may not be logical. Here the term *real* is conceived in the sense of *causal efficacy* and it is contained in the empirical space. Now my point is that if the relation of this kind of contradiction reduces to a case of causality in Buddhist logic, would it then not be a misnomer to call it *a contradiction in the two-value classical sense*? Is it not causality simple? It was the opinion of early

Vaisesikas where *efficient opposition* as a relation is taken into account. Efficient opposition is a natural loathing between two things, such as, for example, the natural irreconcilable antagonism of the ichneumon and the snake. It seems that the Buddhists with certain reservations acknowledged the characteristic of the relation of *efficient opposition* as the relation between “something stopping and something stopped” (*nivartya-nivartaka-bhava*) where the stopping and the stopped were durations. According to Buddhist logic, efficient opposition includes the fundamental characteristic that the diminishing phenomena must possess duration very similar to the suspending phenomena. The causal relation associated with dependent origination obtains between the disappearing phenomenon and the superseding phenomenon had some duration. It is the outcome of metaphysical causation but not real causation because real causation exists between *efficient point-instants*.

What is conceived is that the Buddhist logical interpretation is all about of *predication of various terms*, such as blue and non-blue, hot and cold, light and darkness, etc. Buddhist logic takes each of these polar pairs through causal connection. But in modern truth-functional logic, the application of predication through causal connection is completely foreign. The former is theoretically based on causal efficacy but the latter is essentially formal and independent of causal efficacy. Secondly, as bivalence logic is formal and independent of causal efficacy, it completely ignores time duration, but it is unlikely in the Buddhist logic when it takes up LOC. Third, the formal interpretation of LOC expressed in the form of $P \cdot \sim P$ is exhaustive and there is no intermediary or time duration in between them, whereas, in the theoretically causal interpretation of LOC in Buddhist logic, there remains intermediacy between two opposed predicate terms. Moreover, I find formal dearth not only in Buddhist logic but in most of the Indian logical systems. Having said that I do not think that the formal efficacy and the causal efficacy of LOC that I have already outlined in the aforementioned systems are completely detached from each other. Rather I strongly believe that the formal efficacy of LOC contains the causal efficacy and goes beyond that. Otherwise, the sense of LOC cannot be retained almost the same in both systems. I have already justified it by saying that there are various *sub-senses of the sense of LOC* for which the comparison of LOC between Buddhist logic and bivalence logic became worthy. So I end the paper with a single-

line conclusion that the comparison between Buddhist logic and the classical two value logic finds its foothold if we rely *on various senses of LOC and nothing else.*

A METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OF SELF IN THE LIGHT OF PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

SOMDATTA BHATTACHARYYA

I

Tracing back to the history of philosophy of psychology we may find that in the field of psychotherapy, an important metaphysical question can be raised in the context of therapist-client relationship. It is like this – in the dialogue between the therapist and the client which ‘person’, or ‘self’ is addressed (taking ‘person’ and ‘self’ in synonymous way). Here we can quote from Carl Rogers who originally believed that self ‘was a vague, ambiguous, scientifically meaningless term’ but that his clinical experience showed him that people spoke of their ‘self’ as if it was an entity – it seemed clear that the self was an important element in the experience of the client¹. In therapeutic context, the client shares her most private events which include both mental and physical behaviours. These issues regarding mental and physical states are focused here from multi-various perspectives in different approaches of mind-body problem. In Indian tradition too Caraka in his famous *Caraka-Samhita*, has stipulated the qualities to be possessed by a client for the achievement of optimum result². In this context he gives the nature and characteristics of a patient (client) who is termed as Rashipurusa or Cikitsapurusa, i.e., the person or purusa or jibatma who can have treatment³. To mention, caraka refers to both physical and mental diseases; the latter called as manasa. But here I shall look into the matter in a little different way.

In the field of Applied Psychology the age-old and common question of everyday occurrence such as “who am I?” is addressed in the theories of Personality. In the theory of Personality, this question is dealt in a little different manner, it is – “what type of ‘person’ is he?” But the question is whether the ‘person’/‘self’/ ‘conscious or unconscious mind’, in other words the ‘I’ entertained in therapeutic sessions can be understood with the help of such theories of personality or not. By this I do not want to imply that a fully comprehensive theory regarding the nature of ‘self or person’ addressed in therapy can be curved out reflecting on such theories of personality. But my point is, I would like to understand ‘person in therapy’ with the help of some related issues some of which may be observed from the theories of Personality discussed in the field of Applied Psychology.

II

Etymologically the source of the English word 'Personality' has been derived from the Latin word 'Persona', 'Persona stands for the mask worn by actors in drama that stands for the characteristics of the role played by the specific actor'⁴. The term 'personality' is used to account for the sum total of all the characteristics that pertain to distinguishing an individual from others and also the intra-individual stability as well as change in an individual with reference to her psychological characteristics⁵. Thus, the central theme of the personality theories is the substance of the inter-individual differences and intra-individual differences in personal qualities and characteristics of individuals. While this is true of every theory of personality, the ways and means with which the personality theories achieve this account vary from one theory to the other.

It is to mention that both the physical or behavioural and mental or psychological states are considered while the personal qualities and individual characteristics are focused in the theories of personality. But the question is it a general approach of all the theories of personality? The Behaviouristic tradition in Psychology is quite well known for its completely different approach which solely emphasizes on the physical or behavioural aspects of person. Behaviourist like Skinner (1904 - 1990) does not believe in distinguishing personality from behavior. According to him personality characteristics, i.e., behaviours are considered to be just mediated by conditioning principles. He contends that the principles of reinforcement of operant conditioning are universal across species. He observed that pigeon, rat, monkey or whatever that may be, that behavior, shows astonishingly similar properties. In ultimate analysis what one conceives by the term personality reduces to objective activities. Till the end of his career, Skinner contained resisting the growing belief that the cognitive processes - thoughts, processes, expectations - have a necessary place in Psychology and even in our understanding of conditioning⁶.

The picture that is mentioned above is quite different in theories like Freudian Psychoanalytic theory, theory of Jung, Adler, Horney, Sullivan, Fromm and Erikson, Humanistic theories of Rogers, Maslow etc. which emphasize both on behavioural and mental or psychological aspects of personality. The starting point of Freud's theory clearly shows the relevance of mental aspects along with the bodily or behavioural activities.

Freud⁷ conceived mind (personality) as having three structural components of psyche, the id, the ego, and the super ego. It is very commonly known that the id is the oldest and most central aspect of the human psyche. It is unconscious in its entirety. Freud describes that although all of our psychic energy originates with the id, it is often necessary to channel this energy in a manner that leads to socially acceptable conduct. It is the ego which leads to the performance of behaviours that can be described as logical, rational and socially acceptable. Super ego develops after the id and ego. Its most important function is to limit the satisfaction of the id's wishes. It is an internalized sense of conscience that imposes the moralistic values of society upon the individual. Whereas the id is hedonistic, the ego is realistic and the super ego is idealistic in nature.

As it has been sketched above, Freudian psychology has overlaid the role of the unconscious. An important question that arises with regard to this assumption is - whether person is dominated by the unconscious or by awareness. Freud holds that the unconscious is the primary source of one's behavior. Thus it seems that there is a sort of causal connection between unconscious mental states and bodily behaviours. From this contention it follows that whatever a person does primarily leads from her unconscious drive. Thus as far as the ontic nature of the 'person' is concerned, it seems to be unconscious in nature. The 'person' as a client in a therapist-client relationship also appears to be unconscious in nature. From this contention a very obvious metaphysical question would be - how the co-ordination between unconscious mental states and conscious bodily behaviours would be possible? Again, how does a conscious bodily behavior arise from an unconscious mental state? Although Freud, establishes his theory bringing forth the reality principle of ego over and above the admittance of the id on one hand and super ego on the other, still we may be justifiably skeptic regarding his topographical presentation of mind or psyche ('self in this case or person) as having three interconnected compartments - id, ego and super ego.

The personality theories of Jung, Adler, Horney, Sullivan, Fromm, and Erikson do share many of the basic assumptions held by Freud. They differ from him in emphasis placed on libido functioning. Jung developed a personality typology that has become very popular. Jung's revision of psychoanalysis involves a spectacular array of complex ideas taken from psychology, philosophy, astrology etc. The

'psyche' or 'total personality' was viewed by Jung as composed of a variety of separate structures or systems that which are quite different from one another, are capable of influencing one another. The major structure is the ego, the personal consciousness and the collective unconscious. Jung hypothesized that the contents of the collective unconscious consist of powerful, primordial images called archetypes (original model). The self is the most salient archetypes in Jung's theory. The self archetype cannot emerge until all other systems of psyche have become fully developed. Jung's theory is free from the charge regarding the dominance of unconscious mental states which is the primary notion of Freud. Because Jung admits the significance of both unconscious and conscious mental states in his system. Thus the ontic status of self or person needs not be discussed only in terms of an uncomfortable discourse of unconscious mental states. Thus, Jung and others like Adler, Erikson, Maslow, Rogers etc. consider the conscious states over and above unconscious one⁸.

The second question that I would like to address here is – which aspect of conscious mental states of the person (client in case of therapy) are mainly addressed in therapy - the cognitive states or the emotive states or both? Cognitive theorists like Beck, Ellis and others consider the application of cognitive theory as key in overcoming many negative aspects of personality. They believe that cognition always precedes behavior and emotion and therefore, changing in the other two. In cognitive theory, behavior is explained as guided by cognitions (e.g. expectations) about the world, especially those about other people. Cognitive theories are theories of personality that emphasize cognitive processes such as thinking and judging. In this contention there lies a problem. It may be difficult for the therapist to understand the cognitive states of the client without addressing the emotive part related to that cognitive state. The 'person' or 'self' in the client may be said to have different dimensions if the emotive content varies with reference to the same cognitive state. In this context the notion of Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), an approach to Cognitive Behaviour theory can be brought in which was originated in 1955 by Dr. Albert Ellis, an American Clinical psychologist. According to REBT although cognitions are important to an understanding of the way people feel and act, emotions and behaviours along with cognitions are not separate psychological processes in the sense they interact in complex ways⁹.

The principle of REBT¹⁰ has its roots in Stoic Philosophy in general, and in particular the writings of Epictetus from which the current version of REBT can be summed up as - People are disturbed not by things, but by their rigid and extreme views of things. Views of things are designated as beliefs of things. Beliefs are deemed to be fully evaluative in nature and either rational or irrational in nature. According to REBT theory, belief change is considered to be the type of change that best promotes the psychological health of the person. But the question is - what does this type of change involve? REBT posits that four irrational beliefs lie at the core of psychological disturbance, namely rigid demands, awfulising beliefs, low frustration tolerance beliefs and depreciation beliefs (depreciation of self and others). The course of change in such beliefs is referred to in REBT as profound and enduring. Such beliefs are referred to in REBT as profound and enduring philosophical change, which is heavily emphasized in REBT literature. Philosophical change can occur in specific situations across situations or pervade the clients' life. It is important to note that while philosophical change is the preferred treatment goal, it is not the only goal. If some of the clients are not interested in philosophical change or believe it is beyond their present capabilities to achieve, then non-philosophical changes are to be focused, such as, learning relaxation and breathing techniques to combat their panic attacks instead of dropping their safety behaviors to confront and overcome their fears. It is to note that these clients always have the option of returning to therapy to pursue a philosophical solution if the non-philosophical change has helped them in significant ways. Here the person or self in therapy seem to have all sorts of negative features like being rigid, impatient, tensed, panicked, having feeling of failure etc. The aim of REBT theory is to develop the positive features like having full preferences, non-awfulising beliefs, high frustration tolerance beliefs and acceptance beliefs, which seem to be healthy rational beliefs. The point which can be emphasized here is that the emotional aspect of the client in therapy has to be observed and attended properly over and above the cognitive aspect of the person in order to have an apparently coherent view of the 'person' or 'self' in therapy.

Ellis¹¹ considers that emotional insight represents a strongly and frequently held conviction in something which influences one's feelings and behavior in significant ways. In order to understand this observation properly the details of

therapeutic process of REBT needs to be examined which does not fall within, our scope of discussion over here. But the point is self as seen as having rational aspects, or as having cognitive aspects do not provide an over arching view of 'person' or 'self' as a client in therapy in particular and 'person' or 'self' as a common human agent in general. It can be mentioned in this context the third voice movement in the history of psychiatry (the other two are - paternalism and principlism) which is advocated by the Feminist trend of Philosophy, that 'emotion' of person is to be taken care of along with reason or the rational aspects of human self. It is not only the REBT school of psychotherapy which emphasizes on emotions of self along with cognitive and behavioural aspects. Other prominent traditions are there which worked on this too. The Rogerian tradition of client - centered therapy is an important name in this field. According to Carl Rogers, a healthy individual is aware of him or her emotional feelings. Whether or not they are expressed, those feeling that are denied to awareness, tend to distort perception of and reactions to the experience that triggered them. Rogers does not appreciate educational systems that overemphasize intellectual skills and undervalue the emotional and intuitive aspects of full functioning¹².

III

In Rogerian system development of self-concept has a very significant role. The central question of this article, i.e., which 'person' or 'self' is addressed in psychotherapy, receives a prominent place in Rogerian client centered 'therapy'. In contrast to the theories using the term 'self' to designate the facet of personal identity that is unchanging stable, event external, Rogers uses the term to refer to the ongoing process of recognition. This emphasis on change and flexibility underlies his theory and his belief that people are capable of growth, change and personal development. The self is an individual's view of oneself based on past experience, present inputs and future experience. Roger believes that growth force exists in every individual. The natural growth process of the organism involves greater differentiation, expansion, increased autonomy, greater socialization and on the whole self actualization, Holdstock¹³ refers that in terms of person-centered theory 'self can embrace the 'fluidity of the self-other boundary'. Where the subjective-objective dichotomy also seems to disappear. Referring Rogerian theory I would like to concentrate here that the 'self or 'person' addressed in therapy is autonomous or not. This refers to a

very important philosophical issue of 'free choice' or 'freedom to act in a particular way or other'. As it has been mentioned above, Rogers emphasizes on the autonomous aspect of 'person' in his client-centered theory. We may point out theories of personality which considers- the determined nature of 'self for person in therapy'. For instance, behaviourist like Skinner rejected all notions that humans are autonomous beings whose behaviour is determined by the presumed existence of internal factors (unconscious, archetypes, traits etc.). He assumed that all behaviours are lawfully determined, predictable and able to be brought under environment control¹⁴.

In this context we may refer to Joel Fienberg¹⁵, a liberal theorist, regarding the notion of 'autonomy'. He has advanced one of the most, thoughtful account of liberal self appropriately described as 'autonomous'. This account is perhaps best-known for its description of the qualities that inhere in one who is autonomous: qualities such as authenticity, integrity and distinct self-identity. Gerald Dworkin¹⁶ in his *The Concept of Autonomy* adds that a proper view of autonomy should not conflict "with" emotional ties to others, with commitments to causes, with authority, tradition, expertise, leadership, and so forth. In the context of Psychotherapeutic ethics (falling under medical ethics) five basic moral principles are described by Welfel & Kitchener and Kitchener. These are Principle of Autonomy, Principle of Beneficence, Principle of non-maleficence, Principle of Justice and Principle of Fidelity¹⁷. In therapist-client relationship, the question is, whether the therapist respects the autonomous self or person of the client or not. The autonomy beneficence conflict in the field of psychotherapeutic ethics is an arena which has received great prominence. But in this discussion the ethical implications of autonomy-beneficence controversy is not our concern. But here I would like to mention that which self is reflected in therapy? As we have mentioned, Rogers would agree that ultimate goal of every individual is to become a fully functioning person. The fully functioning person has faith in her ability to make judgement and to take decisions. Fully functioning individuals experience a sense of freedom which implies that she is autonomous. Rogers opines that in client-centered-therapy, the autonomy of the client should be respected. Question arises, if the autonomy of the client is impaired, then how can it be respected? Impairment follows from psychological dysfunction of the client.

At this point, I would, like to mention another factor due to which a person's autonomy may become impaired. In the field of feminist philosophy, it has been explained that the traditional women's role entangles her indefinitely in relational demands that often supersede her own needs for quiet, privacy, and self-development¹⁸. Diana Meyers in her essay "Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization" opines that the 'traditional woman' is strongly socialized to feminine norms and devotes herself primarily to the care of her family. According to the assumptions of mainstream liberal theory, this woman is marked by several characteristics that would seem likely to disqualify her as an autonomous agent. Moreover what is very much important is that the 'traditional woman' has chosen this role in large part because of an early and comprehensive socialization that defines this role as appropriate and valuable to her because she is a woman."¹⁹

Thus, we may observe that in psychotherapeutic context the impaired autonomy of the person or self of the client referred in the first place, can be purely understood in terms of psychology, in such cases the cognitions may get affected or the beliefs may be irrational etc. which may lead to impairment of autonomous aspect of the person /self in the client. While in the second case mentioned above the impairment of autonomous aspect of the person /self of the person/self in the client is due to social construction. In such the 'traditional woman' is ensnared by social norms in such a way that she is not in a position to recognize and accept her self-identity. Over and above the psychological distress, the patriarchic society also impedes the development of autonomous self in such a client. In this context it can be mentioned that the Rogerian school²⁰ holds that the acceptance of one' self is prerequisite to an easier and more genuine acceptance of others. At the same time being accepted by another, leads to a greater willingness to accept oneself. This self-correcting and self-enhancing cycle is the major way one minimizes obstacle to psychological growth. Such psychological growth is incredibly significant to discover and rediscover the 'self' or the 'person' situated in the socio-politico-ethical world. Such psycho-social 'self or person' is also placed as a client in the context of psychotherapy. It is also the therapist in the psychotherapist-client relationship or any other being in the world. It can be held that the 'person or self' in the client which is addressed in psychotherapeutic relation is not an all comprehensive ontic being who

is placed in the outer world, but as according to Rogers²¹, within the field of experience is found the self. This self is not a stable, unchanging entity. The self is an organized consistent gestalt which is constantly in the process of forming and repressing situational changes. Thus, it may be assumed that the concept of self may be attempted to be understood in the living experiences; it can not be taken as an absolute concept and the philosophical search for understanding it, is actually a continuous process.

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CĀRVĀKA HEDONISM: SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS

NIRMAL KUMAR ROY

I

We know that Indian Philosophy, in general, prescribes for four *puruṣārthas*, viz., *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. But the Cārvāka School accepts only two *puruṣārthas*, viz., *artha* and *kāma*, and rejects *dharma* and *mokṣa* altogether. Between the two *puruṣārthas*, *kāma*, the Cārvāka School says, is the supreme end and *artha* is the means to fulfil this end.

Let us explain the Cārvāka ethics in brief. The ethical theory of the Cārvāka School is known as hedonism. Here the question comes: What do we mean by hedonism? The word ‘hedonism’ literally means a doctrine of pleasure. This ethical theory holds that pleasure is the ultimate or supreme goal of human life. Hedonism is based upon two assumptions – one is metaphysical and another is psychological. The former holds that we are basically sensuous in nature. We have reason no doubt, but our reason is not the master, rather, it is the slave in the hands of our passion. According to the psychological assumption man naturally seeks pleasure and avoids pain. This hedonism is of two types viz. Psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism. ‘Psychological hedonism holds that pleasure is the natural and normal object of desire, that we always seek pleasure and avoid pain. Ethical hedonism holds that pleasure is the proper object of desire; that we do not always seek pleasure but ought to seek pleasure’.¹ According to the Cārvāka School, the satisfaction of sensual pleasure and biological need is the supreme goal of human life. Thus, it is seen that the Cārvāka ethics is nothing but hedonism. Ethical hedonism again is subdivided into two kinds- (a) egoistic hedonism and (b) altruistic or universalistic hedonism. ‘Egoistic hedonism regards the individual’s own pleasure to be the moral end, whereas universalistic hedonism considers the pleasure or happiness of all to be the ideal.’² The Cārvāka ethics can be described as egoistic hedonism since it suggests the individual’s own pleasure to be the moral end. The ideal of the Cārvāka ethics is beautifully expressed in the oft-quoted verse which goes as:

*“Yāvatjīvetasukhamjīvetarṇamkṛtvāghṛtampiveta.
Bhasmibhūtasadehasyapunarāgamanamkutaḥ”.*

¹ Sinha, Jadunath. *A Manual of Ethics*, p. 66.

² Sharma. I.C. *Ethical Philosophies of India*, p. 110.

i.e., ‘while life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt; when once the body becomes ashes how can it ever return again?’³ The Cārvākas advise people to live happily even at the risk of incurring debt because they are of the opinion that this life is the only life, after death, there is no chance of coming back to the world again. According to them, there is no soul over and above the body. The soul is the conscious-living body. Our consciousness is nothing but the by-product of the combination of the four material elements mentioned above in a particular proportion. So, after death when our body is turned into ashes then how can our consciousness come back again? Saṅkarācārya, in this regard, says: ‘The soul is but the body characterized by the attributes signified in the expression, “I am stout,” “I am youthful,” “I am grown up,” “I am old,” etc... The consciousness found in the modifications of non-intelligent elements is produced in the manner of the red colour out of the combination of the betel areca nut and lime.’⁴

As the existence of the soul as different from the body is denied the mokṣa, the transmigration of the soul along with the existence of God are rejected altogether by the Cārvākas. This view has been expressed by Mādhavācārya in the following way: ‘Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain produced by purely mundane causes such as thorns, etc.; the only supreme being is the earthly monarch, whose existence is proved by all the world’s eyesight; and the only liberation is the dissolution of the body.’⁵ God is generally admitted as the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. The Cārvākas maintain *svabhābavāda* and therefore deny the necessity of God. They hold that the creation, preservation and destruction of the world is an automatic process. In this regard, Mādhavācārya says: ‘The fire is hot, the water is cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn. From their own nature was it born?’⁶

Conforming to the norm of the discussion of Indian philosophy the Cārvākas first refute the views of the other schools, that liberation is the summum-bonum of human life. By liberation, we mean a state of total and permanent destruction of

³ Mādhavācārya. *Sarvadarsanasamgraha*

⁴ Saṅkarācārya, *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha*, p.7.

⁵ *Sarvadarsanasamgraha*, p. 4.

⁶ *Sarvadarsanasamgraha*, p. 10.

suffering. This liberation or *mukti* is of two types: (a) *Jīvanmukti* and (b) *videhamukti*. The former holds that liberation can be attained only after death when the soul is completely detached from the body. The latter, on the other hand, maintains that liberation can be attained even in this life when our soul continues to be united with the body. But the Cārvākas criticize both of the views and ultimately reject them. They argue that *Videhamukti* cannot be accepted for the simple reason that this *mukti* consists in the freedom of the soul from its bondage to physical existence, but there is no point in maintaining the existence of the soul apart from the body, since the conscious-living-body itself stands for the soul.

So far as the concept of the *jīvanmukti* is concerned the Cārvākas hold that if liberation means the attainment of a state in this very life which is absolutely free from all types of pain, then again it is also equally an impossible ideal. This worldly life is the essential mixture of pleasure and pain. So, the absolute cessation of pain in this life is quite impossible. In this situation, we can only try to minimize pain and enjoy as maximum pleasure as possible. Liberation in the sense of complete cessation of pain and suffering can only mean death.⁷ The Cārvākas state that those who try to attain a state completely free from sufferings and pain through rigorous suppression of their natural appetites are nothing but fools. In this context they argue that no wise man would ‘reject the kernel because of its husk,’ nor ‘give up eating fish because there are bones,’ nor ‘cease to grow crops because there are animals to destroy them,’ nor ‘stop cooking his food because beggars might ask for a share.’ The Cārvākas opine that as we know that our existence is confined to the existence of the body and this life only, so the wise decision is to enjoy this life as much as possible. They further maintain that no wise person should through away the opportunities of enjoying this present life, in the uncertain hope of enjoyment hereafter. In this context, they say, ‘Rather a pigeon today than a peacock tomorrow,’ ‘A sure shell is better than a doubtful golden coin,’ ‘who is that fool who would entrust the money in hand to the custody of others?’⁸ Keeping all these in mind the Cārvākas hold that the supreme goal of a human being is to enjoy this present life by attaining pleasure as

⁷ *Maranaṁ eva apavargaha, Bṛhaspati-sūtra.*

⁸ *Kāma-sūtra*, Chapter. 2.

maximum as possible and avoiding the pain. A good life is a life of enjoyment. A good action is an action that makes a balance of pleasure.

II

Cārvāka ethics is nothing but the corollary of the Cārvāka metaphysics, and the Cārvāka metaphysics, in turn, is the necessary consequence of the Cārvāka epistemology. So, we can say that the Cārvāka ethics is nothing but the essential corollary of the Cārvāka epistemology. If so then the refutation of the Cārvāka epistemology implies the refutation of the Cārvāka ethics. I think Cārvāka epistemology can be refuted by a number of cumulative arguments and thereby the Cārvāka ethics also can be refuted. According to the Cārvāka epistemology, perception is the only source of valid cognition. Cārvāka School categorically denies the other sources of knowledge like inference, testimony, comparison and so on. Some arguments have been produced by the Cārvāka School in order to refute the other means of cognition. Among them, one of the important arguments is that the other means of cognition like inference, testimony, etc., sometimes give us false knowledge. But then owing to the same argument the perception also cannot be regarded as a means of valid cognition, since sometimes perception also gives us false knowledge. Who can deny the fact that sometimes we perceive a rope as a snake, a shell as silver, and Ram as Shyam? These types of erroneous knowledge are not universal in the sense that these types of errors are not committed by all persons at the same time. When one perceives a rope as a snake others may perceive that rope as a rope but not as a snake. But sometimes we come across some of the universal types of perceptual erroneous knowledge. We know that the sun is more than thirteen million times bigger than the earth. But we all without exception perceive the sun millions of times smaller than the earth. We all universally perceive that the sun moves around the earth but the fact is otherwise. Besides this, our perception cannot give us the true picture of anything. For example, when we perceive a tree, we perceive only one aspect of the tree; the other aspects of the tree remain unseen and thereby unknown to us. Now keeping all these things in view if perception is considered as a *pramāṇa* then why the other means of cognition cannot be regarded as *pramāṇa*?

The Cārvāka School denies inference as a *pramāṇa*. We all know that another name of inference is argument. So, to deny inference amounts to deny argument. But if the validity of argument is refuted by the Cārvākas, then how can they establish their own views? We come across different arguments given by the Cārvākas to substantiate their own views and they obviously consider these arguments as valid, and thus indirectly they recognize the validity of inference. Besides this, if the validity of inference is denied then our practical life will be paralyzed.

The Cārvāka School does not recognize the validity of inference because it does not recognize the relation called *vyāpti* underlying the *hetu* and the *sādhyā* which is considered as the nerve-centre for the possibility of inference. But if the relation of *vyāpti* along with the inference is denied then how can our day to day-transection be explained. If we are in the need of fire then we seek smoke. The moment we perceive smoke coming from a particular place we go there without hesitation for receiving fire. Likewise, when we are thirsty, we drink water immediately in order to allay our thirst, and most importantly in no case we are disappointed. The validity of all these days to day-transection clearly implies the validity of the relation called *vyāpti*. Now let us go to another important *pramāṇa* called verbal testimony. The Cārvāka School also denies verbal testimony as a *pramāṇa*. But if the Cārvākas does not recognize the validity of the verbal testimony then why the other persons will believe in the views of the Cārvāka school itself? What is the logical ground of their appeal to others to believe in their views? I think in this way a long-listed arguments can be produced against the Cārvāka view of epistemology and thereby deny the same. We have already pointed out that the Cārvāka metaphysics is the corollary of the Cārvāka epistemology. So, to deny the Cārvāka epistemology is to deny the Cārvāka metaphysics. The Cārvākas are of the opinion that as perception is the only valid source of cognition it implies that whatever is perceived can only be recognized, and we cannot recognize anything which is beyond perception. The four material elements called earth, water, fire and air along with the objects produced out of the combination of them can only be perceived and therefore they can only be recognized. But the ether, soul, heaven, hell, God, etc., cannot be perceived and therefore their existence cannot be recognized. But as long as our discussion is concerned, we have seen that the perception is not the

only *pramāṇa*. We have to recognize the other *pramāṇas* like inference, verbal testimony, etc., as well. If so then the existence of non-perceptible things like soul, God, heaven, hell, etc., cannot be denied. The existence of all these things can be established either through inference or through verbal testimony or through both of them. Now if this is the case then the Cārvāka metaphysics called materialism cannot be accepted. The denial of the Cārvāka metaphysics leads to the refutation of the Cārvāka ethics which is considered to be the essential corollary of the Cārvāka metaphysics.

The Cārvākas in order to establish their view that the soul is nothing but one's body itself says that every now and then we pass statements like, 'I am fat,' 'I am tall,' 'I am stout,' and so on. But who does not know that very often we also pass statements like, 'My body is not running well,' 'My body is fit now,' 'My body is tired,' and so on. I think the above views of the Cārvāka School are not acceptable. All of the arguments shown by the Cārvākas can be refuted easily. They maintain that *videhamukti* cannot be accepted because the life after death is not proved by perception, the only *pramāṇa* recognized by them. But we have already seen that perception cannot be the only *pramāṇa*. We cannot but recognize the other major *pramāṇas* like inference, verbal testimony, etc. along with perception. So, the life after death can be established through verbal testimony and inference and thereby the concept of *videhamukti* can be justified. I think the existence of a disembodied soul can be proved by some other arguments.

I think another important objection can be raised against the Cārvāka view of the soul. If the Cārvāka view of the soul is taken for granted then it implies that our body itself is soul. In that case, our sense organs themselves stand for the soul. Not only that our different sense organs stand for different souls which leads to a great problem of integration among different knowledge derived through different sense organs. If there is no soul over and above the body and sense organs then who will integrate the same? Again, if both of the eyes of a person called A are destroyed owing to an accident and if both of the old eyes are replaced by new ones taken from another person called B, then our problems will be multiplied. Here the person with the new pair of eyes would not be in a position to identify his near ones and dear ones. He would not identify even the parents of A, since as per the implication of the

Cārvāka view of the soul the eyes themselves are knower and as they are seeing the parents of A for the first time how can they identify them as his own parents? I think the drama does not end with it. These eyes, on the contrary, know other persons to be his own parents who are the parents of B, from whom the new eyes have been taken. Here problem comes: Whom should be regarded as his own parents and what are the logical grounds behind the answer? Is the person with the new pair of eyes identical with A or with B or with none of them, a new person? Someone may reply that this person with the new pair of eyes is identical to A since the whole body excepting the eyes are the body of A.

Now if the person with the new pair of eyes happens to meet another fatal accident leading to the damage of several organs and subsequently different vital organs like heart, lung, etc. taken from other persons called C, D and so on are replaced and both of his hands and legs are imputed then what will be the status of the identity of that person? Is that person now identical with A or B or C or D or someone else? In this way, we can logically assume that all the different organs of a person may be replaced by different organs, each taken from different persons. In that case what will be the identity of that person? I think no proper answer can be offered from the perspective of the Cārvāka view. But if the concept of soul given by the seven other Indian philosophical Schools (except the view of Buddhism also) that soul is eternal, unchanging and different from the body is taken to be true then all problems mentioned above will be solved in a moment. Besides these, several objections have been raised by the Nyāya School against the Cārvāka and Buddhist view of the soul. But I shall not deal with those arguments because interested readers can go through the Nyāya literature directly and know the same. As long as our discussion goes it is established that there is an eternal and permanent soul apart from our body. The existence of this unchanging and eternal soul logically accounts for the phenomena like memory, recognition and our identity. As this soul is eternal it continues to exist even after the death of our body and thus *videhamukti* is possible. I think *jīvanmukti* is also possible. Apparently, the Cārvāka view seems to be true. If liberation means the attainment of a state which is absolutely devoid of pain and suffering then it appears that the attainment of such a state in this life is not possible, because this life is necessarily mixed with pleasure and pain. But our rigorous logical

analysis shows that attainment of such a state in this very life is possible. In fact, suffering and pain belong to our mental world. It is our mind which suffers or enjoys. There is neither suffering nor enjoyment independent of our minds. But our minds can be made suffering proof, like the bulletproof jacket. Our face is the mirror of our minds. We know that Socrates used to put on the same clothes in summer as well as in winter with a smiling face. In our day-to-day experience, we come across some of the richest persons who are most unhappy in their lives without any proper reason. On the contrary, we see that a sanyasi who lives on begging is one of the happiest persons in the world. Swami Vivekananda was never seen with a gloomy face. As long as our mind continues to be the locus of ignorance it remains sensitive to suffering and pain. But when the ignorance of our mind is replaced by true knowledge then our same mind turns as suffering and pain proof. In this situation, our mind remains indifferent to pain and suffering. The man having such type of mind is called *sthiprajñā* in the terminology of *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*. This type of person attains a state which is absolutely devoid of pain and suffering. This type of person is attributed to as *jīvanmukta*.

Now let us go to the criticism of Cārvāka ethics. The Cārvāka ethics, we have already seen, is called egoistic hedonism. In this context we have come across their famous slogan, ‘*yāvatjīvet...*’. I think the Cārvāka egoistic hedonism is impossible to implement in a true society. What I am claiming necessarily follows from the Cārvāka ethics. If the Cārvāka hedonistic ethical principle is taken as a premise then my following observations are logically deduced as conclusions from it. Being motivated by the slogan mentioned above everyone will be interested to take debt from others. But one can take debt only when someone will be interested to give the same. In fact, no one will be interested to give debt to others because it contradicts the slogan in question and thereby it goes against the ethical principle of the Cārvāka School. Why someone will take debt? The simple answer is that it ensures the pleasure of life and therefore it corresponds to the Cārvāka ethical hedonistic principle. But one’s act of giving debt to others, in no way, ensures one’s pleasure, rather it ensures one’s pain. Because there is every chance of not getting back the same. So, the act of giving debt to others directly goes against the ethical principle of the Cārvāka School. Our logical analysis of the Cārvāka ethical principle clearly

shows that it can only advise to take debt, but it cannot advise to give the same to others since it directly contradicts the very spirit of this principle. But if none is interested to provide debt to others then the advice to take debt is pointless. Thus, the Cārvāka famous slogan mentioned above is proved as absurd. Here one may raise the question: Why am I claiming that no one will be interested to offer debt to others? If one gets interest for the money given to others as a loan then it will surely promote pleasure for him. In response to this, I like to request him to examine whether the principle of Cārvāka ethics allows giving interest for the money taken from others as debt or loan. According to the Cārvāka egoistic hedonism, an act is good and therefore should be done if and only if it promotes a balance of pleasure over pain. But the act of providing interest for the money taken from others as debt or loan, in no way, promotes pleasure rather it turns to be the cause of pain and suffering. This shows that the Cārvāka ethical constitution does not include any principle like providing interest for the money taken from others. We all know that providing interest and taking the same are relative concepts. One is meaningful in terms of another. The absence of the former makes the latter absurd. Our further analysis shows that the Cārvāka ethical constitution does not and cannot contain even the principle of repaying the money taken from others as debt, for the same reason that instead of promoting pleasure it ensures pain and suffering.

Secondly, according to the Cārvāka egoistic hedonism, the only end of human life is to the fulfilment of individual pleasure. The Cārvāka slogan mentioned above implies two things. (a) The end justifies the means and (b) the end can be fulfilled by hook or by crook. If so, then even stealing, cheating, lying, murdering, raping etc. in a word, any kind of action, can be taken as means to ensure our end, i.e., pleasure. But the society where all these types of activities are allowed to do is bound to be chaotic and undisciplined and therefore there cannot be any pleasure, peace and happiness. Thus, the Cārvāka project is bound to be doomed.

No ideal society can be constructed following the Cārvāka ethical principle. The Cārvāka ethical principle called hedonism is purely egoistic and therefore individualistic. In an individualistic society, there cannot be any social bond. In the absence of a social bond, no society in the true sense of the term is possible. A true society is one where a group of people lives together being closely related with each

other having a feeling of co-operation and self-sacrifice. But there in an egoistic and individualistic society cannot be any true social bond, since, there can be no fellow-feeling of co-operation and self-sacrifice. A building is not merely a collection of some bricks one upon another. The most important thing of a building is the cementing relation among the bricks. The more this relation becomes stronger the more the building will be long lasting. More or less the same is true in the case of a society. A society is not only a sum total of a number of people living in a particular place. The most important thing is the organic relation underlying the people living in a certain place. Here the thread which is the cementing factor is the disinterested universal pure love and self-sacrifice for others. But so far as the Cārvāka egoistic hedonism is concerned there is no room for love and self-sacrifice for others. It strictly encourages the satisfaction of self-interest. Thus, the Cārvāka ethics goes against the ideal of a true society. From the immediate preceding argument another strong objection arises. We know that ethics or morality is meant for the people living in a society. But we have just seen that Cārvāka ethics cannot help to construct a true society, rather it goes against the ideal of a true society. So, Cārvāka ethics is useless and absurd.

Another charge may be raised against the Cārvāka theory of ethics, that it cannot prove the superiority of human being. It brings down the human being to the level of animal. It completely destroys the dignity of man. We all claim human being to be superior to animal. This view is substantiated by our *śāstra* also. Some of the *śāstras* go one step ahead and claims that man is superior even to God. Chandidas beautifully expresses the same, '*sabaruparemanussatya, taharuparenai*'. But the question is: What does the superiority of human being consist in? I think the answer to this question can be derived from our common sense as well as from our *śāstras*. First let us appeal to our common sense. Human being shares some properties in common with animal. Among them the most fundamental ones are the food and sex. But man has some uncommon properties as well where lies the superiority of him. These uncommon properties are the rationality and the attitude of self-sacrifice. Two dogs are seen to fight for a simple piece of meat. But we have come across some people in our day-to-day life who have sacrificed even their lives for the sake of others. Khudiram, Binoy, Badal, Dinesh and many others are the living examples of

the same. Keeping this in view, John Stuart Mill beautifully says, 'It is better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than to be a pig satisfied'. Now let us go to our *śāstra*. Our Hindu *śāstra* says, '*Dharmenahīnāpaśubhisamāna*'. It is worthy to note that here *dharma* means self-sacrifice for others and the sense of morality. The Bible says, 'Man cannot live by bread alone'. Ramkrishna says, '*janmechhisyakhan dag rekheya*'. Thus, it is seen that man is superior to animal because an animal lives for food and sex alone and therefore it lives for itself, but a true man lives for others, he finds the meaning of life in the self-sacrifice. A man is not superior to animal so far as his physical urges are concerned. But there is something additional, in the terminology of Tagore 'surplus' in man which makes man different from and superior to animal. This surplus consists in a number of things like rationality, conscience, the sense of morality, the sense of aesthetics etc. But in the kingdom of the Cārvāka ethics there is no space for self-sacrifice. It is strictly self-oriented. So, this ethics is the ethics for animal, and therefore it is not an ethics at all in the true sense of the term.

The base of the Cārvāka egoistic ethical hedonism is psychological hedonism. But psychological hedonism, I think, does not necessarily imply egoistic hedonism. From the fact that we want happiness or satisfaction for ourselves does not necessarily follow that that happiness always comes from the satisfaction of our own individual and personal interest, sometimes we have more mental satisfaction and peace if we can do something for the betterment and well-being of the society (*vahujanahitāya, vahujanasukhāya*). Here lies the superiority of man. Keeping this in mind Mill and Bentham conclude ethical universalism or altruistic hedonism from psychological hedonism. Egoistic hedonism is also called crude hedonism. It does not know any qualitative difference of happiness; it knows only the quantitative difference of happiness. But as a matter of fact, the qualitative difference of happiness cannot be denied. The pleasure derived from eating meat is not the same as the pleasure attained from reading literature or listening to the song. Only a human being can understand this difference. That is why we consider the latter type of enjoyment as superior to the former one. Mill and Bentham also agreed upon this view.

The aim of the Cārvāka hedonism is to make our life happy and enjoyable. But, in fact, instead of making our life happy and enjoyable it makes our life unhappy and miserable. The Cārvākas say that the crow of today is superior to the peacock of

tomorrow. It implies that one should always give priority to the present rather than the future. We should enjoy our life today as much as possible because there is no guarantee that I shall not die tomorrow. But our day-to-day experience shows that most of the people who do not bother to think of their future run through an unhappy and miserable life. In fact, there is always a disparity between our demand for enjoyment and the wealth we have. We all are quite conscious of the fact that enjoyment cannot come out of nothing. The Cārvākas also realize this truth. Keeping this in view they recognize *artha* also as a *puruṣārtha*. They hold that *kāma* is the end and *artha* is the means to fulfil this end. So, without *artha* our *kāma* can never be satisfied. But it is worthy to note that our *kāma* does not know any limit, it is always limitless, on the contrary, our wealth is always limited. So, our unbalanced maximum enjoyment of the present life leads to the scarcity of the wealth or *artha* of our future life which in turn makes our life unhappy and miserable. Our past, present and future life are causally connected. Our past life is the foundation of our present life, and our present life is the foundation of our future life. The implication of this fact has beautifully been expressed by the statement, 'As you sow so shall you reap'. If all seeds are consumed today then we cannot sow anything tomorrow and we will have nothing to reap the day after tomorrow which obviously throughs our life into the sea of misery and unhappiness. That is why our *śāstra* says, '*Āpadārthedhanamrakṣet*' (keep aside your wealth for your ill days).

LANGUAGE AND REALITY: THE BUDDHIST AND WITTGENSTEIN APPROACH

K.BHIMA KUMAR

Introduction:

Philosophy of language concerns about the relationship between words and reality. The central questions of the philosophy of language is whether language describe successfully the way things really are or do words in fact function as a mask that conceals the reality. There are different opinions prevail regarding this question. Some are having the opinion that would posit a comfortable fit between words and reality known as naïve linguistic optimism. Some are having the opinion that some words do depict reality with some degree of accuracy known as moderate and possible linguistic optimism. However, words do miss their mark, failing to pick out things as they really are. Some are having the opinions that completely undo any relation between language and things, as they really are known as linguistic pessimists. In fact, linguistic pessimism should be distinguished from linguistic skepticism; this is because it says that we cannot know to what extent our words correspond to the world as it really is. Regarding this an attempt has been made in this paper to present the arguments against predicaments of *self* and the private language sensation. Further it also discusses the idea that the language is connected with mind activity and social conventions or agreements. In the Buddhists and Wittgenstein framework the assumption of the grammar, *self* leads to the assumption of ontological *self*. In order to reject the ontological *self*, the Buddhists on one hand and the Wittgenstein on the other hand argued against solipsism, nominalism and private language-sensation arguments, which is the crux of this paper.

Buddhist view on Language and Reality:

The relation between language and reality has been interpreted and understood by the Buddhist texts and traditions in many ways. The Buddha looked upon language as an activity.¹ Buddhist texts typically express caution about the tendency for words to lead us astray and there is a strand of moderate linguistic

¹ Kalupahana.J.David, “The Buddha’s Philosophy of Language”, Sarvodaya Vishva Lekha Publication, Srilanka, 1999, p.48.

optimism in some forms of Buddhism. In other words, when language used carefully and appropriately, language is capable of describing things as they really are.

According to the Buddhists, man is analyzed into the five impersonal aggregates (*pañcaskandhas*). They are a) form (*rūpa*) consisting of the different factors which we perceive in this body b) feelings (*vedanā*) of pleasure, pain and indifference c) Perception including understanding and naming (*sañjñā*) d) predispositions or tendencies generated by the impressions of past experience (*samskāras*) and e) consciousness itself (*vijñāna*)². The five aggregates as being impermanent (*anitya*), without an enduring self (*anattā*) and thus the cause of suffering (*dukkha*)³. It proves that, a person is complex bundles of mental and physical inter connected events with no unchanging agent or subject of experience. An alternative analysis explains that the individual and objects as comprising twelve spheres (*āyatana*s) namely the six senses (the five physical senses and the mind) and the six types of objects of those senses.⁴ Another explain found in the literature which refers to 18 elements (*dhātus*) namely the six senses, six types of sense objects, and six types of consciousness⁵. All these explanations describe accurately the genuine constitution of the individual and the world of objects, leaving no room for a belief in anything unchanging and uncaused. The descriptions are thought to pick out the genuine character of the world as it really is, independently of our interpretations. In contrast to this, the enduring self and stable external objects identified by language as tables, chairs, trees and so forth do not exist independently of our perceptual and cognitive processes that reify the flux of causally connected mental and physical events.

Early Buddhism is a form of nominalism, according to which much of the world described by words does not exist independently of our minds. In other words, some language hits the mark. For example, the statement that ‘things are impermanent and dependently originate’ is an accurate proposition about the nature of reality. The descriptions such as *skhandhas*, the *dhātus*, the *āyatanās* and so forth

² *Samyutta Nikāya*, pp. 138-45.

³ *Majjhima Nikāya*, i, 138-139.

⁴ *Samyutta Nikāya*, iii, 62.

⁵ *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, 138-39.

are thought to be precise and correct uses of language. Furthermore, the statement that ‘linguistic referents such as ‘chariot’, ‘Nāgasena’ and ‘being’ exist only in dependence upon our perceptual and cognitive faculties also expresses the way things really are. According to Hamilton⁶, *sanjñā* is the capacity to discriminate, identity and name in early Buddhism. Our ability to form concepts picks out objects from their environment. Further, Hamilton clarifies that *sanjñā* does not in itself mean false conceptions. This is because some conceptions or names are compatible with things as they really are. However, some *sanjñā* is incompatible with reality. For example, the statement ‘things are permanent and uncaused’ is simply incorrect as is the claim that entities such as ‘chariot’, ‘Nāgasena’ and ‘being’ exist independently of our cognitive and perceptual processes. These propositions misrepresent the way things really are.

In Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakosa* and Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra* a systematic account of nominalism and modern linguistic optimism explained for the first time in early Buddhist texts. There is an analysis of the *self* and objects into constituent processes is more sophisticated with the elucidation of many types of momentary physical and non-physical events (*dharma*) and also the various types of causal relationships that pertain between them. The non-physical *dharma*s are the range of psychological occurrences that together categorized in the mind. The physical *dharma*s are related to atomic sense data out of which sensed objects and the human body are fashioned and named by consciousness. In Buddhist epistemological framework we found the general characters known as *sāmānyalakṣaṇas* notably impermanence and dependent origination, which are shared by all of these conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) *dharma*s. In addition, each *dharma* has a defining characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) which allows it to be described as a particular type within the classification of *dharma*s. According to Vaibhāṣikas these *dharma*s have substantial existence (*dravyasat*) or inherent existence (*svabhāva*) and are ultimate truths (*paramārtha satya*). In other words, the conditioned *dharma*s are the real features of the world that exist independently of language but can be described accurately by it. In contrast to this, things that are formed out of these *dharma*s are

⁶ Hamilton, s, “Identity and Experience. The constitution of the Human Being according to Early Buddhism”, London, Luzoc Oriental, 1996, pp 53-65.

said to have conceptual or nominal existence (*prajñaptisat*), to be conventional truths known as *saṃvṛtisatya* and to have no inherent existence⁷. It explains that language that refers to things such as tables and chairs describes reified objects that do not exist independently of the mind. Vaibhāṣikas thinks that sense data, as raw material, gets interpreted and labelled as the discrete everyday objects our conventional world. This is because we impose on the sense data a cognitive and linguistic framework that does not correspond to the complex dependently originality flow of events that is ultimately real.

A.K.Warder further confirmed that *Theravāda Abhidharma* texts express a similar attitude to language and reality. For example, the *Abhidharmavatāra*, distinguishes between concepts or names (*paññatti*) that are occurring (*vijjamāna*) and non-occurring (*avijjamāna*). For Warder, ‘occurring’ means that there is a reality, which corresponds to the name; whereas ‘non-occurring’ means that, there is no such reality. In other words, occurring concepts are those that refer to something ultimately real (*paramārtha*). They identify the defining characteristics of the *dharmas*, a non-occurring concept has a referent, such as the *self*, which is a mere name (*nāmamattai*). Further, Warder explains that *Paramatthavinicchaya* of Aniruddha similarly distinguishes between occurring and non-occurring names. The former identify the ultimately real elements, that is, the *dharmas*. They are not contradicted (*avisamvādaka*) by reality. In contrast to this, the concepts or names that are non-occurring have conceptual or nominal objects such as ‘being’, ‘person’, ‘I’, ‘table’, ‘chair’ and so forth. They are not ultimately true but are in conformity to the linguistic usages of the world in everyday language⁸.

Both Vaibhāṣika and Theravāda forms of Abhidharma combine nominalism and moderate linguistic optimism. For them many entities exist only as referents of language, some named entities, that is, the *dharmas*, exist independent of our perceptual and cognitive interpretations. For instance, if language goes wrong, it attributes a mind-independent existence to those things that are simply conventions. It also misses the mark if it misidentifies the *dharmas* and their general and individual

⁷ Williams, ‘on the *Abhidharma Ontology*’, in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 1981, pp.227-257.

⁸ Warder.A.K., ‘*The concept of a concept*’, in the *Journal of India Philosophy*, 1971, pp.181-196.

characteristics. However, these *dharmas* and their causal relationships can be accurately described. Thus, language can express about the way things really are, including that many things identified by language do not have a mind independent existence.

From this, it is evident that the Buddhists think that the world of everyday things is dependent on language for its existence. Thus, tables, chairs and mountains exist; this is because language categories the world into these objects. It is claimed that such things only exist because of language. Philosophically it seems to be it is problematic, given that there is evidence of pre-linguistic discrimination of objects. Things sometimes seem to be identified, or picked out from their surrounding environment without the use of names. For instance, witness the ability of young babies and non-human mammals to recognize features of the world without having any linguistic skills. Those who know language can often recognise objects without having known their names or when their names have been forgotten. In our day-to-day activities most of them seems to takes place at a pre-linguistic level where we identify objects and yet do not name them. It would be known that perceptual and cognitive processes, some of which are pre-linguistic, identify the world of objects. Our sense organs and minds act as interpreters of the even-flowing world of *dharmic* processes, shaping these processes into the relatively stable objects of perception that we experience. This interpreting activity happens even prior to naming through the use of language which adds a new level of complexity to the individuation of objects.

Wittgenstein view on Language and Reality:

Like the Buddha for Wittgenstein, too philosophy is not a body of doctrines, but an activity⁹. According to Wittgenstein, philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts and the task of philosophy is to clarify the thoughts expressed in language. Wittgenstein in his early philosophy goes with Russellian atomism by holding the relation of picturization between language and reality. The whole life of Wittgenstein can be discussed in two phases namely ‘Tractatus’ or Early Wittgenstein and ‘Investigation’ or Later Wittgenstein. The main aim of Wittgenstein

⁹ Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, 4.112 (Translated by D.F.Pears and B.F.Meguinness, London, 1961).

is intended to bring out the philosophical implications of the use of language. He stood against the traditional concept that philosophy is an attempt to explain life and the universe as a whole and advocates that the central problem of philosophy is the analysis of language.

Both the Buddhists and Wittgenstein did not commit to either nominalism and realism. In the *Aranavibhanga Sutta*¹⁰, the Buddha advises to the monks as “thus, monks, is the non-commitment to the language of a country and the non-transgression of common parlance”, while in the paragraph of 383 of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* (now onwards PI), says nominalists make the mistake of interpreting all words as names and so of not really describing their use¹¹. In the PI, paragraph 383 says that “we are not analyzing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. thinking), and therefore the use of a word. So, it may look as if what we were doing were nominalism. Nominalists make the mistake of interpreting all words as names, and so of not really describing their use, but only, so to speak, giving a paper draft on such a description”. (Page.8 of PI).

Sometimes it is not about different meanings but different symbols for instance to say “green is green”. The use of signs is the result of arbitrary convention. Thus if we want to grasp the meaning of the words, we have to look at its conventional use. The use of the words is always manifested in the limit of certain language-games, which implies ‘the actions’. In brief, the meaning of the words is determined by the language-games where words are inserted. Between language-games, there could be generalities, which are called “family resemblances”. There is no meaning outside of the language-games. Finally, it can be seen that Wittgenstein’s criticism of “our craving for generality addresses either nominalism or realism. This can be seen in Wittgenstein’s PI where he said, “We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it. Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think we perceive a state of affairs of highest generality¹². The Buddhist philosophy of language has been recurrently characterized as ‘nominalism’. However, this theory is

¹⁰ *Aranavibhanga Sutta* - The Exposition of Non-conflict (MN 139). translated by Ñanamoli/Bodhi. Retrieve from <http://buddhism.vipassati.ch/nikaya/mn-139-aranavibhanga-sutta-the-exposition-of-nonconflict>.

¹¹ Wittgenstein’s “*Philosophical Investigations*”, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, page 8, paragraph 383.

¹² Wittgenstein’s “*Philosophical Investigations*”, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, p.46.

debatable and has not accepted since from the Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising and non-self (*anattavāda*). It has been understood that concepts do not refer to entities taken as either particulars or universals.

David Burton in his article ‘Language and Reality in Buddhism, The case for Moderate Linguistic Optimism’ argues that there are different streams of Buddhism namely the *Nikaya, Abhidharma* which advocates the view that Universals depend on the mind perception cognitive processes and that language, if carefully used may describe things. According to this view the notions of *skandhas, ayatana* and *dhatu* describe the human person and the world extensively, analytically, accurately and objectively, independent of our interpretations. On the contrary, to this, the meaning of terms such as tables, chairs, and mountains depends on our perceptual and cognitive processes, which falsify reality. From this, one can find moderate linguistic optimism and nominalism. The *Nikaya Sutras* postulates that ‘names are mere sounds’. From this, it seems that the Buddhist philosophy of language advocates ‘nominalism’. The idea ‘names are mere sounds’ does not mean that words are mere mind construction. It is very much clear from *Milindapanha sutra* that the emphasis on conventionality as a source of the function of the designation of names. Buddha observes common parlance to impart meaning without clinging to the words. In this *sutra* one can read the notions such as ‘living being’ are mere a conventional way of speaking. The main focus is on the idea about the conventional source of meaning is found more explicitly in *Niruttipatha sutta*, where it says the meaning and its change of words and sentences depend on the changes of linguistic conventions.

In order to understand the relation between language and reality Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* develops a representational framework. The basic concern for Wittgenstein is the structure of the sense, since it provides the key to the structure of language and the world. In this context, the world represents the reality. For him, the structure of the world is the same as the structure of language and this can be unfolded by the logical structure of sense. This is the source of the idea that logic is transcendental since it brings out the underlying structure of language and the world¹³. Wittgenstein in his transcendental logic attempted to bring out the essence of

¹³ Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, 4.01.

language and the world. With regard to language-world relationship Wittgenstein, showed thought and language together make up the logical space that makes the notion of world-representation possible and thus solves the so-called ontological issues. Thus in Wittgenstein framework world representation has become crucial component of the semantics of representation. Wittgenstein holds that neither sense nor reference is sufficient in itself to fix the relation between language and the world. Hence, for him, there is no semantic problem of setting the language-world relationship.

Conclusion:

To conclude, Buddhist philosophy of language should be considered rigorously when the linguistic clinging becomes an epistemological subject. The same kind of attitude we can find in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language that which is epistemologically inspired. However, it should not minimize the centrality of the mystical in his Tractatus. Hence, the explicit focus on the stereological must not be established as criteria of incommensurability between Buddhism and Wittgenstein. In Buddhism, we can find an idea that the language is connected with mind activity and social conventions. From this, it is evident that language does not only names things and intervenes in the reproduction of the self-identification and the assumption of ontological self. The assumption of self leads to the assumption of ontological self. Rejecting the ontologization of the self, Buddhism and Wittgenstein argue against solipsism, nominalism and private language sensation arguments.

**KNOWLEDGE AND ENDING OF THEORIZING (A STUDY IN
YUKTIŚAŚTIKA)
SHAKUNTALA BORA**

Nāgārjuna says that liberation is attained not with the help of being or non-being but by knowledge of being and non-being. We have Nāgārjuna saying: ‘One is not liberated by being (*bhāva*), one does not [transcend] the being¹ (*bhāva*) by non-being (*abhāva*), [but] by thorough knowledge of being and non-being (*bhāvābhāvaparijñānāt*) the magnanimous (*mahātma*) are liberated.’² For Nāgārjuna this state is the very transcendence of being and non-being by understanding: ‘Those whose intelligence (*buddhi*) has transcended being and non-being and is unsupported have discovered the profound and inobjective meaning of ‘condition’.’³ This is clear thus that, for Nāgārjuna, the transcendence lies in understanding. Transcendence is not to be taken in the sense that there are really beings or its absence which are transcended. Rather, he implies that being and non-being lose significance for the person of knowledge. As Nāgārjuna puts it, the reason for being losing meaning is because knowledge reveals this very fact that being is not there. And of course, as he sees it, without being the issue of non-being does not arise as non-being is nothing but being going out of existence. This is the reason for which he can say that for the person who has seen reality, there is also no *Samsāra* and *Nirvāṇa* – there is neither being and consequently nor its cessation. He says: ‘Those who do not see reality (*tattva*) believe in *Samsāra* and *Nirvāṇa* [but] those who see reality (*tattva*) believe neither in *Samsāra* nor in *Nirvāṇa*. Being (*bhāva*) and *Nirvāṇa* – these two are not [really] to be found [since] *Nirvāṇa* [may be] defined as the thorough knowledge of being.’⁴ If there is knowing of the fact that there is no beings, which make up personal existence, *Nirvāṇa* understood as ending of it also loses meaning.

Nāgārjuna’s whole effort, thus, can be said to be concentrated, in a way, in demonstrating that being is not there. And as he keeps pointing out, this is not to be taken in the sense that being has gone out of existence. Rather he says that there is, in fact, no being as such to talk of its disappearing and thus of non-being. This of course

¹ The term ‘being’ is used for ‘present existence’

² *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 4

³ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 1

⁴ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 5-6. The term ‘being’ is used for ‘existence’

gives rise to the question of what these are then that we have in hand, what their status is. Nāgārjuna is trying to tell that as being in fact is not there, what we consider as being is nothing more than something created, conjectured. And it is precisely because of this fact that he keeps denying destruction of the being. There cannot really be talk of ending of the conjectured, that which is not there. We find Nāgārjuna saying: ‘While [the ignorant] imagine the annihilation (*nirodha*) pertains to a created thing (*bhāva*) which is dissolved (*naṣṭa*), the wise (*sat*), however, are convinced that annihilation (*nirodha*) of [something] created (*kṛtaka*) is an illusion (*māyā*).’⁵ For the one who sees being, there remains the question of its annihilation. But for the one who has understood being in its true nature, as a conjecture, destruction also is only apparent. Nāgārjuna says: ‘though [something apparently] is annihilated by being destructed, it is not [destructed] when one thoroughly understands it as compound (*samskṛta*) [for] whom will it be evident (*pratyakṣa*)? How could one speak of it as dissolved (*naṣṭa*)?’⁶ For the one who understands that a thing is a lie, for him there is no real origination and destruction: ‘When one sees that which arises conditioned by ignorance (*avidyāpratyaya*) with a correct knowledge (*samyajñāna*), no origination (*utpāda*) or destruction (*nirodha*) whatsoever is perceived (*upalabhyate*).’⁷ Nāgārjuna says that it is in this realization – there is no being – that one’s purpose is attained. This understanding definitely does not come in degrees. That is, it can never be that one realizes some things to be not existing and some things to be existing or that things somewhat do not exist and somewhat do exist. All get extinct. We find him saying: ‘This is extinction in this very life (*drṣṭadharmanirvāṇa*) and one’s task is accomplished (*kṛtakṛtya*). If [however] a difference (*viśeṣa*) occurs here, just before (*anantaram*) the knowledge of the principle (*dharmajñāna*), [then] [h]e who imagines that even the most subtle thing (*sūkṣma-bhava*) arises, such an ignorant man does not see what it means to be dependently born (*pratya-yotpannārtha*)!’⁸

Nāgārjuna carries out his project – the project of proving that there are no beings – by insisting that that which is dependent is not to be considered as independent. And the problem with people, as he sees it, is precisely this – that the

⁵ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 7

⁶ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 8

⁷ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 10

⁸ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 11-12

dependent is treated as something independent. He tells that it is wrong to treat one of the co-arisen as arisen as the co-arisen is precisely co-arisen. We find him saying: ‘That which has arisen dependently on this and that that has not arisen by own-being (*svabhāvataḥ*). That which has not arisen by own-being, how can it literally (*nāma*) be called ‘arisen’?’⁹ At times, what he has said has been opposed on the ground that the Buddhas did talk about destruction. As reply to such objections, he argues that the teaching about origination and destruction is a prelude to the actual teaching. It is only in understanding destruction that one can understand impermanence which alone can lead one to the knowledge that there is no own-being by virtue of which something may be determined as being. He says: ‘So to conclude (*evam*): There is no origination (*utpāda*), there is no destruction (*nirodha*). – The path of origination and destruction (*utpādanirodhamārga*) has [however] been expounded [by the Buddhas] with a practical purpose (*kāryārtham*): By understanding origination (*utpāda*) destruction (*vināśa*) is understood; by understanding destruction impermanence (*anityam*) is understood; by understanding impermanence (*anityatā*) the true principle (*saddharma*) is also understood.’¹⁰ The true principle, as Nāgārjuna understands it, is that everything dependently originating has no actual origination – the very principle of dependent co-origination has no origination. And it is only in such an understanding that there can be ending of dogmas which lies at the root of human suffering. He says: ‘Those who have understood dependent co-origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is devoid of origination (*utpāda*) and destruction (*vināśa*) have crossed the ocean of existence consisting of dogmas (*dr̥ṣṭibhūtahavārṇava*).’¹¹

Nāgārjuna’s argument is simple – one is creating a whole lot of problem by treating the dependent as independent. According to Nāgārjuna, those now who treat being, which is dependent on non-being, as not dependent are perverting the fact - the fact that each is dependent. This perversion, by this very fact of being so, degenerates into a view – a mere view of fact, not the fact. And it is due to this perversion or holding view that, according to Nāgārjuna, passions arise. He says: ‘Profane people (*prthagjana*) with their positivistic attitude (*bhāvātmake*) are, due to the fault of being perverted about being and non-being, dominated by passions (*kleśa*); they are

⁹ *Yuktiśaṣṭhika*, 19. The term ‘own-being’ is used for ‘substantially’ for *svabhava*

¹⁰ *Yuktiśaṣṭhika*, 21-22

¹¹ *Yuktiśaṣṭhika*, 23.

deceived by their own mind (*svacitta*)!’¹² That is, once being is accepted as independent, arising also would become true which would allow the entire chain of human existence to come into being. As Nāgārjuna sees it and says, one who continues to think in terms of origination and destruction of things has not understood meaning of dependent origination. ‘Those who imagine that a compound (*samṣkrta*) possesses origination (*utpāda*) and destruction (*vināśa*) do not understand the movement of dependent origination (*pratītyopādacakra*).’¹³

Nāgārjuna makes the subtle move from saying that the dependent is not independent to say that independent is not there. His argument is that in seeing things being dependently originated, one would see independent not being there. This argument is now taken forward and Nāgārjuna says that as one sees that the independent is not there, the so-called-independent becomes a lie. In other words, for the one seeing things being dependent, things are false. He says: ‘Those who understand being¹⁴ (*bhāva*) see that things are impermanent (*anitya*), fraudulent (*moṣadharmā*), vain, (*tuccha*), empty (*śūnya*), selfless (*anātman*) and isolated (*vivikta*). Stationless (*anāspada*), inobjective (*nirālamba*), rootless (*nirmūla*), unfixed (*asthita*), totally arisen as a result of ignorance (*avidyāhetutaḥ*), without a beginning, middle or end....Without a core (*asāra*), like a plaintain (*kadalī*), like the city of *Gandharvas* [thus] the dreadful world (*tīvrajagat*) – a city of confusion – appears as an illusion!’¹⁵ The example Nāgārjuna has chosen to bring home this point is that of *Brahmā* and the world. *Brahmā* has meaning only as dependent. As an independent entity, it is not true. He says: ‘*Brahmā* etc., which appear quite true to this world, have been said to be false (*mṛṣā*) to the noble (*ārya*). What about the rest apart from that?’¹⁶ In other words, the so-called-independent no more remains for the one who has seen truly that things are dependent. As there have never been in reality any things, the issue and question of a thing’s being born does not arise: ‘But how is it thoroughly known? – By seeing dependent origination! The [Buddha] best among knowers of reality also said that that which is dependently born is unborn.’¹⁷

¹² *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, 24.

¹³ *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, 18

¹⁴ The term ‘being’ is used for ‘fact’

¹⁵ *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, 25-27.

¹⁶ *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, 28.

¹⁷ *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, 48.

Similarly, there is no extinction of that which is not there. Nagarjuna says ‘A compound thing quieted due to an extinguished cause is understood to be extinguished but that which is not extinguished by nature how could it be spoken of as extinguished?’¹⁸

Nāgārjuna cannot insist enough the need to see that there are no things as such. For, it is these people who see that there are no things who do not get disturbed as they realize that the so-called-things are mere illusions. He says: ‘When one thinks that an illusion (*māyā*) arises or that it is destructed, one who recognizes the illusion is not bewildered by it but one who does not recognize it longs for it (*paritṛṣ-*).’¹⁹ And for Nāgārjuna it is important to realize that these so-called-things are illusions because it is only in seeing this that dogmas do not arise. Nāgārjuna says: ‘One who, with intelligence (*buddhi*), comes to see that existence (*bhāva*) is like a mirage (*marīci*) [and] illusion, is not corrupted by dogmas [based on] previous limit or a final limit.’¹⁹ Now, for Nāgārjuna, not holding or having theory is very important because, as he sees it, it is due to this factor of having a position regarding things that give rise to passions. We find him saying: ‘By taking any standing whatsoever one is attacked by the twisting snakes of passions. But those whose mind has not standpoint are not caught.’²⁰ This very holding of views is ignorance for Nāgārjuna because of which passions arise. ‘For those who suppressed by false knowledge take the untrue for true (*satye satyagrah-*) a series of seizing and contention etc. (*parigrahavivādādikrama*) will arise.’²¹ Nāgārjuna firmly maintains that it is impossible not to have passions as one holds views: ‘How can those whose mind takes a stand avoid the strong poison (*mahāviṣa*) of passions? Even if they are [like] ordinary [people] they are consumed by the snakes of passions.’²² That passions do not arise, it becomes necessary that one does not hold any view. He says: ‘When one affirms ‘being’ there is a seizing of awful and vicious dogmas which arise from desire and hatred, and from that conceptions (*vivāda*) arise. That is the cause of all dogmas, without it the passions

¹⁸ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 20.

¹⁹ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 16.

¹⁹ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 17.

²⁰ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 51.

²¹ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 49.

²² *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 52.

(*kleśa*) do not arise. So when this is thoroughly understood, dogmas and passions disappear.²³

Nāgārjuna gives the reason why with view passions arise. Fact is not that passions arise due to views. Rather having view and passions, as he does not forget to mention, are co-arising. To have a view is indicative of the fact that one believes in objects. And it is due to this belief in objects that passions arise: ‘Just as a fool (*bāla*) is attached to its reflection (*pratibimba*) because he conceives it to be true (*satya*), thus the world (*loka*) gets stuck in the cage of objects (*viśayapañjara*) because of [its] stupidity (*moha*).²⁴ And actually it is because of the reason of seeing that there are no objects that for the wise suffering does not emerge. This is so because suffering arises only from the passions. Nāgārjuna says: ‘When the great souls (*mahātman*) see the things (*bhāva*) are like a reflection (*pratibimba*) with their eye of knowledge (*jñānacakṣuḥ*) they do not get stuck in the mire of so-called objects (*viśaya iti pañka*).²⁵ Thus liberation is when there is the knowing that there are no things at all. Liberation does not happen, according to Nāgārjuna, even in detachment. He says: ‘Fools are attached to material form (*rūpa*), the moderate attain absence of passions, but those of supreme intellect are liberated by knowing the nature of material form.²⁶ Nāgārjuna does not say explicitly why there cannot be ending of suffering in dispassion. But one can infer that in dispassion there always lies the possibility of emergence of passion while in case one sees that there are no things, the very possibility of having passion dies. He says: ‘The faults of passion that torment due to false knowledge do not arise for those who understand the meaning of judgments concerning being and non-being (*bhāvābhāvavikalpārtha*).²⁷ However, Nāgārjuna does place dispassion at a higher level than passion though it is not liberation. It may be because suffering would be less in dispassion than in passion. We find Nāgārjuna saying: ‘One desires by thinking of [something] pleasant; by turning away from it one becomes free from desires, but by seeing it to be void (*vivikta*) like a phantom (*māyāpuruṣa*) one obtains Nirvāṇa.²⁸ But in case of those who have understood that

²³ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 46-47

²⁴ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 53.

²⁵ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 54.

²⁶ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 55.

²⁷ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 57.

²⁸ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 56.

there are no things at all, there is no more views and no more possibility of passion arising. Thus there is liberation from suffering. Nāgārjuna says: ‘If there were a standpoint there would be passion or dispassion [or distaste], but the great souls without standpoint have neither passion nor dispassion. Those whose fickle mind (*calacitta*) is not moved – not even at the thought of the void – have crossed the awful ocean of existence (*tīvrabhavārṇava*) which is agitated by the monsters of passion.’²⁹

We get to understand why there are no views in seeing no independent things in Nāgārjuna’s criticism of the some Buddhists. Nāgārjuna criticizes the Buddhist who agree that things arise due to conditions and yet believe that things exist. For as he sees it, to understand as being dependent is to understand that there is no thing independent. We find him saying: ‘That which originates due to cause and does not abide without [certain] conditions but disappears when the conditions are absent, how can it be understood to ‘exist’?’³⁰ Nāgārjuna says that he may understand a substantialist believing in things, but he finds it strange for a Buddhist to believe in existence. He says: ‘If the adherents of being who keep on clinging to being, go on in the same way, there is nothing strange about that; [b]ut it is strange indeed that the exponents of impermanence of everything [who] rely on the Buddha’s method keep on adhering to things with strife.’³¹ Nāgārjuna has been saying that in truth realization, there are no dogmas. Dogmas can arise only in relation to things: ‘Those who adhere to a Self or the world as unconditioned alas they are captivated by dogmas about permanent, impermanent etc (*nityānityadr̥ṣṭi*)!’³² Nāgārjuna asserts that even if the belief is of conditioned things, still it does not escape from the fact of being a dogma - it being about some thing. He says: ‘Those who postulate that conditioned things are established in reality (*tattvataḥ*), how are they not also overtaken by mistakes about permanence etc. (*nityādidoṣa*)?’³³ But who has seen that there are no things, question of making assertions also does not arise for him: ‘But those who are convinced that conditioned things are like the moon in the water (*(u)ḍakachandra*), neither true nor false, they are not carried away by dogmas

²⁹ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 58- 59

³⁰ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 39.

³¹ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 40-41.

³² *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 43.

³³ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 44.

(*dr̥ṣṭi*).³⁴ Fact is, one never asserts anything about that which one knows as never being there. He says: ‘When ‘this’ and ‘that’ said about something is not perceived by being analysed (*vicāra*), which wise man (*visakṣana*) will claim with strife (*vivāda*) that ‘this’ and ‘that’ is true (*satya*)?’³⁵

Nāgārjuna cites scripture in support of the view that everything that we have in hand, everything worldly is illusory. The world is illusion. As the world has been declared by the Buddhas to be product of ignorance, whatever is seen in ignorance must be considered as mere discrimination and not reals. He says: ‘Since the Buddhas have declared that world is conditioned by ignorance, how is it not reasonable that this world therefore is a [result of] discrimination (*vikalpa*)? When ignorance is stopped why is it not clear that that which stops was imagined by ignorance?’³⁶ In other words, whatever we see is false. In fact, Nāgārjuna says that as the Buddhas have declared only *Nirvāṇa* to be true, the rest must be regarded as false: ‘Inasmuch as the Buddhas (*jina*) have stated that *Nirvāṇa* is true, which clever person (*paṇḍita*) will then imagine that the rest is not false?’³⁷

It may be true that what we are considering as things are not things at all. But, as Nāgārjuna has pointed out, this is something that cannot be spoken of to someone uninitiated. It is for this reason, Nāgārjuna says, that the Buddhas did talk about things. And then gradually has taken the person concerned towards its actual status – that it is not a thing at all. We find Nāgārjuna saying: ‘To begin with [a teacher] should say that everything exists to his truth-seeking. Later when he has understood the meaning he gains isolation (*vivikātā*) without being attached.’³⁸ The teachers refer to things to lead people to truth. When understanding happens, things will definitely lose their significance. Nāgārjuna says: ‘Just as the Buddhas have spoken of ‘my’ and ‘I’ for pragmatic reasons, thus they have also spoken of the aggregates, the sense-fields and the elements for pragmatic reasons. Such things spoken of as the great elements are absorbed in consciousness. They are dissolved by understanding them. Certainly they are falsely imagined!’³⁹ Similarly, it is only for

³⁴ *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, 45.

³⁵ *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, 42.

³⁶ *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, 37-38.

³⁷ *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, 35.

³⁸ *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, 30.

³⁹ *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, 33- 34.

the people who have seen that there are no things at all, that the so-called things are mere illusions, for them only nature or quality of conduct loses significance. For the one who has not seen truth, for whom the things are real, for him the quality of conduct certainly has meaning. We find Nāgārjuna saying: ‘The [various kinds of] *karma* with its results (*phala*) and the places of rebirth have also been fully explained [by the Buddhas]. The full knowledge of its nature and its unorigination have also been taught [by them].’⁴⁰ In other words, in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy, ethics does not lose its importance so long as wisdom is not gained. Though the Buddhas as well as people of the world may seem like advising the same kind of conduct, one should be able to discern the Buddhas’ project which is so very different from those who are in the world. It is the purpose behind the teaching that determines the nature of teaching. We find Nāgārjuna saying: ‘The world (*loka*) which is blinded by ignorance and follow the current of desire (*trṣṇāusārin*) and [on the other hand] the wise, who are free from desire, how can their view of the good (*kuśala*) be similar?’⁴² Till the realization of truth, activities do not lose their importance. One may have an intellectual understanding of truth, but that cannot be considered as sufficient. Activities lose meaning only in experiencing truth and not in mere learning about it. Thus we find Nāgārjuna saying: ‘Those who do not understand the meaning of isolation (*viviktārtha*) but keep on merely learning without enacting merit (*puṇya*), such base people (*khala*) are lost!’⁴³

In the light of what has been said to far, it becomes understandable when Nāgārjuna says that the Buddhas’ teaching is not a theory at all. To be a theory it has to be about something while the Buddhas’ teaching is not about any thing at all. Rather, it is the very road that leads to realization that there are no things at all. Keeping in mind that a path’s significance lies in being walked, the Buddhas’ teaching is the very way walking which one ends theorizing. The teaching being about no thing, being the very ending of theorizing, it cannot even serve as the ground for a counter theory. He says: ‘The magnanimous (*mahātman*) have neither thesis

⁴⁰ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 32.

⁴² *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 29.

⁴³ *Yuktiśaṣṭika*, 31.

(*pakṣa*) nor contention (*vivāda*). How can there be an opposing thesis (*parapakṣa*) to those who have no thesis (*pakṣa*)?⁴⁴

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⁴⁴ *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*, 50

ARE WE ALL AMORALISTS? SOME DEBATES

REKHA OJHA

An individual that pays no attention to right or wrong motives seems to be rather unimaginable in a world where we seem to be programmed to symbolize and epitomize even the most clinically objective and random of occurrences, in which we attach meaning to otherwise meaningless, abstract objects. Yet, much like when arguing the meaning of art, one should try to first describe, even if highly hypothetically, what an ideal or perfect artwork MUST contain, and from that point, retrospectively focus on what art should and should not attain to, we too can focus on the Amoralist, even if such a being is entirely mythological, or especially if we are to reject morality entirely as a smokescreen for amorality, before we can draw any meaningful conclusions.

Nietzsche, in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1885), and a year later in *Beyond Good and Evil* might have put the final nail (if such a thing can ever be possible in philosophy) in the debate over the existence of morality from the point of view of the individual, where the power of will, more accurately the supremacy of vaguely defined and understood, but positively present 'life force', surpasses subjective culturally ephemeral moral standpoints to show that arguing for or against morality is in itself a false subjective act, deviating from (an amoral?) Truth. However, his theory fell into obscurity as quickly as it rose, as evolutionary determinism shamelessly disproves "life-force" in the new era of Western thought (*even as I postulate this throughout the text, I am aware that classical evolutionary /genetic determinism is under rapid fire by breakthrough, however premature studies in epigenetics (and other fields. Refer to: [http:// nexusofepigenetics.com/the- philosophy- in and- epigenetics/ for further reading](http://nexusofepigenetics.com/the-philosophy-in-and-epigenetics/)*). Modern scientific breakthroughs, especially in the field of psychology, psychoanalysis and neurology suggest that today we are faced with something that Nietzsche may have named, if he were to accept it, as the death of the individual. Indeed Nietzsche set the snow ball rolling in his monumental work of the 1880s that has been expanded, and has metamorphosed over the past 100 years first by the psychoanalytic work of Freud (who was immensely influenced by Nietzsche), and Lacan or by Jean Paul Satre's lucid and honest interpretations of Radical Freedom and the delusion of the self, much like Darwin's first steps into

evolution have now permeated across all human sciences and in recent times applied by scientists like Steven Pinker or Richard Dawkins, to dissect the mystery of humanity, language and social behaviour among strict scientific guidelines. The individual met his death with epistemological studies not so much from the discovery of subtle influences and conditioning by external forces on human behavior, such as the ideas of culture industry, and in extreme forms of occultism or the thousands of deeply troubling, often nihilistic studies into fascism after the calamities of two World Wars, but from internal forces, first of the recognition of the control of unconscious drives, motives and repressions, and the existential crisis of the individual and later, from the studies into the origins of consciousness which through back into question very existence of free-will by illustrating that the will of an individual is an after-effect of a deep, inaccessible decision-making process, and illusion of the psyche, that creates a mirage to trick a conscious acceptance. A simple experiment in which the subject is asked to choose between two pictures, by pressing either the button on the right or on the left, is but one example – neurologists can in real time study the subject's brain and predict the choice before the subject is consciously aware of making it¹. Evolutionary determinism, especially Natural selection and Survival of the fittest contest that random genetic mutations follow no path to complex behavior, have no destiny or direction. Many similar experiments have come to the same rather gloomy conclusion; that conscious perception, including such complicated processes as reason and motive, is an illusionary process; it may play a part in certain rationalizations and reason (such as for an apt example; comparing and strategizing on two outcome by creating a model of the future that can be explored intentionally) but conscious awareness has no ultimate control in originating ideas, or even in making choice – where and how these processes originate is a subject of lengthy and at present obscure debate, but the implications of what a functioning human being and by extension a functioning society is, are in need of revision –not in the least in the question of morality.

Before we lapse into an attempt of this revision, it may be mentioned briefly that we are likely to approach a kind of synthesis, in the terms of Hegelian Dialectic, as we turn our attention to the proposition of rather foreign to the field sciences, beginning with evolutionary biology which is modeled today into theorizing on

economics, the rise and fall of civilizations and social behaviour : such as Economic Game theory², where all social interaction are giving values based on selfish interest of the gene (*the theory of Selfish Gene was popularized by Richard Dawking's book to counter the erroneous idea of "selfish species"-however, for the purpose of this discussion it matters little what propagates our survival drives as long as we accept that it affects individual action directly or indirectly*) – this parallels the exchange of properties that we find in classical physics, and more intriguing even, are the correlations we can theorize on between particle interactions in quantum physics or the implications of ideas such as Chaos theory (*i.e. small, seemingly unrelated changes in, genetics produce ripples that cause global effects on society at large. See: Butterfly Effect Theory*).

We have momentarily digressed only for the purpose of acknowledging that a scientific synthesis is more possible today than it was in Nietzsche's time; this can be seen as an encouragement that we are indeed, on the path to, philosophically speaking, truth. Throughout this dysjunction of ideas and theories, especially in the face of most complicated classification of humankind, we are forced to find a new place for morality, be it merely on superficial platform: it is important to stress that even if we choose, as today's empirical evidence seems to demand, to entirely reject good and evil, reject rational and conscious behaviour as subjective, transitory manifestations of ulterior functions, and even if we were amass irrefutable evidence to approach a true synthesis, we are at present, and in the foreseeable future, inept to remove ourselves from the world of morality. For the purpose of this discussion we can place morality in three categories (rather bravely, I have trimmed many alternative categories):

1. Morality is a manifestation of personal, conscious ideologies, which are themselves product of unconscious drives, for the purpose of accessing external reality.
2. Morality is a manifestation of cultural and societal ideals, for the purpose of maintaining collective survival and
3. Morality is a representation of 'the drive of life- force', a tool for the progress in the direction of development, evolution or greater complexity – or towards utopia, and is thus but a part of a much more complex and unknown external

drive. It is only in the third option in which morality is a distinct entity, but this supposition of morality as an external quality is under intense scrutiny in today's scientific approach: if morality on the other hand is condition, than it would be no great leap to presuppose that below the surface we are all amoral.

So far, this essay has been resting on one very important assumption which I am now in need of addressing: that rational reasoning is vital for moral behaviour, and everything irrational is by definition amoral. Consciousness seems to be *a priori* to defining morality; we all make mistakes, but intentionally making a mistake can lead you in front of a judge. Although the penal code is certainly an inferior evaluator of morality, it is also the most concise, especially if we suppose that the legal system is but a controlled expression of human emotion, chiefly 'revenge' customized to function within the terms of society; as such, thankfully for children and animals conscious intent is a requirement for a guilty verdict. For example, there are hundreds of "sleepwalking murder" cases, dating back from the 17th century, in which the suspect has been found not guilty after claiming that he / she was unconscious during the act: in some cases the suspect covered a great distance, even by car, and used complicated weapons, to complete the act, all while remaining totally asleep³. Sleepwalking is a state where unconscious drives transcend internal thoughts and the id gains control of motor-function, creating automation out of the individual, who then, the theory can be extended, becomes an amoral subject, fulfilling the pleasure-seeking desires of the unconscious unrestrained by morality. Yet, a sleepwalking person is not an entire individual, but rather an incomplete version- he/she is not normal in the sense that anyone encountering the subject in this state will be able to tell so right away. Is morality then a vital part of what makes a human, human? Does an amoralist, if such a person exists, cease to be human? Can there be a philosophical Zombie (*a philosophical Zombie is a hypothetical individual that acts and responds to stimuli as if he/ she possesses all qualities of human life but in actuality lacks consciousness, feeling suffering and morality. Such a person would be indistinguishable from any normal human being. This thought experiment is highly debated and often rejected by philosopher*), as depicted in this comic:



4

Consider another scenario: that of a beggar asking you for a hand-out. The morally correct thing, assuming that you are in a position to help, would be to yield to the beggar's demands; however, one can play skip-rope with morality on such occasions, seemingly controlled by the whims and wants of the subject at that particular time – i.e. “he’s just going to spend it on alcohol”, “how is my money helping him find a job”, and other such half-explained, half-entertained yet socially acceptable principles, (and terminologies like “hand-out”). On different occasions, the impulse may be to be charitable, on certain day’s one may be predisposition to feel pity, or to impress some observer, while on other days one can choose to be amoral in this situation, as a lawyer can choose to be amoral in regard to his defendant, even if he knows that the suspect is guilty: morality is not porous, like for example language, but can be switched on and off by a conscious subject, it seems to be but a context against which we judge our egos (this idea is wonderfully explored in Mark Twain’s *What is man?* (1906) where any apparently altruistic is refuted as fulfilling the selfish desire of individual ego in a judgmental society: I could not bear to live with myself if I didn’t attempt to rescue the drowning child).

The question becomes how can we approach morality logically (analytically) when it has no interconnectivity, when it seems to be entirely subjective (amorality, however, is merely the absence of morality, and is thus objectively sound)? We may scorn philosopher Peter Singer when he laments that suffering is the same regardless of intensity of suffering⁵, and should be deplored; thus murdering a zebra is as tragic and morally unacceptable as murdering a man: what gives you moral right to disagree, the argument goes, how can you distinguish between the two, on what scale can you possibly rank 'suffering'? It would be easy to take the advice of Kant, or if you prefer, the teaching of Jesus Christ and proclaim that man should treat others as he would prefer others to treat him, until you meet masochist, of course. So far evidence points to morality as an individual creation. Consider Martin Seligman claim that happiness is synthetic, that, as any new-age hippy and speculative, pseudo-science life guide books like *'The Secret'* will agree, we create happiness (or any other emotion) at will⁶: yet we are merely pushing the problem back one step: create at *what will?* let us suppose that the ultimate definition of Free Will is the conscious freedom to commit suicide- we may not have a choice of *if we die*, but we may choose when to die, and yet, even the most prejudice psychologist will point out that the subject who attempts suicide is depressed, is unwell or sick - not acting within his full rational capacity. Most intriguing is an epigenetic study⁷ that showed how abnormal methylation of DNA was found in all suicide victims pointing to environmental and genetic factors, as oppose to conscious action that determined the victim's fate (by comparing "the brain tissues of those who had committed suicide to those from a control group who died suddenly, from heart attacks and other causes" the study determined that "the DNA in the suicidal groups brain tissue was ten times more methylated". "The gene being shut down (for unknown reasons) was a neurotransmitter receptor that plays a major role in regulating behavior). Worth mentioning is as a group, do we really have any choice in tendencies towards collective suicide (when starting and fighting in wars, or inventing and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction) or is the choice already made for us by some external and mysterious forces? (Remarque's literary masterpiece, *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1929) discusses First World war soldier's inability to understand their place in war remarkably).

Let us again attempt to approach this from a modern, purely socio-evolutionary standpoint. If individuals in groups are acting according to efficiency, within the principal of 'survival of the fittest', and groups, family, and society follow from this function then it is easy to see how cooperative behaviour may be favourable in certain conditions, and competitive behaviour in others – everything in between is but a facade for the propagation of the individual, the species, the gene, the collective, the country: the object, of course, is interchangeable as life- drive is not restricted to only human individuals. As mentioned before, in such circumstances morality is subjective to, not just status, but outcome, and not just emotion, but productivity- in the strict sense of the word. Perhaps this is why we can imagine a utopia world but never realize it, or even approach it. We could all then be considered to be amoral to the point where our acts are disingenuous even (or especially) to our self – rational. Or put plainly: is life amoral? If it is, then we by definition are amoral, no matter how large the illusion of morality is.

However if life in itself possess a moral compass - or to be more modern, if morality is an evolutionary process on its own, gaining ability, expanding as those capable of propagating it (humans) mutually expand with it. This will have to presuppose a starting point for the evolution of morality. It could be human reasoning. The *a priori* in this case is amorality, from which morality emerges at the beginning of civilization (whatever that may be): under such condition we maintain the integrity of morality, especially if we suppose that morality has or has the ability to evolve independent of humanity (here, the exciting field of Artificial Intelligence can one day yield some answers: time will tell if AI will evolve its own independent sense of morality).- in such a scenario, morality should be accepted at face- value and amorality, although vital for historical analysis, should have no place in modern life. But if morality is interlinked to your own perception only (this theory requires less assumptions), than it has no steadfast quality, and in analytical terms at least, it has no real quality. Consider Theodor Adorno's thesis which postulates that humanity has reached a stage where, having no longer to fear nature, we have turned our fear towards each other, "a humanity whose control of nature as control of men far exceeds in horror anything men ever had to fear from nature"⁸.

Under such conditions, the morality of tomorrow may be no more morally intact than the morality of bygone days when witch-burning and sprawling slave-markets were acceptable. If morality has no principals, if it can be turned into a weapon, as it has been, time and time again, then we cannot justly give it a decisive entity, and as Nietzsche pointed out, we should become strong and overcome this *Slave Morality*, to evolve from *Tschandala worship* of illusionary morality past the realm of immorality and into amorality- ironically, under such conditions, it becomes easier to dream of utopia.

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2. Proposed by psychiatrist Eric Berne (among others) in *Games people play* (1964).
3. Refer to Lawrence Martin's lucid study titled *Can sleepwalking be a murder defense*(2009), published by: Lakesidepress.
4. Existential comics number 11*Bad News at the Docto'*
5. See peter Singer's entry in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Chicago(1985), pp.627-648
6. Wonderfully described in a Ted video by Dan Gilbert titled *The Surprising science of Happiness* 2008 study by Dr. Michael O. Poulter and Dr. Hymie Anisman:
7. <http://pepoledisease.blogspot.in/2009/04/genomic-changes-found-in-brains-of.html>
8. *Dialatic of Enlightenment*(1944) and *Theses Against Occultism* (1974), Theodor Adorno

EXISTENCE AND PREDICATION: SOME OBSERVATIONS

DIPANKAR BARMAN

I

The problem concerning the predication of existence has been a controversial issue in the philosophy of language and logic. The trace of this problem, of course, is found in Plato's *Theatetus*, where he remarked on the first elements that "[e]ach of them just by itself can only be named; we cannot attribute to it anything further or say that it exists or does not exist..." (Cornford, 1935, 201E-202, p. 143). Notwithstanding, the problem came in light duly from Descartes' Ontological Argument as to God's existence. The problem basically lies in the formation of an assertion, which is either a true or false description. In an assertion, a predicate describes a subject by ascribing or denying some property to the object or class the subject denotes. When the denoted object or class substantially possesses the ascribed property or lacks the denied property as described by the assertion, it becomes true; but when the object or class lacks the ascribed property or possesses the denied property, it becomes false. Now, what it implies is that the justification of the truth-value of an assertion depends on the *existence* of the denoted object or class. Hence the *existence* of the subject becomes necessary for making assertions, and eventually, we become confined into the realm of existent things for making assertions. Thus we can truly assert 'Aristotle is a philosopher' and falsely assert 'Cows are carnivorous' only if 'Aristotle' and 'cows' denote an existing individual and at least one member of the class *cow* respectively, otherwise we cannot say anything true or false about them. If it is so, existence becomes a prerequisite for predication. And thus, existence restricts itself to become a predicate. However, in ordinary language, we significantly make assertions in which existence is being ascribed or denied. Some such assertions are 'Homer exists', 'Elephants exist', 'The author of *Waverly* exists', 'Pegasus does not exist', and so on. Now, a question is very pertinent here, if '...exists' is not a predicate then how are these statements to be justified as true and meaningful? The question seeks answers, and all the possible answers may be converged in two alternatives:

- (1) These statements are meaningless as existence wrongly posited at the predicate parts.

- (2) These statements are meaningful; hence existence is a predicate of a specified kind.

Some philosophers strictly maintain the first alternative; while some others attempt to justify the meaningfulness of those statements by explicating the nature of existence in accordance with their own philosophical perspectives.

II

In all probability, most of the arguments against the predication of existence come forth from the critics of Descartes' Ontological Argument regarding God's existence. Descartes remarked in his fifth *Meditation* that 'existence is a property'. He held that just as a triangle cannot be a triangle without having three interior angles, similarly God is not to be God without having existence (Descartes, 1641/1911). The essence of God includes existence as an essential property of Him. Since the essence of God involves the notion of a perfect being, and since being cannot be perfect without having existence, saying 'God is perfect, but does not exist' is contradictory. Before Descartes, St. Anselm also believed that 'existence is a property of God'. But Descartes' argument triggered in the realm of philosophy to enlighten on existence.

From the perspective of criticizing Descartes' argument, Kant's view comes into focus. For him, existence cannot be included in the essence of God; since it is not a real property, rather it is merely a logical property. Hence God's existence cannot be inferred from the essence of God. He made a distinction between a 'merely logical' predicate and a 'real' predicate. When a subject is predicated of itself, the predicate is 'merely logical' one; whereas a 'real' predicate says something new about the subject. For instance, in the sentence 'All red roses are red' the predicate 'are red' is a merely logical one; but in the sentence 'Some flowers are red' the predicate 'are red' is real. By a 'real predicate' Kant actually intended to mean a determining predicate. He said: "...a determining predicate is a predicate which is added to the concept of the subject and enlarges it. Consequently, it must not be already contained in the concept" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781/1929, p.504).

Some predicative expressions like '...is red', '...are girls' can work as both types of a predicate in different contexts in which they occur, but '...exists' can never appear as a real predicate in any context. By using a real or determining predicate like

'X is red' or 'X is beautiful' we describe some facts about X and this description enlarges the concept of X. But in saying 'X exists' we do not describe any fact about X, and thus nothing is added to the concept of X. So 'exists' is not a real predicate at all. As Kant (1929) put it:

'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. (p. 504)

Therefore, according to Kant, in saying "'God is' or 'There is God', we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates" (CPR, 1929, p. 505).

Alongside Kant philosophers like J. Wisdom, A. J. Ayer, and C.D. Broad prescribed a type of absurdity that would follow if we consider 'exists' as a predicate. As they reached the same absurdity with different logical analyses, I am explicating only Ayer's analysis here. In the book *Language, Truth and Logic* (1946), Ayer unfurled the absurdity in this way: If we accept existence as property or predicate, all positive existential propositions (viz. 'This exists') and all negative existential propositions (viz. 'This does not exist') would turn into tautologies and self-contradictory respectively. Because the subject part of a proposition is constituted by a name (including general name, proper name, and description) which denotes an element/elements that existed in the actual world. In that case, we cannot succeed in saying of an element that 'This exists' or 'This does not exist'. When we say 'This exists', by adding 'exists' to 'This' we assert just the existence of *this* again, and the assertion actually says 'This (which exists) exists'. Thus the assertion turns into a tautology. In the same way the assertion 'This does not exist' says 'This (which exists) does not exist' and turns into a self-contradictory. For him, 'exists' in statements like 'God exists' or 'I exist' is merely a *sleeping partner* as it fails to act as a predicate. That's why he remarked that all the statements like these do not belong to the proper type of statements but to a degenerate class of statements (*The Problem of Knowledge*, 1956).

III

Gottlob Frege conveyed a different explanation of Kantian thesis on 'real' and 'non-real predicates. For him, it is indubitably true that '...exists' is incapable of performing as a predicate in contexts like 'God exists', but it doesn't mean 'exists'

can never function as a predicate since in some other contexts like ‘Elephants exist’, ‘Tables exist’ etc. it really functions as a predicate. So, existence is no doubt a ‘real’ predicate, it is a real predicate of second-level. In order to make his contention cognizable, we need to understand some of the notions he used in this regard, such as ‘sense and reference’, ‘complete and incomplete expressions’, and ‘concept and object’.

Frege emphasized logically perfect language discarding ambiguous ordinary language. According to him, in a logically perfect language, every meaningful expression has a sense and a reference. In his paper “Über Sinn Und Bedeutung” he made a distinction between sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*). The reference of an expression is that to which it refers. And the sense of an expression is ‘the mode of presentation’ of the reference, and it determines the reference (*On Sense and Reference*, 1892/1960). For example, the name ‘Socrates’ refers to the person named Socrates and the act of referring is being determined by the sense that may be presented to us as ‘the Greek philosopher who taught Plato and drank hemlock in Athens’.

According to Frege, meaningful expressions are of two types- complete and incomplete. Complete expressions are the names of objects. Proper names, definite descriptions, and complete declarative sentences are considered complete expressions. So they all are names in a sense. The referents of proper names and definite descriptions are individuals, while the referents of declarative sentences are their truth-values. But Frege technically called both the referents ‘objects’. For him, objects are complete or saturated as having been referents of complete expressions which do not have any incompleteness within themselves. Incomplete expressions, on the other hand, are predicative expressions like ‘...is red’, ‘...is an elephant’ etc. These expressions have a type of incompleteness within themselves. The referents of incomplete expressions are concepts that are essentially incomplete or unsaturated analogous to the incompleteness of the corresponding expressions of which they are referents.

Frege had divided concepts into first-level and second-level by analogy with the distinction between first-order and second-order functions in mathematics. Accordingly, predicative expressions are of two types- first-level and second-level, as concepts are referents of predicative expressions. The incompleteness of a first-level

predicate and that of a second-level predicate are different in nature. The incomplete part of a first-level predicate is of such a nature that only complete expressions (names of objects) fit into it. Thus predicative expressions such as ‘...is a poet’, ‘...is an elephant’ and the like are called first-level predicates since we can significantly assert, ‘Rabindranath is a poet’ or ‘Ramu is an elephant’ as ‘Rabindranath’ and ‘Ramu’ being names of objects which fall under the concept of being a poet and the concept of being an elephant respectively. Hence, it is to be said that first-level predicates are predicates of objects. On the other hand, predicative expressions being incomplete by themselves do not fit into the incomplete part of a first-level predicate rather they fit into the incomplete part of a second-level predicate. Thus second-level predicates are to be regarded as predicates of concepts. Hence first-level predicates cannot be predicated of concepts, and second-level predicates cannot be predicated of objects. We are capable of saying something of an object by using first-level predicates and that of a concept by using second-level predicates. What can be said of an object cannot be said of a concept and vice versa. As Frege put it: “Second-level concepts, which concepts fall under, are essentially different from first-level concepts, which objects fall under” (*On Concept and Object*, 1892/1960, p. 50).

For Frege, ‘exists’ is a second-level predicate. He called “existence a property of a concept” (*CO*, 1960, pp. 48-49). And for this, it cannot be applied to objects, i.e. object’s name cannot be inserted into its incomplete part. That’s why, we cannot significantly make assertions like ‘Julius Caesar exists’, ‘Rabindranath exists’ or ‘Pegasus does not exist’ because in each of these sentences we are inserting a name of an object into the incomplete part of the predicate ‘exists’. Such sentences, for Frege, make no sense because they are not well-formed. As Frege said:

I don’t want to say it is false to assert about an object what is asserted here about a concept; I want to say it is impossible, senseless, to do so. ‘There is Julius Caesar’ is neither true nor false but senseless. (*CO*, 1960, p. 51)

As a second-level predicate ‘exists’ can be predicated of concepts only, we can say ‘Elephants exist’ because by saying this we assert that the concept of elephant has instances in the actual world or something falls within it. In this regard Frege pointed out that we can significantly say ‘there is at least one square root of 4’ but we cannot say ‘The square root of 4 exists’. The former says about the concept ‘square root of 4’ that it is not empty, something falls within it. We can truly say ‘2 is a square root of

4'. But in the latter existence has improperly attributed to *the squire root of 4* which is an object being the reference of a definite description 'The squire root of 4'. This is how Frege considered 'exists' as a real predicate, a predicate of second-level.

Russell logically upheld the possibility of the predicative use of 'exists'. He, following Frege, conceived that "[e]xistence propositions do not say anything about the actual individual but only about the class or function" (*The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, 1918/1956, p.234). He claimed that existence is not a property of any individual, rather it is "essentially a property of a propositional function" (*PLA*, 1956, p.232). Therefore, 'exists' can be used as a predicate of a propositional function. A propositional function is an expression containing one or more variables and is such that if those variables are replaced by appropriate values, a proposition results. Thus, for example, 'x is a man', 'x is a unicorn', 'y = successor of 3' are all propositional functions in the sense that if we replace the variables (viz. 'x', 'y', etc.) by appropriate values they result in propositions.

According to Russell, we can make significant assertions like 'Men exist'. In saying 'Men exist' we are actually asserting that the propositional function 'x is a man' is sometimes true, i.e. it has at least one instance in which it is true. This is the fundamental meaning of the word 'existence' (Russell, 1956). With the help of the existential quantifier and variable, we may express 'Men exist' as ' $(\exists x) (x \text{ is man})$ ' or ' $(\exists x) Mx$ '. Here the quantifier ' $(\exists x)$ ' expresses existence and it is attached to the propositional function '(x is man)' in which "x" is variable. So it is to be said that our statement affirms the existence of a propositional function. But we cannot meaningfully assert 'Rabindranath exists' or the like if 'Rabindranath' or else is treated as a logically proper name¹. Because in that case the meaningfulness of 'Rabindranath exists' compels us to accept meaningfulness of 'Rabindranath does not exist' according to the *principle of significant negation*, i.e. if a sentence is meaningful, then its denial is also meaningful. Now if *Rabindranath* does not exist then 'Rabindranath' does not refer to anything and hence 'Rabindranath' would be

¹ A logically proper name is devoid of any descriptive content; it only refers to a particular which is its meaning. Only demonstrative pronouns, such as 'this', 'that', 'it', 'I' etc., are logically proper names.

meaningless. Thus by following that very principle ‘Rabindranath exists’ would become meaningless too.

But if we treat ‘Rabindranath’ as an ordinary proper name, then it would be meaningful. Because every ordinary proper name, for Russell, is actually a disguised definite description (a phrase of the form “the so-and so”). Hence the name ‘Rabindranath’ is equivalent to ‘The author of *Gitanjali*’. This enables us to logically transform the assertion ‘Rabindranath exists’ into ‘The author of *Gitanjali* exists’, and thus it becomes meaningful. Russell (1920) said:

The proposition ‘the so-and-so exists’ is significant whether true or false, but if *a* is the so-and-so (where ‘*a*’ is a name), the words ‘*a* exists’ are meaningless. It is only descriptions- definite or indefinite- that existence can be significantly asserted.... (pp. 178-179)

For Russell, the logical structure of the assertion ‘The author of *Gitanjali* exists’ is of a conjunctive proposition, and its conjuncts negate the conditions - (i) no one wrote *Gitanjali*, and (ii) more than one person wrote *Gitanjali*- which make the assertion false. So, the assertion inevitably involves the following conjuncts into its logical form:

- (a) at least one person wrote *Gitanjali*, and
- (b) at most one person wrote *Gitanjali*.

This can be expressed in technical language with the help of an existential quantifier and variables in the following way:

$(\exists x) [x \text{ is an author of } Gitanjali \text{ and } (y) (\text{if } y \text{ is an author of } Gitanjali \text{ then } y = x)]$

It can further be symbolized as : $(\exists x)[Ax.(y)(Ay \supset y=x)]$

[Ax: x is author of *Gitanjali*]

[Ay: y is author of *Gitanjali*]

Through this analysis, we find that ‘The author of *Gitanjali*’ has disappeared and what remains constant is propositional function. So the assertion is not about any individual, rather it is about propositional function. Here the predicate ‘exists’ is properly attributed to a propositional function. Therefore, after Russell, propositions like ‘Pegasus does not exist’ are to be analyzed as propositions containing definite descriptions, and in this particular case as ‘The winged horse does not exist’. So, Russell is also of the opinion that ‘exists’ is a predicate, although a predicate of a propositional function.

What is being revealed from the discussion we made is that predicative use of ‘exists’ is possible and it is limited to concepts, classes, or propositional functions only. So a sentence containing ‘exists’ or ‘does not exist’ as a predicate would be well-formed only if the predicate follows a subject which is either a concept word, a class name, a definite description, or an ordinary proper name. But we cannot add ‘exists’ or ‘does not exist’ to a logically proper name in making assertions. Because to “attempt to do so would make the sentence unconstruable” (Strawson, 1959, p.239). Hence we cannot make assertions like ‘I exist’, ‘It exists’ etc. in which subject terms are logically proper names. But if it is possible to transform logically proper names into descriptions then these sentences will also be meaningful. In this regard, Quine (1948/1963) has suggested a method, in the essay “On what there is”, by which all kinds of proper names can be transformed into definite descriptions. A logically proper name can be reduced to a definite description in the following way (Shaw, 1988):

- (1) a is F
- (2) The thing which is-a (or a-ises) is F.

Hence the sentence ‘This is a man’ can be reduced to “The thing which is- this (or this-ises) is a man. Quine has followed Russell’s theory of description by which he eliminated all definite descriptions in terms of quantifiers and variables. In his notation the sentence ‘This is a man’ would take the following form:

$(\exists x)(Tx.(y)(Ty \supset x=y). Mx)$, where “T” stands for “this-ises” and “M” for “is a man”.

In this way, singular terms such as “I”, “this”, and “that” can be translated into logical notations of variables and quantifiers. For example, ‘I exist’ would take the following form:

$(\exists x)(Ix.(y)(Iy \supset x=y))$, where “I” stands for “i-ises”.

Therefore, by accepting this method existence propositions containing logically proper names as subjects can be construable. Thus ‘exists’ may be coherently taken as a predicate to whatsoever the subject term is. So we may say ‘exists’ is a real predicate of a specified kind, and the predication of existence is possible.

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THE CONCEPT OF *BHAKTI* IN BENGAL VAIṢṆAVISM

BAISAKHI DAS

The genesis and development of Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism, otherwise known as *Gauḍīya* Vaiṣṇavism, is a religious movement initiated by ŚrīCaitanyaMahāprabhu (February 18, 1486 – June 14, 1534 A.D.) and his followers in the 15th and the 16th centuries A. D. ŚrīJīvaGosvāmī (1513-1598 A. D.) has given the philosophical foundation of *Gauḍīya* Vaiṣṇavism in its articulation of *Acintyabhedābheda-vāda*, a school of Vedānta representing the philosophy of inconceivable one-ness and difference. Both Rūpa Gosvāmī (1489 – 1564 A. D.) and SanātanaGosvāmī (1488 - 1558 A. D.) were his paternal uncles. Etymological derivation suggests that Vaiṣṇavism centres round Viṣṇu though He is designated by different names by different devotees hailing from different regions of India but the path of devotion and pure love (*prema- bhakti*) is common to all of them and Kṛṣṇa of the *BhāgavataPurāṇa* is said to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu in human form with human qualities and sentiments. Viṣṇu, who is appeared to be more appealing and attractive, is adequately portrayed and delineated in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* through His *līlā* (sportive joy) with parents, friends, *gopīs* and other devotees professing unconditioned love and devotion. In course of time, Rādhā came to be recognized as the consort, an ideal devotee and lover of Kṛṣṇa. This divine, pure and super sensuous relation between Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā is difficult to comprehend and its true significance cannot be fully realized by any ordinary being with human sensibilities.

The most outstanding feature of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism in its religious aspect is its theory of *Rasa* (Relish). Etymologically, the word *rasa* means a thing that may be tasted or enjoyed. Bengal Vaiṣṇavism is an area of fascinating study, unique in its articulation of *Acintyabhedābheda-vāda*, as a philosophy according to which the only way to God realization is *bhakti*. It establishes the superiority of *bhakti* over *Karma* and *Jñāna*. The Absolute is the eternal embodiment of all *rasas* (relish) (*nikhilarasāmṛta-mūrti*). The teachers of the Bengal school declare that Kṛṣṇa-*rati* appears as five different kinds of dominant moods, viz *Śānta*, *Dāsya*, *Sakhya*, *Vātsalya* and *Madhura*. The *rasas* (relish) are realized differently by the different class of devotees. Among these different modes of God-realization the worshipping God as one's own child is unique. It is called *Vātsalya-bhāva* and the *rasa* (relish) that the *bhakta*

experience is called *Vātsalya-rasa*. It is an extension of one's love for one's child to the 'other' and through this gradually to God.

How can human beings realize God through Divine Love (*bhakti*) in and through the consideration of God as one's own child? This is based on *ahetukī bhakti*, according to *Gauḍīya* Vaiṣṇavism. The word 'love' is very familiar to everybody, from the growing child to the God-intoxicated man. Love does not depend on anything; it may exist and be expressed without of the word. Man loves or tries to love, though their love is self-centered, pleasure-oriented, problematic and brittle, but ideal love and common human love thus seem to be poles apart. It seems that the motive of self-enhancement ultimately controls all human affiliations. Yet the ideals are not something imaginary or unrealistic. People look up to these ideals and pursue them. For example, the ideals of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa *prema*, love of Hanumāna for Rāmacandra, the *gopīs* of *Vṛindāvana* for Kṛṣṇa, filial love of Yośodā for Kṛṣṇa etc. provided wonderful example of extraordinary love (*prema*). In this context, what is called 'love of God' may appear to hold some hope. By the word 'love' God (Kṛṣṇa) is conceived as both *rasa* (relish) and *rasarāja*. The Vaiṣṇavas of the Bengal school do not only worship the Lord as their 'swamī' (controller) through *Madhura-bhāva*, but also worship through unconditional self-surrender to the Lord. It is practiced through all kinds of human relationship which expresses His *līlā*. Sometimes the devotees (*bhaktas*) realize this *līlā* through understanding the relationship of love of a servant for his master (*Dāśya-bhāva*), a friend for a friend (*Sakhya-bhāva*), parents for their child (*Vātsalya*; filial attitude) and lastly *kāntā-bhāva* or love of a lady-love for her lover¹ (*Mdhura-bhāva*) and all these form of devotion have to be motiveless, i.e., it would not have any cause or reason.

With this prerequisite let us discuss *Vātsalya-bhāva*. The parents of Kṛṣṇa are illustrations of the *Vātsalya* mood of devotion through love; in its pure and simple form that ignores power and majesty. Here God is being loved as their own child. *Vātsalya-bhāva* can be regarded as the highest state of ecstatic joy, for it can lay its calm on the whole of devotee's time and attention on account of the restrictions of time and circumstances imposed on it. Here the Lord Kṛṣṇa is conceived as loving 'Gopāla' of Mother Yośodā and the force of the sense of Kṛṣṇa's lordship is minimized to a great extent by the devotee's filial affection for the Lord. In the stage

of *Vātsalya*, the devotee has the conceit of parents or parent-like ones and looks upon the *Bhagavān* as his/her child. It flows spontaneously, regardless of any injunction, sanction or stimulus from without. It is eternal and ever-growing. *Vātsalya* involves *mamatā*; belief and the feeling that ‘Kṛṣṇa is my child’. Kṛṣṇa is regarded as the supreme deity owing to filial love of an extreme nature which makes devotee blind to the absoluteness of Kṛṣṇa. Even if Kṛṣṇa Himself manifests His lordship to a devotee like Yośodā, she is awe-struck only for the moment and soon manages to react to it as one does to an illusion or an evil omen. It has been said in the *Bhāgavata* that while being suckled by His mother Yośodā, Kṛṣṇa showed her His universal form. But Yośodā could not fix her mind on it for long. Her motherly love made her forget the lordship of Kṛṣṇa, and being afraid and anxious like an ordinary mother, she hurriedly took all steps to ward off any evil that might befall her child Kṛṣṇa.

According to Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, the Knower and the known get united only after getting final deliverance, i.e., achieving *bhakti*. The teachers of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism hold that the relation of ‘difference-in non-difference’ though undeniable, yet not intelligible to logical understanding.² It attempts at exhibiting the genesis and development of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism providing us with a probable solution to this unfathomable gap between the knower and the object of knowledge. The word *Bhakti* has been derived from the root *bhaj*, which is used to mean complete servitude or *sevā* (i.e., entire submission to Him in body, mind and words). It is complete self-surrender or *ātmanivedana* to the Lord. The path of *bhakti* is open to all without distinction of race, sex, colour, intelligent or caste and creed. *Bhakti* is manifested in *prapattī* which means the complete surrender of one-self to God. In the final stage of *bhakti*³ the devotee realizes the unity of all existences, even God Vāsudeva and he, himself, are one.

It is indeed true that Bengal Vaiṣṇavism gives importance to the theory of *rasa* - ‘*rasa vaisah, rasamhyevāyāmlabdhvānandībhavati*’ (*Taittirīya*: 2.6.1). In the *TaittirīyaUpaniṣad* it has been mentioned of Brahman as *rasa* (relish), and individual soul becomes full of bliss (*ānanda*) identified extension of love, which infinitely surpasses the charm of the bliss aspect of Brahman.⁴ The intrinsic nature of Kṛṣṇa and power of His bliss (*Hlādinī*) in the highest plane of His transcendental abode with which He makes human beings to realize this. This way of realizing reality resembles

the human intellectual method of enjoying dalliance (*līlā*). According to Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, *Kṛṣṇa-rati* appears as five different kinds of dominant moods, viz *Śānta*, *Dāsyā*, *Sakhya*, *Vātsalya* and *Madhura* - these are relished differently by five different kinds of devotees. Man is by nature a seeker of joy, life-long and persistent desire for joy can be attended only on the realization of the bliss (*rasa*) of Kṛṣṇa. Let us now discuss *Vātsalya-rati*. How can man be united with God as their own child based on *ahetukībhakti*.⁵

The parents of Kṛṣṇa are illustrations of the *Vātsalya* mode of devotion. Here God is being loved as one's own child. In this stage, Kṛṣṇa, the Supreme Lord, is worshiped as one's own son. He receives parental love and care from the concerned devotee. They should feed Him, dress Him, administer Him medicines when he is ill, put Him sleep and then watch Him over when asleep. The mind of the devotee in *Vātsalya-bhāva* is wholly occupied with thoughts for their beloved Lord whom they perceive as their child. *Vātsalya-bhāva* can be regarded as the highest state of ecstatic joy, for it can lay its calm on the whole of devotee's time and earnest attention on account of the restrictions of time and circumstances imposed on it. The *Vātsalya* consciousness of Vāsudeva and Devakī, who were the parents of Kṛṣṇa, was disturbed by the sense of Kṛṣṇa's power and majesty. But the Lord Kṛṣṇa is conceived as loving 'Gopāla' of Mother Yaśodā and the force of the sense of Kṛṣṇa's lordship is minimized to a great extent by the devotee's filial affection for the Lord. In the stage of *Vātsalya*, the devotee has the conceit of parents or parent-like ones and looks upon the *Bhagavān* as one's own child. It flows spontaneously, regardless of any injunction, sanction or stimulus from without. It is eternal and ever-growing. *Vātsalya*, involves *mamatā*, belief and the feeling that 'Kṛṣṇa is my child'. Kṛṣṇa is regarded as the supreme deity owing to filial love of an extreme nature which makes devotee blind to the absoluteness of Kṛṣṇa.

Vātsalya or paternal sentiment is still superior, since in this stage the devotee regards the Lord as her/his affectionate child deserving anxious parental care and kindness, and on account of the loving sense of superiority goes so far as to chastise and punish Him, if such measures appear to him necessary for His correction. The sense of 'mine'⁶ (*madīya-bhāva*) involved in the parental love is much more intense than that involved in friendly love. The loving service of a friend even at its highest

stage does not involve the sense of superiority and the intense feeling of care and anxiety for the object displayed in parental love. The highest stage of *Vātsalya* leads to self-realization which consists in the loving service of Kṛṣṇa alone as the dearest and nearest one. *Vātsalya* is to restore the tranquil state of the devotees, so that they may realize His intrinsic nature. *Rasa* (relish) and *Ānanda* (bliss) have no meaning except as enjoyment which implies the duality of subject and object. The true nature of the ultimate reality is conceived as consisting of perfect self-enjoyment which finds its fullest and highest expression in the eternal communion of Yaśodā and Gopāla. As *rasa* (relish) the supreme reality is not only the object relished as bliss but also the subject that relishes. Actually *rasa*(relish) is emotional sublimation of intimate human sentiments to-wards Kṛṣṇa. The devotee voluntarily submits her/his own self to God and experiences a sweet, personal, intimate relation of love and comradeship with Him. The Vaiṣṇavas of the Bengal school cannot only worship the Lord as their *Swamī* through *Madhura-bhāva*, they worship and surrender unconditionally to the Lord through all kinds of human relationship which expresses His *līlā*. It is the understanding of relationship of love of a servant for his master (*Dāsyā*), love of a friend for a friend (*Sakhya*), parents-child, filial attitude (*Vātsalya*) and Lady-love for the beloved (*Mādhurya*).

Vātsalya-bhāva is regarded as the nearest to the stage of *Madhura-bhāvain* the series of gradual development of *rasa-realization* starting with *Śānta-bhāva* and ending with *Kāntā-bhāva*. *Vātsalya-bhāva* is superior to *Dāsyā* and *Sakhya*. In terms of intimacy each of the succeeding stage of *rasa* of *Vātsalya-bhāva* is higher than the earlier one. *Vātsalya-rasa* has the characteristic of tenderness in addition to the three characteristic of *Sakhya*, namely the senses of divinity, service and reliance arising out of unconditional love. In it a devotee regards as the patron of Kṛṣṇa who appears to him as the object of parental care. The *Vātsalya* consciousness of Vāsudeva and Devakī, who were the parents of Kṛṣṇa, was disturbed by the sense of Kṛṣṇa's power and majesty. Here the Lord Kṛṣṇa is the 'ultimate concern' conceived as affectionate loving son 'Gopāla' of Mother Yaśodā. In this stage of *Vātsalya*, a devotee (*bhakti*) has the conceit of parents and looks upon the *Bhagavān* as her/his own child. It is analogous to flowing *karuṇa rasa* spontaneously, regardless of any injunction,

sanction or stimulus from without reason and feeling of fearlessness. It is eternal and ever-growing.

Kṛṣṇa delights to sport with His closest devotees in the form in which they desire Him the most. It is said in the *Purāṇas* that Droṇa, Vāsu, and Dhārā, who were great devotees, obtained Kṛṣṇa as their son because of their parental attitude towards Him. Kṛṣṇa is reputed to be the son of Nanda and Yaśodā, who were originally Drona and Dhārā.⁷ The story of the good fortune of Nanda and Yaśodā is only illustrative of Kṛṣṇa's extraordinary grace to His ardent devotees. The Vaiṣṇavas of Bengal holds that Nanda and Yaśodā are not ordinary mortals but eternal *parikaras* or associates of Kṛṣṇa. Though in the manifest *līlā* they have been found to obtain the special favour of being the parents of Kṛṣṇa on account of their parental feeling (*vātsalyabhāva*) for Him in the non-manifest *līlā*-s where they are eternally the parents of Kṛṣṇa. In the manifest *līlā* in *ātma-nivedana* state Kṛṣṇa is sometimes known as the son of Vāsudeva and Devakī at the prison cell in Mathurā whence He was subsequently taken to the place of Nanda and Yaśodā at Vṛṇḍāvana. Like His other acts, His birth, though resembling phenomenal acts, is non-phenomenal. It is the common belief among the followers of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism that kṛṣṇa became the son of Vāsudeva and Devakī not by entering into the womb of the latter but by taking possession of their minds. The form in which He has manifested Himself to Vāsudeva and Devakī is not the same in which He manifests Himself to Nanda and Yaśodā. As the son of Vāsudeva and Devakī, He is four-handed and awe-inspiring. While as the son of Nanda and Yaśodā He is two-handed and his transcendental form is characterized by exquisite beauty and loveliness. He is an ever-smiling playful cowherd boy, who wears a crown of wildflowers around His neck and with one hand He carries a flute and with the other, He carries a stick. The majestic feature of the Lord is now fully eclipsed by His juvenile suavity. No doubt Vāsudeva and Devakī are His *parikara*-s, but their status as devotees of Kṛṣṇa is not as that of Nanda and Yaśodā. Here Kṛṣṇa manifests Himself in His lower awe-inspiring form to Vāsudeva and Devakī and assumes the sweet intrinsic features of *rasa* (relish) and *ānanda* (bliss) which have no meaning except as enjoyment which implies the duality of subject and object. But the true nature of the ultimate reality is conceived in Bengal Vaiṣṇavism consisting of

perfect self-enjoyment which finds its fullest and highest expression in the eternal communion of Yaśodā and Gopāla.

Genuine love is not only unmotivated; it is also unconditional (*ahetuki*). In the *Caitanya-caritāmṛta* it is said that the love for Kṛṣṇa (*Kṛṣṇa-prema*) is eternal; it is not something to be accomplished. What is brought about is its manifestation in heart of the *bhakta* (devotee) purified by listening to contemplation etc. The *Bhagavān-prīti* as a *rasa* (relish) is not accessible to all; only the *bhakta* can realize it through love for Kṛṣṇa which is inherent in every soul as the seed of devotion. “*sakaleramājheāchena Kṛṣṇa, kehanayakhāli| kāromājhevikaśita, kāromājhe kali||*”⁸ The un-manifested form of the seed needs special nurturing with faith as its root. According to Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, “Kṛṣṇa can be realized only on the basis of faith, never by reasoning or argument (*viśvāsemilāyavastutarkevahudūra*)”.⁹ But how does reverential faith arise? If faith does not arise without depending on our will, the theory of devotion will not stand. If repetition of a holy name or *mantra* is practiced on regular basis, the basic ground of reverential faith will be prepared. It is reported that *yavana* (a muslim) Haridās, a non-*hindu* devotee used to repeat in chanting the holy name one *lakh* times every day. But now a day we do not have so much time for meditation of ‘name repetition’ (*nāma-japa*) or chanting. But without doing this there would be no preparation of the field for sowing the seed of devotion. Without belief in the existence of God, devotion is impossible. God and the devotee have inseparable relationship (*aprthaka-siddhi*). In the absence of one, the other also will be absent. In the language of Rabindranath Tagore a *bhakta* may say: “*āmāyanahile, he tribhūbaneśvratomāraprema ye hatomiche*”.¹⁰ So *Bhagavān*, Lord Kṛṣṇa who is conceived both as *rasa* (relish) and *rasarāja* is not only the object of relish (*rasa*) as bliss (*ānanda*) but also as the subject that relishes. The devotee voluntarily submits her/himself to God and experiences a sweet, personal, intimate relation of love and comradeship with Him.

Now the question is: Does the parental love, *Vātsalya-bhāva* have any relevance in today’s society? ‘Tolerance’ and ‘altruism’ are two main features of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism. Here we see, mother Yaśodā taking Devakī’s son Kṛṣṇa as her own child. On the other hand, the boy Kṛṣṇa also accepted Yaśodā and Nanda as His parents. The example of making others as our own inspires us and we can realize our

extension to others. If we try to extend this altruistic parental love (*parakīyā-vātsalya-bhāva*) for inter-relationship in our family and society it will lead to sustainable good relation in our society. This parental love (*parakīyā-vātsalya-bhāva*) is an extension of oneself to others; others' children are as good as one's own children. This, of course, awakens a sense of interdependence through the bond of love in us, and gradually it works for value based development of our society which suffers from selfishness, meanness, greed, hatred and delusion. Pure love is the remedy for such mental illness. Hatred begets hatred and hatred can be won by love. This is the message uphold by the followers of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism. If we practice this value of *Vātsalya-bhāvain* society many orphans will have the opportunity to grow up with real parental affection, love and discipline and this will certainly contribute to elevate our society to the highest level of peace and progress. For example, if the teachers take care of their students with parental affection, love and care as they do for their own children, our society will grow with elevated citizens in future. If the medical community, where the physician has a pivotal position, serves the patients with the same affection as their own children, then the solution of many problems of the society may be easily addressed and minimised. The ideal relation between a doctor and a patient is described as one of parental relation by Caraka. And it is here that we may find the relevance of *Vātsalya-bhāva* of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism to address problems of today's society in many other ways.

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PERSPECTIVES OF GLOBALIZATION AND ITS ETHICAL DIMENSIONS

PURNIMA DAS

Introduction

The present contribution deals with the Ethical Dimension of Globalization and by way of rounding off the concept an effort has been made to throw some light on debit and credit side of it and varied forms of the same. The dictionary meaning of the term 'globalization' is two-way traffic-extension of us to the world and all parts of the world to us. The effect of globalization lies in the world-wide movement towards economic, financial trade and communications. Moreover, globalization is taken as the process of international integration arising from the inter-change of world views, products, ideas and other aspects of culture. Economic globalization is found in the activities of World Bank and other funding authorities providing money when a nation is in need, political globalization found in the formation of European Union, G8, and International Criminal Court etc. and cultural globalization is related to transmission of ideas, values and meaning of cross-cultural contacts and various bilateral Cultural Exchange Programmes like Indo-Netherlands Cultural Exchange Programme, Indo-French Cultural Exchange Programme etc. Apart from these, globalization can be shown in different perspectives like Vedantic globalization, Aesthetic globalization and yogic globalization, which are equally important for us.

Vedantic Globalization: In Indian philosophical literature we find different types of globalization which draws our attention. When it is said that all-pervading Self as admitted in the Advaita Vedānta remains both in nearer place and remote places (*"taddūretadvantike"*)¹, it indicates globalization. Self, if all-pervading, has got no spatial ascriptions like near, far etc., which may be the cause of our sense of nationalism, taking whole world as our relatives (*"vasudhaivakutumvakam"*) self-love etc. Sri Aurobindo had talked about the Nation which is nothing but the manifestation of Self (*deśātmbodha*).² The Upaniṣad also believes in this type of globalization when it preaches one entity i.e., Self-pervading the whole world i.e., world-wide-website (w.w.w) which is otherwise called in Bengali- *viśvajoḍāphāndpātā*. In the Advaitic sense globalization is a two way traffic- self extended to the world and world extended to self :

*'yastusarvāṇibhūtāniātmanyevānupaśyati/
sarvabhūteṣucātmānamtatona vijugupsate//'*³.

The Buddhist concepts of *maitrī* and *karuṇā* provide us an emotional globalization or love of the globe on account of which they are called *Brahmavihāra* i.e., rejoicing in the broadness covering the whole world. No man can remain alone in this world in this era of globalization, which is emphasized by Swami Vivekananda. Swamiji has brought harmony between an individual's emancipation as well as that of others. Not only in materialistic thinking, but in spiritual pursuit also, an individual should not seek his own well-being and emancipation neglecting those of others. Swamiji's Master, Sri Ramakrishna, had told him to be as great as a banyan tree so that many persons tormented by worldly cares could take shelter under him.⁴ It will make one expand and engulf the entire world. An individual's personal emancipation or freedom is not really freedom if others who are non-different from him are also not free. To Vivekananda freedom or emancipation is to be achieved in and through the freedom and emancipation of others; it is not a selfish self-seeking endeavour or an act of cowardice or escapism. It is spiritual truth made living, made practical which is the ethical principle of Vivekananda. It is very difficult to adopt selflessness, *niṣkāmatā*, from the very beginning. For this reason, the Advaitins advise an individual to start with his own limited or immature self and to extend the attitude to others for acquiring maturity in terms of self. In this way he can cover all – mobile and static. This extension of self ultimately becomes unbound and matured which is tantamount to the status of selflessness. Though the extension of self serves the purpose of selflessness, its prescription has got a social value as it helps to generate the Upanisadic 'truth' – 'self in all' or 'all in self' (*ātmanisarvabhūtam or sarvabhūteātma*)⁵ which alone can bind all through the thread of brotherhood and it will be a real social and spiritual welfare of others. It cannot be argued that to bind all through the thread of self is the result of attachment. For, it becomes possible for a man, as he is detached from the worldly affairs, which alone can afford him a real freedom. The attachment towards the individual property is stated to be harmful for a man, as it finds him, but attachment to all i.e., self is not the cause of his bondage, as it is not his immature individual ego, but it becomes the cause of absolute freedom. As 'all' has been included in one's self, there is left nothing, which does not come under 'all' or 'self' or subject and hence there is nothing, which, being an object, can find him. Vivekananda has considered superstitions as obstacles to the path of action. Those who believe in superstitions are afraid and weak, and hence they cannot do any

real work. ‘It is fear that is the great cause of misery in the world. It is fear that is the greatest of all superstitions ... it is fearlessness that brings heaven even in a moment.’⁶ This fearlessness comes when one feels that one is united with the universe, which is also another form of globalization. This expression of oneness is called love and sympathy, which is the basis of all morality and ethics. Other persons and objects are considered to be one’s own self. Each and everyone in the world are part of me, and hence in hurting another I am hurting myself, and in loving another I love myself. This knowledge follows from the *Mahāvākya*, *tat tvamasi*. If someone considers all as his own self, looks upon no one else, as a stranger, there will be total harmony. This Vedantic principle provides us the basis of ethics. Why should we be moral to others? Because the whole world is covered by self and hence each and every individual should be looked upon as the part of the self or Divine. Hence one would not have any tendency of exploiting others and should not feel greedy towards others properties.

*Īśāvasyamidamsarvamyatkiñcajagatyām jagat/
Tena tyaktenabhujñhāmāgrdhaḥkasyasvīddhanam.*⁷

The *Upanishad* gives us the message of enjoyment through renunciation. One should not enjoy one’s life after confining oneself within but it is permissible if the enjoyment is shared by others. The attitude develops if one feels the existence of Self or Divinity to all social being. From this point of view all are related (*ātmīya*) in the true sense of the term and hence there does not arise any question of conflict among social beings leading to a good moral life. This type of spiritual globalization is the main root of universal brotherhood, fraternity, social bondage and friendliness.

Aesthetic Globalization: The real appreciator of a literature is called *sahṛdaya* or connoisseur. The property of being a *sahṛdaya* lies in the fact of being identified with the feeling of the poet. The poet creates a literature, the appreciator realizes it and being *sahṛdaya* or connoisseur he re-creates the same in his own self. Just as fire covers the dry wood, the aesthetic pleasure arising in one’s heart covers his whole body. This aesthetic pleasure is produced if the object is appreciated by heart (*hṛdayasaṁvādī*).

(“yo

‘rthohṛdayasaṁvādītasyabhāvorasodbhavah/Śarīraṁvyāpyatetasūksmāmkāṣṭhami vāgninā’)⁸. The appreciators who have stretched their minds’ mirror through habit of practicing literature and who have acquired the capability of engrossing themselves

with the matter of presentation are called connoisseurs having same state of heart. (*“sahṛdayānāmyeṣāmkāvyaṇuśīlanābhyāśavaśādviśadībhūtemanomukurevarṇanīya-tanmayībhavana-yogyatātesahṛdaya-saṁvāda-bhājahsahṛdayāḥ”*)⁹. In fact, the term ‘sahṛdaya’ means having same state of heart in trio- dramatist, artists and spectators. In a drama the motion generated in a dramatist’s mind is transmitted to the dramatic characters which again transmit the same with the audience.

It may be argued why this-worldly pleasure is not considered as aesthetic. In reply, it can be said that this is not an aesthetic pleasure due to lack of its impersonal, disinterested and universal character. When an individual becomes happy at the happiness of the dramatic character, this pleasure does not belong to him (i.e., arising from his personal life) and hence it is impersonal. For this reason, he remained untouched with his personal enjoyment, which has got some sort of pathological basis. This pleasure, not arising from the fulfillment of his self-interest, is disinterested and hence non-pathological. In the realm of experience, he will find any reason in his personal life so that he can have a feeling of enjoyment. Such type of feeling does not occur in the case of only one individual. It happens so in the case of all individuals enjoying the drama. That is why, it is universal or global. It has been stated earlier that due to complete absorption in the aesthetic pleasure a man forgets his individual love, fear etc. At that time there remains a universal love which is aesthetic pleasure. When a terrific scene is represented, there is enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure called *bhayānaka*. In this case also we generally forget that this fear realized by us belongs to the dramatic character and enjoy the universal character of fear which is free from other barriers like individualistic elements. The generalization called ‘*sādhāraṇīkṛti*’ is the process of idealization through which an individual may go from his personal emotion to the serenity of contemplation of a poetic sentiment. *This universalization is another characteristic feature of globalization.* Actually, it is observed by us that when a drama or film is enacted or shown in the auditorium, there are persons of diverse taste, status and mood, but it is astonishing to note that all are enjoying the drama or film equally. The poet and audience must have capacity of idealization. For this reason, a poet can present personal emotion as an impersonal aesthetic pleasure which is enjoyed by others. As this pleasure transcends the limitations of personal interest, it is disinterested

universal pleasure. A pleasure which transcends this-worldly interest is surely transcendental and hence, mystic. As this-worldly pleasure arising out of this-worldly affair like the birth of a son, attainment of property etc. is not impersonal, disinterested and universal, it cannot be described as an aesthetic pleasure. Aesthetic pleasure is the emotional mood revealed in a blissful knowledge free from all barriers.¹⁰ The state of blissfulness free from all barriers is not confined in certain time and space, but it remains through out the whole globe.

According to Abhinavagupta, an object becomes beautiful if our self is reflected there. When someone realizes the misery of some character in a piece of literature, he thinks it as his own due to the reflection of his own self there. This view is more firm-footed if the Upaniṣadic view is reviewed in this context. It has been stated in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad that husband seems to be beloved to someone not because she loves her husband but because she loves her own Self etc. (“...*navā are patyuhkāmāyapatihpriyobhavati, ātmanastukāmāyapatihpriyobhavati*” etc.)¹¹. Here is a long list where it has been shown that the same theory is applicable to other individuals and material things we love. Due to the extension of self to other relations like wife, father, daughter, student, teacher etc. and material objects like golden ornaments, musical instruments, playing materials etc. our love towards them is possible. When an individual’s personal desire is transformed into the impersonal aesthetic sentiment, the realization of aesthetic pleasure which is of universal character is possible. Hence, Abhinavagupta has accepted ‘generalisation’ (*‘sādhāraṇīkaraṇa’*) as one of the characteristic features of aesthetic pleasure, which may otherwise be called a globalized phenomenon. Though there is reflection of Brahman in an individual’s mind which is free due to the prominence of *sattvaguna*, this pleasure is quantitatively different from the pleasure of Brahman, but qualitatively it is same as Brahman. Hence it is described as sibling image of the taste of Brahman (“...*rajastamovaicitryānuviddha-sattvamaya-nijacit-svabhāva-nivṛtilakṣaṇah parabrahmāsvādasavidhah*”).¹² This type of aesthetic enjoyment is compared to the younger brother of the taste of Brahman, where we find that our conscious nature of self is predominant with *sattva*-quality of nature and associated secondarily with the diversity created by *rajas* and *tamas*. Though there are the presence of the diversity arising out of *rajas* and *tamas*, it is dominated by the *sattva*

and hence it brings the stage of mental equipoise or tranquility qualitatively same as the taste of Brahman. As such enjoyment is temporary due to its culmination as soon as the absorption breaks; it is quantitatively less, because the bliss arising from Brahman is eternal in nature. When a drama of Kalidas or Shakespeare is enacted, the aesthetic pleasure arising from the drama is of universal nature. Otherwise, it is not an aesthetic. There may be spectators of varied types like literate, illiterate, labour, having linguistic and cultural diversity yet they are always in a position to enjoy the drama, which is the effect of universalization or emotional globalization. This is not true only in case of literary form of aesthetic but in case of dance, music etc.

Globalization through Yoga: The literal meaning of the term *yoga* is ‘addition’ as opposed to ‘subtraction’ or *viyoga*. We get three meanings of the term- one adopting expertise in action (*karmasukauśalam*)¹³, having sense of equanimity (*samatva*)¹⁴ and one-pointed concentration (*samavadhānam*). If someone has got deep connection with a work, he attains an expert vision. If one has got the sense of equanimity with all, one can sacrifice oneself for the welfare and wellbeing of the mass. If there is one-pointed concentration, it gives rise to power of creativity in the form of literature, music, paintings, dance and morality. Through the last one an expert jeweler can differentiate a real jewel from the fake one, a scientist can discover a scientific truth and an engineer can prepare a machine. Through *yoga* our power is concentrated just as sunray coming through magnifying glass can burn though ordinary sunray cannot. Through yogic power frogs and snakes like a lump of clay become free from hunger, thirst etc. in the winter, though they arise in other time. In the same way, human beings can control their sense-organs and can enhance the internal power. Those who have less breathing become long-lived. In the modern society we find the younger generation has lost control on their sense-organs and hence, they suffer from frustration, depression, melancholy leading to drug and other addiction, which is a global phenomenon. If they are properly trained in *yoga*, they can get rid of these sufferings. Tension is the main problem of modern people, particularly young generation, in modern world. In order to reduce this *Yoga* can be utilized as a tension therapy capable removing tension and tension-oriented melancholy etc. through out

the whole world. To get rid of such suffering is the positive side of the globalization of yogic training.

Yoga has been found very effective in dealing with stress and anxiety—two leading causes of broken relationships and suicides. With changing lifestyle these two problems have become common in the world. That is why, many corporate offices including Google, have adopted *yoga* at their workplace. A healthy and mentally peaceful employee is certainly more productive. These amazing benefits have made *yoga* a craze world over. Today *yoga* is thoroughly globalized phenomenon; *yoga* has taken the world by storm and is gaining popularity in modern society. Many of problems for modern life like alcohol and drug abuse, Obesity, Hypertension, depression, suicide and shootouts, etc. can be solved very easily. In fact, *Yoga* is a bridge between body, mind and spirit. Since its practices smoothly coordinate the functions of the bones, muscles, blood, brain etc., which help to improve health, and as they train human mind, which is immaterial and intangible, for modifying proper attitude, behavior and values may establish mental peace. Thus, investigation in this direction has significant relevance towards our modern society to establish a balanced life. The popularity of *yoga* has attracted a large number of people globally who strive to practice it for achieving a better quality of life. In order to keep their faith intact in this hugely successful Indian practice, it is essential that the basic premise and knowledge base is used appropriately to train, guide and mentor aspirants who want to practice and learn *yoga* across the globe. *Yoga* is committed to the cause of moral and spiritual uplift of mankind. Along with mental and spiritual peace *Yoga* opens various jobs in several fields such as research, management, hospital, academic, administrative consultation, etc. There are numerous job options available both in the government as well as the private sectors for the *Yoga* professionals.

So far as Nyāya-Vaisesika is concerned, it believes that the excess power (*atisāya*) of our sense organs including mind can enhance the power of them and hence our external organs can see which is very near and far away from us. The excess power generated in mind can provide an individual to see or remember whatever happened in past, is happening in present and will happen in future. Even they can know all which are far away from them or in other part of the globe within a flash, which is also called a *yogic globalization*. According to Nyāya, *yoga* is a kind

of property arising out of yogic practice as recommended by scripture, book of law and purana etc. A yogin is two types- *yukta* (always connected) and *yujñāna* (occasionally connected) and hence the property arising from *yoga* is of two types. A connected *yogin* (*yukta yogin*) can have an eternal connection with all the entities like ether (*ākāśa*), atom (*paramāṇu*) etc. with the help of property arising out of *yoga*. In this context the ether is taken as an instance of all-pervasive (largest) entity and atom as subtlest. If a *yogin* is connected with the largest and subtlest entity, he is said to be *transcendentally globalized* due to having nothing unconnected ('*Yogajodvididhaḥproktoyukta-yujñāna-bhedataḥ/ yuktasyasarvadābhānam...?*'- *Bhāṣāparichheda*, Verse nos.65-66).¹⁵ That *yoga* can connect us to the globe is evidenced from the phenomenon of *bhāvasamādhi* (to be engaged in deep concentration). Once Ramakrishna had undergone into a deep concentration for three/four hours. When he came out from the meditative condition to normal stage, he told that he had gone to another corner of the globe i.e., in USA and felt a great devotion of thousands of people having fair complexion. At that time Narendranath had not gone to USA and became Vivekananda. From this it is proved that there was a global yogic connection with him.

Ethical Dimensions: Globalization as pointed out earlier has got some darker side if the ethical dimension of it is concerned. The effect of globalization is more prominent in the developed countries where the visual and electronic media are strong and internet facilities are easily available. But in a country like India, they are not so prominent which is evident from the fact that there are certain villages in our country where there is no newspaper, internet and other media. But the villagers of India have got a strong cultural background which is hardly reflected in the global culture due to absence of infra-structural facilities. Globalization has resulted in the loss of some individual cultural identities due to which there is an outbreak of identity movements, regionalism, terrorism etc. When an individual culture is not recognized by the primordial world culture then there arises identity crisis. There are rural areas in India where there is no electricity, internet connection, newspapers or other facilities and hence the villagers do not feel the effect of globalization. In the remote village areas there are cultural products like folk songs like *baul* (a sect of singer based in Birbhum district of Bengal), *alkap* (folksong prevalent in the Murshidabad district of Bengal),

gambhira (folk song found in the Malda district of Bengal), *hukumdeo* dance, *bairatidance* (folks available in different districts of Northern part of Bengal), *santhalidance* (mainly from Birbhum, Purulia etc), and handicrafts etc. which are not always reflected in the global picture. Rabindranath is of the opinion that an instrument can produce melody if the strings are tied with two poles of the same. In the like manner, our life and culture would have been appreciable if we are connected with both globalization and individualization. In one side there should be *Viśva* (globe) and in another there should be *Viśeṣatva* (individuality) leading to perfect harmony (*'ogosaḥārogoāmārviśva hate cittevihār'*).

Globalization is not connected with good only, but sometimes with evils. Environmental challenges like global warming, cross-boundary water, air-pollution, over-fishing on the ocean etc. are linked with globalization. Under-employment and ever widening wealth chasm have created a deep sense of mistrust in trade and globalization. For example, the inhabitants of Meghalaya had fought against the installation of railway lines in their state only to enjoy the benefit for isolation. Considering this the journalists have coined a term called 'glocalization' combining two terms 'globalization' and 'localization'. In fact, a perfect harmony should be made between globe and individual to have the real effect of globalization. The developed countries can highlight their cultural products easily through globalization due to having infra-structural facilities while the underdeveloped countries suffer giving rise to identity crisis among certain groups of people, which is not at all desirable. In Vedantic, Aesthetic and Yogic globalization there is a method of unifying oneself with the globe giving rise to universal brotherhood, morality etc.

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 15. 'yogābhyāsajanitodharmaviśeṣaḥśruti-smṛti-
purāṇādipramāṇakaḥityarthah...yuktasyatāvadyogaja-dharma-sahāyenanamasākāśa-
paramāṇvādi-nikhila-padārtha-gocaraṁjñānaṁsarvadaivabhavitumarhati.'
- SidhhāntamuktāvalīonBhāṣāparichheda- kārikā* nos.65-66, edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya,
Kolkata, 1374 (B.S.), pp.310-11.

AN EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF ANANDAMURTI'S PHILOSOPHY

BEDABATI CHOWDHURY

Prologue

The mystery of the conception of Consciousness remains in an embryonic stage. With time, the penetrative human mind is increasingly aware of the subsequent cosmological theory to resolve their perennial quest; where are we? Where do we come from? What are the fundamental constituents of the universe? How did mind, matter, and life emerge? What is the origin of the universe? However, these questions are common to philosophy, religion, and higher poetry" (Iqbal 2008). Along with philosophers, brain and neuroscientists acknowledge a plethora of problems regarding the confusing nature of Consciousness as it is regarded only as a byproduct of the nerve impulses of our brains (Pepperell 2018). Moreover, we have confronted a number of perplexing issues concerning the essence of Consciousness and its nature (Chalmers 1996; Baars 1997; Block 1996). On the other hand, our ancient Indian traditions boast a solid ontological, cosmological and soteriological perspective since Vedic and Upanishadic ages (Raju 2008). Brahman is "the infinite source, fabric, core and destiny of all existence, the formless infinite substratum from which the universe has grown". According to Paul Deussen (Deussen 1906), Brahman in Hinduism signifies the "creative principle which lies realized in the whole world". Thus Vedic and Upanishadic revelations teach us that Consciousness is the all-encompassing, all-knowing, luminous, transcendental, ultimate reality. By realizing it, every individual can be free from the unending cycle of birth and death. The same sound echoed in the Indian philosophical system.

The Past decade has witnessed a paradigm shift with the emergence of the conception of Consciousness as it is characterized as the rudimental cause of the phenomenal world (Sarkar 1955). In this regard, *Vedas*, *Upanishads*, *Vedanta*, *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, *Nyaya-Vaisheshika* philosophy, and *Tantra* have contributed uniquely and abundantly to understand the nature, scope and significance of the ultimate supreme entity. From the Vedas and Upanisads to contemporary eastern and western thoughts, we find an alternative paradigm including nihilism, agnosticism, positivism, materialism, idealism, neutralism (Bhatta 2015). Epistemological nihilism is a form of "philosophical skepticism". The American Heritage Medical Dictionary defines "one form of nihilism as an extreme form of skepticism that denies all

existence". In terms of agnosticism, both theists and atheists may (and often do) maintain that agnosticism is a cowardly and unstable middle ground position not worthy of serious consideration regarding the existence of God or cosmic entity (Yoder 2013). Besides this, there has been advocacy of celebrated scientists and materialists of the eighteenth century viz., Ludwig, Feurbach, Diihring, Karl Marx, and Engel. Karl Marx advocated that all reality lies on matter (Sica 2019). This matter and its motion constitute all the things, living beings, and minds in the world. Contrarily, Descartes professed that mind and matter are relative substances which are created and owe their existence to God (Hassing 2011). In terms of occidental views, Sāṃkhya's dualistic approach made a magnificent attempt to emphasise the importance of matter instead of Consciousness (Larson 2011; Potter 1970). Challenging Sankhya's dualistic approach, Sankara strongly adheres to the non-dual nature of *Brahman* which is highly appreciated by intellectuals, academicians and scholars in modern society (Indich 1995). Aurobindo re-frames Sankara's cosmological and ontological structure emphasizing the involution and evolution movements of *Sachidananda* (Aurobindo 1969). The sheer amount of empirical studies associated with the exploration of Consciousness helps to actualise the true notion of Consciousness (Deutsch 1965; Dasgupta 1975; Indich 1995; Towsey 2011; Govind Bhattacharjee 2018; Kalita 2019).

Alternatively, an eminent Indian philosopher of the 20th century Shrii Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar (P. R. Sarkar, spiritual name Shrii Shrii Anandamurti), in his Ānanda Mārga Philosophy explained a synthetic view with more significant logical and practical dimensions to grasp the essence of occidental and oriental cosmological and ontological considerations to envisage Consciousness as the ultimate substratum and final desideratum of the entire cosmos. Sarkar's bipolar conception of *Śiva* and *Śakti* can resolve the most perplexing enigma of the essence of Consciousness and its significance. Emphasizing the interplay of *Śiva* and *Śakti*, Sarkar explained threefold conceptions of Consciousness, which is the combining state of *Nirguna Brahman*, *Saguna Brahman* and *Tāraka Brahman*. Sarkar took great initiative to conclude the enigma relating to the nature, scope, and functionality of Consciousness. Sarkar's spiritual philosophy is concerned with the practical synthesis of Veda and Tantra. Phenomenologically, Sarkar's philosophy belongs to the Tantra (fifth century AD) and Kashmiri Saivism (after 850 CE). His most fundamental spiritual discourse

Ananda Sutram or "aphorisms leading to *Ānanda* or divine bliss" is a core text of his spiritual philosophy, among others. The present paper is as follows: The second section emphasizes the true notion of Consciousness. The third section will provide a revealing insight regarding tri-aspects of Consciousness. The fourth section will focus on a preliminary attempt to identify the importance of the concept of Consciousness in the present scenario.

True Notion of Consciousness: In delineating the essence of Consciousness, Sarkar, with his *tantric* and mystic standpoint, explicitly emphasizes that Consciousness is nothing but the conglomeration of *Śiva* and *Śakti* (*Ānandamūrti* 1996)¹. For Sarkar, Infinite Consciousness is the source of everything, and in Sanskrit, it is called *Brahman*. *Brahman* means "The entity which is infinite and has the ability to make others infinite". *Brahman* is composed of Consciousness and energy. In Sanskrit, Consciousness is known as *Śiva* or *Puruṣa* (*pure śete yah sah Puruṣah*) and energy as *Śakti* or *Prakṛti*. Both *Śiva*, the sense of cognitive faculty and *Śakti*, the sense of operative principle, are combinedly known as Consciousness or *Brahman*. Therefore, both the existence of *Śiva* and *Śakti* remain intrinsically in Consciousness. The term *Śiva* is often used in the sense of '*Citi-Śakti*' as pure Consciousness, *Ātman* as '*Prati bodhasattā* or omni telepathic entity' (Sarkar, 1958), 'Causal Matrix' as the material and efficient cause of the universe (Sarkar, 1978). While *Śakti* is the divine force of *Śiva*² and frequently equates with *Prakṛti* (operative principle) (Sarkar 1967) and *Māyā* (cosmic creative principle) (Sarkar 1964). Basically, *Śakti*, composed of three *gunas*, namely *sattva guna* or 'sentient force', *raja guna* or 'mutative force' and *tama guna* or 'static force', is a qualifying agent. Sarkar defines *guna* as the 'cosmic force whereby the universal Consciousness is bound to create various shapes or ideas'.

With the help of its three qualities, *Śakti* qualifies *Śiva* to create this phenomenal world so that *Śakti* is regarded as a 'force creating object'. Though *Śakti* is primordial energy (Sarkar 1956) but *Śakti* itself is a blind force³ always acts under the supervision of *Śiva*. Consequently, *Śakti* remains dependent on Consciousness. In

¹ *śivaśaktyātmakam brahma* (Brahma is the composite of Shiva and Shakti) A.S.1-1.

² *Śaktih Śa Śivasya Śaktih* (*Śakti* (the Operative Principle) is the (force) of *Śiva*). A.S.1-2

³ "Fundamentally, energy is a blind force. What is to be done or what should not be done, this sort of conscience is lacking in energy"

terms of the subtle relationship between *Śiva* and *Śakti*, Sarkar holds *tantric* opinion that the pre-eminence of *Śiva* over *Śakti*. Thus *Śiva* and *Śakti* are two poles of the same singular entity viz. Consciousness. The principle of polarity is the foundation stone of Sarkar's perception of Consciousness. Instead of their bi-polarity in nature both these principles can not be separated; rather *Śiva* and *Śakti* inevitably exist in every object from the minimal to optimal expression. In this regard, Sarkar explained implicitly that it is entirely impossible to separate from each other like milk and its whiteness, as two sides of a piece of paper. Therefore Sarkar argued that "though both these elements are two for the sake of argument, they can under no circumstances be separated. . . None of them can stand without the other". Thus Sarkar's *Śiva-Śakti* unification is the credible corroboration of the true notion of Consciousness.

Tri-Aspects of Consciousness: It is a formidable task to identify whether the nature of Consciousness is completely *Nirguna* or *Saguna*. The true nature of Consciousness is not merely *Nirguna Brahman* (non-qualified aspect of consciousness) as admitted by Sankara, or, not exclusively *Saguna Brahman* (qualified state of consciousness) as advocated by Ramanuja. Sarkar was the first interpreter, who tried to resolve several ontological discrepancies by providing threefold conceptions of Consciousness which is the combination of *Nirguna* (attributeless), *Saguna* (with-attributes) and *Tāraka Brahman* (liberating).

Nirguna Brahman: In consequence with *Śiva-Śakti* unification, Ānandamūrti explicitly states that though Consciousness is singular in essence but the varied expressions of Consciousness in the different phases of evolution can not be negated. Fundamentally *Nirguna* is the state of Consciousness where the operative principle of Consciousness remains unexpressed or *anuchhunya* so that Consciousness is free from the qualifying impact of his operative principle. Accordingly this state of Consciousness is regarded as *gunatita* or beyond the scope of *gunas*. As a result of mutual harmony among three *gunas* this state of Consciousness exists beyond the realm of subject object distinction and differentiation. This Objectless Consciousness is completely non-qualified, attributeless. Anandamurti explicitly states that Non-qualified Consciousness is the ultimate witnessing and controlling entity of all actions and reactions which is the ultimate source of creation and dissolution. In this regard, J.C Chatterjee also argued that "He is logical first principle" (Chatterjee, 1962). In his interview German physicist Max-plunk argued that "I regard Consciousness as

fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing, postulates consciousness."

Saguna Brahman: On the other hand, *Saguna (gunayukta)* or qualified aspect of Consciousness is nothing but the metamorphosed form of Consciousness. Due to the qualifying influence of operative principle Consciousness gets qualified and metamorphosed in the different names, forms, and shapes to create this phenomenal world. Basically, in this state of *saguna*, the balance among three forces of *prakrti* get lost and thus *prakrti* has scope to induce its influence on Consciousness (Sarkar 1959). As a result of ever increasing influence of *prakrti*, a part of Consciousness gets converted and metamorphosed into a world in the different names, forms, and shapes and is known as *Saguna Brahman* or Qualified Consciousness. This state where Consciousness reveals as qualified, attributed, and manifested world in the form of different names, shapes, and colours while *Prakrti* remains as *uchhunya*, expressed, and exhausted. For Sarkar, *Saguna Brahma* is regarded as the material and efficient cause of the universe while *Prakrti* is the secondary efficient cause and linking force between the efficient and the material cause.

Tāraka Brahmn: The conception of *Tāraka Brahman* is utterly an innovative formulation of Sarkar's philosophy as it is more soteriological and ontological perspectives than philosophical. For Sarkar, *Tāraka Brahman* is a tangential point between two states of *Nirguna* and *Saguna Brahman*. Therefore, *Tāraka Brahman* is regarded as the common point bridging together the empirical state of *Saguna Brahman* and metempirical state of *Nirguna Brahman*. Sarkar explicitly states that *Tāraka Brahman* is the ultimate sole liberator whose ultimate mission is to emancipate from the bondage of his/her own actions which is the ultimate goal of each being (Sarkar 1959). *Tāraka Brahman* as 'the great appearance' (*Mahasambhuti*) (Sarkar 1969) comes into reality to elevate the souls unto the path of self liberation who can wholeheartedly sacrifice their utmost self reverence and devotion onto its holy feet. In *Ānanda Mārga* Philosophy, the advent of *Lord Śiva* and the advent of *Lord Krisna* are considered to be *Tāraka Brahman* in the entire human civilization.

Importance of the concept of Consciousness in the present scenario: Human beings are confronting an increasing number of complexities including

environmental, socio-economic, psycho-social, and psycho-spiritual identity crises. Global psycho-socio-spiritual problems engulf entire modern society and force people to assimilate the experience of malpractice in every sphere of life. In this regard Peter Russell asserts that "At its root, the crisis of our times is not so much an environmental crisis, an economic crisis, a population crisis or a political crisis; It is in essence a Consciousness crisis - a mismatch between our psychological development and our technological development". He raised the perennial questions "can we realize that the ego-mode is not only mode and certainly no longer the most appropriate. And can we then release ourselves from its grip, and allow our true intelligence to shine into the world. The root of our environmental crisis is an inner spiritual aridity. We need not only to conduct research in the physical and biological sciences but also need to explore the psychological and more sacred sciences". The Buddhist writer also states that "we must be willing to create a radical internal climate change. To address the external symptoms without changing the internal mindset achieves nothing". To lessen these social and environmental scenarios, Sarkar stresses the feeling of interconnectedness with Cosmic Consciousness. That helps to elevate universal love, ecology, and devotional sentiment. The practice of oneness helps to step against all sorts of anti-human emotions like geo sentiments and national sentiments by inculcating the broadest feeling of universalism. Sarkar strictly adheres to universalism and regards that "No 'ism' except universalism can be tolerated." Universalism suggests love for all without manipulating other forms of life. The broad aspect of universalism embraces all the entities of the cosmos, including plants, animals, and the inanimate world into one cosmic family. Thus the revolutionary change in every sphere of individual and collective life depends on the propagation of universal love through the practice of interconnectedness. Sarkar explicitly expresses that "golden day is sure to come..... when human intuition will realize that the essence in the subatomic world is pure Consciousness". Therefore Sarkar's new hypothesis regarding Consciousness may be vital in resolving the current global crisis.

Conclusion:

The deliberation on Consciousness is one of the most controversial and widely discussed central issues in the history of Indian philosophy and world philosophy. Unfortunately, the task of re-interpretation or re-valuation of the concept

of Consciousness has not yet been undertaken on a comprehensive scale. In this regard, we can conclude that Sarkar's new hypothesis on Consciousness as *Śiva- Śakti* unification may shed light on the traditional interpretation concerning the dichotomy of transcendental and empirical; spirit and matter; subject and object; body and mind; and so on.

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ARGUING AGAINST THE STREAM: HILARY PUTNAM ON INTERNAL REALISM

JAYANTA BARMAN

Introduction

We are all either realists or anti-realists about the world whether we think of it or not. The way we see the world is the totality of objects. It is supposed or intended that there are things such as tables, chairs, trees, and rocks, etc., but how do they exist in the world? There are two theories about how objects exist in the world or how the world appears to us, such as idealism and realism. Idealism is a metaphysical view that holds that reality depends on the mind, on the contrary, metaphysical realists maintain that reality does not depend on our mind. George Berkeley (1685-1753) was one of the main proponents of idealism. He is claimed to be a subjective idealist because for him nothing exists outside our minds and their ideas. For Berkeley, ordinary objects are nothing but a collection of ideas, which are not independent of our mind but rather dependent on it. However, the dichotomy between the subjective and the objective worldview on reality has been discussed, contested, and evolved through a sustained period of time in the history of philosophy. Starting with Plato and Aristotle, the contemporary scenario as well is ripe with such tensions between the contesting world views. For Plato ideas alone are real which are universals as well. Aristotle on the other hand criticized Plato to espouse a realist worldview.

In the twenty-first century, American philosopher, Hilary Putnam (1926-2016) offers an alternative view of the world which he calls ‘internal realism’ or ‘pragmatic realism’. As an analytic philosopher, his prominent field of work is the philosophy of language. His epistemic investigation on the brain in a vat has been a seminal contribution to late twentieth century philosophical studies of mind. In the realm of language, he has contributed to the causal theory of reference, semantic externalism. As a semantic externalist, he intended that meaning of sentences are determined by some external factor and that “meanings just are not in the head”¹. The

¹ Anders, O. (2011). *Hilary Putnam on meaning and necessity*. Uppsala University. Department of Philosophy. p. 52

key objective of this paper is to show Putnam's journey to conceptualize internal realism, distinct from the notions of metaphysical realism. And the paper will show the arguments he provides in favor of internal realism and his criticisms against metaphysical realism. Putnam is very well known for repeatedly changing his philosophical position. He has changed his philosophical positions several times throughout his career, but his position on 'Internal Realism' which will be discussed in the paper, has been defended by Putnam from the mid- 1970 until around 1990.

Putnam's Understanding of Metaphysical Realism Metaphysical realism is an objective worldview about the nature of reality in metaphysics. Metaphysical realism is a worldview in which the world exists independently of the human mind and language. Putnam, in his seminal work *Reason, Truth and History* (1981) characterized metaphysical realism in the following way, "The world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is.' Truth involves some sort of correspondence in the relation between words or thought- signs and external things and sets of things. Putnam calls this perspective the externalist perspective, because its favorite point of view is a God's eye point of view"² The term 'independent' in metaphysical realism which gives uniqueness to metaphysical realism from idealism, means ontological and not causal independence. Assuming a set of components, A and B, it can be said that A is ontologically independent of B if A does not depend on B for its existence and that it can even exist in the absence of B. For example, the pen used by a writer is causally dependent on the mind of its designer because someone has designed it. At the same time, it is ontologically independent because it may continue to exist even after its designer's death. Following this proposition, the metaphysical realists claim that the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects, by way of which the world becomes ready-made.

The Ready-made World: Putnam says that the idea of the ready-made world of the metaphysical realists is nothing but a realist myth, and so he concludes that there

² Putnam, H. (1981). *Reason, Truth, and History*. Cambridge Cambridge shire: Cambridge University Press. p. 49

cannot be a ready-made world. Metaphysical realist presupposes that the world has a structure or substantial form that is independent of the human mind. But Putnam argues against this assumption by showing that the so-called ready-made world is a misnomer. Putnam says that what metaphysical realists hold to be true is, as Putnam argues, “We can talk about things as they are, independently of our minds, and that we can do this by virtue of a ‘correspondence’ relation between the terms in our language and some sort of mind-independent entities”³.

This assumption has been previously challenged in the eighteenth century by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as well, who claimed that the world that we can know is the construction of our two forms of sensibility and the twelve categories of understanding. His seminal work *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) explicitly deals with such claims. According to Kant, therefore, when the mind perceives something, it is not merely a passive faculty, but rather it takes an active role in shaping things. Thus, the role of the perceiver using his/her mind is not minimal. The world as it appears to us, according to Kant, is the phenomenal world that is distinguished from the noumenal world. And Kant says that the phenomenal world is empirically real but transcendently ideal. Kant and on his line, Putnam argue, that the phenomenal world is not a mind-independent world as it is constituted by our mind. On the contrary, metaphysical realists argue that the world exists independently of our mind and language, although the question of reference, how such a reality can be referred to at all and how it can be represented in our language, has been hardly argued by the school.

The Internalist View Point: The non-presence of a ready-made world can be easily demonstrated through the internalist point of view, following Hillary Putnam’s argument. Putnam’s internalist position does not deny the reality of the world but denies that the world is independent of human perception. Putnam says that the world depends on the theory or system of description which represents the world. So, according to Putnam, it can be said that the world is internal to the system of description which represents the world. This internality is a requisite condition to substantiate the correlation point of view. Putnam distinguished between objects and

³ Pradhan, R.C. (2001). Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy. ICPR. p. 419

concepts. The way objects are represented by the theory or system of description is concepts. In the language of Kant, the world does not come ready-made and what the world consists of, is determined by the human mind's interaction with the world. So according to Kant, we are looking at the world through a spectacle which contaminates reality. Similarly, Putnam says that the world is relative to our conceptual schemes. If according to Putnam, the world is relative to our conceptual schemes, it leads us to a theory of conceptual relativity which is the central tenet of Putnam's internal realism. By making this idea central to his thought, he conceptualizes the theory of description which will again be relevant in presenting the propositions of conceptual relativity. Hence, he argues that "I shall refer to it as the internalist perspective, because it is characteristic of this view to hold that what does the world consist of? is a question that it only makes sense to ask within a theory of description."⁴

Conceptual Relativity: Metaphysical realist assumes that there is one correct and complete description of reality. But Putnam opposes such an assumption of metaphysical realist and contradicts them by declaring that there are many different ways through which the world can be described. He thus embraces conceptual relativity to visualize reality, which can be said to be the heart of Putnam's internal realism or pragmatic realism. Putnam has not provided any particular definition of 'Conceptual relativity', rather he assembled a myriad of instances of it from science, mathematics and logic. Putnam's conceptual relativity refers to a situation that can be described in multiple ways which are perhaps incompatible with each other but equally true in their assumption. Putnam's most well-known example of conceptual relativity is Carnap and the Police logician's argument.

The example is briefly discussed below. Putnam asks us to imagine that somewhere in this universe there is another planet where there are three individuals, such as X, Y, Z. Then Putnam asks his first question, 'how many objects are there in that universe?' If we employ the ordinary concept of the object then the answer, of course, is that there are exactly three objects in this world: X, Y and Z. Three objects in the sense that we can identify 'individual', 'objects', 'particular' etc. However, by

⁴ Pradhan, R.C. (2001). Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy. ICPR, p.422

contrast, someone who admits particular mereology of objects, accordingly accepts that for every two particulars, the third is an object which is their sum. He counts the objects and reports that there are exactly seven objects in this world: X, Y, Z, X+Y, X+Z, Y+Z, XYZ. There are seven objects in the sense that the various combination of the original three individuals are themselves object. This is the view of police logicians. So, the Police logician's answer is not the same as Carnap but yet each is true within their conceptual framework. Thus, what is real about the world is relative to our conceptual schemes. We cannot thus readily describe the world apart from the use of the term which reflects our choice of conceptual scheme and we choose the conceptual scheme that determines how we will answer the question about the world.

As a conceptual realist Putnam insists that the question, 'how many objects are there in this world?' has no sense. In the language of Putnam "what objects does the world consist of?"⁵ is a question that only makes sense within a theory or description. In short, there is no sense of this question without first establishing a theory of description or defining what counts as an object. Such that the assumption that what does the world consists of is a question that has an absolute answer which Putnam has never accepted. If there are myriad ways through which the world can be described then it follows that there is more than one true description of the world. Thus, Putnam concludes that there is more than one true theory and complete description that can be used to adequately describe the same situation.

Putnam on God Eye's Point of View: The idea of God's Eye point of view is found in the third chapter of Putnam's seminal work *Reason, Truth and History* (1981) where he criticizes the metaphysical realists. He claims that the metaphysical realists presuppose a 'God's Eye view of Reality' or 'No Eye view of Reality', which is different from Putnam's internalist perspective. Putnam says that there is no God's Eye view of reality because we can't remove ourselves from our human perspective and explore the world as it really is from the point of view of an omniscient being. Putnam illustrates this through his seminal thought experiment 'Brains in a Vat',

⁵ Forrai, G. (2001). Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes: A Defense of Internal Realism. Kluwer Academic Publishers. p. 134

developed in his book *Reason Truth and History* (1981). In the thought experiment, he says that if all human beings in this world are brains in a vat, then a God's Eye View or No Eye View of reality is possible. Putnam contends that, if metaphysical realism is true, it could be possible that we are brains in a vat. But Putnam cancels out the possibility of brains in a vat as it is a self-refuting supposition, which will be discussed later in detail. According to him, metaphysical realism assumes the existence of a gap between how man conceives the world and the way the world really is. Putnam tries to bridge this notion of the gap between man's concept of the world and the way the world is. Metaphysical realist view of truth is, therefore a non-epistemic relation of correspondence between language and reality. But Putnam says that truth is an "idealization of rational acceptability"⁶.

Further Putnam had already contended, that there cannot be "exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'"⁶; in the way metaphysical realists require. That we cannot go outside to see the reality or the things in itself and become an observer with a God's eye point of view. According to Putnam, metaphysical realism is therefore false because we cannot have a God's Eye view of reality as we are limited to our conceptual schemes. Putnam does not deny the idea of the correspondence relation between signs and what signs stand for only within our language. He only rules out the correspondence between the language and the language-independent world. If the world is independent of language and our conceptual scheme then it can never be represented in our language. But Putnam says that the world must be internal to the language and the system of representations. Thus, it can be said that "truth wears a human face and not the "cosmic face" as Smart likes to call it"⁷. Apart from God's Eye point of view, Putnam has also criticized global skepticism through this 'brains in a vat' experiment. Global skepticism leads us to think that we might be under an illusion or dream created by an evil demon. This argument was presented by Descartes in his book *Meditations on*

⁶ Anders, O. (2011) *Hilary Putnam on meaning and necessity*. Uppsala University. Department of Philosophy. p.61

⁶ Putnam, H. (1981). *Reason, Truth, and History*. Cambridge Cambridge shire: Cambridge University Press. p. 49

⁷ Pradhan, R.C. (2001). Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy. ICPR. p. 427

The First Philosophy (1641). Putnam denies this kind of skepticism by illustrating the 'Brain in a Vat' thought experiment.

Brain in a Vat: Putnam allows us, through his thought experiment, to imagine a situation where everything that one believes, everything that one says, and everything that one does in this world is not real, but rather one is a brain in a vat. So 'brain in a vat' means one is just a brain, a person doesn't have both body and sense organ together. This thought experiment outlines that a mad scientist has removed a person's brain from his body or skull and suspended it in a vat where that brain can stay active. The mad scientist has also connected that brain to a powerful super-scientific computer that sends neurological signals to the brain as our brain normally receives sensation from the external world. The super scientific computer is smart enough because if the person who is a brain in a vat tries to raise his hand, the computer sends the same neurological signal to the brain, as a result, the person who is a brain in a vat does not understand that he is being deceived by the super scientific computer or someone. Putnam says that instead of having just one brain in a vat we could imagine that all human beings are brains in a vat. If it is true or if we are brains in a vat, the whole world will be a collective hallucination for us. From this hypothetical situation the question has been raised by Putnam that is if we are brains in a vat, could we imagine or say or think that we are not brains in a vat?

Putnam says that although brains in a vat do not violate any physical law yet it cannot be true. Its truth value is absent precisely because, according to Putnam, in a certain way, it is a self-refuting supposition. By self-refuting supposition, Putnam means, a supposition whose truth implies its own falsity. For example, if someone says that 'I do not exist' and if it is true then the statement 'I do not exist' on the contrary implies his existence, in the similar logic which Rene Descartes(1596-1650) substantiated in his book *Meditations on the First Philosophy* (1641). So, one can be certain of his existence by thinking of his non-existence. Similarly, Putnam says that brain in a vat supposition is a self-refuting supposition because it implies its own falsity. Before entering into the main theme at first, understanding the Turing Test becomes inevitable to negotiate the impossibility of the brains in a vat condition.

Turing Test is intelligence as well as an imitation game. The idea of the Turing Test was first introduced by British mathematician Alan Mathison Turing (1912- 1954) in his article *Can Machines Think?* (1950). The aim of this game was to discover whether a computer can think or not. In this game, there are three players suppose that player A is the man and player B is the computer and player C is the interlocutor, who is tasked to find out the non-human computer through their conversations or by using a keyboard, each of them separately performing. The interlocutor will be talking to both A and B from different places. Whether one is talking to a computer or a man will have to differentiate by the interlocutor through the conversations. The computer is smart enough because it tries to show itself as a man. Suppose that if you ask him: 'Do you like Apples?' 'yes', I like apples, it is very sweet and good for health.

How can the interlocutor identify the computer? If he/she can't differentiate between them or if the interlocutor can't identify as the computer, then the computer will pass the game. But Putnam slightly modified this game which he designated as Turing Test for Reference. The purpose of this game is to determine whether the computer can refer to apples or not when it says apples as we do in the actual world. In short, we can say that Putnam tries to find out the existence of reference through this Turing Test for Reference. Putnam argues that if the computer can refer to actual apples the way we do it in the actual world, then the computer will pass the game. The example that I have mentioned before that if it is asked the computer that 'Do you like Apples? The computer can give you a perfect description of apples which is similar to actual apples but it can't say what actually apples are, since it has no real experience with apples. Therefore, it can be said that according to Putnam, Turing Test for Reference is not definitive because it cannot refer to anything more than what has been recorded in the computer.

According to Putnam, the computer can beautifully describe the world in the way it is programmed by its designer or creator but it could not recognize or refer to an actual apple because it has no causal connection with Apple. In the same way, it can't recognize or refer to the sun, the moon, the rock and so on. So, when we say there is an apple on the table it refers to an apple which is not the same as when the computer says apples. Similarly, Putnam says that when we are brains in a vat, our

words do not refer to actuality. Putnam, therefore, concludes that the brains in a vat can't refer to trees when they say 'there is a tree in front of me'. Finally, through this argument, Putnam illustrates against the supposition that 'we are brains in a vat'. Putnam argues that the brains in a vat cannot refer to anything external at all as they cannot say that they are brains in a vat world. Putnam objected that there is no close connection between the word 'trees' as used by the brains in a vat and the actual trees. Brains in a vat can even think and define trees even if trees do not exist. Putnam suggests that the brains in a vat follow the truth condition when they say that 'there is a tree in front of me' since there is a close connection between the word tree in vat English and the presence of the tree in the image. The truth condition of seeing or experiencing a tree is right since the brain is right in thinking. Similarly, Putnam argues that the vat in vat- English doesn't refer to a vat in the actual world. And neither it has any intimate relation to the real vats. Therefore, we are not brains in a vat because the brains in a vat only refer to an image of a brain in a vat that has no causal connection to the actual world. One may thus conclude that if we are brains in a vat, then, 'we are brains in a vat' refers to brains in the image, thereby making it false. If we are not brains in a vat then the supposition 'we are brains in a vat' is false because it refers to actual vat.

Internal Realism: The term 'internal realism' was first introduced in "Realism and Reason", his 1977 address to the American Philosophical Association but later developed in his book *Reason, Truth, and History* (1981). It has already been mentioned that Putnam's internal realism is completely different from what a metaphysical realist implies. Through his criticisms, as has been developed in the essay, reality can be characterized in the following ways:

1. There cannot be a ready-made world.
2. There cannot be a God's eye point of view.
3. There can be more than one true and complete description of the way the world is.
4. Truth from an internalist perspective is "some sort of ideal coherence of our belief with each other and with our experiences as those experiences are

themselves represented in our belief system – and not correspondence with mind-independent or discourse-independent ‘states of affairs’⁸.

Metaphysical realist's view of truth is non-epistemic but Putnam suggests that truth is an epistemic notion which he calls ‘idealized justification’. Much of his notions on truth comes from Michael Dummett, whose works have helped him in conceptualizing the epistemic view of truth. For Putnam, thereof, truth is idealized justification rather than ordinary justification. Putnam then characterizes the internalist notion of truth as follows:

“Truth, in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability. We speak as if there were such things as epistemically ideal conditions and we call a statement ‘true if it would be justified under such conditions’⁹.”

Putnam's internal realism asserts that no description of the world is completely independent of our conceptual scheme. Thereby making it possible to state, that from an internalist point of view, there is no fact, objects, properties that are independent of our conceptual scheme. Putnam, of course, is a realist in the sense that he does not deny the reality of the world but denies that objects exist independently of the human mind and language as it traditionally has been underscored. Putnam's internal realism also extends to other fields such as morality. For him, there are no absolute answers to our moral questions because the rightness and the wrongness of an action depend on the context to some extent. Internal realism can therefore be read as a combination of a certain form of realism and idealism, roughly. Whereas in a broader sense, one can negotiate such a worldview by assessing Immanuel Kant's idea of empirical realism and transcendental idealism. Putnam's internal realism thus moves against the prevailing notions of truth and reality. In a way, it stands in between realism and relativism. For the realist, the world makes up the mind. Whereas relativists argue that the mind makes up the world. And Putnam negotiates a middle path stating that “the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world”¹⁰.

⁸ Putnam, H. (1981). *Reason, truth, and history*. Cambridge Cambridgehire: Cambridge University Press. p. 49-50

⁹ Pradhan, R.C. (2001). Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy. ICPR. p. 427

¹⁰ Putnam, H. (1987). *The Many Faces of Realism*. Open Court Press. p. 1

Conclusion:

The difference that Putnam brings about in his work to argue against the prevalent stream of thought, i.e., metaphysical realism, manifests into a new field of knowledge altogether. Internal realism becomes a vital epistemic domain in understanding the multiple realities of life. It also works to resolve the age-old dualisms of different schools and walk past the schisms. It privileges not a single epistemic tradition, but seeks to incorporate differences and discrepancies pertaining to these worldviews. Also, his comparatist approach or the conceptual relativity that justifies a covalency of worldviews, is intimidating to the modern and post-modern readers alike, to resort to a middle ground in juxtaposing the nature of reality, truth and simulation. Further, his epistemic investigations on 'brain in a vat', reading Turing's test through semantic relationality, validates internal realism as a possibility, contrary to the metaphysical reality worldview. The implications of internal realism are far-reaching in the field of mind, philosophy of mind and history of truth. Thus, one can thoughtfully argue that Hilary Putnam, through his contestations of the metaphysical realist viewpoint and consequent theorization of internal realism, has successfully revolutionized our understandings about the ontology of things, truth value and reality of the world.

RADHAKRISHNAN ON RELIGIOUS HARMONY AND SOCIAL ETHOS

POOJA VYAS

I

In philosophical tradition of India, Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan has a great place among modern Indian thinkers like, Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, Swami Vivekananda, Iqbal etc. He is considered as a great intellectual teacher of philosophy and religion. The root meaning of religion as we understand the word, is 'binding force'. But, in the world, many religions exist and each religion claims that its scripture is unique and its God is superior to other Gods. So, because of their claims of perfection and absoluteness there has been a change in the real meaning of religion. Now the general attitude of religious people is to think that the one religion is opposed to another. But the reality is that no one can claim to perfection and absoluteness about his religion and think derogatively about other religions. Radhakrishnan emphasises this when he opines that “Religion should not be confused with fixed intellectual conceptions, which are all mind-made. Any religion which claims finality or absoluteness, desires to impose its own opinions on the rest of the world, and to civilise other people after its own standards.”

It has always been an uphill task to define religion. Religion, according to Radhakrishnan, is discipline and practice not theology. It touches the inner core of man and creates the power of conscience to understand difference between good and evil, right and wrong, moral and nonmoral values. It gives us power to escape from greed, lust, hatred and non-ethical acts. It discovers the essential power in human being to unite his relation with spirituality or ultimate reality of this world. Religion helps us to change ourselves in our personal and interpersonal lives. It helps us in resolving the conflicts which exist in our own nature and diminish the hateful feelings. It always increases the feeling of love and morality in our life. The true religion always generates the feeling of likeness to divinity or spirituality. Religion is the bridge between God and man and its function is to unite them. All religious practices like meditation, worship etc. are disciplines which purify the mind. It does not only help in developing an insight to see the reality but it helps us in direct experience of reality with the help of religious insight. We can perceive the divinity

and identify ourselves with it through religious discipline. Radhakrishnan, in his famous book *Religion and Society*, says that 'The religious man transcends the limitations imposed on him by his material nature or social conditions, and enlarges the creative purpose. Religion is a dynamic process, a renewed effort of the creative impulse working through exceptional individuals and seeking to uplift mankind to a new level'.

Religion is identified with feeling, emotion, sentiment, instinct and faith. The aim of religion is to provide spiritual fulfillment to all the individuals. Religious experience does not create conflict or disturbance in the human life; it brings peace in this world. Radhakrishnan uses the word 'Shanti' for it. He defines it as 'A positive feeling of calm and confidence, joy and strength in the midst of adversity and defeat, loss and frustration'. Now the question arises why this experience is called religious and what is peculiar in it in comparison with other experiences? It is called religious because it is a sort of inner satisfaction and has the capacity of realizing spirituality. It discovers eternal truth. Its peculiarity we can see in its effort to discover the life-spirit that unites individuality with higher levels of its own being. Radhakrishnan says that, 'However much we may quarrel about implication of this kind of experience, we cannot question the actuality of this experience itself. Religious experience has the capacity to diminish the sense of separation and discover the feeling of love and harmony. He says that men are not divided on the basis of religion but many times conflict is the cause of this division. He says that the aim of true religion is spiritual fulfillment. It can be realized when we understand the inner forms of religion or the essence of religion through religious experience. He also says that conflicts take place in our life when we apprehend outer forms of religion without religious experience.

Religion, according to Radhakrishnan, is identified with higher instinct, reason and love. It has deep faith in morality. It is way of life. "Religion signifies faith in absolute values and way of life to realize them... Religious faith gives us the passion to persevere in the way of life and if it declines obedience degenerates into habit and slowly withers away". Different religions, according to Radhakrishnan, are different expressions or modes of one truth. Every religion is the mode of human effort in the direction of spirituality. They all prepare us for struggle and encourage us to achieve the supreme goal of life. In his own words, "the different religions should

be regarded comrades in joint enterprise in facing common problems of peaceful co-existence of the peoples, international welfare and justice, racial equality and political independence of all peoples. Different religions are to be used as building stones for development of a human culture in which the adherents of different religions may be fraternally united as the children of one supreme". The true religion is not polluted by creeds, dogmas, caste, colour or superstitions. But if this is so, the question arises what is the main cause of the religious differences and how it vitiated true religion? For Radhakrishnan what vitiated the religion was the conflict itself though it cannot affect the essence of true religion. Conflicts are the main cause of religious differences. Conflicts and differences disappear when we begin to think that all religions are the expressions of one truth that is ultimate reality.

II

Radhakrishnan in *The Hindu View of Life* opines: 'the differences among the sects of the Hindus are more or less on the surface, and the Hindu as such remains a distinct cultural unit, with a common history, a common literature and a common civilization'. Hinduism has universalistic approach in this sense. It is not bound up with a creed or a book, a prophet or a founder: Hinduism always searches for truth. In Hinduism there is no end of prophecy and no limits of religious scripture. It always welcomes new experiences and new expressions of truth. 'Hinduism has no common creed and its system of worship has no fixed form. It has bound together multitudinous sects and devotion into a common scheme'.

Hinduism is a practical religion because it is a way of life. It gives liberty to every individual to enjoy any code or practice. It never insists on religious action but it always insists on spiritual and ethical approach in life of every individual. Hindu way of life always gave emphasis on moral life and the fellowship for all who accept the law of right and seek for the truth. Hinduism has rationalistic approach. It studies the facts of human life in scientific spirit. But Hinduism is not only to study the facts but also try to obtain victory over facts. 'Religion is not so much a revelation to be attained by us in faith as an effort to unveil the deepest layers of man's piety and get into enduring contact with them'.

There is a distinction between the Sanskrit term *Dharma* and the English word 'Religion'. *Dharma* has got a worldwide connotation; it is not confined to any religious sect or community, but, is meant for the welfare of the entire universe. Lord Shri Krishna in the *Gita* tells His disciple, Arjun that he has to fight for the establishment of the kingdom of 'Dharma' (*Dharma Rajya Sthapna*), by defeating the Kaurvas, the symbols of the undivine forces 'Abhudaya and Parmarth, Preyas and Shreyas' have been the guiding principles of the Indian thinkers. Vedvyasa, the celebrated Seer of the *Mahabharata* tells us in so many words that *Dharma* alone prevails, and nothing else. Manu and other thinkers have also like-wise supported this ideology. 'Religion' on the other hand confines itself to binding oneself to the supreme self, the God, the Father in Heaven. Jesus Christ propagated this theory and His numerous followers all over the world follow this in Toto, the *Old and New Testament* uphold throughout, this relationship. This amply proves that the word Religion for the Westerner means accepting the essence of God. It is purely a theistic approach, a dualistic approach. But Radhkrishnan bases his religious Harmony Theory on the celebrated theory of Indian Philosophy, the Vedantic Philosophy, Shankara's Advaita Philosophy. For him, religion in India is deeply rooted in the concept of the non dualistic philosophy, *Kevaladawita Vedanta*. This theory of the reality underlines the fundamental unity of the entire universe. The *Brhamasutra* tells us that only the *Brahma* is Real and the phenomenal world is relatively not that real, '*Brahama Sataym, Jagan Mithya, Jeevo Brahmaiva Naparha*'. Radhkrishnan insists on the hierarchy of the religious experiences. For him, the experience of the Absolute is ultimate (*Nirguna –Nirakar*). In his own words," The worshipers of the Absolute are the highest in rank, second to them are the worshipers of the Personal God (*Nirguna-Sakar*); then come the worshipers of the incarnations like Ram Krishna, Buddha (*Saguna – Sakar*); below them are those who worship ancestors ,deities and the lowest of all are the worshipers of the petty forces and the spirits". (*An Idealistic View of Life*, p. 32) Thus, Radhkrishnan's concept of *Dharma* is very clear. For him, *Dharma* means the direct experience of the Divine; this is the most important aspect of *Dharma* and then come the concepts of social wellbeing of the entire universe (*Loksangraha and sarvabhuthita* as propounded by the *Gita*).

It may be pointed out here that for the sake of convenience, Radhakrishnan uses the word religion, though for him religion is always *Dharma* and not Religion as prevalent in the West. At the same time, I would like to make it clear that Radhakrishnan makes a distinction between religious experience, on the one hand, and integral experience, on the other. This standpoint will also help us in understanding Radhakrishnan's distinction between Religion and Religions. For him, the term Religions represents the various interpretations of experience, while integral experience is the essence of all religions. To quote his most significant words, "If experience is the Soul of religion, expression is the body through which it fulfills its destiny. We have the spiritual facts and their interpretations by which they are communicated to others." (Indian View of Life, page 90). In a different context, Radhakrishnan says, it is the distinction between immediacy and thought. Intuitions abide, while interpretations change." (*An Idealistic View of Life*), but this interpretation should not be confused with the experiences themselves. For Radhakrishnan, conceptual experiences are tentative and provisional..., because the intellectual accountsare constructed theories of experience (*Idealistic View of Life*) and he cautions us to 'distinguish between the immediate experience or the intuition, which might conceivably be infallible and the interpretation which is mixed up with it.

For Radhakrishnan, the creeds and theological formulations of religion are only the intellectual representations and symbols of experience. The idea of God, according to Radhakrishnan, is an interpretation of experience. (*Indian View of Life*, p.186). It follows here religious experiences are, for him, context - relative and therefore imperfect. They are informed by experiences through specific cultural, historical, linguistic and religious angles. Because of their conceptuality and subsequent intellectualization, experiences in the religious sphere are limited. It is in this sense that we may refer to experiences, which occur under the auspices of one or other of the religions as 'religious experiences'.

Radhakrishnan emphatically asserts that religious intuition is a unique form of experience. Religious intuitions are more than simply the confluence of the cognitive, aesthetic and ethical sides of life. However, vital and significant these sides of life may be, they are but partial and fragmented constituents of a greater whole, a

whole which is experience in its fullness and immediacy and religious intuition. In fact, he is firm in his conviction that religious intuition is not only an autonomous, form of experience, but a form of experience, which informs and validates all spheres of life and experience. Philosophical, artistic, and ethical values of truth beauty and goodness are not known through the senses or by reason. Rather, they are apprehended by intuition or faith (*Indian View of Life* p. 199). Thus, Radhakrishnan maintains that religious intuition informs conjoins and transcends an otherwise fragmentary consciousness.

Radhakrishnan's interpretation of religious intuition lies in his affirmation of the identity of the Self and Ultimate Reality. Throughout his life, Radhakrishnan interpreted the '*Upnishdic Mahavakya tattvamasi*', as a declaration of the non-dualitiy-Advait (of *Atman and Brahman*), Advaitic interpretation of the ultimate reality prompts him to accept the non dualistic experience of religious intuition. He not only claimed to find support for his views in the Upanishads, but believed that correctly understood, the ancient sages expounded his interpretation of religious intuition. Concluding, Radhakrishnan says, 'Here we find the essence of religion, which is the synthetic realization of life, the religious man has the knowledge that everything is significant, the feeling that there is harmony underneath the conflicts and the power to realize the significant and the harmony.'*(Indian View of Life* p. 201)

According to me, Radhakrishnan identified intuition- in all its contextual varieties- with integral experience. The two expressions are for him, synonymous- integral experience co-ordinates and synthesize the range of life's experiences. It furnishes the individual with an ever deepening awareness of and appreciation for the unity of reality. As an intuition integral experience is not only the basis of all experience but sources of all creative activities, whether they are philosophical, scientific moral, artistic or religious.

Religious Harmony – Radhakrishnan explains the concept of the Religious Harmony on the basis of his notion of the essential unity of all religions. The question arises here what is that common element that every religion shares? Radhakrishnan replies, Religion is not a creed or a code but an insight into reality.*(My Search for Truth* p. 27). This insight reveals that man is always confronted with something greater than

himself, which is known as the eternal or the absolute reality. It is present in the soul of every man and forms the bridge between finite and the infinite, and consequently an insight into this Truth constitutes the essence of Religion. Hence, Radhakrishnan says that religion is that discipline or way of life which, enables man to, 'make a change in his own nature to let the divine in him manifest himself.

Religious harmony depends on a true understanding of the nature of religion and also expects the seeker of the Truth to have a faith in the ultimacy of absolute spiritual values and a way of life to realize them. In this context, we must understand that this faith involves an awareness of the beyond, and therefore a conviction that such awareness is possible. That is why, great religions have often been prophetic, have been based on Truth realized or experienced by gifted Seers. That is the reason behind Radhakrishnan's insistence on making the concept of religious harmony, based on the true understanding of religion and religious experience, essential for applying the social ethics to the practical life.

Religious Harmony in Theory and Practice- If we analyze Radhakrishnan's concept of religious Harmony, we find that there are two aspects of this theory – one is theoretical and the other is practical, in fact, both are interrelated. The theoretical aspects depends on a deep understanding of religion, religious experience and direct realization of the Ultimate Reality; thus, it is metaphysical and spiritual both. On the other, the practical aspect insists on respecting all religions and developing the feeling of tolerance. Explaining it further, he says, 'The differences among religions seem prominent, because we do not seem to know the basic truth of our own religions. There is a common element in all.'

At another, place Radhakrishnan writes, 'the different religions are like partners in a quest for the same objective' (*East and West*, p. 29). Radhakrishnan has tried to explain the concept of religious harmony and unity on the basis of the etymological meaning of the word 'Religion,' also as is well known, the term Religion comes out of two words-'re' and 'legere'. Here the word 're' means again and 'legere' means to bind together. Thus, the term 'Religion' means to bind again; it is amply clear from this etymology that the word Religion expresses the element of unity.

Usually, all religions accept God to be the centre of devotion. As a matter of fact, God is the basis of different religions. Some eminent learned philosophers like, Radhakrishnan have gone a step ahead and declared that the concept of religious unity depends on the essential unity of the highest Self. Establishing the fundamental unity of all religions, Radhakrishnan says, "The spiritual glory of Hinduism, the faithful obedience of the Jews, the artistic life of the greek seekers, the theory of great compassion of the Buddhist religion, the lesson of God- Love of the Christianity and the self dedication of the individual to the creator-, the Islamic ideal all lead us to the same goal of multifaceted perfection of the mankind." (*Fragments of a Confession in the Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, edited by P. Schippl, p.76).

Religious Harmony and the Present Man- The Ideal of attaining religious harmony on the universal plane, has become easier now because of the scientific progress and the acceptance of the ideal of Globalization. The world has come nearer today because of the scientific growth but this is only one side of the picture, the other side of the picture is very dark and gloomy. There is a keen contest and in fact cut throat competition between the countries and individuals, in this sense man has become narrower in his outlook and self -centered as also ego -centric. And here we feel the need of religious understanding, religious harmony and the essential unity of all religions.

Religious Harmony and Social Ethics- It's a well known fact that the individual and society are complementary to each other and their day to day behavior needs a moral, religious and spiritual control. Without these, man becomes animal- like and falls a prey to his passions and basic needs, he loses the hold over his senses and acts in a very confused way, which is damaging for the progress of the individual and society both. All the thinkers, right from the days of the Veda to the present times, have been insisting on practicing a rigorous discipline in order to make society, morally healthier and religiously and spiritually more sound.

III

The *Mahabharata*, says, 'The *Veda* is one; its significance is one, though different *Vedas* are constructed on account of misunderstanding. The acceptance of common authority by the different sects helps to purify them. Those parts of the new

faith which are not in conformity with the Vedic canon tend to be subordinated and gradually dropped out. While no creeds and no scruples were forced to disappear as outworn or out of date, every one of them developed on account of influence of the spirit of the Vedanta, which is by no means sectarian".

So, the Hindu method of religious reform is basically democratic because it permits each faith to get the truth through its own ways. Each group has its own historical tradition and change, the condition of its growth of spirit. Toleration is the most basic tenet of universalism which is accepted by Hinduism. Hinduism does not refuse any religious belief. For example, Christian's description of personal, immediate dogmatic faith in Jesus and His authority as God is self-certifying. "Christian theology becomes relevant for those who shared and accepted a particular kind of spiritual experience, and these are tempted to dismiss as illusory other experience and scriptures as imperfect'. But Hinduism was not betrayed into this situation. The Hindu thinker readily admits other points of view than his own considering them to be just as worthy of attention. If the whole race of man, in every land, of every colour, and every stage of culture, is the offspring of God, then we must admit that, in the vast compass of his providence, all are being trained by his wisdom and supported by his love to reach within the limits of their power a knowledge of the Supreme".

Radhakrishnan knows about criticism of Christian missionaries against Hindu beliefs and religious practices. With deep and clear religious sense, he removes all criticisms. He says that all such criticisms are due to the lack of understanding. He says we can completely remove them by the understanding of true religion, because only it can stop the complete annihilation of human race. So there is need to understand the true meaning of religion to every individual of world. Let me end with some thoughts of Vivekananda. He says: 'Religion without philosophy runs into superstition; and philosophy without religion becomes a dry atheism'. He further says that, 'In every religion there are three parts: philosophy, mythology and rituals. Philosophy of course is the essence of every religion; mythology explains and illustrates it by means of more or less legendary lives of great men, stories and fables of wonderful things and ritual gives to that philosophy a still more concrete form so that everyone may grasp it. Ritual is in fact a 'concretized philosophy'

Every religion has its own philosophy which is unique to itself and which enables it to differentiate it from the other religions. But the question is if each religion differs from the other at its most basic philosophical level, how can it be possible to have one universal philosophy? Moreover, it is also observed that each one claims superiority on others in a very rigid manner. Sometimes the people say those who do not follow his religion, cannot attain salvation. They must go in hell because their way is not the true and right one. Each religion brings out its own doctrines and insists upon them as being the only true ones. And not only does it do that, but it thinks that he who does not believe in them must go to some horrible place. We must first of all know that we all are human beings and that we are not equal. We are not equal in our physical strength because one man is stronger than other, some have more power and some have less power and some are men and some women. There are many differences between us. But along with these differences we have one element which is common in all of us. We all are human beings; we all belong to one humanity. This is the true nature of religious harmony and social ethos.

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HUSSERL'S TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY: CONTINUITY TO EXISTENTIALISM

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The philosophical development of Edmund Husserl, the founder of twentieth-century phenomenological philosophy, can be divided into three main periods, the first period of his pre-transcendental or epistemological phenomenology, the middle period of his fully transcendental phenomenology and the last period of his so-called “genetic” phenomenology. Although our attention will be concentrated on the middle period of his properly transcendental phenomenology, we shall nevertheless present Husserl’s thinking in terms of these three phases. There is no one work which stands in the same relation to the Husserlian philosophy that *Being and Time*, *Being and Nothingness* and *Phenomenology of Perception* stand in relation to the thinking of their respective authors.¹

The *Cartesian Meditations* provides a good over-all picture of transcendental phenomenology. The motifs of Cartesianism are strongly or faintly imprinted in different texts of Husserl, e.g., *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas I*, *First Philosophy* and in different unpublished treatises and lectures. The *Cartesian Meditations* consists of a series of lectures delivered by Husserl at the Sorbonne, Paris in 1928. Beginning with a generous expression of indebtedness to Descartes Husserl portrays phenomenology as the historical completion of the subjective movement inaugurated by Descartes’ *Meditations*. Husserl begins by saying that his Cartesian Meditations are an explicit attempt to renew Descartes’ programme of a reconstruction of knowledge. Husserl characterizes Descartes’ aim as “a complete reforming of philosophy into a science grounded on an absolute foundation.”² Accordingly, the first order of business for the Husserlian phenomenology is to locate “those cognitions that are first in themselves and can support the whole storied edifice of human knowledge”, with a view to “constructing on their basis a science governed by the idea of a definitive system of knowledge ...”³ The programme that Husserl sets for himself is that phenomenology is to be characterized as transcendental phenomenology of knowledge. However, the theory of knowledge is inseparable from the philosophy of the ego *qua* the knowing subject. Hence, Husserl’s phenomenology is not only “transcendental theory of knowledge” but also “a science

of concrete transcendental subjectivity”; it is not only epistemology, but also at the same time “pure egology”. Here, too, Husserl intends to follow the lead of Descartes’ *Meditations* attempting to “renew with greater intensity the radicalness of their spirit to uncover thereby for the first time the genuine sense of the necessary regress to the ego.”

Husserl proposes to begin with Descartes’ point, the pure *ego cogito* and lead from there to transcendental phenomenology. The *ego cogito* indicates the way to the province of transcendental subjectivity, which is the domain of certain and first being. This is in consonance with Husserl’s manner of speaking in the *Ideas I* that phenomenology as an a priori science, sets out the indissoluble essential structures of transcendental subjectivity which persists in and through all imaginable modifications.⁴ The search for the essence of consciousness culminates in transcendental subjectivity. Ordinarily by subjectivity we mean the experience of the subject. The idea of subjectivity lays stress on the purely mental side of experience as opposed to objectivity. In its narrowest sense, it can go to the extreme of denying that the mind can at all know objects existing independently of it, besides its own ideas. And this paves the way for solipsism and idealism. The search for a criterion of the mental thus, leads to the investigation into the subjective experience.

For Husserl, the subject and its experiences are not a part of theoretical natural science. Transcendental consciousness takes form through the suspension of belief in the existence of the external world. It constitutes itself only when suspension of belief in the existence of the external world takes place. In his *Encyclopedia Britannica* article “The Idea of Phenomenology”⁵, Husserl explains that transcendental phenomenology studies (the) ‘transcendental subjectivity’. The sphere of the transcendental subjectivity is first brought to light by means of a technique that Husserl calls the ‘transcendental-phenomenological-reduction’. Here we ‘bracket’ “not the world only but its souls as well, which cannot be found under the attitude of psychological or natural science, being is no part at all of the natural world.”⁶ This is the fundamental task of the constitution of a pure self. Husserl offers a transcendental argument to show this. He says, “Subjects can’t be dissolved into nature, for in that case what gives nature its sense would be missing”.⁷ That is to say, subject is the origination of the attribution of meaning.

'Meaning' here is not understood as in analytical philosophy. As Robert. C Solomon says, "The central concept of 'meaning' in Husserl's philosophy is not to be identified with the linguistic analysts' notion of 'meaning'"⁸ Husserl was concerned with the meaning of intentional acts. The acts of perception, feeling, imagination, etc., have their meanings in the objects perceived, felt, or imagined. In his later work, *Cartesian Meditations*,⁹ in connection with transcendental subjectivity or transcendental ego (Husserl uses these two terms interchangeably), Husserl stresses the notion of the active constitution of objects by the ego.

Husserl's conclusion with regard to the status of the world then is that, "the real world exists, but in respect of essences relative to transcendental subjectivity, and in such a way that it can have its meaning as existing reality only as the intentional meaning-product of transcendental subjectivity."¹⁰ Now we place Husserl's phenomenology within the phenomenological tradition itself. We have pointed out in the course of our work that Husserl is acknowledged by all hands to be the founder of phenomenology. We also mentioned that phenomenology is associated with a number of influential "existentialist thinkers" who claim to employ the phenomenological method.

1. Martin Heidegger: Heidegger was Husserl's assistant from 1919-23. He dedicated his *Being and Time* to Husserl. What he does in this work is widely divergent from Husserl's phenomenology. The question he poses at the outset of *Being and Time* is "the question of the meaning of Being". It may be recalled that Husserl also raised the question of being. Being for him is simply the intentional correlate of consciousness: to be is to be an actual or possible object of consciousness. All beings are relative to the transcendental ego except the being of the transcendental ego itself which is absolute being. For Heidegger the pure ego as subject of consciousness is an empty abstraction. The only real I exists in the world. The real I is in the world which is transcendent to him and in which he finds himself. Hence, Heidegger rejects Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and the transcendental ego. He characterizes ego as Dasein, being-there "*da-sein*". Naturally, he rejects the phenomenological projects of Husserl such as Husserl's ideal of presuppositionlessness, his programme to ground knowledge on absolutely certain foundations, his phenomenological standpoint, etc.

The above passage shows Heidegger's departure from Husserl on a number of crucial issues. These crucial issues involve Husserl's positing of the transcendental ego and transcendental experience; Husserl's adoption of a special phenomenological technique, namely, the *epoché* or phenomenological reduction, and Husserl's view that phenomenology escapably leads to transcendental idealism. To be precise, even when Heidegger seems to agree with Husserl, the agreement conceals profound differences. Heidegger rejects Husserl's 'transcendental ego', 'transcendent experience' and 'pure essences' as intellectual abstractions. Heideggerian phenomenology is not transcendent, but rather existential. It is the careful analysis of the concretely existing human being. In other words, phenomenology is concerned with elucidating concrete existence. We encounter objects in pragmatic engagements of or comportments with the environment. It is only because I encounter something environmentally and pre-conceptually that I am later able to make it the focus of theoretical objectification. Husserl was wrong in privileging theoretical activities over lived engagements. Husserl had become pre-occupied with methods for gaining access to the transcendental sphere of the apriori structures of consciousness.

To treat the meaning of Being phenomenology has to start from our own experience of Being. That does not mean to look inside our own minds or to separate our consciousness from objects. Our own Being is Being-in-the-world. We are, however, a particular part of the world by virtue of the fact that we are *conscious* of it. This human mode of Being Heidegger calls Dasein - "being there". Dermot Moran¹² has pointed out Heidegger's almost total disregard of Husserl's theory of intentionality. Husserl has made a detailed examination of intentionality which pervades almost the entire corpus of his phenomenology. Given the fundamental role of it in Husserl's thought, it becomes a shock that Heidegger *Being and Time*, while explicitly claiming to be a phenomenological treatise, contains only two brief references to intentionality¹³. Heidegger criticizes and rethinks it in his later works.¹⁴ According to him, intentionality must be understood in terms of the structural features of the Dasein, especially Dasein's *transcendence*, that is, the fact that Dasein is already somehow beyond itself, already dwelling in the world and not locked up in the privacy of its own consciousness. The intentional relation must instead be founded on the 'being-with' or 'being-by' of Dasein, i.e., intentionality is a form of 'ontic' transcendence which can only be understood if Dasein's more basic

‘ontological’ transcendence is understood. The radical interpretation of intentionality in terms of transcendence leads Heidegger to the understanding of Dasein as nothing other than the very possibility of Being’s gaining entry to the world, having world-entry.

Heidegger abandons intentionality altogether, in favour of the nature of our dwelling in the linguistic and significative domain (being-in-the-world). Heidegger’s emphasis on transcendence has been understood by commentators as being opposed to Husserl’s supposedly subjectivist account of intentionality. Heidegger regards *temporality* as the meaning of the Being of Dasein. Temporality is an integral element of Heidegger’s phenomenology. We may point out that time or temporality is a concern of Husserl too. From the early 1900s Husserl had clearly identified the link between transcendence and time. It is temporal through and through as every act grasps a ‘profile’, ‘adumbration’ or ‘aspect’ which changes with a change in our perspective. Any act looks beyond itself to these other profiles and assumes them in grasping the object. So objects are never given consciousness in their fullness. The object spills over what is given to consciousness. This is a limiting feature of both objecthood as much as a feature of consciousness. This is hardly the position of a radical subjectivist.

But what about Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl that he had prioritized the cognitive over the practical in his account of intentionality? So the question we ourselves pose is: Does Husserl overstress the cognitive dimension and ignore the practical? It is undoubtedly true that Husserl focused more on elucidating acts of consciousness rather than human actions. Yet it is not difficult to find in his writings detailed descriptions of our ordinary dealings with things in the natural attitude. But there is always the possibility of a shift in perspective, the possibility of one attitude giving way to the other – the practical attitude giving way to the theoretical. The theoretical attitude is to be valued in itself as one possible outcome of our lived engagement with things. Moreover, as Husserl’s manuscripts continue to be published, they tend to reveal a greater-willingness to accommodate the practical than is evident during his lifetime. In his *Ideas* II the detailed description of our ordinary dealings with the things of the natural world is very close to Heidegger’s account of the practical intentionality. Dermot Moran has even claimed that the two

philosophers' argument on the kind of encounter with things prevalent in the natural attitude is so close that it may be said that Heidegger has taken over from Husserl.

Moran has drawn our attention to a passage in *Ideas II* where Husserl characterizes the world of things discovered in the natural attitude as 'on hand' (*Vorhanden*). "I may also be concerned with things in their use. Things can offer themselves in our apprehension 'food as a means of nutrition, or as the use of objects of various sorts; heating materials, choppers, hammers, etc. For instance, I see coal as heating material; I recognize it and recognize it as useful and as used for heating ... it is burnable'". Husserl here uses the very example of the hammer employed later to such effect in *Being and Time*. In support of his interpretation Moran quotes from an unpublished manuscript of Husserl labeled "*gegen Heidegger*" written in 1931. There Husserl emphasizes that "the 'theoretical interest is motivated, like the artistic, by a desire to play freed from concerns of the necessities of life, and this theoretical curiosity is by no means a deficient mode of the practical as Heidegger had claimed.'"¹⁶

Heidegger is enormously indebted to Husserl for his own ideas of phenomenology. Yet, he accuses Husserl of having 'fallen out of Being'. Husserl, Heidegger thinks, did not understand the problem of Being. Husserl started his researches by distinguishing between phenomenology and ontology. This presupposes that the phenomena encountered in the one were different from the entities encountered in the other. This suggests that the entities-in-themselves are not the entities that appear to us as the phenomena. Husserl wants to reject this conclusion and argues that the things that appear to us become the things themselves through transcendental constitution. But this is challenged by Heidegger: Can it be possible that phenomenology begins by distinguishing it from the study of being and then tries to bring them together? In this opinion once we have distinguished between phenomenology and the study of entities, we become trapped in a scepticism what Husserl wanted to avoid so much. How can it be believed that the objects of experience correspond to objects as they are in themselves? Heidegger, though he accepts Husserl's method, challenges Husserl's initial starting point in applying the method. Both are of the opinion that philosophy must examine phenomena, but they differ as to how these phenomena are to be encountered. Husserl introduced phenomenological epoché, a bracketing of the natural standpoint. Under it we

suspend judgements about existence and we make an enquiry into essences. This means that phenomenology is not concerned with existence at all. Heidegger points out that existence is not to be neglected, for philosophy is a study of the problem of being. Husserl may hope to show that objects are constituted and thus it is established that the natural standpoint is a derivative of the phenomenological standpoint. Heidegger does not accept this kind of meaningless hope. Once the phenomenological epoché is performed the bracketing of the world is permanent. Heidegger rejects the phenomenological bracketing and thus the phenomenological standpoint. In his opinion being simply cannot be bracketed. Our choice or adoption of a standpoint presents entities. In Heidegger's language, 'The entity is, it is given, it confronts us: accordingly it is to be found at any time and it is in certain realms known to us'. In his experience our experience of entities cannot be bracketed. Husserl begins with the presupposition that our familiarity with entities in the world is a philosophical theory imposed upon us. Heidegger does not think that our belief in the existence of entities is an imposition. It is, according to him, an essential aspect of the most 'primitive' experience. Heidegger, however, does accept Husserl's appeal to direct phenomena, but he rejects Husserl's appeal to particular objects. Heidegger has already maintained that no understanding of Being which he accepts as his goal can be derived from any knowledge of particular beings though it may be direct. He says, 'unless we are guided by a developed knowledge of treeness.....we can look over thousands and thousands of trees in vain---we shall not see the tree for the trees'. For Heidegger phenomenological examination is not an examination of individual objects, but the examination of the phenomenon of Being as such. The world, in the opinion of Heidegger, is not simply a totality of objects, but a peculiarly independent object for examination apart from any and all entities in it. Husserl thought to have solved the problem of our knowledge of objects by introducing transcendental constitution of objects by the pure or transcendental ego. A system of *noemata*, intuitions and exceptions of intuitions constitute an object. Each *noema* is a different 'aspect' of the object. Heidegger accepts the important elements of Husserl's theory of perception. He says, 'the main thing is to impress it on our experience that we cannot immediately grasp the Being of the entity itself...we get only aspects'. Heidegger does not agree with Husserl that it is the ego which constitutes the world. In his later writings Husserl introduced transcendental reduction which reduces all

objects of intuition to the products of this ego. It is on this point that Heidegger makes the radical break with the philosophers of the past. It is true that there is a grammatical necessity for self-reference, when we talk about experiences of the world. Our grammar also distinguishes between subject and predicate. The language of perception has therefore the distinction between perceiver-subject and perceived-object. Heidegger raises the question. Why we do accept a distinction between subject and object? Heidegger suggests a total rejection of the most basic commonsense distinction and with it a host of epistemological concepts which have affected modern philosophy. In Heidegger's opinion, there is no ego, there is simply what he calls 'Being-in-the-world'. The world is not 'bracketable', nor is the concept of ego necessary. Once the concept of ego is removed, we are free from the threat of philosophical scepticism. In this context the 'phenomenological movement' is divided into two branches - and he establishes what is called "existential phenomenology"¹⁷

2. **Jean-Paul Sartre:** The most remarkable feature of Sartre's literary life was that it was, in the fullest sense of that word, *a literary life*. Sartre belongs to a very small band of *literati* (almost all of French provenance) whose writing covers virtually the entire spectrum of literary genres from plays, short stories and novels, through biographies, autobiographies and critical works of one kind or another, to original pieces of philosophical thinking. But the manifoldness of Sartre's accomplishments had little to do with any ostentatious display of literary versatility but was integrally bound up with the central concern of his life- to convey, by all available means, his own unique (and tragically qualified) vision of life and of the human condition.¹⁸

In the philosophy of Sartre, in particular we come across a more fully developed existentialist theory of consciousness. Sartre attempts to work through the phenomenological method in his study of the structure of consciousness; and consistent with this method, he eventually meets with a negative position. True to the phenomenological standpoint, Sartre takes consciousness necessarily as having reference to something. Consciousness can hardly have any reality beyond the referential function on the plane of phenomena. Already Heidegger, also proceeding on phenomenological lines, had exposed the fallacy of a conscious enclosed in itself.

However, denying, on the one hand, a substantive status to consciousness, Sartre nevertheless emphatically insists on the irreducible existentiality of

consciousness. As Sartre remarks: "Consciousness has nothing substantial about it, it is a pure appearance in the sense that it only exists in so far as it becomes apparent". Immanence and concrete reality (existence) are thus sought to be combined in the Sartrean notion of consciousness. Pursuing the phenomenological analysis in its consistency, Sartre tends to go beyond the Husserlian position itself, so far as the central issue of "transcendental I" is concerned. In his small but significant book, "The Transcendence of the Ego", Sartre takes up his stand on a non-egological conception of consciousness. The phenomenological conception of consciousness, he argues, renders the unifying and individualizing role of 'I' to be totally redundant. For it is consciousness, instead of the ego as such, which makes possible the unity and personality of my 'I'. So Sartre concludes: "the transcendental *I* has no *raison d'être*"

A phenomenological study of consciousness, according to Sartre, reveals it as presence to oneself and presence to the world. This table, that wall etc. Exist in themselves; but man alone in this world exists *for himself*--in Sartrean terminology, "*pour-soi*" (for itself) as distinguished from "*en-soi*" (in itself). Being, for Sartre, includes both 'being-in-itself' and 'being-for-itself'; and the latter is regarded as the nihilation of the former—consciousness conceived as lack of being, a desire for being, a relation to Being. Each 'For-itself' is the nihilation of particular being. Thus "*pour-soi*" becomes synonymous with consciousness, and for it alone there is a world. Consciousness is accordingly defined as that by means of which there is a world. Rejecting the idea of self as in classical metaphysics and psychology, Sartre points out that consciousness is empty of content. All content is on the side of the object. Consciousness does not imply an ego (who is supposed to be the owner of that consciousness) ; the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness—it is outside, 'in the world'. Consequently, consciousness would prove to be simply a spontaneity—a sheer activity transcending towards objects.¹⁹

Sartre became acquainted with Husserl's phenomenology through reading Emmanuel Levinas' book, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*. In his first published article, "*Transcendence of the Ego*"²⁰ Sartre accepts Husserl's view of phenomenology as the search for essences as eidetic analysis but he never separated those essences from the world of facts, and in that sense, was already leading phenomenology in an existential direction. He rejected much of Husserl's

methodological apparatus, including the *epoché*, the reduction, Husserl's account of the noema and the intentional object and his account of ego.

Yet his *Being and Nothingness*²¹, Sartre will study being by studying consciousness, the "locus" of appearing. From his studies of imagination he sees that it is essential to consciousness but its object is absent. He came to the conclusion that consciousness is the opposite of objectivity and opposite of being; which is to say that it is non-being. Unlike Husserl Sartre considers consciousness as the source of negativity or "nihilation". In that light we can understand Sartre's interpretation of Husserl's notion of intentionality, which because it is non-real is non-being. The being of consciousness is to negate reality and hence the determination which consciousness contributes is negativity, and this for Sartre is existence. Since by nihilation intelligibility is conferred, negativity is prominent in Sartre's thought. Freedom is also negative, since it cannot be a power to negate being-in-itself.

Sartre's brilliant phenomenological-psychological analysis of "bad faith" is interpreted as an attempt on the part of subjectivity to be "in-itself," making it equivalently a denial of freedom. Sartre's very original development of the theme of the other may be compared to Husserl's thoughts on the experience of the other which, according to some, is not a very satisfactory account. Sartre's treatment seems to go in the direction of the other as an "intolerable person", "invasion of subjectivity". It is nothing completely different from Husserl's constitutive analysis of inter-subjectivity. His thoughts have crossed the boundary of phenomenology and at the same time it is testimony to the possibility of broadening the field of phenomenological investigations.

Thus the peculiar paradox of the whole situation about man's existence is that man is ever that what he not yet is, and is not that what he already is. So he can, never be fixed as an essence; his existence is rather to be defined as 'being-out-of-itself', so that in whatever way his essence is sought to be determined, it is bound to remain ever beyond his existence. Consequently what Sartre prescribes is a different approach: man must *create* for himself his own essence. Man makes out his existence in and through his *act*--the act of *choice*. This is the line with the fundamental activist position of the Sartrean metaphysics, more or less present in every form of existentialism. "There is no reality except in action", Sartre declares.²²

3. Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Maurice Merleau-Ponty was a French phenomenologist. Phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty sees it, combines a form of subjectivism with a form of objectivism. It is subjectivist in that it recognizes that all experience is *someone's* experience, that 'how things appear' means 'how they appear to a particular 'subject'. A description of phenomena, that is, of how things appear, must thus necessarily be a description of *subjective experience*. But, since the being of subjects is being-in-the-world, that is, since experience consists in being 'involved with the world', a description of subjective experience is not a description of something purely 'inner', but of our involvement with the world which exists independently of our experience of it. The world, Merleau-Ponty says, is not something we merely think about, but the places in which we will live our lives, the world we act in, have feelings and hopes about, as well as the world we try to know about.

Merleau-Ponty opens his *The Phenomenology of Perception* with the question: What is Phenomenology? and stays for an answer, an answer, an answer which is admittedly somewhat contradictory. Phenomenology, he tells us, is *both* a philosophy of essences (Husserl) *and* a philosophy of existences (Heidegger), *both* a philosophy which starts with the reduction (Husserl) *and* a philosophy for which the world is always already there (Heidegger), *both* a 'rigorous science' (Husserl) *and* a description of the immediate structures of the life world (Husserl or Heidegger). Moreover, these contradictions, Merleau-Ponty insists, are not resolved by distinguishing between the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and the ontological phenomenology of Heidegger because they recur in the development of Husserl's own thinking as he shifts from a transcendental mode of analysis to an investigation of the '*Lebenswelt*'.

It is this 'both-and' which defines Merleau-Ponty's own conception of phenomenology as he proceeds through the four themes which furnish the topic of his Introduction, the themes of description, the reduction, essences and intentionality. Phenomenology is a descriptive science and so has to be distinguished from any science which would seek to explain, that is, from science commonly so called, and this because phenomenology cannot take for granted the reality of the world which forms the starting point for any scientific investigation and so has to return to 'that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speak , and in relation

to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language...(p.ix). To be sure, as much as this is accomplished by analytical reflection-by which Merleau-Ponty mostly has Kant in mind-but in the wrong way. For the reflection which starts from our ordinary experience of the world and then moves back to account for this objectivity in terms of the synthesizing activities of a transcendental subject finishes up by locking itself into an interiority or immanence which loses the very world it seeks to reconstruct. But the reflective activity to which phenomenology appeals is one which reflects upon the unreflected, one for which therefore the world is not in man but man in the world.

Merleau-Ponty says that reduction takes me away from the common world and locks me into a private (phenomenologically reduced) world of my own. On the contrary, Merleau-Ponty insists, the reduction is precisely that through which I first become fully aware of my relation to the world and to the other subjects with which I share a world. Merleau-Ponty's relation to Husserl is less of an antagonism and more of clarification.²⁴ He continues to develop Husserl's basic idea of philosophy as a radical, rigorous science, distinct from the empirical sciences. He criticizes different aspects of Husserl's theory but it is not a relation of simple opposition. He questions the possibility of phenomenological reductions. In that context, he does not suggest that we should give up the reduction but rather that we should assume that the endpoint of the interrogative project is in the form of a solution or an explanation. He does not deny that we should retain some of our claims, judgments and beliefs, scientific or commonsensical, but argues that all such attitudes – as well as suspensions of them – are based on a non-propositional, non-thetic connection, a different kind of bodily intentionality. Instead of rejecting Husserl's reductions, he wants to study their starting points. The nature and possibility of this study is the central and recurrent problem of his philosophy.

So, it is misleading to say that Merleau-Ponty gave up the suspension of the thesis. Rather he asks about the conditions of possibility of the idea of suspension itself. His answer is that it presupposes a pre-reflective, pre-thetic connection to the world, a connection that does not have the structure of a position. The doxic thetic attitude presupposes other kinds of relation to the world. The world is not encountered primarily as an object of belief but as an expressing gesture, a face or a figure.²⁵ The primordial attitudes or postures are affective attitudes, sensations, sense-

perceptions and emotions. This is what he calls the primacy of perception. They have an original intentionality which differs from belief in attitude. They do not allow reduction in the sense of suspension of the thesis. This is for the simple reason that the experience is not yet structured as a thesis. Both the thesis and its suspension presuppose – as their condition of possibility – the affective bonds that tie us to the world.²⁶ Merleau-Ponty points out that it is Husserl who led him to realize the autonomy and primacy of non-thetic experience. He had the occasion to go through Husserl's manuscripts at Leuven. He points out that the natural attitude turns into a thesis only in "naturalist" thinking. Suspending the thesis is not an operation performed in the natural attitude as such but an operation performed on the naturalist interpretation of their attitude.²⁷

The question then becomes what can be done, if we still want to practice philosophy in the phenomenological sense of the word. Merleau-Ponty claims that Husserl himself approached the notion of the pre-reflective when developing the concept of *operative intentionality*. According to him, Husserl uncovered in his manuscripts and later publications the operative intentionality of desires, affective perceptions, and emotional evaluations which "furnishes the text which our knowledge tries to translate in passive language."²⁸ According to him, Husserl's originality lies beyond the notion of intentionality. Beneath the intentionality of representations, there is a deeper intentionality which others have called existence. But his treatment of intentionalities of passions, affections, etc., was restricted by his intellectualist interests. Thus Merleau-Ponty's position is sometimes summarized by saying that he rejected Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and set out to describe experiences and phenomena in all their particularity and plurality.

Conclusion

Now one very significant line of classification in the field of existentialist philosophy at large is that between phenomenological and non-phenomenological existentialism. Heidegger and Sartre represent the former, while the rest of the existentialist philosophers belong, broadly speaking, to the other group. Hence we may ponder a little over the title "Phenomenological existentialism". The question might legitimately be posed: is it not anomalous to couple phenomenology with existentialism---the two representing rather contrary attitudes? On the face of it it might appear that such an alliance would be unholy.

Like Husserl, but unlike early Heidegger and Sartre, Merleau-Ponty's thinking covers all three planes. However, it is not so much a matter of developing an epistemological and a transcendental as well as an ontological phenomenology. Rather the contrary, like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty is exclusively committed to the exploration of the originary realm. But he gets there by employing a tactic whereby the other two stages are taken account of in terms of their nominal representatives- the realists and the idealists, the empiricists and the intellectualists. Moreover, this nominal representation not only groups together a diversity of philosophical figures; the net is cast widely enough to cover different schools of psychology. What is missing (though it is implicit) in Merleau-Ponty's analyses is the development of a logic whereby empiricism and intellectualism would no longer be placed side by side in an antinomial relation but in an order which, in my estimate, corresponds to a logic inherent in the evolution of the schools in question. What is also missing (though again it is implied) is an extension of the scope of the human science to cover disciplines such as psychoanalysis, child psychology, anthropology, mythology- in other words, disciplines whose theme is that of the originary.

To sum up and to situate each of our phenomenological philosophers in terms of the format established initially: Husserl operates upon all three levels- though in a development which proceeds *from* the second *through* the third and so on to the fourth. Heidegger confines himself to a movement *from* the second *back* to the first (in the order of being) as the last (in the order of analysis). With Sartre we remain from first to last upon the second plane- though in such a way that both the ontological and the existential implications of such a stance are made explicit. Finally, with Merleau-Ponty, all three planes are covered but in such a way that two of these three (the second and the third) are subjected to a mutually destructive critique which leaves the way open for the last (the fourth as 'reflection upon the unreflected', that is, upon the first).

Husserl's achievement has often been called the 'triumph of subjectivity' – and rightly so. It is, however, part of the 'triumphalism' of contemporary philosophy that it should think of itself as having finally reached a vantage point from which it becomes possible to dismiss such archaic concepts as 'interiority', 'subjectivity', 'consciousness', 'spirituality' etc. from the roster of relevant philosophical categories. It may well be that these categories need re-thinking and re-

defining, but I would like to suggest that whenever, and wherever, anything approaching civilization has emerged in human affairs, it has been due to something which deserves to go by one or other of these currently disreputable names. No one understood this better than Husserl whose *Crisis* assumes, in its historical perspective, the proportions of an extended cry of pain as the founder of phenomenological philosophy watched his cherished ideal of philosophical rationality collapse into the abyss of Nazi irrationalism. So it is simply not possible to overestimate the prophetic grandeur of the following, uncharacteristically rhetorical, passage with which Husserl concludes his Vienna Lecture of May 1935:

Notes and References:

1. *Four Phenomenological Philosophers, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty* by Christopher Macann, London and New York, 1993, p. 1.
2. *The Crisis*, p.12.
3. *Ibid*, p. 5.
4. *Ibid*, p. 6.
5. “Die Idee Der Phenomenologie”, *Husserliana II*, Walter Biemel (ed), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958. Eng. Tr. By G. Nakhnikian and W. P. Alston in *Readings in Twentieth Century Philosophy*, New York: Free Press, 1963, pp. 622-677.
6. *Ibid*. p. 657.
7. *Ideas II*, Eng. tr. by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer, Dordrech: Kluwer, 1989, p. 297.
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THE WORK ETHIC OF A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: A CONTEMPORARY REFLECTIVE STUDY OF THE AO NAGAS

BENDANGINLA

An unquestionable fact of man's existence is the propensity for social relations. As the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle had said long ago that man is a social animal and he who is not a part of society must be either a god or a beast. Isolated life is not just alien to man but it is a fact that man always finds himself born into a society. Every society possesses its own culture, which determines the nature of the society and the lives of its members. Culture is broadly understood as the embodiment of the different aspects of life such as institutions, customs, traditions, beliefs, language, rituals, arts, etc.¹ It certainly includes the value aspect of life. E.B. Taylor had conceived of culture as standing for the beliefs, morals, customs, laws, and other capabilities and skills acquired by man as a member of society.²

Every culture thus, has its system of values, its beliefs about what is right and wrong, good and bad which are manifested in the forms of behaviors and practices of that society. These values are determined by their customs and traditions, and it is these value beliefs regarding man's actions which constitute the ethical standards of the society. The maturity and strength of a society are moreover, reflected by the kind of values a society accepts.³ It is this aspect that gives a culture its uniqueness and identity. This paper attempts at bringing a reflective perspective on the ethical standards that underlie the working culture of the traditional Ao Nagas. The Aos are one of the major indigenous Naga tribes, inhabiting the state of Nagaland, North East of India. They are an ethnic group, having a distinctive culture of their own. Before colonialism and subsequent inclusion into the Union of India, the Aos, like any other Naga tribes were living an independent, self-sustaining life free from any kind of external control.⁴

Traditional societies essentially mean those whose ways have developed in the absence of writing and have been perpetuated by oral and behavioral traditions alone.⁵ The traditional Ao society was in this way a non-literate society. However, what it lacked in literacy was made up for in their robust system of customary laws and oral traditions, which served as the anchor of their community in all circumstances. It defined for them what constituted a good member of the community

and how to maintain harmony within the community. Their customs and traditions contained within themselves all the subtleties that were required of in man's relations.⁶ These encompassed their value beliefs too.

Views exist which states that philosophy cannot belong to the domain of a culture that lacks literature and that they lack a system of thought also.⁷ Theories had been propounded which held that the people belonging to such "primitive" cultures possess an undeveloped intellect and thus questioned the rationality of the thoughts of these people.⁸ The absence of written literature should not entail that the non-literate people were devoid of any kind of worldviews worth elaborating or discussing. This view can be seen affirmed in Paul Radin's work where he observed that philosophical thoughts and rationality are not the exclusive properties belonging to the western mind. On the other hand, he was of the view that these people belonging to the non-literate culture possessed an even truer sense of reality than the western minds.⁹ The truth of this observation is found exemplified in the reflective study of the traditional AOs which shows that meaningful worldviews and philosophy underlies their beliefs and practices. Their culture and traditions mirror their inner philosophy of life and worldviews, both at the individual as well as the community level.¹⁰

The purpose of this paper is not to show that the AOs possessed some kind of unique philosophy but it is to bring into view that there is more to the life of this community than being merely seen and understood as a people regulated by customs and traditions. Historical, sociological, theological, and anthropological studies on this community are being done but philosophical reflections and writings on the beliefs and practices of the community are unexplored territories. The paper is a modest attempt to contribute to this. This study uses ideas from existing historical, sociological and cultural studies, to reflect on the philosophical- moral consideration that shape the community's approach to work.

The AO is always a community-oriented individual.¹¹ Here 'community' does not only mean a group of people living together in one place as defined in the *Illustrated Oxford Dictionary*. However, as Ferdinand Tönnies, the German sociologist had defined, it refers to the bonds existing amongst the individuals living together, which are manifested in the forms of kinship, blood relationships,

friendship, the neighborhoods, etc.¹² These forces would imply shared history, language, culture, and values, etc. In a traditional society, it is these bonds that act as the forces of social cohesion, create a sense of being in a distinct group, and sustain the community. The bonding of individuals leads to mutual identification of the self with the common life and purpose of the community, for which “we” is the natural expression.¹³ The characteristic stamp of the cultural identity of the Ao society is this communalistic nature. In such a social context, members of the society acknowledge the existence of common goods and values, and these guide the actions and the thoughts of a man in his relations with others. In Ao society, their customary laws and tradition created a system of values that regulated all the activities of the individual with the community. It is in the light of this communitarian nature, that the moral considerations which guided the traditional AOs in their approach to work, can be reflected upon.

Work Ethic: The term ‘ethics’ originated from the Greek root word ‘*ethos*’, meaning “*character, customs, habits*”. Technically, ethics is understood to mean that area of study which is concerned with morality. In a narrower sense, ethics is also used to mean the moral principles of a particular tradition, group, or individual.¹⁴ The term ‘morality’ itself comes from the Latin word “*mores*” meaning “customs and habits” which corresponds with the Greek word ‘*ethos*’.¹⁵ Morality means the beliefs, social rules, norms about what is good, bad, right, and wrong regarding conduct as well as the character of persons. Thus, though morality is the subject matter of ethics, these two terms are often used interchangeably. Ethics can be thus understood as the moral standards or rules of conduct that guide human individuals or groups in their relations to one another and society. The term ‘traditional ethic’ is used here to refer to the notions of morality concerning their works, as held by the traditional Ao people. Since the time Max Weber first coined the word ‘work ethic’, the term has undergone different conceptions. However, work ethic is commonly understood as that which recognizes virtues such as hard work, honesty, perseverance, integrity, as the core values in a person's approach to his work. These values imply that work ethic requires a person to have a degree of self-sacrifice or dedicating oneself to the work. It is a belief that work and diligence have a moral

benefit and an inherent ability, virtue, or value to strengthen character and individual abilities.¹⁶

More precisely, work ethic refers to a set of values that focus on the importance of the desire to work hard. It means perceiving work as a desirable activity and considered as a mark of good character.¹⁷ Work ethic means that work is valued as the means to some end, it is bound up with the attainment of some state of affairs which is valued.¹⁸ The term 'work ethic' is a western modern construct that is conceived to understand and gauge the working culture of different areas of man's activities. The preliterate non-western culture, such as the traditional Ao society never had such formal conception of work ethic as found in modern western culture. But this does not mean that traditional Ao society lacked this moral or ethical approach towards their work. The purpose of ethics is to regulate the behavior of individuals so that the welfare of the group is fostered.¹⁹ This purpose can be seen in the working culture of the Aos.

Work culture: Culture is the result of beliefs, values, behaviors, habits, experiences, etc. It may be understood as the way of behavior and living which is created when a group of people comes to accept certain ways of living and doing things. Culture is the environment in which an individual always finds himself doing things as well as interacting with others. How a person works, the attitudes he possesses towards doing things then are greatly influenced by the culture in which he finds himself. It may be stated that work is the culture and identity of the Aos. The Aos always had a healthy, positive attitude towards work, because it was understood that work is what sustains the life of a human being on earth; until and unless one engages in work, survival is impossible. He is described as industrious and hard-working.²⁰ As traditional communities, their lives revolved around their cultivation activities. Knowing that his livelihood depended on this, he worked hard, laziness was considered as a vice and always cautioned against in the community. The propensity to work hard was always viewed as a desirable trait in the character of an Ao and thus a virtue to be possessed. Begging out of laziness or due to some other reasons was completely unknown to the Aos.²¹ They survived by their hard work.²² The attitude of the Aos towards their work was determined by their customs and traditions. More precisely, it is aroused from the underlying philosophy of a community-oriented society according to which the

upliftment, welfare, and harmony of the community are of utmost importance. Their customs and traditions served as the bulwark from any disintegrating elements to this communal spirit.

Apart from the fact that the Aos were hardworking people, one striking feature of their work culture is community work, which takes two forms – compulsory community work and voluntary works. A study of this feature reveals that these seemingly ordinary normal manners of the whole community coming together to work is an expression of a deeper thought process, that constitutes their worldview. For the Aos, the village is the primary unit within which they existed. It is the largest unit bound together by social, religious, and political ties, which act as a unit in all things.²³ An individual possesses an identity only in so far as he belongs to a village and participates in all the activities of the village. All social and domestic life was regulated by a set of well-articulated customs and traditions.²⁴ The social community context was defined by this belongingness to a village. The village thus represents the highest degree of social cohesion.²⁵ Belonging to the village entails belonging to the larger entity of the Ao community. This concept of the larger entity of community is termed “*loktiliba*” which means the “*way of the people*”. The traditions and norms that entail from this term guided and determined all the actions of an Ao. How a man contributes to this entity determined his position and identity in society.²⁶

All such voluntary works come under the term known as “*naja*”, which means ‘*free labour*’. Such practices are the result of the Aos possessing a strong sense of oneness, their duties towards each other, and helping one another in times of need.²⁹ This work culture of the Aos emanating from their adherence to the customary laws and traditions is a reflection of the people’s wisdom and understanding about humanity and one’s place in the whole circle of life. It brings out the communal dimension of ethics that no man is an island – a man is never alone but he is a part of the whole, a part whose identity can only be found with the community to which he belongs, which calls for reciprocity, interrelatedness, and harmony. In a communitarian context the rightness, goodness of actions, the character is determined by the ability to contribute to the common welfare, upliftment, and harmony of the community. A person is considered a person only within the context of his

participation in the community and thus his relation to the 'other' in the community. This belief is brought out in the form of giving mutual help, caring, and sharing in the community. These ethical considerations are found mirrored in their approach to work.

This deep respect and regard for the well-being of the community guided the Ao man in all his work and activities. His sense of responsibility to help, care, and contribute to the community was a recognition of the truth of the interrelatedness which exists between the larger entity of the community and the individual. The community was not a sum of atomic individuals who happened to come and live together. But the traditional Ao community was a living community where there was a close relationship among the people on account of their common history, culture, traditions, values, beliefs, etc. It can be characterized as an organic community where there is the reciprocity of awareness and this was evident in all their actions and behaviors.³¹

Ethical Elements in the Ao work culture: Reflections on the Ao work culture show the ethical elements which guided the lives and actions of the traditional people. First and foremost, the moral consideration in their approach to work was altruistic in temperament. Altruism is understood as the principle of conduct that regards the good of others as the end of moral action.³² The communalistic spirit which prevailed, discouraged any kind of egoistic outlook in the thinking and activities of the individuals. W.C. Smith observed that in such homogeneous communities, there was little room for individualistic tendencies.³³ Working for the greater good always prevailed. The morality of actions and the character of an Ao were judged based on the degree to which an action or the person contributed to the greater good, the well-being of the community. Insensitivity to the needs and sufferings of others was always looked upon as repugnant. Since the underlying objective was focused on bringing about the greatest good for the community, the common welfare at all times, it may be stated that their moral outlook was utilitarian.

Another important ethical element that stands out is that their work culture was guided by the moral principle of duty. The moral principle of duty in the sense that to live and practice as laid down by their customs and traditions at all times,

because it is the right thing to do and to live otherwise was to bring disruption and disharmony to the life of the community. The customary nature of the society itself mandates a morality that stresses the duty to others, to the community. It may be maintained here that this sense of duty, of responsibility, is induced by the consciousness of needs and not of rights. The communitarian work values of cooperation, mutual help, solidarity, compassion arises due to the awareness and the acceptance that these are necessary to be exemplified in one's actions because these uphold the social structure, which means continuity of life for the community. This leads to certain duties or responsibilities to be discharged towards others in need. The values of communitarian society thus impose the duties on the individuals.

Such moral elements in the Ao work culture show that being pre-literate society what they lacked in well-formulated written principles, they were able to express in their lives and actions. The customs and traditions which were the guiding force in their activities were not some simple laws and regulations created by their pre-literate minds to keep their community intact but it was a reflection of inherent awareness and knowledge of morality, a recognition of the worth of fellow human beings, the interconnectedness that exists among men. The acknowledgment of these moral values is found fully extended to their working culture which constituted their work ethic.

A contemporary overview: As a customary society, the AOs continues to exist and function regulated by their customary laws and traditions, even though it comes under the larger administration of the Indian Government. This is because the Indian Constitution had recognized the importance of traditional institutions, laws, and customs of the Nagas in general as specifically important to their lives, and therefore, these are protected by a special amendment of the Indian Constitution.³⁴As it is already shown that the AOs possessed well-established strong conceptions of what is right and wrong, good and bad, which were expressed in different forms including their approach to work. Adherence to these beliefs provided social cohesion and maintained societal relatedness in the community. In contemporary times this adherence to customs and traditions in one's approach to work still prevails to a considerable degree but the threat of a slow, gradual disappearance of these traditional values in one's approach to work is an ever-present reality. Certain factors

like westernization, rapid urbanization, the impact of technology both at the individual as well as at the social level are playing a major role in causing a slow death of the communalistic spirit which is the foundation of the Ao society. In today's generation, the value of hard work is conspicuous by its absence. The impact of western culture in different forms has brought about a considerable change in people's attitude and outlook, bringing about a more individualistic mindset, an attitude that does not concur well with the communal values. This is manifested in the form of selfish, individualistic, and often oppressive ways of doing things to carry forward one's agenda.

Corruption is another factor that is threatening the work values that upheld the traditional way of working. The spirit of contributing towards common welfare or upliftment of common wellbeing seems to be spiraling downwards every day. Individuals working with the idea of common welfare are rather looked upon as being idealistic and impractical. Corruption is defraying the fabric of the Ao society at different levels and this is basically due to the selfishness, greed, materialistic mindset, and a loss of a sense of community welfare that so characterized the traditional society. Moral values like honesty, integrity, concern for the needs, and the well-being of the 'other' which were the values that guided the traditional Aos, have been thrown to the winds. The offices of public servants, political as well as civil administration, and other social services are looked upon, desired after because these are seen as good avenues to partake the 'greater national or society cake'. Fortifying oneself, one's position for the future seems to be the sole objective.

In traditional society, youngsters both male as well as female were trained and inculcated with different work values starting from showing respect to elders to doing different kinds of manual work, which prepared them for their future citizenship in their respective villages and community.³⁵ Today, respect for elders is a value becoming rarer by the day, young people feel rather ashamed to be seen doing manual work, so they avoid it and would also rather pay the fines imposed for not participating in community work. Many social problems are created because individuals are on the lookout for earning easy money without hard work and also without learning any skills. The concept of 'we' 'ours' are gradually replaced by the

concept of 'me' 'mine', the signs of individualism seeping into the fabric of the society.

Indeed, the culture of a society is not static. The changing times are bound to leave their marks and the old is bound to give way to the new in many respects. But what is new, modern and contemporary do not always mean blessings, because certain factors may prove to be detrimental to the very structure of a society, eroding the foundations on which the culture of the society stands. It is thus imperative on the part of the people, the community to make all efforts to hold on to and keep those aspects of their traditions which are proved to be good for the society, which will help the community to grow, move forward, and exists as a society with strong ethical moorings. The traditional work ethic of the AOs is one such aspect of their culture which has sustained their community. Their customs and traditions which guided them in their work are the monuments of history, constructed out of human action, wisdom, and experience. It reflects the maturity, intellectual exercise, and strength of society.³⁶ It exhibits values that are not just specific to this community alone but are acknowledged and extolled universally. The work values speak to the purpose and needs of all human beings by belonging to the community of mankind. The true measure of a society ultimately must not be how modernized or technologically advanced it is, but how strong are their moral and ethical values and how well a society allows itself to be guided by such values. The contemporary AO society to retain its rightful place amid changing times, as an ethical society true to its tradition, must look back to revive the good ethical elements and embrace them to strengthen the society.

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NON-VIOLENCE AND WAR IN GANDHI'S PHILOSOPHY

KRISHNA PASWAN

The principle of non-violence is not a new concept. It has been preached from times immemorial. In the history of man we come across many sages like Socrates, Jesus, and Buddha who preached and practiced non-violence. Gandhi had been inspired by their life and teachings and tries to apply the technique of non-violence to every walk of life. Etymologically *ahimsā* is composed of three words: a (not) *hims* (to kill or injure) and a (nominal suffix). So the literal meaning of *ahimsā* would be non-killing of living beings. In ancient times it also means refraining from inflicting physical injury even though mere injury does not cause death except in extreme cases. It's original meaning not to injure. This is more general than the literal meaning of non-killing.

According to Vedic philosophy, neither violence nor personal welfare, but welfare of mankind is the ultimate goal of religion. That is, a *Hindu* (should) pray to providence for the well-being of all man. Nevertheless, non-violence towards non-human creatures is also recommended: "If thou slyest Our cows, horses and man, Will shall kill thee With bullet of lead So that thou shouldst not be Slayer of our heroes." – *Atharveda* 1/16/4

The *Rāmāyana* and *Mahābhārata* have exerted the most paramount influence on the minds of the Hindus in India for centuries and mauled their character. They have common ethical concepts and common philosophical ideas based on the teachings of the *Upaniṣads*. War in the *Rāmāyana* (like battles in other epics or apocalyptic stories and myths) is symbolic of the struggle between the forces of good and evil. Thus striving to satisfy the thirst for rationality and meaning in life. Rama's rivals are less clearly men and then they are mythical titans, demons, or a Jungian collective unconscious. Consequently, the viewpoint of reforming a moral theory about warfare or homicide from the *Rāmāyana* is faint from the start. Individual comments about moral ends and means in war may have no literal meaning apart from their intent to interest or from the general belief or hope that evil is overcome by good. But the comments may be enlightening, just as slips of the tongue or blocked memories can sometimes assist speakers to determine what they really wished to say. In the *Mahābhārata*, *Danadharmaparva* (chapter-117), *ahimsā* described as:

*Ahimsā Paramo Dharmasthaahinsa Paro Dumah /
Ahimsā Paramam Dānam Ahimsā Paramas Tapah //
Ahimsā Paramo Yajñas Tathāhismā Param Balam /
Ahimsā Paramam Mitram Ahimsā Paramam Sukham //*

In the *Anuśāsanaparva* of *Mahābhārata*, non-violence is described in a long chain of superlatives. There appears the well-known statement “*ahimsā paramodharmah*, non-violence is the highest religion. It is also said to be the highest self-control (*dama*), the highest gift (*dāna*) and the highest penance (*tapas*).”¹ In another context this praise is reiterated, with the addition that non-violence is the highest truth from which all *dharma* springs forth. This implies that, in the case of conflict, non-violence (probably in the Vedic sense) has heretically higher value than truth and any form of religion. In *Mahābhārata* Vyāsa mentions non-violence is an important virtue for a self-restrained persons. He proclaims, “*Ahimsā* is the best practice.” *Ahimsā* is the highest *dharma*. *Ahimsā* is the best *tapas*. *Ahimsā* is the greatest gift. *Ahimsā* is the highest self-control. *Ahimsā* is the highest sacrifice. *Ahimsā* is the highest power. *Ahimsā* is the highest friend. *Ahimsā* is the highest truth. *Ahimsā* is the highest teaching.”² In the *Śāntiparva*, too, it is said that “there is no other *dharma* superior to *ahimsā* with respect to living beings. *Ahimsā* towards all living beings is regarded more highly than all other virtues.”

Are both violence and its contrary *ahimsā*, taught in the Epics? If even Gandhian idealism would same day propose both choices at different levels, why not here? An alternate, if less likely, resolution of the dilemma can be built on the assumption that the *Rāmāyana*'s author(s) deliberately chose to demonstrate their oscillation on the issue. Like some would be pacifists on the contemporary scene who have vacillated between non-violent strategies and deployment of demolitions, the *Vālmīkian* contributors could not make up their minds. A less speculative generalization can sum up the quandary: in the measure to which the *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa* divulges ancient and popular beliefs; a strong and definite tendency to non-violence was one of them. No straight “just-war theory” here”³ In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the main offspring of the duel of *Ikṣvāku* are said to be lovers of non-violence

¹ *Anuśāsana Parva* 116.38

² *Mahābhārata* xviii: 116. 37-41

³ *Ibid*, p 119

(*ahimsā-rati*). This seems to refer to *ahimsā* as a preferably virtue rather than as a necessary duty.

Negative aspects of non-violence: The usual meaning of *ahimsā* is non-killing. Most often its meaning is made broader by emphasising that non-killing is merely one example of *ahimsā*. *Ahimsā*, then, is conceived as non-injury. In any case, *ahimsā* is conceived as the opposite of *himsā*. Gandhi accepts this and adds much more to its content. He also accepts that *himsā* means causing pain or killing any life out of anger, or from a selfish purpose, or with the intention of injuring it. Refraining from doing all this is *ahimsā*. Violence, according to Gandhi, was committed not only by actions but by thought also. In this world, all living beings are equal, to hurt anyone of them is violence even a thought of hurting them is an act of violence. Most of the people believe that not harming anyone is *ahimsā* but according to Gandhi, it is only an apparent meaning of it, *ahimsā* is much more comprehensive principle. Malicious thought is violence, hastiness is violence, and false speech is violence and so is hoarding an object request by the majority. The root meaning of violence comes from the Latin word 'violentia', meaning vehemence, a passionate and uncontrolled force, the opposite of a calculated exercise of power. Traditionally the word meant "to prevent some object, natural or human, from its natural cause of development" and "to exceed some limit or norms". Political theories of eighteenth century- like Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu--agreed that violence could not regenerate people or society and unlike later political philosophers, set limits to the justifiable province of violence.

Violence can be of many types such as: technological, economic, business, political, radical and police violence. Sexist, racial, ethnic, personal, anomic, and psychogenic, assassination, terrorism and political murder are some of the different kinds of violence. Men committed violence on the basis of some reasons. First of all personal interest: the violence committed in the process of eating etc. has personal interest because it provides strength to our body. And the second is violence committed for the betterment of an individual of if wound is aggravated, then doctor will operate it to cure the infected part. This cannot be termed as violence as the doctor has operated the infected part so that this infection does not spread to other part of the body. Among these mentioned cases, first case is of violence necessitated

by needs. If one leaves eating so that he became non-violent or leaves violent animals alive to move about freely, then it will be problematic situation. But in the last case, there is not violence. As the alleged 'violence' committed has no interest to the person who committed it. On the contrary, violence is committed to provide relief to the individual.

Positive aspects of non-violence: Besides these negative aspects of *ahimsā*, Gandhi describes it as active love and extensive pity. Romain Rolland has described it as infinite patience and unlimited love. From this point of view anger, hatred, revenge etc. are alien with the concept of *ahimsā* because all these are indirect form of violence. Together *ahimsā* and hatred cannot find place in our heart. In this emotional interpretation of *ahimsā* which incorporates Buddha's pity and compassion, Mahāvīra's compassion and happiness and Hinduism's stress on mercy towards creations. Every religion accepts the existence of soul in all living beings, this any type of violence is irreligious. Love in the form of *ahimsā* is genesis of all virtues. The arisen of compassion, sympathy, benevolence, tolerance, pity etc., lies in love only. So *ahimsā* is a positive state of love, of doing well even to the evil-doers. But it does not mean helping the evil-doer to continue the wrong or tolerating it by passive acquiescence. On the contrary, love-the active state of *ahimsā* requires you resist the wrong-doer by dissociating yourself from him, even though it may offend him or injure him physically.

War in Gandhi's philosophy: The origin of Gandhi's thinking on war is deeply related to his general philosophy of peace or non-violence. Curiosity exists in the midst of the scholars that what made Gandhi to understand on the meaning of the term 'war'. Gandhi's view on war was greatly influenced by Hindu text, *Bhagavat Gītā*. To him, "the *Gītā* deals with a person's duty in time of crisis. It is not a historical discourse but it merely uses physical illustration to drive home a spiritual truth."⁴ He keep up that war described in the *Gītā* was "not a war between cousins but between the two natures in us, good and the evil." In this process, good triumphs over the evil. To comment that *Gītā* preaches violence or justifies war, was in Gandhi" He was swayed that the *Gītā* neither advocates war nor condemns violence.

⁴ . *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, New Delhi, Vol. 15, p 312-313

How Gandhi interpreted the *Gītā* becomes important because it gave an opportunity to understand the nature of war and non-violence. Gandhi defined war as "an ancient method of settling vital affairs of mankind through the arbitrament of the sword." Gandhi wrote. "In 1920 I became a rebel. Since then, the conviction has been rising ahead me that things of essential important to the people are not secured by reason unaccompanied but have to be purchased with their anguish. Suffering is the law of human being; war is the law of the jungle. But suffering is infinitely more than the law of the jungle.... suffering is the badge of human race, not the sword."⁵

Again, on the question of war, Gandhi did not accept the distinction between just and unjust war because for him every war was wrong. He supposed that every war resulted in massive violence including the just war. Thus, Gandhian approach appears to be indefensible. For example, Gandhi supported western democracies adjacent to the Fascists and Nazis in World War II. But in doing so, he fervidly opposed the use of violence for the sake of just war. Here emotionalism played a part in Gandhi's life because he believed in the solution of crisis through nonviolent means, whatever the situation would have been. In this way Gandhi rejected the distinction made between "just" and "unjust" wars. Here his methodology was quite different from Thoreau's Civil disobedience. Thoreau's effort is related to his response to the Mexican War of 1848. In the Mexican War, he refused to pay the poll tax and advised the others to do the same. Gandhi opposed this method of boycott. He said "If I have only a choice between paying for the army of soldiers to kill my neighbours, or to be a soldier myself, I would as I must consistently with my creed enlist as a soldier in the hope of controlling of violence and even converting my comrades."⁶

Infect Gandhi's perception towards war fairly different from pacifist thinkers. War, to him, was a natural outcome of his own thinking and experience. So far pacifists were concerned, they accentuated on the "negation of war," while Gandhi war primarily concerned with human dignity in all its aspects. Therefore, Gandhi's stress was on experiments with truth and it was based on non-violence, the relationship of means and ends and self-suffering. It exposed the influence of the Gita on his political and military writings. In Gita, the theme of Krishna's discourse to

⁵ . Ibid, Vol. 16, p. 553, Vol. 48, p 189

⁶ *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, New Delhi, Vol. 42, p 437

Arjuna is “action alone is the province... nor should thou desire to avoid action province.... nor should thou desire to avoid action.”⁷

Non-violence and War: Gandhi view: Gandhi thinks that the growth of the military art and the display of the military liberty by the soldiers is a sign of decadence and not of progress. The cult of armament and preparedness is the indirect testimony to the wide prevalence of fear, distrust and suspicion. Hence, Gandhi wanted freedom to preach non-violence as a 'substitute' for war. He considered war as an absolute evil and would not accept even the plea of defensive war or a just war. He would have absolutely repudiated the notion of an anticipatory war. He feels that there is always some party which is guilty of initiating a war. It is not correct and adequate to state that war is the mechanism of devil or of uncontrollable forces. He said that behind the hand that hurls and sward there is always the brain and the mind that prescribed the use of the sword. Leo Tolstoy also recognized the clamouring contradiction between the profession of Christianity and the simultaneous acknowledgement of the necessity of armaments for national security. Gandhi thought the absoluteness of peace and had even visualizes universal disarmament. His *ahimsā* provides an ultimate vision of universal fraternity and he hoped that in world politics there would be the increasing resort to consultation and arbitration in place of armed conflicts.

Although, according to Gandhi, all war is unjust from the standpoint of *ahimsā*, still the aspiration after freedom would distinguish between the aggressor and the defender and render all moral support to the latter. Sometimes a contradiction has been felt to exist between Gandhi's non-violence and his participation in some forms of war. During the time of Boer War, in 1899, he raised a Volunteer Ambulance Corps. In 1906, he raised a stretcher-bearing party of twenty Indians at the time of Zulu Rebellion. In 1914, he raised a Volunteer Ambulance Corps in London consisting chiefly of Indian students residing in London. In 1918, he nearly killed himself by strenuous activity for the requirement of Indian soldiers for a war on the British side. While Tilak wanted to help the Allies through recruitment only on certain conditions being fulfilled, Gandhi was for unconditional military support. Hence it is asked that if Gandhi was a votary of absolute *ahimsā* why he participated

⁷ Mahadev Desai, *The Gita According to Gandhi*, Ahmedabad, 1956, p 128, 161

in any way in a war. When he was helping recruitment in 1918, was he not aiding in planning the killing of German soldiers? But Gandhi had defended his action on the ground that so long as he was a subject of British Empire it was his duty to help it in times of crisis. He says in his *Autobiography*, "When two nations are fighting, the duty of a votary of *ahimsā* is to support war. He who is not equal to that duty, he who has no power of resisting war, he who is not qualified to resist war, may take part in war. I had hoped to improve my status and that of my people through the British Empire. Whilst in England I was enjoying the protection of the British Fleet, and taking shelter as I did under its armed might, I was directly participating in its potential violence. Therefore, if I desire to retain my connection with the Empire and to live under its banner, one of the three courses was open to me: I could declare open resistance to the war, and in accordance with the law of Satyagraha, boycott the Empire until it changed its military police; or I could seek imprisonment by civil disobedience of such of its laws as were fit to be disobeyed; or I could participate in the war in the side of the Empire and thereby acquire the capacity and fitness for resisting the violence of war. I lacked this capacity and fitness, so I thought there was nothing for it but to serve in the war. I make no distinction, from the point of view of *ahimsā*, between combatants and non-combatants. He, who volunteers to serve a band of dacoits, by working as their carrier, or their watchman while they are about their business or their nurse when they are wounded, is as guilty of dacoity as the dacoits themselves. In the same way those who confine themselves to attending to the wounded in battle cannot be absolved from the guilty of war"⁸ But it may also be pointed out that in the course of Second World War, he categorically refused to adopt a position similar to the one adopted in 1918.

In 1927, when the *Autobiography* was published, Gandhi was 58 years old. There were still many non-violent struggles to be fought e.g., Hindu-Muslim unity, abolition of caste based untouchability, advocacy of home-spun Swadeshi clothing's and above all gaining India's independence from the British rule. His *Autobiography* provides insights into shaping of core beliefs on which his non-violent instrument of political action, *Satyāgraha* or truth force was later founded. On his concept of

⁸ *The Story of My Experiment of Truth*, p 264

ahimsā Gandhi writes: "*Ahimsā* is the comprehensive principle. We are helping morals caught in flagration of *himsā*. The saying that life lives on life has a deep meaning in it. Men cannot for a moment live without consciously or unconsciously committing outward *himsā*. The very fact of his living-eating, drinking and moving about - necessarily involves some *himsā*; destruction of life is it ever so minute. A votary of *ahimsā* therefore remains true to his faith if the spring of all his actions is compassion, if he shun to the best of his ability the destruction of the tiniest creature, tries to save it and thus increasingly strives to be free from the deadly coil of *himsā*."⁹ Such an individual will then constantly grow in self-restraint and love for others.

When two groups are fighting, it is the duty of the worshiper of non-violence to stop the war. He who is not capable for this duty, who has no strength to resist the war, who is not able to do so, can take part in war and try to liberate himself, the nation and the world from war. All efforts to end the war will fail until the causes of the war are understood and its root causes addressed. Isn't the main reason for the modern war the inhumane explanation of the so called weak nation of the world? If there is no courage, no heroism behind the war would have been a very disgusting thing. Speech was not needed to produce war. Whatever happens today is disrespect to the principle of non-violence, the introduction of violence as if it is an eternal law. Today we see an open competition one with another on the issue of weapons. Gandhi thinks that the outcome of World War II will be the same as described in *Mahābhārata*. One of the *trisankubāsi* described the *Mahābhārata* as the eternal history of man. The thing that is mentioned in the epic is happening before our eyes today. The warring nations are destroying themselves with such fury and terror that in the end everyone will get tired. The destiny of the winners will be like that of the *Pandavas*. The great warrior Arjuna was robbed a little in board daylight. And a new system will be born from this horrible massacre. Millions of exploited and hardworking people have been thirsty for so long. The prayers of peace lovers can never fail.

⁹ Balwant Bhaneja, *Understanding Gandhi's Ahimsa (Non-violence), Reflection on an Autobiography: The Story of My Experiment of Truth*, Book Review, Articles, 2006, ISSN- 1886-5860

THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IN AMARTYA SEN: SOME OBSERVATIONS

NGAHPI LHOUVUM & L. BISHWANATH SHARMA

The idea of modern or modernism in the western world is connected the awakening of the right to freedom, the charm and the enigma embedded in the idea of freedom. The birth of a new idea has spawned a number of theories and writes ups on the issue of freedom. One of the most enduring concepts of freedom was given by Jean Paul Sartre, a French Existentialist philosopher who maintained that human beings are necessarily free and it is impossible for a human to fail to be free. His eyes opening slogan goes as such that Man is condemned to be free. To fail to be free, in his view, is the same as to cease to be. So, he equates ‘to be’ with ‘to act’ and ‘to act’ with to be free. Thereby he concludes that our consciousness is nothing but our freedom of choice to act something. He considers freedom is emergent property of consciousness. In a somewhat similar way, Bertrand Russell also understood freedom as the freedom to do something, to have something.

Amartya Sen is also following the Sartrian conception of consciousness as freedom. He quoted in the introductory chapter of his book *Freedom and Rationality* a couplet from William Cowper “Freedom has a thousand charms to show, that slaves, however contented, never know” (Sen, 2005, p. 9). The concept of freedom includes a diversity of concern and there is no one authentic characterization of the basic idea of freedom. In his theory of development, Sen equates development with expansion of freedom. Having come to the conclusion that none of the traditional theories of development satisfactorily capture a complete picture and explanation of development, Sen proposes the capability approach to development. This approach requires having the substantive freedom to achieve the kind of life one values. This theory is an attempt to see development as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. In his theory of development as freedom, expansion of freedom is viewed as both the primary end and the principal means of development. According to Sen, they may be called as the ‘constitutive role’ and the ‘instrumental role’ of freedom in development.

Constitutive role of Freedom: The constitutive role of freedom relates to the importance of substantive freedom in enriching human life. The substantive freedoms

include elementary capabilities like being able to avoid such deprivation as starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality as well as the freedoms that are associated with being literate and numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech and so on. In this constitutive perspective, development involves expansion of these and other basic freedoms (Sen, 2006, p. 36).

Viewed in this perspective, the process of development is not essentially different from overcoming such unfreedoms as famines, under-nutrition, having no access to healthcare, ensuring clean water or other sanitary arrangements, doing away with inequality between men and women and other deprivations of freedom like political liberty and basic civil rights. Amartya Sen is emphatic that political participation and dissent are constitutive parts of development itself. So, the question of whether they are conducive or not to development is a defective question. Sen very clearly states that even a very rich person who is prevented from speaking freely or from participating in public debates and decisions, is deprived of something that she has reason to value. The process of development, from the perspective of enhancement of human freedom, has to include the removal of this person's deprivations. Even if there is no immediate interest in exercising the freedom to speak or to participate, it would still be a deprivation of one's freedom if one is not given a choice on these matters.

The usefulness of wealth, argues Amartya Sen, lies in the things it allows us to do – the substantive freedoms it helps us to achieve. So, the concept of development must go beyond the accumulation of wealth and the growth of gross national product and other income-related variables. Economic growth is, therefore, although a very important component of development should not be treated as an end itself. Development has to do more with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy. Expanding the freedoms that we have reason to value not only makes our lives richer and more unfettered, but also allows us to be fuller social persons, exercising our own volitions and interacting with – and influencing – the world in which we live. Political liberty and civil freedoms are directly important on their own and do not have to be justified indirectly in terms of their effects on the economy. Even when people without political liberty or civil rights do not lack adequate economic security, they are deprived of important freedoms in leading their lives and denied the

opportunity to take part in crucial decisions regarding public affairs. The constitutive role of freedom clearly shows the evaluative importance of freedom as an objective of development. Human freedom therefore has to be considered an end in itself apart from its instrumental role in contributing to development.

Instrumental role of Freedom: The instrumental role of freedom concerns with the way, different kinds of rights, opportunities and entitlements contribute to the expansion of human freedom in general, and thereby, promotes development. The effectiveness of freedom as an instrument lies in the fact that different kinds of freedom interrelate with one another and freedom of one type may greatly help in advancing freedom of other types. Amartya Sen makes a list of five types of freedom which he feels is extensive, though not exhaustive in the instrumented perspective. These five distinct types of instrumental freedoms are (1) Political freedom (2) Economic facilities (3) Social opportunities (4) Transparency guarantee and (5) Protective security (Sen, 2006, p. 38).

Political Freedom: Political freedoms refer to the opportunities that people have in choosing and having a say in the governance of the state. Political freedoms and civil liberties are essential for development. Amartya Sen therefore emphasizes the necessity of having a well functioning democracy. According to him, developing and strengthening a democratic system is an essential component of the process of development. The use of democratic institutions as devices for development is conditioned by our values and priorities and by the use we make of the available opportunities of articulation and participation. Public debates and discussion permitted by political freedom and civil rights can also play a major part in the formulation of values. Political freedoms include the political entitlements associated with democracies in the broadest sense (encompassing opportunities of political dialogue, dissent and critique as well as voting rights and participatory selection of legislators and executives) (Sen, 2006, p. 38).

Economic Facilities: According to Amartya Sen, economic facilities refer to the opportunities that individuals respectively enjoy to utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption or production or exchange. The economic entitlements that a person has will depend on the resources owned or available for use as well as on

conditions of exchange, such as, relative prices and the working of the markets. It should be obvious that in the relation between national income and wealth, on the one hand, and the economic entitlements of individuals (or families), on the other, distributional considerations are important, in addition to aggregative ones, How the additional incomes generated are distributed will clearly make a difference (Sen, 2006, p. 38-39). For a state or a country to be developed, economic growth is essential. However, it cannot be taken as an end in itself because development has to be more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy. The usefulness of wealth lies in the things it allows us to do. Therefore, it is not adequate to take as our basic objectives just the maximization of income or wealth.

Social Opportunities: Social opportunities refer to the arrangement that society makes for education, healthcare and so on, which influence the individual's substantive freedom to live better. These facilities are important not only for the conduct of private lives (such as living a healthy life and avoiding preventable morbidity and premature mortality), but also for more effective participation in economic and political activities (Sen, 2006, p. 39). The extent and amount of social opportunities, that the people enjoy is an important yardstick for measuring how a nation or a state fares on the development front. The better the facilities a state provides to its citizens the more developed it is considered to be. Poverty or the impoverished state in which a person actually lives is because of lack of opportunities. The basic objective of development as the expansion of human capabilities has been admitted but the focus of modern development literature has been mainly on the generation of economic growth.

Education and health are distinctive influence that can promote or constrain the freedom that individuals have, including their ability to make use of economic opportunities. Illiteracy can be a major barrier to participation in economic activities that require production according to specification or demand quality control. Similarly, the inability to read newspapers or to communicate in writing will hinder people to participate in political debates, discussion and other activities. Therefore, illiteracy and physical unfitness can be major stumbling blocks in the political process and economic endeavours.

Transparency Guarantee: In social interactions, individuals deal with one another on the basis of some presumptions of what they are being offered and what they can expect to get. In this sense, the society operates on some basic presumption to trust. *Transparency guarantees* deal with the need for openness that people can expect: the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity. When that trusts in seriously violated, the lives of many people –both direct parties and third parties – may be adversely affected by the lack of openness. Transparency guarantees (including the right to disclosure) can thus be an important category of instrumental freedom. These guarantees have a clear instrumental role in preventing corruption, financial irresponsibility and underhand dealings (Sen, 2006, p. 39-40).

Protective Security: On the issue of protective security Amartya Sen says that no matter how well an economic system operates, some people can be typically on the verge of vulnerability and can actually succumb to great deprivation as a result of material changes that adversely affect their lives. He therefore opines that protective security is needed to provide a social safety net for preventing the affected population from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even starvation and death. The domain of protective security includes fixed institutional arrangements such as unemployment benefits and statutory income supplements to the indigent as well as ad-hoc arrangements such as famine relief or emergency public employment to generate income for the destitute (Sen, 2006, p. 40).

By material changes, Sen means changes that take place as a result of famines or any other crises like the Asian economic crises. He attributes the problems of East Asia and South-east Asia in the late 90s to the neglect of two instrumental freedoms, viz., “protective security” and “transparency guarantees”. The development of the financial crises in some of these economics have been closely linked with the lack of transparency in business, the lack of public participation in reviewing financial and business arrangements. Amartya Sen therefore emphasizes the need for democratic governance. The positive role of political and civil rights applies to the prevention of economic and social disasters. Democratic governance, including multiparty election and open media, makes it very likely that some arrangements for basic protective security will be instituted.

Freedom and Rationality: Rationality has been understood by Sen as the discipline of subjecting one's choices – of actions as well as of objectives, values and priorities – to reasoned scrutiny. “There is a reciprocal relationship between rationality and freedom” .” Even though the idea of freedom is sometimes formulated independently of values, preferences and reasons, freedom cannot be fully appraised without some idea of what a person prefers and has reason to prefer. Thus, there is a basic use of rational assessment in appraising freedom, and in this sense, freedom must depend on reasoned assessment of having different options (Sen, 2005, p. 5). Therefore, rationality with its demand for reasoned scrutiny can serve as the basis for interpreting the concept of freedom where reasoning and reasoned choice play an important role.

Rationality, in its turn, depends on freedom. This is not merely because without freedom of choice, the idea of rational choice would be quite vacuous, but also because the concept of rationality must accommodate the diversity of reasons that may sensibly motivate choice. To deny that accommodation in favour of conformity with some preselected mechanical axioms or with some pre-specified “appropriate” motivation would involve, in effect, a basic denial of *freedom of thought*. Our motives are for us to choose – not, of course, without reason, but unregimented by the authoritarianism of some context-independent axioms or by the need to conform to some canonical specification of “proper” objectives and values (Sen, 2005, p. 5-6).

Rationality, thus, helps us in the understanding and assessment of goals and values which in turn helps us to make systematic and rational choices. Hence, rational choice will help us to create better societies and eliminate intolerable deprivations of different kinds. Sen takes up three approaches of rational choice in main-stream economic theory which leads to development. The first approach assesses the relation between choices in different situations comparing what are chosen from different sets of alternative available for choice. Here choice is compared with choice and not with objectives, values, preferences etc. So, there is no external reference in this approach and choice is seen entirely in terms of choices themselves. The second approach sees rational choice as selecting those alternatives that promote the person's own interest most whereas the third sees maximization in general. Both the second and third approaches approach involve external reference since what is to be

maximized must invoke something external to the acts of choice such as goals, values and objectives. So, rational choice is an important part of social choice theory.

Social choice theory is traditionally concerned with welfare economics and voting theory. Sen feels that the traditional approach to social choice theory has neglected other equally important concerns and interest in the world such as the subject of freedom. So, he goes beyond the traditional scope of social choice theory and extends the use of the discipline to the analysis of freedom. Freedom is a plural concept having different facets. So, Sen chose the social choice approach to analyze freedom since he believes that this approach can address certain questions that needs to be explored and help to clarify the nature and significance of the critical components of the complex idea of freedom. However, before Sen goes on to proceed with a discussion on values, ethics, behavioural norms and so on, he discusses three grounds for scepticism of the possibility of reasoned progress under the following headings.

Impossibility and Informational bases: The point is sometimes made that given the heterogeneity of preferences and values that different people have. It is not possible to have a coherent framework for reasoned social assessment. There can be, in this view, no such thing as a rational and coherent social evaluation (Sen, 2006, p. 249).

What is at issue here, it turns out, however, is not the impossibility of rational social choice but the use of an inadequate informational base for social judgements and decisions. The Arrow's theorem in effect establishes not the impossibility of rational social choice but the impossibility that arises when we try to base social choice on a limited class of information. Besides, leading to certain inconsistencies, a majority rule would pose a serious problem as a mechanism for resolving economic disputes. In theory, nothing seems to be wrong as the goal for majority improvement is achieved as it certainly adds to the kitty of the other two. But the question is whether such method of improving social outcome is really acceptable especially if the person thus victimized happens to be the poorest of the three. In the name of making a majority improvement more and more can be taken away from the share of the poorest person and dividing the loot between the richer two. This process of

“improvement”, Sen observes, can go on until the poorest has no cake left to be taken away. Therefore, we cannot make social judgment with so little information.

Intended changes and Unintended consequences: The second of the identified reasons for scepticism of the idea of reasoned progress is the alleged dominance of unintended consequences and the related doubts about the possibility of reasoned and intentional advancement. It is true that most of the time unintended consequences of human action are responsible for many of the big changes in the world. Things do not go as we plan and sometimes also it turns out better than expected (Sen, 2006, p. 254). This does not however mean, Sen is quick to point out, that motivated programs are not successful. There are plenty of examples of success in social and economic reforms guided by motivated programs such as universal literacy in various countries, yielding positive results in combating epidemics and diseases etc.

The theory that many good things that happen are typically the unintended result of human action was allegedly advocated by such thinker as Adam Smith, Carl Menger and Friedrich Hayek (Sen, 2006, p. 255). Adam Smith’s “unseen hands” is supposed to be originating seed of this theory. He was deeply sceptical to the morals of the rich and thinks that they pursue only their vain and insatiable desires. And yet others can in many circumstances benefit from their actions since the actions of different people can be productively complementary. He argued that the selfish and the rapacious are led by an “invisible hand” to advance the interest of the society without intending it and without knowing it. Such line of thinking is what is called the unintended consequences. It may also be the case, according to Sen, that sometimes the consequences that occur were not only, not intended but were not anticipated either. What this shows is that human expectations are fallible and the failure to anticipate also provides inputs for learning for future policy making. The anticipation of unintended consequence should be treated, as part of a rationalist approach to organizational reform and social change.

Social values and public interest: The third scepticism relates to the claim that human beings are uncompromisingly self-interested and as such the possibility of broader social values is doubted by many. Sen however thinks that such scepticism could be quite unjustified. He argues that although self-interest is also an important

motive, many of our actions reflect values which have social components that take us well beyond the narrow confines of purely selfish behaviour. In Sen's own words "the emergence of social norms can be facilitated both by communicative reasoning and by evolutionary selection of behavioural modes" (Sen, 2006, p. 261). Socially responsible reasoning and ideas of justice are concerns that often move people in exercising their freedom. But the basic ideas of justices are not alien to social beings who worry about their own interests but are also able to think about family members, neighbours, fellow citizens and other people in the world. Social values can play and have played an important part in the success of various forms of social organizations including market mechanisms, democratic politics, elementary civil and political rights, provisioning of basic public goods and institutions for public action and protest.

Individual freedom as a social commitment: The importance of having a sense of collective responsibility has already been established. However, this in no way can substitute the role of individual responsibility. In fact, the sense of collective social responsibility brings into focus the importance of individual responsibility. If we collectively are to take responsibility for all events that lie within our power, then the concerned individuals will be robbed off their responsibilities for their action. If the responsibility of a person's action falls on another, then that person will lose out on many important things like motivation, involvement and self-knowledge. In short, this will be sapping individual initiative and effort and even self-respect. Therefore, to try to replace individual responsibility with social responsibility will be counterproductive. In order to carry out his responsibility as a rational human being, an individual need to have the requisite freedom. The substantive freedom that we enjoy to exercise our responsibility are extremely contingent on personal, social and environmental circumstances. Sen feels that a child who is denied the opportunity of elementary schooling is not only deprived as a youngster but also handicapped for life. He will not be able to do certain basic things that require reading, writing and arithmetic. The adult who lacks the means of having medical treatment for an ailment from which he/she suffers is not only prey to preventable morbidity and possibly escapable mortality but may also be denied the freedom to do various things that she may wish to do as a responsible human being.

When Sen talks about individual freedom of choice, he is talking in terms of creating more opportunity for choice and for substantive decisions for individuals who can then act responsibly on that basis. He disapproves of too much involvement of the Government in people's lives and too much protection may result in limiting the freedom of the people. Thus, by individual freedom, Sen does not mean the kind of freedom provided by the so called 'nanny state' (Sen, 2006, p. 284). Although he is against too much involvement of the state in people's lives, he nevertheless admits that the state does have a role to play in committing to individual freedom. Other institutions like political and social organizations, non-government agencies, the media, community-based organizations etc. should also be socially committed to ensuring individual freedom.

Opportunity and Process aspect of Freedom: The relevance of the social choice approach in understanding freedom is evident when we analyse two features of freedom which Sen identifies as the opportunity aspect of freedom and the process aspect of freedom. The opportunity aspect of freedom is concerned primarily with our ability to achieve while the process aspect is concerned with the process through which that achievement comes about.

In assessing the "opportunity aspect of freedom", the focus has to be on the alternatives that a person has reason to value or want. The importance of freedom and of opportunity would be hard to motivate if the focus were not on the options or processes that one has reason to value or want, but rather on alternatives one has no reason to seek (Sen, 2005, p. 257).

The process aspect of freedom focuses on the freedom involved in the process itself. That is to say whether others intruded or obstructed the process and so on. Just as freedom depend on reasoned assessment of having different options, reasoned assessment or rationality plays an important role in the values people attach to the process of freedom. Though the opportunity aspect and the process aspect are distinct from each other, there is also a point of convergence. The basic connection that these two aspects of freedom have is the mechanism of preferences that is to say our preferences link the two. For, we may value objectives related to the outcome but we can also value the process of choice through which we arrive at the outcomes. Just as

there is a relation between preference and the opportunity aspect of freedom, there is also a connection between preferences and the process aspect of freedom. Systematic process concern reflects beliefs about social propriety whereas personal process can be entirely self-centred. Both personal process concern and systematic process concern are relevant to social evaluation and to the understanding and appraisal of freedom. Personal process concern has an immediate relevance in assessing the nature and extent of personal freedom.

From the foregoing discussions on the various aspects of freedom, it is amply clear why Amartya Sen insists that freedom should not be treated merely as a means to achieve our goals but is something to be treated as an end itself. Only when barriers to freedom such as poverty, inequality, illiteracy, violations of basic civil and political rights and any other such unfreedoms are removed, can a person be said to have the capability to act out of his personal choice. Unless a person is empowered to exercise his choice, he cannot be considered to be free in the true sense of the term. Greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves and also to influence the world, and these matters are central to the process of development (Sen, 2006, p. 18). In his theory of development, Sen equates development with freedom because he believes that there is a convergence point between development and freedom. It is this particular aspect of development which will be analysed in the next chapter.

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NAGARJUNA'S REASONING WITH NON-IMPLICATIVE NEGATIONS

SAROJ KANTA KAR

Introduction:

Does negation imply anything positive or negative? On this query, Nagarjuna's reasoning unfolds certain uses where negation is supposed not to imply anything. This is termed here as non-implicative negation which is found in his specific philosophical intent as well as an exposition of going beyond notions and conceptualization. Generally, the human mind is always occupied with some or other notions and concepts which have their empirical values and uses. However, some abstract concepts, and notions, for example, *svabhāva* or *ātman* are believed to represent something more real, that is to say, a metaphysical entity, which is categorized alongside or at the upper level of the empirical reality and its pragmatic value. This is not only wrong sometimes, but is also non-beneficial, and therefore, Nagarjuna has the task to expose their untenability by his dialectical use of reason, wherein the non-implicative negation has its primary use.

The Necessity of Non-Implicative Negation: It is a common understanding that the nature or *svabhāva* of things and beings points out their uniqueness. For example, water, fire air, etc., and flowers, fruits, eatables, medicines, etc., or pots, carts, etc., have their unique characteristics or *svabhāva*. Similarly, animals, as well as human beings, have their *svabhāva*. The *svabhāva* here points to the empirical characteristics and stands for the identity of things and beings. The *svabhāvas* are empirically real, 'but when empirically things and beings are keeping changing constantly, what about their *svabhāva* and identity?' The Buddhists accept the changeable identity by the principle of causation, with the argument that the previous state of the things, beings and personality is the cause of the next state, thus keeping continuity and giving us a sense of unity of the thing, being or personality.¹ The non-Buddhists, however, take up a notion of the universal, elemental, foundational, or base level non-changeability throughout the phenomenal individual changeability.² This non-Buddhist notion was not sufficiently understood, for which the wrong notion of it was developed, which

¹ The causal nexus is accepted in the conception of *pañchaskandha*, and *Vaibhasikas* and *Sautrāntikas*, and the notion *pratītyasamutpāda* by Mahayana and the stream of personality or *santānavāda* of *Yogāchāra*.

² For Example, Jainas conceive an Jiva, Vedanta conceives Ātman .

the Buddha was avoiding and not entertaining.³ It was because the empirical *svabhāva* was elevated to conceptual, and then supposed to point out to a metaphysical and spiritual upper level reality. In the next stage, this conception of *svabhāva*, particularly when taken about man himself describes an individual *ātman* or self. Mind is apt to explore this notion of *ātman* so much so that it is conceptualized in very many different ways, by many, in different situations, ultimately making man confused, and then developing justificatory speculations, and then getting attached to any to them. Having this ground, man most likely develops certain types of mental and physical behavior, way of living, engaged in peculiar speculations and practices in the name of spirituality. To cancel such speculations, disengage people from different harmful practices, the Buddha was dissuading people from them, and Nagarjuna applies dialectical reasoning. A part of such dialectic is what is understood here as non-implicative negation in reasoning. For example, to take up one of his arguments, everything come into existence by depending upon causes and conditions (*pratītyasamutpāda*), that comes into existence by their causes and conditions, have all empirical existence (*bhāva*), have their *svabhāva* in empirical sense of reality. However, all these *bhāvas* and *svabhāvas* by themselves are not found in the causes and conditions, separately or collectively, nor also found in something other than their cause and conditions, and therefore are metaphysically lacking or *śūnya*.⁴ In this context, when the metaphysical sense of the *svabhāva* is negated, ‘what more does it imply?’ Does it imply a *parabhāva*? This is not tenable as *svabhāva* itself is not plausible. The negation implies nothing. It is intended that the negation be the end of the discourse and does not imply anything positive or alternative to think of. This argument has its ultimate use in getting freedom from conceptualization, speculation, picturization, and reification in thought and meditation, which eventually helps in shedding the attachment, anger, and other factors that end up the involving of *karmas* and finally lead to *nirvāṇa*. It is this soteriological benefit that the logic of Nagarjuna aims at, for which the non-implicative negation is important.

³ The Buddha was asked about some extreme questions about eternity or not eternity of soul and such questions making total 14 unspeakable (Avyākṛitas). The Buddha remained silent for any answer to the questions in either assertion or denial or both or neither would lead to the problematic situation.

⁴ Ref. *Na hi svabhavabhavanampratyaśūvidyate*- MK.1.3;
Na cha vyastasamastesuPratyayesvasti tat phalam-MK.1.11

The Non-Implicative Negation: Nagarjuna's use of negation is expressed in different terms in Sanskrit such as *niṣedha*, *pratiṣedha*, and *vipratiṣdha*.⁵ There are many senses of negation by use of *nañ* for negative sense in the form of prefixes like *ni*, *vi*, and *a* before the words.⁶ In most of the negative expressions, negation generally implies something else than the negated. This is understood as implicative-negation. In such negation by negating or denying something, a concept, an idea or a notion, certain others are implied to be asserted. Accordingly, if by negation of any metaphysical notion, like *svbhāva*, *parabhāva* may be asserted, then a state of *nirvikalpa* (no-conceptualization), which is Nagarjuna's objective, may never be possible. It is because, when any notion or view is negated in his criticism, it may leave a space for another notion by implication, which is understood as implicative negation and so *ad infinitum*. Hence, for understanding Nagarjuna's objective, the division of implicative-negation and non-implicative negation, has to be brought out, wherein the latter can lead to no-conceptualization. This is the way out of conceptualization as well. In this regard, the non-implicative negation and implicative-negation may be clarified.

A brief discussion on some aspects of negation,⁸ what is excluded by negation, and the implication⁹ of the exclusion may be ensured. A negative sentence is that, where negation qualifies some or whole parts of the sentence. It qualifies the whole sentence by qualifying the predicate (verb or adjective), or subject (noun), or both in a sentence.

(i) Negation of sentence – It is not that the cow moves. (particular)

⁵ The first term means denial. The root is *ṣidh*, meaning to keep away and the prefix *ni* is used in the sense of certainty. The term *ṣidh* with *ni* is *niṣedha*. It means denial with 'no more'. *Niṣedha* is used in the sense of prohibition or negation of some rituals, while there is another word *vidhi* means the injunction of some rituals. The prefix '*prati*' in *Pratiṣedha* means a relation, and the total term *pratiṣedha* would mean a denial in relation to something. So, the term may mean contradiction. The prefix '*vi*' in *vipratiṣedha* is used in the sense of *viśeṣa* meaning 'more' or 'stronger'. Another sense of '*vi*' is '*vigata*' passed away or past, which of course is not used here. So, *vipratiṣedha* may mean to a stronger case of denial. However, all the three *niṣedha*, *pratiṣedha* or *vipratiṣdha* are also used in the sense of denial only. *Virodha* is another word meaning obstruction, prohibition, opposition, negation etc. It is also used to sense contrariety and contradiction in different cases. '*Nirodha*' is an instance of use of *nañ* or negation with a negative word, here, *rodha*, stresses the stronger meaning of obstruction.

⁶ *Tatsādrśyam abhāvaśchataadanyatvaṃ tadālpatā*

Aprāsastyam virodhśchanañārtham śatprakirtitāh. Iswarachandra Vidyasagar, *Samagra Vyākaraṇa Kaumudī*, Calcutta: (-) 1978, p. 630.

⁸ We find *pratiyogi* in *Nyāya*, *abhāva* in *Vaiśeṣika* and *Mīmāṃsā*, *niṣedha* in *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta*.

⁹ The term 'implication' is not used in strict logical sense.

No cow moves. (universal)

- (ii) Negation of sentence by negation with the verb – The cow does not move.
- (iii) Negation of noun with asserting the verb– That moves, but that is not a cow.
- (iv) Negation of verb and noun – There is neither movement nor there exists a cow.
- (v) Negation of verb, and adjective – There is no moving cow.

In each case, there is at least one declarative meaning (*abhidhā*) that can have an implication. There are ways of deriving different meanings, one of which is taking the meaning indirectly by analysis of the meaning of sentences, and another is picking up the intended or purported meaning (*lakṣaṇā*), and still another way is comrading the explorative meaning (*vyañjanā*).¹⁰ There are ways of finding the intended meaning by exclusion, implication, and presumption, etc. In the case of negation, one may find an implied positive meaning of the negations by exploration or presumption. By applying this, it can be seen that the above-mentioned sentences when negated may mean or imply something indirectly. For example,

(vi) Implied meaning of (i) – It may be that it is not not-cow (something otherthan cow) that moves.

(vii) It may be that the cow grazes.

(viii) It may be that something other than cow grazes.

(ix) Implied meaning of (ii) – It may be that not-cow moves.

(x) Implied meaning of (iii) – Something other than cow moves.

(xi) Implication of (iv)----(This case is important.)

(xii) Implied meaning of (v) – There may be a white cow that grazes.

It is clear in the above that if negation qualifies the sentence, it may qualify either of the noun or verb or both of them, and for this reason ‘(i) has different implications by negation. It has been seen that negation qualifies some part of a statement or the whole statement. The part of the statement, which is not qualified by negation, may be taken with what is excluded from the negation. The case of negation where there is no implication or excluded meaning are derived is a case of total negation. Such, sentence is in ‘(iv) - There is neither movement nor there exists a cow’. This is non-implicative negation or complete negation. In contrast, other sentences in ‘(i), (ii), (iii) and (v)’ are examples of implicative negations.

¹⁰ The predicate says about the subject only indirectly.

The implied meanings in all the cases of negations are not implications in the strict sense of the term, because in implication the implied is drawn from the implicands by a necessary meaning-based relation (*arthāpatti*) between them. *Lakṣaṇā* and *Vyañjanā* need the context, intents, etc., which are external to the sentence meaning. Now, if the above-mentioned meanings are considered as implications, then the implied statements are understood to be implied not from the statements alone, but the statement along with the situations or context and possibilities associated with the statements. The implication is due to the situation or context, which is **external** to the statement, but is related to it so far as the statement is within the context or is related to the context and is invariably, goes with certain intent. There is no necessary exclusive meaning-based relation between the implicated and the implicands. If, on the other hand, the statement and the situation make a totality and are taken as a whole, the whole can be the implicands and the derived statements are its implicated ones. The so-called implications are cases of other possibilities that are excluded from negation and stand out by negation of one possibility. The implication in this case, therefore, is not a material implication or strong implication (as between container and contained), but a case of presumption of the possibility, a kind of inference from possibilities in the context.

Paryudāsa and PrasajyaPratiṣedha: In the light of the above clarification of negation, its exclusion, and implication, it may now be understood that the above mentioned two types of negations have to be recognized in Nagarjuna's criticisms. One is *paryudāsapraṭiṣedha* that is the 'implicative negation', as described above, where negation implies an alternative (possibility as in the above) or allows a presumption that is not negated or excluded in the negation. The other is *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* that is the 'non-implicative negation', as in the above, which means a negation whereby negating or prohibiting a concept, there is no question of exclusion of something, and therefore there is no implication of the negation. Nagarjuna's use of both of the negations is the major issue in his *prāsaṅgika* and *svātantrika* method. To be clarified about the two negations, first, we have to know the terms in other philosophical texts, that though belong to post-Nagarjuna, but helps to get the meaning of these negations.

We get a clear-cut notion of both the terms of negations with use of *nañ* in Mimāṃsā. It is said that when *nañ* is used with the *uttarapada*, the negation is *paryudāsapratishedha*, when *nañ* is used with the verb, this is a case of *prasajyapratishedha*.¹¹ Negation with the verb, sometimes suggests that the remaining other cases of negation, i.e., the negation with other words like noun and adjective are not *prasajyapratishedha*, and such cases may be taken as *paryudāsapratishedha*. In Sanskrit, the term *uttarapada* means the second word of a compound word, where the first word is called *pūrvapada*. Such compounding of words into one word is called *samāsa*, and our case may happen in *vahubrihisamāsa* and *karmadhārayasamāsa*. In both these cases, compound words are used as adjectives and nouns. One instance may be considered here for our purpose. Take a word *pītodakaḥ* from *pītaḥ* (drunk) + *udakaḥ* (water), which means somebody who has already drunk water. Here, *pītaḥ* (‘drunk’) though is an adjective, but in its root is a verb part of the compound word, and it is the first part (*pūrvapada*) of the compound word. *Udakaḥ* is the second word (*uttarapada*). Now, if we attach *nañ* in *pūrvapada*, which is from verb (i.e., *pītaḥ*), like *nañ + pītaḥ*, it will be like = *apītaḥ* (‘a’ stands for ‘nañ’ when the word starts with a consonant). This, in compound with *udakaḥ*, will be like *apītaḥ + udakaḥ* = *apītodakaḥ*, which means **(somebody, who has) not drunk water**. Here negation qualifies the verb. On the contrary, if we attach *nañ* with *uttarapada* (i.e., *udakaḥ*), like *nañ + udakaḥ*, it will be like = *anudakaḥ*. By compounding it with *pītaḥ*, we may get *pītaḥ + anudakaḥ* = *pītonudakaḥ*, meaning that **(somebody, who has) drunk no-water**. Here, negation is used with a noun. Thus, by the discussion, now we may get a clear picture of both the terms *paryudāsa* and *prasajya* like:

Paryudāsapratishedha – *pītonudakaḥ*, who has drunk not-water.
Prasajyapratishedha – *apītodakaḥ*, who has not-drunk water.

¹¹ *Paryudāśṣaviññeyoyattrottarapadenanañ*
Pratiśedhaśṣaviññeyahkriyayāsaha yatra nañ. Ref. A.M. Ramanath Dikshit, (ed.), *Mimāṃsā-Nyāyaprakāsa of Apadeva*, Benaras: Kāshi Sanskrit Series, 1949.
Pratiśedha, by its literal as well as other meanings (if there is any), is used to deny something that is said or existed to which (*prati*) the negation (*śedha* from root *śidh*) pertains to. The case of negation (*pratiśedha*) qualifying the verb in the sentence may be explicit by adding not (*na / a*) or implicit by using words of opposite meaning. The first letter of the word that is to be qualified by negation, according to Sanskrit grammar determines either ‘na’ or ‘a’ to be the sign of negation. If the first letter is a vowel it takes ‘na’, otherwise, if it is a consonant it may takes up ‘a’ as the sign of negative expression.

There can be another combination, i.e., *apitonudakaḥ* - who has not drunk not-water. This may be another case, which may be an example of the strongest case of *prasajya*. It is to be mentioned that the definition of *paryudāsa* and *prasajya* are technical. The prefix *nañ* for negation qualifies the *uttarapada*, 'water', in *paryudāsa* making it 'not-water'. The prefix *nañ* qualifies *kriya*, 'drunk', in *prasajya* making it 'not-drunk'. *Paryudāsapraṭiśedha* is often called term-negation in contrast with the verb-negation in *prasajyapraṭiśedha*. The former shows exclusion, that is, something other than water is drunk. A presumption may be made from the excluded in the expression 'not-water, that is, something else is drunk, but not water. In the *prasajyapraṭiśedha*, the negation is applied to the verb 'drinking', and hence there is no question of drinking, and therefore, there is no question of anything else than water. That is, the negation of the verb negates the whole part qualified by the verb. This is a complete negation. Both the negations qualify the word that is used as predicate as well as adjective making a negative sentence.¹²

We may simplify these two types of negations by indicating their compounding word-structure. We know that '*prasajya*' (*pra+sañj*) means 'implying' or 'implication', 'consequence of something', 'result', what 'follows', 'be applicable' in the context, and '*praṭiśedha*' means 'denial'. Their compounding meaning with negation may be the case of a negation where any implication of it is also simultaneously denied in the negation. It is denying with denying the implication as well – so it is non-implicative negation. In a similar manner, '*paryudāsa*' may be split into '*pari* (in the sense of *paritaḥ* (around)) + *udāsa* (indifferent)'. Its application with negation may then mean that a case of negation, where the force of negation is indifferent to any implication of the negation, for which the implication can be carried out.¹³

Nagarjuna's Use of *Pratiśedha*: Nagarjuna's uses and Chandrakirti's arguments suggest both these negations in Nagarjuna. There are modern scholars, who

¹² To mention here, the same word may also be used as the subject in the place of an actual subject in further discussion of the continuing context, when the word is previously used as a predicate for the subject once. For example, if once we say that the cow is not drunk-water, in the sequence of talks regarding the cow we refer to the cow by just the word the 'not-drunk', without mentioning the cow and water.

¹³ The interpretation may be debatable but is made for simplifying by the scholar himself.

differentiate both the negations in Nagarjuna.¹⁴ In Nagarjuna's context, all *pratiṣedha* are not *prasajyapraṣedha*.¹⁵ It is because *pariyudāsapraṣedha* is also found as the cases wherever Nagarjuna negates opposite or contrary alternatives, without fail, and in the case, it must be understood that each negation is *pariyudāsa* type, while all such negations taken together can make the *prasajya* negation (as stressed here by the author). *Pariyudāsapraṣedha* is taken as a relative negation, where something is excluded by negation, and it relatively implies something.¹⁶ For example, not-water in the above example, may suggest milk. *Prasajyapraṣedha* is total negation, that is, there is no exclusion or inference of the negation, for which it is understood as non-implicative negation.

A little light may be focused on these negative functions. Kajjima comments, "In *pariyudāsa-pratiṣedha* a positive idea is yielded by the negative expression, and both sides are conveyed in a single sentence (*ekavākyatā*) because both refer to the same object. In *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, the primary aim is negation, – affirmation may be understood, but it is only secondary to negation.¹⁷" To note here that Kajjima's second statement seems to be implausible for allowing the affirmation with secondary value. There is no affirmation of what is negated nor is also any excluded aspect that can be implied and affirmed in *prasajya*. It is only the case that the negative statement is itself asserted as a statement, which puzzles Kajjima, but its assertion is of another level, i.e., of the sentence, not the object negated in the sentences. Scholars like J. L. Shaw, B. K. Matilal, Ruegg Seyfort, J. F. Staal as they are concerned with the question also similarly understand the negation that implies

¹⁴ J. F. Staal: "Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought: A Comparative Study", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XXV, part I, pp. 52-71. For him *pariyudāsa* is exclusion and *prasajya* is prohibition.

Matilal says *pariyudāsapraṣedha* is nominally bound negative and *prasajyapraṣedha* is verbally bound negative. Ref. Bimal K Matilal: *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, The Hague, Netherland: Morton & Co, N. V publishers, 1971, p. 163.

Seyfort Ruegg: "The uses of the four positions of Catuskoṭi and the problem of the description of reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism", *Journal of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. 5, No. 1 / 2, pp. 1-77.

¹⁵ It is not known definitely that where and when it is added, but the terms are already known in 900 AD in Arcat's *Hetu-Vindu-Ṭīkā* and In Karṇakagomin's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇvārtika-svāvr̥tti*.

¹⁶ "Pariyudāsa – praṣedha is term-negation, the implication of which is directly positive." J. L. Shaw: "Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning", *JIP*, 1978. 6. pp. 59-77.

¹⁷ Y Kajjima, "Three Kinds of Affirmation and two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy" *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sudasiens*, (1973), vol. 17. pp. 161-175, p. 171. Also quoted in J. L. Shaw, "Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning", *JIP*, 1978. 6. p. 61.

affirmative implication is a *paryudāsa* negation; and the negation that does not have any positive implication is *prasajya* negation. This way Kaṇṇakagom in also distinguishes both the negations and inferences from them. For him,

“*Niṣedhakmchanīṣedhamprādhānyenabhidhāyārthātanyabhidhānamāha Paryudāsa, pratipādakamtuvākyampratiṣedhapūrvakamanyavidhānamprādhānyenāhaitiastievaviśeṣaḥiti.*”¹⁸

That is to say, since the negation of something is primary in a negative expression, something other is also expressed therein. The *paryudāsa* sentence is negative, but there is something other (*viśeṣa*) in it.¹⁹ In other words, the *paryudāsapratīṣedha* is a negation, where there is a positive inference or implication of the negative sentence. In this sense, it is a relational negation. The examples of it are of many kinds as in the above ‘(i), (ii)’, etc., except the types that are *prasajyapratīṣedha* as in above ‘(iv)’. Thus, we may understand *prasajyapratīṣedha* as a negation, where no positive inference is possible. It is a total negation, also called ‘pure negation’ or ‘simple negation’. We may find it in the form of various formal statements, such as

- (a) negative universal statement, for example, as ‘(i) universal) in the above;
- (b) statements where both noun and verbs are qualified with negation, as ‘(ii)’ in the above;
- (c) where the negation is put at the beginning of the statement, by that distributing the negation both to the subject and predicate of the statement. In other words, the negative particle is found with such a part of the sentence that the negative statement does not imply any statement, the content of which would be excluded from the negation. It is as ‘(iv)’ in the above.

The *prasajyapratīṣedha* is described in three ways. (I) One is a direct negative sentence, where every part of the sentence is qualified by negation. The negative sentence does not mean or carry any positive inference or presumption. (II) There is another type of negative sentence, where no terms are directly negative, but the meaning says something negative. In this case, if any inference or presumption is derived from this, the inference may say the same as what the sentence conveys. (III)

Another type of *prasajyapratīṣedha* is that, where all alternative exclusions of negation are further negated exhaustively. That is to say, this is an exhaustive

¹⁸ As in Dharendra Sharma, *The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic*, Netherlands, Morton & Co., pp. 34-35. [Underlined is rewritten by breaking the long sentence.]

¹⁹ It seems that we have to be limited with this clarification regarding the concepts. There is no need to bring more texts and contexts regarding this that have developed unto Santaraksita.

negation of alternative *paryudāsa* negations. Example of *pasajya* negation (first type): (a) There are no cows in the world. (Universal)

(b) Negation of verb and noun – There is neither a movement nor there is a cow in the site. (It is made by putting negations before both subject and verb, which can then be analyzed in the form of putting negation only before the verb: ‘there is no moving cow in the site’.) Example of *prasajya negation* (second type):

(c) ‘Everything is void’. (Except the context, where Nagarjuna’s saying that he doesn’t have anything to negate by it in the *Vigrahavyāvartani*).

Example of *prasajya negation* (third type): (d) When all implied alternatives are exhaustively negated as seen in *chatuskoṭi*.

We may summarize our study on negation, its implication, and Nagarjuna’s *Madhyamika* position up to this, in the following table.²⁰

<i>Paryudāsa Pratiṣedha</i>	Subject	Predicate	Sentence	Inference/Presumption/Implication
	Subject	1.negative predicate	Negative sentence ‘The cow is not movable/ moving.’	Inference/Presumption/Implication
	Subject	2.negative predicates	Negative sentence ‘The cow is not moving speedily.’	Inference/Presumption/Implication
<i>Prasajya</i> ²¹ <i>Pratiṣedha</i>	Subject	Negative predicate	Negative universal ‘The cow does not sweat. Svabhāva does not exist.’	No inference/Presumption/Implication
	Negative Subject	Negative predicate	Total negation ‘There are neither any cow nor it sweat / There is no sweating cow.’	No inference/Presumption/Implication
	Subject	Negative predicate	Negation of essential and defining characteristics in a sentence in the predicate. ‘Things are devoid of intrinsic nature.’	
	Negation of all alternatives, for example, in <i>chatuskoṭi</i> .			No position. This is the <i>Mādhyamika</i> position.

***PrasajyaPratiṣedhaby* Negation of Exhaustive Alternatives:** Mind makes conceptualization, where there is a role of *paryudāsa* negation. A negation can imply

²⁰ It is to be mentioned that Nagarjuna’s much emphasis on use of negation and deriving negative meanings of the concepts may give rise to the concept of ‘*apoha*’ in the latter period.

²¹ It seems that there is an extra hype about Nagarjuna’s *prasajyapratīṣedha* in some contexts. The present effort needs to be cautious about some scholars’ descriptions of it. The complete elaboration and comment regarding this may be made in the latter study of it.

any alternative or its opposite as an implied alternative. In this case, each such alternatives must be negated. This is seen in Nagarjuna's writings, where he negates mutually opposite predicates to something. For example, in MK 25.3 he speaks about *nirvāṇa* in six negations - "*Nirvāṇa* is neither accomplished nor relinquished, is neither annihilation nor eternal, is neither produced nor cease...."²² Similarly, the opening verses of MK are individual examples of *paryudāsapratīṣedha*, wherein each opposite alternative is denied distinctively as *anutpāda-anirodha*, etc.²³ The alternatives are so related that negation of one implies the assertion of the other. So, each has to be denied. Such denial removes all options and predicates and thereby removes conceptualization. In certain cases, we may think, collection of *paryudāsa* negation of alternatives and opposites may therefore be a case of *prasajya* negation. It is because one *prasajya* negation denies a term as well as any possible implication of the negation, which is done by a series of exhaustive *paryudāsa* negation of mutual opposites and all alternatives. So, it can be said that exhaustive individual *paryudāsapratīṣedha* is equal to or makes up *prasajyapratīṣedha*, i.e., $paryudasa^n = prasajya$. It may not be practical that one can find *n* number of *paryudāsa* as equated with *prasajya* for the state of *nirvikalpa* or no-conceptualization.

***PrasajyaPratīṣedha* by *Chatuṣkoti*:** By *prasajyapratīṣedha*, mind may lead to no-conceptualization. It applies to simple sentences expressing one subject and one predicate. The case of negation of possibilities of more than one predicate as an alternative, and finding exhaustive alternatives, options, about any issue, is of course problematic. It is because, if one alternative is denied, it may imply the assertion of another alternative and innumerable alternative implications may be generated by the negation of one alternative after another by *parjyudāsapratīṣedha*. Pondering over this problem of alternatives and exhaustive denial of all of them, which is empirically not always possible can be logically possible. This brings us to the Buddha's

²² *Aprahīṇāmasamprāptamanucchinnaśāśvataṃ, aniruddhamanutpannametanirvānṃmūchyate.* MK.15.3

²³ *Anirodhamanutpādamanucchedamaśāśvataṃ, anekārthamanānārthamanāgamamanirgamam.* *Yadpratītyasamutpādamprapañchopaśmaṃ, deśayāmāsasaṃbuddhastamvande vadatāmvaraṃ.* MK. Introductory verses.

conversion of *chatuskoti*,²⁴ wherein an issue is denied in four logical categories. For example, Kashyapa asks,

Whether, Gautama, *dukkha* is created on one's own?
 Whether, Gautama, *dukkha* is created by others (i.e., not by one's own)?
 Whether, Gautama, *dukkha* is created both by one's own and the other?
 Whether, Gautama, *dukkha* is created neither by one's own, nor by the other?

The Buddha negates all the alternatives exhaustively. Similarly, there are questions on which the Buddha remained silent, as nothing satisfactorily can be said in answer to them, and therefore they are called unspeakable (*avyākṛtas*). One of the examples of unspeakable is “Whether the *Lokas* finite or infinite or both or neither?”²⁵ To analyze, the first alternative can be expressed as ‘is the world finite?’

- The second alternative can be ‘is the world infinite?’
- The third alternative can be ‘whether the world is both finite and infinite?’
- The fourth alternative can be ‘whether the world is neither finite nor infinite?’

Thus, there are exhaustive alternatives of the issue in question, where first, second, third and fourth are originally expressed in *chatuskoṭī*. Each *koṭī* represents an extreme alternative in logical category, and there are four such alternatives or categories, in which no one can be reduced to the other, but all the alternatives can be represented with any issue or notion. When one alternative or extreme is not asserted, the other alternative comes in sequence. There is the need of denying and by that getting rid of all the alternatives to accomplish the no-conceptualization. For this reason, the Buddha is said to be silent, which, out of many possibilities, may mean that the alternatives are negated. (The importance of such negations in *chatuskoti* here is to stop the speculation which may burden us with the conceptualization.)

²⁴ An example of Buddha's discourse involving *chatuskoti* is like this.

“*Kiṃ nu khobho Gotamasayamkataṃdukkhanti.*” - ‘Not so verily, Kassapa, said the exalted one.’”

‘*Kiṃpanabho Gotamaparakataṃdukkhanti.*’ - ‘Māhevaṃ Kassapati Bhagavāvocha.’

‘*Kiṃmukhobho Gotamasayaṃkataṃchāparamkataṃchādukkhanti.*’ - ‘Māhevaṃ Kassapati Bhagavāvocha.’

‘*Kiṃmukhobho Gotamaasayaṃkataṃchāparamkataṃchādukkhanti.*’

‘*Māhevaṃ Kassapati Bhagavāvocha.*’ *Samjukta Nikāya* (Pali text society ed. II. pp19-20.) The above translation is dialogue is quoted from *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*, Mrs. Rhys Davids and F.L. Woodward (eds), Pali Text Society, London: 1922. Vol. II. p.5. The similar is also dealt by Nagarjuna in the verse, *Svayaṃkrasyāprasiddheduh) khamparakr) taṃkutah), Paro hi dukhamyat kuryāttattasyasyātsvayaṃkr)taṃ.* MK.12.7.

²⁵ *Loka* here stands not only for the phenomena but also for the substantiality – it is something that exists or not in its own. Apart from this *loka* in the substantiality is understood to be the appearance of the Ātman, the substance. The Buddha's and Mādhyamika's dealing with this is made from their non-substantial approach.

Nagarjuna's use of *prasajyapratishedha* in *chatuskoṭi* directly leads to non-conceptualization. Exhaustive non-implicative negation in *chatuskoṭi* is used by Nagarjuna in his arguments upon different issues in the *Mūlamadhyakakārikā*.²⁶ The non-implicative negation by *chatuskoṭi* is also found in his criticism of *pramāṇas* in the *Vigrahavyāvartani* which may be taken up here to exemplify the matter that in this way that whether *pramāṇa* is (a) established by the other *pramāṇa* (*paratahprāmānya*), or (b.1) without other *pramāṇa*, i.e., by itself (*svatahprāmānya*), or (b.2) by *prameyas*, or (c) by each other or (d) not by each other, i.e., independently?

- a. If one *pramāṇa* is established by another *pramāṇa*, then it will lead to infinite regress or *anāvasthā*.

or

- b. 1. if it is said that the *pramāṇas* are established without another *pramāṇa*, then it amounts to the discordance that something needs to be proved by *pramāṇa*, but *pramāṇas* themselves do not need so.²⁷

- b. 2. If *pramāṇa* is established by itself without relating to the *prameya*, then what for it is to be called *pramāṇa*. It cannot be self-established without relating to *prameyas*.²⁸

or

- c. If *pramāṇa* and *prameyas* are established by each other, then it is like a father is established by a son and *vice versa*, then who the father is and who the son is.²⁹ Further, it amounts to the fallacy of *itaratarāśraya*, where the roles of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* will be interchanged. It may also fall into *chakrakadoṣa*.

or

²⁶ *Chatuskoṭi* in single verses: *MK.* 1.1, 1.3; 7.20; 12.1 (all these in dealing the same issue of causation, where the negation of 4th alternative is not found in 7.20); 18.8 (dealing the definite teaching of Buddha that everything is tathya or atathya etc.); 22.11 (dealing with the issue of holding *sūnya* as expressible, not expressible etc.); 25.17 (dealing with survival of the Buddha after *parinirvāṇa*), 22 & 23; 27.13 (respectively dealing with the issues, such as whether *dharmas* are finite, infinite etc., eternal, non-eternal etc, past and present of personality) ; in multiple verse in 25.5-16 (dealing with nirvāṇ is an element or not etc.). In *IV*, XXXIII – LII, Nagarjuna uses *Chatuskoṭi* the issue that whether (*pramāṇas* are self-established/proved), or (by its nature or by other) or (by different, i.e., one *pramāṇa* is established by another) or (established without cause /reason). *IV*, ed. by Sastri, Heramba Chatterjee.

²⁷ . *Teṣāmathapramāṇairvināprasiddhirvīhiyatevādah, Vaiṣamikatvaṃtasminviśeṣahetuśchavaktavyam.* *VV.v.33.*

²⁸ *YadiSvataścha pramāṇa siddhihanapekṣatavaprimeyani, Bhavati pramāṇa siddhirnaparapekṣāsvatahsiddhiḥ.* *VV. V. 40.*

²⁹ *Pitrayadyutpadyahputriyaditenacivaputrena, Utpadyahsayadi pita vadatatrotpadyatikahkam ? Kasca pita kahputrastaratvambruhitaubhayapica, Pitṛputralaksanadharaayatobhavati no samdehah.* *VV.v 49-50.*

- d. If *prameyas* are established, without *pramāṇas*, [and vice versa], then ‘what is the necessity of *pramāṇa*?’³¹

Therefore, Nagarjuna concludes that *pramāṇa* is not established by itself without relating to any or by other *pramāṇas*, or *pramāṇa* and *prameya* by each other.³² Like this, all phenomena have the same characteristics that their separate individuality cannot be established by themselves, by the other, or by each other or without any cause (and condition).³³

Concluding Remarks:

So far it is discussed, the non-implicative negation in the form of *prasajyapratishedha* is one of the important tools in Nagarjuna’s dialectic. He might not have any intention to advance a new vista in epistemology by this. By this dialectic, he negates all alternatives of a conception or thought exhaustively and thereby enables to reach a state of no-conceptualization (*nirvikalpa*). It was practically needed as the conceptions are the roots of ego-consciousness and that in turn is the root of all attachments and for this reason by exposing the weakness in the establishment of any conception, man can have an intuitive insight into the non-conceptual mode of consciousness, without being bound by them. It eventually helps to attain *nirvāṇa*.

³¹ *Atha tupramansiddhirbhavatyapekasyaivateprameyani, Vyatyayaevam sati tedhruvampramanaprameyanamtepramanasiddhya premeyasiddhih prameya siddhyaca, bhavati pramanasiddhirnastyubhayasyapitesiddhih*, VV. v 45-6.

³² *Naivasvatahprasiddhirnaparataratahparapramanarvā. Na bhavatina-ca prameyairnacapyakamatpramananam*. VV. v 51.

³³ *Na svatahparatah no dvabhuyamapyahetutah. Utpannajatuvidyantebhavahkvacanakecan. Mūlamadhyamikakāikā* 1. 1.

THE ABSOLUTE AND IDENTITY STATEMENTS: SOME OBSERVATIONS

ABHINSHYAM SHANKAR TIWARI

I

The Indian Philosophical interpretations of the Upaniṣadic Mahāvākya ‘*Tat Tvam Asi*’ differ quite vividly when we compare the accounts given to it by the schools of Vedānta such as ‘*Dvaita Vedānta*’ of Mādhva, ‘*Vishīṣṭādvaita*’ of Rāmānuja, and most famously, the ‘*Advaita Vedānta*’ of Śankara. The statement translated into English reads something like ‘Thou That art’, which refers to making the individual Atman realize that he himself is the Absolute – The Brahman. In one way of saying, the different names given to the Absolute are synonymous while, in others, they may tend to differ. One way of interpreting these identity statements is Gottlob Frege’s theory of ‘Sense and Reference’ in which he advocates that two or more words may have the same referent but can differ in their ‘senses’ i.e. intensions, connotations, etc. By assuming that we can adequately understand synonymy in the extensional form, one can argue that all terms used for the Absolute are synonymous i.e. intersubstitutable. Though, still, they may tend to be different in their intensional mode and, hence, not synonymous. In this paper, an attempt has been to develop the idea of how the Fregean notion of Sense and Reference can be used on the identity statement ‘*Tat Tvam Asi*’ and, consequently, show how one can realize this synonymy of Ātman with Brahman, assuming that both the terms are referring to the same object factually and, like the realization of morning star and evening star, which is done by perception, can be realized by specific means of knowledge.

The paper is divided into three sections. In the first, a brief description of Gottlob Frege’s distinction of sense and reference has been given along with its use on the assertive statements we use in our daily lives. The second section deals with the nature of Brahman and Ātman given in the light of Advaita Vedanta exclusively, for the sake of this paper’s length. The third and final section presents an application of the Fregean theory on the identity statement ‘*Tat Tvam Asi*’ and tries describing a way by which an individual can realize his perpetual union with Brahman.

II

Gottlob Frege is considered one of the biggest figures in the analytic philosophical tradition mainly for either of the two things. First, his famous work

Begriffsschrift, which attempted to define basic concepts of mathematics and to show that mathematical laws have its true foundation in the laws of logic, which was later developed by Russell and Whitehead in their magnum opus *Principia Mathematica*. Second, and the major focus of this paper, the theory of meaning given by Frege, which influenced the prominent figures of the twentieth-century analytic philosophy such as Wittgenstein and Quine. We will deal with Frege's semantic theory, which we find in his famous essay titled "Sense and Reference." Frege developed his theory because of his motivation of distinguishing between sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*) to show how identity statements can be meaningful. Frege, at the outset of his essay, asks the question "is identity a relation?" and if so, is it "a relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects?" (Copi and Gould 65); the problem, as shown in *Begriffsschrift*, is what is being dealt with here: if we take identity to be a relation between objects, we are led into a paradox.

The classic example given in regards to this distinction is of Hesperus and Phosphorus, the evening star and the morning star, both of which were eventually discovered to be planet Venus. The issue is that if we take identity to be a relation between objects i.e., the extensional referents, we are led to assert that there is no new information gained when we assert 'Hesperus' or 'Phosphorus' to denote planet Venus as the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' both refer to the same object, i.e. Venus. In *Begriffsschrift*, Frege had held that the sole linguistic content of a proper name was its bearer, that is, the item the linguistic content referred to. But since 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' both refer to the same object, their linguistic content is the same i.e. the content of the sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is precisely the same and consistent with that of 'Hesperus is Hesperus.' The latter one is an analytical *a priori* statement, which is a tautology. However, the former one, too, becomes non-informative, if we assume that there is no way of knowing the content of a sign or symbol other than the referent it denotes. But this account of meaning becomes clearly unsatisfactory, because the two sentences are asserting different things and are not cognitively alike. It is possible to know that Hesperus is Hesperus without knowing that Hesperus is Phosphorus, as it is possible to know that $A=A$, without knowing $A=B$. To solve this difficulty, Frege advocates the difference between the reference of the sign i.e., the object denoted by the sign, and the mode of presentation of the sign i.e. the sense of the sign. Consequently, the connection between a sign, its

referent, and its sense “is of such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that, in turn, a definite referent, while to a given referent (an object) there does not belong only a single sign.” (Frege 211). For example, the sign ‘Samuel Clemens’ refers to a referent in another sense than the sign ‘Mark Twain’ refers to the same (it could that one designates a man born in Florida and the other can designate the author of *Huckleberry Finn*). There can be many senses to a given referent but a single sense ‘serves to illuminate only a single aspect of the referent, supposing it to exist’ (Frege 211). We also see, in our daily lives, that the same name or sign belongs to different persons and even animals or plants, which are their referent. So it will be quite a mistake for us to consider such names as purely denotative

The definition of sense is not clearly defined in Frege, though we can, for ease of access into this paper, take it to be as the ‘mode of presentation of that which is designated’ (Frege 210). The distinction of sense and reference applies to sentences as well, where the sense of the sentence is the *thought* contained by the sentence (Frege 215) and the referent is the *truth-value* of the sentence as its referent (Frege 216). No thought, according to Frege, is “the subjective performance of thinking but its objective content, which is capable of being the common property of several thinkers” (Frege 214). Though we will not look forward to illuminate the niceties and subtleties of this application to every linguistic form, it will suffice us to know that (1) there can also be signs of signs; and, this, in turn, leads us to distinguish between a *customary* and an *indirect* sense and a *customary* referent from an *indirect* referent:

“In order to have a short expression, we will say: In reported speech, words are used indirectly or have their indirect referents. We distinguish accordingly the customary from the indirect referent of a word; and its customary sense from its indirect sense. The indirect referent of a word is accordingly its customary sense. Such exceptions must always be borne in mind if the mode of connection between sign, sense, and referent in particular cases is to be correctly understood.” (Frege 211-212)

And (2) that Frege agrees with the intuitive reception to a statement, that contains an empty referent i.e. it lacks a referent. For example, the statement "Superman is Clark Kent" has no reference to any of the senses given. But it is no doubt that statements like these have a meaning of some sort, though they do not contain any referent. The statement seems intuitively true to those who know that ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’

refer to the same person in the movie. But for Frege, the statement is neither true nor false. He remarks in *Logic*

“Names that fail to fulfill the usual role of a proper name, which is to name something, may be called mock proper names [*Scheineigennamen*]. Although the tale of William Tell is a legend and not history and the name ‘William Tell’ is a mock proper name, we cannot deny it a sense. But the sense of the sentence ‘William Tell shot an apple off his son’s head’ is no more true than is that of the sentence ‘William Tell did not shot [sic] an apple off his son’s head’. I do not say, however, that this sense is false either, but I characterize it as fictitious” (229-230)

There appear several inconsistencies in Frege’s distinction between a linguistic expression’s sense and reference, which is highlighted by Bertrand Russell in his “*On Denoting*”, but it is presupposed, for this article, that the sense-reference distinction, in the form approximately presented by Frege, can survive its critics.

III

Now that I have put a fair and summary of the semantic theory laid down by Frege, we should also look at some of the major defining characteristics of Brahman and Ātman as described in Advaita Vedānta, while keeping in mind to define it only for the sake of the application of the sense and reference theory given in the first section on the identity asserted between them. The crux of Advaita theory of Śankara’s account of Brahman is expressed in *Brahmajñānavālimālā* as “*brahma satyam jagan mithyā jiva brahmaiva nāparah*” (verse 20): Brahman is ultimately real, world is a false appearance and Jiva is non-different from Brahman. Śankara, again, in his *Brahman-Sūtra*, describes Brahman as

“Brahman is that whose nature is permanent purity, intelligence, and freedom (nitya *Śuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvam brahmeti*); it transcends speech and mind, does not fall within the category of ‘object’, and constitutes the inward self of all. Of this Brahman our text denies all plurality of forms; the Brahman itself is leaved untouched the cause, ‘Nor this, nor that’ (*Neti, Neti*), negatives not absolutely everything, but everything but Brahman.” (3.2.22)

Brahman is assumed to be foundational, though it is in no sense a substance (Dharmaraja I). One of the most important statements, which is indeed deemed as one of the five *Mahāvākyas* is *Tat Tvam Asi* (that thou art), which appears in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (VI.Viii. 3.), and to which we see a major emphasis being given to by Śankara. For the Advaita Vedāntins, it is Brahman alone that exists. The negations are emphasized to negate the qualities rather than the substratum itself. The

Śāstras are real only till the Brahman is not realized by the seeker of *Ātmavidyā* has not realized his oneness with Brahman. There are various names This Absolute can be known: Ātman, Iṣvara, Brahman, and so on. Ātman and Brahman possess the same characteristics of being (*Sat*), consciousness (*Cit*) and bliss (*Ānanda*). ‘The purely subjective side is also the purely objective. Brahman seems to be mere abstract being, even as Ātman seems to be mere abstract subjectivity to the eyes of the intellect’ (Radhakrishnan 501).

Human mind realizes its own limitations; thus, when a person attains *Brahmānubhava* (integral experience with Brahman), he realizes the higher i.e. Para Brahman. He answers every question about the nature of the world in silence or in negative symbols. But Brahman, cast through the moulds of logic i.e. when it is attributed by *Avidyā* or lower knowledge, is Īśvara. Max Muller, in his *Three lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy*, gives us an account of Śankara’s attempt to clarify between the Para and Apra Brahman:

“When Brahman is described in the Upanishads by negative words only, after excluding all differences of name and form, due to Nescience-that is the Higher. But when He is described by such terms as (Khanda. III. 14, 2), the intelligent whose body consists of spirit, whose body is light, being distinguished by some special name and form, for the sake of worship only, that is the other, the lower Brahman” (133)

Thus, we see that Brahman can be described to an individual by three different descriptions: on the first description, it can be known as the eternal and pure “I” - Ātman. On the second, we can also know it as the Īśvara or Apram or lower Brahman, which is the ‘best image of the truth possible under our present conditions of knowledge’ (Radhakrishnan, 503). And on the third, it is the attributeless (*Niṣprapañca*), the differenceless Brahman which can only be reached by an integral experience (*Anubhava*) by the seer; in language it can only be asserted by a perpetual No. As Saint Augustine says in his *Trinity*, “We can know what God is not, but not what he is.” (viii, 2). This Absolute can be known in any one of the three aspects of reality. "Individual things cannot exist apart from Nature and they are thus all caused by Nature. But this is not to say that they cannot be accounted for in terms of particular connections, provided that we remember that *natura naturata* is not a substance distinct from *natura naturans*. There is one infinite system; but it can be looked at from different points of view." (Copleston 228). The significance of the

identity statement ‘*Tat Tvam Asi*’ is as much similar to that of ‘the morning star is the evening’ or ‘Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain’; all three of these assert identities between two senses, which have as their referents the same objects. And for the moment, it is assumed that all three statements have referents which can be known or perceived by one way or the other. However, in the first statement, which is the concern of this article, it is important to articulate a way to realize the oneness of the individual soul with the Absolute.

IV

We have, so far, been acquainted with both the description of sense-reference theory and the nature of the object of its application. It is now a fairly simple affair to affirm the identity between the Ātman and Brahman without making the relation look tautologous. Like we saw in the first section that although, the same planet i.e. Venus can be referred to by using two different ‘modes of presentation’ – Hesperus and Phosphorus – and yet, it could be informative for a person to know that Hesperus i.e. the morning star is the same as Phosphorus i.e. the evening star. In the same way, the identity statement ‘*Tat Tvam Asi*’ can refer to the same object i.e. the Absolute, while having two different ‘modes of presentation’ i.e. the Ātman and the Brahman. The other three Great Teachings: *aham Brahma asmi* (*Bṛhadrānyaka Upaniṣad* I.4.10), "I am Brahman"; *āyam atmā Brahma* (*Mandukya Upaniṣad* I.2.), "This Ātman is Brahman"; and *prajñānam Brahma* (*Aitreya Upaniṣad* III.3), "Consciousness is Brahman." These four *Mahāvākyas* recapitulate the same point: the identity of Ātman and Brahman.

It is, now, the matter to provide a substantial option to experience this identity between Ātman and Brahman where meaning is denotation. Various sorts of *Pramānas* (sources of knowledge) can do this inquiry; *Śruti* (scriptural testimony) is the only way advocated in the *Brahma-Sūtra* to know the Absolute Brahman: *śāstrayonitvāt* (I, I, 3.). Further, we see the saying ‘*tat tu samanvayāt*’: “But that [Brahman is to be known only from the scriptures and not independently by any other means is established] because It is the main purport (of all Vedānta texts)” (I, I, 4).

However, this article differs here from Śankara’s main attempts to explain the ways to know Brahman for one can also find another way to realize this identity with Brahman. We know that identity between the morning star and the evening star can

be known by the act of apprehension known as perception; thus, it will be more convenient to regard the identity between Ātman and Brahman capable of being known by another act of apprehension. We can term this act of apprehension and the apprehension itself as *Mokṣa*. Though *Mokṣa* seems an unhappy term as its connotation must be uncomfortably narrowed down to act only as a description of a kind of an act of apprehension; yet, we find that the term is not absolutely unrelated to this sort of use. "*Mokṣa* is founded on Ātmajnāna, which is the knowledge of the self." (Chatterjee 102). This knowledge does nothing else except removing ignorance. *Mokṣa*, therefore, means the removal of ignorance by knowledge: *mokṣapratibandhanivṛttimātram eva ātmajñānasya phalam*. This knowledge is objective and, just like Frege's concept of *Thought*, does not depend on the mind but on the existent fact: *Brahmajñānam vastutantram* (*Brahma-Sūtra* I, I, 2.) It must be said that the referent i.e. Brahman, once known, does not abolish the sense of duality, but only makes us know the identity between the sense: *Jñāte dvaitam na vidyate* (*Mandukya Upanishad* I, 18). We see the same appearance, but give a different value to it (Radhakrishnan 597).

Now that it is adequately put that *Mokṣa* as a term can be used to describe the act of apprehension in identifying the oneness of Ātman with Brahman, a brief explanation is to be put as to how is it, assuming that it is, possible to attain this state of apprehension (as we all know *Mokṣa* is radically different from an empirical i.e. *Vyavāhrika* perception). According to the Advaitins, *Mokṣa* is already an existing thing (*Siddha*). It is, as Śankara Says in his *Śankara-Bhāṣya* part of *Brahma-Sūtra* (IV. III. 31):

“Since Brahman is Present everywhere, within everything and is the self of everything... it is altogether impossible that it ever should be the goal of process of going. For we do not go to what is already reached; experience tells us that a person goes to something from him.”

It is now that *Mokṣa* need not be a newly attained power to perceive supernaturally than we do otherwise. It could be said as just a shift in our perspective to look at the same thing. The same act of apprehension, which, after our knowledge of identity between morning star and evening star, allowed us to view planet Venus differently, can be said to analogously be similar to knowing the identity between Brahman and Ātman (which were understood to be different before). Śankara declares many times

that the true nature of individual is that of the Absolute itself. In his *Brahma Sutra*, it is stated that the Self of the highest lord is “the real nature of the embodied soul; and the state of embodiment is due to the limiting adjuncts”: *Pārameśvaram eva hi śarīrasya pāramāthikam svarupam, upādhikṛtam tu śarīratvam* (III, IV, 8). Taking from Hiriyanna’s *Popular Essays*, one may put it:

“The end sought may be already there, and yet we may not be able to get at it owing to some obstacle or other as, for example, in the case of buried treasure. Here achievement consists merely in removing the obstacle...To give a trivial but typical example, a person may be so much beside himself as to set about searching for his eye-glasses while he is actually wearing them. Here "attainment" consists in the person in question overcoming the delusion into which he has fallen, either by being appraised of the fact by someone else or by himself coming somehow to discover it” (66)

What is now be sought is a simpler approach toward identity: one can know this similarity of the Ātman and Brahman by being told by any authority (a *Guru* and teachings of *Śruti*) on whom the seeker has an unwavering faith (*Shraddhā*) and, thereby, concentrating the intellect on the ever-pure Brahman (*Samādhāna*). Therefore, it rightly seems that *Mokṣa*, as an apprehension, is a two-fold act of denying and affirming; denying the difference between the Absolute Brahman and the individual Ātman by the removal of nescience (*Avidyā*); and affirming the identity (*Tadātmaya*) between the two. This shift in view could, then, be a sight of the differenceless and unlimited Brahman. “To us, from our limited view-point, the soul with its outlooks confined to the body, the senses, the mind and understanding, is the real; and the liberated soul which has realized its oneness with the universal self, has conquered time, and reached life eternal, seems to be unreal” (Radhakrishnan 599)

The apparent inability of various people to communicate precisely with one another, especially when talking about God, or Ātman, or Brahman, or Iṣvara, may justly be based upon nonessential, or could be region-oriented, characteristics of the senses of those names, obscuring whatever characteristics they have in common. It might seem quite plausible that there can be one Absolute, just one universe, just one God, and only one infinite Being. But the senses describing an indescribable reality (*Anirvachanīya*) are an effort to get beyond the bounds of language; the same person can have different senses (in the fregean sense of ‘sense’) at different times to describe the same referent i.e. Brahman. It would then be a call for a completely different attempt to perform an Occam’s razor to

distinguish the most commonly held senses for this referent from the senses subjective to an individual. A paper of this length does not allow us to do so; it should only be looked as an attempt to clarify the semantic meanings of the words attributed to the Absolute.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have shown that the Fregean theory of sense and reference can be applied to the linguistic assortment of identity statement ‘*Tat Tvam Asi*’ by presuming some alternative definitions to the term ‘*Mokṣa*’. I have first put out a brief description of the Fregean theory of sense and reference; in the second section, the nature of the referent i.e. Brahman on which the theory needs to be applied has been described. In the third and the final section, I have made attempt to apply this theory on several proper names by which we refer to this Absolute Brahman. There are other, different, and more successful theories of meaning than the one Frege has advanced. However, we should not deny the inherent plausibility of the sense-reference distinction to the linguistic forms, which makes me justify my acceptance of this position for this paper. The apparent success, which this paper proposes is another reason for accepting this theory of meaning. If the problem of the identity between the supra-objective Brahman and the supra-subjective Ātman can ever be solved linguistically by some theories, the Fregean theory of Sense and Reference would be one of them

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ON THE QUESTION OF MEANING OF LIFE

MADHURIMA BHOWMICK

Grappling with the question of the meaning of life is indeed intriguing. *Prima facie* it seems to appear that the question is a simple one and answers to this question can be attempted from different perspectives - e. g. theistic angle, naturalistic standpoint and so on. However, in contemporary times many thinkers have engaged themselves with the issue which was hitherto unknown or unthought-of. These thinkers could realize that without understanding the question itself and the intricacies of it, any attempt to answer this question will be an exercise in futility. Hence, we find a number of contemporary philosophers who took interest in exploring the inside story of the question.

It is perhaps a natural propensity of a human being having the reflective capacity to raise certain questions and also attempt to find answers to those. Out of these questions, one question that usually occurs in human minds is: what is the meaning of life. To put it more precisely the question can be reframed as what is the meaning of human life. Perhaps non-human animals cannot frame such a question. Out of the words that occur in our reformulated questions four most important terminologies are—‘the’, ‘meaning’, ‘human’ and ‘life’. All these expressions are very familiar to us. However, when dealing with these from the philosophical perspective we find that most of these are more knotty than we usually think about these terminologies. Let us take a glance at their meaning.

The use of the article ‘the’ gives us the impression that there can be only one answer to the question. It confers some sort of uniqueness to the issue. However, a close study of available literature makes us feel that the question can have many answers and hence attaching uniqueness will invite more troubles than a solution. The fourth word in our list is ‘life’. Life can be differentiated from non-life or inanimate things. In the present context when we talk about life our focal point is human lives and not other lives, i. e. non-human lives. But the notion of human (the third word in our list) has perplexed thinkers since ancient times. Aristotle has defined human beings as those having the capacity of rationality. But his definition has been questioned by later thinkers. Any definition given about humans seems to fall short of comprehensiveness in the sense that it excludes some beings whom we consider

human though they do not fall within the bracket of any given definition. This brings to our mind the view of Rabindranath Tagore who spelt out a better picture by holding that there is a surplus in man. This surplus cannot be stipulated by any particular word/s.

Now let us come to the word 'meaning'. Students and scholars of philosophy encounter this word at umpteen times and in various senses out of which semantical sense dominates. Though there is no gainsaying the fact that semantical sense or linguistic context dominates the scene other senses are not less important. For example, when officials of the income tax department unearth a large dubious transaction, they may ask the question 'what is the *meaning* of this transaction?' By way of asking this question, they try to excavate the purpose of this act. We may find many more such contexts when the word 'meaning' is used.

We find attempts by thinkers to extricate the different senses of the word 'meaning'. It is popularly called meanings of 'meaning'. In the present paper, our attempt will be to unravel the questions latent in the question of the meaning of life. It is very much required as without doing this, to my mind, any attempt to answer the question of life's meaning will be either shallow or a pointless effort. To be more precise, our endeavour will be a second-order activity and not first order as we shall refrain from justifying any particular sort of life that somebody may consider meaningful. Rather we shall be questioning the question itself and try to grow aware of different facets of the issues involved in the question.

It is interesting to note that such an approach towards understanding the question began only in contemporary times with the advent of the analytical method of philosophizing. Before this right from the time of ancient Greece till the modern period, philosophers struggled to give some sort of straightforward answers to the question presupposing that this ultimate question of life is an uncomplicated one. For example, Epicurus considered pursuit of happiness made life meaningful. But does everybody want happiness in the traditional sense of the term? A. J. Ayer holds that the pursuance of happiness view holds good only when happiness 'is used merely as a description of any end that is in fact pursued'¹ by different individuals. Other

¹ Ayer, A. J.: "The Claims of Philosophy" Chapter 16 in *The Meaning of Life: A Reader*, Edited by Klemke, E. D. and Cahn, Steven M., Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 201.

philosophers find out other alternatives which made life meaningful. Not only philosophers even thinkers from other fields, e. g. scientists also took a keen interest in the issue. One such interesting attempt was made by $E=mc^2$ equation inventor, i. e., Albert Einstein, in his celebrated book *The World as I See it*. He was confident that life has a meaning and hence he said “the man who regards his own life and that of his fellow-creatures as meaningless is not merely unfortunate but almost disqualified for life.”²

It is fascinating to note that Indian philosophy since its inception were consistent on this project as it steadfastly responded to this question with the pursuit of some *summum bonum* through this *summum bonum* varied from time to time. For example, in *Dharmaśāstras*' time, it was the pursuit of *dharma* that imparted meaning to life, in *Arthaśāstras*' period it was chasing *artha*, in *Kāmsāstra*'s tenure it was strivings for the fulfilment of desires and later on it was *mokṣa* or liberation that stole the limelight. However, in contemporary times our philosophers who knew Indian philosophy and also mastered Western philosophy experimented infusing analytical methods into Indian wisdom. Hence, they gave answers which were a blend of a new sort. Still classical Indian philosophy did not engage itself with analysis of the question. Rather it conceptually excavated a response to the question which was coherent with their systems.

Let us go back to the meaning of the word ‘meaning’. Lexicographers tell us that the term ‘meaning’ is a late Middle English and is derivative of the term ‘mean’. They list a number of senses signified by the term which I tried to read and reread a number of times in order to get some clue from them. Though the term 'meaning' has a number of imports given in the dictionary two of them drew maximum attention. One is what is meant by a sentence, a word, a group of expressions, an action, etc. The second one is in the sense of signifying or making purpose explicit. Philosophers also attempted to untwine different senses of the word 'meaning'. One such attempt we find in the writing of Robert Nozick, the celebrated American philosopher. He talks of five senses of the word such as 'meaning as external causal relationship', 'meaning as external referential or semantic relation', 'meaning as intention or

² Einstein, A. (Translated by Alan Harris): *The World as I See it* (Source: <http://www.colonialtours.com/ebook>, p. 5)

purpose' 'meaning as a lesson' and 'meaning as personal significance, importance, value, mattering'.³ He is of the opinion that these five senses can facilitate in explaining the next two senses which are relatively unclear. These two senses are

- 'meaning as objective meaningfulness: importance, significance, meaning' and
- 'meaning as intrinsic meaningfulness: objective meaning ... in itself, apart from any connections to anything else.'⁴

This effort of extricating different senses of the word meaning is indeed important as it will help us to understand what is actually sought in asking the question under discussion. Realizing this many more thinkers spent time exploring its different intents. One such thinker is Garrett Thomson who arranges the different threads of the question of the meaning of life under three heads: 'Does life have a purpose or point', 'does life have some value', and 'does my life signify something'.⁵ He opines that an answer to the question of the meaning of life needs to address all these angles. From these efforts of the philosophers, it becomes evident that before making an attempt to answer the question of the meaning of life, understanding the question itself becomes imperative. It is held by many philosophers that philosophy's task is not to give solutions rather formulate questions so that the question becomes very precise. Such precision facilitates better attempts at answering the issue at hand.

As we have seen previously that the occurrence of the definite article 'the' in the question 'What is the meaning of life?' has made the issue more intriguing. Such use of 'the' imparts uniqueness and it helped the discourse to become a battleground. Whoever articulated a response to this question assumed that his is the only plausible answer ignoring the fact that those other answers have also worth. In Jain philosophy's parlance, we can say that they advocated some sort of *akentavāda* forgetting importance of the theory of *anekantavāda* or that others' views are also worthy and present some other facets of the reality. As Garrett Thomson aptly says: "... the greatest challenge to the idea that life has a meaning is that it has many rather

³ Nozick, Robert: "Philosophy and the Meaning of Life" Chapter 1.4 in *Exploring the Meaning of Life: An Anthology and Guide*, Edited by Joshua W. Seachris et al, Wiley Blackwell, p. 64.

⁴ Loc cit.

⁵ Thomson Garrett: "Untangling the Questions" Chapter 1.2 in *Exploring the Meaning of Life: An Anthology and Guide*, Edited by Joshua W. Seachris et al, Wiley Blackwell, p. 47.

than one.’⁶ Some consider pursuit for happiness gives meaning to life some hold obeying God's will brings meaning in life and many more. On account of this host of answers, readers may become puzzled and it might create some cynicism in mind. But this is not an apt attitude for philosophers. Some responses might be partially true/applicable, some might be false also. John Stuart Mill tells in his *On Liberty* that even false views should not be suppressed as it helps us to reconstruct our answers newly while countering those supposedly false views. Failing to do this will turn our views to a dead dogma. Moreover, individuals, as well as ages, are never infallible. Hence, views about the meaning of life given in the medieval period are considered obsolete or dogmatic nowadays. Therefore, philosophers need to shun cynicism or holding the view that only his/their own answers are defensible and other thinkers views are not justifiable. Rather what is required now, as we have been given to understand that it is not a single simple question, we need to improve upon the question by extricating different issues/questions involved in the apparently simple question. Thomson putting the question neatly tells that *improving* a question is a distinct process from *answering* a question. Rather it is directed towards revamping our understanding of the issues in a highly loaded question. “Better responses require better questions”⁷, writes Thomson. Hence, he suggests us to ‘unpack’ the question and not to kick off the investigation ‘with some set of ideological objectives already in mind.’ The disadvantage of inquiry with fixed objectives is that it is not helpful for a circumspect investigation.

It is also interesting to note that the question gained importance in the recent past on account of factors triggered by certain drastic shifts in attitude. Scepticism that came into fashion began challenging our ordinarily accepted worldviews. This sceptical attitude and dominance of reason have resulted in questioning the definitive nature of answers given either from religious or scientific standpoints. In addition to that, as Iddo Landou, points out the tradition of giving approbation to the ideals of pleasure-seeking has fallen from its grace, as an increasing number of people began feeling that this is not important enough to impart meaning in one’s life.

⁶ Ibid., p. 41.

⁷ Ibid., p. 42.

It is also notable that when we enquire into the meaning of life we assume that there will be an answer which, at least to some extent, will have universal appeal or acceptability. But close scrutiny of some of the answers reveals that in most cases the answer is culture-specific. It becomes evident when we scrutinize the answers that we find in Indian philosophy. Moreover, such responses are not atemporal. Hence, we find variations in answers of different ages.

A search of the genesis of the question makes us feel that it appears to our mind in certain situations or contexts. For example, spending some time under a rigid routine schedule the person may become bored and think that such stereotype lifestyle is very monotonous and is not worth pursuing. In other words, it is not making a purpose in life. In moments of despair also people may ponder about the purpose of life. Even looking at stars or thinking about the birth of the cosmos a meditative mind can get absorbed in thinking about life's origin, meaning and many other strange issues. As John Kekes says: "The problem originates in a disruption of everyday life. Because we are unsuccessful, bored, poor, tired, unlucky, sick, grief-stricken, victims of injustice ... we start reflecting on the point of the routine activities we endlessly perform. Once we embark on this reflection, it is hard to stop."⁸

If looked from a different angle we find that within the fold of the question there are 'why' questions, 'how' questions, 'what question' and maybe some more. Let us illustrate this point in a bit detail. When existentialist philosophers address the question: 'Why should I live when I could commit suicide?' the *why* issue gets utmost importance. A. J. Ayer also thinks that it is the 'why' question that constitutes the core of enquiry. He writes: "...what is required by those who seek the meaning of life is precisely an answer to their question "Why?" that is something other than an answer to any question "How?"⁹ A person almost at mid-point of his/her life could realize that what he has done up till now is not a significant one and he needs to systematise his/her life in a way which he/she thinks is better or more important. This reordering of life question is actually *how* question - how can I reorganize my life or

⁸ Kekes, John: "The Meaning of Life" Chapter- 22 in *The Meaning of Life: A Reader*, Edit. Klemke, E. D. and Cahn, Steven M., Oxford University Press, p. 255.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 200.

improve upon my life for the rest of the portion of life is at the center of enquiry. When it is a metaphysical or personal issue, it is *what* enquiry that predominates the scene. Let us recall the celebrated case of Aruna Shanbug whose friend's plea for euthanasia went to the Supreme Court India. The argument given in favour of her plea was that life is not mere living but living with vitality. As Aruna's life lacks this, it lacks quality and hence is not worth living, i. e. it is not a meaningful life. Thus she should be allowed to have assisted death. This metaphysics of quality of life was a perplexing question to many thinkers. One such thinker was Robert M. Pirsig who took a keen interest in exploring the metaphysics of quality of life. However, answers from this standpoint provide us with some common image of human life which someone can consider as a mark of a meaningful life, some may reject also.

Some thinkers also show that the issue can be tackled from different levels.

Thomson talks about three such levels

- of the universe itself
- of life in general' and
- of a specific individual's life

The first level of enquiry is a blend of metaphysical and normative explorations. It wants to furnish the answer what imparts our being here a sense. If we have a rudimentary knowledge of it we can get a significant understanding of how should we live our lives? Thomson writes: "...it provides a connection between what we are and how we should live."¹⁰ Most of the religious systems follow this method when they discern in a specific way the nature of the cosmos and of life and on the basis of their understanding; they offer a set of instructions to organize our life in a way which it considers meaningful. The understanding of the nature of the universe and of life has significance at a general level. However, at a specific level, i. e., when the question is posed from an individual's point of view it may be caused by a different situation and it might be the case that the individual might consider his life until now meaningless and if he/she can find an answer to this question he can bring modification in life so as to transform it in a way which can bring meaning in the questioner's life. It might contain an instance for others to follow.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 45.

There are thinkers who raise the question about the question's meaningfulness, i. e. whether the very question "What is the meaning of Life?" has any meaning or it is a question that makes no sense at all. Such questions arise, it seems, as it calls for answering so many endless questions and ultimately we find ourselves nowhere. Answering such questions is indeed problematic but this is not a sufficient reason for evading the problem. It is the nature of the human mind that it involves itself in dealing with such conundrums. Life is sometimes compared with a complex play where we participate after the drama has begun and also we shall leave the play before it ends. It is these unseen parts that make the issue intriguing and we want to unravel or reconstruct it. John Wisdom says that in asking the question of the meaning of life we "express a wish to grasp the character, the significance of the whole play. They are a confession that we have not yet done this and they are a request for help in doing it. Is the play a tragedy, a comedy or a tale told by an idiot? The pattern of it is so complex, so bewildering, our grasp of it still so inadequate, that we don't know what to say, still less whether to call it good or bad. But this question is not senseless."¹¹ Wisdom is of the opinion that it is indeed difficult to articulate the answer of meaning of life in few words. However, it does not mean that the question is senseless. Intellectuals cutting across disciplines have couched their views which may give us some inkling to make further headway.

Another relevant point is that even if we can think out the missing part of the play, it becomes only a narrative. We can understand the purpose or intention of the creator. If life is such like we merely participate in this process. Can mere understanding of this partnership is enough for life to have meaning is a moot question. If it is the case, I am just working as an instrument to fulfil the desire of something else and that too is mechanically. I cannot change anything in this complex setup even if I think that changing in a particular way will bring meaning to my life. As mechanical life brings little hope, we eagerly expect a teleological answer to the question.

While dealing with the question of the meaning of life we need to bear it in mind that the quest for a meaning of life is not an empirical or factual quest. It is rather seeking guidance as to how the analyst should live. It is usually believed that

¹¹ Ibid, p. 222.

life has a purpose. But this purpose is not the same for all. As all purposes are not of equal value, the researcher seeks input in his/her window of opportunity. Hence the enquiry ultimately boils down to the question of how I ought to live my life. The term 'ought to' clearly shows us that the issue at hand falls under the province of moral enquiry. Again, it is not merely a theoretical moral domain but a knowledge that is to be applied in action. As it also involves choosing the moral principles that impart meaning in one's life, it may be different from another person's depending upon the set of values he/she prefers. Thus we choose to *give* meaning to our life. To the question does life have a meaning A. J. Ayer says that in a sense it does have. "It has for each of us whatever meaning we severally choose to give it. The purpose of man's existence is constituted by the ends to which he, consciously or unconsciously, devotes himself. Some men have a single overriding purpose to which all their activities are subordinated. ... but the fact is that there is no end that is common to all men ... there is no single thing of which it can truly be said that this is the meaning of life. All that can be said is that life has at various times a different meaning for different people, according as they pursue their several ends."¹²

A few thinkers recast the question of the meaning *of* life as meaning *in* life. One such thinker is Susan Wolf. By changing this preposition they intend to show that meaning is not something mechanically attached to life. It is to be produced consciously. For Wolf, it is 'active engagement' and 'projects of worth' that bring meaning in life. By active engagement, she means engagement with those activities or people 'about which and whom we are passionate'. She enumerates certain activities that she considers 'projects of worth' or we may call worthwhile activities. But suppose some activities she considers not as 'projects of worth' and a person pursue that/those activity/ies. Does it mean that his/her life is meaningless? To put it in a different way: Can there be meaningless lives? Steven M. Cahn disagrees with Wolf and holds that by stipulating certain activities as worth pursuing and hence meaning-giving in life and some are not wolf is belittling some persons who follow those projects which, according to Wolf, are not 'projects of worth'. Writes Cahn: "Why not allow others to pursue their own ways of life without disparaging their choices and declaring their lives meaningless? ... If a person can find delights that

¹² Ibid. p. 201.

bring no harm, such a discovery should not be denigrated but appreciated.”¹³ From this, it appears that there cannot be a meaningless life.

We can well think that we are the creation of the evolutionary process. And in this higher stage of evolution there arose a capacity to raise the question about the meaning of life. But does the capacity of raising a question imply that it has an answer? Sri Aurobindo tells us that it is not merely physical evolution that is taking place in this universe but also psychical evolution is going on. So in this higher stage of evolution when the capacity of mind increases, are we not capable to attempt some sort of answers that our hankering mind craves for is a moot point.

Theistic philosophers in the discussion about life's meaning try to explore a divine plan. If we spend life in conformity with this plan life becomes meaningful and life lived in contravention of this plan fails to acquire meaning. A naturalist or agnostics do not agree with this line of arguing. They try to explore the metaphysical background of the question. Hence, they mull, turn and twist the question in various ways to go into the deep layer of the issue. They show the complexities of the question, raises the question about the use of the vocabularies such as 'meaning', 'meaningful', 'meaningless' when applied to life. From their discussion, we can realize that the apparently simple question is indeed conceptually obscure and full of intricacies. It is not a single question but a synthesis of many questions out of which some are cogent and we may think some answers can be ventured upon and some may not be answerable at least at the current stage of our development.

Previously we showed that meaning can also indicate purpose in the present context. But the question of the meaning of life when translated as the purpose is somewhat misleading. Every person cannot have the same purpose in life. Purpose of person A may vary from the purpose of person B. Hence, we can say that life can become purposeful in many ways. Different people may pursue different projects that they consider worthwhile. Hence, analytic philosophers instead of talking of *a* purpose talk about *purposes*. Again purpose can be used in a pejorative sense. An instrument can serve some purpose. The debatable point then is should a human being be treated as an instrument. Does such an analogy detract dignity from a human being? The theistic explanations face such insuperable contentions. Non-theists find

¹³ Ibid, p. 237.

explanations of theists as autonomy-dismissing and dignity-impairing. Another incident that complicates the issue is the event called death. Those who consider life meaningless as with death everything ends, attribute meaningfulness to immortality or rebirth. This view is also challengeable. As we find temporal limitation does not necessarily lessen value. Immortality or perpetuity is neither necessary nor sufficient proviso for according value to something, e. g. in case of getting the desired job.

A further issue that needs to be brought within the ambit of discussion is could a person's life have or may fail to have meaning without his becoming aware of it. That is: Is awareness of the agent is the *sine qua non* for life's meaning. If A is unreflectively happy and B is unthoughtfully unhappy can we say meaningfully that they have neither found nor failed to realize the meaning of life? Is 'meaning' when applied to life-situation is something awaiting to be tracked down or it is something to be given by the inquisitive mind is a debating point. As Hepburn says, "A person looks in vain for meaning and is needlessly frustrated when he cannot find it - if he conceives it as somehow existing prior to his decisions about what policies to pursue."¹⁴ From the above, it becomes clear that the question about the meaning of life when addressed need to take into account a number of issues in order to be comprehensive and not one-sided.

¹⁴ Hepburn, R. W.: "Questions about the Meaning of Life" Chapter 1.3 in *Exploring the Meaning of Life: An Anthology and Guide*, Edited by Joshua W. Seachris et al, Wiley Blackwell, p 49.

SARTRE'S ANALYSIS OF BAD FAITH

RUPON NAG

Introduction:

Jean Paul Sartre is an Existentialist Philosopher. He is one of the best-known philosophers of the twentieth century. He had a very assiduous pursuit of philosophical view, scholar creativeness, sincerity and resourcefulness. Not only that, he was an internationally reputed and recognised political person. He has a renowned personality and known as the father of existentialist philosophy. His philosophical and rational repercussions can be constructed into five grades, namely, psychology, ontology, ethics, political responsibility and the relationship between the fine arts and philosophy, especially concerning literature. Sartre develops his philosophical position in his great work *Being and Nothingness*, published in 1943. According to him, Existentialism is nothing but an attempt to draw all the consequences from a consistent atheistic position. Bad faith is one of the most enduring of Sartre's concept. The concept of bad faith stems directly from Sartre's description of the basic structures of consciousness; human experience consists of a tension between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. The man constitutes of consciousness and the first description of man always goes in terms of consciousness as it is the base of life in a man. This life does not mean the biological but the whole life circumstances which make him a human being and not just living organism. According to Sartre, consciousness is fundamental and inner structure of human being as pre-reflective cogito and the being of the percipere. This account of consciousness is connected to reflection, Cartesian Cogito and intentional consciousness of Husserl, in some way or another. But one thing is clear in Sartre's theory of consciousness that it is not subject to laws of appearance, as the other domain of being is dependent on phenomena. Consciousness creates itself, occurs through nausea, boredom, and it itself is just a being or simply a being to be intuited. In his statement of knowledge, he describes being as a knowing subject which is conscious. This consciousness is not particular mode of knowledge, it is self-knowledge or transphenomenal being in the subject.

Account of Consciousness: Sartre accepts the intentionality theory of Husserl. According to this theory, consciousness is always directed towards an object. But he rejects that part of theory where Husserl says that 'all consciousness is consciousness

of something'. Husserl meant by this that there is no consciousness which is not positing of a transcendent object and it means there is no self-conscious or consciousness has no 'content' in itself. Sartre says that to equal the consciousness to things is to deny the cogito because it should be the first principle of philosophy to expel things from the consciousness and to establish consciousness to be the true connection with the world. According to Sartre, consciousnesses as well as objects of the world, such as, stones, trees, buildings, are real existent things. So, Sartre does not support the view of Husserl that noema is unreal. Sartre says that not all consciousness is knowledge, but all-knowing consciousness mean knowledge of its object only and it is necessary at the same time that it be consciousness of itself as being that knows itself. We arrive into contact with consciousness as a fundamental existence which makes man a man but not an object in the world. Only through consciousness our knowledge is possible as knowledge of me and of the world. Now the question is what is the basic nature of this consciousness? The ontological form of this consciousness can be stretched from different examples taken from the life of a human being. Sartre describes that the human being is separated by the world by a 'not', i.e., I am not a tree, she is not like me etc. Sartre says that these negations adore as a instrument to contact to myself. Being a human, in the depth of my being I know myself. It is not the case that I know myself from the outside world but this consciousness belongs to my subjective realm. This is consciousness, an immediate relation of self to itself. I am the knower and the remaining world is known. This subject-object relation has been a problem in philosophy. So, Sartre uses the third term, self-consciousness between the knower-known to reduce infinite regress and subject-object dualism. He introduces two kinds of consciousness as such:

1. Pre-reflective consciousness is also known as non-thetic consciousness or non-positional consciousness. Here, there is no knowledge but an inherent consciousness of being.
2. Reflective consciousness also known as thetic consciousness or positional self-consciousness. In the sense that transcends itself in order to contact an object.

In case of consciousness reflection does not play the prime role that has been reflected on. Consciousness is something that cannot be revealed by reflection that reflected on to itself but its non-reflective consciousness put forward the reflection possible.

Cartesian cogito which says, "cogito ergo sum" is not supported by Sartre. Because he places pre-reflective cogito prior to Cartesian cogito and he explains that pre-reflective and Cartesian cogito both are in relation in terms of condition which means pre-reflective cogito is the condition for Cartesian cogito. First of all, consciousness of existing belongs in every person. This first consciousness is not positional at all. It is determined by itself as both perception and consciousness of perception. This first self-consciousness is called non-positional consciousness of self. This self-consciousness of something can be considered as a mode of existence. An intention, or a piece of pleasure, or a grief is as an immediate self-consciousness that can only exist.

Being always comes before consciousness, but conscious being is the source and conditions of all possibility. Its existence expounds its essence. In this transcendence of ego, Sartre recites relation of the ego to the consciousness. He says that "a pure consciousness" is an ultimate because it is its own consciousness. It remains a "phenomenon" in very special in where "to be" and "to appear" are one. Consciousness performs the cogito which oriented towards a consciousness and by which consciousness is taken as an object. According to Sartre, if consciousness which constituted the ego by representing itself as false, then consciousness is hypnotised by itself with this ego which has been constituted by it. Distinction between possible and the real, between appearance and being, between the wild and the undergo is possible by the help of ego. Consciousness is produced by itself on the pure reflective level which can be happened. Ego is escaped by consciousness on all sides and creates ego continuously to dominate and maintain it as if the ego is there. On the level distinction is not happened between possible and real which exists as appearance that is absolute. There are no longer any barriers, nothing which can cover up consciousness from itself is said by Sartre. Then consciousness recognizes the thing that could be called the mortality of its spontaneity and is suddenly anguished. It is that anguish which is absolute and without slave, fear of itself which can relate constitutive of pure consciousness. We can't avoid this anguish which imposed upon us. It is at one and pure event of transcendent origin and ever possible accident of our daily life at the same time. That consciousness work as link between me and the remaining world and this was framed by Sartre.

Bad Faith: To be in anguish means to be conscious of one's freedom and to be connected merely with one's future. Thus, to undergo anguish in the being is not simple and human being always likes to choose easier way out. To live in anguish means to connect every work of life in freedom and choosing a correct way. It also inhales adoption of failures, depressions with responsibility and without excuse. But it is tough to go with such a heavy responsibility so that human being chooses excuse that is called flight. One is starting to believe in determinism. We do not go for seeing at all the chances but confide on the one chosen. Because it has been assigned on us from without. We start in ourselves with the chance of itself. We refuse to agree that we have chosen but we ourselves presume that it was the only way out chosen for us. Thus, we run away from anguish by trying to catch ourselves from without as another or as a thing. Anguish and flight both of them exist in some consciousness. And it is not possible to run away from something without being aware of it. This is the cause of flight. According to Sartre, anguish gives path to two modes of conducts. One is freedom and another is 'bad-faith'. The right way of action chosen by human being is not the relation of bad-faith to anguish, but most of the times, human being is found engaged in bad-faith. For Sartre, one definite and essential attitude of mankind in which consciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward itself, is called Bad- Faith (*mauvaise-foi*).

Bad faith is often thought to be identical with falsehood. We speak of an ordinary person who sings of bad-faith or who lies to himself. We will willingly accept that bad-faith lies to oneself on the condition that we distinguish between lying to ourselves and lying in general. We will agree that lying is a negative attitude. But this negation does not affect the consciousness, the goal is towards the transcendent. The characteristic of a lie is that the liar knows the whole truth but he hides it. A person lies about what he does not know; when he preaches about a delusion; when he is mistaken, he does not lie. The ideal description of a liar is a kind of cynical consciousness that admits the truth to itself, denies it in its words and so negative. This dual negative view depends on the transcendent. The facts that are revealed are transcendent because they do not exist. The first negative depends on a truth, that is, on a particular kind of transcendence. Incidentally the heart I do negatively with which I have a prey for truth depends on the world. Moreover, the internal situation

of the liar is positive and can be the object of an affirmative presumption. The liar wants to deceive and he does not hide that intention from himself nor does he want to disguise it beyond consciousness. Conversely, he is supposed to fix secondary behaviour when he accepts it. It publicly imposes an instructive control over attitudes. The flaunted intention to tell the truth, everything from ('I'd never want to deceive you', 'This is the true I swear it') to it is the object of an innermost negation, but the liar does not consider it to be his intention. It is played, imitated, it is the character in whose role he plays the questioner that the specific reason is that this character does not exist, is a transcendent. So, lies do not provide the current inner character of consciousness in the game. So, all the negatives that form him, affect the object that stays away from consciousness for this event. Therefore, falsehood does not need any subjective basis and all the explanations that need to be negative are valid in the case of deception without any change. Of course, we have described the ideal lie. Undoubtedly, it often happens that the liar is a victim of his lies and he thinks about himself. But this common popular form of lying is its dead look. These lies are intermediaries between falsehood and bad-faith. The lie is behaviour of transcendence.

The situation cannot be the same if bad-faith is called indeed a lie to oneself. It is true that bad-faith hides an unpleasant truth or presents an unpleasant half-truth as truth. Bad-faith then has a seemingly false form, which changes everything, so that in bad-faith I hide the truth from myself. So, there is no duality between the deceiver and deceived. Rather there is a unity of a single consciousness in bad-faith. This does not mean that it cannot be affected by the condition of group commitment, as is the case with many other human phenomena. But group commitment can evoke bad-faith only when it establishes itself as a situation that leads to the departure of bad-faith. Bad-faith does not come to man from outside, no one goes through bad-faith or no one is infected by it, it is not a condition. But consciousness itself is struck by bad-faith. There is an original or primitive project and there is also a project of bad-faith. The project indicates the perception of bad-faith and is accompanied by a pre-reflective consciousness that affects itself through bad-faith. It is followed that the one who told a lie and one who tells a lie both are same person. This means that, I, as a deceiver need to know the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one

deceived. Better yet, if I know the truth but I can hide it more carefully, not at two times, which can re-establish a sense of duality together. Rather it will be in the form of a project.

Sartre gave so many examples of bad faith. A young lady has gone for a date with her friend. The lady knows the motives of her friend but when her friend puts his hand on hers, she pretends that the hand is not hers. But she has to make a decision now that he does not have the courage to make. Leaving the hand as it is, it means that she agrees to move forward in love and if she withdraw the hand, it will mean, to ruin the sweet moment that has developed. So, as soon as possible, she wants to postpone this moment. She now rises to the level of complete reasoning and becomes emotionless as she speaks of the ideals of life and even greater things. In this way her body and mind became separated. The hand is but like an unconscious object in fist of a warm hand all the time. Sartre wants to say, the young lady is in bad faith.

Many more examples of bad faith are found in Sartre's plays and novels. Lulu, the protagonist of the 'intimacy' story, decides to return to her husband, under the bad faith that her husband needs her. In 'The Room', Eve also takes her husband's unnatural world for his bad faith. In this context Sartre said, man tries to be what he is not, in the case of bad faith, but can he be what he really is? That is, can he gain sincerity or good faith? Sartre gave the example of café attendant who trying to become an ideal servant in runs, saying. He comes to the guest on foot a little faster, leaning towards them with interest, his eyes seemed to be praying when he ordered food for the guests. Then he comes back to mimic the firm rope steps of an automatic machine and he keeps the hand tray in a state of perpetual motion, like a man steeping on a stretcher and he tries to do something at work by fixing it with the gentleness of his hand every moment. But a café attendant cannot be a café attendant in the sense that an inkwell is an inkwell. He wants to be a café attendant, but he is not just a café attendant. He is a conscious person and so he cannot be one with the ideal café attendant like an unconscious object. He is not a café attendant; in this sense he can be a café attendant. The significance of the ideal of sincerity in this regard is that it is an ideal that cannot be mastered. This ideology means self-contradiction in the formation of consciousness. To be sincere means to be what one is. The pre-condition for this is that I am not what I am in the first place. But if I don't get what I want in

the first place, I'm going to lose everything. And this impossible phenomenon is not hidden from consciousness, but is the element of consciousness. It is inability to accept what we are and the inability to form ourselves as we are. From this point of view, there is no difference between bad faith and good faith or the essential element of sincerity, because sincere people want to build themselves in the way that they are not. Sartre wants to say that even trying to be sincere is afraid of falling into bad faith. In the case of bad faith, it is said that man sometimes fail to control his emotions, so he chooses to flee. Sincerity is what makes a person want to do something that makes him immobile. So, he is becoming what he is not. Even in bad faith, people are turning themselves into what they are not. Since the sincerity with which man seeks to himself with the ideal, he cannot do so, the time remains unaffected. As a result, man has to mechanize himself, which, according to Sartre, is the epitome of bad faith. The first act of bad faith is to flee from something that is human. It is this escape that discovers a broken state in the heart of humanity, a bad faith that wants to remain in a broken state. But he wants to deny this broken state and turn himself into an object. Sincerity is also broken -trying to find the ideal of the consciousness object to protect oneself from the state even though it is not. Sartre thinks that bad faith is possible, because the nature of consciousness is that it is not what it is and that it is not what it is.

Conclusion:

Bad faith is the psychological phenomenon whereby individuals act inauthentically. Sartre suggests that by acting in bad faith the waiter and the woman are denying their own freedom. But they are denying freedom here by using their freedom to do so. They manifestly know they are free, but are actively choosing not to acknowledge it. Bad faith is paradoxical in this regard: when acting in bad faith, a person is actively denying their own freedom, while relying on it to perform the denial. We know politically, our freedom is not unlimited and people are confined within his world and in this sphere, he is not allowed to choose his own freedom. But this is a kind of narrative that the present paper offers regarding the issue of bad faith. Sartre explains how we can achieve authenticity when he says that both in bad faith and good faith or sincerity one is aiming to in-itself. I consider Sartre's concept of bad faith as one of the relieving styles of living. Bad faith makes us more conscious

of our nothingness and insignificance. So, we are more aware of our habit to slip into bad faith and try to be in good faith.

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THE RELEVANCE OF ŚRIMADBHAGAVADĠĪTĀ'S TEACHING OF LOKASAMGRAHA

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BhagavadĠitā is a valuable and rare work. It is an intellectual as well as moral wealth of Indian culture. The teaching of the *BhagavadĠitā* can help anybody. As S. Radhakrishnan beautifully says, “....It is a book conveying lessons of philosophy, religion and ethicsif the hold which a work has on the mind of man is any clue to its importance, then the *Ġitā* is the most influential work in Indian thought.”¹ The book *BhagavadĠitā* teaches for the holistic welfare, not only the welfare of humans but also of non-humans. This holistic welfare is termed as “*Lokasamgraha*” in the *Ġitā*. Here the welfare is referred to the fruitful welfare of every aspect of reality: seen and unseen, human and divine, micro and macrocosm, animate and inanimate. In the language of Raimon Panikkar it aims at the cosmotheandric welfare.² That is why the name “*Lokasamgraha, the welfare of the worlds.*” There are mainly two *slokas*, the word ‘*Lokasamgraha*’ is used in explicitly besides many implicit references. In both the areas, it (*Lokasamgraha*) means “*the welfare of the worlds*”.

*Karmaṇaiva hi samsiddhim āsthītā janakādayaḥ/
Lokasamgraham evā 'pi sampaśyan kartum arhasi // (3/20)*

It was even by works (karma) that *Janaka* and others attained to perfection. Thou shouldst do works also with a view to the maintenance of the world.³

*Saktāk karmany avidvāmsō yathā kurvanti bhārata/
kuryād vidvāms tathā 'saktas cikīrṣur lokasamgraham// (3/25)*

As the unlearned act from attachment to their work, so should the learned also act, O *Bharata* (*Arjuna*), but without any attachment, with the desire to maintain the world-order.⁴ The word ‘*lokasamgraha*’ means *lokanām samgraha*, collecting/protecting the world together, or protecting or guarding the world together or maintenance of the world. In the derived sense we can express it as “*Holding the worlds together*” or the “*welfare of the worlds*”⁵. Thus, we can translate the word

¹ Radhakrishnan, S. *Indian Philosophy*, vol-1, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002, p-519.

² The term Cosmotheandricism is coined by Raimon Panikkar to denote the complex inter-relatedness between nature (cosmos), divine (theos) and humans (anthropos). For more details, Raimundo Panikkar, *The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness* (New York: Orbis Books, 1993).

³ Radhakrishnan S. *The BhagavadĠitā*, Blackie & son (India) Ltd., 1977, 139.

⁴ Ibid. p. 141.

⁵ Krishnaraj, 79. Lokamanya Tilak uses this meaning when he speaks of ‘*universal welfare*’ or the ‘*lokasangraha*’ in his *Ġitā-Rahasya*.

Lokasamgraha in the plural sense, ‘welfare of the worlds’. The word ‘worlds’ denotes not only the visible world where we live, eat and also have our beings, but also the world we are connected with or have our rational beings. The worlds summarize the totality of our existence and also their inter-connectedness to different spheres of our life. In this sense it may be cosmotheandric.

The importance of *Lokasamgraha* in the contemporary World: Working for the welfare of the worlds is a duty of all human beings. In the words of the *Bhagavadgītā*, “the one who does not help keep the wheel of creation in motion by sacrificial duty, and who rejoices in sense pleasures, that sinful person lives in vain.”⁶ Duty arises not only from a moral perspective but also from the ontology of our being. This is where authenticity comes into play.

Social Welfare: A realized person is a true *karmayogī* in which the three paths advocated in the *Bhagavadgītā* are conjoined such persons are capable of inspiring and bringing about revolution in society. If the person is not a true *karmayogī*,⁷ then that person will not be able to inspire people, although they may pursue the person without any conviction. These people can be called faceless people. For centuries, there have been various social evils that have prevailed in India: child marriage, the burning of widows (*satī*), the *zamindari* system, forced labor, caste system, dowry, untouchability, witchcraft, blind beliefs, entry ban and temple worship, etc. *Raja* Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1833) ushered in a new era of the Renaissance movement in India which tickled thousands of persecutors and persecuted. The people that followed Roy were Dayananda Saraswati (1824-1833), Govind Ranade (1842-1901), Ramakrishna (1836-1886), Vivekananda (1863-1902), Tilak (1856-1920), Gandhi (1869-1948)), Ambedkar and Annie Besant, just to name a few.

An important area where people fall behind is the lack of education. If the country is to progress, education is a basic requirement. Education should not only be at the indigenous level, but at the international level. The traditional Sanskrit language which was the hegemony of the people was replaced by the vernacular and

⁶ Prasad Ramananda , *The Bhagavad-Gītā: The Song of God* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2010), 48.

⁷ We see many of the modern gurus, social workers who claim that they are the real saviors of the world, are like “seeing they do not see, and hearing they do not hear, nor do they understand” (Mt. 13:13).

English. Christian missionary schools, Ramakrishna mission schools, and universities sprang up all over the country. This has brought about a revolution in people's thinking. Tilak, Swami Vivekananda and Dayananda Saraswati took on leading roles in this. *Lokasaṃgraha* establishes the platform for a citizen to make the country a *Rāmarājya*, 'Kingdom of Rāma' without seeking a selfish motive, and work for the well-being of the country. Therefore, it sets a social standard. When a leader watches it, the follower automatically made to follow. Thus says the *Bhagavadgītā* "Whatever noble persons do, others follow. Whatever standards they set up, the world follows".⁸ Gandhi's non-violent movement for freedom in Africa and India is an uncompromised example for the same that can be cited here. There is a further duty of the enlightened person, "to inspire in all the works". The enlightened one must inspire others by performing himself all works efficiently and without attachment. S. P Agarwal says that, "by adopting the approach of *Gītā*, underlying the word *josayet*, Gandhi achieved considerable success in obtaining mass support for his Satyāgraha movement".⁹ It is this belief, practice and the role model displayed by Gandhi which led thousands of people to follow in his footsteps which eventually christened him, '*Mahātmā*'.

The duty of one implies the service for the other throughout life. The other includes first and foremost, oneself, then the family, society, the divine and also the cosmos. Therefore, the journey of life is a journey of duties to all beings. In a more rigorous sense, it is *yajña*, the cosmic sacrifice in which the desire for our personal interest is burned.¹⁰ One should work constantly without any expectation in return, like the sun shining without any hesitation or like the breeze that blows relentlessly or the river that flows without any break.¹¹ By His sacrifice, *Prajāpati* made the world, the beings and by our sacrifice we recreate the divine. The *Gītā* explains this as follows. At first, *Prajāpati*, having created men together with *Yajña* (selfless work

⁸ *Yad-yad acarati sresthas tad-tad eve taro janah/ sa yat pramanam kurute lokas tad anuvartate*|| BG. III.21.

⁹ Agarwal, Sathya P. *The Social Role of the Gītā: How and Why*. Columbia: Urmila Agarwal Publishers, 1993.309.

¹⁰ The quality of fire is burning. In Yājñic terms, fire burns the impurities and creates anew. Fire also soothes one from chill and gives a pleasant experience. Heat in a harmonic right amount enables life to emerge from the embryo.

¹¹ Joshi, Shubhada A. "God, Man and Nature: Perspective of Bhagavadgīta," Gen's 17, no. 3 (7 January 2009), 34.

dedicated to God or Vedic sacrifice) as their duty (*dharma*), declared: “By this shall you multiply. May this be to you the Cow of Plenty yielding all your wants!” Also, it says, “You cherish the *Devas* with *Yajna*, and may the *Devas* in turn bless you (with rain and other desired gifts)! Thus, mutually cherishing, you shall attain the highest good.”¹² In other words, by faithfully carrying out our *dharma*, we participate in the Trinitarian fellowship of God in recreation, maintenance and sanctification. Hence, our *svadharma* also the work of *God (opus dei)*. It is said that this establishes the kingdom of *God*.

Political Welfare: When we talk about political well-being, it is not what we earn from the country that matters, but what we give to the country. It’s our duty to work for the country. *Lokasamgraha* is an attitude of ‘selfless giving’ without any attachment. Swami Vivekananda says: “In whatever you do for a particular person, a city or a state, assume the same attitude as you have towards your children, and expect nothing in return”.¹³ In the contemporary context, in the light of *Lokasamgraha*, a question arises about the emancipator acts of political leaders. The powerful becomes more powerful at the expense of the weak. Leaders, who are supposed to serve, seek to be served. Can we call it *Lokasamgraha*: erect statues of political leaders and logos of their parties for the sake of the voting and development bank? The word “minority” has become a vote bank for the powerful. Is it *Lokasamgraha* or *svārthasamgraha*?¹⁴ It is nothing other than deifying oneself.

Global development should be the motive of all political leaders in the country and thus establish peace and harmony in a diverse country like India. To achieve this, a just war may sometimes be necessary. But it should be “*last resort*” when all other possibilities for establishing peace are proven. Even in this act of just war, care must be taken that the damage done to humanity and the cosmos is minimal. A responsible national leader may have to make some decisions that could disturb certain sectors of

¹² *Sahayajñāḥ prajāḥ sṛṣṭvā puro ’ vāca prajāpatiḥ/ anena prasaviṣyadhvam eṣa vo ’ stv iṣṭakāmadhuk|| devān bhāvayatā ’ nena te devā bhāvayantu vaḥ/ parasparam bhāvayantaḥ śreyaḥ param avāpsyatha||* BG.III. 10-11.

¹³ Agarwal, Sathya P. *The Social Role of the Gītā: How and Why*, Columbia: Urmila Agarwal Publishers, 1993.308.

¹⁴ *svārthasamgraha* is the term we coined to signify the selfish greed which tries to amass power, politics, money etc.

society. But such decisions must be preceded by an open search for the well-being of all and by a sincere dialogue with all interested parties, as the *Gītā* itself states, “*that no taint of kāma, no element of egoism, should be at work in such decision.*”¹⁵ Hence, the dominant spirit of the leader should be equanimity, non-violence, compassion, *dvandvātīta* attitude (II.45, IV.22), *daya*, *karuṇa*, etc.

Ecological welfare: *Lokasamgraha* can be considered an ideal for preserving and protecting biodiversity. It makes us aware of our responsibility. Gandhi’s *ahimsa satyāgraha* influences Sunderlal Bahuguna to protect forests through the Chipko movement. It is a living example for environmental ethics specialists. So, it becomes a *yajña*. In Agarwal’s words, “*Lokasamgraha* ideal if properly understood, can make people aware of their responsibility and can provide ethical rationale for curbing unnecessary consumption and reducing pollution and waste”.¹⁶ The question is: what happens if the harmony (*ṛta*) of the cosmos is not preserved? *Kṛṣṇa* Himself answers this question in respect of karma for *Lokasamgraha*: “if I cease to work, the lokas as well as the people would be destroyed.” In other words, “I would be the cause for its confusion and destruction” (3.24). For the Lord, preserving the *loka* is a duty and therefore for us it is a divine duty. Therefore, if we fail to preserve the cosmic *ṛta*, we will not only fail in our divine duty, but also become cause for the doom of the cosmos.

Today, the global environmental crisis threatens humanity and the earth’s biodiversity. The amount of pollution from various vehicles, industries, mines and their waste creates an imbalance on the earth. Inappropriate monsoons, climate change, melting glaciers, depletion of the ozone layer that causes various diseases are real facts. To make matters worse, invisible pollution such as radiation and electronic waste both within the living earth and in outer space and its consequences are unimaginable. Therefore, the fragmentation of the earth is not only a question of the future of humanity, but also of the life of the earth; the degradation of complexity in interrelation is above all a moral and religious problem. The *Gītā* states that all

¹⁵ Painadath, Sebastian. ‘Does the Gita Advocate Violence?’, *Jnanadeepa*, Pune Journal of Religious Studies 5, no. 2 (July 2002), 29.

¹⁶ Agarwal, Sathya P. *The Social Role of the Gītā: How and Why*. Columbia: Urmila Agarwal Publishers, 1993.339.

creation is Divine. The Divine moves around the world. Fill the universe. The divine soul manifests in all creation in various forms. This is why various aspects of nature such as the banyan tree, tulsi, cow, monkey, garuḍa, lion, air, water, fire, etc., are symbolized as sacred. They are the mythological figures¹⁷ of the scriptures.

Conclusion

So far as our discussion is concerned we conclude that the *Bhagavadgītā's* vision of the world order is holistic. It covers all aspects of reality. It not only aims at the welfare of the visible world, but also at the invisible world. Therefore, the word *Lokasamgraha* is defined as 'welfare of the worlds'. This theme runs through the entire *Gītā* and can be the epicenter of a contemporary reading of it. Today the world needs an order, an order not only in human knowledge, in living conditions, in behavior, in culture, in politics and in the relationship with other human beings, but also in ecology and spirituality. A simple *jñānamārga* or *bhaktimārga* is not enough, as the Vedānta seers say. There is a need for a *karmamārga* mixed in the same way with the previous two that *Aurobindo* correctly indicated as integral yoga for rhythmic coexistence. *Lokasamgraha* is not just a new concept in the field of wellness. There are other similar concepts which are prevalent in India and which have had a greater influence on people. Some of them are, dharma, *satyāgraha*, *anāsakti*, *sarvodaya*, etc. Although *Lokasamgraha* is not as famous as these previous concepts, it is far superior to them. Furthermore, its greatness is in its complete nature, scriptural approval and eminent scholarship. It has the ability to stimulate people to a greater extent in matters relating to well-being. *Lokasamgraha*, when fully understood, aims at the well-being of the cosmos, human beings and the spiritual realm and their interrelationships. In this way, it aims for the well-being of all aspects of existence. Its starting point is always the individual self, from where it advances into the cosmic and metaphysical world. Thus, the concept can become an ideal tool for well-being in the liberation of the last, the last and the lost in the contemporary world. It is an ideal concept for our own well-being and the well-being

¹⁷ Myth can be understood in a deeper sense. Myths point to a yonder reality.

of others. It is an ideal for moral, social and also political life. It is above all an ideal for preserving ecology. It has a lot to contribute to the philosophy of liberation, trade and commerce and interreligious dialogue. Therefore, it can become an ideal goal of human existence by creating a just, loving and human society.

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THE CONCEPT OF GLOBALIZATION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SWAMI VIVEKANANDA

BIBHAS CHAKRABARTY

In the present world, we come across a globalized attitude and practice in almost all aspects of our life all over the world. Some legal steps also have been initiated by different countries to materialize the same. The principal purpose of this attitude and practice is to bring balance and harmony particularly in financial aspect of the different countries of the world through the implementation of the economic development mainly of the undeveloped and underdeveloped countries. But unfortunately we see the opposite picture. Instead of bringing about the financial balance and harmony it results in the financial disbalance and disharmony. The poor countries are getting poorer and the richer countries are becoming richer. This gives birth to more poverty and more unemployment in our society. So the question is: what is wrong with this attitude and practice and how this problem can be solved? I think the root cause which hampers the purpose of this good effort lies in our minds: The cause is nothing but our exclusively individuals, selfish and materialistic attitude. This problem, again I think can be solved following the philosophy of Swami Vivekananda. The essence of the whole philosophy of *Advaita Vedanta* has been beautifully explained only through two Mahāvākyas “*Sarvam Khalvidam Brahman*” Everything is Brahman and “...*Jiva Brahmaivanāparah*”. Most of the thinkers are of the opinion that the philosophy of Swami Vivekananda is nothing but the *Advaita Vedanta* itself with some reformation. If this is so then the essence of the philosophy of Swamiji also is the same as that of *Advaita Vedanta* and has been expressed through the same *mahāvākyas*. Now if *Jiva* is identical with Brahman and Brahman is one, then we all are also one. So, there is no point of individual and egoistic separateness and for this reason there is no room for selfishness. The philosophy of Swamiji is strictly spiritualistic, so material enjoyment cannot be the end of our life; rather self-sacrifice is the ultimate end of us. Thus, the proper teaching and implementation of the philosophy of Swami Vivekananda in our society can show the path for construction of an ideal and true globalized society.

We, the human beings are said as essentially social. So we cannot live without a society. We take our birth in a society, we grow up and live in it, and

ultimately we die in it. So, human life, in true sense cannot be conceived of without society. But society may be either ideal or non-ideal. Accordingly human life also may be ideal or non-ideal. An ideal human life necessarily presupposes an ideal society. But the question is what do we mean by an ideal society? What are its properties? Following the philosophy of Swami Vivekananda, Tagore, K.C.B and many others it can be said that ideal society cannot know any boundary or limit imposed by different communities or countries. The world itself is the limit of it. So, the whole world is a single ideal society. This implies that any sort of division and demarcation goes against the ideology of an ideal society. According to this ideology the whole world is a single society and the whole humanity is a single community living in that society (*Jagatjuriaakjati ache se jatirnammausjati*). Being motivated by the ideology of this philosophy an attempt has been made from the part of the government of different countries to initiate the foundation of a globalized society. Which helps us to transcend the boundary made by different countries becomes a helping condition to construct a globalized ideal society. The principal motive of this society is to bring about a harmony in financial aspect in particular and in all aspects in general all over the globe. To materialize this purpose strong and active initiative is seen to be taken by different leading countries of the world. But in reality the purpose is not satisfied. This society is making the poor poorer and the rich the richer and thereby the financial disbalance is going to be stronger. So, the question arises: what does the reason owe which our mission is not getting successful? And how this problem can be overcome? I think our self-oriented materialistic attitude is responsible for the problem mentioned above and this problem can be solved if our society follows the philosophical ideology taught by Swamiji.

If we define globalization as the process that integrates people across the world and through this globalization if we try to build a single world where each individual will interact with others, how can it be possible then? Because if we see the philosophy of Swami Vivekananda, according to him, there must be food first, then only we can devote our mind to the higher things. Where people in every second are crying for food, how can they think of a united world? How will they spread their ideas, cultures etc? Therefore the question is why are these problems here? What is missing in the today's concept of globalization? The answer is it is due to the lack of

proper religion. Swami Vivekananda understood this problem. That is why he decided to spread the *Vedāntic mantra* all-over the world to arise all human being. To materialize this end, he attended the world's parliament of Religions held in Chicago, 1893. From here he actually had started Globalization of Religion with a new dimension. When he said, "my sisters and brothers of America", he actually tried to drive out the differentiation from all the religious people. For him we all are one and there is no difference among different kinds of religions. The only differences among them are the way to spiritual realization. That is why he talked about the universal religion. For him, "Religion is the manifestation of the Divinity already in man". If we realize this divinity our humanity will awake and we will serve our man in the sense of God.

Swamiji also said, physical weakness is the cause at least of one-third of our miseries. We are lazy and we cannot work and also we do not love each other because we are not physically and mentally stable. Psychologically we are not in a position to love any one, because there is a huge competition of accumulating food and money as wealth across the world and we have to participate in it. By this participation rich persons of the world are becoming richer and poor are becoming poorer. Now in this situation how can we dream of a single or united world? There is no way as such. But in this situation if we see the practical Vedanta philosophy of Swami Vivekananda then I think we can have a beautiful way to solve this problem. Swamiji showed us a way of spiritualism. According to him physically the world cannot be united but spiritually the whole world is already united (*advaita*). Swamiji shows us how we can bring a unity among this world of diversity. That is why he talks about unity among diversity. He says, "*Individuality in universality is the plan of creation. Each cell has its part in bringing about consciousness. Man is individual and at the same time universal. It is while realizing our individual nature that we realize even our national and universal nature. Each is an infinite circle whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere. By practice one can feel universal selfhood...*" [1]

For him this diversity across the world is nothing but the law of nature or universe – "*Unity is before creation, diversity is creation. Now if this diversity stops, creation will be destroyed.*" [2] Therefore we cannot deny or ignore it. Though we cannot unite this physical world but we can bring an eternal peace in this physical

world following the practical Vedanta philosophy of Swami Vivekananda. We should respect this diversity of physical world in the sense that, these all are manifesting from the same ultimate or pure reality. Otherwise we cannot bring the unity among the people of entire world. Here what Swami Vivekananda has tried to mean that, true unity can be possible only by realizing our true spiritual nature of unity. For Swami Vivekananda, *“The whole universe is one chain of existence of which matter forms one pole and God the other.”* [3] The question therefore is: how can we then unite this world? To answer this question Swami Vivekananda has spoken of the realization of our spiritual nature that, we are nothing but God or Brahman. And it is said that Brahman is everywhere in everything then everything is Brahman. Therefore we are also Brahman. Brahman is like a sea where each and every individual is like the wave of that sea. Two waves are different from each other as far as their name and shapes are concerned. But from their essence they are nothing but the water itself. Waves come and go but the same water remains there in the sea. Similarly every individual and every object come in this world for a time being and also will go in certain time but same Brahman will remain here in this world. Therefore Brahman alone is real and we ourselves are nothing but that Brahman. Our physical body will be destroyed at a certain time but the soul will remain there as it has neither creation nor destruction, it is eternal. It is our body, name and form which create diversity but they are not real in reality, we all are one. This implies that the whole universe is a unity by virtue of our true nature. One and the same soul or Brahman runs through different individuals. Thus we all are one. Soul is the only reality. So unity or oneness is the only truth.

One who will realize this spiritual nature will have the feeling of oneness. That person will see himself/ herself in everywhere in every being. Thus if every individual sees himself / herself within every being of this entire world, the whole world can immediately be united. In this way we can bring a unity among this world of diversity. Thus true Globalization can be made. The same truth has been reflected in the *‘Srimadbhagavadgita’* – *“Sarva-bhūta-sthamātmānaṃsarva-bhūtānichātmani ikṣhate yoga-yuktāmāsarvatrasama-darśanaḥ”* [4] This world is full of wealth and these wealth are for each and everyone living in this world. Each and everyone have the same right to enjoy this wealth equally. No one has created this wealth, because

these are already there from the very beginning of the creation. Wealth is there but we just have to utilize it in a proper way. According to *Gītā*, when a child takes a birth, he comes with empty handed and when he leaves this world he also leaves this world being empty handed. Therefore nothing is one's own property. One has a duty to share this wealth with others instead of enjoying alone. It will be unfair and unethical if someone enjoys more wealth than one actually needs.

Swamiji always teaches us how each and every people in this world can be the God. Every one of us is God, eternal soul or the *Brahman*. There is no diversity among us in our spiritual nature, whatever diversity we see, these all are due to our lack of perfect spiritual knowledge. There is diversity only in respect of our body and name. But spiritually we have no differences; we all are the same reality. That is why Vedanta says "*tvat tam asi*". If someone can realize this truth, immediately he will find himself in this entire world. Therefore if one cheats someone else, thereby one cheats oneself only. Here what I'm trying to mean is that, in the form of global trading system when capitalist countries are absorbing other weaker countries, it is also like a cheating with them (the weak countries). Because in the name of global trade, capitalist countries intervene in the small industries of the weakest or less advancement countries. Small industrial products of the weaker countries cannot compete with the high subsidized products of capitalist countries and as a result the weaker countries are becoming more weaker day by day. As their economy is not growing up, they are facing a big problem to survive. Therefore of course the capitalist countries can continue their global trading system but the motive of their trade should not be to cheat the weak countries rather they should co-operate them so that the financially weak countries can be economically developed and sound.

Therefore it should be kept in our minds that as we all are the same reality or *Brahman*, there should not be any inequality among us. Every people from the every corner of the world must have the equal opportunity in every field of their life. In this respect, each and every person from all the countries should have the equal opportunity to produce and sell their products in the global market. Thus all persons will be benefited and encouraged to produce and sell their products. They will do so for the welfare of their family, their society and their country as well. After that there will be no one in starving, no one will die from hunger. This is the way, by which we

can serve every people of the world. This is the sense what Swami Vivekananda tries to mean as “*shivajnanejivaseva*”. This is the true sense of service and that is why, “*He who sees Shiva in the poor, in the weak, and in the diseased, really worships Shiva;*” [5] Therefore capitalist countries should help the other weaker countries in the world instead of absorbing them. By this service to man in the sense and name of God, one can kill his egoism and only after that one can be able to achieve or realize the ultimate unity among the entire world. And then only the whole world can be united. Therefore we have to awake our inner spirituality. When our inner spirituality will wake up, we will regain a great strength, vigour and courage within us by which we will be able to fight against every problem in the world. We will help each other in every situation and every family will help another family, likewise every state and every country will help each other like true friend. I think, in this way our world can be united and this can be the Globalization in the true sense of the term.

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**THE TRUTH OF PHOTOGRAPHS: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL
REFLECTIONS**
SUBHANKAR PODDAR

Introduction:

Truth is one of the widely discussed areas in philosophy. The discussions in this field are primarily focused on the question of what is the nature of truth and how can we know if something is true or not. There are different categories of *truth bearers*¹ with which we associate the concept of truth. These categories are sentences or utterances, statements or assertions, beliefs that are associated with judgements or thoughts, and propositions.² The differences among these categories lead to the complexities in the theories of truth. There are different questions related to these categories, such as “what is meant by ‘*x* is true?’” or “what makes *x* true?” or “what is the criterion for *x* to be true?” etc. Here *x* refers to the different categories, such as the sentences or the statements. To address these questions, philosophers have devised different ways to look into the matter and these ways are the different theories of truth. There are five main theories of truth: the correspondence theory, the coherence theory, the pragmatic theory, the redundancy theory and the semantic theory. The aims of these theories of truth are various. A theory of truth should explain the nature of truth, the criterion of truth, the meaning of the word “true”, the use of the word “true”, and the purpose of saying that something is true.³ For example, in the case of “*x* is true” where *x* is a particular statement or proposition, the criterion for *x*’s being true, or what it means to say that *x* is true should be determinable following a theory of truth.

According to the correspondence theory, a statement or a proposition is true if it corresponds with the fact. For example, if I say “it is raining”, then the statement will be true if it is raining, and the statement will be false otherwise. Here, the criterion for the statement to be true is to correspond with the actual world. Coherence theory holds that a judgement or a statement is true if it coheres with other sets of judgements. Its truth is determined by observing whether it coheres with other

¹ David, Marian, (2004), “Theories of Truth” in *Handbook of Epistemology* (eds. Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen and Jan Woleński), USA: Springer-Science & Business Media, B.V, p. 331.

² Ibid., p. 331.

³ Ibid., p. 335.

judgements or not. According to the pragmatic theory of truth, we can know a statement or a judgement as true or false by use of it. If acting based on the statement can give the desired result, then the statement is true, otherwise false. The successful usability of the statement is the criterion here. The redundancy theory holds the view that it is meaningless to say "it is true that x ", where x is a statement, because it becomes redundant, and it does not add anything to the existing knowledge. For example, to say "it is true that the sun rises in the east" and the fact that the sun rises in the east is the same. Hence, using the prefix 'it is true' does not add anything new to the existing knowledge. That is why it is redundant to say "it is true that the sun rises in the east." The semantic theory of truth gives "an account of what truth consists in."⁴This theory, instead of analyzing the concept of truth, provides what truth consists in. For instance, when it says that "snow is white" iff snow is white, then it means that the statement "snow is white" will be true if and only if snow is white. It means that the truth of the sentence consists in fact. This theory by Alfred Tarski has a similarity with the correspondence theory.

The truth bearers, mentioned above, are not limited to these categories only. Truth is associated with other categories also. For example, photographs provide us with truth, but photographs themselves are not statements or sentences or beliefs. Rather photographs may convey some thoughts or beliefs and hence, they can convey true or false beliefs or thoughts or states of affairs. So, photographs can be used as a medium of non-verbal communication. Unlike verbal communication like using sentences etc., photographs non-verbally communicate an idea or a thought. As photographs can be used as a medium of communication, they are used for various purposes. For example, they can be used as evidence of something, archival of memory, as documents, to study about different things like astronomic events or anatomy of living beings, for medical purposes etc. All these uses of photographs are dependent upon the truth-giving feature of photographs. But the question here is: what makes photographs truthbearers? What is the criterion of the truth-giving characteristics of photographs or how do photographs give us the truth? This paper aims to answer these questions. To answer the question, we have different theories of

⁴ Walker, Ralph C. S., (2017), "Theories of Truth" in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language* (2nd ed.) (eds. Bob Hale, Crispin Wright and Alexander Miller), USA: Wiley Blackwell., (2017), p. 548.

truth against which photographs and theories related to them will be tested. But the redundancy theory and the semantic theory are not relevant here as they focus on statements only. At first, we have to understand what is meant by the truth of photographs and what makes them truth bearers. Unless a photograph is true, there is no question of its ability to convey the truth.

Truth of Photographs: Scott Walden said, “pictures are regarded as arrangements of marks on surfaces which, when presented to our visual system, cause it to operate in many ways just as it would were it confronted, not with a picture, but with what the picture is a picture of.”⁵ For example, if someone went to The Taj Mahal and saw it from the River Yamuna, and later if that person saw a representation of The Taj Mahal from the same angle, it may result in similar perceptual belief. This may be a painting or a photograph of The Taj Mahal. We will have a firm perceptual belief if it is a photograph instead of a painting because, in the case of paintings, the painter perceives the scene and then paints it, whereas, in the case of a photograph, the camera mechanically captures the scene.

Perceptual beliefs are formed in two stages. At first, we get the perceptual inputs or data from the scene, and then we make our beliefs about that scene using some pre-existing knowledge or beliefs. In the case of photography, Walden suggests that we get perceptual information from a photograph and make our perceptual belief and we also make second-order beliefs about the first-order perceptual belief that those beliefs are true.⁶ This belief is based on the objective nature of photographs. A camera mechanically captures a scene. It captures different kinds of information about the object. Though there are some objections to the claim that a camera captures unbiased and objective information, which will be discussed in the next sections, from the beginning of photography its process was taken to be objective. This objective nature of photographs makes us believe that photographs are associated with truth. This belief in the truth of the information and message that we get from the photographs makes it a truth bearer.

⁵ Walden, S., (2008), pp. 97-98.

⁶ Ibid., p. 104.

Correspondence Theory of Truth and Photographs:

If we look at the history of photography, the technology related to photography has changed a lot, but the basic principle behind photography has remained the same as it was in the 1840s. The basic principle of photography is about capturing an image using light on a light-sensitive surface. In the beginning, Joseph Nicéphore Niépce, who is credited to have invented photography, captured images on a sensitized pewter plate. To capture the image, he exposed the plate for almost a day. Later Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre and William Henry Fox-Talbot in France and Britain respectively worked on it and made photographs by exposing the light-sensitive plate for a much lesser amount of time. From that time till today the basic principle of photography remains the same. The object has to be placed in front of the camera and by opening the shutter of the camera, light enters and falls onto a photosensitive plate or a sensor and thus the image is captured. That is why photographs are termed as the "drawings of nature" because, unlike paintings, photographs are not handmade objects. Photographs are captured mechanically or electronically. The process is automatic. So, photography does two important things. Firstly, it automates the image-making process and secondly, by making it automatic, it diminishes the role of human intervention in the form of drawing in image-making.

Photographs are mechanically produced images. As the camera captures mechanically, there is no place for the elimination of something. The camera will capture what is there in front of the camera. Roland Barthes said that a photograph is always about something. There has to be something to be captured.⁷ A camera can capture every detail of the object. Daguerre said that photographs are perfect in detail and accurate. A photograph represents what is there in the scene. Dominic McIver Lopes compared photography with the signalling system.⁸ He said, "...individual photographs are cues to the appearance of depicted scenes."⁹ He also said that photographs are "belief independent feature tracking."¹⁰ This is the reason behind the truth-giving ability of photographs. Photographs give us knowledge about the world

⁷ Barthes, R. (1981)

⁸ Lopes, D. M., (2016), p. 21.

⁹ Ibid., p. 21.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 21

based on this characteristic. This similarity refers to the correspondence theory of truth. The basis of the correspondence theory of truth is the relation between the statement and the factual state of the affair. In the same way, the truth of photographs depends on the correspondence between the photograph and the factual world. So, it can be said that the truth giving characteristic of photographs can be theorized using the correspondence theory of truth.

But not all photographs correspond to the world. The advancement of technology makes it easier to change the characteristics of the object in the photograph. For instance, a flower can be captured using different filters of the lens, or with different white balance or exposure and this can result in a different colour of the flower in the photograph. This alteration can be done in post-production also. Brian Walski, a photojournalist from the *Los Angeles Times* once combined two images to produce one, which was published on the front page of the newspaper. This photograph was misleading and because of this when he admitted what he had done, he was dismissed from work.¹¹ This possibility of manipulation of photographs puts into question the truth-giving character of photographs. To check whether any such alteration has been done one needs to see whether the photograph corresponds to the fact. But this is often not possible, which forces us to check the coherence of the photograph with other available documents including other photographs.

The Coherence Theory of Truth and Photographs:

According to the coherence theory of truth, a statement is true if it belongs to a coherent system of beliefs. This theory emphasizes the relationship between statements. For example, if someone says that “an accident happened on the highway between a car and a helicopter”, this statement will not easily qualify as true, because a helicopter is usually not found on a highway. Here, the statement does not cohere with other statements. But if someone says that “an accident happened on the highway between a car and a bus” and some other sources also support this statement then this statement can be regarded as true. So, the relation between statements can make a belief true or false.

¹¹ Walden, S., (2008), p. 91.

Bhopal Gas Tragedy is one of the most tragic industrial disaster events that ever happened in the world. The disaster took place in Bhopal in a pesticide plant run by Union Carbide India Limited on the night of 2-3 December in 1984. Toxic Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) gas leaked from the plant and around 600,000 people were exposed to the toxic gas. Because of this, around 3,000 people died instantly and over 500,000 people got injured. But the effect of this accident did not stop there. From 1984 till today people who were exposed to the gas are suffering and more than 20,000 have died of related conditions. Even the second and third generation of children are being born with disabilities. These statistical data can indicate the terrible effect of the disaster, but these data cannot show the pain that people suffered due to the disaster. Raghu Rai, one of the most prominent photographers of India covered this disaster and took photographs that depict the pain and suffering of that incident. Let us see some of his photographs and from these photographs, we can see how the coherence theory of truth can be useful in case of determining the truth of photographs.

Figure 1 depicts some of the people who lost their sight because of exposure to the gas leak. Their lungs were also got affected. Figure 2 shows that a man is carrying his dead wife. Figure 3 depicts the burial of an unknown child, who died of the toxic gas. Figure 4 depicts some of the aborted fetuses preserved in jars. Regarding this photograph, Rai, in an interview, talked about his conversation with Dr Satpathy from Bhopal who said that the women who were full pregnant on that night and running for their lives, got aborted on the way. The fetuses were picked up by the medical team later on.¹²



Figure 1



Figure 2

¹² Art Talk, (2018).



Figure 3




Figure 4

All these photographs cohere with each other. All of these photographs are from the place of the disaster and none of them depicts any irrelevant visuals. Moreover, other photographers' photographs of the same event depict images of the same sort. So, as the coherence theory says, if a statement coheres with other sets of statements, then the statement will be true; similarly, these photographs cohere with other photographs and hence, become true.

Let us see another example. In 1971, Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) saw a revolution that ultimately brought liberation to them. After the partition of India in 1947, Bangladesh was under the control of Pakistan. In 1971, the people of Bangladesh fought for their rights which finally liberated them. But after the liberation, thousands of people came to India as refugees. This event is also captured by photographs that show the pain of the people who came to India as refugees. The photographs given below are taken by Raghu Rai.

Figure 5 shows the suffering of an old refugee woman who was eager to go back to her home. Figure 6 shows the uncertainty of being a refugee. Figure 7 portrays many people who took shelter in Hume pipes. Figure 8 shows the refugees in search of shelter. Figure 9 is a photograph of Delhi.



Figure 5



Figure 6




Figure 7




Figure 8



Figure 9

All these photographs depict the pain and suffering of the people. These photographs also cohere with each other, except Figure 9 which has a different context. Figure 9 is a photograph of Delhi's Chawri Bazaar. This photograph has no connection with the others. So, we find that figures 5-8 can be regarded as true based on the coherence among them. But figure 9 is irrelevant here. But this individual photograph has some documentary value based on correspondence. So, though there is coherence between the photographs, ultimately what the photographs depict and their truth depends upon correspondence. Because of correspondence with fact, individual photographs become true, and when they cohere with other photographs, they give a broader true story about the event. The problem that arises here is that a photographer may have a certain perspective on an event. This can make the photographer focus on certain aspects of the event leading to a partial view of the matter posing as the truth. A set of photographs taken by a person or persons with a similar perspective may be coherent with each other, but this does not ensure that the photographs show the truth of the event. Hence, in looking for coherence as the giver of truth, one has to check with photographs taken by different individuals and documents from diverse sources.

Pragmatic Theory of Truth and Photographs:

The pragmatic theory of truth is about the application of a given statement. If a statement is successfully applicable then the statement is true, otherwise false. In the case of photographs, we have seen that the truth of the photograph depends on the correspondence of the photograph with the fact or the coherence between the photographs. But sometimes both these ways of ascertaining truth fail to give the truth of the photograph. In such a case, the content of the photograph may be applied to see whether it is true or not. Suppose we get multiple sets of coherent photographs of an event and every set shows a different story about the event. In such a case, if possible, one can go to the place of the event and verify which set of photographs shows the fact. But this has its limitations. Not every event can be verified later. In those cases, the pragmatic theory needs to be applied where we judge the truth of the photograph by using it. For instance, when people are lost somewhere and we get some photographs of that person to identify, if the lost person is found successfully using that photograph, we can say that the information in the photograph was true. This kind of use of the photograph is very common in different investigations

including forensic investigations, etc. Hine was deeply influenced by William James's pragmatism. According to James's pragmatism, knowledge is experience-based and can be considered as such only if it is successful in social, psychological and natural contexts. This influence can be seen when we analyze Hine's photographs. Hine believed that his photographs speak for him. We can know about his intellectual and political life from his photographs. This is possible if we use photographs as the conveyer of the intention and idea of the photographer.

Here are some of Hine's photographs. Figure 10 is the photograph of the Pennsylvania coal breakers. All the labourers are children. Hine said about this photograph, "There is work that profits children, and there is work that brings profit only to employers. The object of employing children is not to train them, but to get high profits from their work."⁴⁵ Figure 11 and Figure 12 are from different mines where children were working. These photographs show the terrible situation of the American children. Because of these documentations, activism against child labour developed and labour acts were amended.



Figure 10

⁴⁵ The Guardian, (2018)



Figure 11



Figure 12

So, it can be said that these photographs successfully conveyed the idea and thought behind the photographs to the people. Moreover, these thoughts are not objective, rather they are experienced. That is why these photographs become true in terms of pragmatism. Another thing is that, not only Hine's photographs, any documentary photograph, including earlier examples by Raghu Rai can also successfully communicate the ideas behind the photographs. But the role of the correspondence cannot be denied in these photographs also. The experience and the thought are important behind the documentary photographs, but the content of the photograph does not depend on the thought only, but it is the subject of the photograph that matters and that depends on correspondence.

Conclusion:

So far, we have seen that there are different theories of truth and the truth of photographs as a medium of communication can be assessed in various ways. The truth of photographs is based on correspondence with fact. However, we cannot always check that correspondence. That is why we have to look for coherence with other photographs of that object or event. In different photo stories, photographs cohere with each other and give us the truth about an event. But these kinds of photographs may also mislead, and in such a case we have to rely on the application of the photograph. The truth of the photograph depends on the mechanism of the camera and its ability to capture the event as it was. But at the same time, this

mechanism can also lead to misleading photographs. Though the truth of photographs is sometimes ascertained based on coherence or pragmatism, it primarily depends upon the relation of correspondence with reality. The truth of photographs has multiple modes of establishing it, but at the most bottom level, it depends on correspondence.

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TAT TVAM ASI IN *ADVAITA VEDĀNTA*: UNIVERSAL IDENTITY REVEALED

SIMRAN RAINA

Introduction:

All Schools of Indian Philosophy have basic assertion and on the basis of basic assertion the whole philosophy of a system is developed. The basic assertion of *Advaita Vedānta (AV)* is Non-duality of *Brahman* and *Ātman* (soul). Śaṅkara summarizes his teaching in following *śloka*:

ślokārthenapravakṣyāmiyaduktatīṅgranthakotibhiḥ
Brahma satyamjagan-mithyajīvobrahmaivanāparaḥ

Brahman is real, the world is false/appearance and the soul is only *Brahman (Tat Tvam Asi)* (Balasubramanian, 1980, 108-110), nothing else. *Brahman* is said to be the real. Real, according to *AV* is defined as that which remains un-contradicted at all spans of time.¹ Now, the world and its objects are subject to origination and destruction, therefore world cannot be regarded as real; it is considered as unreal. The world which we experience and which is the ground of all our actions is the product of *avidyā (ignorance)*, everything in the world operates in the backdrop of *avidyā (ignorance)*. Again, the soul or *Self* in the individual is *Brahman*,² the pure consciousness (*Shudhacaitanya*). *Atman*, which is none other than *Brahman* appears as individual self only on account of *avidyā*. *Avidyā* give rise to superimposition.³ Superimposition of various attributes to the soul (like, mind- senses and body), give rise to cognitive error and the terms “‘I’ am fat’, ‘‘I’ am tall’, ‘this is mine’ etc are being used for the self. In other words one starts attributing various attributes to the

¹ *Brahman* is pure consciousness, the inner self/the atman. An argument offered by Śaṅkara for the reality or existence of consciousness is that “none can doubt its existence, for it is involved in doubting. Fire cannot cancel its own heat; even so Self consciousness can never doubt itself” Again in case of deep sleep one experiences peace immediately upon waking. This bliss or peace must be identical with eternal existence and self revealed knowledge because it is experienced in non-duality, beyond the activity of cognition. It reveals the reality of *Brahman*. (See William M Indich 1995, 26-27)

² Self refers to *Brahman* or *ātman*, while self is the individual who is under ignorance and has forgotten the identity between his *Self* and *Brahman*.

³ Superimposition is defined as attributing the property of one thing upon another. See (Śaṅkaraçārya, 1890: 108). All the Advaita Vedāntins agrees about the way of thinking about superimposition as the Śaṅkara has proposed. Śaṅkaraçārya in *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* writes; “Some indeed define the term 'superimposition' as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing. Others, again, define superimposition as the error founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is superimposed. Others again, define it as the fictitious assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing.” (Śaṅkaraçārya, 1980: 108).

ātman. One uses first person pronoun ‘I’ for oneself and second person pronoun ‘you’ for others who are never recognized as being connected with “I” neither epistemologically nor metaphysically. This unexamined distinction is caused by fundamental ignorance. This ignorance is beginning-less and natural. (Thibaut, 1890, 111). To get rid of the ignorance and to realize the identity between the *Brahman* and *Ātman* is the only objective of human life. On account of ignorance individual thinks itself to be finite, i.e., limited in knowledge, power and other aspects. The individual performs action in the affairs of the world and becomes subject to pain and pleasure. Most importantly, individual is caught up in the transmigratory existence and suffering thereof. Thus, to get rid of suffering or to achieve liberation is the goal of human life. The goal can be attained with the destruction of ignorance.

Ignorance can be destroyed by its opposite, i.e., knowledge. *AV* regards knowledge as only way to liberation; Knowledge of the identity between *ātman* and *Brahman*. *Mahāvākya TatTvamAsi (That thou art)* is referred by Śāṅkara to reveal the truth about individual self. But, if the objective of human life is to realize non-duality of the *Self* with the absolute (i.e., *Brahman*) then why to pursue ethical actions? Why good actions are to be performed for the welfare of other beings or the society. Since social set up is the result of cognitive error woven by ignorance. Given the views of *AV*, it seems that the system does not involve ethics in its framework. This paper intends to reveal with the analysis of the great statement *TatTvamAsi* that the system is infused with ethics. If one analyses the metaphysics of *AV*, one would explore that ethics is inherent in the system. In this context Max Muller remarks that “The Vedānta philosophy has not neglected the important sphere of ethics; but on the contrary, we find ethics in the beginning, ethics in the middle and ethics in the end...” (Radhakrishnan, 1913, 168)

TatTvamAsi is one of the four prominent *Mahāvākyas*.⁴ The statement is repeatedly used by teacher Uddalaka Aruni to his son Shvetaketu. Uddalaka Aruni

⁴ The other three are 1) They are: *Prajñānām Brahman (Consciousness is Brahman)* in the *Aitareya Upanishad* of the *Rig-Veda*. 2) *Aham Brahmāsmi (I am Brahman)* in the *Brihadāranyaka Upanishad* of the *Yajur-Veda*. 3) *Ayam Atmā Brahma (this Atman is Brahman)* in the *Mandukya Upanishad* of the *Atharva Veda*. The first statement, *Consciousness is Brahman*, explains the true nature of *Brahman*. The second statement is the self-assessment from the seeker when he/she recognizes his/her true divine nature. Third statement refers to practice or formula for the seeker to discover the Oneness of *Atman* and the *Brahman*.

instructs his son in the nature of *Brahman*, the supreme reality. Uddalaka sends his son Svetaketu to *Gurukula* for learning the *Vedas*. Svetaketu accordingly spends twelve full years in learning the scriptures and thus returns home with the vanity of being learned. His father asks him: My dear, why are you so conceited? Have you learnt that, by learning which the unheard becomes heard, the unknown becomes known, the unperceived becomes perceived? How is it? Asks Svetaketu, and the father gives the reply. It is just as by knowing one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known: for whatever the modifications of the effects are, they are only names, and have their origin in speech. One who knows the cause knows all its effects, since the cause and its effects are non-different. Then, Uddalaka gives various examples for ascertaining the cause of the universe. In the same way, if you know "*Brahman*" then the entire universe that cannot exist without him is also known."He continued his teaching and concluded with the statement, *Tat TvamAsi* or "You are that". In simple terms the individual jiva is *Brahman*.

Analysis of Tat Tvam Asi: The statement *TatTvamAsi* literally means the identity between the individual and the God⁴⁶. But the statement should not be understood in its literal meaning. 'Tvam' refers to the individual, i.e., finite being. While 'Tat' means God or *Īsvara* in *AV* and *Asi* refers to identity between the two. Literal or primary meaning of the word Tvam is individual consciousness connected with the mind and the sense of ego and the word Tat means that which has *avidyā* its limitation, known as *Īsvara*/God; the creator of the universe, omniscient, omnipotent etc. Since the meanings are incompatible one has to resort to the implied or the secondary meaning (*lakṣyārtha*). In addition to literal or primary meaning there is secondary meaning or *Lakṣaṇā* (Datta, 1960, 288-290).When in a given context the primary meaning of a word is unintelligible the word is credited with secondary meaning related to the primary meaning. The famous example is: The village is on the *Gaṅgā*. Since the primary meaning (village on the water) in the given context is impossible, the sentence; the village is on the *Gaṅgā* is understood as the village is on the bank of the river. It is clear that whenever

⁴⁶ The literal meaning of a word is its original, basic meaning.

there is incompatibility in understanding the primary meaning of a word one should resort to its secondary meaning or *lakṣaṇā*. *Lakṣaṇā* is divided into three kinds:

1. Exclusive (*jahallakṣaṇā*): In this type, the primary meaning is completely abandoned and the new secondary meaning is posited, e.g. the village is on the Ganges.⁴⁷
2. Inclusive (*Ajahallakṣaṇā*): This type includes the primary meaning in addition to the secondary meaning. E.g. protect the ghee from the crows. The meaning of the sentence would be to protect the ghee not only from crows but also from other animals.
3. Quasi inclusive (*jahadajahallakṣaṇā*): In this type of *lakṣaṇā* a part of primary meaning is preserved while rest is rejected, e.g. 'This is that Devadatta.' In a sentence like 'this is that Devadatta', the term 'that' refers to the Devadatta as determined by the past time and space and the term 'this' refers to the same Devadatta as determined by the present time and space. The sentence does not mean that the two incompatible determinants 'this' and 'that' are identical; nor does it mean that the person determined in the term 'this' is identical with him when determined in the term 'that'. It only means the identity of substantive Devadatta, by rejecting the incompatible elements. The two qualified cannot be identical; but they refer to the same substantive, Devadatta. So the identity here refers to the individual Devadatta, who is unrelated to the time, past or presents (Datta, 1960, 290).

Śaṅkara uses this special kind of *lakṣaṇā* called *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā* or *bhāga-tyāga- lakṣaṇā*⁴⁸ to bring out the significance of '*TatTvam-Asi*'. In the *mahavākya Tat tvamasi* one part is left out and other part is retained. *Tvam* (thou) as part of a sentence does not mean the person or individual *jīva* with limited intelligence, but stripped of all individual attributes such as limiting adjuncts (like mind, senses and body), *Tat* (that) means the universal soul, stripped of all qualifications such as omniscience, omnipotence etc. It is the only pure consciousness in the individual soul that is identified with that in the universal soul or *Brahman*.

⁴⁷ The secondary or implied meaning is village is on the bank of the river Ganges.

⁴⁸ It is also called '*Bhagatyagalakṣaṇā*' (literally: part abandoning implication).

Such instance where a word is signifying a qualified entity gives up one part of its primary meaning and retains another part (the part which is excluded is the limiting adjuncts in the individual and attributes like omniscience, etc, in the *Īśvara* or God and the part which is retained is the pure consciousness which belongs both to the universal soul, i.e., *Brahman* and Individual self) belongs to the exclusive-non-exclusive implication or *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* in the view of *AV* (Datta, 1960, 250-252). This type of implication helps the system of *AV* to establish the identity between the self and the *Brahman* which is the main or sole purpose of *AV*.

The *ātman* (*Self*) whose essential nature is pure consciousness is without any attribute, devoid of any type of activity and difference. However when mind,⁴⁹ senses and body are attributed to the *Self*, then the *Self* becomes an individual self- the agent and the enjoyer of all activities. The mind-senses and the body are the product of ignorance and have no reality of their own. These are regarded as unreal as opposed to real. Due to the adjuncts like mind-senses and body the Self becomes finite. The result of superimposing these adjuncts is that the individual thinks oneself to be finite in knowledge, power and other aspects. In *jahadajahallakṣana*, the notion of mind, senses and body is to be given up and the original status, i.e., pure consciousness is to be kept. *Īśvara* or god is the creation of human mind under the influence of ignorance, just as a man with defected sight sees double moon, similarly human beings under illusion construct the notion of God and takes it - to be the supreme ruler of everything. While applying *lakṣaṇā* the attributes attributed to *Brahman* are left out and the pure consciousness is retained (Radhakrishnan, 1999, 554).

The mahavākya implies the identity of objective reality and subjective self on the one hand, and the influence of *avidyā* (illusion producing ignorance) on the aspirant on the other. The identity of *ātman* and *Brahman* is already there as an accomplished fact. Knowledge of it is something like discovery of a necklace around the neck of the wearer which she has lost sight of due to forgetfulness. But the wearer being unmindful of the presence of the necklace would not be able to discover it and confess her forgetfulness unless someone else reminds her of it. In like manner the statement, '*That Thou Art*', is uttered by the instructor and known or meditated by the

⁴⁹ Mind is also regarded as internal organ or *antahkarana* in *AV*. Pure consciousness veiled by *avidyā* becomes conditioned and "the concept of "I" took place. The 'I' leads to all selfish activities in the present state of existence.

aspirant himself that the ignorance of the aspirant is suddenly dispelled and he realizes the real, i.e., pure consciousness/*Brahman*. One may ask that removal of *avidyā* and realization of the truth of *mahāvākya 'TatTvamAsi'* leads to cessation of all actions, whether ethical or unethical. In this context it is important to understand that *avidyā* is not a thing of some kind. *Avidyā* is not absence of knowledge. It is simply wrong knowledge about the entities of the world. Some later Vedāntins have reified and hypostatized ignorance and treated it as if it is a thing of some kind. Thus, *avidyā* is simply wrong notion about the world (Rao Srinivasa, 2012, 132) After removal of *avidyā* a person does not become action-less, but the attitude toward performing actions is reformed. This point can be made clearer with the example of nature of a liberated person: A man of illumination, i.e., a person who has the intuition of *Brahman* while living has no wants and is impelled by no desire. He is known as *jīvanmukta*.

Jīvanmukta has nothing to accomplish in the world or in the next. Nor is there anything left for him to be attained here or hereafter. But a person is embodied due to the *prārabdha karma*⁵⁰ he has done in his previous life and in order to enjoy the fruit of *prārabdha karma* person is embodied. So long as redemption of *prārabdha karma* is not complete even the self-realized cannot achieve final release or bodily death. *Prārabdha karma* perishes by enjoyment. Such person can continue to take part in worldly actions without endangering his salvation (Max Weber, 2012, 185). The knowledge of Self only protects one from entanglement of action (*Karma*- performed with desire leading to bear fruit in future life).⁵¹ One cannot dispense with actions as long as one has body. So, both the ethical and unethical actions are retained, but the nature of knower becomes such that he is inclined towards ethical actions. In *Bahagavadgītā*, it is mentioned that liberated person acts in accordance with duty while inwardly remaining detached; he acts as if he acted not. It is not the case that morality or the sense of good and bad fades away at this stage; rather ethical actions naturally flow from the liberated individual. Thus, after hearing the truth of the

⁵⁰ *Prārabdha* is that portion of the past karma that is responsible for the present. These are the ripe and fructuous actions and reactions. The things that you did in the past make you what you are today. It cannot be avoided or changed, but only exhausted by being experienced.

⁵¹ Entanglement of action means that knower of the Self has body but his sense of having body is annihilated so he has no desires and whatever he performs is without desire and does not bring results on account of which he is to be reborn.

mahavakya actions are very much performed but the knower becomes aware that actions performed without desire of the fruits (*Niskama karma*) are not binding. The Knower has awareness of both the ethical and unethical action and he follows the ethical path; both the paths rest on the differences between 'Self' and 'Other', but in former path there is no conceptual difference. For example, there is difference between the mother and her child; they are two - the mother is one and her child is "the other". But this difference does not lead to any conceptual discrimination against the child by its mother because the mother does not use the difference between herself and her child to discriminate against the child. She does not discriminate because she never looks upon her child as truly another (Rao 2012, 205).

Similarly after knowing the truth of *mahāvākya* "*TatTvamAsi*" the sense of performing actions remains (in *jivanmukta* state) but the conceptual framework of the liberated Self changes on account of which the ethical path is followed by him. On the other hand one who is unaware of the truth works under the framework which weaves discriminations leading to social chaos. Though he experiences pain and pleasure like an ordinary person, he has already known their nothingness and irrelevance. He is indifferent to pure and impure, auspicious and inauspicious, good and bad etc inasmuch as he is not affected by them or bound by them, and because the evil and the base has no place in his mind. He is neither bound by scriptural injunctions nor does he wantonly violate them; he is beyond them. In spite of this freedom, *Jivanmukta's* virtuous behavior before the dawn of the Knowledge remains with him as part of his habits. Thus, it has been said that virtuosity (such as adherence to Yama, commands etc.) will come to the Self-realized person spontaneously, though for him it is not an instrument to achieve anything. Thus, the liberated soul is directed only towards ethical actions, since one cannot expect selfishness, cruelty or performance of unethical actions on part of liberated person. So ethics is integrated to spirituality. One cannot be spiritual without being ethical.

Pure Consciousness: The Enworlded subjectivity: Pure consciousness is the ground of existence. All else is superimposed on the pure consciousness. But how the absolute, non-dual, unqualified consciousness gets involved in the phenomenal world and perceives everything in terms of duality of 'I' and 'You'. This is the basic problem which the system of *AV* faces: the problem of 'enworlded

subjectivity.⁵² Balasubramanian defines the problem of Enworlded Subjectivity in the *Advaita* as follows:

There is on the one hand, the dichotomy between consciousness and the world of objects presented to consciousness; there is, on the other hand, involvement of consciousness in the objects of the world. How is it possible, *Advaita* asks, that consciousness which is essentially different from everything else presented to it as its object, get itself involved in the objects of the world surrounding it, losing its identity in such a way that it is not even reckoned as an entity in its own along with other objects? (Balasubramanian, 1992, 77)

Enworlded consciousness and the object presented to consciousness are two different entities, but when the consciousness gets engaged in the objects of the world and does not realize its essence as real then the problem of enworlded subjectivity arises. The philosophy of Śāṅkara deals with the problem of enworlded subjectivity, i.e., the *Self* being involved in the world, falsely identifies itself with the world. The dichotomy between consciousness and the world of objects presented to consciousness shows that the objects presented to consciousness are different from it and therefore object of consciousness. While consciousness which reveals the object is only the subject. The object which is unconscious can never be designated as *Self*. But, it is natural for individual self to regard the objects like mind, senses and body as conscious. Since, it is the mind which thinks, it is the body which feels and acts; the individual under ignorance thinks mind and body as conscious. Superimposition of the mind, senses and body on the consciousness leads to false identity of the *Self* with the objects giving rise to day-to-day activities. All our worldly transactions comprising all kinds of activities - conative and affective (*loka vyavahāra*) rests on the discrimination between subject and the object.

Individual self cannot be the owner of anything that is different from it,⁵³ be it mind, sense organs, the body or any external object outside one's mind, senses and body. (Balasubramanian, 1992, 77-93). The nature of *Self* or consciousness is such that being the principle of awareness in human knowledge and experience, it remains untouched and unaffected by all that is known or experienced. All the experienced

⁵² Enworlded subjectivity simply means subject or individual self actively engaged or involved in the affairs of the world.

⁵³ Individual self is different from mind senses and body because the true nature of individual self is pure consciousness while the mind, senses and body are devoid of consciousness. They are sometimes present and sometimes absent (e.g. in deep sleep) But the *Self* remains constantly present in all the stages (sleep, dream and deep sleep).

objects cannot belong to the *Self* or can affect it. This means attributing anything to the *Self* is logically impossible, because all that we know, think and speak of cannot be about the *Self*. It reveals the fact that conception of self taken in our normal activities is always predicated. Again, the other individual self is always seen along with predications (mind, senses and body); while *AV* establishes that the *Self* (pure consciousness) is beyond all the predications and is to be realized as one and non-plural. This realization of the *Self*⁵⁴ (*Self* without predications) leads to identification of one's self as not different from another, i.e., self-in-other and other-in-self (Sarukkai 1997, 1408).

Ethical Interpretation of Tat Tvamasi: Identity between *Self* and *Brahman* reveals that all the living beings have one ground; it leads to the view that there should be Universal identity which leads to greater social harmony among all the beings. In this context S. Radhakrishnan advocates that a careful observer would find that ethics is inherent in the metaphysics of *AV*. According to *AV* metaphysics, *Brahman* is the sole reality and individuals are modification of *Brahman*. In saying this *AV* postulates absolute oneness of all the existence: "In a *Brahmin* endowed with wisdom and humility, in a cow, in an elephant, as also in a dog and dog eater, the wise see the same". This non-dualism requires us to look upon all the creation as one, upon all thinking beings and the objects of all thought as non-different. Individual is enjoined to cultivate a spirit of non-difference. (Radhakrishnan, 1913, 68-70). If one man is non-different from other man then there will be the sense of oneness and this sense of oneness will cultivate the ethics of love and brotherhood. Thus, the metaphysics of *AV* naturally occupies ethics inherently. Moreover, the objective of *AV* is realization of identity between *Self* and the *Brahman*, this realization leads to cultivation of love towards all the creatures. As the whole creation is one.

The objective is realization of the *Brahman* but this objective can be achieved by knowledge. Again, knowledge is attained only after following ethical actions like non-violence, charity, self control (control over mind, senses and body). Ethical actions purify the mind, enabling it to meditate over self and realize the identity (Śāṅkara, 1911, 750). In *Atmabodha* Śāṅkara makes it clear that a highest degree of

⁵⁴ This realization is with the study of scriptural statements like "*Tat tvamasi*".

virtue is pre-required for receiving the doctrine of Self.... this emphasis on virtue being purified from evil is repeated in *Upadeshasasri*, where Śaṅkara writes “the knowledge of *Brahman* should be given to him whose mind has been pacified, who has controlled his sense, and is freed from all defects, who has practiced the duties enjoined by scriptures and is possessed of good qualities, who is always obedient to the teacher (Kazemi, 2006: 19-20). The virtues needed to be cultivated both by the person who aspires for liberation (*nihīśreyas*) and also for one who does not aspire to attain liberation i.e., person involved in worldly affairs. As, these virtues are helpful for achieving *abhudayā*, i.e., material prosperity. Truthfulness consists in eschewing falsehood, deceit, hypocrisy, pride and boastfulness. Non-deceit and non-crookedness in speech, body and mind constitute truthfulness. It is the foundation of knowledge of *Brahman* (Sinha, 1952, 595-598). Celibacy destroys afflictions, and purifies mind. Virtues help to attain knowledge, at the same time these virtues like truthfulness, non-violence, self-control also assists in constructing a peaceful society. Thus, the objective is realization of *Brahman* and this objective also strengthens the ethics.

Misconception about *AV* that it is an anti-ethical system is based on initial misreading that *Brahman* and the world are two numerically different entities. But this is not true. *Brahman* is the ground upon which the world of phenomenon is projected, all other existence depends upon *Brahman* for its reality and being (Swami Madhvananda, 1921, 222). Moreover, the world is not an erroneous construct. Śaṅkara assigns empirical reality to the world (Śaṅkara 1965, 306). In Śaṅkara’s schema there are three levels of reality: *pāramārthika* (transcendental/absolute), *vyāvahārika* (empirical) and *prātibhāsika* (illusory). The *Brahman* is the *pāramārthikasattā* (*absolute reality*), the world of space-time-causality belongs to *vyāvahārika*, while erroneous perception of the objects like silver in the shell, snake in the rope, are at the *prātibhāsika*. Śaṅkara admits that the world is as real as anything possibly is, from the empirical level of reality (Apte, 1960, 306-307). It is undoubtedly true that the main presupposition - *Brahman* is real, the world is false and the individual self is no other than the universal soul (*Brahman Satyam, jaganmithyā, jīvo Brahmaivanāparaḥa*) (Śaṅkarācārya, 1910, 64) is found in the writings of Śaṅkara. This assertion indicates that the plurality of the world is false or unreal because it disappears in that moment when the effect of ignorance disappears.

Thus, the world is unreal from the standpoint of transcendental reality. The world is regarded as real (empirically) because it is being experienced, and notably *Brahman* is the substrate or ground on which this world of plurality appears. Thus, the world is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal, but it is relatively 'real'. The world is real in relation to the *Brahman* and apart from *Brahman* world can have no existence (Swami Madhvanand, 1921, 102-104). Moreover, prior to the realization of *Brahman* all the transactions of the phenomenal world are real enough (Śaṅkarācārya, 2005, 57). Again, this remark can be strengthened by Śaṅkara's writing in the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*;

It would be reasonably sustainable to understand that prior to realization of *Brahman* as the self of all, all transactions (of the phenomenal world) for the time being are real enough, even as the transactions in dreams are real enough (for the time being) until waking consciousness returns.....Therefore prior to the realization of *Brahma* as the Self of all, all the worldly and religious transactions based on the scriptures, are reasonably sustainable i.e., valid, even as ordinary man, while he is asleep and dreaming, sees all the high and low entities, and definitely considers his experience quite as real as they are when they are directly perceived, and has no notion, then, of their having only an unreal appearance (of direct perception) (Apte, 1960, 306-307).

From the above statement, it is obvious that *AV* advocates empirical realism. Any experience at the empirical level cannot be rejected outright. Thus, worldly actions do not rest under error, but have their worth. The reality, can be viewed from two standpoints or experience, first from the standpoint of relational experience (*yuktidarśana*) in which one relates oneself with the entities of the world; and secondly from the standpoint of the experience of ultimate being (Shrivastava, 1968, 57-80). Śaṅkara emphasizes that from the former standpoint (empirical level) reality of all our experiences, including identity of the 'Self' with the body and creation of its co-relate 'other' and the behaviors resulting from the creation of these images cannot be denied, but at the level of the later experience (transcendental level or experience of ultimate being, i.e., *Brahman*), the sense of difference between the self and other gets removed (Śaṅkara, 1965; 306-312). Moreover, the activities performed with the

apprehension of the distinction (resulting in social disharmony) between self and other (particularly unethical activities) also get faded (Shrivastava, 1968, 105-117).⁵⁵

The predications to the *Self* result in the feeling of distinction and separation from other selves. This feeling gives rise to a particular attitude or behavior towards others, which is the root of most of the misery and suffering. In *AV*, metaphysical ignorance occupies a significant position. It is only because of ignorance that the cycle of birth, death, pain and pleasure are associated with the individual self. Individual self without knowing its essential nature gets involved in the affairs of the world and perform actions. The results of actions lead to future life involving pain and pleasure. Moreover, it is on account of these painful experiences in the “life-world” that self experiences bondage. This bondage generates an inner urge to *know the Real* and attain liberation. *AV* advocates that in yearning for liberation (*mumukṣa*) from suffering, one realizes that the cause of the suffering is ignorance about the real nature of the self. While everything is *Self*⁵⁶ and all the predications to the *Self* rests upon a mistake, then such a mistaken thinking leads to recognizing the reality of the other as different from the self. There occurs discrimination between self and other due to this misconception, which leads to consequences which are not good for the individual and the society as a whole.

One of the causes of social problems is the ego or *ahaṃkāra*.⁵⁷ Sibajiban Bhattacharya defines the function of the ego as,

... ‘Ego’ the source of ‘I’ consciousness, owner of all mental states and acts of the individual, restricts a person and separates him from other persons and the objects of the world, is the center around which all thoughts and actions revolve, usurps all functions of pure consciousness as the foundation of a person, is the principle of identity and identifies itself with the mind-body complex (Bhattacharya, 1992, 44-76).

⁵⁵ Since at this level there remains no plurality. The self experiences oneness of all the beings.

⁵⁶ It means that the all are one, i.e., *Self* *Brahman* but on account of limitation the one appears many. In *Ātmabodha* Śaṅkara writes “it is the association with the *upādhis* of various material bodies that makes *Brahman* appear as gods, angels, men, animals, birds, trees and stones” (Śaṅkarācārya 1946: 58-60).

⁵⁷ Ego is the aspect of mind that expresses individuality. It is known in Sanskrit as the *ahaṃkāra* ‘*aham*’ means I and ‘*Kara*’ means maker. So it is the composer of individuality and distinguish itself from other ‘I’s’ (ego’s). It is the ego that gives the sense of ‘I’ or mine. In every action one is conscious of oneself as ‘I am the doer.’ The ego takes place due to association of the *Self* with the limiting adjuncts (mind, senses and body). Ego is the covering over the *Self*.

It reveals the fact that the ego is the major vehicle which carries all the activities. The ego expresses itself as 'I' or 'mine' and the idea of self identity is created. This ego is the foundation on which all other identities are framed like those of family, religion, nationality etc (Rao, 2012, 202-206). Ego constantly strives to be always right, always superior, never wrong and never inferior. It constantly seeks self-importance, power and superiority over others. The root of most of the conflicts in the society is ego or image of the self constructed under ignorance (Rao, 2012, 201-202).

All activities in the world are associated with self and other, so the distinction between them plays an important role.⁵⁸ However, if the source of this distinction is not properly understood, it may lead to chaos in the society, because this distinction is the source of further discrimination based on caste, color, creed, sex, and religion. This discrimination is an extension of the distinction between self and the other and most of the problems like social discrimination, exploitation and political oppression of the people from one group by the people from another group is generally fuelled by the feeling that they are different, inferior and deserved to be ruled and exploited.⁵⁹ And this is not all; most of the present conflicts due to economic competition are also rooted in this distinction between self and other. Instead of helping the economically weak, there are trade wars going on, which have the potential to trigger a full scale armed conflict between nations. It is due to this distinction between self and other and hatred for the other (root cause of the distinction is our ignorance about the truth of identity between the *Self (tvam)* and *Brahman (tat)*) that today we have economies based on violent conflicts which justifies the production of guns, tanks, missiles and even nuclear weapons, which can annihilate the population of entire earth many times.

Hence, it is crucial to note that *AV* goes beyond this distinction by teaching the oneness of all selves (the universal identity). The oneness of all implies absence of the 'other.' rather the absence of feeling of distinction between one and another.

⁵⁸ Every action presupposes a duality between one self and other. At the empirical level it is difference between one self and other that makes possible all the worldly affairs (*lokavyavahāra*).

⁵⁹ We have numerous examples of this in the human history. Nazi genocide of Jews is well documented and recent examples include conflict in the Middle East among various factions divided on religious grounds and again violent clashes between Burmese Buddhists and Rohingya Muslim.

Thus, once the feeling of distinction (discrimination based on this distinction) between self and other is removed, the treating of 'other' in an undesirable way is also obliterated. When we consider others as different from us, we do not bother about any harm caused to the other, by our actions, but on the other hand, if we have some concern for other, it is because we are looking upon the other person as not 'other' anymore. Rather, we are treating him as an extension of ourselves (Rao, 2012, 202-206). It is natural for us to desire to preserve one's own identity and existence. However, in its course, one may behave and act inappropriately for self subsistence. This many a times cause harm to the other. In sharp contrast, once the mahavakya *Tat Tvam Asi* is understood and realized, the individual self recognizes its unity and non-difference with the other, it functions in an amicable fashion. This sense of 'oneness of all' brings transformation in the attitude of individual self, which further leads towards an ideal, peaceful and conflict free society.⁶⁰

An objection is often raised that if "All is one" then why to perform actions since actions are always directed towards other? To this, it may be said that absence of the 'other' does not establish elimination of the 'other' or it does not mean that elimination of 'other' leads to complete in-action. As it is said above that before the realization of *Brahman* all the transactions of the phenomenal world are real enough. Even after realization the world does not become chimera like horn's hair, rather one's understanding or attitude towards the worldly affairs gets changed. The liberated or realized person performs actions in an unattached way. Moreover, it is impossible to think that if true nature has been realized (one realizes that he is Brahman, the Pure consciousness) then action is not to be taken over. Because all the actions are for the person with the body it is on account of body, mind, and senses that actions are possible and these actions are unavoidable. The wise do not, therefore, renounce action by abstaining from action - which is, after all, an impossible task. Instead, they renounce action through knowledge. They continue to

⁶⁰It is possible to have conflict free society if every individual in the society understands and performs his duty well, the society can be a beautiful place to live in. No doubt the society has always being in conflict. Although people realize the importance of a peaceful world, but the manmade disasters are far worse than any natural catastrophe. Disagreements, difference over ideologies, beliefs etc are bound to cause conflicts. But man has a fragile aspect also. It is a proverb that 'man is harder than a rock and also more fragile than an egg'. This fragile aspect of man is to be explored and this can be explored with the message of *AV*. The lesson of non-difference of one individual self from other will scatter the seed of brotherhood and love among beings. This can be a boon for the peaceful society.

act, but no longer identify themselves as the doer of those actions. The sense of non-doership leads to action which will not bring any fruit in future life and there will be no transmigration thereof.

Conclusion:

On a careful analysis of the *mahāvākya TatTvamAsi*, it can be explored that the great statement *TatTvamAsi* is a vehicle for greater social cohesion. The statement emphasizes on the one-ness or identity of one's self with the *Brahman* (and one-ness or non-difference among all the human beings) and the spirit of ethics lies in identification of one's self with other person. In other words, the statement carves out a ground for the essential one-ness of beings which brings about significant attitudinal transformation. If one understands the essential unity of all beings (even if one does not realize the *jīva-Brahman* identity in a transcendental sense), one's attitude towards others and all actions unto others will incur significant transformation. It can be argued from the side of the *AV* that, despite refraining from theorizing morality, the system creates a significant foundation for moral living in which any normative (deontological or consequentialist) concerns are not the primary issues, but the consciousness that works behind all knowing and doing is what matters. In brief, the norms of action or the consequence of it are of secondary importance; and the attitudinal transformation before all actions is of primary importance.

The *AV*'s position can also be seen in view of the fact that despite knowledge of good and bad, right and wrong, human beings are not prompted to genuinely engage with the right and refrain from the wrong. A right inducement into virtuous life demands or presupposes a consciousness or a preceding cognition, which in the case of *AV* is represented by the great statement *TatTvamAsi* which further teaches the 'essential unity of self and other'. Without this consciousness as necessary condition for virtuous living, mere knowledge of good and bad does not prompt human beings to lead a morally commendable life. In ordinary experiences, the said consciousness is instantiated by our expressions of empathy, care, cooperation, love, etc. When one portrays these traits, the essential human unity is portrayed in fact.

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RELIGION: A SUBSET OF *DHARMA*

MOUSUMI SAHA

Introduction:

Religion has been central to human life since prehistoric times. A large number of great and noble acts came to be performed under the inspiration of religions. So it is undeniable that religions occupy a remarkable place in our society. ‘We should not be far wrong in saying with Max Müller that the true history of man is the history of religion’ (Edwards, 1924 p. 9). We have many theories as to the origin of religions, but what looks prominent among them is that religion is originated by the man himself to content his own spiritual aspiration. But today’s society, under the banner of religions, is going through many man-made tragedies that pull down our mutual trust. Similarly, although *dharma* is the greatest and the most valuable contribution of India to humanity, yet it is sometimes understood as merely a theological category, a closed system of faiths composed of divinity and dogmatism. Moreover, many people conflate religion with *dharma* and use the two in the same sense. So, the following questions that come to our mind are quite natural: What is *dharma*? What sense *dharma* is synonymous with religion? What basic differences are there between *dharma* and religion? And how consistent is it to use ‘religion’ as a synonym of ‘*dharma*’? This article aims to seek answers to those questions so that we can recognize *dharma* and religion in their true sense.

I

The Sanskrit term ‘*dharma*’ is so unique that no other term of any language can render it. Of course, ‘*dharma*’ usually refers to many things, such as religion, principle, and so on; but none of these terms can provide an adequate meaning of it. However, we could recognize *dharma* in its true sense in the context of Hinduism since it is inextricably engaged in the long tradition of Hinduism. Here, we need first to expend few words about the origin of the word ‘Hindu’. As per its lexical meaning, Hindu is ‘a native of Hindustan or India’. But as far as history is concerned, the word ‘Hindu’ was first used by the Persian king Darius-I to referring the people inhabiting the entire land around both sides of the Indus river. Their lives did govern by a particular way or principle, which got recognition as their *dharma* over time. And later, this *dharma* came to be known gloriously as the *Sanātanadharmā* since it has been prevalent in Hindustan for a long time (Tiwari, 2009, p. xi). Now turn to the

question: What is *dharma*? It is very challenging to provide an answer to it because ‘*dharma*’ has acquired a wide variety of meanings in its uses as in the sacred text of Hinduism, the *Rgveda*. It has appeared in the hymns of the *Rgveda* either as an adjective or a noun (in the form *dharman*) a minimum fifty-six times (Kane, 1930, p.1). This indicates that the exact sense in which it is used is very difficult to be grasped. However, by etymological explication, we can find ‘*dharma*’ deriving from the Sanskrit root *dhr*, which means “to uphold, to support, to nourish” (p.1). And on the basis of this root meaning, ‘*dharma*’ is found to be used in very few passages of the *Rgveda*, such as *Rg. I.187.1*.¹ In this connection, even we may cite an exposition from Mahābhārata that seems to be quite adequate here. Therein Yudhiṣṭhira asked Bhīṣma to explain the meaning and scope of *dharma*, and Bhīṣma replied:

It is most difficult to define Dharma. Dharma has been explained to be that which helps the upliftment of living beings. Therefore, that which ensures the welfare of living beings is surely *dharma*. The learned *rishis* have declared that what sustains is Dharma. (*Shanti Parva.109. 9-11*)

So we can say that *dharma* is ‘that which upholds’ or ‘that without which nothing can stand’, or ‘that which maintains the stability and harmony of the whole universe’. Apart from this meaning, in the *Rgveda*, ‘*dharma*’ would mostly mean religious rites or sacrifices (*yajña*)² to gods that are instrumental to happiness and are enjoyed by the Vedic adoration. Even the Vedas have accorded profound value on *yajña* for the description of this world. “The world comes to be through *yajña*, is maintained by *yajña*, and man's well-being in the world is ensured by *yajña*” (Koller, 1972, p. 134). Consequently, during that period, people felt the obligation to performing rites to attain their desired goals that Vedic injunctive passages indicate. Thus *yajña* came up as people’s duties or *dharma*. Here *yajña* and *dharma* may be seemed identical, but it is not the case. Because, *yajña* does merely mean the effects of *yajña* i.e. maintenance of order, while *dharma* adds something more to its concept as it causes desired change in the structure and sequence of the universe through conformation with the highest law (*ṛta*) of the ultimate reality. That’s why we may understand the concept of *dharma* more sharply with relation to *ṛta*.

¹ *pituṃ nu stoṣaṃ maho dharmāṇaṃ taviṣīm |*

² *samidhāṇaḥsahasraḥajidagnedharmāṇipuṣyasi | (Rg. V.26.6.)*

Literally, *ṛta* means “the course of things”. But in the context of the *R̥gveda*, it means the highest, the immutable order of the highest reality which has issued this manifest reality. In this sense, *ṛta* is ‘the actual coursing of the highest reality’, the supreme order, concerning it any other order or rule is subordinate. Moreover, it is not the subject of the violation; even *devas* abide by it. The whole universe is being nourished, sustained, and ordered according to it. Not only that, but it also regulates human conduct as a moral order. It illuminates the right way to move on from evil to good. And this becomes evident in so prayer to Indra: “O Indra, lead us on the path of *ṛta* on the right path over all evils”⁶¹. So, *ṛta* is regarded as the all-pervading cosmic order which maintains harmony in the natural and moral world and society.

In connection to *ṛta*, *dharma* is the law of function for an individual to participate in the highest reality of which it is a manifestation. This participation becomes substantial through the essential property of things, without which things do not sustain. Therefore, both the aspects of a thing –‘essential nature’ and ‘function of participating’- may be considered *dharma*. For example, attraction is the essential property of a magnet since a magnet cannot be a magnet without having the property of attracting. Thus, this property becomes an upholder to its being. On such understanding, we can say attraction is the *dharma* of a magnet through which it participates in the ultimate reality. Now we can formulate a relation between *yajña*, *ṛta*, and *dharma*. The effect of *yajña* is the desired change in the order of reality, the function of *yajña* (*dharma*) is the changing of the order of reality, and *ṛta* is the ultimate order of reality. So these are very closely related to each other and are normative as well as ontological. The being (*sat*) of reality and its function (*ṛta*) do not carry bear any difference. *Sat* or being is the manifestation of the highest reality, while *ṛta* promotes the security and stability of the *sat*. *Satya*, ‘the principle of conformity to the *sat*’ as an abstract substantive, is fundamental as a principle to the reality (*ṛta*). These are treated identically in the Vedas and *Upaniṣads*.

⁶¹*vayam indra tvāyavaḥ sakhitvam ā rabhāmahe |*

ṛtasya naḥ pathā nayāti viśvāni dūritā nabhantām anyakeṣām jyākā adhi dhamvasu ||

(Rg. X.133.6)

Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad (I.4.14) has shown the identity between *ṛta* and *dharma* thus: “That righteousness is verily truth. Therefore they say about a person speaking of truth, ‘He speaks of righteousness’, or about a person speaking of righteousness, ‘He speaks of truth’, for both these are but righteousness” (Madhavānanda, 1950, p. 178). This discussion, to some extent, makes it decisive that the term ‘dharma’ is used basically in the sense of duty, obligation, and righteousness.

Thereafter, some duties were imprinted in scriptures for people to maintain social stability, harmony, and to sustain the structure of society. These duties are divided into two heads: universal (*sādhāraṇa*) and specific (*Varṇāśrama*). The Universal duties comprise such “obligations which are binding on every one” (Prasad, 1981, p. 57). For example, faith in virtue, non-injury, devotion to the good of all creatures, etc. And the specific duties are “obligations relative to one's caste and stage of life” (p. 57). There are the four different castes or varṇas - *Brāhmaṇa*, *Kṣatriya*, *Vaiśya*, and *Śūdra*, and four different stages of life - *Brahmacarya*, *Gārhastha*, *Vānaprastha*, and *Sannyāsa* in Indian traditional culture. So, the duties prescribed for different stages of life of a man belonging to a particular caste are called *Varṇāśramadharmā*.

The term ‘*dharma*’ is also used to refer to an object of human desire in the Indian traditional concept of *puruṣārtha*, wherein *dharma* is the foremost *puruṣārtha* and the ensuing two *puruṣārthas*, i.e. *artha* and *kāma*, are described to be enjoyed under the surveillance of *dharma*. Even it was thought that the ultimate *puruṣārtha*, viz. *mokṣa* remains unattainable if we fail to perform *dharma*. In this regard, T. M. P. Mahadevan (1962) said: “While it is admitted that *mokṣa*, and not *dharma*, is the supreme end, the sole intrinsic value, it is clearly and undoubtedly taught by all Indian thinkers that, without *dharma*, *mokṣa* cannot be gained” (p. 479). So *dharma* is not only the regulating principle of the remaining three *puruṣārthas*, but it has an intrinsic value also. However, there is debate on the priority between *dharma* and *mokṣa*. In Indian tradition, we find two types of theory concerning *puruṣārthas*, namely, *trivarga* and *caturvarga*. The theory of *caturvarga* holds that the ultimate end and the highest value of human life is *mokṣa*, and as the theory of *trivarga* has skipped this truth it is unsystematic. As opposed to this, the theory of *trivarga* argues

that *mokṣa* cannot be an object of desire since in that case it would be ceased to *kāma*; thus incurring *mokṣa* in the concept of *puruṣārthas* does not make *caturvarga* really systematic. In this regard, Prasad (1981) remarked that the theory of *trivarga* presents a functional scheme of human values because it seems to have been inspired by an insight that all *puruṣārthas* are meaningful only in relational human complex “obligating them to perform various functions so that society and the individuals composing it may live a life which they not only like to live but is also worth living” (p. 56). Since *mokṣa* is not functional but an individualistic value, *dharma* may be considered as the highest or supreme value of human life. So we can say the pursuit of the trio (*artha, kāma, and dharma*) together is not only quantitatively richer but qualitatively better than the quad (*artha, kāma, and dharma, mokṣa*) from the perspective of social welfare and harmony.

II

Now, we should turn to see what the meaning of religion is to grasp the relationship between *dharma* and religion. Throughout the ages, religion has been an inspirational power in the life of many people. All religions, like Christianity, Judaism, Islam, etc. that we find throughout the world are denotations of the word ‘religion’. But the question is, what makes all these traditions coming under the same term ‘religion’? This question leads us to find the “essence” of all religions to understand the connotation through which we can reach the heart of religion. But the problem here is to identify one common characteristic feature for all religions. Because the religions of Middle-East origin, like Christianity, Judaism, Islam have faith in the existence of a single God, while so-called religions of Indian origin either involve polytheism or are reluctant to believe in God, as are Buddhism and Jainism. That there are differences regarding the acceptance and nature of Supreme Authority, the rituals, the practices, and all that sort of things between every two religions as well as groups of religion. That’s why it is very difficult to find any connotative definition of ‘religion’. However, we can initiate our endeavour by undergoing its etymological meaning. Etymologically the word ‘religion’ is derived from Latin words, first ‘*religio*’ which means ‘respect for the sacred’ and, and secondly, ‘*religāre*’ which means ‘to bind together’ in the sense of obligation. So, from this origin, religion may be understood as a set of beliefs and practices that

helps humans to have an experience of kinship under some sort of sacred or spiritual integrity amidst a human group. However, historically the word 'religion' carries multiple meanings according to the different stages religion has passed through. At the primitive age, it was identified with magic which was something mystical performance did to control unexplained natural phenomena, such as lightning, rain, floods, and the like. During that period people who had denied the power of magic were called 'irreligious'. At the next stage, it was understood as a divine power that causes all those phenomena, and rituals, practices, etc. were arranged to have the intervention of that power to control the phenomena. After then, that divine power gradually came to be known as gods, or the God, and the concept of religion involves faith in many goddesses or a single God, worship, salvation, morality, etc. In consonance with this history, the Oxford Dictionary holds that religion involves 'the belief in the worship of a superhuman controlling power, especially a personal God or gods'. We experience that Abrahamic religions, viz. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are predominately accepted here as organized religions and by finding out their common characteristics religion is defined for general. These religions share the common characteristics of "belief in one God (Yahweh/God/Allah), one prophet (Moses/Jesus/Mohammad), one scripture (the Torah/the Bible/ the Quran), one Day of Judgement (*Yom HaDin/al-Qiyāmah*)" (Paranjpe, 2013, p. 9) and a unified method of worship. So the conception of religion involves "a belief in God as the creator of the universe, a central revelation of God, a messenger of that revelation, a central book containing the life and the sayings of that messenger of God, a central code of commandments" (Chaturvedi, 1993, p. 39). There are many interpretations regarding religion on which the prevalence of those common characteristics is noticeable at the academic level. We can say, for instance, of James Martineau (1889) who thinks religion is the "belief in an Ever-living God, that is, a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding Moral relations with mankind"(p. 1). Religion, in E.B. Tylor's words cited in *Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics* (1919), is "the belief in spiritual beings"(p. 663).For Emile Durkheim (1912/2001), "a religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and surrounded by prohibitions-beliefs and practices that unite its adherents in a single moral community called a Church" (p. 46). Well, such interpretations give us an idea of religion, which is identified with a form of belief either in God, in sacred

things, or in spiritual beings. Now we step onto our next section to understand the relationship between dharma and religion.

III

To understand the relationship between religion and *dharma* accurately, it is important to know the differences between them. But we first need to know the particular sense of *dharma* being used as a synonym of religion. In this regard, I like to recall the view of K.N. Tiwari. In his book *Comparative Religion*, he said that every traditional religion has two essential features- (1) each one carries certain specific convictions or beliefs concerning the world-and-life situation as a whole, and (2) under these convictions, each one ascertains a specific way of life for its adherents. We have already noticed that even dharma fulfils these two basic conditions of religion while discussing the first section of this article. A like accredited religions, dharma also asks for a way of life based on some specific, spiritualistic convictions for the sake of setting the world and life in unison for a meaning. In this specific sense, *dharma* can be understood as a synonym of religion. But this does not mean that dharma is equivalent to religion. Actually, all the apparent similarities we think and perceive between *dharma* and religion are just the tip of the iceberg; a huge dissimilarity remains unperceived between them just like the unperceived mass beneath the surface of the water. Let's see what differences are there between them.

- 1) Almost every religion of the world has a specific history of origin with a specific founder. But *dharma* came down to people through eternity. It has no specific date of origin. Although it is associated with the names of many sages and saints, none of them is regarded as the founder of it. Actually, all they have done is just trying to make the whole thing apprehensible to all in their own particular ways. Thus, they have added their contribution to the evolution of *dharma*. Similarly, most religions have a definite text such as the Bible for Christian, the Quran for Islam. But dharma emerges from many different kinds of literature, such as the *Vedas*, the *Upaniṣadas*, the *Dharmaśūtras*, *Dharmaśāstras*, etc., none of which can claim the exclusive authority of *dharma*.

- 2) Dharma is more liberal and less rigid compared to religions. Any person can follow the way of *dharma*: a polytheist, as well as a monotheist, a believer in a personal God, or a non-believer; all may lead their lives somehow on the way of *dharma*. *Dharma* is understood to unite every being of this universe with a universal principle, while religion can hardly avoid making some differences between sects as per their own beliefs and practices.
- 3) Religion is different from *dharma* in view of salvation too. Every religion has some definite rules and practices regarding salvation, and each believer must follow the instructions of his own religion for salvation. But *dharma* does not prescribe only one means for *moksha*. There are several ways of salvation, in our understanding of *dharma*, and one can choose according to his belief, temperament, and inherent quality. That is to say, we say, the persons who are pursuer of knowledge follow the *jñānmārga* for salvation, while those who are industrious and always energetic in performing actions and they have the quality of achievement may follow the *karmamārga*. And those whose heart contains devotion to God may follow *bhaktimārga* etc.

Conclusion:

The differences between *dharma* and religion we noted above are no doubt significant, but these differential chords do not always imply that they are contradictory as such. One is deeply connected with the other in terms of our spiritual development. *Dharma* aims at establishing society on a profound moral basis, and religions, too, aim at performing the same end. But many people fail to grasp the true meanings of these two, and as a result, we often experience moral decay in our society. For example, if we look at *Varnāśramadharmā*, we would see that it was maintained duly on the basis of merit and deeds at the Vedic age; but its glory got faded when it had passed aside of its original goal somewhere in its long journey due to perhaps socio-economic and political changes and came to be admitted on the basis of birth. And from all this, casteism (*jāti-prathā*) has evolved and started indulging people towards the idea of caste segregation, which we are sometimes experiencing with so insensitivity. However, if we encourage the meaning *dharma* is as an inherent human quality, we may bring all humans under one fold with the sense of humanity irrespective of caste, class, gender, and all that, and declare “*Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*”. Hence, following Rabindranath Tagore, we may say that worshipping

in the temple, lightening the candles, or praying five times in a mosque is not something that *dharma* is. *Dharma* is the quality or attribute of something that holds the thing and being in all its aspects. And, if the *dharma* of fire is burn, if the *dharma* of the sword is sharpness, then the *dharma* of all humans is humanity. Hence the scope of *dharma* is much wider than that of religion, and it is inaccurate to say that *dharma* and religion are synonymous rather religion may be considered as a subset of *dharma*.

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TAGORE ON MAN'S NATURE: AN ANALYSIS

SHUBHRA JYOTI DAS

Introduction

Thomas Hobbes famously described the natural state of man, in the chapter XIII entitled 'Of the natural condition of mankind as concerning their felicity and misery' of his *Leviathan*, unless controlled by a political authority, as poor, solitary, short and nasty brutish; way back in 1651. Almost a century later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau countered it; by saying that man's nature is fundamentally good. Human beings could have lived a better life outside the clutch of the modern state. A comparable claim of essential goodness, in the human beings, can possibly be inferred from the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad; where man has been addressed as "sons of the immortal"¹—*śṛṅvantu viśve amṛtasya putrāḥ*. But Tagore does not resort to any of these extreme views and opts for a middle path similar to Buddha's *madhyamā pratipat* or Aristotle's golden means. According to Tagore, religion is to have trust in Man – the Eternal, and it comprises of efforts to cultivate the qualities inherent in His nature. He observes, "If these qualities were absolutely natural in individuals, religion could have no purpose."² Man's historical journey begins with his animal nature's prompting to fulfil the immediate but essential needs. But in the deeper layers of man, in terms of tendencies, the living flow of universal humanity runs in virtually an opposite direction. Religion becomes instrumental in reconciling this incongruity, by subordinating the animal-tendencies to what is considered "as the truth of Man."³ The deepening of our conviction upon the Eternal-Man, who has been addressed and imagined by different names and images, facilitates this process. These two natures are so strongly opposed that man has willingly given up his fundamental needs and, even at times, made supreme sacrifice for expressing his *dharma*. Here *dharma* stands for the truth of the 'Supreme Man'. Thus, Tagore neither declares absolute perfection of man nor ascribes him complete brutality; he rather pronounces man as an amalgamation of both in the natural state.

Mapping the Issue: Tagore begins his essay entitled 'Man's Nature' by claiming that man became cognizant of a mystifying 'spirit of unity', which expressed itself in the social order through him only; as soon as he actually became aware of his own self. It exists for itself, bereft of any other purpose, acting as a medium of association

among the creatures; representing a value for living. Man has, by one way or the other, understood that this spirit is Divine by nature; which could claim everything that he possesses individually. It represents the best liberty and is the abode of his highest meaning which transcends the limited being. Tagore further maintains that man has expressed his allegiance to this spirit in his religion, symbolizing it in the names of the deities he venerates. This could explain how the primitive gods became tribal gods and why the same tribe owned the deities worshipped by the subsumed communities. He notes, “With the extension of the consciousness of human unity his God became revealed to him as one and universal, proving that the truth of human unity is the truth of Man’s God.”⁴

Tagore notes, “The vision of the Supreme Man is realized by our imagination, but not created by our minds.”⁵ His transcendental and permeating personality, being more real than the individual beings, goes beyond each one of us. The march of His ideas, pursuing His grand purpose, is continuously moving on the way to perfected truth; overcoming confronted obstructions. We, in spite of having our space in His composition, may not necessarily be in conformity with His plan. In fact, we might be acting in the contrary way leading ourselves towards doom. But true religion is gained by us only when we willfully contribute to His purpose; where, sacrifice and suffering turns to the tools for our joy. In simpler words, His plan may not suit our plan. Therefore acting His plan out might not be a comfortable course for us. Yet we must find joy in those so called painful acts, which we perform as a part of His will, since that is the true religion and the real purpose of our existence. Through this love for the Supreme Spirit, *Mahātmā* in Tagore’s terminology, the awareness of the love that radiates from Him grows in us.

For Tagore, *dharma* is the counterpart of religion in Sanskrit language. The former, in the technical sense, refers to the essential property of any given thing; heat in the case of fire for instance. Etymologically *dharma* “implies the principle of relationship that holds us firm.”⁶ Tagore quotes Lao-tze saying, “One who may die, but will not perish, has life everlasting.”⁷ It implies that he exists in the Existence of the immortal Being. The aspiration for this Life- Eternal induces man to engage in a struggle for true existence. Tagore quotes the scriptures warning, “Through *adharmā* (the negation of *dharma*) man prospers, gains what appears desirable, conquers

enemies, but he perishes at the root.”⁸ It suggests existence of a life, truer than the transitory physical life of the human beings. Tagore observes, “Our life gains what is called ‘value’ in those of its aspects which represent eternal humanity in knowledge, in sympathy, in deeds, in character and creative works.”⁹ Therefore, from the primitive stage itself man is seeking, sacrificing everything at most of the times, not just success but the value for our existence. In other words, man is aspiring to realize the immortal Man in himself so that he does not perish even after death. It is echoed in the upaniṣadic utterance which goes as, “*Tam vedyam puruṣam veda, yatha mā vo mṛtyuḥ parivyathāḥ* – Realize the person so that thou mayst not suffer from death”¹⁰(*Praśna* 6.1.6)

The possibility, in fact, presents a paradox; our sense-organs or reasoning fails to judge its truth-value. Yet, Tagore notices, man has dissociated himself from all forms of fear and greed and defied all the natural instincts; in order to preserve and acknowledge the life belonging to the Eternal Person. According to him, there have also been such people who followed this path in spite of not believing in that Reality. This ideal reality is termed as ‘spiritual’ by Tagore, though he admits the nomenclature as vague. However, by means of the obscure knowledge that has reached man, penetrating the obstructions of physical existence, individuals have somehow developed stronger faith in the spiritual Being. According to Tagore, possibly from the beginning itself, man has not treated the physical as the final; envisaging his welfare in a perfect relationship with some greater Reality beyond the physical, which opens vista of a more profound existence. Man ascribes more value to that life than to the mechanical prolonging of the material life.

Tagore notes, “Our physical body has its comprehensive reality in the physical world, which may be truly called our universal body, without which our individual body would miss its function. Our physical life realizes its growing meaning through a widening freedom in its relationship with the physical world, and this gives it a greater happiness than the mere pleasure of satisfied needs.”¹¹ For him, man awakes to a deeper meaning of his own self with the awareness of some paradigm of perfection. This beautiful ideal leads to an internal sense of completeness, heightening man’s individual reality. Such a sense deepens his conviction upon the ideal through an understanding of human world. In the words of

Tagore, “But whatever may be the name and nature of his religious creed”;¹² man’s ideal of perfection is based on a bond of unanimity which, penetrating the individuals, culminates in the supreme Man who corresponds to the Eternal in human beings. In the civilized world, perfect expression of the ideal generates an array of truths which is meant for revealing the Eternal Man and not merely for attaining some ephemeral success. Thus, when this *dharma* – the creative ideal gives room for some other superficial element, it constructs the funeral pyre for itself; just like the star which blasts out of boisterous brilliancy. Tagore quotes Lao-tze, referring to a good individual, who remarks, “He quickens but owns not. He acts but claims not. Merit he accomplishes but dwells not in it. Since he does not dwell in it, it will never leave him.”¹³ We can do business only with the external objects that we possess and not with the intrinsic values of our self. This comprehensive absorption of truth is part of “the paradise of perfection.”¹⁴ It does not belong to the purgatory of the self. It marks maturing of a prolonged progression of civilization.

From the exposition presented above, one thing becomes amply clear that Tagore is primarily reliant on the Upaniṣads for constructing his views; thus aspiration for the higher life in the individuals is explained based on Brahman – the genesis. But how does he deal with the issue of imperfection in human beings and the subsequent problem of evil? What is his stand regarding the exercise of freewill by the individuals? Does he take both dualist and non – dualist stands into account? But, what picture does the solution reveal about Tagore’s own position? Does he, as an elucidator of the Upaniṣads, interpret like a dualist or a non – dualist? Does his stand have broader implications in understanding the nature of man and his moral practices like *dharma* and *adharma*? Since, we already know that values and Metaphysics get intertwined in any discourse of Ethics. It should be further noted that, Tagore takes a theistic stand in order to give the exposition on man’s nature and to create his discourse on ‘values’. Since evil presents a serious challenge to theism, therefore the next question would be – What kind of theism is he presenting in his exposition? Is it compatible with the stand he takes to deal with the problem of evil? Does his theism contribute, in any way, to make man’s nature more intelligible? Next two sections will deal with these few questions.

Tagore's Treatment of Evil and Freewill: In the light of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja:

As it has already been mentioned, Tagore accepts imperfection as a part of this world. Man, being a part of this world, is also a subject of the same. He does not entertain the position that man's nature is essentially bad or that the existence itself is an evil. For him, complete pessimism is a kind of "mental dipsomania."¹⁵ Tagore expresses his optimism as, "I shall look forward to a turning in history after this cataclysm is over and the sky is again unburdened and passionless. Perhaps the new dawn will come from this horizon, from the East where the sun rises; and then, unvanquished man will retrace his path of conquest, despite all barriers, to win back his lost heritage."¹⁶

If we compare Tagore's position with the traditional vedāntins like Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, a more vivid picture of his stand emerges in this regard. Unlike Rāmānuja, he does not maintain that complete freedom from evil or pain resulting from it is not possible during one's existence in this world; it comes only with the death of a seeker of Truth. While commenting on the *Bhagavadgītā* (5.23), which reads, "He who is able, even here, before he is released from the body, to bear the impulse generated by desire and wrath, he is a Yogin (competent for self-realisation); he is the happy man";¹⁷ where it talks about the possibility of *jivanamukti*, Rāmānuja maintains, "...he is released 'here itself from the body', i.e. even during the state when he is practising the means for release, he gains the capacity for experiencing the self. But he becomes blessed by the experience and gets immersed in the bliss of the self only after the fall of the body."¹⁸ On the contrary for Tagore, in fact, error is not permanent by its inherent nature.

Though, Tagore does not explain the exact reason behind the existence of imperfection;¹⁹ yet he makes it a point to affirm that it is only *provisional truth*. Man realizes that anything which is limited is not actually "imprisoned within its limits."²⁰ It continuously moves in order to get rid of the finitude. In fact, finitude is not denial of the infinite, nor imperfection of perfection. As a matter of fact, for Tagore, they are "completeness manifested in parts."²¹ Evil tendencies are like errors in our intellectual life. It is transitory and therefore cannot replace the truth. Thus Rabindranath notes, "Error, by its nature cannot be stationary; it cannot remain with truth; like a tramp, it must quit its lodging as soon as it fails to pay its score to the full."²²

If evil is comparable, as Tagore maintains, to the errors made in our intellectual life; it would be like mistaking a rope to be snake on a certain occasion. Defects in the eye of the perceiver or lack of sufficient light or any such causal condition might be responsible for the incident. This is primarily case of lack of true knowledge (*pramā*) of the perceiver. Śāṅkara, in his introduction to the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* observes, “This behaviour has for its material cause an unreal nescience and man resorts to it by mixing up reality with unreality as a result of superimposing the things themselves or their attributes on each other.”²³The mistakenly perceived snake is not called as *asat* but *mithyā* by *Advaita* Vedāntins. *Asat* is an absolutely non – existent entity like hare’s horn; but, *mithyā* is that which is negated with a different knowledge. Here, the snake is *mithyā* since it is negated as soon the knowledge of the rope dawns. It can be termed as ‘partial truth’, since it is not like hare’s horn. The ignorant man responses to it as real, till the ignorance persist. For Tagore, evil is also such a *provisional truth*. It is nothing but just a by-product of ignorance, right understanding eradicates such tendencies.

The task of human intellect is to capture the truth through error, i.e. to get rid of the “untruth.” The goal of personality is to attain emancipation by overcoming evil. Therefore man is actually marching from evil to good. Therefore Tagore notes, “Evil cannot altogether arrest the course of life on the highway and rob it off its possessions. For the evil has to pass on, it has to grow into good; it cannot stand and give battle to the all.”²⁴ For him, even immorality has its basis in the morality only. He notes, “The life of a man can be immoral, but that only means that it must have a moral basis. What is immoral is imperfectly moral, just as what is false is true to a small extent, or it cannot even be false.”²⁵ Thus, Tagore considers the notions truth and error in terms of their degrees. In the *Advaita Vedānta* tradition, three steps viz. *śravanam*, *mananam* and *nididhyāsanam* has been prescribed to train the intellect in order to capture the truth. *Śravanam* refers to listening about the Truth, *mananam* is reflection on the Truth and *nididhyāsanam* means meditation upon the Truth. By means of these methods ‘untruth’ has to be removed so that Truth is revealed. Just like Tagore, degree of Truth and error was entertained by the post- Śāṅkara *Advaita* Vedāntins. They talked about dream-like erroneous experiences as *prātibhasika sattā* (illusory truth), the waking state of consciousness as the *vyvahārika sattā* (practical

truth) and the state of *samādhi* or *turīya* as *pāramārthikasattā* (Absolute Truth). The first layer is negated by the second and the second one by the third.²⁶

The confusion in man occurs because he is not able to identify the universal law, though Tagore treats the law as ever-present, with the ordinary instruments of understanding; at least in the primitive stage. He notes, “Then we have our minds; and mind seeks its own food. Mind has its necessity also. It must find out reason in things. It is faced with a multiplicity of facts; and it is bewildered when it cannot find one unifying principle which simplifies the heterogeneity of things.”²⁷ But, according to Tagore, man overcomes this confusion by eliminating the perplexity himself. Thus he adds, “Man, as a knower, is not fully himself – his mere information does not reveal him. But, as a person, he is the organic man, who has the inherent power to select things from his surroundings.”²⁸ Consequently, for Tagore, the whole issue of exercising freewill is resolved based on the knowledge of the Truth or the Cosmic Reality. As soon as man recognizes the “spirit of unity”, with the removal of ignorance about the universal law, the dichotomy of individual and universal will dissolve; leading to perfect harmony between man’s nature and nature-in-general. He notes, “The universal power which is manifested in the universal law is one with our own power. It will thwart us where we are small, where we are against the current things, but it will help us where we are great, where we are in unison with the all.”²⁹ Therefore, according to Tagore, breaking the limited barrier of individual ego becomes the sole instrument to experience infinite joy. He observes, “In the heart of all man is constantly working the urge of evolution. Man in human society is all the while striving to realize himself in the world-man by breaking through the shell of his ego. In fact, it is in this process that the whole cosmic universe seeks its own truth, the supreme truth of ever-growing, ever-becoming Humanity.”³⁰ When the universe is in synchronization with us, we realize it as truth and enjoy it as beauty.

Tagore conceives freedom in two forms – negative and positive. Negative freedom is the ego-centred freedom which is a subject of *avidyā*, *karma* and *kāma*. One who exercises that kind of freedom is actually not aware of the Reality. On the contrary, one who can distinguish between eternal and the ephemeral can only practice positive freedom. In order to practice positive freedom, one has to attain considerable measure of liberty from being a subject of ignorance. Tagore notes,

“Our will can be free not towards the limitations of our self, not where it is *māyā* and negation, but towards the unlimited, where is truth and love. Our freedom cannot go against its own principle of freedom and yet be free; it cannot commit suicide and yet live. We cannot say that we should have infinite freedom to fetter ourselves, for the fettering ends the freedom.”³¹ Therefore, error is eliminated with the awareness of the higher Self. There is no other reason for the existence of evil as well. Thus Tagore observes, “When we are conscious of our soul, we perceive the inner being that transcends our ego and has its deeper affinity with the All”³² Thus, one can say that Tagore makes a distinction between soul and ego. But the most noteworthy point, in this case, is that the individual does not know the soul as something separate from him; but as his Real Being only.

Responding to whether, according to his belief, the Divine is isolated from the universe; Tagore says, “Not isolated. The infinite personality of Man comprehends the Universe. There cannot be anything that cannot be subsumed by the human personality, and this proves that the truth of the Universe is human truth. I have taken a scientific fact to illustrate this – matter is composed of protons and electrons, with gaps between them; but matter may seem to be solid. Similarly humanity is composed of individuals, yet they have their interconnections of human relationship, which gives living solidarity to man’s world. The entire universe is linked up with us in a similar manner, it is a human universe. I have pursued this through art literature and religious consciousness of man.”³³ In a nutshell, just like Absolutist, Tagore declares evil tendencies as synonyms of ignorance. Therefore he notes, “This is the reason why separateness of our self has been described by our philosophers as *māyā*, as an illusion, because it has no intrinsic reality of its own.”³⁴ He further adds, “In its finite aspect, the self is conscious of its separateness, and there it is ruthless in its attempt to have more distinction than all others. But in the infinite aspect its wish is to gain that harmony which leads to its perfection and not its mere aggrandizement.”³⁵ To my mind, with the backdrop of the Upaniṣads, Tagore gives a sufficiently comprehensive and convincing explanation of evil; along with an appreciable solution. By reading him carefully, we can see that he establishes a relation between the Absolute and the evil tendencies. Since each individual is connected to the whole cosmos at the substratum level; in other words, since the true

existence of a man is all-pervading, he aspires to regain his Primal Being by acquiring the worldly riches. The attempt to gain the non-dual gets expressed in fragments in the dualistic paradigm. Any evil tendency, greed for instance, can be clearly explained on this basis. Moreover, Tagore has not overlooked the issues of blame and responsibility while treating evil as error. He, by admitting existence of ego and the subsequently introducing the notion of negative freedom, has clearly placed responsibility on the lower self. One can easily infer that Tagore will not treat ego as an absolute non-existent entity like barren woman's son. It will persist and will remain real, so long as ignorance of Man-the Eternal persists.

Theism and Man's Nature in Tagore: in the light of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja:

During a discussion with Albert Einstein, on 14th July in 1930, regarding whether the Universe is a unity which depends on humanity, Tagore replies, "Yes, one eternal entity. We have to realize it through our emotions and activities. We realize the Supreme Man who has no individual limitations through our limitations. Science is concerned with that which is not confined to individuals; it is the impersonal human world of truths. Religion realizes these truths and links them up with our deeper needs; our individual consciousness of truth gains universal significance. Religion applies values to truth, and we know truth as good through our own harmony with it."³⁶ Tagore virtually avoids the universal conflict between theism and the problem of evil, by almost resorting to Absolutism; while dealing with the issue of imperfection. But he is not an Absolutist like Śaṅkara, when it comes to theism. Moreover, he entertains actions and emotions as a tool for the highest realization; which Śaṅkara does not do. Knowledge is the only means for liberation according to Śaṅkara. Action is just a tool for purification of mind for him. The seeker having such a pure mind is fit for the discipline of knowledge.

While commenting on the *śloka* of the Bhagavadgītā which reads, "Through the performance of his works as worship man wins *perfection* – worshipping Him from whom all beings have proceeded and by whom all this has been pervaded";³⁷ Śaṅkara maintains, "That inner controller, God, from whom all living beings have originated and by whom all the world has been pervaded – by merely worshipping Him through the performance of each man's works according to his class; man wins perfection consisting in the eligibility for the discipline of knowledge."³⁸ So, action

has a very limited function in Śaṅkara's scheme. As far as devotion is concerned, Śaṅkara makes a distinction between *saguṇa* and *nirguṇabhakti*. The role of *saguṇabhakti* is same as that of *karma*; it is meant only for *sattva śuddhi* or mental purification. *Nirguṇa bhakti*, called as *akṣaropāsana* by Śaṅkara, is a tool for the emancipation of the seeker of truth. But this form of *bhakti* no more remains compatible with the practice of *karmayoga*. Śaṅkara notes, "In (*Bhagavadgītā*) 12.11 it is suggested that the worshipper of the imperishable (*akṣaropāsaka*), who perceives no difference, cannot reasonably perform *karmayoga*, as this is an offspring of nescience. Similarly the Lord shows the impropriety of a *karmayogī* betaking himself to the worship of the Imperishable. In the verse 12.4 (they reach Me alone) states that the worshippers of the Imperishable freely attain 'Aloneness' while 12.7 (I am their deliverer) shows the dependence of others on the Lord. If the worshippers of the Imperishable have been assimilated to the Lord – have become His very Self since they see no difference whatsoever – it will be improper to suggest that they are the objects of an act of deliverance."³⁹ Due to the necessity of a dualistic paradigm to sustain *karma* and *bhakti*, Śaṅkara places them in a unique way to suit his purpose; which is not the case in Tagore.

Tagore believes in a God who is not completely impersonal like the *nirguṇa* Brahman of *Advaita Vedānta*. But, at the same time, it is not like Rāmānuja's *saguṇa* Brahman; who resides in *vaikuntha*, in the form of Lord *Viṣṇu* along with His consort *Laxmī*. Tagore's God is personal and impersonal at the same time. His God, in the form of Man – the eternal, is known as a part of the seeker only. He rejects any objection pertaining to the anthropomorphic dimension of his faith; arguing that, as a matter of fact, it is a human limitation. For Tagore, a follower of the upaniṣadic tradition, realization of God is the experience of infinity in the finite i.e. "the giver in the gifts."⁴⁰ Thus he notes, "He is the infinite deal of perfection. But we are not what we truly are; we are ever to become true ever to become *Brahma*. There is eternal play of love in the relation between this being and the becoming; and in the depth of this mystery is the source of all truth and beauty that sustains the endless march of creation."⁴¹ Thus one can note that *emotion* comes to play a very important role the scheme of Tagore. Truth has twin dimensions of freedom and restraint. Tagore maintains that on one side, everything moves fearing Him (Lord);⁴² possibly with

reference to the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* which reads, “From the fear of Him fire burns, from fear shines the Sun; from the fear run Indra and Air and Death, the fifth.”⁴³ On the other side, *Taittirīya* passage suggests that everything is born out of out of joy. The exact text goes as, “(He) knew bliss as Brahman; for from Bliss, indeed, all these beings originate; having been born, they are sustained by Bliss; they move towards and merge in Bliss.”⁴⁴

If only restraint is focussed, it is injustice to the possibilities in Brahman; as indicated in the scriptures. True respect to the notion of Brahman is given only when both the facets are positively explored. Therefore Tagore proclaims, “This world which takes its form in the mould of man’s perception, still remains only as the partial world of senses and mind. It is like a guest and like a kinsman. It becomes completely our own when it comes within the range of our emotions.”⁴⁵ Therefore emotions become an indispensable element to explore the Ultimate Reality in its comprehensiveness. Tagore notes, “Our emotions are the gastric juices which transform this world of appearance into the more intimate world of sentiments. On the other hand, this outer world has its own juices, having their various qualities which excite our emotional activities. This is called in our Sanskrit rhetoric *rasa*, which signifies outer juices having their response in the inner juices of our emotions.”⁴⁶ And adds, “By constant human associations sentiments gather around our things of use and invite the help of art to reveal themselves.”⁴⁷ For Tagore, finite and infinite are dependent on each other. In fact, *Brahma* is dependent on *jiva* for the completion of His love. He observes, “In our country the *Vaiṣṇavas* have realized this truth and boldly asserted it by saying that God had to rely on human souls for the fulfilment of His love.”⁴⁸ In this way he highlights that vital aspect of man’s nature which the so called rational, logical or thinking mind often tends to overlook; that dimension of Brahman which has been described as *rasa (raso vai saḥ)* in the *Upaniṣad*. The text goes as,

“*asadvā idamagra āsīt/ tato vai sadajāyata/ tadātmānam svayamkuruta/
tasmātattasukṛtamucyata iti/ yadvai tat sukṛtam/ raso vai saḥ*” (*Taittirīya* II.7.1)

Though the existence of negative emotions can also be explained on the same ground as that of the negative values, establishing a relation between emotions and

the problem of evil, Tagore does not directly attempt to do so. But, he surely claims emotion as a tool for the highest realization; thereby establishing a connection between emotion and the Ultimate Reality, where the former is a means to know the latter. But the later set of emotions, identified as a tool, is positive and pure emotions signifying Universal Love. Even if we do not consider Tagore as a radical interpreter of the Upaniṣads, one perhaps should not blame him of not subscribing to any of the classical models exhaustively; for the simple reason that Upaniṣads themselves do not subscribe thoroughly to any such model. They also present, to borrow a term from Gadamer, 'a fusion of horizon'; where varieties of ideas appear to merge into one another, without necessarily trying to create any consistency in the classical sense of the term. Therefore Tagore's middle path, creating an amalgamation, comfortably fits into the larger Upaniṣadic framework.

Conclusion:

In the conclusion, it can probably be said that Tagore, oscillates in between Absolutism and theism; and presents, more or less, a holistic picture of human propensities in his 'Man's Nature'. His highlighting of the *rasa* aspect of Brahman – the Ultimate Reality, who is nothing but his Eternal Man present in all, and the nature of man's interplay with Him, reveals why man is not only a rational animal but also equally an emotional being. The essay makes it clear that due to the very nature of his Being, man aspires to love and desires to be loved. This aspect of human life needs nurturing, sensitization and care, at par with the training given to the intellect. Tagore suggests different art-forms like music, dance and painting as tools; in order to meet with this end. Though he could not solve the problem of evil in the light of his theism, as we have already noted that his solution resorts to the Absolutist model; his attempt of explaining the situation, with the help of the notion of Eternal Man, has lots of implications in the domain of morality. By the very description of his Being; man, by means of the Eternal Manhood present in him, is connected to the whole Universe. For that reason, injustice done to any other being is bound to come back to the agent; since every other being is a part of his own Being only. Similarly, one's helping others also means helping oneself only in this paradigm; since that is also bound to return following the principle of non – dualism.

Therefore, there is an intrinsic justification for the claim, which Tagore makes with reference to the scriptures in his essay; that though by means of injustice man may acquire pleasurable things in this world, it destroys him in the root. Tagore's criticism of negative freedom as a self – slayer can also be justified on the same ground. As a whole, we get a very comprehensive account of human character in this reading. Of course, Tagore has placed them all with the background of the *Upaniṣads*; otherwise these would have called for many more set of justifications. But, given the human experience, his hypothesis floated with the help of scriptures seems to explain it well. The claim of comprehensiveness of Tagore is justified, since almost all the vital aspects of human nature has been addressed by him; though one may argue that he is not consistent with the selection of any specific model, be it dualistic or non-dualistic. But the argument is not valid since the applied synthesis is Tagore's own model, which could be treated as his unique contribution; and *Upaniṣads*, as such, do not support any specific classical model. On the same ground, Tagore's solution of the problem of evil from Absolutism and prescriptions for a healthy emotion-culture from a theistic viewpoint is equally justified.

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18. *Ibid.*, p.207
19. Neither Śāṅkara nor Rāmānuja has given an unambiguous explanation of its beginning. Rāmānuja maintains that this causal series is beginningless and *avidyā*, the root cause of the series, is *anādi* according to Śāṅkara.
20. Tagore, R.N., *Sadhana*, McMillan & Co. Ltd. London 1964, p.48

21. Ibid., p.48
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23. Gambhirananda, Swami, (Trans.) *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya* Advaita Ashrama Calcutta 1998 p.1
24. Tagore, R.N., *Sadhana*, McMillan & Co. Ltd. London 1964, p.52
25. Ibid., p.56
26. In the *Nyāya* epistemology, *pramā* (valid knowledge) is subsumed within *jñāna* (knowledge). *Jñāna* also includes *bhramajñāna* or illusory knowledge. This position is also accepted by the vedāntins.
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AN ETHICAL CONSIDERATION OF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT

NGALEKNAO RAMTHING

When we ponder over the term 'preferential treatment', we are often led into thinking the ethical dilemmas associated with it. The ethicality of advancing the policy is controversial and contentious. It is contentious and controversial as it barely has any 'right' or 'wrong' decision over the question of whether or not preferential treatment is ethical. The preferential treatment is based on the idea of provisioning a special privilege with an aim to restore the members of social groups which have been discriminated against in the past which undeniably may lead to conflict. However, the practice of the policy is not invariable in nature. Some important questions to be pondered over are: What is wrong with preferential treatment? Is not discrimination of some sections of people based on caste, creed, birth, and sex morally wrong? Is the justification of the treatment derived its basis from the utilitarian principle? This short paper in an attempt to highlight the concept and briefly analyse the ethical dilemmas, secondly, argues how resorting to preferential treatment is not discriminatory and finally argues that although preferential treatment may not be the best solution but it is the most practicable and efficient means of redressing past institutional discrimination, mistreatment and exploitation..

The term 'preferential treatment' is synonymous with different phrases such as, positive discrimination, affirmative action, reverse discrimination, preferential discrimination, special consideration, and quota system. Its uses have provoked immense debates. Preferential treatment is generally understood as a set of policies and practices within a particular system seeking to include particular groups based on their gender, race, sexuality, creed or nationality in areas in which they are under-represented such as education, employment, etc. It is founded on the idea of rectifying past discriminatory policies inflicted on certain socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. It is an attempt to make equal opportunity by giving special privilege to a particular group of community whose economic and social condition are comparatively much lower and underdeveloped due to past discrimination. As in the case of India, the preferential treatment is known by the name quota system or reservation policy. Any serious attempt to discuss the issues

concerning preferential treatment can be considered from two different perspectives. The first approach is to stop discrimination against any groups and treat them at par with the rest of the members in the society or nation. It neither involves compensation for the past injustices nor helps to undo the effects of past discrimination.⁶² The second approach is to venture further and give preferential treatment to the victimised groups temporarily for a fixed period of time so as to rectify the on-going effects of past discrimination.

To make more conversant with the discussion, it is imperative to explicate what are the policies involved in preferential treatment. Most of the arguments about preferential treatment may be characterized as either compensatory or inclined towards the past or towards the future. The preferential policies involve fixed quota systems in the field of political sphere, education, employment, promotion of the members of the victimised groups. However, it is to be mentioned here that the policies and programs intended for the victims of the past must be within the scope and limits of the constitution of a territory and are not invariable in nature. One can pose a question: Is not discrimination of people on the basis of caste, creed, birth, and sex morally wrong? The critics is of the view that preferential treatment is a social evil as it denies justice to others or involves a 'reverse discrimination' that bestows 'undeserved preferences' on its beneficiaries and deprives the others sans any faults of theirs. Some critics also argue that preferential treatment is morally unjustified since it infringes the principle of justice to equality and the principle demands that everybody should be given equal consideration for equal benefit. Some argues that preferential treatment is a social evil because it victimizes certain classes of people who are deprived of the benefits. Alan Goldman says "the non-members of the preferred minority will feel that some people are getting undeserved benefits which are not available generally. The persistence of such feelings will slow down the whole process of the integration of the previously disadvantaged groups; as a result, there will be 'more friction and resentment than that inevitable from residual

⁶² Y. V. Satyanarayana (2010) *Ethics: Theory and Practice*, Published by Dorling Kindersley(India) Pvt. Ltd, Pearson Education in South Asia, New Delhi, India.

bigotry”⁶³. It is not untrue to say that we cannot hold people of the present generation morally responsible for the harms and exploitation and injustice done in the historical past. Discrimination may be defined as making a policy or decision on the consideration of irrelevant factors in questions such as caste, colour, creed, race, sex and so on. These factors are almost irrelevant to decisions about whom to give special preference and whom to exclude and thus seems to indicate unfairness and prejudices.

Whereas, defenders on the other hand argue that preferential treatment is a social good because it gives justice to certain sections of people who have been victims of past institutional discrimination, mistreatment and exploitation.⁶⁴ They argued that victims of past discrimination were so far behind in the race that without preferential treatment, equal opportunity would never be more than a high-sounding phrase. There is nothing unreasonable in bringing about neutralizing or rectifying the effects of the past discrimination and giving advantage to the victims on the factors such as caste, colour, creed, race, sex, are not considered as irrelevant factors because the history of discrimination has turned them into relevant factors. It can be further argued here that the past discrimination, mistreatment and exploitation have adversely affected the present position and unless substantial provision is arranged, uplifting of the plight of the victims cannot be possibly practical. In this regards, Brooks aptly argues that “... a mere barring of discrimination acts...may not be enough to cure the evil. Affirmative action is one of the bits of social engineering which has been devised to rectify an entrenched practice of discrimination.”⁶⁵ Many thinkers expressed their views in consonant with him that discontinuation of the practice of discrimination is not simply enough and that people who have been discriminated against in the past must be adequately compensated for the injustice done to them. They emphasized on the point that the present provision is intended to neutralise the on-going effects of past discrimination and to rectify the social disparities existent in the social system. Preferential treatment as a rectification of past discrimination reduced based on the notion of equal opportunity.

⁶³ Goldman A.H (1979) *Justice and Reverse Discrimination*, p-143.

⁶⁴ Jagat Pal (2012) *Justice, Equality and Morality: An Essay in Applied Ethics*, Masdhav Books, Gurgaon(Haryana), p-22

⁶⁵ D.H.M. Brooks (1987) ‘Why Discrimination is Especially Wrong’, in Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty (eds), *Social Ethics: Moral and Social Policy*, McGraw-Hill, New York, p-204.

The principle of compensatory justice states that whenever a particular injustice has been done to some persons, just compensation, or reparation should be given to those injured persons. The history of discrimination and its persistence requires restoration of the balance of justice to the victimized groups to obtain the requirements. The advocates of compensatory justice argue that, 'the past lives in the present'. The inequalities resulting from past discrimination necessitates compensatory provision to members of groups victimized in the past to develop equally with others. There exist morally good reasons to justify difference in treatment among different classes of people in a particular social context. The principle of justice to equality does not logically assume equality in the same degree. It only prescribes that everybody should be treated equally unless there are morally relevant reasons to justify difference in their treatment. Not giving special means to the underprivileged people to uplift themselves would amount to letting them suffer due to past discrimination which is not morally justifiable. However, it is to be mentioned here that the policies that are to be implemented may be morally justifiable if it is intended to level the playing field for all other actors marked by inequalities in a social context for providing and ensuring equality of opportunity to them in genuine sense of the them.⁶⁶ While discussing the principle of redress John Rawls says, "the principle holds that in order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine equality of opportunity, society must give more attention to those with fewer native assets and to those born into the less favourable social positions. The idea is to redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of equality"⁶⁷. It is to be understood that equality of opportunity calls for a differential approach to different classes and it is a consequence of the principle of equality of opportunity that those with inferior initial means of obtaining the types of competence required should be treated in a more favourable way: otherwise their opportunities are unequal. The principle of utility also states that an action or a practice is morally correct if it produces better consequences. It is not for compensation or rectification of past injuries but for morally good consequences to

⁶⁶ Jagat Pal (2012) *Justice, Equality and Morality: An Essay in Applied Ethics*, Masdhav Books, Gurgaon, Haryana, p-45

⁶⁷ Rawls J., (1972) *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p-100-1

happen to the victimized groups of the past. Richard⁶⁸ argues that preferential programs can be justified on the basis of utilitarian claim to have good consequences for an integrated and egalitarian society. He further argues that, “It is also wrong to think that program of preferential treatment in any strong sense is either unjust or unprincipled... Such programs may reasonably be viewed as potentially valuable, effective means by which to achieve admirable and significant social ideals of equality and integration.”⁶⁹ In order to rectify the past discrimination it is important that factors which can restore the members of groups which have been discriminated against in the past be implemented.

One can understand the frustration of the opponents of preferential treatment the generosity of programs and may argue that the program to rectify the past discrimination is at the expense of other innocent persons who have nothing to do with the past discrimination. They suggest that the cost of preferential treatment overrides the benefits and thus persistence on provisioning of preferential treatment is uncalled for. However, it is not out of place to make a little mention here that the program designed for rectification of past discrimination is mostly compensatory. The society in which we live is thoroughly dug in with full of social disparities and injustices. And we have never been free from the so-called network of the problems, amongst which, the problem of social disparity is one that has drawn serious attention not only to a few educated citizens but it also provokes even the attention of the commoners and this perhaps need to be everyone’s business to ponder upon. The problems of social disparities in the society are too important to ignore. The role of a state ought to be strengthened to promote social harmony and social balance and hence it is the duty of the state to design appropriate policies to have a just and equal distribution of position concerning the affairs of education, employment, wealth etc. And thereby, the state needs to establish some fact that there are social disparities in the society and this is partly because of the past history. The members belonging to certain social groups have been subjected to discrimination in the past and the consequences of the past have put them in a disadvantaged position to compete

⁶⁸ Y. V. Satyanarayana (2010) *Ethics: Theory and Practice*, Published by Dorling Kindersley(India) Pvt. Ltd, Pearson Education in South Asia, New Delhi, India, p-90.

⁶⁹Richard Wasserstrom (1987) ‘A Defence of Programs of Preferential Treatment’, in Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty (eds), *Social Ethics: Morality and Social Policy*, McGraw-Hill, New York, p-218-219

equally with the members of non-preferred groups and as a result, the members of the victimized groups are under-represented in many areas. The principle of human rights requires an equal, respectful and dignified life to all members and hence, there is a need to program or design to neutralise the effects of the past discrimination as well as to rectify the on-going social disparities and such remedial recourse can be taken only when the victimized groups are adequately compensated for the injustice done to them in the past. The program associated with preferential treatment is essentially devised to address the social disparities prevailing in our society. It is a method to rectify the social imbalance in the social system. It is a tool designed to bring about and maintain a level of equality in the society by uplifting sections of people who had suffered due to past discrimination, mistreatment and exploitation. Thus, by neutralizing the present wide disparities the goal to achieve the so-called “ideal society” or ‘casteless society’ based on the ‘principles of justice’ can be realised as envisaged by Dr.Ambedkar.

In any serious discussion, a general question about the incompatibility of preferential treatment with the concept of equality for all arises. It is, however, not untrue to be sceptical about whether the implementation of reservation policies in India or other places are effective in fostering equality, harmony and social peace. It may be argued here that although preferential treatment may not be the finest solution and yet it is the most practicable and efficient means of redressing the past institutional discrimination, mistreatment and exploitation despite uncertainties over the efficacy of the implementation and its impacts. As a moral community, it is the responsibility of the state as well as individual to promote the welfare of the disadvantaged groups by ameliorating their situation. Ameliorating the status of such groups may not be meaningful unless provisioning of facilities is implemented for uplifting the welfare. And such means, perhaps may ensure creation of adequate and ample opportunities for self-development, enhancement and advancement of their status to the fullest standard possible. The success of such implementation may develop a conducive avenues which may preferably lead to productive insights which is worthwhile, not only because there are some interesting policies enshrined in the concept but because

the very possibilities of creating a conducive avenue per se is a positive alternative. James Warnock⁷⁰ has rightly stated that the general object of moral evaluation must be to contribute in some respects, by way of the actions of rational beings to the amelioration of the human predicaments, that is, of the conditions in which these rational beings, humans, actually find themselves. And the content of morality is to help human predicament, namely the underprivileged sections of society, by expanding our sympathies, which has a tendency to get worse. The tendency to get worse is mainly because of the limitations of resources, such as intelligence, knowledge, rationality and sympathy and because of which the social condition tend to fall apart and hence it is the role of ethics to offer an anti-entropic response, to offer order and structure within society which people may flourish as human being.⁷¹ And to make it so it is important to rectify the past discrimination by eliminating causes of discrimination in order to restore the members of groups which have been discriminated against in the past to a position of equality with other groups in the society because the ultimate aim of the preferential treatment is to remove inequality prevailing in society.

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**THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE NATURES OF THE BINARY IN
SĀMĀKHYA PHILOSOPHY: SOME OBSERVATIONS**

SWAGATA GHOSH

I

The Sāmkhya philosophy is one of the most ancient traditions of the Indian philosophical system. Like the other orthodox schools of philosophy in the Indian tradition, the Sāmkhya system too considers liberation to be the highest goal of human life. According to the Sāmkhya philosophers, liberation being identical to the absolute cessation of sufferings, can only be attained through the discriminatory knowledge (*vivekajñāna*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. The main objective of the present research paper is to study the contrast between the essential natures of the transcendental consciousness and the insentient matter from the perspective of the classical Sāmkhya tradition. In establishing the above stance of the Sāmkhya philosophical system, numerous references from the authentic Sāmkhya tradition have been referred to, as well as some aspects of contrast and debate with the other philosophical traditions, both orthodox and heterodox systems, have been elucidated in the present article.

We know that the Sāmkhya philosophical system being a dualistic, realist school, admits the binary, namely, the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, indicative of the consciousness and an insentient material agent respectively. *Puruṣa* has been described as pure (*śuddha*), eternal (*nitya*), immutable (*aparīṇāmī*), unrelated (*asambaddha*), not-bound (*kūṭastha*) etc. Such unique nature of *puruṣa* as opposed to *prakṛti*, that has been admitted in Sāmkhya philosophy poses to be a matter of intrigue, and demands in-depth discussion in the concern of Indian philosophical academics. In that context, it may be cited that, in the eleventh *Sāmkhyakārikā*, we find that –

that –

‘*triṅṅamavivekiviṣayaḥsāmānyamacetanaṁprasavadharmi/vyaktaṁtathāpradhānam , tadviparītastathā ca pumān//*’¹. The above *kārikā* expresses the common properties of *vyakta* and *avyakta*, that is, *prakṛti* or insentient matter, and those in turn represent the features which are absent in *puruṣa*, that is, the consciousness. The *puruṣa* can never be attributed with the above properties, since it is radically different in essence. Each of the properties and their significance are going to be discussed in the present article with an effort to bring out the essence of *puruṣa* as opposed to that

of the *vyakta* and *avyakta*, that is, *prakṛti* in order to posit the unrelated, unbound, unique nature of consciousness, as have been admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy.

Further from the nineteenth *Sāṃkhyakārikā* we find the knowledge of *puruṣa* in its transcendental state. This helps in attaining the discriminatory cognition (*vivekajñāna*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, requisite for liberation. This *kārikā* establishes the *puruṣa* as radically different from *prakṛti*. Analysing the terms ‘*tasmāt*’ and ‘*viparyāsāt*’ in the above *kārikā*, we would find out how they refer to the common properties of *vyaktāvyakta* in the eleventh *kārikā*, and at the same time states the absence of those properties in *puruṣa*. The *atriguṇatva* etc. of *puruṣa*, as mentioned earlier, are indicative of its *sākṣitva*, *kaivalya*, *mādhyastha*, *draṣṭṛtva* and *akarṣṇbhāva* or *akarṣṭtva*. It is important to note here that in Sāṃkhya philosophy, the nature and the definition of consciousness have throughout been provided in contrast to that of *prakṛti*. Hence, in order to cognize the essence of the transcendental consciousness, as opposed to that of the material principle, as admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy, it is necessary that we first delve into the nature of *prakṛti*. The following discussion will be carried out in that manner.

II

The third *Sāṃkhyakārikā* states that—
 ‘*mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtirmahadādyāḥprakṛtīvikṛtayāḥsapta/*
ṣoḍaśakastuvikāronaprakṛtirnavikṛtiḥpuruṣaḥ!’². The twenty-five principles (*tattvas*) as admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy are divided into four broad categories based on their characteristic features, and the divisions are such that they themselves are distinguished from the others. In Vācaspati Miśra’s words —‘*samkṣepato hi śāstrārthasyacatasro vidhāḥ*’³. The term ‘*vidhā*’ here indicates that the divisions are characterized by mutually exclusive properties. The four categories are - *prakṛti*, *prakṛti-vikṛti*, *kevalavikṛti* and *anubhaya (naprakṛtiḥnavikṛtiḥ)*. Now let us discuss each of these categories individually. To ascertain the nature of *prakṛti* it is said that ‘*mūlaprakṛtiḥnavikṛtiḥ*’. Etymologically, *prakṛti* can be defined as ‘*prakarotiyāsā prakṛtiḥ*’⁴ which means that, that which acts or creates in the perfect manner. *Prakṛti* is always the creator or the cause of creation, but it is itself uncaused. It consists of agency (*karṣṭvaviśiṣṭa*) and is not the object (*karmatvāviśiṣṭa*). It is also termed as

the *pradhāna*, meaning the primary or the primordial, original cause. The essential nature of *prakṛti* is ‘*sattvarajastamasām sāmīyāvasthā*’⁵. That is, the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas* – *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* constitute the *prakṛti*, and it is due to their equilibrium that the state is referred to as *avikṛti* or *mūlaprakṛti*. It is thus called because it acts as the root cause of the world which is an effect (*kārya*) of the heterogeneous transformation (*virūpapariṇāma*) of the three *guṇas* and is such that it serves the purpose of the others (*saṁghātarūpa*). However, the *mūlaprakṛti* is itself uncaused, that is, it does not have any further root cause. It is uncreated (*akṛta*). Rather trying to determine the root of the root-cause itself, would only lead to an infinite regress, and there are no supporting views to such stance either, that might endorse such conceptual infinite regress. Hence, it is sufficient and logical to admit the *avikṛti* or the *mūlaprakṛti* as the uncreated primordial cause.

Moving on to the next category we find that seven principles are attributed with the property called *prakṛti-vikṛti*. These are the *mahattattva*, *ahamkāratattva* and the five *tanmātras*. These principles are such referred to, because they themselves are created and they act as the causes of other principles as well. Thus, they are sometimes regarded as the cause (*prakṛti*) and sometimes as the effect (*vikṛti*). *Mahattattva* is the effect of *prakṛti*. It is its first product in the course of the manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of the world. The *mahattattva* in turn acts as the cause of *ahamkāratattva*. Again *ahamkāra* being the effect of *mahattattva*, in turn acts as the cause of the *pañcatanmātra* and *indriya*. The *pañcatanmātras* again act as the causes of the *pañcabhūta*, themselves being the effect of *ahamkāra*. Thus, the seven principles are referred to as *prakṛti-vikṛti* which means that, that which is the *prakṛti*, is itself the *vikṛti* too.

The third category consists of the *vikṛti* or the *kevalavikṛti* which are sixteen in number. These are the five sense organs, five motor organs, the internal sense organ (*manas*) and the five gross elements (*pañcamahābhūta*). These principles are only the effects of their respective preceding principles and are never the causes of any other principle. Thus, they are referred to as *kevalavikāra*. Here one might argue that how can we say that the gross elements like the earth *etc.* are simply effects, and never the causes, as we find various other objects like the jar *etc.* to be produced from the earthen elements? Hence, these principles should also be considered as *prakṛti*,

that is, causes of the subsequent products. Vācaspati Miśra, in his commentary, provides the answer to the above apprehension. It is true that the gross elements like earth *etc.* undergo transformation in the form of jar *etc.*, then milk into curd, a seed into a tree and the like, yet these transformations cannot be termed as distinct principles or as separate *tattvas*. Those principles which lead to the production of other principles, only such principles could be considered as *prakṛti*. Here the milk from the cow, or the curd from the milk, or a jar from the clay are not separate principles (*natattvāntara*). So their respective causes cannot be regarded as *prakṛti*. Now the natural question which comes up at this point is that, why cannot the above products be held as different principles? In response, Vācaspati Miśra says that – ‘*sarvesāmgoghaṭādīnāmsthūlatendriyagrāhyatā ca samāitina tattvāntaratvam*’⁶. Here we find the core essence of *satkāryavāda*, which states that the cause is necessarily more subtle (*sūkṣma*) and more extended in its existence (*vyāpaka*), as compared to the effect (*vyāpya*). According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy, the term ‘*sūkṣma*’ does not mean small, rather it is used in the sense of extension and subtlety. The subtlety is again determined with respect to sense-perceptibility (*indriyagrāhyatā*). Now it is evident that there is no difference in subtlety and sense-perceptibility in case of the *pañcamahābhūta* and the products like cow, jar, milk, tree *etc.* produced thereafter. Thus, there being no difference in their subtlety (*sūkṣmatva* or *saukṣma*), the above objects cannot be considered as distinct principles from one another. Consequently, their causes like earth *etc.* cannot be considered as *prakṛti*. Thus, the afore-mentioned sixteen principles can only be regarded as effects (*vikṛti*), and in spite of their transformations, leading to the emergence of new substances, they cannot be considered as *prakṛti* owing to their similar subtlety (*saukṣma*) or grossness (*sthūlatva*) with their products.

Finally, we arrive at the fourth category – *anubhaya*. That is, *puruṣa* or that ‘other’ principle which is, ‘*naprakṛtiḥnavikṛtiḥ*’. It means that the *puruṣa* is neither the cause nor the effect. It is not included in the causal chain at all. It is radically different from all the above categories. It is neither the producer nor itself produced. Thus, it is the only entity which stands out of the entire system of causality in Sāṃkhya philosophy and is the only sentient principle admitted there. Hence, in a nutshell we can refer to the specific characteristics of each of the categories as⁷ –

prakṛti: tattvāntaropādānatve sati tattvāntarānupādeyatvam
prakṛti-vikṛti: tattvāntaropādānatve sati tattvāntaropādeyatvam
kevalavikṛti: tattvāntarānupādānatve sati tattvāntaropādeyatvam
naprakṛtiḥnavikṛtiḥor puruṣa: tattvāntarānupādānatve sati
tattvāntarānupādeyatvam

III

From the third *kārikā* we have come to know that the *puruṣa*, and the *prakṛti* along with its evolutes, are characterized by mutually exclusive properties. We have also found out that the *puruṣa* is radically different from *prakṛti*. Thus, it becomes imperative to discuss in detail about the essential features of *puruṣa* and that too in contrast with the characteristics of both *vyakta* and *avyakta*. The above discussion is going to be carried out, referring to the eleventh *kārikā*, as follows – ‘*triguṇamavivekiviṣayaḥsāmānyamacetanaṁprasavadharmi/vyaktaṁtathāpradhānam , tadviparītastathā ca pumān!*’. The above *kārikā* expresses the common properties of *vyakta* and *avyakta* and those in turn represent the features which are absent in *puruṣa*. That is, *puruṣa* can never be attributed with the above properties. It is radically different in essence. Each of the properties and their significance are being discussed as follows:

The term ‘*triguṇam*’ indicates both *vyakta* and *avyakta*. Here VācaspatiMiśra says that the term ‘*triguṇam*’ should be interpreted as that which consists of pleasure, pain and delusion (*sukhaduḥkhamohātmaka*).⁸ The twenty three principles as mentioned before along with the *mūlaprakṛti* are essentially of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. That is why, the objects produced from them share the similar essence, and accordingly, when the *manas* is related to the various objects, states of pleasure, pain and delusion are experienced in the respective contexts. Here it is important to note that in Sāṁkhya philosophy; ‘*guṇa*’ always refers to *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The helper (*upakāraka*) or the one which is responsible for bondage (*bandhanakāraka*) is referred to as *guṇa*. The *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are the helpers of *puruṣa* in the sense that they are responsible for the production of the *mahat* etc. which act as the causes of bondage. Thus, the trio are called *guṇas*.⁹ However, such definition of *guṇas* are not applicable to pleasure, pain and delusion. Then the question arises that why Vācaspati Miśra admits pleasure *etc.* by the term ‘*guṇa*’ in this context. The reply is that the above *kārikā* indicates the common features of both

the *vyakta* and the *avyakta*. Now if we interpret *guṇa* in the above verse as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, then it would indicate only the *avyakta* or the *mūlaprakṛti*. That the evolutes of *prakṛti* too consist of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* would not be clearly indicated then. Thus, on account of the fact that the properties of the effect are obtained from those of the cause, following *satkāryavāda*, we can claim that the evolutes (*vyakta*) being of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, their root cause (*mūlaprakṛti* or *avyakta*) too is of that nature. Further, VācaspatiMīśra states that by interpreting *guṇa* as pleasure *etc.*, the Nyāya position is refuted consequently.

According to the Naiyāyikas, pleasure is a property of the self. VācaspatiMīśra here points out that by mentioning the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* as *triguṇa* in the *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has clearly shown that pleasure, pain and delusion are the common properties of *prakṛti* and its evolutes, and thus, they can never be the property of the self.¹⁰ Moreover the *Vedas* unequivocally establish the thesis that the self or consciousness is unrelated and not bound (*‘asaṅga hi ayampuruṣaḥ’*)¹¹. So pleasure *etc.* cannot essentially be related to the self. Otherwise we would arrive at a contradiction with the above Vedic tenet. Hence, pleasure *etc.* has to be admitted as properties of the *vyakta* and the *avyakta*.

Now the second property is *avivekitva*, that is, both *vyakta* and *avyakta* are *avivekī*. The term ‘*viveka*’ means distinction. So the above term in the *kārikā* means that the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* are devoid of distinctions from each other. The *mūlaprakṛti* retains its essence and its evolutes like the *mahat* *etc.* are also essentially the same with their respective causes. Vācaspati Mīśra, however, clarifies the notion of *avivekitva* in a different manner. He says that –‘*sambhūyakāritātra avivekitā*’¹². Both the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* require the assistance of others for the production of their own effects. For instance, *mahat* requires the assistance of *prakṛti* for the production of *ahamkāra*, *ahamkāra* depends upon *mahat* for the production of *tanmātras* and the like. Thus, none of these principles are efficient enough to produce its own effect independently. All these principles have to depend upon their preceding causes for manifesting their own effects. That is why, the principles are *sambhūyakarī*. The term ‘*sambhūya*’ means to be united, together or dependent upon others. Thus, the category of *vyakta* includes all those principles which always act together, or depend upon the other for their actions. It is interesting to note here that

even the *avyakta* or *mūlaprakṛitī*, is *sambhūyakarī*, as it also requires the assistance of *adr̥ṣṭa* for the production of its first evolute, *mahat*. Such *sambhūyakāritā* is referred to as *avivekitā* by Vācaspati Mīśra.

The third property common to both *vyakta* and *avyakta* is *viśayatva*. Here, *viśayatva* or *jñānaviśayatva* refers to the fact that these constitute the objects of cognition. These are knowable objects. This further indicates that they are different from knowledge itself (*jñānabhinna*). Vācaspati Mīśra here points out that such a position refutes the Yogācāra Buddhist view of *vijñāna*. According to the Yogācāra Buddhists, who are idealists, *vijñāna* is the only existent entity. It is internal, and all the objects are nothing but forms of *vijñāna*. That is, even objects like pot, cloth *etc.* are not different from their respective cognitions (*jñānābhinna*). It can be argued here that if such be the case, then *vijñāna* itself should also be the object of *vijnāna*; but that is an absurd position. Thus, Vācaspati Mīśra states that ‘*vijñānādvahihiti yāvat*’¹³, that is, *vijñānabhinnatva* is *viśayatva*. The distinction from *vijñāna* constitutes object-hood (*karmatva*). Hence, objects like jar, cloth *etc.* are not forms of *vijñāna*; rather they are completely different from *vijñāna* itself, and thus constitute the objects of *vijñāna*.

The next commonality between the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* is *sādhāraṇatva*. Vācaspati Mīśra states that – “*ataeva ‘sāmānyam’ ‘sādhāraṇam’ ghaṭādivadanekaihpuruṣairgr̥hītamityarthaḥ*”¹⁴. That is, *vyakta* and *avyakta* being distinct from *vijñāna* are knowable by many individuals, and hence, they are termed as ‘*sādhāraṇa*’. *Vijñāna* is specific to each and every individual. There is no such one *vijñāna* which is attained by all. Now if the objects like jar, cloth *etc.* would have been identical to *vijñāna*, then the same object could not have been known by many individuals. Again, *vijñāna* is nothing but the reflection of the *antaḥkaraṇa* transformed in the form of the object (*viśayākārāntaḥkaraṇavṛtti-pratibimba*). The *antaḥkaraṇa* is specific to each and every individual. Accordingly, their modifications (*vṛtti*) and the subsequent reflections (*tadvṛttipratibimba*) would be different from one another. Such *vijñāna* is known or perceived individually. The individuality of the *vijñāna* of an individual is expressed by Vācaspati Mīśra as ‘*parabuddheḥ apratyakṣatvāt*’¹⁵. So *vijñāna* is always private and/or internal, and

hence not accessible to other individuals as opposed to the public character of the *vyakta* and the *avyakta*.

The final common property between the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* is *prasavadharmitva*. The term ‘*prasava*’ here refers to the transformations undergone by the *vyakta* and the *avyakta*. However, these principles are eternally in the state of transformation. So the above term in the *kārikā* more explicitly claims that it is the very essence or property of these principles to be continually in the state of transformation in some form or the other. Thus, from the above *kārikā*, it is evident that the said properties are the characteristic features of both *vyakta* and *avyakta*. Moreover, they are markers of the fact that the consciousness or *puruṣa* is radically different from all these principles. This is expressed by the latter portion of the verse ‘*tadviparītaḥtathā ca pumān*’. However, the term ‘*ca*’ in the *kārikā* gives us another important insight that in spite of certain commonalities between the *puruṣa* and the *vyaktāvyakta*, they are contradictory to each other in terms of the said properties. The interesting commonalities are that both the *puruṣa* and the *pradhāna* are uncaused (*ahetumat*), they both are *nitya* as a result, and the *vyakta* and the *puruṣa* both are many in number. The main features of contradiction between the *puruṣa* and the *vyaktāvyakta* are that the *puruṣa* is *atriguṇa*, *vivekī*, *aviṣaya*, *asādhāraṇa*, *cetana* and *aprasavadharmī*.¹⁶ On that note, we would next discuss about the specific essential nature of *puruṣa* or consciousness as admitted in Sāṅkhya philosophy, following the nineteenth *kārikā*.

IV

The nineteenth *kārikā* states that -

‘*tasmāccaviparyāsātsiddhāmsākṣitvamasyapuruṣasya/
kaivalyamādhyasthyamdraṣṭṛtvamakartṛbhāvaśca*’¹⁷. It provides such knowledge of *puruṣa* that depicts its transcendental essence, and hence in turn is efficacious in helping the individual to attain the much-sought-after discriminatory cognition (*vivekajñāna*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. The discussions found in the *kārikā*, help to establish the *puruṣa* as radically different from the *prakṛti*. The term ‘*tasmāt*’ in the above *kārikā* refers to the properties of *vyaktāvyakta* in the eleventh *kārikā*, and the term

‘*viparyāsāt*’ states the absence of those properties in *puruṣa*. The *atriguṇatva* etc. of *puruṣa*, as mentioned in the earlier *kārikā*, helps to establish its *sākṣitva*, *kaivalya*, *mādhyastha*, *draṣṭṛtva* and *akarṭṛbhāva* or *akarṭṛtva*. The *vyakta* and the *avyakta* are insentient (*jaḍa* or *acetana*). The *puruṣa* being opposite in nature is sentient (*cetana* or *caitanyaśvarūpa*). The *vyaktāvyakta*, as we have already found out, are *jñānaviṣaya*, but the *puruṣa* is never the object of cognition (*aviṣaya*). The *cetanatva* and the *aviṣayatva* of *puruṣa* help to establish its *sākṣitva* and *draṣṭṛtva*. Grammatically speaking, *sākṣī* and *draṣṭā* both are synonymous as they each indicate the direct perceiver of an event. We know that only a sentient entity can be a perceiver, and never an insentient one. So the inference which establishes the *puruṣa* as the perceiver is – ‘*puruṣaḥdraṣṭā cetanatvāt*’¹⁸. The above inference is based on the negative concomitance – *yatrayatradraṣṭṛtvābhāvatatratracetanatvābhāva*. However, Vācaspati Miśra points out that here the term ‘*sākṣī*’ should not be considered in the general grammatical sense, that is, as a direct perceiver of an event. Rather a witness (*sākṣī*) is one who is being shown a particular event, or to say that some phenomena is occurring in front of that individual. Here the *prakṛti*, more specifically, the *mahat* or the *buddhi*, exhibits the objects cognized by it (*svagr̥hītaviṣaya*), to the consciousness (*prativimbitapuruṣa*) reflected on it. In this manner, the *prakṛti* serves the *puruṣa*; but in essence the *puruṣa* remains unrelated and is not bound by *prakṛti* or its evolutes. Thus, due to the essential indifference (*udāsīnatva*) of the *puruṣas*, they are considered to be the *sākṣī*.

The term ‘*sākṣī*’ is ordinarily applied to an impartial, immediate seer (*udāsīnaaparokṣadraṣṭā*). In Sanskrit, it is usually said that ‘*sākṣātdraṣṭarisañjñāyām*’. That is, the term ‘*sākṣī*’ stands for the subject who immediately apprehends the objects presented to him/her. In the *Upaniṣads*, the term ‘*sākṣī*’ is frequently used to denote pure consciousness. In this connection, one may cite the statement of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, - ‘*ekodevaḥsarvabhūteṣugudhaḥ/sarvavyāpīsarvabhūtāntarātmā/ karmādhyakṣaḥsarvabhūtādhivāsah/sākṣīcetākevalonirguṇaśca*’¹⁹. When the term ‘*sākṣī*’ is applied to pure

consciousness, it does not actually mean the subject or the knower. On such occasions, it refers to the pure, illuminating principle of consciousness. This consciousness becomes the knower or the subject, when an object is presented before it. In fact, a *sākṣī* is never affected by any change, and is never related to anything. For this reason, the ordinary sense of *sākṣī*, where a *sākṣin* is required to be impartial and entirely unaffected by whatever phenomena is presented before it, is retained in the Upaniṣadic use of this term. The Sāṃkhya system considers *puruṣacaitanyas* as essentially identical with pure consciousness which is eternal (*nitya*), pure (*śuddha*), pure knowledge (*buddha*) and liberated (*mukta*). Since, the *puruṣas* are essentially changeless, unrelated to anything, they are called *sākṣī*, following the Upaniṣadic tradition.

V

It is evident by now that the *puruṣa* being of the opposite nature of *triguṇa*, the essential nature of the transcendental consciousness, as *kaivalya*, is established. *Kaivalya* refers to the absolute absence of the threefold sufferings. Such absence of sufferings in *puruṣa* is its inherent essence or in other words, its true nature (*sva-svarūpa*). Thus, the *puruṣa* is eternally free, and devoid of any relation to any kind of sufferings. Sufferings are nothing but modes of transformation of the *rajas*. Thus, if *puruṣa* had consisted of the three *guṇas*, sufferings would have been a part of its essential nature. Consequently, liberation would have been impossible. However, *puruṣa* being contradictory in nature to the three *guṇas*, it is essentially devoid of sufferings. The term ‘*atraiguṇya*’ as applied to indicate *puruṣa*, which refers to the absence of pleasure, pain and delusion (*sukhaduḥkhamoharāhitya*) in pure consciousness. Whatever pleasure, pain *etc.* are experienced by the *puruṣa* are due to mere impositions on it. Those are nothing more than mere apprehensions (*ababodha*) of the being. In case of a being, the *antaḥkaraṇa* and the *caitanya* being contiguous to one another, the transformations (*vṛtti*) of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, appear to be that of the *puruṣa* itself. Just like the moon reflected on the wavy waters of a lake, appears to be wavering as well, whereas in reality the moon remains static, similarly for the *puruṣa*. Due to the reflected consciousness in *antaḥkaraṇa*, whatever pleasure *etc.* is there in it, also appear to be there in the consciousness. Thus, the apparent sense of the respective experiences occurs in the individuals. However, this does not hamper the

kaivalya or the eternally free existence (*nityamuktāvasthā*) of *puruṣa*, as the pure consciousness (*bimbacaitanya*), just like the moon in the analogy, remains ever unaltered and unaffected.

Further, the *puruṣa* is referred to as the *mādhyastha*. The term ‘*mādhyastha*’ refers to a mediator who is indifferent (*udāsīna*). This is also due to the *atraiguṇya* of *puruṣa*. The non-attachment of *puruṣa* towards either pleasure or pain is natural, as any relation to such is simply apparent (*ābhimānika*) on the part of the *puruṣa*. Thus, in Sāṃkhya philosophy, *puruṣa* is essentially indifferent. Finally, the *puruṣa* is never the agent (*akartā*). Knowledge, volition and desire are all modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. These are the conditions which constitute agency. Then evidently, *puruṣa* can never be the agent of an action. Moreover, the *puruṣa* being *vivekī* and *aprasavadharmī*, it is always devoid of agency. The *puruṣa* is *vivekī* because it is radically different from *prakṛti*, and also, it does not depend upon other principles for its function, as it is devoid of any functionality as such. This is further endorsed by the fact that it is *aprasavadharmī*, which indicates its essential immutability (*apariṇāmitva*). These conditions establish the *puruṣa* as the non-agent (*akartā*).

VI

On reaching upon the terminal point of the discussion in question, it is important to look into some of the objections raised by the opponents, namely the AdvaitaVedānta tradition of philosophy regarding the nature of consciousness, as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers, and also the account of the creation of the world, considering such nature of consciousness. We know that the AdvaitaVedāntins being the stakeholders of a monist and idealist school, pose to be the severest critics of the Sāṃkhya system. They consider the Sāṃkhya philosophical system to be their main opponent (*pradhānamalla*). The Advaitins have tried to refute the Sāṃkhya position on various grounds. The Sāṃkhya philosophers too have put forward a number of objections against the AdvaitaVedānta thesis, and that is why they are considered as the main opponents of the Advaita system. This is evident from the amount of effort employed by Śaṃkara to refute the Sāṃkhya position which is not observed in such proportions in case of refutation of the other philosophical schools.

This is primarily because of the fact that many of the tenets regarding the nature of consciousness as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers are of immense significance. Moreover, both the Sāṃkhya philosophers and the Advaita Vedāntins admit *satkāryavāda* as their causal theory. That is why there are quite a few aspects where the views of the Sāṃkhyatradition are admitted by the Advaita Vedāntins too. For instance, both the systems admit the modification of the internal sense organ in the form of the object (*antaḥkaraṇaviśayākāravṛtti*). They admit that the sense organ reaches out to the external object and takes up its form, and accordingly, the internal sense organs undergo transformation through subsequent steps which lead to the production of cognition.

Further both the schools admit cognition and emotions like, pleasure, pain *etc.* as transformations (*pariṇāma*) of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Hence, it is very significant on the part of the Advaita Vedāntins to pay utmost attention to the Sāṃkhya views and establish their own distinctness from the Sāṃkhyaschool through detailed analysis and its refutations. The primary refutation by the Advaita Vedāntins is about the nature of *puruṣa* as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers. The Advaitins hold that if the nature of *puruṣa* essentially be eternal (*nitya*), pure (*śuddha*), enlightened (*buddha*), free or unbound (*mukta*), as admitted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers, then it is not tenable to admit the plurality of consciousness (*puruṣabahutva*). This is because the distinctive properties that are advanced by the Sāṃkhya philosophers to establish the multiplicity of *puruṣa*, namely, the experiences of birth, death and individual inclinations *etc.*, are all fundamentally related to *prakṛti* only, and none of them could be considered in relation to consciousness. This is the first objection.

The second argument objects that if the nature of consciousness (*caitanya*) is such that it is completely devoid of any relation to *prakṛti* (*cetanānadhiṣṭhitajada*) and is distinct from it (*svatantrapradhāna*), then such an essence of *puruṣa*, can never be responsible for any sort of creation. This is because; any material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) which is not presided over by a sentient agent is not capable of production. Such arguments have been put forward in ‘*Smṛtipāda*’ and ‘*Tarkapāda*’ of *Brahmasūtra*, for instance, in the aphorism ‘*dṛśyate tu*’²⁰. Further, the Advaita Vedāntins argue that if the *puruṣa* is essentially of the nature of *anubhaya*,

that is, *naprakṛtiḥnavikṛtiḥ*, and moreover, if *akhyātivāda* is to be admitted, that is, if any cognition is essentially valid, and whatever illusion is apprehended occurs only in respect of usage, and not in respect of cognitions, as per the Sāṅkhya position, then actually there cannot be any bondage in case of *puruṣa* at all.

The third objection, however, has been raised and clarified by the Sāṅkhya philosophers themselves in the sixty second *kārikā* as follows, - ‘*tasmānnabadhyate’ addhānamucyatenā’ apisaṃsaratikaścit/saṃsaratibadhyatemucyate ca nānāśrayāprakṛtiḥ*’²¹. That is, the *puruṣa* being essentially unbound, immutable and devoid of the three *guṇas*, - *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the question of its bondage and that of its volition towards liberation does not arise at all. The *puruṣa* being devoid of any relation to birth or death, any question of its migration does not occur at all, and accordingly, the propensity of *puruṣa* to attain liberation becomes meaningless. Thus, all sorts of phenomenal activities like, birth, death, migration and tendency to be liberated are not there in *puruṣa*, rather they all are located in the *prakṛti*. They are only imposed on the consciousness in case of empirical experiences. Hence, here the idea of liberation of *puruṣa* refers to its liberation from the imposed bondages, while the *prakṛti* attains fulfilment by serving the purpose of the *puruṣa*. The Advaitins, however, hold that the Sāṅkhya philosophers have not been able to resolve the issues satisfactorily related to bondage and liberation. The Sāṅkhya philosophers, on the contrary, argue against the Advaita Vedāntins’ theory regarding the genesis of the world, namely, *brahmakāraṇavāda*. According to the Sāṅkhya philosophers, the world (*jagat*) and consciousness (*caitanya*) being intrinsically different or essentially opposed in nature, - *atyantavilakṣaṇasvabhāva*, admission of the creation of the world from pure consciousness cannot be a tenable position. Hence, *brahmakāraṇavāda* cannot be an admissible position at all. This is expressed in the *sutra* - ‘*navilakṣaṇatvādasyatathātvaṃca śabdāt*’²².

However, the focus of the paper in question, being primarily on the contrast between the natures of the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, further discussions on the debate between the Sāṅkhya philosophers and the Advaita Vedāntins regarding the nature of consciousness, and its role in creation, would only lead to digression. Hence, pertaining to the focal point of our concerned paper we refrain from delving further into the above issues in this context. Thus, in conclusion, it could be said that the

Sāṃkhya system emphasizes on the irreducible difference between the material and the conscious principles, and the impossibility of the emergence of one from the other. In response to the objections put forward by the Advaita Vedāntins, the Sāṃkhya philosophers state that life and consciousness, even in its most rudimentary form, cannot arise from insentient matter. Modern science, too, admits that no living being, even ultra-microscopic ones, can come into being in a sterilized environment. Thus, if the fundamental principles of *satkāryavāda* are to be retained, there cannot be any causal interaction between matter and consciousness. Hence, all causal transformations pertain to the domain of the material principle, thereby implying the Sāṃkhya thesis of *pradhānakāraṇavāda*. This further emphasizes the necessity of the admission of the binary in the Sāṃkhya philosophical system, and their contrasting natures could actually be considered to be essential pre-requisites for the account of *being* in the world.

References:

¹Sāṃkhyakārikā 11

²Sāṃkhyakārikā 3

³Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 35

⁴Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 36

⁵Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 36

⁶Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 38

⁷Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 38

⁸Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p.117

⁹Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p.117

¹⁰Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 118

¹¹Bṛhadāraṇyaka4/3/15

¹²Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 119

¹³Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 120

¹⁴Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 121

¹⁵Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, pp. 121-122

¹⁶Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 127

¹⁷Sāṃkhyakārikā- 19

¹⁸Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā*, p. 190-191

¹⁹Śvetāśvatara- 6/11

²⁰Brahmasūtra-2/1/6

²¹Sāṃkhyakārikā -62

²²Brahmasūtra -2/1/4

SEMANTIC IMPORT OF MORAL TERMS: COGNITIVISM VS. NONCOGNITIVISM

ANUREEMA BHATTACHARYYA

An important discussion in the area of metaethics is about the meaning of ethical terms which in turn relates to the epistemic status of moral judgements. The purpose of this paper is to understand the specific approach towards 'meaning' when there is a discussion about meaning of a term; thereby investigating the claim towards epistemic import of a judgement, if at all justified. The paper seeks to interconnect the two independent philosophical approaches to ethical language and hence prove that there is no convergence or divergence strictly as to relate the meaning of an ethical term with the judgement being cognitive or non-cognitive. In this contribution and also for the sake of precision, a focus has been made on Hume's theory as a version of naturalism along-with Ayer's theory as a version of emotivism in order to execute the plan of action proposed. The aim is to establish that the approach in understanding the meaning of an ethical term by a naturalist and an emotivist being basically distinct and different, the claim for cognitive/non-cognitive status of an ethical judgement by both becomes irrelevant for comparison if considered on the same platform.

Meta-ethics is a philosophical discussion on the import of ethical language - be it semantic, epistemic or meta-physical. There are discussions on meaning of an ethical term ranging from naturalism to non-naturalism, emotivism, prescriptivism etc., and also discussions where philosophers concentrate on the cognitive status of an ethical judgement ranging from cognitivism to non-cognitivism, or on the ontological status of moral properties ranging from moral realism or non-realism to anti-realism. It is a conventional attitude of philosophers to identify naturalism or intuitionism as cognitivist schools, whereas emotivism, or prescriptivism as noncognitivist schools. The intention is to explore the semantic and epistemic understanding of ethical language separately and thereby try to understand whether the divisions within one approach correspond to that within another, or whether they are over-lapping divisions having based on exclusive standards.

In this contribution let us consider two specific approaches based on two different standards and thereby examine their semantic and epistemic claims in order to find out if at all they confirm to any sort of correspondence or coherence to/with the other. The first focus is the Humean theory regarding value-judgements as explicated in his famous work ‘Treatise of Human Nature’. The celebrated work is popularly interpreted as meaning there is a logical gap between ‘is-statements’ and ‘ought-statements’ and hence introducing the is-ought dichotomy in the area of metaethics. The second focus will be on the emotivist school as propounded by A. J. Ayer. In the celebrated work ‘Language, Truth and Logic’, Ayer makes an attempt to view ethical judgements in the eyes of Logical Positivism which he followed. In both the theories we may find claims to meaning and cognition in their own ways. My endeavour will be to highlight the difference in their basic standards for the claims, so that the two worlds are shown to be of different paradigms with different standards of interpretation which makes comparisons irrelevant.

I

David Hume in his book ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’ commented that perceptions are the only constituents of our mind. Whatever we see, feel, or do are in any way connected to our perceptions. Our mind cannot engage in any activity which is not connected to perception. Hence, when we make a distinction between good or bad, right or wrong, we are actually making judgements on the basis of perceptions. This opinion is in contrast to the view that ‘virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason’.¹ The argument which is held in favour of rational morality is that, every rational being agrees or disagrees to things in the like manner and thereby is in an obligation to do good things and abstain from bad ones due to their rationality. They hold that sense of morality is derived from idea or relations of ideas just as truth. We need to understand here how Hume has considered this matter of morality derived from reason.¹

In the *Book III Part I Section I* of his book *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume has given a clear analysis of whether and how can reason help us in distinguishing moral good from evil. Morality, Hume says, is a part of Practical Philosophy as it greatly influences our passions and actions. We can very well

confirm this by our common experiences that many of our actions are done from a sense of duty or obligation towards others; many others are avoided as being unjustified. Hence we are guided by our moral sense in our activities. This also shows that our actions are not always guided by reason. Now, from the above analysis, we may say that because actions are guided by morality and not by rationality alone, it follows that morality is not connected to rationality. Our passions are instigated through morals and therefore, leads us to do or not do actions. Reason can never initiate an action on its own. The inference stands thus:

Reason alone cannot have any influence on our passions/actions.

Morality has an influence on our passions/actions.

Therefore, morality cannot be derived from reason or understanding.

The inference is based on the assumption of the principle that reason is not sufficient to influence our actions. Hume clarifies this principle and presents the relevant argument for his assuming so in the context of morality. He says that the role of reason is in the establishment of truth/falsehood. Truth/falsehood is determined by agreement/disagreement with real relations of ideas or matters of fact. Whatever cannot be conceived as agreeing/disagreeing with reality cannot be determined as true/false and is therefore not a subject of reason. In case of our passions/volitions/actions, they are original facts and realities and are therefore complete in themselves; so, there is no context of agreement/disagreement with reality, and is therefore not susceptible to be determined as true/false. Therefore the merit or demerit of an action/volition is not in accordance to its conformity/disconformity to reason, an action can be appreciable/blameable, but cannot be reasonable/unreasonable.²

After having rejected the option of morality as being a relation of ideas springing out of reason, Hume tries to examine whether it can be a matter of fact discovered by reason. If it is neither, we may conclude satisfactorily that morality is not an object of reason. Let us take the instance of a vicious action, say murder. Can we see the vice as a matter of fact? What can be found is only certain passion, motive, volition, thought, no other matter of fact as vice. Thus vice is not an objective fact which we come across. Rather, we find a sentiment or feeling of disapprobation

towards the action when we introspect ourselves. So, the vice involved in the action can be identified with this object of feeling as approval/disapproval. This feeling is surely a matter of fact; a matter of fact discoverable by emotion, sentiment and not by reason. It is present not in the object outside us, but in the feelings inside us. As Hume says, "Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind". We may, therefore, following Hume consider morality as subjective facts instead of corresponding to objective facts. Both the facts being natural, we understand that Hume is a Naturalist philosopher. But his version of Naturalism is subjective naturalism. To quote Hume again, "Here is a matter of fact: but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object." 3

In the immediately following paragraph, Hume comments that he finds it suitable in this context to highlight on the matter that, in every system of morality there is a passage from 'is' to 'ought', a passage from rational assertions to moral prescriptions. This passage is invalid according to Hume because the change of the relation from assertion to prescription is imperceptible and also inconceivable. The claim which Hume makes here is clearly understood in context of the arguments he presents before to show that morality is not grounded in reason. Naturally it is not correct to deduce the irrational moral judgements from rational assertive statements. The passage from 'is' to 'ought' is surely unjustified in that sense.

Geoffrey Hunter in his article 'Hume on is and ought' written in the book *The Is-Ought Question* addresses the defects of the most popular interpretation of Hume on morality. He refers to it as the 'Brief Guide Interpretation' of Hume. Hunter shows that Hume is misunderstood as claiming that moral judgements are very different from factual judgements. He gives his counter-arguments for interpreting Hume as claiming that moral judgements are but a subclass of factual judgements, i.e., it is a peculiar category of factual judgements resulting from a causal relation between contemplation of an action by the speaker and his having a peculiar sentiment or feeling towards it as a result. When Hume says that 'the passage from 'is' statement to 'ought' statement seems altogether inconceivable', the stress is actually on 'seems', which means that with a deeper understanding the sense of the passage may be revealed. Hunter points out that the interpreters of Hume generally fail to

understand this intention of Hume as expressed in the passage. He also says that Hume may be interpreted as meaning that moral judgements are in no way deducible from factual judgements, because, the 'ought' statements are basically paraphrases of 'is' statements. So there is no question of deducing 'ought' from 'is'. To explain moral judgements are actually certain factual judgements caused by sentiments or feelings. These feelings are in turn caused by contemplation of a certain action by the subject. So the deduction is explained not in terms of moral judgements deduced from factual judgements, but in terms of moral judgements, as a class of factual judgements, deduced from certain emotional facts whatsoever. Hume, according to Hunter, does not differentiate moral judgements from factual judgements. His emphasis is on differentiating them when factual judgements are taken in the scientific sense of the term, as based on reason or understanding alone. But moral judgements are not known by understanding alone, but by sentiments which are the objects of our feelings or sentiments.⁴

Let us now go back to the first and primary assertion which Hume had made in the context of understanding the nature and the origin of morality. He admits that it is impossible to ignore the moral distinctions we make in our everyday lives. He further says that whatever we perceive are all activities of our mind. Hence moral distinctions are also no exception to this. They also originate in our minds. He clarifies that whatever is present in our minds can either be matters of fact or relations of ideas. Hume gives sufficient arguments to show that morality cannot be a relation of ideas. He also analyses the sense in which morality is a matter of fact, though not an objective fact in the scientific sense of the term. Moral distinctions are perceived; what is it exactly that we perceive? Hume divides perceptions into impressions and ideas. Because moral relations are not ideas as already explained, they are impressions of some kind. We can rather say that morality is not judged of, but felt. But the feeling or sentiment is so soft and gentle, unlike the vivid nature of an impression, that we are often confused to consider it an idea.

What is the nature of such impression? And what role does it play in affecting our minds? Hume answers that the feeling of pleasure can be identified as the associate of virtue, whereas the feeling of pain as that of vice. The feeling of pleasure or pain is further equated with the more general feeling of agreeability or non-

agreeability. This feeling is aroused when we have the experience of a particular action. Hence, certain actions are the cause of the feeling of pleasure/pain, and with it simultaneously of approval/disapproval. But on having such feeling we do not judge or infer the action to be virtuous/vicious. Just when we have the feelings of pleasure or pain, we in effect can feel the action to be virtuous or vicious. Hence, morality is not a matter of inference, it is only a feeling or sentiment.

Hume objected to the traditional way of rationalising what is right and wrong. He argues that we cannot deduce an 'ought' statement from an 'is' statement meaning 'ought' statements are independent of reason or argument. They are only dependent on certain feelings or sentiments which are part of our sensations. From the feeling that we have regarding an action, we do not infer anything good/bad about it, we only have the feeling of pleasure/pain which results in a sentiment of approval/disapproval towards that action. Thus we make a distinction between a good action and a bad action though our actions resulting from sentiments. 5

The role of reason is to produce truth/falsehood on the basis of correspondence with reality. Anything which cannot have such correspondence with reality is not subject to being true/false. Morality, which depicts only feelings or sentiments, felt, is natural facts which cannot be empirically verified. They are such facts which are directly felt. Hence they are not known. Such a version of naturalism is a non-cognitive theory unlike the other versions of naturalism, if cognition is taken in the scientific sense of the term referring to objective knowledge. But if cognition is understood in a wider sense as covering any human activity involving the brain and senses, then feeling should also be counted as a sort of cognition. Humean internal naturalism refers to facts within human nature, viz. feelings, sentiments instead of external facts concerning objects. Therefore it is a version of subjective naturalism which is also a version of cognitivism in an un-conventional sense undoubtedly.

II

Emotivism as a theory of morals arose in response to the theories of naturalism on the one hand and intuitionism on the other. All such theories present a meta-ethical discussion on the import of moral language. As regards the meaning of ethical terms, philosophers differ on the basic point of interpreting the meaning of

‘meaning’. The naturalists or the intuitionists understand by the meaning of an ethical expression, the reference of the particular term – whether a natural or a non-natural property. The emotivists, on the contrary, emphasise on the use of an ethical expression while understanding its meaning. They are of opinion that a moral judgement is used to express our feelings directly. Hence, they do not state or assert anything and are therefore neither true nor false. Here I mean that they do not state or assert either an objective fact or a subjective fact.¹

Emotivism, as propounded by A. J. Ayer in his celebrated work ‘Language, Truth and Logic’, laid the foundation-stone of noncognitivism in the area of meta-ethics which was later developed, further refined and modified by others like R. L. Stevenson, R. M. Hare etc. Ayer, in the 6th chapter (*Critique of Ethics and Theology*) of his book ‘*Language, Truth and Logic*’ sets out to give an account of the ‘judgements of value’ in line with the British empiricist tradition as also with the analytic philosophers of language like Russell and Wittgenstein. His basic contention was that value judgements are significant only if they are scientific. He establishes that they are not so as they are neither analytic nor empirical, and scientifically valid statements, according to the classical convention are either empirically verifiable or are true by definition, i.e. either empirical or analytic. Therefore the value judgements do not have any literal significance. However they are meaningful by virtue of their functions or uses. Ethical judgements, as analysed by Ayer, are expressions of emotion or feeling and are neither true nor false. ²

Ayer starts his discussion on ethical language by considering the naturalists’ contention that ethical terms are definable by non-ethical terms. Naturalists are either subjectivists or utilitarians. They are subjectivists when they define ‘good’/ ‘bad’ in terms of subjective feelings like approval / disapproval. On the other hand, utilitarians define ‘good’ in terms of ‘pleasure’ and interpret the sentence ‘X is good’ as ‘X is pleasurable.’ In whichever way we define it, there remains the scope of further questioning the universal applicability of the definiendum with respect to the definiens, and hence the definition does not stand valid. To make it clear, it is possible that we say that a thing is pleasurable but not good. So the definition of ‘good’ as ‘pleasurable’ is fallacious and the fallacy is known as the naturalistic fallacy which the non-naturalist cognitivist philosophers like Moore pointed out.

Naturalistic fallacy is the fallacy of defining the indefinable. Moore held the view that the ethical judgements are intrinsic in nature, and are not empirically calculable. Ethical terms exhibit a non-natural property which are known intuitively. Mere appeal to intuition cannot sufficiently prove the validity of a proposition, hence ethical judgements are not verifiable. And therefore, they are not definable in empirical terms. Any attempt to define an ethical term, according to Moore, is an attempt to define the indefinable resulting in the naturalistic fallacy. 3.

Though not empirically verifiable, ethical judgements are held to be genuine synthetic propositions as they relate to our experiences. But as mentioned before, a synthetic proposition is significant only if it is verifiable. Therefore, it is necessary to understand that neither naturalism, nor intuitionism, but a third theory is needed in order to give an explanation of moral judgements consistent with radical empiricism. In this context, it is said that though not verifiable, ethical concepts can be given an explanation. They are not analysable because they are pseudo-concepts, i.e., they are not real concepts imparting any knowledge. Their presence does not add anything to the content of knowledge. Ayer takes as an example the ethical statement, 'Stealing money is wrong.' He says that this statement is neither true nor false and is almost equivalent to saying, 'Stealing money!' What Ayer wanted to point out here is that the statement is merely an expression of psychological disapproval for the particular act of stealing, it does not give us any information regarding stealing. In fact uttering 'right' or 'wrong' does not add anything, it only expresses a feeling. Ayer makes a subtle observation here, he says that we do not state the feeling, but only express it through the moral judgement. Therefore, there is no assertion involved here.

Ayer also comments that ethical terms not only express our sentiments, they also play a vital role in arousing our feelings and thus stimulate action. They also sometimes act as commands. For example- 'It is good to tell the truth', 'You ought to tell the truth.' etc., there is a tone of suggestion, command, advice regarding telling the truth along with an expression of sentiment about it.4.

Emotivism, though talks of the expression of feeling through moral judgement is not a subjectivist approach as there is no assertion made about the feeling of the subject. Subjectivism is a theory which talks of the assertion of a

subject's feeling through a moral judgement, thereby admitting moral judgements as stating facts, though subjective facts as they relate to the feelings of the speaker. It denies that the ethical judgements express propositions of a unique non-empirical character, though they do not deny ethical judgements as being genuine propositions whatsoever. Moreover, the emotivists held that moral judgements cannot be contradicted as because they are mere expressions of feelings which may naturally differ from others without being in opposition with the other. Expressions of different persons about the same object or about the same object by a person at different points of time are naturally prone to be different. However, if it would have been propositions stating feelings of the subject and there had been other propositions stating a contradictory feeling of the subject on similar matter, a verification of the actual fact on the feelings of the subject would have made one proposition true, and the other false. But this is not so when we are considering ethical judgements as only expressions and not assertions as per the emotivists.⁵

The emotivists and the subjectivists both relate ethical statements to the feelings of the speaker. Hence, the question may obviously be raised whether we can at all argue about questions of value. Ayer says that there will be no conflict if two persons have different opinions about the same action in accordance with their individual feelings, i.e. if one person considers thrift as a virtue and another person considers it as vice. As both persons express their feelings, they may be equally right. But when it comes to assertion of feeling as a matter of fact, we do have disputes over values.

The emotivists argue that moral judgements do express our feelings, and that does not create disputes or disagreements. The reason is that moral disputes are not over our feelings expressed, they are with facts asserted. To explain: When two persons quarrel over the issue whether thrift is a virtue or vice, it is not because they have different views about the values - virtue and vice; rather, it is because they have a different perception/feeling of the attitude of thrift. As Ayer puts it, "When someone disagrees with us about the moral value of a certain action or type of action, we do admittedly resort to argument in order to win him over to our way of thinking. But we do not attempt to show by our arguments that he has the 'wrong' ethical feeling towards a situation whose nature he has correctly apprehended. What we

attempt to show is that he is mistaken about the facts of the case. We argue that he has misconceived the agent's motive: or that he has misjudged the effects of the action, or its probable effects in view of the agent's knowledge; or that he has failed to take into account the special circumstances in which the agent was placed. Or else we employ more general arguments about the effects which actions of a certain type tend to produce, or the qualities which are usually manifested in their performance."⁶

Ayer points out that having grown up in similar environment, it is not possible for two persons to differ in their values, the point of difference is possible only with respect to the interpretation of the circumstances or the facts on which the moral judgement is passed. Thus, on removal of all misunderstandings, it is expected that the opponent gets convinced of holding the same attitude of morality towards the object. If it is otherwise, no further attempt is made on it and is considered a hopeless one. It is easily understood therefore, that, under similar conditionings we presuppose a specific account of morality to which we are to conform. This presupposed notion may be considered a principle which is not further questionable. Thus we see that the emotive theory surpasses the major objection of subjectivity raised against it and establishes the non-cognitive version of moral judgement satisfactorily. ⁷

Emotivism differs from the Humean tradition in being absolutely opposed to naturalism. They deny morality as factual derivations or as depictions by direct sensations of natural feelings. They are neither known nor felt. They are rather expressions of feelings or sentiments and is to be distinguished from cognitivism on the one hand and naturalism on the other. Emotivism has different interpretations in the writings of different philosophers. Ayer's theory of emotivism shares the basic conviction with the Humean theory of morals that values are not any part of the objective world. This is the general line of thought in the empiricist theory of morals. A clear reflection of such an idea is found in Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus': "The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value – and if there were it would be of no value. If there is any value which is of value, it must lie outside all happenings and being so, for all happening and being so is accidental."

The logical positivists were exclusively concerned about scientific discourse, i.e. in those which were strictly fact-stating. Any other use of language which does not refer to facts were considered vicious. Thus Ayer considered ethical terms as mere 'pseudo-concepts', whereas Wittgenstein in the 'Tractatus' denied the existence of any ethical proposition. Ayer also basically had a negative mentality for ethics, in that he tried to actually throw out ethical discussions by justifying it as being non-scientific. Though he characterised ethical language as emotive, he further showed very little interest in it.

III

It is now time that we comment on the two theories presented here as depicting moral language. As was our motive, we need to concentrate on the distinct approaches to the semantic theories of ethical terms in the two schools of naturalism and emotivism. Naturalism defines ethical terms through natural terms which they refer to, whereas emotivism understands the meaning or essence of an ethical term through its use/purpose. Thus meaning/essence/definition of an ethical term corresponds to reference in case of the naturalists, while to its usage in case of the emotivists. Now, ethical cognitivism is a metaethical theory which deals with the cognitive status of moral judgements. Naturally, it is relevant that the meaning of 'cognition' be clear and univocal. In Humean theory of naturalism as has been dealt here, morality refers to our passions/volitions which cause an action to happen. Moral judgements refer to subjective facts of feeling/emotion. Thus they are not rationally justifiable as true/false. But they may be empirically verifiable as facts. Cognition, in the empiricist sense of the term (Hume being a staunch empiricist philosopher), may be understood as vivid sense-impressions of emotions which are felt. Hence, Hume's naturalism, though in an un-conventional sense, may be considered a form of cognitivism. On the other hand, Ayer's emotivism as rooted in the background of logical positivism does not have a flavour of cognition outside the scientific realm, and so strictly considers objectivity as the mark of knowing. We have seen that the ethical terms, according to Ayer, though lack literal significance, are meaningful by virtue of their uses. Having mentioned this, he clearly reveals that his intention as a logical positivist philosopher is surely not to give any attention to the ethical judgements which are outside the domain of scientific knowledge. Their mind-set

clearly hints to the fact that cognition for them can be nothing outside knowledge, and knowledge is only objective scientific knowledge.

In a way of conclusion it can be said that ‘meaning’ and ‘cognition’ having different standards for naturalism and emotivism, are not comparable as meta-ethical theories on the same platform. The meta-meta-ethical understanding is equally important as is the meta-ethical understanding.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIRTUE ETHICS^{*}

SAHABUDDIN AHAMED JAMADER

Introduction:

The concept of virtue is one of the central concepts of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy deals with the questions of morality that discusses how one should live. Here we will make an attempt to elaborate a brief survey of concept of ‘virtue’ from its etymological meaning and historical development to its journey across the century. Virtue ethics gained its popularity in Ancient Greece from the writings of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, though it can be found even before these writings. But it has again become popular in the last part of the twentieth century with the writings of the thinkers like Elizabeth Anscombe, Phillipa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre and Benjamin Franklin. The word ‘virtue’ is used as an equivalent of the Greek word ‘*arête*’ means ‘moral excellence’. Though ‘*arête*’ in its basic sense designates the “the excellence of any kind, virtue is generally regarded as a quality which is morally good, and thus it is used as a foundation of the principle of good moral being.

The term ‘*arête*’ or virtue has a long history and it is used with many meanings. In the ancient Greece, the notion of excellence was bound with the act of living up to one’s full potential. Homer used the term for both the Greeks as well as Trojan heroes and also for the female figures, such as Penelope, the wife of Greek hero Odysseus. For the Greek and Trojan heroes it is used for their bravery but in the case of Penelope it is known for her faithfulness towards Odysseus. Though *arête* is frequently used to designate bravery and faithfulness, it is more often associated with the effectiveness. When *arête* is used as a quality of man and woman it signifies that the man or woman is having the quality of highest effectiveness. It means that the man or the woman having *arête* use all their faculties - strength, bravery, and wit - to achieve their goal. In regards to the *Iliad* the way Homer describes Achilles is an example of *arête*. Here *arête* is used as the goodness and strength of a warrior. Though Homer used the word to describe the fighting spirit of warriors; many authors applied the term to animals and even to lifeless objects, such as tools and instruments.

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Sophists' View of Virtue:

By the end of the fifth century B.C., one important meaning of *arête* was popularized by the Greek thinkers. This meaning of virtue or *arête* represents as becoming a good citizen and achieving success in daily life, especially in politics and society. Taking advantage of this, the Sophists claimed that, they possessed the secret knowledge of achieving success in public life. Thus, they were able to attract the young people who were struggling to achieve success in Athenian life. However, the leading Sophists did not practise what they taught to others, because they did not belong to the society of Athens; they were foreigners.

There were few Sophists who were very popular in their time. Protagoras, Prodicus and Gorgias were among them. Protagoras of Abdera came from Thrace; he travelled around Greece as a teacher and lived in Athens for several years, where he got associated with Pericles and other rich and powerful Athenians. Pericles invited him to write the constitution of the newly founded Athenian colony, Thruui, in 444 B.C. Prodicus came from an island of Ceos. His countrymen sent him as an ambassador to Athens but later he is known as a great speaker and a teacher. Gorgias came to Greece from Leontini in Sicily. They all were first generation Sophists. These foreigners became very popular and successful not by becoming good citizens and succeeding in public life, since foreigners could not do such things. They were popular for their teaching. They could convince the Athenian young people that their teachings would help them to develop excellence for success in Athenian life.

Pre-philosophical conceptions of virtue:

As the teachings of the Sophists gained in popularity in Athens, the sophists also became controversial figures. Their way of making money from teaching virtue also bothered their rival men. The controversies regarding their teaching raised sufficient discussion about excellence or virtue among the Athenian people. At the end of the fifth century Socrates became a major person in these ongoing debates. Socrates and his contemporary philosophers began to discuss about virtue with the prevailing notions of virtues. They pointed out their difficulties and ultimately modified them. The quote from Plato's *Protagoras*, "the Sophist Protagoras describes virtue as deliberating well (*euboulia*) about one's own affairs and... as one plays a

role in public life (*Protagoras* 318E – 319A).⁷² As the discussion started, Socrates asked whether virtue can be taught by teachers and about whether virtue is one or many. He further asked whether there are many virtues and if there are too many virtues then are they separated from one another? From Plato's dialogue we come to know that there are many types of virtues. Plato discusses the virtue of Temperance or *Sophrosyne* in his *Charmides*, his *Laches* deals with Courage, *Euthyphro* with Piety and Justice and the *Crito* is about Justice.⁷³ The concept of justice has an important role in Plato's writings; the main question of Plato's *Republic* is 'what is Justice?' Let us consider the six major characteristics that perhaps proposed by Sophist philosophers. Though, later on these characteristic were modified by Socrates.

Virtues are admirable and praiseworthy: It is very difficult for us to determine whether virtues are truly admirable. For example, Odysseus is a more admirable character in Homer, than he as appears in Sophocles. In Sophocles' play *Philoctetes*, Odysseus is described as clever and deceitful. But in Homeric epics he is an admirable character. Sophocles describes how Odysseus planned to kidnap Philoctetes and steal his weapon by cheating. By any standard, this act of Odysseus is injustice and shameful.

Virtues are related to actions: This behavioral view of virtue was presented by Homer. He talked of great warriors whose actions were admirable because their actions were heroic and excellent. From the Socratic days it was very clear to the Athenian people that virtue was about deeds, deeds that are admirable and not shameful.

Virtues are based on one's role in life: In Plato's dialogue *Meno*, Meno (a person) begins his discussion of virtue with Socrates by saying that virtue varies with one's role in social life (*Meno* 71E – 72A).⁷⁴ Virtuous behaviors are not same for the all people of a society; they vary from person to person. The virtue of a warrior differs significantly from that of a poet, a musician, a politician, an ordinary citizen, a head

⁷² Devettere, Raymond J., *Introduction to Virtue Ethics: Insights of the Ancient Greeks*, p. 61 , Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2002

⁷³ *Ibid*, p. 61

⁷⁴ Devettere, Raymond J., *Introduction to Virtue Ethics: Insights of the Ancient Greeks*, p. 61 , Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2002, p. 62

of household, and so on. Virtuous behavior is one thing for a woman living as a wife, another for a man acting as a citizen, another for warriors, and another for children and still very different for slaves. In other words, virtuous behavior is relative to persons' role in life in the society.

Different virtues are not interconnected: Each virtue has its own uniqueness with no connection to any other virtue. Being a virtuous person in a particular field does not entail to be virtuous in other areas of life. For example, a warrior might have great courage in battle but have no temperance to take wine or having sex.

Virtues can do harm to themselves: Virtues can also do harm to the person who is performing virtuous behavior. One courageous soldier could lose his health; even lose his life when he is performing courageously in battle. Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, put his life in danger when he challenged Odysseus by returning to Philoctetes the awesome bow that the Greek desperately needed at Troy.

Wisdom or knowledge is just a kind of virtue: Wisdom or knowledge has no special role. It is just an important form of excellence, such as justice, temperance and courage. These popular conceptions of virtue began to be changed when Socrates and other Philosophers started examining them and criticizing the Sophists account of virtue.⁷⁵ What we know today as virtue ethics is the result of radical modification of the concept by the philosophers.

Socratic conception of virtue:

Socrates and other philosophers show their dissatisfaction to the popular conception of virtue at that time. Though their theory of virtue considerably differ from the popular conception of virtue yet they both agreed on the first characteristic that virtue is admirable and praiseworthy. Socrates modified the second characteristic and thoroughly revised the rest four. For them, virtues are not only actions but psychological states; they are connected with each other. And the last one, practical wisdom is not just a virtue; rather it is a foundational virtue of every other virtue. Let us discuss the seven cardinal characteristics of virtues by Socrates.

Virtues are admirable and praiseworthy:

⁷⁵ Devettere, Raymond J., *Introduction to Virtue Ethics: Insights of the Ancient Greeks*, p. 61 , Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2002, p. 63

As we have already mentioned earlier that this is the only characteristic of virtue that Socrates and his other fellow philosophers had agreed. They both agreed that virtue should have the quality of admirability and praiseworthiness and are in argument with the popular conception of virtue.

Most virtues are psychological states: According to the Socrates virtues are mainly related with the character, habits and dispositions of persons. They explain their views by determining the kind of person one is, and not his actions. Because actions follows from virtuous character, but do not determine a virtuous character.

Virtues are not based on our social roles: The Greek philosophers believe that virtues are rooted in our soul; they are not based on the roles played by a man in the society. Socrates in his *Meno*, explained that virtues such as justice and temperance are not dependent upon the role that a person played in life. Being a good human being one is just needed to have a set of virtues independent of what role he plays in the society (*Meno* 72C -73C).

Virtues are connected: All virtues are internally connected with each other. If a man has one type of virtue, it means that he can have them all. Ancient philosophers believed that all virtues are united or integrated in the character of person, and so are in responsible for each other. For them virtues cannot be separated. If a person does not have the virtue of temperance it follows that he does not have the virtues of justice, love, and so on. Though this theory looks like counterintuitive yet it is clear that, with wisdom as a virtue unity of the moral virtues seems to be inevitable.

Virtues are not contrary to the person's self-interest: Virtues are never in conflict with person's self-interest. Many people think that this theory is counterintuitive. Most of the modern moral philosophers react against it by saying that ethics is about social life, but the interest of the society need not necessarily contradict personal or self-interest. Live and let live is the principle of social living.

Wisdom or knowledge is the foundation of all virtues: All of our virtues require wisdom to move us towards the goal. For Socrates wisdom or knowledge is the only virtue, and for Aristotle and Plato, it is the foundational virtue that creates the others.

Virtue requires freedom: A person is called virtuous only by freely choosing his or her actions. So virtue requires personal freedom, the freedom of choosing actions. A person becomes just only by choosing just actions repeatedly, he became honest by choosing honest actions repeatedly, temperance by choosing temperate actions

repeatedly, and so on. Without the freedom of personal choice authentic virtuous character cannot be constituted. However, it is also true that freedom does not alone guarantee virtue. Choosing to do something does not necessarily mean that what is chosen is good.

Plato's notion of virtue:

Plato's account of virtue can be found mainly in his two different works, one is *Protagoras* and the other one is *Republic*. In Plato's dialogue *Protagoras*, Protagoras (a person) claimed that virtue is some kind of a whole with different parts, such as a human face is a whole with different parts (nose, eyes and so on). He says that a person could have some virtues but not all, just as a person could be missing a part of his face, an eye, for example. Like this a person could be courageous but might not be temperate or just.⁷⁶

The other account of virtue was expressed by Plato in his famous dialogue *Republic*. But there is no common view in the *Republic* and in the *Protagoras* regarding the notion of virtue. Plato begins his statement concerning the human soul. He divides the human soul into three parts: appetite, spirit and reason. Each part has its own desires. Appetite (*epithumetikon*) is the part of the soul which is predominant in animals; it is lusting for bodily pleasures. Appetite is desires whatever gives pleasure and such as food, sex, power and wealth. Spirited (*thumoeides*) part originates in the emotions; it intends to find whatever is appearing good in a particular situation. When I am attacked or victimized it may appear good to charge against in anger, when faced with a danger it may appear good to back down in fear, when a family member dies it may appear good to downfall with grief, and so on. The third part, rational, (*logistikon*) desires whatever is truly good. The rational part relies on reasoning to decide in each situation whatever activities that are good or bad for my life considered as a whole.

For Plato, virtue lies in the proper relation between the components of the soul. Reason should guide the soul and help us to determine what is right and what is wrong, spirit must follow the reason and appetite should obey both spirit and reason.

⁷⁶ Devettere, Raymond J., *Introduction to Virtue Ethics: Insights of the Ancient Greeks*, p. 61 , Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2002 p. 79

According to this view virtue is nothing but a magical or accurate ratio of the components of the soul. considering the conception of virtue, Plato suggests that only by the state of the soul, in which reason governs and both appetite and spirit are following reason can knowledge of the good and hence virtue be acquired. Though Socrates and Plato both give an importance to desire for ethical-decision making, they also differ in regarding to some other points. Socrates thinks that all our desires are rational. But Plato acknowledges the existence of non-rational desires which are appetitive and spiritative. For Socrates, all the things which go wrong are due to ignorance. But in the case of Plato it may be due to ignorance and in some cases it also may be due to non-rational desires. For Socrates, our ethics is totally rational but Plato says that though ethics is rational we also need knowledge to shape and form our desires, educate and cultivate good habits.

Aristotle's analysis of virtue ethics:

Though Aristotle is treated as the protagonist of virtue ethics, it does not mean that he was the first person to deal with this topic. He was the first philosopher who discussed ethics as a separate part of philosophy and the different kinds of virtues that form our good life. *Nicomachean Ethics* is the name normally given to Aristotle's best known work and central text for the study of ancient virtue ethics. It is commonly believed that *Eudemian Ethics* is written before the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The *Nicomachean Ethics* is not easy reading for the new comer students, it was meant for the audience of advance students who were sufficiently familiar with Aristotle's philosophy and terminology. Both the works of Aristotle are important to grasp the inner implications of Greek virtue ethics.

According to Aristotle, virtue is neither a passion nor a faculty; it is a state of character. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle offers a definition of virtue thus - "Virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, i.e. by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it."⁷⁷ Aristotle's definition proposes to adopt a middle path which has been much discussed. Virtue is considered as if it lies between two vices which are two extremes. For example, courage is the middle path between the extremes of rashness and cowardice. Such a middle course

⁷⁷ Ross, David (Trans.), *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. ix, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009

will be relative to vices of the extremes depending upon the actual circumstances of the individual.

Bertrand Russell claims that “there are two kinds of virtues, intellectual and moral, corresponding to the two parts of the soul. Intellectual virtues result from teaching, moral virtues from habit.”⁷⁸ Aristotle says that Plato has divided the soul into two parts, one is rational and the other is irrational. The irrational part is divided into the vegetative (such as plants) and the appetitive (such as animals). The expression “character virtue” is used for the original Greek Word “*ethike arête*”. Though some of the translators translate “*ethike arête*” as “moral virtue” or “ethical virtue”, these translations do not signify the actual meaning of “*ethike arête*”. Firstly, the English word “moral” and “ethical” do not serve the same purpose as the notion of “character” serve. Secondly, the expressions “moral virtue” and “ethical virtue” are commonly used to denote the virtue only that is relevant to what we call today morality or ethics, though the master virtue or fundamental virtue is not “moral virtue” or “ethical virtue” but is another kind of virtue namely intellectual virtue (*dianoetike arête*).⁷⁹

The revival of virtue ethics:

In the second half of the twentieth century, some highly significant changes in the moral philosophy has been happen. Before these changes, moral philosophy was divided between two traditions. These traditions were Kantianism or deontological moral theory and utilitarianism or consequentialist moral theory. Kantianism is based on the work of the eighteenth century German philosopher Immanuel Kant while on the other utilitarianism is based upon the writings of the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham, J. S. Mill and Henry Sidgwick. Kantian moral theory proposes that morality must be universal and based on impartial law of rationality. We all know that Categorical Imperative is the foundation of Kant’s moral theory. For him, do not make false promises to get your desires. Because no one can will that, if someone will that, that would be a law of nature and everyone who wants to get their desires should make false promise. And if anyone further asks that why I

⁷⁸ Russell, Bertrand, *A History of Western philosophy*, p. 185, Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1979

⁷⁹ Devettere, Raymond J., *Introduction to Virtue Ethics: Insights of the Ancient Greeks*, p. 66 , Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2002

could not will this, then Kant may reply that if this happens then promising could not survive, making false promises is not in accordance with laws of rationality.

Utilitarianism is a moral theory to which Kant implacably disagreed because this theory evaluates value of a particular moral theory only by comparing the well-being of human beings. Here moral action aims at the good of human well-beings and what is rational also. This theory does not aim solely at one's own well-being. It is again an impartial theory because it obliges us to produce greater amount of overall well-being as possible. However, in 1958 Elizabeth Anscombe attacked on both of these ethical traditions. For her, both of them speaks for a foundation of morality, such as obligation but these notions are nonsensical when there is no such law-giver (God) is assumed. As many of us do not believes in God, Annscombe suggests a foundation for ethics and this foundation is the notion of virtue as a part of human flourishing.

To explain the notion of human flourishing, Anscombe refers the great Greek philosopher Aristotle who was the main inspiration for modern virtue ethics. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle argued that “the best life for human being... consists in the exercise of the virtues (or the ‘excellences’)”⁸⁰ Aristotle talks about the necessity of *eudaimonia* and he was perhaps the most radical virtue ethicist ever. His radicalist view on virtue can be traced when he says that “there is nothing worth having in life except the exercise of the virtues.”⁸¹ To discuss the notion of virtue, few questions that frequently comes in our mind which are as follows:

- What is virtue ethics? Someone may reply in a positive way that suggests us to act virtuously. According to this theory we should live a virtuous life. But this is not enough to explain this theory, for example, Mill may probably agree with this line. His reason would be – one should act virtuously because it helps him/her to produce greater amount of overall well-being. And similarly one Kantian may agree that one should be virtuous because it is an act which is in accordance with moral law.

⁸⁰ Crisp, R. & Slote M. (Ed.), *Virtue Ethics*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2013, p. 2

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 2

- But, how then, a virtue ethicist reacts to it? It must provide some ultimate moral reasons that are neither utilitarian nor Kantian, yet it makes some essential rationality of virtue itself. Here, virtue ethicist's straight-forward answer – I should not tell lie because it is dishonest, not because it is against the moral law, nor because it produces greater amount of overall well-being. So, the notions of virtue are mere basic than that of utilitarian or Kantian moral theory. It may also replace the notion of obligation, that utilitarians or Kantians are based on and moreover at least they do not need such language. Another feature of virtue ethics that makes it alienated from those two is its focus on moral agents and their lives, rather than focusing on one's discrete actions (telling a lie, making false promise, giving alms to beggar).⁸²

So far we have seen, Anscombe's article '*Modern Moral Philosophy*', which was published in 1958, is considered as the inauguration of present revival of virtue ethics. Anscombe, in her article discusses few topics which are in some way or other related to the idea of a revived virtue ethics. But, the main reason that attracted its importance to all is its strong criticism of modern and contemporary moral philosophers and their theories. Though the entire criticism has not been univocally made by the modern virtue ethicist, Kantianism and religious ethicist would also criticize this point. The revival of virtue ethics inaugurated by Anscombe based on two further factors in her thinking –

- i. She claims that notions such as “‘moral obligation’ require a legislative model of morality in order to make sense.”⁸³
- ii. She also claims that “‘Kantian ‘self-legalisation’ is not a sensible notion.”⁸⁴

With both of these assumptions, Anscombe argues that secular moral philosophy that has no law-giver cannot make sensible use of moral obligation and rightness or wrongness of an action become tied to moral obligation. But the problem is, how can we do ethical statements? Anscombe simply answers that ethics can be done or based on the idea of virtue and human flourishing. To explain the ideal model of ethics that everyone should follows, Anscombe lead us back to fourth century B.C.

⁸² Crisp, R. & Slote M. (Ed.) , *Virtue Ethics*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2013, p. 3

⁸³ *Ibid*, p. 4

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p. 4

ancient Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. Yet, she warns us that we do not have actual understandings of the notion of virtue because Plato and Aristotle both of them do not clarify that notion and before we say what virtue is, we must have clear conception about the terms like – ‘intention’, ‘pleasure’ and action. Hence, according to Anscombe, we must have a clear idea about philosophical psychology otherwise it is better to stop moral philosophy.

Virtue ethics differentiates itself by its *aretaic* notions, such as, ‘virtue’, ‘admirability’ and ‘excellence’, which are basic than deontic notions for Anscombe and even it can replace the deontic notions, such as rightness, wrongness or moral obligations. Anscombe’s argument against the emptiness and attributions of moral obligation, clearly favours the virtue ethics and probably this is the most rigorous attack that have been made in the contemporary history of ethics. Thus, after criticizing those popular ethical theories and showing the inappropriateness of the recent moral theory, we should encourage our self to do an ethics Plato and Aristotle does. In other words, once we have an idea of philosophical psychology, then, we must do an ethics, which have virtue ethical commitment to make virtuous character or an ethical theory that primarily concern the character traits.

Anscombe made an extensive research and discussion on the recent development of contemporary moral theory, criticizes them and done an extraordinary achievement to the revival of virtue ethics. Yet, there are many present day ethicist, both defenders and opponents of her theory, do not agree with the assumptions she had made in her article ‘*Modern Moral Philosophy*’. According to many contemporary Kantians, they “can make more sense of self-legalisation than Anscombe supposes”, and there are few virtue ethicists who think that “deontic notions of right and wrong need to be tied to typical, familiar assumptions about moral obligation”, rather they naturally emerges from *aretaic* notions, such as excellence and evil.

WITTGENSTEIN ON LANGUAGE AND LOGIC

AVIJIT GHOSH

Introduction:

When we talk about logic, the first question that we need to discuss is what is logic? Logic can be understood as an *instrument or organon* which evaluates the correctness of reasoning. According to Charles Peirce, there are more than a hundred definitions of it. So when we study logic, we study its method and principles that are used to distinguish *correct arguments from incorrect arguments*. So, the studies of logic will us to learn certain techniques through which one can be able *to test the validity of all arguments*. Logic can also be defined as the science of reasoning. Moreover, logicians are not concerned with this process of inference rather with the initial and endpoints of that process. Further traditional logic is conceived with the science of valid inference. In this regard, McGinn says logic “is concerned with the laws whereby we justifiably move from one judgement or assertion of truth to another.”⁸⁵ Likewise, Wittgenstein says that these laws are nothing over and above propositions of language and *their truth-functional articulation*. Wittgenstein’s conception of logic is mainly found in his books *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* and *Notes on Logic*. In *Tractatus*, we find two important components: one is the elementary proposition and another is the molecular or complex proposition which is the truth-function of elementary ones. He again represents the principle of truth-functionality in his *Notes on Logic* in the form of *ab-function* as a new dimension of representing a truth-functional account of a proposition. While discussing this *ab-function* Wittgenstein goes on to discuss his *concept of entailment*. So, through the discussion of these concepts, we will also try to understand the logic hidden inside the language because Wittgenstein said, “My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition.” (NB: 39)

⁸⁵ McGinn, M., *Elucidating the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy of Logic and Language*, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 54.

Bipartite Reading:

Wittgenstein in his book *Tractatus* remarks, “A proposition can be true and false in virtue of being a picture of reality.”⁸⁶ Similarly, in his *Notebooks*, he remarked “Only in this way can the proposition be true or false: it can only agree or disagree with reality by being a picture of a situation.” [NB: 2.10. 14] A proposition, for Wittgenstein, can be determined as either true or false only in respect of *a fact, pictorial relationship and pictorial form*. These three things make a proposition *intrinsically true or false*. That is why he says in *Tractatus*, “A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.”⁸⁷ He goes on to say, “The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity.”⁸⁸

According to Wittgenstein, propositions of logic ((tautologies, contradiction etc.) belong to the category of complex or molecular proposition which is nothing but the truth functions of the elementary proposition. Therefore, the truth value of these molecular propositions is determined by the truth value of their constituent’s propositions. That is why Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* says, “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.”⁸⁹ Molecular propositions are nothing but the “... expression of agreement and disagreement with truth-possibilities of elementary propositions.”⁹⁰ This agreement and disagreement can be shown by a truth-table in the following manner:

p	q	$p \Rightarrow q$
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

⁸⁶ Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, Pears and McGuinness (trans.), London, Routledge Classics & Kegan Paul, 1922, p. 27.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

Here, on one hand, we have an elementary proposition that works as the pictorial representation and on the other hand, we have molecular propositions which are the truth-functions of them. These two accounts of the *Tractatus* are based on the principle known as the *bipartite* reading of the *Tractatus*. In this regard, Georg von Wright says, “Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* may be called a synthesis of the theory of truth-functions and the idea that language is a picture of reality.”⁹¹ Similarly, K. T. Fann says, “Wittgenstein’s theory of language in the *Tractatus* has two components: the ‘picture theory and ‘truth-function theory.’”⁹² Now the question is, is bipartite reading enough to understand the *Tractatus*? I do not think so because there are many accounts of the *Tractatus* such as ethical, logical, metaphysical, and religious. So from this, I can say that bipartite reading can be justified as a valid reading from a particular perspective i.e., logical perspective but not overall perspective. Some philosophers also raise some objections against this bipartite reading which are as follows:

The first objection is made by Brain McGuinness. He says that “In the first part of the *Tractatus* [...] we seem to be told that the essence of a proposition is to be a picture, while in the later parts we are told that its essence is to be a truth-function [...]. [A] [...] serious difficulty is that the two accounts seem to be quite separate things, and, if this is so, cannot both be adequate accounts of what it is to be a proposition.”⁹³ Like B. McGuinness, Michael Morris complains that “There is a risk of understanding Wittgenstein’s account of language [...] as falling into two completely unconnected parts: one which is appropriate to the conception of elementary sentences as models, the other which concerns the construction of other sentences out of elementary sentences.”⁹⁴ Here, as a reply to these above objections, it can be said that while Wittgenstein is talking about propositions he talks from both the background of pictures i.e., elementary proposition and molecular proposition which is truth-functions of them. Therefore, it is clear to us that the language of the

⁹¹ Wright, G. H., “Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Biographical Sketch”. *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 64, 1955, p. 533.

⁹² Fann, K. T., *Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1969, p. 8.

⁹³ McGuinness, B., ‘Pictures and Forms’, *Approaches to Wittgenstein*, London, Routledge, 2002, pp. 65-66.

⁹⁴ Morris, M., *Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, London, Routledge, 2008, pp. 234-35.

Tractatus contains both the pictorial structure and truth-functional structure. Therefore from the bipartite reading of the Tractatus, it can be said that there is an internal relation between propositional articulation and logical articulation and also a propositions ability to express the sense that it does. Here questions may be asked that how does Wittgenstein show that an account of the nature of the proposition can be said to be able to explain the nature and relation of propositional and logical articulateness? And how does picture theory give rise to a truth-functional account of the nature of the proposition? In reply to the first question, Wittgenstein says that the concept of propositional and logical articulation is understood or is thought of as function-argument articulation. As an example, Wittgenstein in his Tractatus says “Like Frege and Russell I construe a proposition as a function of the expressions contained in it.”⁹⁵ He further goes on to say, “I write elementary propositions as functions of names so that they have the form ‘fx’, ‘ $\mathcal{F}(x, y)$ ’, etc. Or I indicate them by the letters ‘p’, ‘q’, ‘r’.”⁹⁶ In prototractatus, he says that Generally in what follows I indicate elementary propositions by the letters p, q, r, s, t, or else (like Frege) I write them as functions of their objects in the form –‘ $\mathcal{F}(x)$ ’, ‘ $\mathcal{F}(x, y)$ ’, etc.[PT: 4.2212]. In this regard, Elizabeth Anscombe says that “if the elementary proposition consists of names in immediate connection – if it is just a concatenation of names – then it is not reproduced, even if it can faithfully be represented by a formula consisting of some letters for names and some letters for functions.”⁹⁷ Thus, through this function argument articulation Wittgenstein gave the justification of propositional and logical articulation. Therefore, it is clear that the nature of logic is embedded in the pictorial character of the language. In this regards Wittgenstein in his Notebooks remarks, “All logical constants are already contained in the elementary proposition” [NB: 5.11.14]. Even in the book Tractatus he says the same as, “An elementary proposition really contains all logical operations in itself. For ‘fa’ says the same thing as ‘ $(\exists x).fx.x=a$ ’. Wherever there is compositeness, argument and functions are present, and where these are present, we already have all the logical constants.”⁹⁸ Therefore, based on the above analysis, it can be said that as soon as elementary proposition i.e., pictorial

⁹⁵ Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, op. cit., p. 18.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 36.

⁹⁷ Anscombe, G. E. M., *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Second edition, Hutchinson, 1963, p. 100.

⁹⁸ Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, op. cit., p. 56.

character and compositeness are given, logical articulateness is also given there. So the explanation of the propositional articulation and logical articulation in terms of function-argument articulation amounts to the idea of the functional model. Now the question is what is this functional model? In this regard, Frege says that the conceptual content which is also called the content of a judgement or of a proposition is analysable into function and argument in which the former is the constant part and the latter is the replaceable part. Therefore it is said that conceptual content is nothing but the combination of argument and function. Regarding this, Frege further says that “If in an expression [...], a simple or complex symbol occurs in one or more places and we imagine it as replaceable by another (but the same one each time) at all or some of these places, then we call the part of the expression that shows itself invariant a function and replaceable part its argument.” [CN: §9]. Frege further asserts that the functional model can be applied to any possible object of judgement or proposition. Frege shows the expression of a function in *Begriffsschrift* of the argument ‘A’ as ‘(A)’. Here he kept argument A in a bracket following parentheses is the symbol for the function. He gave another example of the two arguments such as argument ‘A’ and argument ‘B’. He shows the function of these two arguments as ‘(A, B)’. Following Frege in 4.24 of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein presented a similar view i.e., the characterisation or expressions of elementary propositions, for example, ‘f(x), ‘ $\mathcal{F}(X, Y)$ ’ have a functional structure. Here ‘f(x)’ represents the function of one argument i.e., ‘x’ and ‘ $\mathcal{F}(X, Y)$ ’ presents a function of two arguments such as ‘x’ and ‘y’. Therefore, from this, it can be said that the significance of the functional model or structure for Wittgenstein is that it indicates the idea that a proposition is said to be articulate, complex and hence has a structure.

Now in reply to the second question i.e., how does picture theory give rise to a truth-functional account of a proposition, it can be said that the answer to this question will be clear from the remarks given by Wittgenstein in the book *Tractatus*. His position is as follows:

Truth-possibilities of elementary propositions mean Possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs [TLP: 4.3].

We can represent truth-possibilities by schemata of the following kind ('T' means 'true', 'F' means 'false'; the rows of 'T's' and 'F's' under the row of elementary propositions symbolize their truth-possibilities in a way that can easily be understood):[TLP: 4.31]

p	q	r
T	T	T
F	T	T
T	F	T
T	T	F
F	F	T
F	T	F
T	F	F
F	F	F

p	q
T	T
F	T
T	F
F	F


P
T
F

The above table says that truth-possibilities of elementary propositions are the conditions of the truth and falsity of propositions [TLP: 4.41]. Therefore, the truth possibilities of the elementary propositions show agreement and disagreement with reality. That means if it agrees with reality then the proposition pictures a fact and if it does not agree then the proposition doesn't picture a fact.

Therefore, the elementary proposition which is pictorial in character gives rise to a truth-functional account of a proposition.


Bipolarity (*ab-function*):: In this section, I would like to discuss Wittgenstein's concept of *bipolarity* i.e., his notion of *ab-function* mentioned in the *Notes on Logic* and thereby I shall try to show the logic behind it. Now the question may be asked why does Wittgenstein develop the *ab-function*? How does Wittgenstein explain the sense of a proposition in the light of the *ab-function*? Wittgenstein said that every proposition bears two senses: one is true and another is false. Similarly in the *Notes on Logic*, he says, "Every proposition is essentially true-false: to understand it, we must know both what must be the case if it is true, and what must be the case if it is false. Thus a proposition has two poles, corresponding to the case of its truth and the case of its falsehood. We call this the sense of a proposition." [NL: 98-99] This remark given by Wittgenstein indicates the idea that a proposition has truth poles that he indicated with the later *a* and *b*. Here, '*a*' indicates to 'true' pole and '*b*' indicates to 'false' pole. Therefore a proposition with its truth poles for Wittgenstein appears to be as '*a-p-b*'. In *Notes on Logic*, Wittgenstein asserts molecular propositions which are the truth-functions that were made possible based on elementary propositions are

called *ab-functions*. So poles are important to understand Wittgenstein's account of molecular propositions. As we know that for Wittgenstein the proposition p is rendered with the help of truth poles as $a-p-b$. So the proposition ' $\sim p$ ' is a molecular proposition with its true-false poles will be appearing as ' $b-a-p-b-a$ '. It seems to mean that, here the symbol ' \sim ' (negation) reversing the truth-conditions of the proposition p . That is turning the a -pole into the position of the b -pole and the b -pole seats in the place of a -pole and thereby it appears as ' $b-a-p-b-a$ ' for the proposition of not p . After showing this, Wittgenstein now goes on to give another example which is devised with the help of two propositions such as proposition p and proposition q . To show this example of two propositions in his notion of *ab*-notation Wittgenstein developed his devising truth diagrams in the following manner. Here the truth diagram that Wittgenstein developed will show the case of a conjunctive proposition i.e., $p \& q$. As we know that a conjunctive proposition is true if both its conjuncts are true and in other cases it is false. The diagram is as follows:



Here, the diagram shows that the outer ' a -pole' is situated outside the diagram i.e., in the above of the diagram is the symbol of 'true pole' and the ' b -pole' which has taken place outside the diagram i.e., in the bellow of the diagram is called 'the false pole'. There are two propositions on the two sides of the diagram. On the left side, we have the proposition p with its true poles appears as $a-p-b$. Here a -pole of the left side proposition p indicates true pole and b -pole indicates false pole. Similar is the case of the right side proposition q . In the diagram a -pole of the proposition p and a -pole of the proposition q are connected by a line and thereby we

have the result of the outer '*a-pole*' which is '*true pole*'. This is so because as we know a conjunctive proposition is true if both its conjuncts are true. So, here is the connection between *a-pole* i.e., the true pole of the proposition *p* and *a-pole* i.e., also the true pole of the proposition *q* making this conjunctive proposition *p & q* true. The outer '*b-pole*' which is a symbol of a false pole, is connected with all other connections of the poles of the proposition *p* and *q* showing the false cases of the conjunctive proposition. Therefore from the above diagram, we can clearly say that Wittgenstein's conception of *ab-function* which was made possible through elementary propositions i.e. *p* and *q* have pole '*ab*' (*true/false*) and hence is bipolar like elementary propositions which are clear from the above truth diagram. This truth diagram also shows that how a molecular proposition which is the true function of the elementary propositions, get its *ab-poles* through correlations with the *ab-poles* of the original elementary propositions. That is why Wittgenstein in the *Notes on Logic* remarks, "As the *ab-function* of atomic propositions is bipolar propositions, again we can perform *ab-operations* on them. We shall, by doing so, correlate two new outside poles via the old outside poles to the poles of the atomic propositions." [NL: 94] Another example of the three propositions i.e., $(p \ \& \ q) \supset r$ can be represented diagrammatically as follows:



In this diagram first, we have connected the proposition p and q and thereby we get the proposition $p \& q$ (description of this $p \& q$ proposition has already been mentioned in the first diagram). Then we connect ' $p \& q$ ' with the proposition ' r ' through *ab-function* to make the *ab-poles* of the complex or molecular proposition $(p \& q) \supset r$. As we know that an implicative proposition is false if its left-hand side is true and its right-hand side is false and in other cases it is true. Here in the diagram, we see that the outer '*a (true) pole*' of the proposition $p \& q$ is connected with the *b (false) pole* of the proposition r and thereby we have the result of the outer '*b-pole*' i.e., false pole which makes this molecular proposition i.e., $(p \& q) \supset r$ false. It is so because as we know that an implicative proposition is false if its left-hand side is true and the right-hand side is false. The outer '*a-pole*' which makes the proposition ' $(p \& q) \supset r$ ' true, is connected with all other connections of the poles of the proposition ' $p \& q$ ' and the proposition ' r ' showing the true cases of the above implicative proposition. Therefore, from this, we can say that molecular propositions or *ab-functions* do not introduce anything that was not already provided by the elementary propositions occurring as arguments in them. In other words, molecular propositions do not add anything to the elementary propositions, based on which they are constructed. The thing they only can do is that they just-make a rearrangement of the elementary propositions *ab-poles*. That is why Wittgenstein says, "Molecular propositions contain nothing beyond what is contained in their atoms; they add no materials information above that contained in their atoms. All that is essential about molecular functions is their T-F schema i.e., the statement of the cases when they are true and the cases when they are false." [NL: 98] In 1913, when Wittgenstein was busy with his study on logic, he wrote a letter to Moore and in that latter, he gave an example of the proposition of p equivalent p or it says ' p if and only if p ' by his *ab-function* as follows:

As we know that the above proposition is called *bio-conditional* proposition which will be true if it's both left hand and right hand are true and if it's both left hand and right hand are false. Here in this diagram, the outer '*a*' pole is called true pole has taken place at the bellow the diagram, which is made possible through the connection between *a-poles* of the atomic proposition left hand/right hand ' p ' and also through the connection between *b-poles* of the atomic proposition i.e., left

hand/right hand 'p'. On the other hand, the outer 'b'-pole is called false pole which is made possible through the connection between the a-pole of the first occurrence of 'p' and the b-pole of the second occurrences of 'p' and again with the connection between the b-pole of the first occurrence of p and the a-pole of the second occurrence of p. After drawing this diagram, Wittgenstein says that the above two connections are not possible because the proposition 'p' cannot both be true and false at the same time. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, the outer 'b' pole is connected through an impossible link and hence cannot indicate a genuine possibility, must be ignored. So, we have now only outer 'a'-pole i.e., true pole and hence always true and indicates the notion of tautology. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, the significance of *ab-function* is that the propositions of logic (tautologies, contradiction etc.) can be presented by using the same method that we used to establish the molecular propositions out of the elementary proposition. That is why he says that like molecular propositions, propositions of logic are nothing but the *ab-functions* of elementary propositions. The *ab-function* (bipolar in nature i.e., true/false pole) is a new notation by which he determines the sense of a proposition.

The Concept of Entailment: In this section, I would like to discuss the concept of entailment in terms of Wittgenstein. The concept of entailment is also known as a logical consequence for Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein in his book *Tractatus* defines the concept of entailment through the following remarks. As he says: "If all the truth-grounds that are common to a number of propositions are at the same time truth-grounds of a certain proposition, then we say that the truth of that proposition follows from the truth of the others." [TLP: 5.11] He further says, "In particular, the truth of a proposition 'p' follows from the truth of another proposition 'q' if all the truth-grounds of the latter are the truth-grounds of the former." [TLP: 5.12]

The truth-grounds of the one are contained in those of the other: p follows from q [TLP: 5.121].

Therefore, for Wittgenstein, the concept entailment says that if all the circumstances in which some propositions are true then we can say that those circumstances are also the circumstances in which a certain proposition is true then we can say that the truth of the latter proposition entailed by or follows from the truth of the former proposition. Let's take an example to understand it. The following

example will show how the one proposition i.e., ' $\sim p$ ' is entailed by the propositions as ' $p \supset q$ ' and ' $\sim q$ '.

p	q	$p \supset q$	$\sim q$	$\sim p$
T	T	T	F	F
F	T	T	F	T
T	F	F	T	F
F	F	T	T	T

The above truth table shows that the true possibilities of the propositions p and q in the first two columns. After that, we have determined the truth-conditions of the rest of the propositions such as $p \supset q$, $\sim q$, and $\sim p$. Now, here it is clearly visible that the proposition ' $\sim p$ ' follows from the propositions $p \supset q$, and $\sim q$, it is so because in all the cases in which the latter propositions are both true, the proposition ' $\sim p$ ' is also true. So, we can say that the truth grounds of the propositions $p \supset q$, and $\sim q$, are the same as the truth grounds of the proposition ' $\sim p$ '. In this regard Wittgenstein remarks in his book *Tractatus*, "When the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, we can see this from the structure of the propositions."⁹⁹ He goes on to say, "If the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, this finds expression in relations in which the forms of the propositions stand to one another: nor is it necessary for us to set up these relations between them, by combining them with one another in a single proposition; on the contrary, the relations are internal, and their existence is an immediate result of the existence of the propositions."¹⁰⁰ Therefore, Wittgenstein here is trying to say that the concept entailment is nothing but a structural relation between propositions. The structural relation for Wittgenstein is also called internal relation. It is so because the structure shows that the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others. So, for Wittgenstein, the concept entailment can be understood with the help of the truth-conditions of propositions.

⁹⁹ Op. Cit., p.46.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 46.

Relation between entailment and inference: It has been said that the concept of entailment given by Wittgenstein is intermingled with the nature of inference in *Tractatus*. Now the question is why does Wittgenstein talk about the internal relation of entailment in terms of its being the justification for an inference? In reply to this question, Wittgenstein says in the *Tractatus* that he seems to base the inference on the entailment. It is so because he thinks that justification of an inference lies in the presence of a relation of entailment between two propositions. In this regard, Wittgenstein writes, “If p follows from q, I can make an inference from q to p, deduce p from q. The nature of the inference can be gathered only from the two propositions. They themselves are the only possible justification of the inference. ‘Laws of inference’, which are supposed to justify inferences, as in the works of Frege and Russell, have no sense, and would be superfluous.”¹⁰¹ The above relation of inference and entailment is also found in the lectures that Wittgenstein gave in Cambridge in 1930-1932. In these lectures, in terms of entailment and inference, he says: *Inference is the transition from one proposition to another, a transition which we justify by saying that e.g. q follows from p. This relation is entirely determined when the two propositions are given [WLC: 56]*. He further says that: *Inference is justified by an internal relation which we see; the only justification of the transition is our looking at the two terms and seeing the internal relation between them [WLC: 57]*. Therefore for Wittgenstein, the relation between inference and entailment is that the latter provides the relevant justification for the former. So if we discuss inference in the light of the above view then inference can be taken as a justified inference i.e. followed from the internal relation of entailment between two propositions.

Concluding Remarks:

From the aforesaid discussion, I can say that the claim that an elementary proposition contains all logical constants in itself is justified by the sense of a proposition for Wittgenstein. In the book, *Tractatus* the sense of a proposition lies in the picture of a state of affairs that makes it either true or false. So from this, I can say that instead of *ab-function* Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, represents the truth conditions of molecular propositions with the help of truth tables. Whereas in the

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 46.

Notes on Logic, he shows how does one can get molecular propositions out of elementary propositions. Moreover, he also represents the truth conditions of molecular propositions with the help of his *ab-function*. The new notation also makes clear in what sense propositions of logic i.e. tautologies, contradictions etc. are the products of truth-functionally constructing molecular propositions. That is why Wittgenstein says that: Among the possible groups of truth-functions there are two extreme cases. In one of these cases, the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions. We say that the truth conditions are *tautological*. In the second case, the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities: the truth-conditions are *contradictory* [TLP: 4.46].

Here I want to divulge another point i.e., to understand Wittgenstein's concept of logic we need to understand the transcendence of logic after Wittgenstein. Regarding this Wittgenstein said *logic is transcendental*. Now the question is, in what sense logic is transcendental? Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* talks about ethical and logical transcendence. But there is a difference between the transcendence of ethics, religion and logic. Ethics, religion etc. are transcendental in the sense that they do not picture anything in the world, hence lie outside the world or transcends the world. Regarding the transcendence of ethics, we can say that as values lie outside the world so ethics transcendence the world. On the other hand, logic is transcendental in the sense that logic is associated with the structure of the world as a whole. It seems to mean that as soon as the structure of the world as a whole is given, logic is also given. That means for Wittgenstein logic is associated with the totality of facts. In this sense logic is transcendental and this transcendentality of logic is different from the transcendentality of ethics, religion etc. They transcend the facts of the world so they treat the world as a whole. Therefore, at last from the above discussion, following Wittgenstein, I conclude by saying that as soon as elementary propositions (language) are given, logic as a whole is also given.

BUDDHIST WOMEN AND THEIR GENDER IDENTITY: A CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST APPROACH

L. UDAYA KUMAR AND JENNIFER

Introduction:

The scope of this paper advances the positive attitude of the Buddha to womenfolk in his time in India. It cannot be repudiated that Buddha did not effort to innovate the entire system of the society during his time apart from changing some peculiar systems like caste one which were strictly held by the Hinduism since the pre-Buddhist period. On the other hand, one should notice that among the innovations of some social systems by the Buddha, the considerable welfares of the womenfolk are involved. Making his followers pay obeisance, the parents put in the place of Great Brahma, extolling the monks who look after mother (*Mātuposaka Bhikkhu*), setting the proper duties of women for a household and repudiating the ones who philosophically assume that there is no mother and father are obvious evidence for that statement. Till Buddha did not turn down the entire social system of his time in India, he managed to completely collapse the wrong views of ultimate spiritual attainment which is held by the *Brahmana* caste. Buddha actually revolved the system of *Brahmana* in both aspects of social and spiritual. Women could completely enjoy, at that time, the fruits of the spiritual revolution of the Buddha. Buddha said that he opens the door to the liberation (*Nibbāna*) for those who have confidence (*Saddhā*). So, if a woman has such confidence (*Saddhā*) as Buddha mentioned, she can also enter the door to the liberation Buddha opened using her own key of wisdom (*Pañña*). Buddha's spiritual teachings are free from all secular things while his social instructions depend on the cultures, customs, and environmental society. That is why men, as well as women, cannot have their content regarding Buddha's social instructions, except the spiritual one.

The position of women has been an essential topic of interest or concern in this modern age. In all areas of activities that women played, assumed and acted upon or took action such as economic, social and even political life, have resulted in significant paradoxical outcomes that led the society to rethink the controversial subject of the position appointed to women in the religious traditions of the modern age. Most of the times, the involvement of women in religious life and rituals has been doubtful and non-existent; performing, carrying-out and fulfilling religious rites

were forbidden to women and some of the important religious knowledge was kept away and secret from women. Women were considered a worshiper at home, meaning they can be good religious and devotees at home. Females were given less fame and males were the prestigious' one, the teachers and the leaders. This paradoxical issue had induced a significant amount of pressure that motives me to decide to examine the role of women in Theravada Buddhism. The Buddha himself supposedly proclaimed a universal message without exception of sex or caste and race, the one designated for the genuine, virtue, health and righteousness of the whole humanity is stored in the males' spiritual achievement. For this reason, the work begins with examining the early stage and the role of Theravada Buddhism's women and also by tracing and keeping track of this historical role of women up to the present day.

In spite of ambivalence regarding the spiritual standing and community role of women even during the Buddha's own lifetime, ultimately Theravada Buddhism, traditionally acknowledged by most historians and scholars as based on the earliest most authentic records of the Buddha's teachings (i.e., the Tipitaka or Pali Canon) established precepts and institutions that ultimately recognize women as spiritual equals in the Buddhist community. The qualitative perception of women practitioners of Theravada Buddhism depends on several influential factors. The cultural framework including the history (if any) of the order of the Bhikkhunis in the particular country is important, including the attitude and support of the surrounding lay Buddhist practitioners. Also of importance is the frame of reference of the Bhikkhunis themselves – whether they are from the ranks of the more traditional Theravada Buddhism based on the teachings of the Pali Canon or if they belong to orders in countries such as China or the United States where the traditional teachings have been added to and amended in ways that reflect the values and mores of the particular culture. The Zen Buddhist orders in the United States reflect Western influence in that the liberties accorded the order of the Bhikkhunis are (not surprisingly) among the least restrictive and most liberal. In spite of the diversity factor, it will be evident that there are some outstanding examples of quality and attainment when it comes to Buddhist women monks.

The Nature of Duality:

The duality: good and bad, positive and negative, optimistic and pessimistic and inferiority and superiority are inherent in every circumstance viz. in every nation, religion and in any society. Therefore, such duality can also be found in Theravada Buddhist society. The discussions about the duality of men and women including *Bhikkhus* and *Bhikkhunis* regarding their general similarity in relation each other have already been completed now. Then, the analytical exposition of the duality exists among particular women without pertaining any special comment on men is going to be advanced. “Although they (women) cannot establish on their own without men in the society at the time of the Buddha they can keep abreast with men in the Buddhist society whereas the women in other religious society cannot. “Until they cannot stand alone in the society at that time, spiritual progress can be achieved by their own independent practice.” It is interesting to study the dual nature of women who really exist over 2500 years ago in India at the time of the Buddha and as to how they behave bodily and verbally and how they generated their mental attitude. In the Theravada texts, we can find the particular portions in which only about the women-centered aspects are described. Those portions are, according to the Canonical Order,

*Mātugāmaṅga*_*Salāyatana**saṃyutta* of *Samyuttanikāya*,
*Bhikkhunīpācittiya*_*Pācittiya**pāli* and *Bhikkhunīkhandhaka*_
*Cūlavagga**pāli* of *Vinaya**pitaka*, *Therīgaāthāpāli* and *Atthakathā*,
Therīapadana of *Khuddakanikāya* and *Itthivagga*_*Ekakanipāta*
Jātaka of *Khuddakanikāya*.

“In other Nikāyas also we often find about them. However only in the above portions, they can be mainly found. Various types of women in different social status are exactly advanced in those portions viz. the donor of the temple”, lady-in-waiting of Siddhartha Bodhisattva, Brahman, and wife of wealthy man, family member of the king, courtesan, and daughter of wealthy man, queen, mother of *Bhikkhus*, converter from other religion, personnel, mendicant, poor one, slave and goldsmith. All these types of women become the same when they enter “*Bhikkhuni Order of Buddhist Sangha Community*”. The theme of the topic is to discuss the women setting under the title of inferiority and supremacy. When the women are condemned, they will be categorized as the inferiority and when they are extolled, nominated as the supremacy. In *Mātugāmaṅga* of *Samyuttanikāya*, Buddha advances the nature of women which are in duality of good and bad. The qualities of women expressed by

the Buddha are very interesting. Then there may be arisen a question that ‘why Buddha talks about the women and can it not be a “*Tiracchānakathā*.”

Swarna de Silva in the 1994 edition of her lecture on “*The Place of Women in Buddhism*” is quick to point out that the social context for women before the Buddha began teaching was not different from the position of women globally at that time – women were generally accorded an inferior and more servile position. At that time (sometimes referred to as pre-Buddhist or “Brahmanism”) other religions practiced in India such as Hinduism also emphasized a role for women that involved subjection to male authority and a discouragement of independence. In Buddha’s day, before Buddhism was practiced, women did not have spiritual purity with men but were not distained or disregarded as much as in other religious sects such as Hinduism. The patriarchal (*Purusha*) philosophy was dominant, however, and provided the foundation and justification to exclude women from many social and religious activities.

Naturally this cultural climate gave rise to an attitude that women could not achieve the same spiritual attainments as men. The Buddha actually turned this strict and prejudicial attitude on its ear by proclaiming a “universal” message, without exclusion due to race, caste, or gender. And he also carried this concept one step further in his teachings:

One of the classic titles given to the Buddha is "Sattā Devamanussanam" or "teacher of gods and humans". If the Buddha had been regarded as a teacher of men, as opposed to women the term "Porisa" (which is the Pali counterpart of "Itti", woman) would have been used in this classic description, rather than the generic term Manussa. More generally the teaching of the Buddha is referred to as one that could lead all beings (Sattā) to liberation, in whatever realm they lived and whatever form they assumed. However another of the classic description of the Buddha describes him as "Purisadammasārathi", or "charioteer of men to be tamed". Some might see in this sexist language, but what it probably means is precisely what it says, viz that men are subject to more violent misdeeds and have to be "tamed" to a greater extent than women.

In fact, Buddha never speaks about anything initiated by him. “Even his very first sermon to the five ascetics: *Khundañña*, *Vappa*, *Baddiya*, *Mahānāma*, and *Assajita*, emerge because of the initiative request of *Sahampati*, the Brahma.” Suggesting that, Buddha never utters even a word without any reason. Here we can utilize the two types of speeches as a yardstick of Buddha’s speaking. “The two types of excellent speeches of the Buddha are:(1) the words of truth, advantageous but not

pleasing to other and (2) the words of truth, advantageous and pleasing to others.” Then the real purpose of every word of the Buddha is to be right and to be profit. As Buddha’s teaching or speaking lead only to the being right and profit, personal sentiment will not be cared. Buddha never teaches or speaks his sermons to get the favor of any people. Therefore, it is possible that someone is not pleased with his teachings. “Also Buddha himself will not upset in failing to get the favor of somebody regarding his teaching or speaking.” That is the steadfast mind condition of the Buddha.

Likewise, he will not care anybody’s criticizing him with regard to his speaking about women. That is why we can deduce that Buddha does not omit the affair of the women. Still we have to remember that Buddha would not have ever being spoken about them without any initiation of someone or something. Not only about them (women), as above mention, but also about all secular affair will not come out of the Buddha’s mouth without initiation or requesting of someone. Therefore, the people of this modern age should express their gratitude to the ancient people who initiate and put questions to the Buddha to get the precious teaching, speaking and answering of the Blessed One.

“In *Mātugāmasaṃyutta* of *Samyuttanikāya* we can find mostly, initiative request of the Ven. Anuruddhā to the Buddha to talk about the inferiority and superiority characteristics of women.” It is interesting that why Ven. Anuruddhā engages in questioning about the women. It is clear that in the mind of some elders (*Thera*) the role of the women in the society as well as in spiritual progressiveness is not very much inferior. Ven. *Ānanda*’s sentiment over women also should not be neglected here. He initiated or requested the Buddha to let the women enter into the “*Sangha Order*”. “Here Ven. *Ānanda* highlights the superiority of Mahapajapati Gotamī. Even just before *Mahāparinibbāna* of the Buddha Ven. *Ānanda* ask about the women.” “Again, after *Mahāparinibbāna* of the Blessed One, he gives the women permission to pay firstly respect to the remains of the Buddha before the men.” However, on the other hand, some elders like Ven. *Mahakassapa* do not seem like to give favor to the women. “That’s why they blame Ven. *Ānanda* with regard to his commitment in favor of women and his initiation to become Bhikkhunis in Buddha’s *Dhammavinayasāsanā*.” Then we can find the different attitudes of the elders

assigned to the affair of women. Although many *Theras* considers that the women are inferior, Thera Ānanda does the opposite.

Women Progressive Life in the Society:

“In the Buddhist society at the time of the Buddha, women characterized as mother and wife, were taken an important role in the Buddha’s attitude.” Without them, the society cannot run properly. However, because Buddha is a spiritual realist, he cannot effort to be socially radical due to the situation at that time. That is why in some parts of social context they may appear to be inferior. Anyway, Buddha would extol her if she is worth to be extolled and condemn her if she is worth of condemnation. That is Buddha’s equitable attitude towards all people including monks and nuns. Additionally, we have to remember that Buddha’s teaching is not the socially-centered kind of sermon. Therefore, it is not wonderful that Buddha cannot manage to socially radicalize. That is why some statements of the Buddha regarding women do not specifically champion women.

According to the *Jātaka* commentary on *Itthivagga* of *Ekakanipāta*, Buddha suggests many defects of women in various ways. But we must remember Buddha’s discourse is always in response to someone or something. “In fact, Buddha talks about the unsavory qualities of women for the sake of foolish monks who fed up with being in attachment to them.” In order to discourage their tension of attachment to those women, Buddha points out some bad points of the women though they possess the good points as well. One aspect we should notice is that Buddha talks about the negative traits of womenfolk only in the presence of men especially in front of the *Bhikkhus*. Therefore, it is clear that Buddha merely tends to reduce the defilement that persisted in some *Bhikkhus* regarding “their criticism of the appearance (*Vanna*), voice (*Sadda*), and smell (*Gandha*) of women. Good appearance (*Itthivanna*) is included as one in five powers of women.”³

Pointing out the negative qualities of women for *Bhikkhus*, on the other hand, Buddha highlights some qualities of the women in that very *Itthivagga* of *Jātaka* commentary. “Queen Mudulakkhana who can manage to show the right path to the Buddha-to-be hermit and an extraordinary woman who can effort to show her qualities in front of the king are illustrated here. Then, between this context of inferiority and supremacy a monk should establish his attitude to the women according to “the Buddha’s saying Oh monk, you should consider the woman in the

age of mother as your own mother, in the age of sister as your own sister and in the age of daughter as your own daughter.” Such attitude can help one not only for not falling into defilement or lustful thinking regarding the women but also for cultivating loving kindness (*Mettā*) to them. In fact, Buddha always tends to condemn one’s emotion of attachment to women’s appearance (*Vanna*) voice (*Sadda*) and smell (*Gandha*) rather than the existence of women. “That’s why Buddha himself says that don’t grasp with craving any senses when you experience those senses. In fact, this Buddha’s instruction of restraining the senses faculties is common to both men and women. Women also should apply this instruction by maintaining morality (*Sīla*), establishing confidence (*Saddhā*) and cultivating wisdom (*Pañña*). “Buddha says that the women who possess these three qualities can overwhelm the husband.” Thus, “*Sīla* is basically very important for oppressing the attachments. Then, of five powers of women, Buddha extols the women with the power of morality (*Sīla*).”

“Moreover, the women who appease the husband are also extolled by the Buddha.” “It does not mean that wife is always in service for a husband, because the appeasing of the husband by the wife should be good according to the Buddha.” But we cannot find anywhere that Buddha extols virtuous men who provides service for women. In this light, one might consider that women are inferior. Here again, the role of social context at the Buddha’s time play as a discriminator. In fact, the essence of Buddha’s teachings does is not in parallel with the social context.

Accordingly, in the society, families do not prefer to bear a female child. On one occasion, king Pasenadi of Kosala was very upset as he was informed that his queen gives birth to a daughter. “When the Buddha know about that, he consoled the king saying that Oh king, raise that daughter, if she is wise, endowed with morality, pays respect for father-in-law and serves her husband she can be a noble woman.” Suggesting that, Buddha, knowing the inferior situation of women in the society and uplifts the position of women whenever the situation permits him. Even if he finds some commitment of the women which deserve censure, he never violently condemns them like men. Buddha usually applies violent usage ‘*Moghapurisa*’: the man who is vain from the path and fruit (lit. foolish man) whenever he violently condemns a man or a Bhikkhus. But Buddha never applies the similar sense ‘*Moghaitthiya*’ in condemning a woman or a *Bhikkhuni*. This shows Buddha’s sympathetic attitude toward the women.

Besides, Buddha thinks much of the prestige of women. “Therefore, he goes to the *Tavatimsā* heaven, according to Theravada tradition, to preach *Abhidhamma* to his former mother, *Mahāmayā* as returning her gratitude.” Then Buddha is a pioneer who highlights the prestige of the woman as a mother and shows the people the way how to return the gratitude of the mother. “Buddha himself says that the excellent way of returning the gratitude of the parents is by preaching *Dhamma*.” “That is why Buddha said that ‘*Yathāvādi Tathā Kārī*’ and ‘*Yathākārī Tathā Vādi*’.” And also “Buddha even extols the monks who give back the gratitude of the mother including father by looking after them.” Subsequently, the mother as a woman takes a very superior role even in the spiritual context. “Buddha’s granting permission Mahapajapati Gotamī to enter the *Sangha Order*, taking action on Yasodayā by going her room himself and preaching *Dhamma*, taking such mad women as “*Patācārī*” and “*Kisāgotamī*” into consideration enough to address sermon and accepting the alms offering of the Ambapālī, the courtesan prove that women are not very much inferior in Buddhism. As a matter of fact, the very inferior status of women in ancient Indian society became elevated to the higher level because of the emergence of Buddhism.

Status of Women in the Society:

There seems to be an undercurrent of discrimination running through most of the world’s recognized religions. Whether intrinsic to Buddhism or a byproduct of the primarily Asian cultures surrounding Buddhist communities, the role and status assigned to women retains as an ambivalent quality. One huge enigma from the lifetime of the Buddha has to do with the Buddha’s reaction to allowing women into the Sangha. i.e., his pronouncement that the introduction of females into the monastic life would cause his teachings to survive only half as long: 500 years as opposed to the thousand years they were destined to survive. Buddha would not, however, renounce his assertion that there was no reason based on their gender, that women could not attain enlightenment as well as men. The Buddha is quoted as saying to his cousin Ananda, “Women, Ananda, having gone forth, are able to realize the fruit of stream-attainment or the fruit of once-returning or the fruit of non-returning or Arahantship”.

Many argue that the Bhikkhunis were put in an inferior position to the male Buddhist monks from the beginning the Vinaya Pitaka section of the Tipitaka (Pali Canon) is the original record of the discipline and rules for both monks and nuns. The

rule of discipline for the Buddhist nuns outnumbers the rules for the monks. Many rules refer to the subordination of nuns to monks. A Bhikkhuni who has lived the monastic life for years are considered to be juniors of even a novice monk. This is a perfect example of subordination but it does not necessarily constitute a position of inferiority. Subordination does infer being submissive to, or controlled by an authority. Usually, it means being subject to the control of another. ‘Inferior’ on the other hand denotes being “lower in rank, importance, quality, value or position”. It also means “lower grade” or “less important, valuable or worthy”. So it is easy to discern that subordination is not necessarily a value judgment of the worthiness of Bhikkhunis. It must also be mentioned that the original version of rules regarding monks and nuns as presented in the Pali Canon are different from the rules presented in later texts. Amendments included in later versions are clearly intended to undermine the ordination of women into the Buddhist monastic life. For example in India, once the orders of Bhikkhuni had died out, a period of time went by during which no new nuns were ordained, since the newer rules required both monks and also nuns to be present at an ordination of a nun – and there were none to attend.

Gender Identification in Buddhism:

Unlike many other religions that are fundamentally patriarchal in nature – the primary example being Christianity in which man is created in the “image of God” and Jesus Christ is lauded as ‘the Son of God’⁴– Buddhism does not identify its teachings and principles with a particular sex. Even though the Buddha himself was certainly a man, but neither the Buddha’s sex or even his personality play any significant role in Buddhism. Buddhism's focus is predominantly on Universal Laws that are genderless and the pursuit of the enlightened state which is also beyond both the self and the sex. The Dhamma basically ignores the sexual identity of the individual, since the gender identity, through transmigration and rebirth. Therefore, the individuals’ current gender in a particular lifetime has very little import. The personal identity is also not thought to persist over many incarnations and is also viewed as unimportant. In Theravada Buddhism, the path of Buddha may be practiced by anyone. Buddha gave no comment or discourse on the subject of gender and whether there were any karmic factors in play that determined whether a person would be born male or female. Especially in modern times, non-Theravada Buddhist practitioners have stories (e.g. the Jakarta stories) in which males and

females have delineated roles. A popular misperception persists that being born as a female may be seen as a negative consequence of “unskillful” practices and conduct although there is absolutely no basis for this perception it has become prevalent in many Buddhist lay communities.

Although Dhamma is the ultimate guide to the practice of Buddhism and is a path open to males or females. Morality (*Sila*), Spiritual Growth (*Bhavana*) and Wisdom (*Pañña*) are categories covered by the components of the Noble Eight Fold Path. Of these three, only morality (*Sila*) makes any reference to different rules of conduct for males and females, and these are relatively minor and do not involve any spiritual aspects. Ritual is another aspect of world religion in which Buddhism is set apart. This is very important because most religious rituals involve giving authority to males as far as performing ceremonial rituals or acting as a liaison between the lay religious community and God (e.g. Catholicism). Buddhism is basically an atheistic religion that lacks central Godhead as its focal point. In this way it skirts and avoids many sexist practices. Many Christian missionaries were surprised to discover that in matters of divorce, beliefs, political leanings and inheritance of property, women were allowed the same liberties as their husbands.

The Buddha does express views on occasion that are compatible with social views and seem to be in agreement with the broad framework of the Dhamma. Buddhism leaves many civil, legal and private matters to social regulation. Although society in Buddha’s time valued male children over female children, Buddha voiced a view in direct opposition to societal norms when he counseled the King of Kosala who was disappointed not to have a male heir by his wife “A woman-child, O Lord of men, may prove to be a better offspring than a male”. Largely, Buddhism espouses rules of reciprocity within the household of lay Buddhist members, emphasizing that although certain tasks may be best suited to certain genders, each sex has their own duties to look after. Buddha was very clear that the wife has duties to the husband and vice versa. Buddha extolled certain qualities in a woman, among them are beauty, virtue, and wealth. Chanting or symbolic offerings are the main ritualistic practices in Buddhism, and both men and women are able to practice these in the same manner, without restriction. Even rituals developed after the Buddha’s passing are not exclusionary to one sex because of gender. It is also worth pointing out that there are no “priests” in Buddhism. This is an important difference because most religions have

a male official assigned as a liaison between a deity and a lay practitioner. Buddhism is essentially atheistic and has no such appointed official. Religions that do priests are often confronted with the fact that they exclude women as officials. There is no doubt that the Dhamma is neutral to the gender of the follower. One recorded response, a response of a follower ‘Mara’ to the Their Soma reads as follows:

<i>Ittibhāvo kim kiyirā cittamhi susamāhite ñānamhi vattamānamhi sammādhamma.m vipassato yassa nūna siyā eva itthāham puriso ti va kiñci va pana asamīti tam Maro vattum arahatīti</i>	What matters being a woman If with mind firmly set One grows in the knowledge Of the Right Law, with insight? Anyone who has to question Am I a woman or am I a man And does not oneself really know Over such a one will Mara triumph
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Some argue that Buddhism does little to refute the lay Buddhist position established in the community for women which involved servitude to husband and children, but this is not true. In Buddhism, the focus is on the individual attaining spiritual emancipation and no principles of Buddhism recognize the marriage rituals and rules as a spiritual dogma that interferes with the Dhamma.

Impact of Buddha Teaching in Women Life:

Freedom was definitely the main attraction for women who came in large numbers to join the newly created order of the Bhikkhunis. Many were wealthy and distinguished, and great numbers of them were recorded as being able to attain the enlightened state. In the Therigatha, a compilation of verses that were spoken by these women as they beheld the light of the Dhamma and were enlightened by the stories of these women who passed down from generation to generation. There is also a frequent mention of them in the Pali Canon, giving them an elevated status. The original Bhikkhunis came from diverse backgrounds. Some were of royal blood. Others were the daughters of nobles or merchants. Others were courtesans, slaves, or daughters of poor families. Yet their stories are immortalized, their sayings have been passed down and even one of these, Patacara, is credited with having 500 personal followers. The Buddha himself is quoted as saying:

*This is the only vehicle Be it a woman or be it a man
The one who takes this vehicle Can reach the peace of Nibbana*

The “vehicle” referred to is the Buddha Dhamma. Furthermore, the opinions expressed in the Dhaniya Sutta of the Sutta Nipata are merely that – opinions. Their overall tone that views obedience as a central characteristic of a virtuous wife has no

bearing on the role of either lay Buddhist women or Bhikkhunis with regard to their propensity for spiritual practice. As previously mentioned, Buddhism is quite unique in that the strictly disciplined Bhikkhus do not act in the role of a priest, i.e. a liaison between the lay practitioner and a higher diet. The establishment of the order for Bhikkhus was a radical departure from the tradition of the “wandering aesthetic” and was established by the Buddha only a few months after his enlightenment. Five years later the Buddha established the order for the Bhikkhunis.

The inclusion of women in Buddhism the religious life, was extraordinary for the times in which Buddha lived. It was an elevation of women from inferior roles accorded them in secular life and an affirmation that women were as worthy as men when it came to spiritual attainment. There are eight special roles eventually incorporated in the Bhikkhuni Vinaya, which is an indication that women were somehow inferior to men in the Buddhist orders. Two schools of thought predominate on this issue. On one hand, given the climate of the times (particularly in India) the subjection and oversight of Bhikkhunis by Bhikkhus provided a protection, especially in isolated areas, of the sort of persecution acted upon the Buddhist nuns. This persecution often times ran the gamut of vile name calling to actual beatings, sometimes resulting in death. “The eight rules were as follows:

1. Bhikkhus were always to have precedence over Bhikkhunis in matters of salutation, etc. irrespective of any other consideration.
2. Bhikkhunis could not observe the annual retreat (*Vassa*) in a district where there were no Bhikkhus.
3. Bhikkhus had to set the dates for Bhikkhuni Uposatha ceremonies.
4. Confessing transgressions by Bhikkhunis had to be done before the assembly of both Bhikkhus and Bhikkhunis.
5. Certain judicial processes in case of Bhikkhunis had to be undertaken by both the Sanghas.
6. Upasampada initiation of Bhikkhunis should be given by the Bhikkhus Sangha as well.
7. A Bhikkhuni should never abuse a Bhikkhus.
8. Bhikkhus can officially admonish Bhikkhunis, but not vice versa”⁵

Theravada Buddhism in actuality elevated the status of women over the centuries, particularly in the lay Buddhist community. This has largely been through the acceptance of the Buddha, who came to realize and legitimize the potential spiritual equality of women as well as through the effort and moral uprightness of the Bhikkhunis themselves. At the time of the Buddha, women had a well defined

inferior status that was commonly reflected in the duties and tasks assigned to them. Women's lower status caused them to be the servants of the entire household, serving and being at the beck and call of all family members, not eating until others had eaten, taking over the cleaning and care of the household. It is only because the Buddha was questioned concerning women and women's roles that Buddha has provided detailed discourse on the role of women. Buddha was not a crowd pleaser and he was very meticulous in his analysis of women's status. He was also honest and, being detached from worldly judgments, traditions, and drama was oblivious to criticism. Ven. Mahakassapa was an early proponent of the spiritual equality of women and because he lived at the time of Buddha and he was able to influence Buddha's commitment to allow women to enter into the Sangha order. Buddha's influence ultimately achieved more than the creation of the monastic order of the Bhikkhunis for women; it also elevated their status in the Theravada Buddhist lay community as well.

Conclusion:

Siddhartha Gautama, known famously as the Buddha, was a timelessly influential spiritual leader whose spiritual wisdoms and insights has brought peace and enlightenment to countless generations in the past – and continues even more strongly to do so today. The role of women in Buddhism continues to evolve along with Buddhism itself. Whether Buddhist women are lay persons or ordained Bhikkhunis, the influence of the societal mores' and values, especially as concerning the status of women, cannot be overestimated. Buddhism began in India and the status of women at the time in which he lived was deplorable. Women had few rights, most women were married off by their fathers to a man they did not choose, and forced immediately into a subordinate role. Women were expected to serve not only their husbands but also their husbands' parents and to care for and serve their children as well. If a woman were fortunate enough to reside in a wealthy household she did have the right to order and manage the servants but a Buddhist wife (or any wife) was in a precarious position. At any point in time should she anger displease or disappoint her husband or his relatives she could be divorced or thrown out of the household? The husband had a right to beat his wife and make demands, though the women had no such rights.

Similarly, the husband could come and go as he pleased, but the wife lacked any similar freedoms. It should come, therefore, as no surprise that when first approached by his cousin Ven Ananda about allowing Buddhist women to be ordained his initial decision was a negative response. This may have been due partially to severe societal strictures surrounding preconceived female roles. Through a series of argumentative conversations, Ananda was eventually able to have the Buddha admit that there was no reason that a woman could not achieve enlightenment as well as her male counterpart. This pivotal conversation became the vehicle through which Buddhist women could achieve Sangha. The freedom that ordination into the Bhikkhunis brought to Buddhist women was unprecedented and attracted many women to become nuns. The ordination provided Buddhist women with the choice of living free from societal restrictions and not required to serve and wait on others hand and foot until their dying day.

Most importantly it gave Buddhist women the opportunity to study the teachings of Buddha and journey on the path of enlightenment. The teachings of Buddha encouraged detachment from ego, desire, and all early circumstances, opening the door to fulfillment and joy for thousands of females formerly doomed to a life of servitude. Being ordained delivered Buddha's female followers from their households, but the gift of being able to live a life of dedication to Buddhist principles came with strings attached. Although no one knows exactly what Buddha was thinking when he formulated the rules for Bhikkhunis – 98 more rules for Bhikkhunis than the male Bhikkhus – there are different schools of thought on how these differences came to be. One school of thought finds the different treatments of monks and nuns sexist and problematic, questioning whether the extra rules applying to Bhikkhunis were actually necessary.

One school of thought recognizes the wisdom of the Buddha, feeling that Buddha sanctions the extra rules for nuns was both a protection and security for the Bhikkhunis who not only had to survive in their communities but also depended on the acceptance and generosity of the lay Buddhist community for their sustenance. The other scholarly view is that having disparate sets of rules, particularly conduct rules, for monks and nuns constituted (and continues to constitute) unequal treatment due to gender differences. Perhaps the most important and accurate view is taken by scholars quick to point out that overall, Buddha recognized that different rules for

Bhikkhus and Bhikkhunis were part of the worldly concourse and were beside the point. The fact that the Buddha recognized the equal potential in women for attaining enlightenment overshadows any minor contrivances to assure order and protection in the Vinaya.

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