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CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

This universe of ours, the universe of the senses, the rational, the intellectual, is bounded on both sides by the illimitable, the unknowable, the ever unknown. Herein is the search, herein are the inquiries, herein are the facts, whence comes the illumination which is known as philosophy. To quote Vivekananda: "man finds himself driven to a study of the beyond. Life will be a desert; human life will be vain if we cannot know the beyond. It is very well to say: Be contented with the things of the present; the cows and the dogs are, and all animals and that is what make them animals. It is philosophy, the inquiry into the beyond, which makes the difference between man and an animal. Well has it been said that man is the only animal that naturally looks upwards; every other animal naturally looks prone. That looking upward and going upward and seeking perfection are what is called salvation, and the sooner a man begins to go higher, the sooner he raises himself towards this idea of truth as salvation. It does not consist in the amount of money in your pocket, or the dress you wear, or the house you live in, but in the wealth of spiritual thought in your brain. That is what makes for human progress, that is the source of all material and intellectual progress, the motive power behind, the enthusiasm that pushes mankind forward."

A system of philosophy is generally tested by its ethical doctrine. 'Though a criticism of life, philosophy is judged by its capacity to improve life'. Let us, therefore, ask how far philosophy satisfies the demands of moral consciousness. Advanced thought and research in philosophy has its own fashions, and it has become a philosophic fashion of the present day to consider everything from multidisciplinary perspectives. But the careful observer will notice that this approach is instinct with ethical interest.

We are happy to publish *Philosophical Papers: Journal of the Department of Philosophy* Volume-14, March, 2018, (UGC enlisted) before the philosophical community. The contributors in the present volume have made an attempt to discuss diverse perspectives in philosophy. We are thankful to the contributors, the esteemed members of the editorial board, all colleagues of our Department for their valuable suggestion, support for the publication of this journal. We are thankful to our Honorable Vice-Chancellor, the Finance Officer (Officiating), and the University Press, without which the publication of the journal would not have been possible.

Subhra Nag in her paper 'Feminist Ethics: Reconsidering Ethics from Feminist Perspective(s)' does a re-reading of the traditional ethics from a feminist viewpoint, taking into consideration the now quite lengthy debate within the different kinds of feminism. The feminists attempted to question the notions of impartiality and universality in earlier ethics. What to do with the mainstream ethical theories as well as how to position feminist ethics are also important matters in the feminist handling of the issue. The contribution of feminist ethics need not be confined only to women's issues but need to have a bearing upon the practice of ethics as such. Universal ethics that allows diverse voices to be heard is a path that many feminists adopt.

Aditi Dasgupta in her paper traces the early years of B. R. Ambedkar and the Marxist movement and helps us to understand the dilemma that each of them was facing during the nationalist movement for freedom in India. Ambedkar was concerned for his community and the pain of casteism that it had to suffer and the Marxists were interested in improving the situation of the working class, and both these concerns were not priorities in the nationalist movement. Gandhi had his views regarding caste, being against untouchability but not letting go of the division. Dasgupta points out following Ambedkar that Gandhi's inability to go with supporting a complete breaking up of the caste system was a way for him to not antagonize the caste Hindus. She sees caste as an earlier specimen of the class dynamics. She also engages with Ambedkar's reading of Marxism and his reservations. Ambedkar was especially concerned with the lack of importance to individual efforts in Marxism. Dasgupta thinks that the fears and reservations of Ambedkar were misplaced to some extent, although admitting that the lack of caste sensitiveness in the Marxists has been reflected in their inability to make inroads in the northern states in post-independence electoral politics. Dasgupta, in the end, argues that in fact, the Marxist intellectuals can be the bearers of Ambedkar's vision.

Anirban Mukherjee in his paper 'The Challenge for Education and the Practice of Philosophy' argues for the extension of philosophical practice to educational processes and training. He contends that education for the future is challenging, as the future is unknown and the project of conceptualising an ideal world is an ongoing one. Hence, education to be useful needs to prepare the present generation to deal with uncertainties and alternative perspectives. These are capabilities that philosophers possess as part of their training. Hence, the tools of the philosophers should be made a regular part of the general training of all students.

Generally, it is believed that Determinism is a rich and varied concept. Jordan Howard Sobel in *Puzzles for the Will: Fatalism, Newcomb and Samarra, Determinism and Omniscience* classifies at least ninety varieties of what determinism could be like. When it comes to think about what deterministic laws and theories in physical sciences might be like, the situation is much clearer. There is a criterion by which we can judge whether a law is deterministic. A theory would then be deterministic just in case all its laws taken as a whole were deterministic. In contrast, if a law fails this criterion, then it is indeterministic and any theory whose laws taken as a whole fail this criterion must also be indeterministic. Koushik Joardar in his contribution tries to explain determinism from the Greek perspective to the contemporary period. What he attempts to show is that determinism has the capacity of self-correction and it entails laws whether moral or legal. Thus, it reflects the normative sensitivities of the agent. The moral is not reducible to the legal. But what is legal has moral overtones.

Integrity is a concept that is so oft-used that most of the times we assume that it is a very admirable one, a clearly understood notion and that it is always in accord with morality. However, a survey of literature that came up in the last couple of decades in analysis of this concept and a little ponderance over the issue make us think that it is not so as it appears to most of us to be. Rather the

concept is a very complex one, susceptible to many interpretations and even always does not go hand in hand with morality. When we try to analyse the concept to get into its core all these features come to the forefront. It is interesting to find that even some interpretations go against our common-sense expectations. Jyotish C. Basak in his contribution cites the example of Bernard Williams whose writings fuelled the debate on integrity in the contemporary period. Following his writings he finds a number of philosophers stepped in to explore the notion as a result of which a vast literature has come up and it immensely helped him to illuminate the concept of integrity.

L. Bishwanath Sharma in 'The Concept of *Dharma* in the *Bhagavad Gītā*' deals with how *Gītā* can guide one towards moral fulfillment and tries to unravel the moral message of the great work. The concept of *dharma* is central to this text. *Dharma* is presented as that which sustains the society and is imperative for all. He draws attention to how *dharma* is related to one's abilities and results in the flowering of the potential inherent in one. The welfare of one is linked to the welfare of all, *lokasaṁgraha.* To achieve that through the path of *dharma*, one must act from one's own 'station in life'.

Ngleknao Ramthing in 'Do Business Corporations have a Conscience?' has raised an important question regarding the moral responsibility of business entities. Linked to this is the issue regarding moral agency and moral rights of such organisations. But do they have a conscience? There is an inherent difficulty in imagining corporates as intentional like individuals or treating them as persons. Ramthing points out that there is also a view that as corporations have goals and strategies, they should also have a conscience. The decisions of the corporation are an agglomeration of that of the individuals and hence, the individuals become the bearers of the responsibility and choice. He refers to the view of Velasquez who holds that the individuals within the corporate have to be held responsible for the corporate actions, for it is they who determine the actions of the corporate. However, Ramthing argues that the corporations, though just legal entities, have to hold a certain

responsibility for their actions, and the organization has a greater continuity than the members of that corporation who may have defined actions at some point of time and then moved on.

Swagata Ghosh in 'Cognition and Consciousness: An Analysis of the Nature and Possibility of Knowledge in Sāṁkhya Philosophy' provides a detailed study of how knowledge is understood in the Sāṁkhya system taking into consideration the views of Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikṣu. Knowledge as transformation, *cittavṛtti,* is located in *citta* and hence, is internal. *Ekapratibimbavāda* and *anyonyaprativimbavāda* are discussed at length and the paper provides an extremely lucid exposition into the debates regarding the issue of consciousness and self-reflexivity in knowledge formation.

Anumita Shukla and Mayank Bora in their paper 'Alethic Relativism and Faultless Disagreement' deal with faultless disagreement (FD), taking different attitudes towards a statement such as 'Liquorice is tasty'. They mention Kölbel as holding that this is because of a 'relativism about truth' or Alethic Relativism (AR). They deal with how to accommodate a genuine and faultless disagreement from an immersed perspective. With indexical relativism, of course, FD will vanish. The reader again could look at it from his/her normative perspective or a dissociated perspective (DP). They try to show that from a DP there can be an FD. There is a thorough discussion of Kölbel and Boghossian relating to this issue.

Anureema Bhattacharyya in her paper 'Review of Ethical Naturalism as a Form of Cognitivism and Realism' deals with the issue of how ethical naturalism fits in with cognitivism and realism. She starts by explaining the different meanings of naturalism in ethics but confines her discussion to the sense in which ethical judgements include ethical terms, which in turn can be defined in terms of factual terms. There is a difference between subjective and objective naturalism. There are certain problems with individual subjective naturalism, general subjective naturalism and interest theory of naturalism. She objects to regarding subjective naturalism as cognitive in character.

Objective naturalism which bases our approval or disapproval in the nature of the object to make us tend towards such reactions also has its problems. The tendency view which focuses just on the tendency aspect is more liable to be cognitive in character. Spencer's evolutionary naturalism falls prey to the desire to understand morality in terms of evolution which is difficult to verify. She concludes by showing how the theories of naturalism relate to realism.

Manoranjan Mallick made an attempt to explore Wittgenstein's notion of use theory of meaning in the context of the ongoing debate between the Classical Wittgensteinians and the New Wittgesnteinians. Classical Wittgensteinians have been finding the divide between Wittgenstein's early and later works quite significant for understanding his writings. The *a priori* logical structure of language in the *Tractatus* gets replaced in later writings by *a posterior* method of assigning meaning by looking into the working of language. This shift, for classical Wittgensteinians defines the divide between the early and the later Wittgenstein. Contrary to the classical readings, new Wittgensteinians propose a post modernist reading of Wittgenstein's writings. They hold that there is important continuity between Wittgenstein's early and later works. Highlighting the notion of meaning as use New Wittgensteinians see a clear thematic continuation in Wittgenstein's early and later works.

Value-theoretic terminology is diverse. Traditionally, "intrinsic value" is understood as synonymous with the idea of being "valuable as an end". Thus, philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that thing has "in itself," or "for its own sake," or "as such," or "in its own right." Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic. The questions whether, nature has intrinsic value, and whether all value require an evaluator is raised in the traditional environmental ethics. These questions are raised between nature objectivists and value subjectivists. The former presupposes that nature is intrinsically valuable, while the later holds that it takes an evaluator to ascribe value. Sashi Mohan Das made an attempt to find out a collaborative and discursive process to account for those

dual ways of proving intrinsic value in nature from the contemporary environmental philosophers' view.

Balaram Karan in his paper 'Gandhi's Views on *Varṇa-Vyavasthā* in India: Some Reflections' deals with the problem of caste discrimination and how Gandhian explorations in this area can help us understand the problem and find a possible way out of it. He dwells on the distinction between the *varṇa* system and the caste system, and how even Gandhi held that one should stick to the calling, livelihood as determined by *varṇa* although he did not believe in any hierarchy among the *varṇas*. Hence, he thought of the caste system, which embodied that hierarchy, as a perversion of the *varṇa* system. The fallout of the caste system gets expressed in the idea of purity of some *varṇas* and the practice of treating some people as untouchable to protect the purity of the 'pure' ones. Gandhi fought against the system of untouchability and thought of it as an abuse of the *varṇa* system. Karan goes on to state how Gandhi has a favourable stance towards the *varṇa* system and argues that the suggestions of Gandhi are difficult to accept.

Soma Sarkar in her paper 'Tagore's Educational Thought' explains how Tagore included a vision of cosmopolitanism in his education system. The paper describes the atmosphere in the Tagore family in the early years of Rabindranath as liberal and seriously concerned with the issue of education. Rabindranath in his initial years was drawn to nationalism, but realizing its limitations, gradually shifted towards a cosmopolitan attitude in educational practice. She refers to the writing and lectures of Tagore including his novels to show how his view of education was moulded by his socio-political views and his vision of India.

Kabita Roy in her paper 'Transcendental Method' explicates the concepts of the transcendental, transcendental method and transcendental argument in Kant. 'Transcendental' in Kant means the 'conditions of knowing' and 'transcendental method' includes the transcendental arguments. Roy explains in the paper how Kant uses the transcendental argument to counter the

sceptic's challenge and that of the different kinds of idealism as well as to situate human cognition. In this context, the different kinds of deduction are enumerated upon.

Prostitution is now identified as a trans-national issue requiring global solutions in relation to its regulation and legislation, but the question of what constitutes a properly feminist response remains a matter of dispute. Ongoing conflicts within the feminist circles over the meanings of sexuality for women, combined with the United Nation's acknowledgment of women's rights as human rights, have produced divergent conceptions of prostitution as a legitimate target of governmental intervention. Feminists contends that prostitution constitutes a form of violence against women and hence a violation of human rights. Priyanka Hazra in her contribution tries to show that prostitution still remains socially constructed as a crime with the prostitute as either a criminal or a victim. She tries to conclude that feminists on both sides agree that contempt and stigma have adverse side effects on prostitution and still prevalent in the 21st century, and will continue as long as prostitution is socially constructed as a crime.

The moral theories that have come up in modern times and especially in the West are indeed very sophisticated postulations. However, Indian thinkers in ancient times though did not speak in terms of these sophisticated theories; they developed some code of conduct for rulers, other administrators as well as for the common man. Adherence to these codes of conduct was the primary requirement for rulers and also for others. Joly Roy in her venture delineates some codes taking clues from some ancient texts - *Arthaśāstras*, *Dharmaśāstras*, epics and *Nītiśāstras*.

ANIRBAN MUKHERJEE

FEMINIST ETHICS: RECONSIDERING ETHICS FROM FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE(S)
SUBHRA NAG

Introduction:

The task of developing a critique of the traditional ethics started forming a major part of the agenda for the feminist movement right from the latter half of the twentieth century. The feminists argue that the matter of omission of perspectives and issues relating to or centring woman (as a moral subject or agent) has provided them with the initial rationale for a serious reconsideration of ethics. Subsequently, over the years they have come forward with several alternative proposals for replacement of the traditional claims and focus of ethics as a discipline. The feminists have gone to the extent of fixing their preferences and priorities of ethics in as many ways as possible. But amidst all the differences the basic commitments or concern of feminism for woman and its agenda for reassigning moral status to her remains nonetheless unquestioned throughout. The crux of the feminist ethical projects gets rightly expressed in words of Alison Jaggar (95) thus:

> "Although feminists differ widely on a range of normative and theoretical issues, they do constitute a community in the sense that all share a few common assumptions. These include the view that the subordination of women is morally wrong and the moral experience of women is worthy of respect. Feminist ethics may seek to explain or justify these claims, but it never seriously questions them."[1]

What has been central to the restructuring attempts of the feminist ethicists is their continuous trial for narrowing down the gaps between theory and practice. To each of the spheres where traditional ethics went wrong corrections are proposed by them. Amidst which elimination of the grounds justifying the split between reason and emotion and the private and public spheres is realized to be an utmost requirement. Apart from which discarding of the construal process of human nature from a typical male point of view is also considered urgent enough.

Admittedly, the task of rebuilding ethics becomes a challenging one in case it demands overthrowing of all/some of those central concepts, postulates or norms which have helped the very discipline of ethics to continue with its objective, neutral or universalistic outfit. Since whether denouncing of those concepts/ postulates/norms

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[1]Jaggar, Alison. "Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects", *Feminist Ethics*. Ed. Claudia Card. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991. Print.

etc., in totality as tools, instrumental for the sustenance of the proclaimed universalistic claims of mainstream ethics, will favour the construction of any inclusive frame of ethics is yet not rightfully ascertained. It persists as a grey area deserving thorough consideration. The feminists, however, have to acknowledge that the conflict between the basic requirements of ethics and that of feminism(s) is needed to be adequately sorted out so that the ethics proposed in the new format does not miss a solid foundation. In this paper, an has been made to develop some critical reflections on the feminist projects and proposals for the reconstruction of ethics taking in due cognizance their applied as well as the theoretical dimensions. The content of the paper so stated is, in fact, an outcome of the close reading of the select literature in the field of feminist philosophy and gender cum developmental studies, which will be properly cited and acknowledged in the coming sections.

The Problematic:

Recognition of 'women' as moral subjects and theorization of their experiences over broader and inclusive frames marked the distinctness of feminist ethics that emerged as an offshoot of the Second Wave Feminism in West. Following the decades of 1960s feminists started putting forth enough effort in thematic representations of sporadic reflections on ethical issues, spread over a considerable period, right from the days of Mary Wollstonecraft and J.S. Mill.Side by side they also started expressing their keenness on the methodical treatment of those issues As a result of which in the prospective frameworks for feminist ethics, apart from the practical ethical issues (like discriminations, violence, abortion etc.) the concern for the abstract ethical ones (like values, perspectives, character, responsibility, etc.) also started to surface at the manifest level. Worthy to be noted, their point of departure from traditional ethics is justified by the feminists on the ground of its exclusion (of the woman) and pseudo claims for objectivity, neutrality and universality. The incompatibility between the argued universalism on the one hand and the latent exclusivism on the other, obvious in the traditionally structured ethics, provides the justificatory grounds for floating of particularist agenda in feminist ethics. The feminists have come to notice flaws in the so-called notions of impartiality and justice too which run parallel to the conventional universalism.

Adoption of any wide, inclusive or accommodative frame for ethics capable of addressing situational differences among individuals is undoubtedly a commendable proposal. But what is even more important to enquire in this regard is how does this inclusion of the 'excluded others' take place. Implications seem to differ a lot if women are proposed to be included as 'women' only in any ethical scheme or are done so primarily as human beings. To what extent the charge of exclusion against universalistic ethics can suitably be met with the replacement of the former by overtly localised, particularistic or partial fame of ethics requires to be thoroughly examined. There are two options for the feminist ethicists to choose. They may either proceed to develop theories specially designed to address localised concerns only or justify afresh the foundational base for ethics and endeavour to develop it either on deontological, teleological or virtue ethical lines. In the latter case, they will, of course, require to bring necessary corrections in the methodical approaches as admissible on feminist grounds. It has been realized by a good number of feminists that doing away with the universalistic norms may not be helpful in the long run in pursuing the agenda for inclusion. Arguing in the line Susan Moller Okin (274) opines that feminist ethics if not self-defeating must take an account of the differences among persons and social groups and yet to be "universal, principled and founded on good reasons that all can accept"[2].

Feminist ethics decidedly ventures into both practical and theoretical domains of ethics with its two-fold proposed objectives. The agenda for feminist ethics in the practical field centres around the task of prescribing morally justifiable ways of resisting actions and practices that perpetuate women subordination and also of devising morally desirable alternatives promoting women's welfare and well-being. At the theoretical level, it aims at developing philosophical accounts of the nature of morality. It pays special attention to revise the central moral concepts so that they become capable of capturing fully women's moral experiences critically and respectfully.What is significant in this regard is to take a definite stance in identifying the root cause(s) behind the theoretic failures of the dominant discourses of ethics. The pressing questionis whether the systemic failures of the mainstream ethical

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[2]Okin, Susan Moller "Inequalities between the Sexes in Different Cultural Contexts", *Women, Culture and Development, A Study of Human Capabilities*. Ed. M. Nussbaum & J. Glover.Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Print.

accounts can be ascribed to the inherent discrepancies of their approved standards or to how those standards were put to use? A group of feminists' dissatisfaction with virtue ethical or deontological theories of ethics like that of Aristotelian or Kantian, for example, is understandable because of the male bias is obvious in them. But would it be wise enough to discard those theoretic frames altogether simply on that ground? Or, the feminists would try to explore the possibilities of retaining the worth of the theories by making them free from the male bias? Some feminists will agree with Annette Baier in admitting that the traditional theories irrespective of their patriarchal bias can still be of good use for a fresh scheme of ethics.[3] Since, "... they also contained the seeds of the challenge, or antidote, to this patriarchal poison." (Baier 26)[4] What Baier contends is that those theories were not just instruments for excluding some persons. They also did argue for the inclusion of as many beings as possible though of course under the certain favoured category.

A feminist ethical position is expected to exercise its privilege over the mainstream ones in viewing woman's moral agency in terms of her concrete reality of being. Adoption of this stance would surely containthe good potential for enriching our understanding of the variety of situated ethical praxis confronted by a woman. However, it is equally pertinent to ask in this connection whether this sort of understanding of 'ethical' would bear similar implications for understanding universalized human situations too. Contrarily, what justifications could have been there for drawing exclusive categorizations between moral perceptions of woman and man and also categorizations among women along the line of culture, community, class, caste or nation? True to speak, if feminism keeps open too many ways for understanding 'ethical' it may fall prey to any weak version of relativism. But if it admits of only one way to understand 'ethical' (applicable to a generalized single category of the woman) there is the possibility of its getting trapped in the very same chain of too formal and abstract universalism of mainstream ethics. Feminist ethics surely needs to find out the third option in between.

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[3]This is strongly objected by the thinkers like Audre Lorde (110-114) – "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House".*Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches,* Ed. Berkeley, CA: Crossing Press. 2007. Print.

[4]Baier, Annette.*Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics*, USA: Harvard University Press. 1995. Print.

How to Situate Feminist Ethics?

There could be two major ways of looking at feminist ethics. Feminist ethics might be looked as a proclamation for enlargement of ethical concerns to unrecognised spheres/issues. Or else it might be treated as a proposal for focused confinement of ethics to woman's issues. Justifying feminist ethics in either of the ways again seems to be problematic. Because if feminist ethics is a bare proposal for drawing ethics to several unrecognized but relevant spheres, it is a proposal for enlargement or expansion of general ethics having least grounds for bearing a new nomenclature called 'feminist ethics'. If on the other hand, feminist ethics fixes its focus on the woman and reflects upon woman's issues only it would be highly difficult on its part to refute the charge of narrowing down ethical concerns to an extremely limited plane. In the second way, the very purpose of feminist ethics is defeated because the claims for gender equality and justice --- the long pursued goals of feminism draw their justifications from a presumed plane of co-existence of and coordination between genders.

There might be a third way of defence which the feminists could confidently argue about. Feminism may come forward with the distinct proposal for enlargement of ethics but especially on 'feminist' line, arguing for prospective 'feminist' ways of understanding issues. If ethics is to go beyond its structural limits the most suitable pursuit for it would be to work out scheme(s) that would do away with the sharp line of distinctions between man's and woman's issues. To separate woman's issues from man's issues is not at all a feasible proposal. As Jaggar (85-86) has pointed out: "Since men's and women's lives are inextricably intertwined, there are no women's issues that are not also men's issues ....."[5] Nevertheless, the very demand for enlargement of ethical concerns to several unrecognised spheres and introduction of fresh perspectives to the already recognised ethical issues will surely call for new sets of moral justifications. Jaggar thinks that feminist ethics will be largely privileged to pursue ethics on a much wider frame than the traditional ones. She declines to take feminist ethics as just an explicitly gendered subset of ethical issues. "On the

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[5]Jaggar, Alison. "Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects", *Feminist Ethics*. Ed. Claudia Card. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991.

contrary, rather than being limited to a restricted ethical domain, feminist ethics has enlarged the traditional concerns of ethics." (86)[6]

The feminists' cause of rebuilding ethics is likely to be considered as a justified one provided their pledge is taken as a pledge for a sharp departure from the male-biased perceptions of morality. The adoption of new perspectives in addressing several age-old issues and a good number of newly identified ones (arising out of the perspectival changes) is sure to enrich ethics as a discipline. Particularly in this sense, the question of adopting a wide, comprehensive perspective that provides due coverage to the issues of the woman (as a human) and rest of the human folk, in general, becomes pertinent. It seems that purely feminine, maternal, lesbian or radical approaches to ethics through having relevance for particular sections of women, would contain less potential for taking ethics beyond the localised concerns (of issues). Contrary to the former position, there are quite a good number of feminists who like Virginia Held (321-344) refuse to treat feminist ethics as "mere additional insights which can be incorporated into traditional theory".[7] This new trend necessitated ethics to evolve through an explicitly feminine line. The works of Gilligan[8], Noddings[9], Ruddick[10], Held[11] and a few others contributed toward the formulation of specialised ethical concerns to a considerable extent. These two counteracting positions of the feminist ethicists have been succinctly outlined in Samantha Brennan's writings (516):

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[6]Jaggar, Alison. "Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects", *Feminist Ethics*. Ed. Claudia Card. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991.

[7]Held, Virginia. "Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory"*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* Vol.50, Supplement, Published by International Phenomenological Society., 1990. Print.

[8]Gilligan, Carol. *In a Different Voice*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982. Print.

[9]Noddings, Nel. *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral education*. Berkeley: University of CA Press, 1982. Print.

[10]Ruddick, Sara. *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace*. New York:NY: Balentine Books, 1989. Print.

[11]Held, Virginia. "Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* Vol.50, Supplement, Published by International Phenomenological Society., 1990. Print.

------ *The Ethics of Care*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 2006. Print.

> While some feminists think the problem with traditional ethics has been the range of problems, others think that the problem runs much deeper and that the problem is not with the application of the concepts and tools of moral theory, traditionally conceived; the tool and concepts themselves are flawed. On this view, we need to revise traditional moral concepts in light of relational insights.[12]

Looking for 'Feminist' Way(s) of Understanding:

Could there be a central focus in the 'feminist' ways of understanding ethical issues? Consideration of gender as a category for ethical analysis helps feminists revealing the discriminations women were or are subjected to. Over the years, the said consideration has proved fruitful enough because implicit gender bias hidden behind the gender-neutral claims of the mainstream ethics is laid bare in the process. Because of their initial aversion for too formal and abstract universalism, working with only universal 'situational frame' (relevant for all humans) was highly inconceivable at the beginning point of the feminists' journey. But at a later date, many of them felt compelled to admit that to operate with any strictly localised existential frame is found to be equally preposterous running the risk of excluding many others.

Given a second-order reflection on the entire issue under consideration it would become eventually obvious that the question of dispensing with all universalism in ethics is based more on a misconception (that goes to argue that the universalistic and objective discourses are always prone to take an exclusivist colour). Nonetheless, it makes sense to say that the task of formulating a standardized version of a generalized category of being (woman as a uniform category) devoid of concrete existential dimensions is sure to take being in abstraction. But corresponding to each individual's, individual group's situational variations formulation of secluded and fragmented views of ethics bearing no implications for the extended others is neither feasible nor worth-seeking. Because of the global concern, developed of late, for humankind in general to what extent cultivation of thoroughly localised or fragmented ethics beyond certain limit would be beneficial even for the concerned sections is becoming difficult to ascertain. Therefore, looking for an option in between 'hardcore essentialism' and 'too fragile relativism' is felt urgent by considerable sections of feminists, social scientists and development ethicists (like

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[12]Brennan, Samantha. "Feminist Ethics", *The Routledge Companion to Ethics*. Ed. John Skorupsky. 2013. Print.

Martha Nussbaum, Onora O'Neill, Susan Moller Okin, Ruth Anna Putnam, Seyla Benhabib etc.,) who work also beyond their localised spheres and are exercising influences in the policy decisions at the national and international levels.

There is no denying to the fact that the issues relating to gender deserve to be treated as a significant one in the assessment of individual positioning along with the issues of race, caste, class, etc. Accordingly, studying the interfaces between gender and class, gender and caste, gender and race or gender and ethnicity etc., at par with the interacting frames of gender and culture or gender and religion, is an utmost necessity in a multi-cultural society. The prevalence of gender disparity in any of these operational frames would surely reveal severe cases of gross injustice. It puts to question the very normative structure based on which the state laws or rules are framed. Hence, injustices rendered to women offer a justified call for the reconstruction of ethics and also re-construal of the basic concepts on which the principles of gender justice or egalitarian ethics would rest.

Quite naturally, the new ethics to evolve must issue a call for a fresh revision of the concepts of justice, impartiality, care, empathy and the like and initiate steps for elimination of the grounds for which or on which women were/are discriminated. The problem is not that easy to be instantly resolved with. There remains enough scope for debates and controversies. One most disputed contention in this regard is that of justice, for example. Questions are raised whether a feminist theory of justice would be a theory with better potential to cope with the situation? Or, the potential contained in any humanist theory would be a better option? Like this justice question, addressing the questions of gender inequality, moral interdependence, defining the range of human capabilities and vulnerabilities in a multi-cultural society and the like become crucial for any inclusive ethics. The requirement for consideration of the issues, as stated above, has been duly acknowledged by a considerable number of feminists cum development ethicists. The studies conducted in the respective fields got documented in the book *Women, Culture and Development* (edited by Nussbaum and Glover, 1995, reprint 2001). The book has dealt elaborately with various persistent controversies and come to throw sufficient light upon the prospects of their resolutions too.

In our view, the core of the considerations undertaken in determining the prospects of inclusive feminist ethics in various circles ultimately centres around drawing a baseline distinction between the two approaches: (i) consideration of woman as woman and (ii) consideration of woman as human. The traditional reductionist approach that narrows down the meaning of human to man only runs a severe risk of exclusion. But the risk factor does not seem to disappear completely in case any fixed essence of womanhood is superimposed on women in general. (We should not be oblivious of the fact that the crypto gender-biased humanist discourses of traditional ethics used the same logic - 'consideration of woman as woman' for excluding women from the moral domain). How to comply with the universal frame of ethics which pays equal heed to the multiplicity of voices of distress is the most demanding issue now. Ethics, as well as justice bereft of universality, can scarcely be shown to be well-founded. Cases could be taken as exceptions on justified grounds provided those grounds were claiming something more than mere preferential causes.

What could have been a suitable moral position? What could have been a more acceptable version of Ethics? The prospective discourses which attempt to answer these questions, leaning towards universalistic frames, are associated with the names of Susan Moller Okin (274-297)[13], Ruth Anna Putnam (298-331)[14], Seyla Benhabib (235-255)[15], Onora O'Neill (140-152)[16], Martha Nussbaum (61-104)[17], Amartya Sen (259-273; 1-21)[18] and quite a few more. The common thread that runs

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[13]Okin, Susan Moller "Inequalities between the Sexes in Different Cultural Contexts", *Women, Culture and Development, A Study of Human Capabilities*. Ed. M. Nussbaum & J. Glover.Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Print.

[14]Putnam, Ruth Anna."Why Not a Feminist Theory of Justice?",*Women, Culture and Development, A Study of Human Capabilities*. Ed. M. Nussbaum & J. Glover. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Print.

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through the universalistic frames of ethics is the desire for developing a humanist frame - a frame which treats all human beings as equal from the moral point of view. This, however, does not entail that for consideration of a being as a human that being should be taken in abstraction with the denial of her distinctive features. While none of the thinkers referred above disagreed at this point, nonetheless they did have subscribed to divergent ethical positions. For example, while Putnam is proposing to work on the Rawlsian frame, Nussbaum's preference is for Aristotelian. Sen's approach traverses through the critique of both Rawlsian and utilitarian frames finally taking a beyond utilitarianist stance. While O'Neill's proposed working frame sticks to Kantian liberalism, Benhabib would like to replace Rortyan "communities of conversation" by "communities of planetary interdependence" and would finally plead for a global dialogical moral community. What is noticeable in the stated attempts for the reconstruction of ethics is that none of these thinkers is ready to compromise with the universal human understanding of a moral situation, while not showing impatience for understanding other's positions. Promising models for moral justifications may be made available to feminism in one or the other way as mentioned.

Amidst the cultural diversities and the situational differences, the search for generalised theoretic frames is quite obvious in the different schemes so proposed. A common concept of humanity is also argued upon for without which the difficulty of addressing women's issues at par with men's issues could not be duly sorted out. In the newly proposed models humanity instead of being used as a given or fixed essence is understood to function as a regulative ideal defining a vision of human solidarity and community.

Clarendon Press, 1995. Print. See also Sen, Amartya and Bernard Williams. "Introduction: Utilitarianism and Beyond"., *Utilitarianism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Print.

A Contextual Negotiation between Ambedkar and the Indian Marxists

Aditi Dasgupta

I

Ambedkar was born on 14th April 1891 in a poor *Mahar* family in Maharastra. The *Mahar* community, in traditional Hindu society, is considered to be *abarṇa*, i.e., the community is deprived of its space even in the lowest rank of the society! The traditional Hindu society, as we see, considers the community as untouchable but it is an irony that such communities have never been considered as *a-Hindu*! They have been related to Hindu society in *some way* and that is, in terms of social hatred! So it is quite natural that a boy from such a community has to keep a safe distance from his classmates even in the academic institution governed by the caste *Hindus*. The hatred went to that extreme as not to allow a little boy to quench his thirst from the common source of drinking water! The *Manusmriti* oriented Hindu society deprived him even of his right to learn Sanskrit and he had to keep himself satisfied only by learning *Farsi*. The age-old tradition of exploitation of the upper-class *Hindus* over the lower castes was intensified and got a new dimension by using the said book as an ethical foundation of social practice. The text prescribed that for the same crime, a person, outside the caste (*atiśudra*) is entitled to face more severe punishment than a *Brahmin*! So we may say that it was the very instinct for survival which motivated Dr Ambedkar to challenge not only the *Manusmriti* but also any political endeavour from a charity for the *Dalits*.

Ambedkar achieved his D.Sc. degree from London School of Economics and was awarded the PhD degree from the Colombia University of United States for his work on state economics. His direct contact with the modern western intellectual world made him aware of the concept of liberalism, republicanism and humanism. He came upon the realisation that those ethical ideals, originated from the bourgeois revolution, are the weapons for fighting against the social evils causing deprivation and agony of the downtrodden. The concept of welfare state encouraged him to hope that the social problem of the *Dalits* may be solved by the political intervention of a just and powerful state. However, later he had the experience of another kind of development of bourgeois civilization and that is capitalism followed by imperialism and colonialism. As a citizen of a British colony, he soon recognised the colonial rule

as the greatest enemy of nationalist spirit as well as of individual liberty. The recognition of such naked truth, coupled with his political sensitivity, made him join India's struggle for freedom. But the irony was that, in that India, the social and political space of Bhim Rao and his community was always being challenged! His nationalist spirit realised that what the anti-colonial nationalist movement needs for its success is an integrated Indian identity which should not be fragmented at any cost by racism, casteism or religious fanaticism. At the same time, his exploited *Dalit* self was very much anxious about the result of that success! Just like the Indian Marxists, he predicted that the nature of post-independent India would no way be of the people, by the people and for the people.

It was a great challenge for the Indian Communist Party, since its foundation in 1920 at Tashkent, to influence the Indian mass by the ideal of socialism and to motivate them towards socialist revolution since they had already been integrated by the ideal of nationalism. The primary goal of both the nationalists and the socialists was to make India free from the British colonial rule. However, the communists were more concerned about the future structure of post-independent India than the nationalists. To the communists, one of the chief aims for India's freedom was the emancipation and empowerment of the exploited working class. The nationalist leaders were blamed for not treating the issue with due importance. The controversy over the question of priority between those two aims made the Indian communists divide into two groups. Similarly, Ambedkar was torn apart between two kinds of interests. If he had to give priority to the interest of his class he had to go against the domination of the upper class in the nationalist movement at the cost of the interest of the nationalist movement as a whole. On the other hand, his full surrender to the interest of the nationalist movement meant treachery to his community! When the Marxists were predicting the dominance of bourgeois elite class in independent India, Ambedkar was always being suffered from the anxiety of the dominance of upper caste and *Hindu sanātanism*! Such a dilemma seems to be the central cause of misinterpretation and controversy on the role of Ambedkar as well as of the Marxists in the anti-colonial movement, which is labelled as 'the nationalist movement'.

However, the nationalist leaders before the Gandhi-era, came upon the realisation that the political freedom for the high-caste educated Indians was

depending on the social freedom to their low-caste counterparts.[1] Though some extremist leaders including Tilak showed their reluctance to social issues, leaders like Lajpat Roy devoted his life for various kinds of social reforms including the abolition of casteism and untouchability.[2] The issue got a serious focus in the literary creation too. Rabindranath Tagore focussed the practice of casteism and untouchability as a foe to the spirit of humanity[3] and against untouchability he wrote his famous lines: "Oh, my unfortunate Motherland! Those whom you have insulted would drag you down to their same level".

The Bengali Essayist Pramathanath Chowdhury attacked the nationalist leaders in the esteemed Bengali magazine *Sabuj Patra* declaring that the nationalists wanted political liberty but they were frightened when the same principle was applied in social matters![4]The changing political scenario, it seems, made Congress pass a resolution in 1917 urging people to remove all the disabilities imposed by the evil customs on the downtrodden.[5] Leaders like B. J. Desai and Aruna Asaf Ali criticized the unjust social privileges of the high-class Indian elites. Later, in 1921, it became mandatory for a person, willing to work as a congress volunteer, to sign in a declaration for fighting against untouchability. But it was the year 1917, which is also the year of the great conquer of the proletariat class in Russia, told quite a different story in Ambedkar's life as detailed below.[6]

Being appointed as the military secretary to the Maharaja of Baroda, Ambedkar descended in the Baroda Railway Station and after a long wait, when nobody came to receive him despite the prior royal order, he realised that his education abroad had nothing to do with his social status as an untouchable! Circumstances made him find shelter not in any *Hindu* hotel but in a *Parsi* inn hoping that the Zoroastrian community, without having any caste system, would not harass him. But the caretaker asked him to leave just after hearing his name which bore a *Hindu* inheritance! Desperate Ambedkar registered himself under a *Parsi* name and started to go to his office from there. His experience in the workplace too was depressingly humiliating! The insolent subordinates made him remember in every moment that he was untouchable! He was not supplied drinking water and in the officer's club, he had to maintain physical distance from his colleagues. The alienated scholar began to enrich himself by the books on political and economic subjects in the public library of Baroda. But the situation got worst when on one morning the

*Parsi*s of the city identified him and attacked him with sticks and harsh words. They ordered him to vacate the inn immediately and went to that extreme to challenge his life! Spending the day at a public garden, the lone fighter left for Bombay in that night. In his later life, Ambedkar could never recall this story of his life without tears and this incident, as many scholars' claims, is one of the most important turning points of his life which made him an untiring soldier to fight against casteism and other social injustice at any cost.

II

Gandhi's struggle against untouchability did not go against the caste system which is considered to be the foundation of casteism and untouchability. Claiming himself as a '*Sanatani Hindu*' he claimed the *Hindu* caste system as the very foundation of *Hindu* society. His arguments for caste division, as expressed in *Navajivan*, are as follows:[7]

- Different castes are like the different section of a military division.
- The seeds of *swaraj* are to be found in the caste system.
- The caste system is proof of the unique power of the organization of a community.
- For spreading primary education caste can act as a readymade means.

However, he was not ready to accept inter-caste marriage since it was not necessary for promoting national unity. Besides this, his argument for preventing two individuals from different castes from the path of inter-caste marriage was that children of brothers do not intermarry. So caste relationship, in Gandhi's view, is a relationship of siblings! If so, we cannot but comment that those siblings have no equal position in their family still now! However, Ambedkar demanded that though in 1922 Gandhi defended caste system, in 1925, there was a change in his view and he became a defender of *Varṇa* system since he realised that the meaning of caste had been changed from as a medium for restraint to a chain of limitation. The caste system was no longer a way of elevation but a state of fall. So he prescribed for the revival of four big *Varṇas* so that the small castes may fuse themselves into one big caste. He praised the *Varṇa*-system since, despite its foundation in human birth; it does not impose any prohibition on a *Śudra* from acquiring knowledge or studying

military art. But Gandhi was not ready to accept the interchange of occupation between the different *Varṇas.*

Ambedkar assessed such a view, which attacks untouchability but supports the traditional division of caste, as based not on any historical observation but political prudence! Ambedkar showed that caste division is not merely a division of labour but a division among the labourers too! [8] Division of labour, in the caste system, is not a natural but an arbitrary hierarchical division where the potentiality and skill of a person is not the basis of his occupation! His occupation is determined by the social rank of his parents. So, division of labour is based on the caste system and not the vice versa! It is that casteism, as we see, the inhuman application of which resisted a starving man to change his occupation for a better living![9] The ultimate aim of Gandhi's battle against untouchability, marked by inconsistencies, contradictions and context-sensitive surrenders and advances, was not the emancipation of the *Dalits* but the success of his political programme.[10] Gandhi's reservation against inter-marriage and inter-dining between Hindus and the untouchables and his explanation of the meaning of untouchability as merely the act of classifying the untouchables as *Śudras*, instead of *Ati-Śudras*[11],support Ambedkar's claim that *Mahātmā* was not ready to lose the support of the conservative upper-caste *Hindus* in his political venture. On the other hand, his act of christening the untouchables with a new name *Harijan* attest the fact, as Ambedkar observed, that he had predicted that the *Śudras* would resist in assimilating the untouchables in their community! Such paradoxes in theory and practice are the cause of Gandhi's failure in eradicating untouchability. In this context, Ambedkar showed three reasons [12:]

i.   Gandhi's reputation as '*Mahatma*' was built up not on his spiritual prophecy but on his image as a herald of political freedom and so, the *Hindus*, to whom he appealed to remove untouchability, were much interested in his political enterprises than to his social appeal. They did not respond to his anti-untouchability campaign.

ii.   Gandhi was not ready to antagonise *Hindus* even when his anti-untouchability programme demanded such action. Gandhi reserved his *Satyagraha* only for the political resistance against the foreign ruler. When the untouchables went to use the same weapon against the tyranny of the upper caste *Hindus*, it was Gandhiji who condemned those

Satyāgrahis on the ground that *Satyāgraha* cannot be used against one's own kindred or countryman! History shows that Gandhi himself used the path of Satyagraha to resist the separate electorate for the untouchables creating tremendous pressure on Ambedkar and his community. Some of the untouchable leaders like M.C. Rajah predicted that the *Dalits* might lose all kinds of social and political sympathy and would have to face a severe antagonism from the *Hindus* in case of Gandhi's euthanasia. Ambedkar had to surrender to the situation the result of which was Poona Pact [1932]. In Ambedkar's language, it was "A mean deal."[13] It minimised Ambedkar's tireless effort to the upliftment of his class and highlighted Gandhi as the greatest patron of the *Dalits*. The incident of *Kavitah* - a village in Gujarat, shows the Gandhian paradox.[14] The *Dalit* demand for admitting their children in the common village school was resisted by the *Hindus* in the way of various kinds of social boycott leading them to starvation. Gandhi neither took any stance to prosecute the *Hindus* nor did he help the *Dalits* to vindicate their right. Rather, he prescribed them to vacate the village, since he considered self-help as the best help!

iii. Gandhiji did not want the actual unity and empowerment of the untouchables from the fear that it would make them independent which would result in weakening the rank of the *Hindus.* So his *Harijan Sevak Sangha*, as felt by Ambedkar, was acting the role of *Putanā* by showing charity and thus creating a slave mentality among them instead of inspiring them to win their fate![15]

III

We have discussed in the first section that the main cause of the dilemma of Indian communists was their concern about the exploited working class. Some of the Marxist thinkers projected the National movement as an alliance of the working class along with bourgeoise. Despite his severe criticism against Gandhiji, R.P. Dutt, in his thesis with Bain Bradley, represents such view. Criticizing that view, which has been expressed in Nambudripad's writings too, Irfan Habib, the eminent Marxist historian, comments that it is incorrect to assume that the working class had the same attitude

towards national movement in the 1940s as it was in 1920s.[16] Though Gandhi might claim his success in organising the Indian mass against the British colonial rule, their political consciousness developed with time and the socialist influence of Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhash Chandra Bose, along with the peasant organizations built by the leftists, brought a massive change in their attitude towards the national movement. So we see that the Gandhian way lost much of its importance in the nineteen forties in the question of the emancipation of the exploited class. And it seems that it was partly because he treated them as means, not as an aim of his political venture! Ambedkar was very much concerned about the class division in society but had not taken class struggle as the ultimate force behind social change. He was not ready to believe either that socialist revolution in India can remove all kinds of exploitation or that the end of class- exploitation means the end of caste- exploitation and untouchability. In Marxist interpretation, caste is seen to be an economic and historical phenomenon which is used as a mechanism of class exploitation since it denies the status of the mobility of the lowest elements of the society, reduces labour costs and facilitates in the extraction of surplus.[17] In *Communist Manifesto*, it is shown that the Bourgeois society has simplified the class antagonisms and has divided society into two great antagonistic camps - the Bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but the earlier societies show complicated arrangements into various orders and a manifold gradation of social ranks.[18] So caste is seen to be one of the older versions of class exploitation. Ambedkar, as we see, did not consider the Marxist explanation of history as adequate, mainly in the context of the problems and they are of the downtrodden in modern Indian Society. A critical exposure of some of his important points of arguments [19] seems imperative at this juncture.

If our aim of emancipation is freedom and if we mean by the term the abolition of mastery and domination on one by another person, what we see, as Ambedkar vehemently declared, is that, the source of power is the religion and social status which regulates the freedom of people. These two factors act in a mutual manner being relative to the social stage. So the socialist claim that an economic revolution, followed by economic equality, is the priority or that the political and social reformation is a great illusion, as estimated by Ambedkar, is an incorrect exposition of society.[20] However, the Marxists may demand in this context that economic relationship, as has been claimed in their thesis, is the main but not the only

and ultimate motivating force of human history. [21] Historical Materialism is not confined within the explanation of the mode of production - the economic base of society and social development. It is also concerned with other social factors such as state, opinions, various beliefs and so on. Though this superstructure is dependent on the base, i.e. the economic structure, its development is not entirely controlled by its base. The development of the mode of production which is a combination of productive forces and production relation of a given period is originated and conditioned by the historical need of human development and so, in this sense, it is independent of human will. On the other hand, the superstructure is developed by conscious human being for his spiritual urge, so, naturally, its characteristics are complicated and manifold. It is an incorrect way to interpret the Marxist socialist approach to society by oversimplified equations taking the remarks of the thinkers only at face value. The dependency of the superstructure to the base does not entail any economic determinism as claimed by many western thinkers. Marx was very much concerned about the difference between the two expressions: 'to influence' and 'to determine' and he used the first.[22] So, Marxism, as we see, never encourages any one-dimensional analysis of social phenomena. Social and political reformation, for which Ambedkar struggled throughout his life, is also a serious issue in Marxist theory and practice. However, the Marxists believe that hunger is the primary and most severe hindrance to all kinds of development. So, they want to start their struggle for a better human society by eradicating the anxiety of starvation at the very outset. The economic reformations in post-revolution Soviet Russia, followed by various kinds of social reformations including mother and child welfare and extermination of prostitution attest this line of reasoning.

Ambedkar accepted some truth in Marx's analysis of society but was not ready to accept it as a complete analysis of the same since it sees the objective force as the ultimate cause of social change. Ambedkar attacks Marx on the ground that he had denied the role of a conscious human being in the development of society. In this context, I am sorry to say that Ambedkar's assessment of Marx and his thought is to some extent, incomplete. The first guiding principle of Historical Materialism indeed says that change and development in society, as in nature, takes place according to the objective laws and the conscious motives behind any activity and the activities themselves are conditioned by the laws of economic development.[23] However, the

Marxist concept of social laws denies any kind of fatalism and always highlights the fact that people can and do change their society through their efforts. Though it shows that the ideas and the role of the individual leaders are the product of the material condition of society and that they always represent a class, it does not deny their role altogether. They act as catalysts in social change. The success and failure of the person Ambedkar in his struggle against untouchability seems to attest this very claim! When the second guiding principle of Historical Materialism claims that social ideas are the product of material conditions of life, the third principle shows that those ideas themselves play an active role in the development of material life.[24] Was Babasaheb ready to deny the practical facts attesting these claims? The human subject and subjectivity which is one of the most important points of Dialectical Materialism are by and by proving itself to be a serious issue of research among many of the contemporary Marxist thinkers.

The Marxists, especially the Indians, however, may feel quite an uneasiness facing Ambedkar's very pertinent question on the proletariat revolution in India! The issue, with its ever-increasing importance in contemporary Indian politics, has established itself as one of the most controversial points in the praxis of Marxism. If all the conditions remain the same, as Ambedkar claimed, there remains only one factor which has the power to unite the people and that is the realisation that the fellow man, with whom one steps into the path of revolution, is influenced by the same ideal of equality, fraternity and justice.[25] He came upon the realisation that none will join the movement unless he is assured that after the revolution, he will be treated with the same status and will not be treated differently due to his caste.[26] It seems that Ambedkar had no doubt on the sincerity of the socialist leaders and he believed that they were influenced by the ideas mentioned above, but his doubt was on the possibility of the actualisation of the very idea! The Marxists, as we see, have shown their apathy to caste-based politics. But it is also a hard truth that a fraction of contemporary Marxists is now interpreting such apathy as the cause of their failure to emerge in northern states.[27] They claim that due to this apathy the Indian Marxists failed to achieve any prudent political revenue from this region. Class consciousness has failed to establish its reciprocal relationship with caste consciousness in Indian society. The caste-based politics has established its relevance in Indian politics, may it be in North India or South India. Ambedkar's bitter realisation followed from his

political view that economic status is not enough for procuring social status and this view is gathering more and more supportive evidence in Indian politics. However, Marxism, as we have seen, always leaves an open space for criticism, re-evaluation and acceptance of previous errors in its praxis. The mentioned phenomenon cannot prove Marxism as wrong or obsolete but demands a sincere and context-sensitive analysis from the Indian Marxists.

There is another face of this caste-based politics which has begun to challenge the proper upliftment of the *Dalits*. A new type of demarcation line is being developed from the central decision of reservation in promotion of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in government service.[28] The decision has developed serious antagonism between the *Dalits* and the backward communities. However, the saffron politics, with many of its leaders from backward communities, seems to favour the backward interest which is not at all a good sign for the *Dalits!* In this situation, the Marxists have every opportunity to prove their worth.

Besides the traditional casteism, elitist casteism, often based on linguistic chauvinism - a legacy of colonial India, challenges a *Dalit*'s due space in the academic and cultural arena. Irfan Habib claims that it is very important to study the origin of Indian intellectuals.[29] He has shown that there are two channels of development. The village schools and colleges, as Habib observed, produce intellectuals influenced not only by bourgeois ideologies but also by various kinds of reactionary prejudices of pre-capitalist society including casteism and communalism. On the other hand, the elite colleges of metropolitan cities produce another kind of westernised intellectuals who occupy the top ranks in society and are comfortable with bourgeois ideologies in their private life. Both kinds of intellectuals may play an antagonistic role in a *Dalit's* struggle for socio-cultural space - the former in a crude manner and the latter in a sophisticated but more harmful way! So what we see is that each kind of intellectuals represents a particular class. The Marxist intellectuals, as Habib claims, never form a social class, but a social '*strata*' which, in accordance to the prevailing social structure and the particular specific circumstances may have a link with different classes.[30] A Marxist intellectual is not simply an intellectual but an intellectual with the sense of duty to organise and lead the masses. Ambedkar had always a high estimation for the positive role of the intellectuals. But he was also depressed by the fact that many of Indian intellectuals neither maintained rationality

nor did they maintain their mobility. The Marxist intellectuals, with their dialectical process of thinking and commitment to the mass, may play a promising role in the actualisation of Ambedkar's dream.

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The Challenge for Education and the Practice of Philosophy

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In this paper, I argue for including philosophical tools as an essential device in educational practices. By 'philosophical tools' I am referring to the mode of doing philosophy. The inclusion of this mode in educational practices would imply encouraging students to engage with their study content by chasing questions and options regarding the content and not necessarily the inclusion of a discussion on a specific philosophical position. Any meaningful engagement with issues in any discipline ultimately leads to questions that have philosophical import. Our aim has to be to take this process beyond the philosophy departments to students who are unacquainted with the charm, utility and significance of the tradition and the practice of philosophy, oblivious to how philosophical thinking affects their political, social, economic and scientific life and views, and how it can be usefully integrated into our educational practice. Philosophy entails deeper engagement with issues fundamental to our being. Hence, in doing philosophy we celebrate what is precious to human existence- the ability to see beyond and behind what seems to be obvious. Philosophy as a discipline provides a space for several such visions to be pursued, articulated, and compared and hence, has an important role to play, not only in the formulation of the theoretical foundation of current knowledge but also in the interplay of various cultures in an increasingly connected 'globalized' world.

The Challenge for Education

Education prepares us for the future. The future is always uncertain. Hence, education must provide us with tools to deal with uncertainty. The future may not resemble the past. The future may bring us new problems. Hence, solutions that worked in the past may not help us in the future, and learning about solutions to just specific problems encountered in the past will be a major handicap. What one needs to learn is the trick to solve new problems. The future may also require us to find new 'problems' in the solutions that the past has given us. Hence the trick of problem-solving is not going to help us either. We would also need the skills of 'problem finding', a nose for going beyond the circle of 'solutions' into a courageous world of new perspectives.

Education needs to give us the courage to fashion oneself freely, flood us with ideas without nudging us towards any of them. It must also instil in us the discipline and courage to be responsible for the way we fashion ourselves, the choices we make and the ideas we cling to. The purpose of education cannot be predetermined in specific terms as the future is not so available. What would people continue to do if they continue to exist? They will trade, they will communicate, they will fight among themselves, they will try to better their lives through newer technologies, they will need to eat and drink, perhaps wear clothes, etc. Or will they? Only time will tell.

It is a difficult task to prepare oneself for an unknown future. Yet we have to carry on doing it hoping that the change will be slight and hence, the past can be taken as a guide to a large extent. However, the crux of the process of educating is that it is not only a preparation to face a future,but it also has to be visualised as a preparation of a generation which is more likely to realize the kind of future that we desire today. Through education, we do not just want to groom our children for the future but also to groom them in such a way that they can envisage a better future for themselves. For the future that one inherits is not all out there to be struggled with, but also one that needs grooming and that one shapes. So education aims to prepare a future generation that would be able to prepare a better future.

Yet without a sense of future, it is difficult to evaluate the present; the desirable present is one that leads to a desirable future. The conception of the desired future may vary; hence, the politics, in an ideal sense and also in the 'unfavoured' sense is about fighting it out in the present for the favoured future from different interest positions. Education gets dragged into that. The different interest positions feel compelled from their sense of commitment to the rightness of their 'interests' to provide a vision of a specific future as part of education.

The economy of any time and its contemporary politics do not have the luxury of contemplating a future that may jeopardise its existence and neither do they have the desire to pursue such a possibility. It aims to convert education into a supplier of its raw human talent, not through any devilish design but because that is only what it exists to do. It seeks the power to think and question to a limited extent in some of them so that they can conjure a future that can be assimilated to the 'current'.

When we sometimes desire thinkers, one has to be aware that there may not be a market for them conceivable from within the folds of the current. When we desire thinkers as a product of our education, one has to be aware that they may challenge the 'current', that they may not be intelligible, and very few of them actually would be able to transform their vision into a 'future', to create a space within which they would be intelligible. Those who would be able to achieve that may get converted into divinities in those future spaces. The current can never / has never been bold enough to encourage such radicalism. When there is a demand for 'out of the box' thinkers, what in effect is demanded is just someone who thinks 'out of a small box' while comfortably remaining within several bigger boxes.

Education does not happen in a vacuum. Despite the prevalent establishment and sometimes in connivance with the current establishment, new thinking emerges and new thinkers devise new ways of being. The community has a bigger role to play in it than just the classroom and the teacher. Education has to be designed to be connected to the community. The take-off points of different communities vary greatly.

Education, though designed and sometimes funded by a community, importantly has to consciously cater to the individual student. Otherwise, it would become an instrument in the hand of the community to manipulate individuals into what it desires them to be. However good the intentions of the community, an education system has to remain true to the needs of the individual pupil by giving that space to the pupil to extract from it as he/she desires. Education has to be a space of learning, not a system of learning.

To be able to communicate one's ideas and collaborate is crucial too. Education traditionally has been an instrument of conditioning, getting a new member of the club to be aware of and to conform to the rules of the game. It is important to understand the rules so that one may communicate with the rest and live harmoniously in the community without creating a ruckus or chaos. The importance of some order in a community and the training of young people to be part of that seem unquestionable. How to reconcile order with freedom, to encourage the ability to think and question and yet be bound to certain norms and conventions is tricky. One way is to design a convention which allows one to challenge conventions conventionally. This is easier said than done. Conventions tend to get institutionalised

and especially reluctant to being overthrown. Hence, is it irresponsible to encourage a young mind to think differently?

The purpose of education is transgression and assimilation. Creative engagement needs to be encouraged. Learning has to be taught; the ability to approach any content rather than just accumulating knowledge of limited content has to be stressed and developed. Learners must be provided with exposure to a variety of ways in which one can get to know. Education should equip us with the tools for educating ourselves rather than providing a finished product. It is not enough to be able to think differently; it is even more important to realise that there could be several other different perspectives on the same issue. It is important to respect others and their other views. To be able to entertain a view that you do not hold, as Aristotle says, shows the maturity of the thinker. It is important to develop civility despite one's ability to think different.

Knowledge is ultimately linked to and founded on ways of living. Ways of living do not have justification which appeals to people beyond that way of life. A certain way of life defines its modes of knowledge production and its value systems. Certain pieces of knowledge and skills are also products of their ways of living within which they get valued and are germinated. Hence, it is sometimes difficult to appreciate the knowledge claims and skills of people from other communities. This is a hindrance to learning from the rich tradition of other communities and it can be a loss when we fail to take advantage of the indigenous knowledge systems because we cannot relate to them or there are no power systems to push them into our curriculum.

Specialisation along with the ability to see the big picture is crucial. As we gather more knowledge about every little thing, the demand for specialisation is bound to be there. Everyone cannot know everything in detail. Some people who become experts in a field devote a lot of time to learn and acquire knowledge about certain areas, which become their areas of expertise. However, it should be possible for everyone to understand the findings and opinions of the experts regarding things of general concern, so that the broader population can decide and act using that expertise. It is important that people understand and are given the freedom and dignity to be told about the expert view regarding what affects them, and is then allowed to make the best decision. There might also be many experts in a particular field who disagree among themselves. The community should be prepared

for such situations and be able to make the most satisfactory decision. Hence, though people have narrow areas of specialised knowledge, their education should be such that they can develop a general understanding of other areas if need be.

Philosophical Practice

Learning to do philosophy is like learning to write or to paint, but by challenging the writing that you have read or the paintings that you have seen; bypassing them, taking off from them, demonising them, and yet in crucial ways, sometimes developing on them, and in very rare cases, creating a piece of writing or painting that transcends them. For most, it is a case of finding reasons, demanding reasons within the same spectrum. For very few, it leads to something further than that and it is on both these groups that the sustenance and progress of the human community depend.

Philosophy is an exploration of possibilities in meaning, truth, reality, understanding, beauty, values: anything. One could start anywhere - in films, sports, people, relationships -and dig deeper. It is an exploration of ideas, and ideas run the world. Ideas run through us; they are our beliefs, convictions. Not all of them are ours; not all of them are ones that we decided to carry in our heads; sometimes none of them is. It is like a cold that we catch, but even worse. A cold causes discomfort; one is aware of it. With ideas, though, one is 'comfortably numb'; philosophy is about waking us up, giving us a jolt.

Philosophy is an ability to jump tracks, change the road. It is about keeping alive the sense of wonder. However, it involves a deep commitment to the activity, a certain concern for the possibilities, for the wonder. Being stuck with one possible answer is a real fear. One should not be confusing finding 'the one' possibility as the aim of philosophy. Each possibility is like a ship: the purpose of the ship is temporary; when the planks start rotting; one has to keep replacing them. Gradually, much of the old ship may get replaced; sometimes all of it may have gradually changed. Then again sometimes one has to abandon the whole ship at one go and cross over to a new ship and carry on with new shipmates who may not understand the tales of the old shipmates. One may need to forge new ties, new stories with new mates.

Philosophy is an activity. It involves a certain sense of purpose; a real urge to find out, to know, to raise all the questions, to keep going back and forth. Going back

and forth is not always bad; the urge to reach and go beyond may not be a good idea if the direction we started out in the first place is not something that one is sure about. To keep going in a direction because we have started and that it would not look impressive to change is itself quite dumb. Living beings change; even dead bodies change. Progress happens through going back and forth, going back to the basics, rebuilding everything on top of it, or gradually like the ship.

Philosophy is an attitude of exploration; a commitment to be open to new ideas, to other ways of thinking and doing. Let us repeat, it involves *thinking and doing*. It is a doing because thinking is a doing; it is about doing, about the thinking behind a doing or behind doings; it is also about the thinking that *should be* behind doings. Philosophy questions; it may also answer. There could be many answers to the same questions, and the same question may be understood differently and given varying importance in different cultures and across time. It is sceptical but may not always end in scepticism; it also need not end in certainty. Studied inability to take a position at times is an important option that education systems should train us to do.

Philosophy even questions itself; it questions the hegemony of the set of questions that can legitimately be raised. In raising a certain set of issues and dealing with it in a certain sort of way, mentioning selected individuals as philosophers can be limiting; one may be misled into thinking that that is the only thing that philosophy does when that is *also* what philosophy does.

The history of philosophy, I feel, and quite strongly, is a series of amazing conversations. We sometimes extol the conversations that took place in the past and claim finality for the truths that emerged out of those conversations. Admiration for past conversations should not happen at the cost of present and future conversations. One should also remember that our present re-telling of the past conversations, in admiration or abjection, is also a conversation with them. The truths of these impending conversations cannot be foretold. That is the fun of philosophy and that is the inevitability of doing philosophy.

Conclusion

Education is a process of preparing the current generation of students for a future world. The future world is one which we have certain expectations about and which is uncertain. The future world needs to meet certain ideals, political and moral as well as certain necessities to grow and flourish our human abilities in harmony

with the environment. To visualize an ideal future, to arrive at that ideal, to give it shape, to be able to break out of the current boxes of thinking which hinder our path towards the ideal, to deal with its uncertainties, and not get boxed in within that 'ideal' again, communities should look to use tools from philosophy honed over centuries which help us to conceptualize our situation, envision the future, to deal with uncertainties, to listen to disparate views and to live harmoniously. Philosophy is the only hope.

DETERMINISM: AN ARGUMENT FROM MYTHS AND TRAGEDIES

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Bertrand Russell writes "one of the defects of all philosophers since Plato is that their inquiries into ethics proceed on the assumption that they already know the conclusion to be reached".[1] May be Russell uses the word "know" in a very strict sense of the term. But to write philosophy or to speak philosophy is something different from to think philosophy, at least at some points. A philosopher puts questions to himself (or herself). He may find his answer, not necessarily in the form of knowledge, but often in the shape of a haunch or that of a strong feeling. He may ask the same question later that in order to gather evidences to turn the haunch into a true belief or to find support in favour of his feeling. The Socratic questions can be understood in this light. The Socratic method of examining men's everyday opinions by means of a carefully elaborated system of questions was not aimed at imparting knowledge, but extracting the principles of good life which are concealed under a sheath of everyday opinions. A systematic philosophical quest cannot proceed without having an idea of the end. But if one is honest, the quest may lead to a different answer altogether.

As a humble student of philosophy, I would not pretend of being totally unaware, or ignorant of the problem I pose before me. My problem is that, when we speak about the moral decline of society, how should we react, what should be our understanding of the state of affairs? We find that people try to evade the problem laying the burden either on the failure of administration, or laxity of the legal authority, or lack of education. The issue is not seen as a moral one, of our ability to exercise our free will, but as the mundane one of some defect or aberration in the situation in which we act. To state the more primary question: If we are to look for a minimum morality from human beings, where should we appeal? To the conscience of human beings or to the legal or some other social institutions? There is hardly any way out if freedom of the will is embedded in deontology of the Kantian type. In spite of the Moral Law, Kant mentioned many cases of pathological actions. When the

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[1] *History of Western Philosophy*, London: Routledge, 1974, p. 95.

'Kantian home' is shaken, the quest may begin for a teleological mooring for the freedom of will.

The problem seems to be the more basic one, that of the meaning of morality. Despite the similarities, morality is often looked upon as a matter of conscience and law as that of enforcement. Many things which are morally reprehensible cannot be brought to book through a legal process. On the other hand, legal codes and decisions may outrage our moral sensitivity.* One can disobey the laws of the state on conscientious grounds, on the ground that they are unjust. Socrates is the luminous example of a civil disobedient, so is Gandhi in our part of the globe. "… [P]olitical laws and laws generally, can commend or forbid external actions, they can do little or nothing to ensure that the action is done or refrained from in the right spirit, and the 'right spirit' is very important for morality at the level of conscience."[2] Moreover, physical force and prudential considerations do not belong to the idea of a moral institution of life. Morality has also been contrasted with convention or with prudence. "Thus morality is distinguished from convention by certain features that it shares with law; similarly, it is also distinguished from law by certain features that it shares with convention …"[3] But whether it is a law or it is a convention, prudential considerations are there behind. This is how morality and law are sought to be contrasted. The moral and legal are two different domains having only some points of contact between them. "Certain acts may be judged both legally and morally wrong - robbery or murder, for instance, other acts that break no law may be judged morally wrong. Still others may be illegal but not immoral.… violation of the law entails sanctions, for example, formal punishments like fine or imprisonment. Moral failure does not entail statutory penalties … moral obligations, in many, if not most cases are left to individual consciences or to the approval or disapproval of the society."[4] I should not say that I am in a position to understand clearly the qualitative difference between what makes an act legal and what makes an act moral. This is made more obscure by the fact that the laws of the state have a tendency to speak in the voice of morality in order to establish its authority and strengthen its grip. The society has

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[2] William Lillie, *An Introduction to Ethics*, London: Mathuen and Co. Ltd., p. 155.
[3] William Frankana, *Ethics*, New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, 1982, p. 7.
[4] J. G. Brennan, *Ethics and Morals*, New York: Harper and Row, 1973, p. 6.

gained an unwanted ability to justify the immoral as legal and illegal as moral. For instance, given the condition that there are politically independent and sovereign Nations, the question of moral dilemma that could possibly arise in a person who has got the aspiration of being the political head of the country in which he or she is not born is overshadowed by the constitutional shade. It seems that Demon parts the God-made moral into moral and legal for this purpose.

But should not what is not moral would also be not legal? Should not the illegal also be immoral? Is really the history of the laws of state and that of moral laws two different histories? Is the non-teleological Kantian-will behind the morality distinguishes moral laws from the purposive laws of state? Or only the political laws have a history and the moral laws don't? What I mean to ask is, are the moral laws *a priori* in contrast with the *a posteriori* political laws? For, the *a priori* cannot have a history. It is Aristotle who explains freewill as a precondition for both ethics and politics, and politics as nothing but community ethics. But that is a different story. Let us look into the history of laws in the early Western thought. We have Greek literature in our hand.

The primitive people discovered themselves to be governed by the forces of nature to be at their mercy. Of such forces those that wrought death and diseases were the most powerful and inevitable and most acutely felt. With any primitive people, their mythologies, subterranean layers of their attitude to nature, destiny and God is a manifestation of their deterministic life-worlds. Dialogues with spirits, i.e. those invisible agencies which are supposed to determine the good and evil in human life, are central to day-to-day behaviour of primitive people. The use of spells, charms and rituals and the things which they wear during performance of rituals are means of appeasing the spirits as well as the forces of nature to stall diseases and death. In Greek mythology, the natural forces are operative as natural laws. They gave the name 'fate' to these laws. One of the laws of nature, the instinct of survival, kept men always in fighting with fate. Fate is not to be thought as an instrument in the hands of gods, nor is gods the authors of these laws. Though it may seem so as the mythical men are found several times to seek help from gods with the hope of victory over fate, and also because fate sometimes revealed itself in the form of oracle. The real nature of fate as "the laws of the nature" is revealed in the myths and plays of the

great Greek tragedians. Nature, once declares that a future-son of Metis the Titaness and Zeus would depose Zeus. Hearing this, Zeus immediately swallowed Metis and made the oracle impotent.[5] The concept of God is nothing but the expression of man's ambition to conquer fate. But could any moral device be proof against destiny? One part of the mythical man always had the belief in the prophetic verse "what will be, will be …"[6] and the other had shown a great assertion of his will to say "No" to the laws that determine his existence. The tragedy is that his hope for freedom from the deterministic world was a hope without a belief. The working of destiny or more precisely, fate as the determinant of human life has been stated in its full-fledged form in the great dramas of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides.

Sophocles' (495-405 BC*) Oedipus the King* is such a story of a man who failed in conquering his destiny. Tragedy begins with Oedipus even before his birth when he was destined by Apollo's oracle to kill his father and become his own mother's husband. Lians, the King of Thebes and who would be Oedipus's father at once put Jocasta, his wife away. But they failed to avoid sex and Oedipus was born. The child's feet were pierced with an iron pin and he was exposed on Mount Citheron. A Corinthian shepherd found him and handed him to childless Polybus, the king of Corinth. Thus, none of Lians's devices could prevent the birth and survival of the unwanted child. Later, Oedipus mourned his survival "… I was not snatched from death/ That once, unless to be preserved / For some more awful destiny …"[7]

So many times destiny made mockery of human striving to frustrate fate. Young Oedipus, after becoming aware of the fact that he had been destined to kill his father and marry his own mother, sought to give lie to the oracle and fled from Corinth because he knew Polybus and his wife Periboea as his parents. But the "demon of the destiny" brought Lians on Oedipus' way. Oedipus killed his father unknowingly in an encounter. He then moved towards the city of Thebes and set the city free from the grip of Sphinx by answering her cunning riddles. He became the King of Thebes and married Jocasta, his mother. Thus happened what had to happen. The Sophoclean Oedipus says of himself :

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[5] Robert Graves, *Greek Myths*, New York: Harper and Row, 1973, 9(d).
[6] Sophocles, *The Theban Plays* trans. E. F. Watling, London: Penguin Books, 1974, p. 35.
[7] *Ibid*, p. 66.

"…. Shedder of father's blood
Husband of mother is my name
Godless and child of shame,
Begetter of the brother-sons;
What infamy remains
That is not spoken of Oedipus?"[8]

But why such a cursed life has been chosen as a central character of the drama? The drama is a tribute to a man who fought against his destiny but did not succeed. It is a tribute to a man who always wanted to go to other way, but demon of destiny puts him on the way to sin in spite of his good will (but not a free one) and noble heart, God once cried against him "Away from my shrine, wretch![9] But why? He was not responsible for what he had to do. Such a life rouses pity and fear in us. We begin to utter with the citizens of Thebes:

He was our bastion against disaster, our honoured king;
All Thebes was proud of the majesty of his name
And now, where is a more heart rendering story of affection?
Where a more awful swerve into the arms of torment?
O Oedipus, that proud head![10]

It would be difficult to interpret *Oedipus the King* as a story of the punishment for pride. The deeds for which the hero would be 'punished' were preordained before he was even conceived. But it is true that the endowments which make him grand - his impulsive intellect, his passion for truth, his great physical strength, his integrity and his pride - are all necessarily used to work out and highlight the pattern of his fate down to its final fulfilment in the realisation of what that fate had been "Through the conflict between individuals who remain sharply characterised is written the eternal conflict between private conscience and public authority".[11]

Thus, king Oedipus is not morally responsible for what he did. His innocence and helplessness in the face of fate was at least recognised by his fellow humans. There are only a few subtle references to moral or family laws in the drama such as: 'it is wrong to marry one's own mother', 'it is wrong to kill one's own father' etc.

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[8] Sophocles, *The Theban Plays* (Trans. by E. F. Watling), London: Penguin Books, 1974, p.63
[9] Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths*: 105(c).
[10] Sophocles, *The Theban Plays*, p. 59.
[11] G. Grene and R. Lattimore (edit), *Greek Tragedies*, Vol-I, Phoenix Books, The University of Chicago Press, 1960, p.179.

In *Antigone* of Sophocles, the presence and the conflict of moral laws is more prominent. It is said that the "classical instance" of moral conflict "… is found in *Antigone* of Sophocles, where the definite law of the state comes into collision with customary principles of family affection."[12] "Antigone" is the story of a conflict between Creon, the King of Thebes and Antigone, daughter of the former king Oedipus:

> "A king, in full and sincere consciousness of his responsibility for the integrity of the state, has, for an example against treason, made an order of ruthless punishment upon a traitor and rebel - an order denying the barest rites of sepulture to his body, and therefore of solace to his soul. A woman, for whom political expediency takes second place, by a long way, to compassion and piety, has defied the order and is condemned to death. Here is a conflict between two passionately held principles of right …"[13]

Now what kinds of laws are they of which we are made conscious of in *Antigone*? Is there really a conflict between two totally different sorts of law, one is the moral law defended by "the woman ruled by conscience"[14] and the other the law of the state? It appears that in *Antigone* we are made conscious of three different kinds of laws that demand obedience from us.

(1) Destiny or the Law of Nature:

Earthquake knows no children, no sick or no saintly person. Likewise, it is futile to pray before destiny. It came to the noble hearted Oedipus in the form of an oracle. And Creon was no villain. He was a man of reason who understood Oedipus; whatever he did, he thought at his heart, that he had done for his country. He was honest when he was saying "No man who is his country's enemy/ Shall call himself my friend. Of this I am sure - / Our country is our life; …"[15]. He speaks like a true king when he says "… How, if I tolerate/ A traitor at home, shall I rule those abroad?"[16] It does not sound immoral that the king has no sympathy for a person, who invaded his country and was shedder of bloods of his people, even though he was his nephew. Nevertheless, if we take it for granted that all Creon did was wrong, the king gave up his own law with a changed heart and decided to set Antigone free.

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[12] Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, India: Oxford University Press, 1950, p.99.
[13] *Introduction to The Theban Plays* by E. F. Watling, p. 13.
[14] *Ibid*, p.14
[15] *Ibid*, p.131.
[16] *Ibid,* p. 144.

But Creon was not forgiven. Gods of the myths in fact had no power to stop misfortune. All the Creon's dear ones committed suicide one after another. "What is to be, no mortal can escape."[17] Thus, although fate has been spoken sometimes by the myths as coming from the hands of Gods, in true sense, it was no power of Gods. The mythical god was only an ambition of man to conquer destiny. That is why I call destiny, the unavoidable as law of nature. Hobbes also sometimes equates law of God and law of nature.[18]

(II) Law of the State:

These are laws by which a king rules the country. "Your will is law", said the citizen of Thebes to their king Creon.[19]

(III) There are "**the unwritten and unalterable laws of God and heaven** …"[20] which are said to be the moral laws as distinguished from laws of state. And Antigone prefers the former, because "… it is of immemorial antiquity and its origin cannot be traced, whereas the law of the state has been made and may be unmade again."[21]

Now, the difference between (II) and (III), as it is suggested to my mind, is not such that they are named differently. Or if they could be named differently, the difference between the legal and the moral is not a qualitative one, at least as far we are concerned with Greek literature. Their difference does not lie in the fact that the laws of the state are manmade and moral laws are God's laws. Both Creon and Antigone, for the sake of their arguments, called up the name of God. Creon's law has: "… he who puts a friend/ above his country; I have no good word for him." Further "… God above is my witness, who sees all …"[22]. On the other hand, Antigone's objection against Creon's law is, "That order did not come from God. Justice/ That dwells with the gods below, knows no such law."[23]. Thus, God seems to be a double agent here. It is very much interesting to note that Anigone is defending the laws of "family affection" the breaking of which invites horrible consequences like those came in her father Oedipus's way. And it is the same God whose laws are

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[17] *Introduction to The Theban Plays* by E. F. Watling, p. 161

[18] *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Vol.8), London : Encyclopaedia Britannica Ltd., 1958, p. 770.

[19] *Introduction to The Theban Plays* by E. F. Watling, p.132.

[20] *Ibid*, p.138.

[21] Mackenzie, *A Manual of Ethics*: p. 99.

[22] *Introduction to The Theban Plays* by E. F. Watling p.131.

[23] *Ibid*, p.138.

being defended by Antigone, has, as she said, brought much suffering to innocent and noble hearted Oedipus who in fact broke the laws of the family at God's will.

If the myths and ancient Greek literature reveal any difference between the moral and the legal, their difference is contained in one of the features uttered by Antigone herself, and that is, the former is of immemorial antiquity and the later is not. About her law, she said that "…where they come from, none of us can tell.[24] It is true that political laws are datable but some rules and customs cannot be traced in this way. That only means, the one is more ancient than the other. And if Antigone is really defending moral law then she must be regarded as ungenerous and narrow minded. A family is a smaller unit than a state. Creon was concerned for more people than Antigone was. But not at all rules or laws to which people refer to as moral are family rules. Anyway, the imaginary distinction between moral and legal as two qualitatively separate category on the basis of some vague concepts had not taken shape at Sophocle's age. Thus, the laws by which Antigone and Creon were being guided by, differ only in their antiquity and the extent of their field of application. Family came into existence because there was the need of survival and security in hostile circumstances. A state is a complex system of families. A detailed history of evolution of the society is not within our scope. But what must be taken into account by us is that the basic force behind a family and a state is the same and that is the instinct of survival. Society emerged for our practical purpose of survival. Family and state are only two different units regarding their size and operations within society. Morality, being a social institution cannot be of more antiquity than society. Man, by nature is not social, so man cannot be moral by nature (However, one considers society as prior to man, one can hold the opposite). The only law we can see behind the formation of all these institutions is that of survival. I would like to quote a few words regarding the views of Hobbes in this context from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*:

> "… he speaks of human desires as directed to various specific objects of which the chief is self preservation. What is, however, continuously clear is his denial that human nature is social. All man's natural instincts and passions are self-regarding … Hobbes appears to direct introspection in support of his views … Bees and ants are social animals; they do not compete for honour and dignity and show envy any malice to one another

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[24] *Introduction to The Theban Plays* by E. F. Watling, p.138.

as men do; they do not set private above public good, criticize and malign each other as men do. … "The object of every voluntary act is good to himself."[25]

One need not be an unqualified Hobbesean. Yet, as we have already pointed out, survival in a restricted sense, is a valuable norm. We can transcend the crude sense of self-love to a meaningful social life with others. Now what this has to do with the so-called conflict between the different kinds of laws or norms we are talking about? So far the moral laws and laws of state are concerned; both have a tendency to become habitual. Like well-worn clothes, they may dispose one to adapt, in well-practiced ways, to the situations one meets, upon which one spends little mental effort or normative reflection. And then there is very little to distinguish human actions from the arbitrary actions of brutes - the necessitation which characterises them. The human psyche, however, refuses to be necessitated in this way. It has the capacity of self-correction and this entails that laws - whether moral or legal - reflect the normative sensitivities of the agent. The moral is not reducible to the legal. But what is legal has moral overtones. In the Greek dramas, cited above, man's life was destined by laws over which he had no control, as he had none over laws of nature. This way of being is 'natural' and god is sometimes identified with nature. Yet, in the man-god conflicts and feuds, sometimes god's law wins and sometimes man's. God was not even thought of as the creator of human beings. It was Prometheus, the Titan who was the creator of mankind.[26] Sometimes the law of the nature as human law wins and sometimes the law of nature as god's law wins. Once a dispute took place at Sicyon, as to which portions of a sacrificed bull should be offered to the gods, and which should be reserved for man. Prometheus was invited to act as an arbiter. He formed two bags from the skin of the sacrificial bull and filled one with the flesh concealed under the stomach and the other with the bones hidden beneath a rich layer of fat. He then offered Zeus the choice of either. Zeus, easily deceived, chose the bag containing the bones. Prometheus was laughing at him behind his back. Zeus punished Prometheus by withholding fire from mankind and cried, "Let them eat their flesh raw."[27] Prometheus made a backstairs admittance to Olympus with the consent of Athena and stole fire in the form of glowing charcoal

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[25] *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Vol. VIII), p.770

[26] Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths* : 39(a).

[27] *Ibid* , page 39 (f).

and gave it to mankind.[28] Thus, myth suggests a constant struggle for existence of mankind in the world of nature. But the man of the age of myths realised the tragedy. The human freedom of will was chained along with Prometheus who was bound naked to a pillar in the Caucasian mountains by Zeus forever!

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[28] Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths*: 39(g).

INTEGRITY: AN ANALYSIS

JYOTISH CHANDRA BASAK

When we think why do we consider integrity so highly, *prima facie* it appears that our unhappiness with the current scenario is primarily responsible to rate it so high. The need for it was felt even in ancient times. In ancient Indian writings, particularly in political morality, its need was felt and we have plenty of evidence of that. On account of sharp moral decadence in government, governance and populace in general that we witness almost everyday, we hope that it can be arrested from further decline by inculcating this virtue, if we are allowed to call it a virtue at all. Hence this word is used very often without knowing intricacies of its meaning. Disciplines which are involved in the excavation of its meaning are philosophy, psychology and public administration.

When we try to understand the meaning of integrity the dictionary meaning of it gives us some clue very succinctly. Oxford dictionary[1] tells us that it has the following four meanings which we can arrange under two heads. We are also told that it had its origin either from France '*intégrité*' or Latin '*integritas*'. It is somehow also related to integer which means 'intact' or 'complete in itself':

1.		the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles
2.	i.	the state of being whole and undivided
	ii.	the condition of being unified or sound in construction.
	iii.	internal consistency or lack of corruption in electronic data.

Many thinkers are inclined to call the first meaning the moral dimension of the meaning and the second meaning with all its three components the formal or structural dimension of meaning. In normal discourse we give importance to the moral dimension. But a philosophical dissection makes it clear that both dimensions are important and emphasizing on one facet at the cost of others actually takes away its essence. It is also required to be borne in mind that the term is question does not apply solely to human beings; even it is applied on objects as it is evident from our 2(iii) component as stated above. Even when it is applied to human behaviour and

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[1]*Oxford Dictionary of English*, 2nd edition (edit. Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevension), Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 900.

views someone upholds, it is used from various angles such as moral integrity, intellectual integrity, professional integrity and so on.

We have already mentioned that Bernard Williams' *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (1973) stirred up the debate at the contemporary time. His view given in the said treatise actually was a polemic against utilitarianism. To be more precise it was directed against act-utilitarianism which holds that an action is right if it maximizes our general well-being. What in a nutshell he wanted to show is that the act utilitarianism cuts off moral agents from their actions and feelings and this, in turn, impairs his integrity. Rule or 'indirect' utilitarianism count on the distinction between theory and practice which for Williams is indefensible. He even prophesied that the heyday of utilitarianism will be on the wane soon on account of these serious lapses. The demand of act utilitarianism is so high, says Williams, that it requires the agent to sacrifice his 'ground projects' and in doing so the agent undermines his integrity. Let us see how does it happen.

Williams holds that the moral agent considers some project which is constitutive of him or to put it simply it makes him what he is. But act utilitarianism tells us to perform only those actions which promote our maximum aggregate well-being. Acting in accordance with this principle of utilitarianism amounts to regarding the agent's project simply 'one set of satisfactions among those which he may be able to assist from where he happens to be.'[2] For Williams, a reflective agent may need to renounce certain projects, but some project 'with which (he) is more deeply and extensively involved and identified' cannot reasonably be given up by a moral agent as this, what he calls 'ground project', is the identity-conferring project for him. In other words, this is that act or project which is integral to his being and with which he 'is more deeply and extensively involved and identified.'[3] This demand of utilitarianism from a moral agent to relinquish such identity-conferring project for fostering some other project merely for promoting overall well-being is an attack on the agent's integrity. In saying this Williams seems to adhere to the 2(i), meaning, i. e., the state of being whole and undivided. This sacrifice is not an ordinary sacrifice rather it is so astounding that it psychologically fractures him. The sacrifice of this

[2] Williams, Bernard (1973), *Utilitarianism: For and Against.* Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 115.
[3] *Ibid*., p. 116.

central moral feeling amounts to losing 'a sense of one's moral identity; to lose, in the most literal way, one's integrity.'[4] He illustrates his point by a number of examples.

Whether there is cogency in Williams argument or not is a debatable issue. More than two decades later Elizabeth Ashford made efforts to show that there no much substance in Williams' claim and utilitarianism, in fact, promotes integrity. She tried to substantiate her claim by invoking the notion of what she termed 'objective integrity'. For her, Williams criticism of utilitarianism hinges on two points. First, for any moral theory to be appealing should not require the agent to act 'in a way that contravenes their present self-conception', let that whatever self-conception may be, and next that utilitarianism compromise those 'commitments, moral and personal, adherence to which the agent sees as constitutive of who he is.'[5] Elizabeth does not agree with Williams' arguments and argued 'that there is a practically realizable state of the world' where utilitarian's demand of moral obligation is not at odds with agent's pursuing of his personal project.

The debate thus started with a critique of utilitarianism is still going on and with greater strength. Some philosophers having realized the hypothetical nature of utilitarians fell back on Kantian Categorical imperative to explain the notion of integrity satisfactorily and also in consonance with our intuitive understanding of it. The philosophical debate about integrity mainly centres around two primary questions:

- First, does integrity primarily mean a formal relation that the agent has with oneself or between different parts of his self?
- Second, does it only mean acting rigidly under certain normative rein, i. e. acting morally?

The problem becomes more complicated when we see that if we accept the first interpretation many widely acknowledged heinous crimes can qualify as a fit candidate for calling them acts of integrity and which is obviously preposterous.

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[4] Williams, Bernard (1973), *Utilitarianism: For and Against.* Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 104.

[5] Ashford, Elizabeth, 'Utilitarianism, Integrity and Partiality, published in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 97, No. 8 August, 2000, P. 421. (source: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2678423, accessed in January, 2018.)

Some prominent interpretations of integrity are: (a) it means the preservation of identity; (b) it is explained as the integration of the self; (c) it stands for something; (d) it means acting under moral constraints; and (e) it is a virtue. Huberts finds at least eight perspectives of it in the literature on ethics and integrity.[6] Those who adhere to any particular interpretation give spirited arguments to substantiate their claims. Let us give a synoptic explanation of some of these approaches.

The champion of identity-conferring interpretation, as we have seen in a preceding paragraph, was Bernard Williams. He and other supporters of this view attempted to explain integrity in terms of commitment, which to my mind is a term that belongs to family-circle of integrity. 'Commitment' is a term used in various senses such as to mean convictions, promises, expectation, an obligation to be undertaken, proclaimed attachment to a cause/doctrine and so on. A person lives amidst a number of commitments either consciously or even sometimes unconsciously. Out of these hosts of commitments, he remains steadfast to some which he holds so dearly and gives up others when faced with obstacles. In other words, the person considers those particular commitments, with which he remains so resolute, confer his/her identity. As these he considers as conditions of his existence, he finds it pointless to live without those commitments. On this view, integrity is precisely to act in conformity with agents deep commitments and hence it cannot be a virtue in the traditional sense of the term.   Though this view has its worth a number of thinkers pointed out drawbacks of such a view. One such important drawback has been pointed out by Damian Cox, an Australian philosopher. In his article 'Integrity' he raises the question 'Is integrity a virtue at all?' Analysing Bernard Williams view given particularly in 'Utilitarianism and Moral Self-indulgence' (1981) where Williams holds that though integrity 'is an admirable human property, it is not related to motivation as the virtues are' he showed that integrity is not a virtue in Williams' sense and hence his interpretation is too narrow. It is too narrow as it overlooks certain important aspects of the term and overemphasizes certain other aspects of it only. Writes Cox: "It overlooks the integrity or lack of integrity with which identity-conferring commitments are formed and revised, and overlooks the way in which

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[6] Huberts, L. W. J. C. (2014), *The Integrity of Governance: What it is, what we Know, what is Done, and where to go*. Palgrave Macmillian: England, p.39-44.

integrity can be implicated in aspects of life other than identity. It overlooks the social aspects of integrity and it denies that integrity has moral implications."[7]

Another persuasive interpretation of integrity is that it is a matter of arranging or integrating various parts of a person's personality into an integrated whole. It is like establishing a formal relation to someone's self. This view of integration considers such accomplishment as an achievement and not as a disposition or quality of a person. When a person arranges different parts of his/her personality into a coherent whole, it is a mere formal arrangement and does not have any evaluative component. Though a number of thinkers championed this view one powerful thinker of this family is Harry Frankfurt, a professor of Princeton University. Frankfurt in his essay 'Identification and wholeheratedness' (1987) gives a basically psychological interpretation of the term in question. Frankfurt was eager to show how different conflicting desires in the agent's psyche can impair the autonomy of the will. In order to explain that he specifies conflicts that goes on in the agent's mind amongst different desires or level of desires. This conflict engenders a tension or inner struggle on account of which the person experiences frustration. To get rid of this unpleasant situation he hierarchically orders his desires so that they become arranged or integrated elements of the self. When ordering such desires and volitions we give more importance to what we care more. This helps us to accept some and reject others when we face obstacles or tempted to act in a particular way. This adoption, rejection and joining in one-self completes the self-integration process. In his hierarchical order, he talks about first-order desires, second-order desires etc. which discipline them and brings into a harmonious whole and thus accomplish the self-integration process. This arrangement of desires and volitions are necessary for a reflective being as without this a person will act merely at that moment's strongest desire. Such a person's act is not done out of integrity and he terms such a man 'wanton'. Hence, rejection of some desires and acceptance of some others and integration of them to one-self is *sine qua non* for an integritous person. The conflicts that Frankfurt discussed are not limited to desires only. It may cover commitments,

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[7] Cox, Damian, Caze, M. L. and Levine, M., (2014) 'Integrity' Source: *The Handbook of Virtue Ethics*, ed. Stan van Hooft, Acumen: Durham, p. 206.

principles etc. too. This conflict and conflict-resolution ceaselessly go on in someone's life.

Frankfurt's elaborate arguments though made a remarkable influence in clarifying the notion in question, still it fell short of common-sense expectation and hence were criticized by many. One such critique is Mark S. Halfon. Halfon in his *Integrity: A Philosophical Enquiry* (1989) describes integrity as a disposition. For him putting only formal limits cannot satisfy our moral demand. It is expected that a man of integrity should be honest and genuine while acting and this self-integration elucidation does not ensure that. He seems to give a holistic interpretation of integrity and not rigid formal arrangements merely. For example, he says that a man of integrity does not rigidly follow one single rule for acting in all circumstances. Rather he takes into consideration all the relevant facts while acting and decides the course of action that he considers best in that moral situation even if it involves an abandonment of some principles that he gave more importance in his previous actions. Halfon's and other critics' main point against this interpretation is that overemphasis placed on formal aspects by the propounders of this interpretation takes way its moral worth. In spite of this criticism, the spirit of this interpretation should not be belittled as it is indeed true that a vast majority of cases a self-integrated person is likely to act more morally than from a not-integrated person.

A constructivist view of integrity, the third one of our list, sees the notion from a different angle. Christine Korsgaard in her *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity* (2009) take a neo-Kantian approach to explain the notion of integrity from this perspective. In her work, she draws heavily from Plato, Aristotle and Kant. Utilizing the Kantian distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives of the practical reason she tells us that acting in consonance with hypothetical imperative may be productive but acting as per categorical imperative makes us autonomous. This principle of the categorical imperative is the legislation for self-constitution. It also provides us with identity. Arrangement of desires etc. harmoniously and coherently is not enough for a rational agent. Though it is necessary for a rational being, it is not a sufficient requirement. Acting on categorical imperative calls for the moral agency to act in a way which his future reflective self will endorse. In other words, the action is not only limited to the present self only rather we need to establish a bond between the present and future self. Actions which

are in congruity with Kant's categorical imperative can constitute and unify self ideally. Not only that, but acting on the said principle also ensures that such action will be morally satisfactory too. As she says, when in the process of falling to pieces we pull them back together, we create or constitute something new, ourselves. If someone can constitute well, he/she will be a good person. 'The moral law is the law of self-constitution.'[8]

The self-constitution version of integrity is a new way of looking at the notion. Still, it has a lot of affinity with the self-integration view that we have discussed. And this affinity makes it susceptible to the similar drawbacks raised against self-integration interpretation. Among the critics of constructivist approach David Enoch who teaches at Hebrew University of Jerusalem is one. He in his 'Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action'[9] made a vigorous criticism of three constructivists out of which Korsgaard is one. Enoch is eager to show why normativity cannot be anchored in what is constitutive of action[10]. For him, the ilk of the agency that Korsgaard talked about is non-mandatory and someone could long for a different type of agency in a consistent way - which he called 'shmagency'. Acting on shmagency can be successful without being committed to universalizability. Thus her prescription for acting on categorical imperative comes to a nought. Korsgaard, says Enoch, 'has to show that self-constitution (in whatever sense she gives this expression) is indeed constitutive of action and furthermore that all the normativity she wants (morality, the hypothetical imperative, and so on) can be extracted from this aim of self-constitution.'[11]

The above three varieties of interpretations can be clubbed into one in the sense that all adherents of these views actually emphasize the structural side. However, common-sense usage of the term 'integrity' seems to be value-laden and hence this set of interpretation fails to meet this expectation and as we shall see even some horrible practices can be interpreted as an act of integrity. Hence under another

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[8] Christine, Korsgaard (2009), *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity.* Oxford University Press, p. 214.
[9] Enoch, David, 'Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action', *The Philosophical Review*, April, 2006, Vol. 115, No. 2, source: https:// jstor.com/stable/20446897, accessed in February, 2018.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 194.
[11] *Ibid*. p. 177.

set of theories thinkers tried to emphasize that integrity stands for something and by this 'something' they sometimes meant it is a social virtue and sometimes it meant that it implies acting under certain moral constraints. Cheshire Calhoun, a feminist philosopher of the United States of America, showing the two drawbacks of the aforementioned three sorts of view persuasively argues for treating integrity as a social virtue. She in her 'Standing for Something' (1995) held this view. Two criticisms she levels against structural views are: One, they in their ultimate analysis reduce the term 'integrity' to something with which, she thinks, it is not identical, e. g. 'to the conditions of unified agency, to the conditions for having a reason to refuse cooperating with some evils,' to volitional unity etc. Second, all these accounts treated integrity as personal, not as social virtue. These two factors acted as limits to the notion of integrity[12]. She shows that who endorse these views of integrity are forced to bite the bullet by accepting in the name of integrity some non-moral actions or even morally despicable actions. In order to plug this loophole and also finding flaws in treating it as a personal virtue, she espoused the view that integrity is a social virtue.

Calhoun held that some virtues are personal, some are social and some are both. Social virtue is defined by a person's connection with others. It is of course agent's correct evaluation of best judgments but this judgment is not like an isolated island. It is the best judgement in a context - within the community where the agent is situated and they are, within the community, collectively trying to uncover what is valuable and worth pursuing. This is giving due respect to other members of the community. As she says, 'one's own judgement serves a common interest of co-deliberators. Persons of integrity treat their own endorsements as one that matter, or ought to matter, to fellow deliberators.'[13] She very cogently showed that her interpretation precludes those fanatic and morally despicable acts that might be done in the name of integrity and allowable under other interpretations showing that their commitments form a coherent whole. She showed that fanatics lack one important characteristic in her schema. It is that they do not show respect to others'

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[12] Calhoun, Cheshire (1995), 'Standing for Something', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vo. 92, No. 5 (May, 1995), p. 252. Source: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2940917?seq=1#metadata-info-tab-conte, accessed in January, 2018.

[13] *Ibid*. p. 258.

deliberations. In showing this Calhoun did a splendid job as the decimation of a group by another group cannot go on in the name of integrity justifying their structural consistency. In spite of this stupendous achievement of Calhoun's account the moot question that arises about her account is what is meant by a proper respect for views to be given to other deliberators. An answer to this question is vital as otherwise we cannot differentiate between a fanatic's stand and some other stand which is right and someone needs to stick to it even under great adversities. There are writers who tried to fill up this gap by giving an epistemic account of integrity and they sometimes held that integrity is an epistemic virtue. Though this is an interesting area and worth discovering, we will not enter into that domain further.

Almost akin to Calhoun's stand is the interpretation given by some writers who hold that integrity entails moral constraints upon the agent of integrity to which he should remain true. Some such advocates are Elizabeth Ashford, Mark Halfon and some other thinkers. The recurring feature of their arguments is that it entails moral obligations, moral purpose etc. Of course, in spite of the similarity in their conclusion, their lines of argument vary. For example, Elizabeth Ashford, about whom we referred in a preceding passage, invokes the notion of 'objective integrity' to show that a person having objective integrity can have enough understanding of his/her moral obligations and it is this that works as a shield for not being morally mistaken. His actions are not in conflict with morality, rather it is in harmony with it. Halfon describes integrity in a different way but he also holds that actions done out of integrity aligns with moral purpose. He considers integrity as a disposition of the agent and acting out of integrity does not mean that the agent will rigidly adhere to any single norm for action. Instead, he will take all relevant factors into consideration in each event and then decide the best course of action. He opined that remaining adamant to a single rule or commitment may be wrongheaded. Hence, for him, integrity 'embraces a moral point of view that urges them to be conceptually clear, logically consistent, apprised of relevant empirical evidence, and careful about acknowledging as well as weighing relevant moral considerations.'[14] In Halfon's account, moral purpose as well as pursuing a commitment both got due weight. In

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[14] Halfon, Mark (1989), *Integrity: A Philosophical Inquiry*, Temple University Press: Philadelphia, p. 37.

spite of this merit, there are certain pitfalls in this view too. One such problem is when we talk about 'all relevant moral considerations', these considerations depends completely on one person - only an agent's moral viewpoint. What the agent considers as moral may miserably fail in other persons' assessment. In the name of this 'all relevant moral considerations' some may perpetrate horrifying actions like one committed by Nazis' or Fascists'. This indeed is a possibility that cannot be ruled out under this interpretation though it has been argued that its likelihood is slim.

A perusal of all these views and some other writers' views that we have not discussed here make us feel that the term 'integrity' refers to something that is quite complex. We need to comprehend that it is not judicious to take only one aspect and ignore others. Actually, within its fold lie a cluster of concepts that all these thinkers have been trying to capture in their elucidations through their prisms. In order to comprehend its essence and eliminate those morally despicable acts which go on in the name of integrity only formal conditions are not enough. They need to be fortified by moral conditions. Emphasizing one aspect at the cost of others will take away its worth that we usually associate with the term. Structural dimensions may be engaging to esoteric few, but philosophical interpretations need to come out of this as the term 'integrity' is used so widely and even in everyday's common parlance. Hence our intention should be to make it exoteric, otherwise, under the garb of integrity many works will go on which future moral agent will not condone. Huberts' collection of eight perspectives, about which we mentioned earlier, gives us a better panoramic view of the notion. These eight standpoints are—wholeness and coherence, moral reflection, professional responsibility, values like incorruptibility, laws and rules, exemplary behaviour, and moral values and norms.

One pertinent question that may arise in any inquisitive mind is why the term 'integrity' is so popular and widely used. To put it differently: not only the question of what is integrity is important, equally important is Why integrity? A simple response to this question is that it has relevance in the social and political arena and also in all other sectors of modern society for a number of reasons. Nowadays in governance and in government it is used on umpteen occasions. There integrity is loosely used as quality or disposition and it is regarded as key to preempting many unethical practices. It is on account this overriding importance of this concept that people began to enquire its meaning and onus fell on philosophers to dig dip into the

concept. There are writers who took a roundabout route to get to its essence. Gabriele Taylor is one such writer. She in her article 'Integrity' tries to capture first what it means by lacking integrity and then tries to understand it what it means by having integrity.[15] We in a previous passage stated that integrity is not a given disposition in a human being, it needs to be accomplished. The moot question is how can we accomplish it or what are the practices required for becoming integritous. Some clue regarding this we find in P. A. Sorokin's view. If integrity is a central virtue, then societal institutions, government and economic arrangements need to be restructured in such a way so that they are helpful or create a congenial milieu for promotion of integrity. It has been pointed out by some writers that many social structures have not been created in a way that conduces to pursue most of its members their goal with integrity. There is no gainsaying the fact that an individual's integrity is closely linked to social and political structures. If society is shaped in a way that it creates obstacles in people's attempt to work with integrity, upon commitments, desires and values that one so dearly holds and also reinforced by other deliberators, then such an arrangement is unfavourable to act with integrity. Some thinkers consider that integrity has a close connection with people's well-being. If a societal structure is inimical to acting with integrity, it becomes a threat to the health of society. It leads to alienation.   By now this much has become clear that integrity concerns decision making and also decision implementation but the area that remains blurred is the question: does it have any connection with outcomes of actions?

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[15] Taylor, Gabriele and Gaita, Raimond, 'Integrity' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 55 (1981), published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Aristotelian Society, source: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106856, accessed in December, 2017)

THE CONCEPT OF *DHARMA* IN THE *BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ*

L. BISHWANATH SHARMA

"I raise my arms and I shout – but no one listens!
From dharma comes success and pleasure;
Why is dharma not practised?" – The *Mahābhārata*, 8:50 & 62.

The *Bhagavad Gītā* is a manual of war, which guides how we have to perform our duty in the war of life to fight with *adharma* for the restoration *dharma*. The war, here, is understood both in physical and mental senses. The external war waged against the enemy is the physical war for overcoming of the existential threat which violates the natural law. On the other hand, the internal war is the mental struggle to manifest the real nature of a perfect man who has a stable mind, *sthitaprajñā* that explains the nature of that human mind which has achieved perfect equilibrium, perfect steadiness. It contains the essence of all the scriptures. The *Mahābhārata* is all about human actions and so is an epic of action, and the *Gītā* endorses action and prescribes the ways of action. In the *Gītā,* Śri Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna the importance of *Karma yoga* to attain the liberation from the worldly bondage based on the specific *dharma* of the people belongs to different social groups. *Dharma* denotes a religious meaning and connotes a related moral ideology, which has to be followed to achieve a meaningful life. This paper outlines how moral ideology is embedded in the *Bhagavad Gītā* to explain the duty of an individual and its practical application in life. The work of Gītā is highly experimental and pragmatic in form and content.

The term *dharma* is understood in different ways in different scriptures as a principle or moral bindings as the universal imperative command, which has to be followed in our human actions to uphold and sustain the general welfare of the society. In Hinduism, *dharma* implies human behaviours that accord with *ṛta*, the cosmic order that maintains the life and universe. It also implies the various notions of duties, rights, laws, conduct, virtues and right way of living. In the *Mahābhārata*, Bhiṣma explains the meaning of *dharma* to his grandsons, particularly to Yudhiṣṭhira. He says:

> "It is most difficult to define *dharma*. *Dharma* has been explained to be that which helps the upliftment of living beings. Therefore, that which ensures the welfare of living beings is surely *Dharma*. The learned ṛṣis have declared that that which sustains is *Dharma*." (*Śānti Parva*: 109, 9-11)

In the *Karṇa Parva*, Śri Kṛṣṇa teaches Arjuna the nature of *dharma* in the following words: "*Dharma* sustains the society. *Dharma* maintains the social order. *Dharma* ensures well beings and progress of humanity." (*Karṇa Parva*: 69.58) Jaimini, the authour of *Mīmāṃsā*, one school of Indian philosophical thought on the nature of *dharma* based on a hermeneutics of the *Vedas*, explains *dharma* as: "*Dharma* is that which is indicated by the Vedas as conducive to the highest good." (Jaimini: 1.2) Madhavacārya, in his commentary on *Paraśara Smṛti*, the law book, explains the meaning of *dharma* as:"*Dharma* is that which sustains and ensures progress and welfare of all in this world and eternal Bliss in the other world. *Dharma* is promulgated in the form of a command." (Madhavacārya: 1.2)

From the above passages, it is known that *dharma* is an ethical imperative that command to all human beings to make sure the well beings of all society in this present life and to attain the highest good that is the liberation from all kinds of bondage in the future life. *Dharma* is an instrument for attaining the *mokṣa*. The Hindu's conception of *puruṣārtha* or hierarchy of values maintains that the *tṛvarga* (*dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*) is the temporal value through which the fourth value or the end that is *mokṣa* can be achieved. As J.A.B. van Buitenen has pointed out the three values, *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* are not distinct and independent values, in principle all three are *dharma . . . mokṣa*, as a release from the requirements of *dharma* to achieve 'self-realisation which is precluded in the realm of *dharma*. (J.A.B. van Buitenen, 1957:36-37) He further remarks that the attitude towards the relationship between *dharma* and *mokṣa* is ambivalence in *Brāhmanism*: one is to follow *dharma* for good of society, yet one is to abandon *dharma* for the good of the soul. (J.A.B. van Buitenen, 1975:161-173)

The famous two verses of the *Bhagavad Gītā* in the Chapter Four which are commonly quoted by many for the protection of *dharma* (virtue) in the society and the destruction of the evil, whatever may come, from the society, tell us as follows:

> "Whenever, O descendent of Bhārata, there is a decline of *Dharma*, and rise of *Adharma*, then I body Myself forth." (The Gītā: 4.7)

> "For the protection of the virtues, for the destruction of the wicked and the establishment of *dharma*, I come into being in every age." (The Gītā: 4.8)

These verses show that the maintenance of *dharma* in the world is much and the objectives of the war in *Mahābhārata* is the divine wish to restore peace and harmony in the world. Śrī Saṇkarācārya's introduction to his *Gītā* commentary, where he refers to this situation that social fabric is getting broken up because there is no cement to unite one human being with another. The purpose of the *Bhagavad Gītā* is to show the *dharma* of all individuals living in the society where they have to follow it in the right way otherwise the foundation of social bound will collapse. Bringing *dharma* or installation of *dharma* in the world, according to the *Gītā*, is to increase *dharma* or ethical and humanistic values in the society by performing their acts following the responsibilities bestowed by the God.

According to the *Bhagavad Gītā*, the realization of God through realizing the self (*ātma*) is the ultimate human end. It is the sole end of all actions. Thus, it has preached the *dharma* of *Varṇāśrama*, but the fulfilment of this *dharma* becomes a duty only because God has ordained it. In the *Gītā*, Lord Kṛṣṇa himself has said that he has created all the four *Varṇas* according to the distinction of qualities and actions. The ontological positioning of the objects in the world including animate and inanimate are manifested following the values internally inherited. Human beings are endowed with different qualities. Some are born with a talent for art, sports, teaching, etc., while, some are embedded with the qualities of active service. *Dharma* is the manifestation of man's hidden potential in conformity with the inner law of being. Thus, the flowering of human beings to enable to play their roles in society is also *dharma*, that is, *svadharma*.

The realization of God, as an undeniable belief in the existence of universal laws, is the only way, which leads to knowledge of the nature of the soul (*ātma*) because the individual soul is only a form of God, that is, the ultimate soul (*paramātmā*). This soul is to be experienced internally as well as in the external world. An ideal yogi or one who knows the principle, which explains the very existence of the world, according to the *Gītā*, experiences God in every state. Therefore, the soul is permanent and unchanging. It is indestructible while all other physical objects of the universe are transient. God (the ultimate soul) is the controller of the individual self and physical objects. He is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. He is omnipotent and omniscience.

Performing actions for social sake without any interest of its own is given much importance in the *Gītā* as means to God-realization given they are postulating that soul and society are parts of the universe. Śrī Kṛṣṇa said in the *Gītā* that *Yogi* who is engrossed in the benefit of all beings goes to him. The social action propels man towards God. Duty should be done not merely for duty but for the sake of consolidation of society. We must work because others are in need; we are there to help them. That is called *lokasaṁgraha*, ensuring the stability of human society. The ethical concept of *lokasaṁgraha*, the welfare of the world is the supreme end of the Gītā.

According to the *Gītā*, the action is superior to inaction. It has been said that liberation from the pains, sufferings and bondage due to worldly attachment cannot be achieved by fleeing from an action or taking leave from the activity in the present life. (*The Gītā* 3.4) The natural actions being indispensable even to the learned people or *yogin*. Action must be carried out according to one's nature. (*The Gītā* 3.5-13) Human actions are necessary for the body and actions are the law of creation. To consolidate the society and to bring peace and harmony amidst the social life, actions are necessary to be done. (*The Gītā* 3.20)

Even God himself acts to set an example to people and to protect society from dissolution. (*The Gītā* 3.21-24) As an incarnation of the Divine, Śri Kṛṣṇa is speaking: "Look at me, Arjuna, I have nothing to attain in the three worlds, and yet I am constantly engaging myself in action". For a learned person, the result of activity and inactivity is similar, but the person who is actively engaged in action is more superior to the inactive one. The *Gītā* has indisputably accorded to *Karma Yogi* in preference to *Karma Sanyāsa Yogi.* Śrī Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna, "To work is better than not to work . . . Your duty is to work . . . Do what must be done".

In the *Gītā*, the daily activities or duties of every individual have been discussed elaborately, according to which every man has a determined set of action to perform. He can achieve his personal and the social ultimate end by preferring these determined actions. The distinctions of quality and action have been utilized for the division of society into four *Varṇas – Brahmana, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya* and *Sūdra*. These four social classifications are based on the internal quality and individual skill of the

person concerned. The quality of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* determines the actions, which have to be assigned to the individuals. The quality of *sattva* abounds in the *Brahmana*, while *rajas* dominate *sattva* in the *Kṣatriya*, in the case of *Vaiśyas*, the rajas overpowering *tamas* and the reverse being the case of the *Sūdra*.

Accordingly, the ethics and moral teachings of *Gītā* resemble that of Bradley in the imagination of every person having a particular station to fill in society. The only point where they differ is that while Bradley treats self-realization to be the motivating cause, the *Gītā* considers the aim to be the attainment of God or consolidation of society.

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DO BUSINESS CORPORATIONS HAVE A CONSCIENCE?

NGALEKNAO RAMTHING

There has been much debate concerning questions such as whether business corporations have a conscience? Do business corporations have the same intention as an individual? Can Business Corporation be treated as a moral agency? Let us now examine and discuss how business corporations should or ought to be treated. To begin with, a business corporation is an economic institution empowered and protected by the law of the state to engage in business transactionswhose main motive is to make a profit for shareholders. Business corporations or multinational corporations have become so powerful and influential but if such powerful institutions are devoid of social and moral consideration what possible harm can it pose to the global society? Can business corporations or multinational corporations be treated on par with persons having conscience of their own to have moral and social responsibilities? Can't business corporations display moral and civic sense in their day to day business activities?

The analogy of treating corporations as persons under the law has raised the issue of whether corporations are sufficient enough to be treated morally and thus have moral rights like ordinary individual human beings. Corporations have been wielded with immense authority to exercise a variety of political rights, more or less extensive and this at the same time raises the questions as to how far do corporations owe their responsibility towards with whom the existence of the corporations depend. There are two antagonistic views over whether business corporations have a conscience.

Can corporate actions be said to be intentional actions? French[1] argues that corporations act intentionally and should be held morally accountable for their action. He argues that every corporation has an internal decision structure. The CID structures have two elements of interest to us here: (1) an organizational or responsibility flowchart that delineates stations and levels within the corporate power structure and (2) corporate decision recognition rule(s) (usually embedded in

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[1] French, P., (1997) "The Corporation as a Moral Person, " in Weiss, W. J., (1994) *Business Ethics: A Managerial, Stakeholder Approach,* Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, California, p. 91

something called "corporation policy"). The CID Structure is the personnel organization for the exercise of the corporation's power concerning its ventures, and as such its primary function is to draw experience from various levels of the corporation into a decision-making and ratification process. According to him, corporations act through their corporate flowchart and corporate policy because it embodies the decisional structure of the flowchart and the intentionality of a firm's policy. He opines that corporate internal decision (CID) structures incorporate actions of individuals as a collective. Functioning CID Structures incorporate acts of biological persons.

French calls CID Structure the grammar of corporate decision-making. It is the CID Structure that provides internal recognition rules and links and associates corporate decisions with the notion of an individual through the CID. It can be said without hesitation that a corporation's very act of doing something concerning CID Structure, involves or includes human beings doing things and that the human beings who hold various positions in a business corporation usually can be considered as having reasons for their behaviour because the behaviour is due to consequent upon complying with the CID Structure of a particular corporation in which business operates. However, treating CID Structure analogous to individuals or persons seems difficult to accept. Because, though the CID Structure encompasses views and policies and thus represents the corporation's decision, corporation, after all, is a conglomeration of individuals devoid of the intentionality of themselves. Corporations themselves do not have a conscience and whatever plans or policies are being made are the corporate members and not the corporations *per se*. Hence corporation cannot be treated analogously to persons. The difficulty of treating corporation on par with a person can be explained by way of interrogation, 'is Microsoft Corporation identical to a person?' The answer to this question, most obviously, would be negative. Galbraith says, "From [the] interpersonal exercise of power, the interaction… of the participants, comes the personality of the corporation."[2] But it can also be said that the interaction being taken place in a business transaction is but the corporate members and not corporations *per se*. The problem with this view is that corporations do not seem to act or intend in the same

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[2] Galbraith, K. J., (1971) *The Age of Uncertainty*, Boston, p. 261

sense that individual humans do. After all, corporations are composed of human individuals that we conventionally agree to treat the actions of these individuals as the actions of that unit. We can express this precisely in two somewhat technical claims that build on the work of Searle:[3]

1. A corporate organization "exists" only if (1) there exist certain human individuals who are in certain circumstances and relationships, and (2) our linguistic and social conventions lay down that when those kinds of individuals exist in those kinds of circumstances and relationships, they shall count as a corporate organization.

2. A corporate organization "acts" only if (1) certain human individuals in the organization performed certain actions in certain circumstances and (2) our linguistic and social conventions lay down that when those kinds of individuals perform those kinds of actions in those kinds of circumstances, this shall count as an act of the corporate organization.

It implies that corporate acts originate in the choices and actions of the human individuals and thus the human individuals should be considered as the primary bearers of moral duties and social responsibility. An action performed in compliance with the CID Structure of an organization does not make an organization itself responsible for the action which originates from the human individuals. Thus, it can be argued that the CID Structure is just a manifestation of the consensus policies and decisions made by the corporate individuals and not the corporation per se. If a corporation acts wrongly, it is because of what some individual or individuals in that corporation chose to do; if a corporation acts morally, it is because some individual or individuals in that corporation act morally.[4]

In analogous with the view above, Goodpaster and Mathew[5] argue that since corporations are credited with having goals, economic values and strategies, they should also have a conscience. They do not, however, believe that corporations should be equated with individuals but that understanding organizations as persons

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[3] Searle, J., (1995) *The Construction of Social Reality*, Oxford Press, New York

[4] Velasquez, G. M., (1994), *Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases,* By Pearson Michael .Education, Inc., Singapore, p. 18

[5] Goodpaster, K. E., and Mathew, J. B., Jr., (2002) "Can A Corporation Have A Conscience*?"* in *Applied Ethics: A Critical Concepts In Philosophy*, Volume V, edited by Chadwick, Ruth and Schroeder, Dorris, Routledge II, New Fetter lane, London

can provide a better framework in the understanding of corporate social responsibility. For them, a corporation can and should have a conscience because its decision-making processes can, and often do, display both rationality and respect and thus maintain that a corporation should have a conscience because neither "invisible hand" of the market nor "governmental regulation" can be expected to lead corporations to make decisions that accord with morality on the most important matters of moral concern.[6] They further argue that there is no reason a corporation cannot show the same kind of rationality and respect for persons that individual human beings can. By analogy, they contend, it makes just as much sense to speak of corporate moral responsibility as it does to speak of individual moral responsibility.[7]

It is important to note that corporations as one of the social institutions of the society do not operate the business in a vacuum. But corporations are intimately integrated with the rest of society. They are bound to have interactions and activities not only among the business members themselves but also extend far beyond their domain and thus affect society and are affected by the social environment simultaneously. It is quite possible to say that though corporations are not analogous to person yet their activities in doing business can reasonably show the kind of rationality and respects towards whom they interact. However, this does not in any sense, means that they (corporations) are analogous to persons per se. It is pointed out here that the organization structures can incorporate rules or guidelines within the system that can be endorsed by corporate leaders to be followed and obeyed by everyone but such rules and guidelines should not be treated as "intentional acts" of the corporation. A corporation is an organization composed of individual rational beings. It is not a corporation that is rational; it is the individuals who are the bearers of rationality and intentionality.

Though the corporation itself lacks intentionality, yet it gives no exception to the corporation from evading responsibility because a corporation is a conglomeration of rational individuals whose policies and decisions run the

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[6] Goodpaster, K. E., and Mathew, J. B., Jr., (2002) "Can A Corporation Have A Conscience*?"* in *Applied Ethics: A Critical Concepts In Philosophy*, Volume V, edited by Chadwick, Ruth and Schroeder, Dorris, Routledge II, New Fetter lane, London.

[7] Goodpaster, K. E., and Mathew, J. B., Jr., (January-February 1982) "Can a Corporation Have a Conscience?" *Harvard Business Review 60,* p. 132-141

corporation. The CID Structure as espoused by French can well adopt responsibility not only towards themselves but also towards the society at large. The CID Structure can incorporate rules and guidelines that reflect respect for persons in which every member is treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means to an end among the members in a corporation and members of the society at large in which business operates. As Kant in his third formulation of the categorical imperative states: we should act as if we are a member of the 'kingdom of ends'. This universal endorsement by a rational person is what makes Kant say that everyone is both subject and sovereign concerning the rules that govern them because it is the rules that endorse every rational being worthy to be respected simply by being a rational person. Donaldson argues that a corporation can be a moral agent if moral reasons enter into its decision making and if its decision-making process controls not just the company's action but also its structures of policies and rules."[8] The core concern is not whether corporations do have a conscience like rational beings. Any rational being is worthy of respect not because of what he/she is but because of being a rational being. Any law, be it in business or legal or anything violates the basic principle of human right that does not treat persons as worthy of respect. It is quite important to remind ourselves "Would I think it acceptable if any other beings treated me the way I treat them?"

The productionists[9] view corporation as an impersonal profit-making institution. For them, the only primary responsibility of business is to make profits without moral responsibility. Corporations are not persons but they are artificial legal constructions, machines for mobilizing economic investments toward the efficient production of goods and service. So, corporations cannot be held responsible but we can only hold individuals responsible. Moreover, corporate executives are not elected representatives of the people, nor are they anointed or appointed as social guardians. They, therefore, lack the social mandate that a democratic society rightly demands of those who would pursue ethically or socially motivated policies. By keeping corporate policies and plan confined to economic motivations we keep the power of corporate executives in its proper place. It is further argued that the idea of moral

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[8] Donaldson, T., (1982) *Corporations and Morality,* Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J, p. 10

[9] Weiss, J. W., (1994) *Business Ethics: A Managerial, Stakeholder Approach*, by Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., Belmont, California, p. 90

projection is a useful device for structuring corporate responsibility only if the understanding of moral responsibility at the level of a person is in some sense richer than the understanding of moral responsibility on the level of the organization as a whole. If we are not clear about individual responsibility, the projection is fruitless.[10]

Velasquez argues that businesses as institutions do not have intentions or act as persons. In support of his argument, he gave two reasons: individual wrongdoers will not be sought and punished if the corporation can be held responsible for wrongful acts and, understanding corporations as intentional persons will cause us to view them as "larger than human" persons whose ends and well-being are more important than those of its members.[11]

Velasquez, therefore, concludes that it is not the corporation itself, who must be held accountable for illegal and immoral acts but rather it is the people in the corporation who are to be held accountable. In his view, the corporation's members and not the corporation bring about the acts of the corporation and thus he demurs "the intention French attributes to corporations, then, do not mark out corporate acts as intentional because the intentions are attributed to one entity (the corporation) whereas the acts are carried out by another entity (the corporate members).[12] According to him, it is the intention of the members of the corporations who are involved and carried out the tasks of business activities executing the tasks and not the corporations themselves who possess the so-called intention as pointed by French. An act can be said to be intentional if the entity that formed the intention brings about the act through its bodily movements.[13] Corporations, on the other hand, are nothing but are legal entities, with legal rights and responsibilities similar but not identical to those possessed by individuals. For Velasquez,[14] only corporate members, not the corporation itself, can be held morally responsible.

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[10] Goodpaster, K. E., and Mathew, J. B., Jr., (2002) "Can A Corporation Have A Conscience*?"* in *Applied Ethics: A Critical Concepts In Philosophy*, Volume V, edited by Chadwick, Ruth and Schroeder, Dorris, Routledge II, New Fetter lane, London.
[11] Shaw, W. H., (1990) *Business Ethics,* By Wadsworth Publishing Company, Canada, p.165
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[13] Velasquez, G. M., (1994) *Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases*, By Pearson Michael .Education, Inc., Singapore, p. 165
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 165

In partial agreement with Velasquez, it can be argued that if corporations are considered as an economic impersonal institution devoid of intention and morally responsible, could it be then possibly mean that corporations do not have moral accountability towards anything that does not bring profit to the corporation? Corporations are economic institutions having to do with provisioning the needs and requirements of customers and the society at large in return for pro62fit. But this does not rule out the crucial point, that is, corporations are parts of social institutions where individuals of different ranks and status intertwined within a system of the body for definite objectives and goals to achieve. Achieving the objectives and goals of corporations do not come by themselves but such is the outcome consequent upon certain action or determination of the individuals. Objectives and goals are necessarily not the attributes of corporations rather they are the determination and effort made to be realised by the members of the corporations through various activities. By the way, whose objectives and goals corporations are endeavouring to achieve? Are the objectives and goals for the corporations themselves or are they for the individuals whose shares are being invested in the corporation for a reasonable return? In slight variation with Velasquez, we can conclude that even though corporations do not possess intention as rational individuals do, nevertheless, it is vital to accept that business decisions do not occur in isolation, but always takes place in and within a wider context, which includes not only the corporate members but it also includes the society at large. Therefore, business corporations do have responsibilities and not only the individuals involved because whatever policies and actions executed by the corporate members are the intended plans determined by the members in the name of corporations and therefore in certain ways,but corporations can also be held responsible for and not only the individuals themselves alone. The reason why business corporations too have responsibilities in certain ways is that corporate leaders may go and come but as stated above corporation is a legal entity having an indefinite life. Every action has a reaction and it is quite possible that an adverse consequent perhaps may arise in connection with corporate actions which had been done in the past decade in which no particular person could be held responsible for the action. In such cases, it is the responsibility of a corporation and not the individual members.

COGNITION AND CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE AND POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE IN SĀṂKHYA PHILOSOPHY

SWAGATA GHOSH

Knowledge provides the foundation to our daily life as well as to all our endeavours be it empirical or transcendental. Nothing could be accomplished without knowledge. Thus, knowledge is undoubtedly regarded as the most valuable asset by one and all. Philosophers too hold congruence at this point; however, there seem to be innumerable debates among them regarding the nature of knowledge. To be more precise, the contention extends to the fact that what at all could be designated as knowledge. The Sāṃkhya philosophical system seems to pose as one of the most intriguing schools in this context, as its very philosophy is founded on the fact that the consciousness (*puruṣa*) is essentially non-related (*asambaddha*), immutable (*apariṇāmī*) and perpetually and universally the same (*kūṭastha*). These attributes indicate the fact that consciousness can never be related to anything. So the question comes up that if the consciousness does not relate with anything at all, then how at all cognition could be possible in case of Sāṃkhya philosophy. Moreover, the notion of liberation in the concerned system is purely epistemological. Liberation, here, is nothing but the attainment of discriminatory cognition (*vivekakhyāti*) between the consciousness (*puruṣa*) and matter (*prakṛti*). However, if the attainment of knowledge itself is impossible for *puruṣa* then how can such a philosophical position be accounted for? Thus, it becomes imperative to study the nature of cognition and its apparent connection to consciousness to understand the intricacies of such a profound philosophical system.

According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the first evolute of *prakṛti* is *citta*. *Buddhi*, *mahattattva*, *antaḥkaraṇa* etc. indicate *citta*. *Citta* is a *taijas* element. *Taijas* elements, like water can acquire the shape of other objects. According to Sāṃkhya philosophers, such transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *citta* or psychosis (*vṛtti*), that is, modification of *citta* in the form of other objects is termed as *jñāna*. It is to be noted that though the transformation of the *citta* occurs in the form of the object, yet the locus of transformation is the *citta* itself, since, the transformation must always reside in the transformed. Thus, in Sāṃkhya epistemology *vṛttijñāna* is not located in the self (*ātman)*, as opposed to other schools; rather it is a property of the *citta*.

The transformation of *citta* in the form of *jñāna* is of two types. One kind occurs inside the body, whereas the other occurs in the external world. The transformation of *citta* in the form of object that occurs in the case of inference and verbal testimony takes place inside the body. On the other hand, when the transformation of *citta* in the form of an object occurs through the eyes, that is, in case of perception, it takes place at the locus of the object itself (*viṣayadeśa*). The eyes are situated in the body, but their rays reach the object outside the body and they get related. Similarly, the *citta*, along with the rays of the eyes, reaches the object and attains its form. Thus, *cittavṛtti* or the transformation of *citta* in the form of an object, be it internal or external, is always located in the *citta* as *jñāna*, and thus, *jñāna* is essentially internal.

Now whatever be the locus of the transformation of the *citta*, internal or external, the object of knowledge must then always possess a form, so that the *citta* may take up that form. Then, naturally, the question arises that, what would happen or how would the *cittavṛtti* be in case of abstract or formless objects of knowledge? Sāṁkhya replies that in those cases the *cittavṛtti* too would be formless or abstract; and that would also be termed as *viṣayākāravṛtti* of the *citta*, that is, the transformation of *citta* in accordance to the object. Thus, it is interesting to note here that the term '*ākāra*' in *viṣayākāra*, *padārthākāra* or *arthākārapariṇāma* or*vṛtti* stands for a relation between the transformation of the *citta* and the object of knowledge, and does not strictly restrict itself to denote distinct forms of objects only.

Now the most important discussion in any school of epistemology concentrates primarily on perception. This is because perception is the direct means of cognition and provides a foundation for all other forms of knowledge. We too here restrict our discussion to understanding the concept of perception in Sāṁkhya philosophy to delve deeper into the concerned issue. We have already come to know that *jñāna* is a kind of *cittavṛtti*. Now, according to Sāṁkhya philosophers, the means of cognition, that is, *pramāṇa* too is nothing but a *cittavṛtti*. Thus, to distinguish perception (*pratyakṣapramāṇa*) from other kinds of *pramāṇa*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa provides the following definition of perception in the fifth*kārikā* - '*prativiṣayādhyavasāyodṛṣṭaṁtrividhamanumānamākhyātaṁ/ talliṅgaliṅgīpurvakamāptaśrutirāptavacanamtu//*'[1].

In the *kārikā*, first of all, it has been stated that '*prativiṣayādhyavasāyodṛṣṭam*'. The term '*dṛṣṭam*' indicates the objective or that which is being defined (*lakṣya*), and the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) consists in the term '*prativiṣayādhyavasāyaḥ*'. '*Lakṣaṇa*' means that which distinguishes the *lakṣya* from its similar as well as dissimilar entities (*samānāsamānajātīyavyavaccheda*). Here, the similar instances are that of inference etc. and the dissimilar ones are the pots, jars etc. The definition intends to distinguish *pratyakṣapramāṇa* from both the cases and establish its distinctness.

According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, an object (*viṣaya*) is that which makes itself perceptible by providing the *citta* a transformation which corresponds to its form. *Pṛthivī* etc. are the external objects of cognition, whereas the internal objects are pleasure, pain etc. All these are capable of imparting their forms to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, that is, *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. However, there are entities which are not perceivable by ordinary human beings. They being supra-sensory or the like can only be perceived by the *yogin*s. For instance, the five subtle entities referred to as *pañcatanmātra* are only perceptible to the *devatā* and the *yogin*s. Hence, the term '*viṣaya*' is intended to include all the objects, including the empirically perceptible as well as the supra-sensory ones. From here it can be said that the term '*prativiṣaya*' means that which is directed or which intends to be transformed towards these objects ('*viṣayaṁviṣayaṁprativartateiti prativiṣayam*'[2]). Here, the term '*vṛtti*' means '*sannikarṣa*', that is, relation. Thus, the intended meaning of the term '*prativiṣaya*' is a sense organ which can have a relation with each of the objects.

In such a sense organ, termed as '*prativiṣaya*', there occurs an *adhyavasāya* (*adhyavasāyaścabuddhivyāpārojñānam*), that is, a transformation of the *buddhi* in the form of cognition takes place in that sense organ. This is termed as '*dṛṣṭa*'. When the sense organ comes in contact with the object, the *antaḥkaraṇa* takes up its form. It is argued that when the sense organ gets transformed into the form of the object, then the *antaḥkaraṇa* also takes up that form. Hence, the *karaṇa* or the instrument towards *cittavṛtti* should be the sense organ itself. The relation (*sannikarṣa*) between the sense organ and the object is the *viṣayākārapariṇāma*, that is, transformation into the form of the object on the part of the sense organ. Now, the cognition that is produced due to the *cittavṛtti* induced by the transformation of the sense organ into the form of the object is termed as '*adhyavasāya*'. The sense organs are specific in terms of their

relation to the type of object to be known by them. Thus, when the transformation of the sense organs (*indriyavṛtti*) occurs in the form of their relation (*sannikarṣa*) with the object, the *citta* which essentially consists of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, then the suppression of *tama guṇa* occurs and consequently, the *sattva* guṇa undergoes *sāttvikapariṇāma* which is then termed as *adhyavasāya*, *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* and *jñāna*. The *adhyavasāya* is referred to as *dṛṣṭa* or *pratyakṣapramāṇa*.

Now, Vācaspati Miśra analyses the definition of perception and states the significance of each of the consisting terms. In the definition, '*prativiṣayādhyavasāyaḥ*', the term '*adhyavasāya*' is incorporated into the definition to prevent the fallacy of over coverage into dubious cognition (*saṁśaya*). *Saṁśaya* is defined as *ekadhārmikaviruddhanānādharmaprakārakajñāna*, that is, where the cognition of various contradictory properties occurs in the same locus, thus producing the cognition of the form '*ayaṁsarpaḥnavā*'. Thus, such cognition is always devoid of certainty. Since '*adhyavasāya*' and '*niḥścaya*' are synonymous, the term '*adhyavasāya*' has been included in the definition to prevent the over-coverage into *saṁśaya*, that is, to emphasize on the certainty of knowledge.

Now, the term '*viṣaya*' has been included in the definition to distinguish such cognition from *viparyaya*, that is, illusions. The term '*viṣaya*' indicates the cognition of a noun qualified by an adjective. However, in the case of illusions there cannot be any such cognition as it is a fact that illusions are always about unreal entities (*asadviṣayaka*). Thus, the significance of the term '*viṣaya*' in the definition is to keep apart illusions from valid perceptual cognitions.

Next, the term *prati* has been included in the definition to leave apart *smṛti* (memory), inference etc. It is important to note here that in the statement '*viṣayaṁviṣayaṁprativartate*', the term *prati* does not indicate *indriyārthasannikarṣa* (sense-object contact or relation). Yet the verb *vartate* originating from the root '*vṛtu*' stands for relation (*sannikarṣa*) and hence that being grammatically related (*samāsabaddha*) to the term *prati*, the intended meaning (*lākṣaṇikaartha*) is the relation betweenthe sense organ and the object (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*). Hence, it is said '*indriyārthasannikarṣasūcanāt*'. Thus, it is proved that the given definition is complete in terms of being free from the fallacy of over-coverage as well as by providing the distinctiveness to perception from similar instances like *anumāna* etc. and also from dissimilar instances like pot etc.

According to Vācaspati, pure consciousness or *puruṣa* is reflected (*anugrahṛta*) by means of perception. That is, when the conscious *puruṣa* gets reflected on the instrument (*pramāṇa*), namely, the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*, then the cognition of the form 'I know' occurs, which is also known as *abhimāna*. *Abhimāna* is the result of *antaḥkaraṇavṛttipramāṇa* with the reflected consciousness on it. According to Vācaspati, *buddhitattva* or *antaḥkaraṇa* are unconscious as they all are evolutes of unconscious *prakṛti*. Just as a jar produced from clay is unconscious, similarly, the evolute of unconscious *prakṛti*, like, *antaḥkaraṇa* is essentially unconscious too. Following the same analogy, it may be argued that *cittavṛtti* and *adhyavasāya* are also unconscious as they, in turn, are produced from unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa*. Similarly, the other transformations of *buddhitattva*, like pleasure, pain etc. are also unconscious. The only conscious entity is *puruṣa* and that is essentially unrelated to all these transformations, like, pleasure etc. *Jñāna*, *sukha* etc. are all properties of *antaḥkaraṇa* and that is their locus. However, *puruṣa* is reflected in that *citta* itself. As a result, due to the non-discriminatory cognition between *puruṣa* and *citta*, the properties like, cognition, pleasure etc. which are there in the *antaḥkaraṇa* appear to be that of the *puruṣa*, and thus, usages like 'I am the knower', 'I am the enjoyer', 'I am happy', etc. occur. Thus, the term '*anugraha*' in '*anenayaścetanāśakteranugrahastatphalaṁ pramābodhaḥ*'[3] as explained so far indicates the usage of the properties of the *citta* as the properties of the *puruṣa* itself.

Now here, naturally, the question comes that since *puruṣa* is essentially unrelated (*asaṅga*), then how can its *abhimāna* or I-usage be justified at all? And if we admit such usages then the essence of *puruṣa* would be contradicted. The following discussion show how the process of cognition has been explained in Sāṁkhya philosophical system as well as the essence of *puruṣa* has been retained.

Like any other philosophical system, in Sāmkhya philosophy too, the term '*pramā*' is attributed with special significance. The etymology of the term '*pramā*' shows that it is composed of the root '*mā*' meaning knowledge with '*pra*' prefix and with suffix '*aṅ*' added to the root and then another suffix '*ṭāp*' along with it. Thus, the meaning of the term '*pramā*' comes out to be valid or perfect cognition. The following example would help to explain the concept of *pramā*. Let us consider that there is a jar in front of us. As soon as it comes in the proximity of the eyes or any other sense organ, the sense organ (*jñānendriya*) immediately takes up the form of

that jar. The *manas* or the internal sense organ helps in acquiring the form of the jar. When the complete form of the jar is acquired, the mind then transmits it to the *ahaṁkāra*. The *ahaṁkāra* then provides the form of *aham* to the jar; consequently, the complex formed is of the form '*ghaṭākāraahaṁ*'. This complex then gets associated with the *buddhivṛtti*, and the *buddhivṛtti* acquires the form of the jar. Now, the property of jar-ness (*ghaṭatva*) in the jar (*ghaṭa*) is initially known as a universal property and then in relation to the individual jar. Finally, the *buddhivṛtti* associates the *aham* with the intermediary complex thus formed, and the cognition of the jar is produced. Hence, the complete form of the *buddhivṛtti* is 'I know this jar' (*ghaṭamahaṁjānāmi*).

Now, the above form of *buddhivṛtti* is essentially unconscious. However, such *buddhivṛtti* partaking the form of the object, due to its origination from *triguṇātmikāprakṛti*, essentially consists of *sattva guṇa* (*sattvaguṇānvita*), and hence it is extremely clear (*svaccha*) in nature. According to Vācaspati, such extremely clear *buddhivṛtti* immediately acquires the reflection of *puruṣa*. Now, according to Sāṁkhya philosophy, *puruṣa* is non-related (*kūṭastha*) and immutable (*apariṇāmī*). As soon as the reflection of *puruṣa* is received, due to its clarity (*svacchatā*) the form of the object is expressed. Such manifested form of the object is called '*pramā*', that is, the perfect manifestation of the object through cognition. The instrument, however, behind this manifestation does not get manifested; that is called *pramāṇa*. According to *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*, the expressed or the illumined form of the object, which is free from all kinds of uncertainty, fallacy or illusions and that which was not known before (*anadhigata*), such expression of an object is called '*pramā*'[4] and the instrument (*karaṇa*) of such cognition is called '*pramāṇa*'. However, the author of *Yuktidīpikā* and later on VācaspatiMiśra has stated that the unconscious *buddhivṛtti* is *pramāṇa*, whereas the illumined *vṛtti* of that *buddhi* itself is the *pramā*. There is no causal connection between the *pramā* and the *pramāṇa*; however, *pramāṇa* is the logical and necessary condition of *pramā*. It may further be stated that following the Sāṁkhya philosophical position, the difference between*pramā* and *pramāṇa* is only an apparent one, since; the *pramāṇa* requires the help of *puruṣa* or consciousness for its manifestation. To prove this, the Sāṁkhya philosophers admit that the cognition along with its cognates is generated due to the reflection of consciousness.

Now, if we admit the *pramā* to be located in *puruṣa* only, then *buddhivṛtti* is the *pramāṇa*. Again, if *pramā* is considered to be located in *buddhi* only, then the relation between the object and the sense organ (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*) is the *pramāṇa*. However, *puruṣa* is only the witness of *pramā* and never the knower. Nevertheless, if we admit *pramā* to be both in *puruṣa* and in *buddhivṛtti*, then the *pramāṇa*s would be *buddhivṛtti* and *indriyārthasannikarṣa* respectively.[5]

It is interesting to note here that *puruṣa*, though essentially inactive (*niṣkriya*) and immutable, is attributed with functionality (*arthakriyākāritva*) in a certain sense. *Puruṣa* does not possess *arthakriyākāritva* like *buddhivṛtti*; however, when the *buddhivṛtti* that is transformed into the form of the object, gets reflected on the *puruṣa*, that itself constitutes the functionality of *puruṣa* in terms of knowing the object (*viṣayagrahanarūpaarthakriyākāritva*). It should, nevertheless, be always kept in mind that the functionality of *puruṣa* etc. are not so in the literal sense of the term, these are mere usages. To explicate the position an analogy has been used as follows - '*japāsphaṭikayorivanoparāgaḥkintvabhimānaḥ*'[6]. That is, a crystal kept near a red china rose reflects the colour of the flower on it. That does not mean that the crystal has become red in colour, but merely appears to be so. Thus, it may be claimed that the reflection is also a transformation of *buddhi* and the reflection of the object on *puruṣa* is simply like the reflection of an object on water or a crystal.

Now, if the consciousness gets reflected on the transformed consciousness (*caitanyavṛtti*) then the entire *buddhivṛtti* appears to be conscious. More so, it seems that the *buddhivṛtti* attained with consciousness is expressing the unconscious, material *buddhivṛtti*. Hence, the reflection of consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* is termed as '*caitanyaviṣayatā*', since, because of that, *buddhivṛtti* gets manifested.

Vācaspati considers two different forms of perceiving the reflection. One is about perceiving a part of the locus of the reflection, whereas the other is concerned with the perception of the reflection in its entirety (*sarvavyāpirūpepratibimbadarśana*). He has kept in mind both the cases while expressing his views. The form of the object as attained by the *buddhivṛtti* is termed as *buddhiviṣayatā*. Similarly, when the *buddhivṛtti* is being reflected on consciousness (*caitanya*), then the consciousness also appears to be of the form of the *buddhivṛtti*. Hence, the attainment of the form of the reflected one is nothing but '*viṣayatā*'. However, Vijñānabhikṣu here argues that the admission of two types of

viṣayatā, namely, *caitanyaviṣayatā* and *buddhiviṣayatā*, is futile, since, *viṣayatā* is one. The attainment of the specific forms of the respective objects of *buddhi* and *caitanya* is nothing but *viṣayatā* that is specific to the individual cases.

Now, Vācaspati Miśra further states that when the reflection of *puruṣa* is received on the *buddhivṛtti*, transformed through the attainment of the form of the object, the *buddhivṛtti* does not get revealed, but cognition is produced and the cognition of the form of the object is also produced. Now the question arises that how at all the cognition of an object is produced? Even though the *buddhivṛtti* appears as conscious, but it is not capable of expressing an object. Again, *puruṣa* is ubiquitous, but it also does not possess the capability of manifesting an object on its own. For, if that would have been the case, then all the objects of the world would have been manifested simultaneously. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra claims that the object itself is always non-perceivable. To refute such a position, Vijñānabhikṣu considers *buddhivṛtti* to be instrumental (*dvāra*) in attaining the form or the reflection of the object, and hence, according to Sāṁkhya position, perception of objects becomes possible.

So far it is evident that the idea of '*arthagrahana*' is pivotal in understanding Sāṁkhya epistemology. Vijñānabhikṣu explains that the '*arthagrahana*', that is, knowing the object can be on the part of the *buddhi* or on the part of the *puruṣa*. In terms of the *buddhi* possessing the cognition of the object, the *arthagrahana* means a definite transformation of the *buddhi*. Now naturally, the question would arise that whether in case of *arthagrahana* of *puruṣa*, a transformation of *puruṣa* would have to be admitted or not. *Puruṣa*, however, is essentially immutable (*apariṇāmī*). So, *puruṣa* cannot possess the cognition of the object. Again, there can be another way of knowing an object, and that is the reflection of the object on *puruṣa*. The objects while being reflected retain their form.[7] Hence, it may be claimed that '*viṣayagrahana*' or '*arthagrahana*', that is, knowing an object on the part of the *puruṣa* is nothing but its reflection on *puruṣa*. It does not involve any relation like contacts, etc. Here, again it has been argued that if the above claim is admitted, then *puruṣa* being ubiquitous, it would receive the reflection of all entities simultaneously. Hence, the cognition of all the objects would be produced at the same moment, but that is inadmissible. However, the refutation of the above objection is not quite found in the Sāṁkhya system. Thus, *arthagrahana* should indicate *ākāragrahana* that is,

acquiring the form of the object both in case of *buddhi* and on the part of the *puruṣa*. This, in a way, establishes the theory of mutual reflectivity (*anyonyapratibimbavāda*). In this context, it may be mentioned that Vyāsadeva, the author of *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, also admits such a position.

Next, the obvious objection that springs up at this point is that if *puruṣa* is qualified (*abhimanī*) with properties like, cognition, pleasure etc., which are in essence properties of *antaḥkaraṇa*, then the true nature of *puruṣa*, that is, non-relatedness, indifference etc. would be hampered. According to the Sāṃkhyācāryas, such never happens. They cite an example in favour of their position, as follows - if a person sees his reflection in a mirror which has got dirty spots on it, and says '*malinaṁmukhaṁ me*', then the actual face does not acquire those spots, in reality, it is only an apparent usage about the reflected face. Analogously, the properties of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, namely, *jñāna*, *sukha,* etc. express themselves or relate themselves to the reflected consciousness or *puruṣa* only, and not with the pure consciousness itself. Thus, the essential nature of *puruṣa* is never hampered, rather it is well retained.

In this context, Vācaspati Miśra also provides an analogy in consonance with the Sāṃkhyaview, which explains how the essence of *puruṣa* is maintained despite its *ābhimānika* cognition. He says that at night the moonlight expresses all the objects, but the moon itself does not have any light of its own. It cannot express itself or other entities. However, the moon expresses itself as well as all other objects with the help of the reflected sunlight on it. Here, the material, unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa* is analogous to the moon. It can neither express itself nor the objects like pot etc. However, when the reflection of the self-luminous (*prakāśasvabhāva*) consciousness is received on it, it expresses itself as well as the cognition of pot etc. that are related to it. Thus, the possibility of cognitive usages and the like in everyday life are properly explained.

Further, Vācaspati says that two things happen when the reflection of *puruṣa* is received on the *antaḥkaraṇa*. First, the unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa* being the locus or substratum of the reflection of the consciousness, it behaves as conscious, and its modification (*vṛtti*), namely, the *adhyavasāya* too becomes luminous (*prakāśasvabhāva*). Secondly, due to such reflection there occurs non-apprehension of the difference between *puruṣa* and *antaḥkaraṇa*, and consequently, *puruṣa* appears to be related to the properties like cognition, pleasure etc. which are there in the

antaḥkaraṇa. This position is further supported by the twentiethSāṃkhyakārikā–
'*tasmāt   tat   saṃyogātacetanaṃcetanāvadivaliṅgam/guṇakartṛtve   ca
tathākartevabhavatyudāsīnaḥ//*'[8] According to the said *kārikā*, when the *puruṣa* and
the *antaḥkaraṇa* etc. come in proximity, the *antaḥkaraṇa* behaves like a conscious
entity and properties like agency etc. appear to be that of the *puruṣa*. Hence, by the
reflection of *puruṣa* on *antaḥkaraṇa*, the respective attributes are mutually
superimposed.

In this context, Vijñānabhikṣu states that though the *antaḥkaraṇa* behaves as
the conscious due to the reflection of consciousness on it, yet the reflected
consciousness located in the *antaḥkaraṇa* cannot lead to the I-usages of *puruṣa*,
despite the apprehension of non-discrimination between consciousness and
antaḥkaraṇa and the subsequent superimpositions of the properties of *antaḥkaraṇa*
on the reflected consciousness. Now, according toVijñānabhikṣu, to explain the I-
usages of the properties of the *citta*, the reflection of *antaḥkaraṇa* on *puruṣa* is also to
be admitted. Such cognition or realisation as related to the self (*pauruṣeyabodha* or
upalabdhi) is termed as *pratyakṣapramā*, that is, valid perception. However, such
cognition is located in *puruṣa* (*puruṣaniṣṭha*). Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu explains
perception by admitting the mutual reflection between*puruṣa* and *antaḥkaraṇa*,
thereby establishing the theory of mutual reflectivity (*anyonyapratibimbavāda*).

Vijñānabhikṣu cites the main argument in favour of his position from
Sāṃkhyasūtrapravacanabhāṣya   as   follows   -
'*antaḥkaraṇasyatadujjvalitatvāllohavadadhiṣṭhātṛtvam*'[9], meaning that when we talk
of the perception of the self (*ātmadarśana*) the object of that act of perceiving is the
self itself. Then naturally the question comes up that who would be the agent of that
action? Now the agent can be the self only and nothing else. This, however, would
produce the difficulty of '*kartṛkarmavirodha*' as the same entity would be attributed
with agency as well as object-hood. When the *buddhivṛtti* is reflected on the
consciousness or self, then the *buddhivṛtti* itself as well as the form of the object
attained by the *buddhivṛtti*, both are manifested by the self. However, the question
remains that while perceiving an object when usage like,'I am perceiving' occurs,
then how does the cognition of the form of 'I' take place? The self cannot express
itself, since, the self, being the object (*karma*) over here, its self-expressiveness

(*svaprakāśatva*) would bring about the fallacy of agent-object contradiction. Then how come the sense of 'I' or the cognition of *aham* is expressed?

In reply to this, Vijñānabhikṣu states that the reflection of consciousness that occurs on the *buddhivṛtti*, that reflection is expressed by the *puruṣa*. Hence, to establish the object-hood (*karmatva*) of 'I' it is necessary to admit the theory of mutual reflection, namely the reflection of consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* and that of the *buddhivṛtti* qualified with the form of consciousness (*caitanyākaragṛhītabuddhivṛtti*) on the *puruṣa*. Herein lies the novelty of Vijñānabhikṣu's theory of mutual reflectivity.

Now, Vācaspati refutes Vijñānabhikṣu's position by claiming that there is only one reflection, that is, the reflection of consciousness on *antaḥkaraṇa*. He puts forward an example as follows - we find the reflection of the moon on the water of the lake, but not vice versa. The reflected moon on the surface of the water consists of wavy movements, some particles of dirt etc. These properties are there in the water which gets superimposed on the reflection of the moon. Similarly, the luminosity of the moon is also superimposed on the water surface, due to the same reflection. Thus, 'the moon is throbbing' or 'the moon is dirty' are only apparent linguistic usages which in no way affect the actual moon and are due to the attributes of the water itself. Thus, admission of mutual reflection between water and moon is not required at all, since, only the reflection of the moon on water suffices to explain the superimposed attributes of the throbbing and dirty appearance of the moon on the water as well as the manifesting power (*prakāśatvadharma*) of the water. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra maintains that just like the reflection of the moon on the water explains the superimposed attributes of both the water and the reflected moon, similarly, simply the admission of the reflection of consciousness on the *antaḥkaraṇa* explains the superimposition of the attributes of the *antaḥkaraṇa* on the reflected consciousness. For that, we do not need to admit another reflection, namely that of the *antaḥkaraṇa* on *puruṣa*. Just as the actual moon stays pure and unrelated, similarly for the pure consciousness as well. The reflected moon gets attributed by the properties of the substratum of the reflection; analogously the reflected consciousness acquires the properties of the locus of the reflection, that is, of the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself, and merely appears to possess those attributes on its own. Thus, there is no need to

admit mutual reflectivity, since, admission of only one reflection (*ekapratibimbavāda*), as state above, is sufficient to explain the thesis.

Now, Vijñānabhikṣu clarifies his stance against Vācaspati's views arguing from the Neo-Sāṁkhya position. He says that desire (*icchā*) is always on the same locus as that of the *buddhi*, that is, *buddhi* and *icchā* are co-located (*ekādhikaraṇastha*). So cognition is also the property of *buddhi*. Otherwise, we would have to say that one person would be attributed with *buddhi* while another with desire. That is, however, contradictory to our experience. Thus, it is to be admitted that the reflected consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* manifests the object. However, such a standpoint goes against the theory of mutual reflectivity. Vijñānabhikṣu had apprehended such objections beforehand and has provided several arguments to nullify the other positions and thus establish his theory.

First, Vijñānabhikṣu says that if the above position is admitted, then there appears clear inconsistency between the two Sāṁkhya aphorisms '*cidavasānobhogaḥ*'[10] and '*akarturapiphalabhogā'nnādyavat*'[11]. Here, the term '*bhoga*' stands for 'I am the knower of this object'. Such cognition ends up in consciousness. It is a common occurrence that the chef prepares the food and the master eats it. So if we overemphasize on the fact of co-located-ness of agency (*kartṛtva*) and enjoyership (*bhoktṛtva*), the above two aphorisms become meaningless. Thus, the opponents' view is refuted. It is, however, important to mention over here that according to the classical Sāṁkhyīs, agency and enjoyerhood both are properties of the *prakṛti* in its different modes (*pariṇāma*), and can never be located in *puruṣa* owing to its essential indifferent (*ūdāsīna*) and inactive (*niṣkriya*) nature. Even then there does not arise any inconsistency in explaining the I-usages with the help of the reflected consciousness owing to the convincing explanation of VācaspatiMiśra's*ekapratibimbavāda*.

Secondly, if Vācaspati's views are admitted then it would be impossible to prove the existence of *puruṣa*. He says that if we try to establish the existence of the actual pure consciousness (*bimbacaitanya*) with the help of its reflection on *buddhivṛtti*, then inevitably there would be the fallacy of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśrayadoṣa*). Vijñānabhikṣu explains the fallacy elaborately as follows - according to Vācaspati, the reflection of consciousness is received on the *buddhivṛtti*. Now, if such a reflection is obtained, then there must be the existence of the actual

consciousness which is being reflected. That is none but *puruṣa*. However, here an objection may be raised that if the existence of *bimbapuruṣa*is not established first, then how can the question of its reflection arise at all. Now, if it is claimed that from the reflection itself, the existence of *bimbapuruṣa*is established and vice versa, then it is a clear case of the fallacy of mutual dependence. Thus, admitting VācaspatiMiśra's views make it impossible to establish the existence of *puruṣa*. Vijñānabhikṣu claims that the admission of *anyonyapratibimbavāda* saves us from such difficulties. The *puruṣa* is established as the knower. So to establish the existence of *puruṣa* we do not need to take refuge of the reflection. However, it is necessary to admit the reflection of the object of knowledge in the *buddhivṛtti* in *puruṣa* itself. It has been already discussed that for the knowledge of the self, the reflection of the consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* is compulsory; otherwise there would certainly be *kartṛkarmavirodha*. Thus,Vijñānabhikṣu claims his position of*anyonyapratibimbavāda*to be free from fallacies.[12] It could, however, be mentioned over here that the above fallacy of mutual dependence, as proposed by Vijñānabhikṣu, concerning establishing the existence of *puruṣa*, is not a tenable one as the existence of *puruṣa* has been logically and consistently proved in the seventeenth *Sāṃkhyakārikā*[13] independent of any theory of mutual reflectivity. Thus, it is to be kept in mind that the reflection of the consciousness on the *buddhivṛtti* is held to explain the nature and the possibility of knowledge in the classical Sāṃkhya tradition, and not the existence of*puruṣa*.

The third argument analyses the expressive power of the reflected consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* in terms of expressing the object. If sunlight is reflected on water, that does not express the plants and animals that are there in the water but say if a fish enters into that part of the water which is illumined by the sunlight, then it being in contact with the sunlight gets immediately expressed. Analogously, the reflected consciousness in the *buddhivṛtti*, though it may express the *buddhivṛtti* itself, it cannot express the object of cognition. Just like the waves of water may be illumined by the sunrays themselves but it is not certain whether the same would happen in relation to the reflected sunrays; this is because it is not that well-established that reflected sunrays have the capacity of expressing other objects. This proves the fact that the reflection of consciousness is not the same as the consciousness itself, rather it is an insentient entity.[14]Here again, another analogy might be put forward to show that the reflection of an illumined object could possess

the capacity of expressing other objects just as the actual object itself. We know that the sunrays are capable of expressing the objects in a room. Now if we keep a tub of water in that room and make arrangements for receiving the sunlight on the tub of water only, then also we would find that the other objects of the room are expressed due to the reflected sunlight on the water. Similarly, for the consciousness and its reflection on the *buddhivṛtti*.

Fourth, Vijñānabhikṣu says that when sand particles, water vapour etc. come in contact with the extremely luminous sunrays, they are expressed in such a manner that we have experiences of mirage. So it is evident that the admission of reflections of *buddhivṛtti*and object (*viṣaya*) on consciousness (*caitanya*) for their expression is consistent.[15] The third and the fourth arguments show the refutation of *caitanyapratibimbavāda* and the establishment of *anyonyaprativimbavāda* respectively. However, such contention of the Neo-Sāṁkhyīs is not quite accepted by the classical Sāṁkhyīs due to their extreme articulation in their system to maintain the non-related essence of the pure consciousness.

In the fifth and final argument, Vijñānabhikṣuagain cites the aphorism '*akarturapiphalabhogo'nnādyavat*'[16] to argue against the co-located-ness (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of knowledge and desire. He says that one can be the enjoyer of the fruit of an action despite being not the agent of that action. Like in case of cooking, the chef is the agent of the action, while the master is the enjoyer of the fruit of that action. Thus, it is clear that even if there is non-co-located-ness (*vaiyādhikaraṇya*) in the case of knowledge and desire, no inconsistency (*anupapatti*) occurs. Again, in case of every individual, it is equally experienced by all that during an action the *manas* plays the role of determination (*saṁkalpa*) and the body directs the movement of its parts. The *buddhi* and the body are different from each other, and so one performs the task of determination while the other acts. So here also we find that the determination or ascertainment (*saṁkalpa*) and action (*kriyā*) are in different loci. In this way, it is possible to explain one entity as the locus of knowledge and another as that of the desire. Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu's theory appears to be a more logical one. However, it is to be kept in mind that if the phenomenon of cognition and specifically that of I-usage could be clearly and convincingly attained by considering VācaspatiMiśra's*ekapratibimbavāda*, then keeping in view the principle of logical parsimony, it is sufficient to admit that theory only and hence, the theory of mutual

reflectivity is rendered futile. Moreover, admission of the reflection of the qualified *buddhivṛtti*(*caitanyapratimbaviśiṣṭaantaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) on the *bimbacaitanya*itself leaves a room for considering the second-order reflection to be one kind of transformation of *puruṣa*, which is in no way tenable with regard to the Sāṁkhya philosophical system. However, regarding the immutability of *puruṣa*, if one considers a somewhat less rigid view, then the mere reflection of the qualified *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* on the *bimbapuruṣa* itself might not appear to be a transformation of *puruṣa* at all. An analogy might help to clarify. Let us consider the case of a mirror where various things are reflected at different points of time. Those reflections, however, do not modify the nature of the mirror. It simply continues to exist as a mirror, that is, an object which has got the reflectivity power. Similarly, in case of the *bimbacaitanya*, if it is considered simply as the reflector of the qualified *buddhivṛtti* or in other terms as a mere witness of it then, Vijñānabhikṣu's position could be considered without hampering the essence of the *bimbapuruṣa*. Thus, the theories of reflectivity as proposed by VācaspatiMiśra and Vijñānabhikṣu both in their respective wayshelp to resolve the cognitive issues related to I-usages, provided the notions are applied in a very cautious and articulate manner.

In favour of his position, Vijñānabhikṣufurther argues that according to Sāṁkhya philosophy, consciousness is a substance and it is ubiquitous. Moreover, it being eternal, it is always in contact with all the entities simultaneously. Here, it might be argued that just like the sunrays express all the objects that are in contact with it, similarly, all that is in contact with the ubiquitous consciousness, be simultaneously expressed. However, there is not much convincing answer to that. Thus, the issue somehow stands that how can then the *buddhivṛtti* transformed into the form of the object be expressed?

According to Sāṁkhyaphilosophers, objects are expressed from time to time and not always. Vijñānabhikṣu terms it as '*kādācitkatva*'.[17] It means 'sometimes'. We know that it is essential for *buddhi* to acquire the form of the object, for its cognition to be produced. Similarly, if *puruṣa* expresses the *buddhivṛtti*, then it should also be essential for the *puruṣa* to acquire its form. But *puruṣa*, according to the *śāstras*, cannot undergo any transformation, yet for the sake of explaining the methodology of cognition, *puruṣa* too must receive the reflection of the *buddhivṛtti*. In this context,

there are proofs from *Smṛti* as well, that establishes the fact of reception of reflection by *puruṣa*; and the *Smṛtivākya* is as follows:

'*tasmiṁściddarpaṇesphāresamastāvastudṛṣṭayaḥ/*

īmāstāḥpratibimbantisarasīvataṭadrumāḥ//'[18]

At this juncture reflecting from Sāṁkhya position, the process of cognition of I-ness (*ahaṁ*) can be traced as follows - in case of *ahamākāra* cognition the *buddhivṛtti* acts as the special cause (*karaṇa*). The reflection of the consciousness is being received by the intellect (*buddhi*). The causal efficacy(*kāraṇatā*) of *buddhi* lies in the fact of receiving the reflection of the consciousness. Now, the *buddhivṛtti* which has attained the reflection of consciousness is the cause towards *ahamākārajñāna*. Here, the cognition of the form of cognition (*jñānākārajñāna*), that is, *cidābhāsa* is there in *buddhi* itself. The object of this *cidābhāsa* which is there in *buddhi* is *ahaṁ*. Thus, *buddhi* gets associated with attributes like *jñānāśrayatva* (=*jñātṛtva*) and *ahamākāraviṣayāśrayatva* in definite order. Thus, in *buddhi* we find the co-located-ness of *jñānāśrayatva* and *ahamākāraviṣayāśrayatva*, and due to such co-located-ness there occurs non-discriminatory mode of cognition in *buddhi* between the *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* of the cognition. Thus, the mode of *buddhi* that is produced is I-ness-associated-knower-ship (*jñātṛtvaviśiṣṭaahaṁ*) and accordingly the usage produced is 'I am the knower'('*ahaṁjñātā*').

Now, onfurther analysis, we might say that valid cognition (*pramā*) is not a property of *buddhi*. This is because, when *puruṣa* is reflected on the *pramāṇa*, that is, on the *buddhivṛtti*, there appears an identity or non-discrimination between the consciousness and the *buddhi*. Due to such identity, the properties of *buddhi* get superimposed on *puruṣa* and consciousness is also superimposed on *buddhi*. Thus, the reflected consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* appears to be the knower. Another analogy has been shown here that when the moon gets reflected on the waves of the river water, the reflection of the moon quivers on the water surface; then ordinary usages like, 'The moon is quivering' ('*candraḥkampate*') occurs, which shows the imposition of the properties of the reflected moon on the actual moon. Similarly, usages like knower (*jñātā*) or 'I know' ('*ahaṁjānāmi*') are simply imposed on pure consciousness. Such usages are referred to as the '*pauruṣeyabodha*' (the cognition of *puruṣa*); however, such is not a true property of *puruṣa*, it is a mere imposition. In this context, other commentators also maintain that '*buddhivṛttyāsahaaviśiṣṭaḥ*'[19]

meaning that the apparent *pauruṣeyabodha* is nothing but the *buddhivṛtti* itself. VācaspatiMiśra, however, admits here that if we conceive of the idea of *pauruṣeyabodha* as the compound that is obtained through the imposition of the properties of *buddhi* on the reflected consciousness on it, then we arrive at an inconsistency. The reflected consciousness is not the *puruṣa* itself, rather it being insentient, can never manifest the *buddhivṛtti*. Thus, the reflected consciousness does not have any expressive capacity. [20] Hence, here we find that both VācaspatiMiśra and Vijñānabhikṣu agree with the view that the reflected consciousness cannot possess the same status and capacity as the actual consciousness, and hence, its accountability for the I-usages is a matter of extreme philosophical concern.

Now, we know that Vijñānabhikṣumaintains that the reflected consciousness is not like the pure consciousness itself. It does not possess any capacity to express objects. According to him, the expression of objects constitutes functionality (*arthakriyākāritva*). This is his main contention. From this part, we enter into the discussion on *pramā* following the neo-Sāṃkhyas namely, the followers of Vijñānabhikṣu. According to them, *pramā* is of two types— the *buddhivṛtti* in the form of an object (*viṣayākārabuddhivṛtti*) and the reflection of that *buddhivṛtti* on *puruṣa*.[21] The instrumental or specific cause (*karaṇa*) towards the first kind of *pramā* is the eyes or other sense organs while that of the second part is the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. In this context, it has been clarified by other commentators like BālarāmaUdāsīna, that the eyes etc. are the *karaṇa* of *pramā*. However, it is important to keep in mind that here, *karaṇa* is defined as '*yenakriyākriyate tatkaraṇam*', meaning that which is responsible for the occurrence of the action. Further, BālarāmaUdāsīna states that the *buddhivṛtti* acts both as the *pramā* and the *pramāṇa*. The reflected consciousness on *buddhivṛtti* acts as the knower (*pramātā*) and the consciousness which has received the reflection of the *buddhivṛtti* on it, is then the witness of the *pramā* only (*pramāsākṣīmātra*).

VācaspatiMiśra and other philosophers, however, have not admitted two types of *pramā*. According to them, when the sense organs get associated with their specific objects under their modes (*svavṛtti*), then the *tamaguṇa* diminishes (*abhibhava*) and the *sattvaguṇa* becomes extremely intense (*udbhava*). Such a state of the *buddhivṛtti* associated with the intense *sattvaguṇa* is called *adhyavasāya*. Thus, the *buddhivṛtti* in the form of the object constitutes the *pramāṇa*. When such

buddhivṛtti receives the reflection of consciousness on it, then that *buddhivṛtti* gets imposed on the reflected consciousness; and that is the *pramā*. *Pramā* is due to *pramāṇa*. Thus, it is evident that the superimposed properties of the *buddhivṛtti* on the reflected consciousness is referred to as the *pramā*, and not simply the properties of the *buddhivṛtti* itself.

Finally, we can cite the view of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī[22] in the context of our discussion throughout. According to him, the *buddhivṛtti* delimits (*avacchinna*) the *puruṣa* or the supra-sensory consciousness, and superimposes its properties and attributes on it. Whatever is imposed on *puruṣa*, that gets manifested. It is to be kept in mind here that Vijñānabhikṣu has also talked of such an argument in his text *Pravacanabhāṣya* through the analogy of the mirage in a desert. From here it might be claimed that the theories reflectivity are mere representations of the cognitive process, however, they all emphasize somehow or the other on the fact that reflections of the *buddhivṛtti* should be received on the supra-sensory consciousness only, and not on the reflected consciousness which acts as its representative.

The entire discussion carried out thus portrays that the view of *ekapratibimbavāda* bears in it the apprehension of the non-attainment of the cognition of the *bimbapuruṣa* itself and accordingly, all sorts of I-usages would be based on the mere reflection of the consciousness and not the actual consciousness itself. This is because however closely the reflection might resemble the actual, yet it can never be the actual itself. Such has been admitted by Vācaspati Miśra too as we have found above. On the other hand, the admission of *anyonyaprativimbavāda* is not possible without considering a restricted sense of the functionality (*arthakriyākāritva*) of *puruṣa* as held by Vijñānabhikṣu. However, such meticulous analysis into the issues involved in case of cognitive usages in Sāṃkhya philosophy finally proves that the views held by various philosophers regarding the nature and possibility of knowledge in the Sāṃkhya system are consistent with the epistemological and metaphysical position of the essence of *puruṣa* as admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy, and convincingly establishes the cognitive usages of I-ness with regard to the reflected consciousness, be it one-sided or mutual (in a restricted sense as discussed above), and at the same time retains the essence of *puruṣa*as the perpetually and universally unaltered consciousness (*kūṭasthasvabhāvacaitanya*).

References:

[1] *Sāṁkhyakārikā*5, *Sāṁkhyakārikā*of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*of VācaspatiMiśra, Narayan Goswami (edited), 3rd edition, Sanskrit PustakBhandar, Kolkata, 1406 (Bengali year), p. 45.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 46

[3]*Ibid.* p. 47

[4]'*asandigdhāviparītānadhigataviṣayā cittavṛttiḥ, bodhaścapauruṣeyaḥphalaṁprama//*', *Sāṁkhyakārikā*5, *Ibid*, pp. 40-41.

[5]'*atra yadipramārūpaṁphalaṁpuruṣaniṣṭhamātramucyatetadābuddhivṛttirevapramāṇam// yadi ca buddhiniṣṭhamātramucyatetadātūktendriyasannikarṣādirevapramāṇam// puruṣastupramāsākṣyaivanapramātāiti// yadi ca pauruṣeyabodhobuddhivṛttiścobhayamapipramocyatetadātūktamubhayamevapramābhedenap ramāṇaṁbhavati//*', 1/87, *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya* of Vijñānabhikṣu in *Sāṁkhyadarśanam*, JanardanShastriPandeya (edited), 1st edition, MotilalBanarsiDass, Delhi, 1989. Henceforth, *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*.

[6]*Sāṁkhya-Yogadarśana Pramāṇatattva*, Dr. Narayan Kumar Chattopadhyay, Bijan Publishers, Kolkata, 1988.

[7]'*arthākāratayaivārthagrahaṇasya buddhisthaledṛṣṭatvenatāṁbinasaṁyogaviśeṣamātreṇārthabhānasyapuruṣe'apyanaucityāt// arthākārāsyaivārthagrahaṇaśabdārthatvācceti// sacārthākāraḥpuruṣepariṇāmonasambhavatītyarthātpratibimbarūpaevaparyavasyatītidik//*', 1/99, *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*.

[8]*Sāṁkhyakārikā* 20, *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*, p. 193.

[9]*Sāṁkhyasūtra* 1/99, *Sāṁkhyasūtra*in *Sāṁkhyadarśanam*, DurgacharanSāṁkhyavedāntatīrtha (edited), Central Book Agency, Kolkata, 1360 (Bengali year).

[10]*Sāṁkhyasūtra*1/104, *Ibid.*

[11]*Sāṁkhyasūtra*1/105, *Ibid.*

[12]'*na ca pratibimbānyathāpapattyābimbabhūtaḥpuruṣaḥsyetsyatītivācyam//anyo'nyāśrayātpṛthagbimb asiddhau ca tatpratiyogitayābimbasiddhiriti// asammate ca jñātṛtayāpuruṣasiddhyānantaraṁtasyajñeyatvānyathānupapattyāpratibimbasiddhaunānyo'ny āśrayaḥ//*', 1/99, *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*.

[13]'*saṁghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayādadhiṣṭhānāt/ puruṣo'astibhoktṛbhāvātkaivalyārthaṁpravṛtteśca//*', *Sāṁkhyakārikā* 17, *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*, p. 169.

[14]'*atha buddhigatacicchāyārūpeṇasambandhenabimbasyaivajñānaṁnatucitaubuddhipratibimbaṁkal pyataityetāvanmātrecettatrāśayovarṇyeta// tadapyasatsūryādeḥsvapratibimbarūpasambandhenajalāditatsthavastubhāsakatvādarśanāt// kiraṇairevatadubhayabhāsanāt//*', 1/99, *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*.

[15]'*marumarīcikādautusvādhyantajalādibhāsakatvaṁdṛṣṭamevetidṛṣṭānusāreṇāsmābhiścitaubu ddhipratibimbaevasarvārthabhānahetutayāsambandhaḥkalpitaiti//*', 1/99, *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*.

[16]*Sāṁkhyasūtra* 1/105,*Sāṁkhyasūtra*in *Sāṁkhyadarśanam*, DurgacharanSāṁkhyavedāntatīrtha (edited), Central Book Agency, Kolkata, 1360 (Bengali year).

[17]'*ato'arthabhānasya kādācitkatvādyupapattaye'arthākātaivārthagrahanaṁvācyaṁbuddhautathādṛṣṭatvāt, buddhāvapi hi saṁyogamātrasyārthagrahaṇatveatīndriyasyāpyarthasyabuddhigrāhyatvaprasaṅgāt//*', 1/4, *Yogavārttika*, *Vyasabhāṣya*. *Yogavārttika*of Vijñānabhikṣu in *Pātañjaladarśanam*, JivananadaVidyasagar Bhattacharyya (edited), Siddheshwar Press, Kolkata, 1897.

[18]*Yogavāśiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa*, referred to from *Sāṁkhya-YogadarśanaPramāṇatattva*, Dr. Narayan Kumar Chattopadhyay, Bijan Publishers, Kolkata, 1988.

[19]*Ibid*, p. 32.

[20]'*citer pratisaṁkramāyāstadākārāpattausvabuddhisaṁvedanam//*', 4/22, *Pātañjalasūtra*, *Pātañjaladarśanam*, JivananadaVidyasagar Bhattacharyya (edited), Siddheshwar Press, Kolkata, 1897.

The*Vyasabhāṣya* of the above *sutra* is '*apariṇāminī hi bhoktṛśaktirpratisaṁkramā ca pariṇāminyarthepratisaṁkrāntevatadvṛttimanupatati, tasyāścaprāptacaitanyopagraharūpāyābuddhivṛtteranukāramātratayābuddhivṛttyaviśiṣṭāhi jñānavṛttirākhyāyate//*', *Ibid*.

In the above commentary it is also important to consider the view of Pañcaśikhācārya in the said context, as follows – '*napātālaṁna ca vivaraṁgirīṁāṁnaivāndhakāraṁkukṣayonodadhinām// guhāyasyāṁnihitaṁbrahmaśvāśvataṁbuddhivṛttimaviśiṣṭāṁkavayovedayanteiti//*', *Ibid*.

[21]'*tathā cāntaḥkaraṇavṛttirindriyavṛttidvārārthasannikṛṣṭābhavatitataindriyavṛttyāsāhārthakārāpariṇ amatesācārthākārāvṛttirguṇarūpāsarvātmanāṁvibhutve'apisvasvāminyevātmanipratibimbate nānyatra, anādisvasvāmibhāvasyapratibimbaniyāmakatvādanyathā'atiprasaṅgāt//*', *Sāṁkhyatattvārthadīpaṇam* of Bhāvāgaṇeśa, *Sāṁkhyasaṁgrahaḥ*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1969, p. 53.

[22]*Bhāṣya* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*, Damodar Mukhopadhyay (edited) Kolkata.

REVIEW OF ETHICAL NATURALISM AS A FORM OF COGNITIVISM AND REALISM

ANUREEMA BHATTACHARYYA

Ethical Naturalism is a form of a meta-ethical theory which connects ethical judgements with empirically verifiable natural factors. This makes naturalism a cognitive theory because verifiability confirms the truth/falsity. The relation of moral language to natural /empirical factors has been variously interpreted by the naturalist philosophers. Naturalism in Ethics may mean either of the following: Ethical terms may be *defined* or analysed in terms of natural facts and properties; Ethical terms denoting ethical properties are *constituted* of natural properties; Ethical properties are *dependent* on natural properties; Ethical properties are *identical* with natural properties *but cannot be defined* in terms of them, i.e. they do not have an identity in meaning. Ethical Naturalism is an interpretation of ethical language which refers to two things - firstly, that the ethical judgement expresses a knowledge by way of empirical verification; secondly, that the judgement contains ethical terms which may refer to something real or existent and is therefore verifiable. The former has an epistemological flavour while the latter a metaphysical flavour of naturalism. However, it is not that cognitivism and realism confirm one another, because a known thing can be real or unreal, again a real object may be either known or unknown. Let us, therefore, consider to what extent can an ethical naturalist theory fulfil the demands of cognitivism and realism.

In this contribution, an attempt has been made to confine myself only to the first meaning of naturalism which says that ethical judgements constitute ethical terms definable in factual terms. Hence, there is a semantic identity of moral and non-moral terms. This makes the ethical terms substitutable by factual terms. Hence, an ethical judgement may be reduced to a factual judgement which is verifiable to be true or false. The factual terms refer to natural facts of the world which are real. However, the theory does not refer to moral facts corresponding to moral terms which are real. The moral terms have their correspondence with the real world only through the factual terms which define them.

Let us examine some concrete theories of naturalism. The theories of naturalism have both subjective as well as objective factors constituting the definiens of normative terms. They may thus be classified as subjective naturalism and

objective naturalism. Those naturalists who define moral terms by subjective facts like individual feelings, attitudes, interests, desires etc. are subjective naturalists, whereas those who define them by objective facts like natural tendencies or capacities in objects are objective naturalists. Subjective naturalism declares that an ethical term in an ethical judgement may be defined in terms of feelings or emotions of an individual or a group of individuals. There are several possibilities in this regard:

a) X is good = interest is taken in X by S (individual subjective naturalism),
b) X is good = interest is taken in X by the members of group G (general subjective naturalism),
c) X is good = interest is taken in X by someone i.e. anyone (Perry's interest theory of naturalism).

Individual Subjective Naturalism:

If the judgement 'X is good' or 'A is right' is identical in meaning with some proposition which expresses the attitude or feeling of one particular person, then the theory is individualistic. This is because the crucial term 'good', 'right' etc. is defined with reference to one and only one person. In this case, however, it will also be possible to distinguish the individual as 'first-person' from 'third person'. According to 'first-person' views, when we say "X is good", we mean that we have a particular feeling or emotion about X; according to 'third person' theories, a statement " X is good" means that some other person has such an emotion.

First-person theories lead us to some peculiar consequences. Firstly, it follows from such a theory that there are no disagreements about what is good. Two contradictory statements "X is good" and "X is not good" are not contradictory when uttered by two different persons or the same person at different times. They express two compatible facts – one person likes X and the other does not, or the same person likes X at one moment and does not like it at some other moment. Each of us when asserting an action to be right or wrong is merely asserting our feelings. Hence, they can never be contradictory; neither is there any scope for moral disagreement. Secondly, first-person theories state that proof of any moral judgement is constituted of only whether the particular person making the judgement does have the feeling or attitude. A. C. Ewing in his book '*Ethics*' (New York, The Free Press, 1965) offers severe criticism against this view. He says that if such a definition is correct, it follows that a man can never be wrong in ethical judgement unless he has made a mistake about his psychology. Again two people will never mean the same thing

despite commenting the same i.e. 'good' or 'bad' on any object say 'X'; they will simply be expressing their approvals or disapprovals. Finally, if a person condemns another person or an act, it won't be actually about the person or the act referred to, but will only be expressing the speaker's feelings.

Third-person theories hold that "X is good" means "S likes/approves/has a favourable attitude towards X. "This theory can avoid relativism because a third person's feeling is referred to here; it is not conditioned by the speaker's individual feelings. Again, there can be genuine moral disagreement in this context when two persons differ about the feelings of the particular individual 'S'. Despite this, the theory is not without its difficulties. It might be questioned that how can the third person designated as 'S' be specified? If it is any person chosen at random, then there is no reason why there could not be any other 'S' instead. If the 'S' is specified as God, it makes the theory a non-naturalistic one in the sense of being not empirically verifiable. If 'S' means a sovereign ruler, then people who wish to mean 'the Queen of England' by 'S' will not be satisfied.

General Subjective Naturalism:

Subjective naturalism may be of a general form in which moral judgements are defined in terms of feelings or emotion of a certain group of people. In such a case, the question might arise as to how is the particular group selected. Even if all members of a certain group agree on the fact that the meaning of "X is good" will be "We approve of X", it is quite possible that people outside the group might consider it a mere stipulation or reporting. They might for good reason describe it as arbitrary and hence unfair. When critically assessed, this general view seems not very different from the first-person view. By saying that "X is good "we mean the same as "we members of group G approve of X". Now, if S who is a member of group G says "X is good", he is saying that members of group G approve of X. Again if S1 who is a member of group G1 says "X is good", he is saying that the members of group G1 approve of X. This shows that there can never be ethical disagreement between two people from different groups, because two seemingly incompatible judgements made by members of different groups are, according to this view, not incompatible. Moreover, the same person may be a member of many groups at the same time. This leads to puzzling consequences, and the view is subject to a modified and somewhat limited relativism. Now, a question arises that "How is the group chosen?" or, "

Where lies the certainty that whatever the chosen group says will be never wrong?" The argument which is most crucial in this context is: it is obvious that we ought to seek as the moral end what is intrinsically good or right just because it is good or right in itself; we ought not to seek what most people approve of just because they feel the approval of it. Therefore 'good' or 'right' cannot mean the same as 'approved by most people'.

R.B. Perry's Interest-theory of Naturalism:

According to Perry, an American neo-naturalist philosopher, "any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it; just as anything whatsoever becomes a target when anyone whosoever aims at it." (Ralph Barton Perry, *General Theory of Value,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1926). Hence, for Perry, X has value= interest is taken in X by someone, i.e., anyone. We see that Perry's subjective naturalism is much more liberal than either of the above versions. Whatever is an object of a person's interest becomes an object of value. The deeper the interest, the more valuable is the object; and the greater the number of individuals expressing an interest in the object, the greater its value. Objects increase in value concomitantly as interest is shown in them, and lose value as interest diminishes.

One objection often raised against Perry is that his theory entails relativistic consequences. If the definition he stipulated for 'good' is accepted, he is forced to accept other stipulated definitions which contradict his own because they are chosen by other philosophers. The interest-theory of value is troublesome because it is open to serious counter-examples. Some people find interest in murder, revenge, rape, cruelty, hate, war, death etc., so they are instances of 'good'. But such a view is unacceptable. Ewing in *Ethics* objected to this theory arguing that if good=desired and better = desired more, then in reality what is desired more should be more good. But this is not always the case. We may desire more about the welfare of our near and dear ones than that of people of whom we read in the newspaper. But this does not make the former case better than the latter. One of the severest critiques of Perry's Naturalism is that Perry is not very reasonable in identifying goodness with interest, because interest does not necessarily make a thing good. Feeling of interest is important for a thing to be good, but it does not have sufficient features to be equated with it.

Subjective Naturalism as a Form of Cognitivism:

All the above versions of subjective naturalism refer to certain feelings/emotions of individuals or individual groups in defining value terms. We have analysed all the possible problems in dealing with subjective factors. Now, the question is whether the definition of moral terms in evaluative judgements by such subjective factors can generate moral knowledge or not. It is interesting to note at this point that though there are subjective factors in the definiens, the presence or absence of those facts makes the definition true or false, hence giving the moral judgement a cognitive value. There may be a problem with the definition itself, but if the definition is accepted and is considered as means of doing naturalism, the theory makes ethical judgements empirically verifiable as is the case in any scientific knowledge.

Here there are two aspects we are dealing with - the satisfiability of subjective naturalism in terms of its definition, and the success of the subjective naturalist theory as contributing to ethical knowledge. As seen in the individual first-person and third-person theories, the definition of a moral term 'good' in "X is good" is either in terms of the individual subject's feeling or the feeling of the group to which the subject belongs. Hence the meaning of the judgement has reference to the individual moral agent who passes the judgement, and the knowledge of the statement 'X is good" is concerning the individual who utters it. A piece of knowledge is justified to be objectively true or false with respect to its correspondence with reality. For example- on seeing a green tree if a person says," The tree is green", he has true knowledge, whereas if he sees it with a jaundiced-eye and utters, "The tree is yellow", he has false knowledge. According to subjective naturalist theories, a person knows "X is good" when he has certain interest or feelings for it. The judgement is tested to be true or false, i.e. the statement "X is good" is tested to be true or false if he has the requisite feelings. This involves circularity. If the subject does not have the feeling, he does not utter it to be 'good', but the utterance 'good' is justified with reference to the presence/absence of feelings. Such knowledge, therefore, will be subject-related. I shall here prefer to call such knowledge not objective at all, rather, not knowledge at all.

Objective Naturalism:

Objective naturalism is a theory which claims that moral judgements are definable by factual judgements which refer to certain objective facts instead of appealing to the feelings of individuals or groups. Edward Westermarck, a Darwinian philosopher of the 19th century considered that moral terms are to be defined by natural tendencies in objects causing an agent to approve or disapprove of it. If the object tends to cause approval in the subject, he judges it to be 'good' and if it causes disapproval, he calls it 'bad'. (Edward Westermarck, *Ethical Relativity,* New York, Brace & World, 1932). These tendencies are inbuilt in the nature of an object and hence are objective. According to this view my saying "X is right"="X tends to cause me to approve of it". X may have a tendency to cause me to approve of it, but I do not approve of it, or I am not acquainted with X. Hence we see that the tendency may be there in an object to cause its approval by a subject, but the subject fails to do so, i.e. the tendency in the object is irrespective of the subject. This makes it an objective theory of naturalism. Westermarck says, "The doing of what ought not to be done, or the omission of what ought not to be omitted, is apt to call forth moral indignation – this is the most essential fact involved in the notion of 'ought'."(Edward Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,* Vol. I, London, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1906,). 'Ought' and 'duty' express the tendency of omitting the possibility of disapproval. It does not say anything about the consequences of the performance. The tendency in a phenomenon to arouse moral disapproval is expressed by the term 'bad' or 'wrong'. The truth/falsity of moral judgements is a function of whether or not there is this tendency. He says: "It is, of course, true that we in a given moment have a certain emotion; but in no other sense can the antithesis of true and false be applied to it."(Westermarck, *Ethical Relativity*).

Westermarck's theory may seem to be a non-cognitivist one. This is because at some point of his philosophy Westermarck had commented that all attempts of the moral philosophers, common-sense theorists to prove the objective validity of moral judgements have failed because the predicates of moral judgements are ultimately based on emotion. Since no objectivity can come from an emotion, so the moral judgements do not have objective validity and hence are non-cognitive in nature. Though Westermarck advocates the theory of the emotional origin of moral judgements, he does not mean that moral judgements imply the existence of moral

emotion in the mind of the speaker. What he intends to assert is that there is a tendency in the object to arouse the feeling of approval or disapproval in the subjection the presentation of the object, and such tendency is a natural one irrespective of the actual feeling of approval/disapproval? Hence, this is an objective tendency view of naturalism.

Westermarck's view is not free from criticism. It is practically not conceivable that we judge a thing to be good because the thing tends to cause me to approve of it. After all, when we judge it as 'good', we do not justify the judgement by the object's causing the speaker to approve of it. Rather, it is because the thing is good that the subject approves of it. The goodness/badness of a thing is something intrinsic to the nature of the object; it cannot be contained in its approval/disapproval. Again, the same object may tend to arouse approval in one subject and disapproval in another. This makes the same object both 'good' and 'bad'. But if the tendency is objective, it cannot vary with the subject. Finally, it is as if we cannot judge a thing to be 'good' or 'bad' if we are not affected to have approval or disapproval of it. This is also not quite acceptable.

Tendency View as a Cognitive Theory:

Can the tendency view of naturalism be considered a cognitive theory? When an ethical judgement is empirically verifiable, it is cognisable. According to the tendency view, an ethical judgement is verifiable as true or false if the object on which the judgement is passed does/does not tend to cause approval/disapproval. Now, when a moral judgement is passed on an object, it is a mark of its approval/disapproval, i.e. if the subject marks it 'good', he approves of it, whereas if he calls it 'bad', he disapproves of it. This shows that the object must have caused the subject to have such feeling of approval/disapproval, for which he makes such comments as 'X is good' or 'X is bad'. The object's causing the approval must be due to the tendency inherent in it. Thus the tendency view asserts the presence of tendency in an object which is verifiable the moment we evaluate the object. The verifiable factor is such that there is no chance of its being false since it is there in an evaluated object irrespective of its actualisation. Hence, the utterance of moral judgement is just enough to make it a piece of knowledge. Cases where the object does not have the tendency are cases where no evaluative judgement is passed on it.

In this sense can the objective tendency view of naturalism be considered a version of cognitivism.

Spencer's Evolutionary Naturalism:

One of the objectivistic naturalist views which are not a tendency view is that of Herbert Spencer. Spencer was one of the foremost proponents of evolutionary naturalism. According to him, 'good' may be defined as 'more evolved'. As stated in his famous dictum, "The conduct to which we apply the name good is the relatively more evolved conduct; and bad is the name we apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved."(Herbert Spencer, *The Data of Ethics,* London, 1879). By being 'more evolved', he means 'more conducive to living'. An evolved conduct strives towards self-preservation to attain a longer and a fuller life. Hence, "…we regard as good the conduct furthering self-preservation, and as bad the conduct tending to self-destruction." Now, the surplus of enjoyment makes self-preservation desirable. An action which serves the lives of others is called a good action because it has immediate and also remote effect on all persons, that the good is universally pleasurable.

Spencer's view is directed towards a synthesis of egoism and altruism. Just as it is true that a person must seek his pleasure and preserve his own life, it is equally desirable that he does it by helping others. An individual's welfare is hampered if it fails to be altruistic. Self-happiness is gained by furthering another's happiness and general happiness is furthered by promoting self-happiness. Good conduct, therefore, produces a surplus of pleasure, and bad conduct results in a surplus of pain.

The theory gives room for moral disagreement. Two persons may disagree concerning calling a particular action good in the sense of being more conducive to living. The same action may be universally pleasure-producing to one person but may not be so to some other person. But to judge an action to be conducive to life or not and thereby to be good or not can be related to its being more evolved. A more evolved conduct implicitly refers to its advancement in time. But we see that there are throwbacks in history, thus a more evolved conduct over time may not be a more self-preservatory one. Moreover, if moral superiority is defined by being more evolved, we see that advancement in evolution is also defined by being morally superior. This involves circularity.

Spencer attempted to present the theory of evolutionary naturalism to reach utilitarianism. His prime focus was to advise for a life which is not for mere survival but is enriched in pleasurable bounties. His basic defect was laid in his assuming that life evolves for the better. We may here refer to the criticism of Spencer by Thomas E. Hill who in his book *Ethics in Theory and Practice* (New York, Crowell, 1956) points out quite rationally that with higher forms of evolution there is a rise in the level of intelligence and social organisation. This naturally creates a more complicated circumstance leading to more destructive forces and wars. The more progress in development, the more is the chance for being intelligently shrewd and cruel. Therefore, it may be said that morality does not come from development; rather development and progress depend on morality. Thus his defining of 'good' in terms of 'more evolved' is not a decisive one. Even if the definition is proper, it cannot be objectively verified whether a particular action is more evolved or not in the sense that it is self-preservatory or not as analysed by Spencer. It is important to distinguish in this context objective verification from the objective factor. The explanation given by Spencer to define 'good' refers no doubt to an objective factor but does not guarantee any objective verification for that. Hence, the definition of moral terms under evolutionary naturalism of Spencer cannot raise an evaluative judgement to the level of knowledge.

Naturalist Theories as Forms of Realism:

In all such cases, moral terms referring to moral properties are equated with factual terms denoting factual properties. Hence, the reality of moral properties is judged with respect to the reality of factual properties. But if such facts are behavioural, emotional, they cannot be real irrespective of the subject. Hence, the subjective naturalist theories are not to be considered as realist theories.

On the other hand, objective naturalism which equates moral terms with terms denoting objective natural facts has a claim for the existence of such facts irrespective of the subjective emotions. Hence, this version of naturalism can be considered a realist theory. As seen in Westermarck's tendency view, the object which is evaluated has a natural tendency which causes a feeling of approval/disapproval for it. This tendency being a natural constitution of the object is as much real as is the object itself. Hence, when a moral term is defined in terms of such a natural tendency, it refers to a form of realism.

As analysed in Spencer's theory, an object is good if it is more evolved. Spencer has a very specific explanation of the connotation 'being more evolved'. There may be difficulties in the definition thus suggested or maybe differences in considering whether an act or a thing has at all the specific features of being more evolved or not. But if they are present in a particular action, the action becomes good. Here also we see that an objective factor being real can be used as a mark of verification of the judgement. It is however noteworthy that, in both the forms of naturalism – subjective and objective, there is no possibility of the existence of moral property in its direct sense. Where possible, they are real only by virtue of definitional substitution of moral terms by factual terms, thereby referring to factual properties. In this sense, the realism hinted at in objective naturalism may be considered as a form of indirect realism.

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ALETHIC RELATIVISM AND FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENT

ANUMITA SHUKLA AND MAYANK BORA

Introduction:

Dora believes that liquorice is tasty. Norma, on the other hand, cannot stand liquorice and believes it to be the foulest tasting substance on the planet. To her, it is amply clear that it is false that liquorice is tasty. Dora and Norma then seem to be in disagreement with each other on the matter of the taste of liquorice. Understanding disagreement in terms of taking differing (doxastic/alethic) attitudes towards the same truth evaluable content, we may say that Dora and Norma take disparate attitudes towards the same content as expressed by (1):

(1) Liquorice is tasty.

Yet, it is not clear if either Dora or Norma can be faulted for taking the attitudes they take. As one may say, it is, after all, a matter of taste. It seems what we have here is the case of a *faultless disagreement* (FD, henceforth).

That there can be FDs seems quite intuitive. But, how can that be? How can we have disputes where no one is at fault? The ready explanation for faultlessness in the domain of taste seems to be that when it comes to taste there are no objective standards. Instead, different people can have different standards of taste and thus even if they disagree about the taste of something they are not to be faulted, as long as they are applying their standards correctly. In other words, the occurrence of FDs in a domain seems to demand a relativistic conception of the domain. Yet, it is not clear how to formulate a conception of relativism such that it can do justice to the intuition that there can be FDs.

Kölbel (2003) has argued that relativism, if it is to capture our intuition that there can be FDs, is best characterized as relativism about truth, as *Alethic Relativism* (AR henceforth). The complaint against alternate formulations of relativism is that they invariably make the disagreement disappear by relativizing the normative judgment or claim in such manner that the disputing agents can no more be seen to be holding disparate attitudes towards the *same* truth evaluable content. AR, according to Kölbel, solves the problem since it allows for the same completely truth evaluable content to be true according to one perspective/set of standards and false according to others. However, Boghossian (2011), building on an earlier argument by Richard (2008), has argued that AR fails to characterize any disagreements as faultless.

Attempts to recover the faultlessness, according to Boghossian, are successful only at the expense of the disagreement.[1]

Boghossian's case against AR boils down to saying that if AR is correct no agent can rationally see a dispute as both faultless and as a genuine disagreement. His argument rests on thinking from the immersed perspective, from a perspective where a normative judgment is warranted. We shall argue that it is completely possible to think about normative disputes from a perspective wherein no normative judgment is made or warranted. We shall argue that an agent taking such a perspective can very well see a normative dispute as a genuine case of an FD even if AR is correct.

1. Alethic Relativism and Faultless Disagreement

Let us take a more detailed look at how AR is motivated by the means of an FD. Kölbel characterizes an FD in the following way: A faultless disagreement is a situation where there is a thinker *A*, a thinker *B*, and a proposition (content of judgment) p, such that:

(a)   *A* believes (judges) that *p* and *B* believes or judges that not-*p*

(b)   Neither A nor B has made a mistake (is at fault). (Kölbel 2003, p 53-54)

Dora and Norma do seem to have an FD in this sense. They seem to disagree about whether the proposition that liquorice is tasty is true or false but it also does not seem like we can fault the judgment of either since they are correct according to their tastes.

While, *prima facie*, it seems obvious that there can be FDs, in the domain of taste, for example, quite contrarily it also appears that one can argue against the possibility of any FDs. Here is how Kölbel presents the argument informally:

> Consider an arbitrary disagreement between *A*, who believes *p*, and *B*, who believes not-*p*. Suppose that *p*. Then what *B* believes is not true. Now suppose that not-*p*. Then *A* believes something not true. Thus, in either case, one of the disputants believes something not true. But this means that in either case, one of the disputants commits a mistake. Thus the disagreement is not faultless. Since A, B and p were chosen arbitrarily, it follows that no disagreement is faultless. (Kölbel 2003, p 55)

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[1] Note that Richard's argument was only intended to show that FDs should not be thought of in terms of truth. Boghossian, on the other hand, is looking to use Richard's argument to build a case against the notion of AR itself.

This argument requires taking the notion of faultlessness in alethic terms, that is it assumes that being at no fault epistemically is not enough for an FD. If someone believes something false they are at fault. Kölbel sums it up as:

(**T**) It is a mistake to believe a proposition that is not true (Kölbel 2003, p 56)

This assumption may seem too strong to some. But Kölbel thinks that FDs exist even if we take such a strong alethic notion of faultlessness. All the argument shows is that given certain background assumptions the notion of FDs seems to be impossible. Perfect sense of FDs may be made if some of those assumptions are challenged. The specific assumption in question is that the truth or falsity of a statement is objective. As such, Kölbel's specific relativist suggestion amounts to saying that we seriously consider two things.

1. That in cases of FDs we have cases of people bringing in different perspectives (or standards: of taste in our example), where there is no fact of the matter about which perspective is the objectively correct one.

2. That statements like (1) are not objectively true (or false), but true (or false) only relative to some given perspective.

We need to understand the second suggestion carefully. The suggestion is not that sentences like (1) are to be understood to be referring to the perspective of the subject; that their contents otherwise are in some sense incomplete just like that of (2).

(2) It is raining

Whether (2) is true or not, or expresses a true proposition or not, depends upon whether it is raining or not at some contextually salient location, perhaps the location of one of the conversational partners. But, presumably, that is so since (2) does not even make a truth evaluable statement without reference to the location of the speaker. In other words, the content of (2) is in that sense incomplete, it makes a complete truth evaluable assertion only when the location of utterances is either specified or implicitly understood due to the context. Thus, for (2) the truth evaluable content that is actually in question is not (2) but (2'), presuming the speaker is in New York at the time of utterance.

(2)It is raining in New York.

Similarly, one could say that (1) is really to be understood as (1') where *i* is an indexical that takes as its value some contextually salient perspective or individual.

(1)Liquorice is tasty according to *i*.

This relativizes the content of the statement to some perspective or subjective standard (Dora's or Norma's, for example). That is, Dora's judgment that (1) is true is really the judgment that liquorice is tasty from Dora's perspective is true since when Dora uses (1) *i* refers to Dora's standards. Similarly, when Norma uses (1) *i* refers to Norma or her standards of taste and hence when she judges (1) to be false she is judging that liquorice is tasty from Norma's standards.

This is what the indexical relativists such as Dreier (1990) have in mind[2] but not Kölbel. Kölbel notes that with indexical relativism we do not get an FD between Dora and Norma since the propositions they are judging to be true or false are very much distinct. Instead, what Kölbel is suggesting is to think that sentences like (1) have truth evaluable contents *as is*. However, their truth is relative to the perspective or standards of evaluation of the speaker. In other words, it is not the content of these sentences which is relative to the perspective of assessment but the truth of their contents is. So, Dora and Norma mean the same thing by (1) but when Dora says it she makes a false assertion (or that, when she utters its negation she makes a true one) according to her standards, but when Norma utters it she makes a true assertion according to her standards.

Once we consider the AR view we can now make perfect sense of faultless disagreements as long as faultlessness is not understood in terms of truth *simpliciter a la* (**T**) but in terms of relative truth *a la* (**T***):

(**T***)It is a mistake to believe a proposition that is not true as evaluated from one's own perspective.

Now with AR in place and FDs understood in terms of (**T***) instead of (**T**) neither of Dora or Norma can be said to be at fault or making a mistake. This is so since even though Dora and Norma hold (1) to be true and false, respectively, contrary to the each other, (1) really is true relative to Dora's perspective and false relative to Norma's perspective.

So, it seems that AR can account for their being an FD between Dora and Norma as long as being at fault is understood in terms of relative truth. But, some like

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[2] This is of course a considerable simplification of the internal relativist view. See (Dreier 1990) for more details.

Richard (2008) and Boghossian (2011) believe that even given AR and (**T***) we still do not have an FD between Dora and Norma.

2. The Argument from Perspectival Immersion

Richard has argued that understood in terms of relative truth disagreements cannot be faultless: [W]hen one is willing to ascribe truth or falsity to a particular claim p, one treats p and the claim that p is true as equivalent: *within* a perspective, truth is 'disquotational'. Suppose I think that Beaufort is a better cheese than Tome, and you think the reverse. Suppose (for *reductio*) that each of our thoughts is valid— mine is true from my perspective, yours is from yours. Then not only can I (validly) say that Beaufort is better than Tome, I can (validly) say that it's true that Beaufort is better than Tome. And of course if you think Tome is better than Beaufort and not vice versa I can also (validly) say that you think that it's not the case that Beaufort is better than Tome. So I can (validly) say that it's true that Beaufort is better than Tome though you think Beaufort isn't better than Tome. From which it surely follows that you're mistaken—after all, if you have a false belief, you are mistaken about something. This line of reasoning is sound no matter what the object of dispute. So it is just wrong to think that if my view is valid—true relative to my perspective—and your contradictory view is valid—true, that is, relative to yours—then our disagreement is 'faultless'. Faultless disagreement is possible—but such disagreement is not one to be evaluated in terms of truth. (Richard 2008, 132) Boghossian presents the argument, which he calls *the argument from (perspectival) immersion*, in the following semi-formal manner:

The Argument from (Perspectival) Immersion:

(3) The content (p) is at best relatively true. (Alethic Relativism)

(4) If Dora judges validly that p, it will also be valid for Dora to judge that *It's true that p.*

(Truth is Disquotational within a perspective)

(5) If Dora judges that *It's true that p* then Dora must, on pain of incoherence, judge that *It's false that not-p*.

(6) If Dora judges that *It's false that not-p,* then Dora must, on pain of incoherence, judge that anyone who judges *not-p* (e.g., Norma) is making a *mistake*.

Therefore,

(7) Dora must judge that Norma is making a mistake and so cannot regard the disagreement with Norma as faultless.

Therefore,

(8) The disagreement between Dora and Norma is not faultless. (Boghossian 2011, p 62)

The first premise, that is (3) as labelled here, just follows from the statement of Alethic Relativism. The premise (4) follows from the fact that the equivalence schema for truth, i.e. a sentence 'S' is true if and only if S, holds for truth and even if the truth is taken to be relative to perspectives it would hold within the perspective. The premise (5) follows from taking Dora to be of a sound rational mind thereby assuming that she will not take both the proposition that p and the proposition that not-p to be true. If she takes the first to be true then she, just like any rational agent, must take the second to be false. But, now if Dora takes it to be false that not-p then she should also take someone who believes or judges that not-p to be mistaken or be at fault, which is what (6) expresses. Thus, we seem to conclude that Dora (or, Norma, or anyone for that matter) cannot take another agent whom they disagree with to be faultless, even if the truth is relative in the domain to which the statement disagreed on belongs.

The important thing about the argument from immersion is the notion of immersion itself. Being immersed in a perspective amounts to the immersed subject holding steadfast to his/her normative principles and making normative judgments, and using *his/her* normative principles in making these normative judgments. If Dora is truly immersed and committed to her principles of taste then she would be committed not only to making the normative judgment that liquorice is tasty, but also that Norma is wrong in thinking that it is not, and most importantly that any standard of taste that suggests otherwise is flawed. This is what precludes Dora herself from using (**T***) and thereby judging Norma, whose evaluation of (1) is perfectly in accordance with her perspective, to not be making any mistake. In any case, the truth of a philosophical position like AR can not be dependent on whether actual agents subscribe to it.

Hence, the argument looks secure until (7). But, what justifies the move from (7) to the conclusion (8)? We can very well agree in that in the example of FD above that Dora and Norma being immersed take the disagreement to be faulty. But why

should we take that to imply that it is faulty? Boghossian (2011) thinks that the transition from the premise (7) to the conclusion can be supported based on the "plausible claim that if a disagreement were faultless it must be possible for a rational thinker to claim that it is." But on what basis does Boghossian assume that if Dora and Norma cannot rationally claim their disagreement to be faultless then there is no other person who could rationally do so? Couldn't the reader rationally claim it to be so?

Boghossian's thought seems to be that the reader is also going to be a normative agent and must as such be part of the discourse and not a mere observer. As such the reader being a normative agent must, in the normative discourse Dora and Norma are engaged in, assume the position of either Dora or Norma. In other words, for any reader either it is going to be true that liquorice is tasty or it is going to be false that liquorice is tasty; the reader must him/herself be immersed one way or the other. In the first case, the reader would have to find Norma to be mistaken and in the later, the reader will have to find fault with Dora. Consequently, the understanding is, there is no rational thinker who can coherently claim the discourse to be faultless since every rational agent being a normative agent too will have to be a part of the normative discourse and pick either Dora or Norma's side, whereby he or she is bound to find the other side of the dispute as being at fault.

The argument goes through then if we accept that any rational agent trying to make sense of a normative dispute will himself/herself have to make normative judgments. But, is this a reasonable assumption? Granted, that in the case of Dora and Norma, or any similar normative disputes, we might find the standards of the taste of one correct and the other wrong. After all, for any agent either the agent likes the taste of liquorice or not. But, we also seem to be able to make perfect sense of the idea that neither Dora nor Norma are committing any mistake *as per their respective standards*. While one invariably has a normative perspective and invariably applies it in making normative judgments in evaluating disputes, one can also make purely rational (i.e. otherwise non-normative) judgments about whether the normative stances of the agents locked in a dispute are consistent with their perspectives.

It seems then that normative agents can refrain from making normative judgments and can make judgments *about* a normative discourse on purely logical grounds. One can keep from entering the normative debate oneself by dissociating

oneself from one's normative perspective and maintaining instead a purely rational normatively dissociated perspective which we shall call a *Dissociated Perspective* (or, DP in short). The question then is in evaluating whether a normative dispute such as between Dora and Norma is an FD or not should we consider the judgments we make from our normatively immersed perspective or from a DP. This is the issue we intend to address in the rest of the paper.

3. Faultlessness from a Dissociated Perspective:

In this section, we want to argue for two things: one, that someone can take up a DP, and two, that from a DP the disagreement between Dora and Norma indeed comes out to be faultless. In the rest of the paper, we shall try to establish that from a DP a normative dispute can indeed be seen as a genuine case of an FD.

To begin with, we need to give brief characterizations of a DP and an immersed perspective. A DP is when a normative agent refrains from using his/her normative system. It is not that s/he uses some other but that s/he refrains from making normative judgments regarding the concerned normative modality completely. S/he still has the use of his/her logical principles (and the normative principles of other modalities) and s/he can use that to make logical judgments about what normative judgments would follow from some given set of normative principles. As a DP is achieved by refraining from one's normative principles but using one's logical ones, it is not an objective view from nowhere, but rather a curtailed view from somewhere. It is very important to note that this is not the same as a third-person perspective as one may very well make normative judgments from a third-person perspective (as Boghossian assumes one must). In other words, a third-person perspective does not necessitate taking a DP.[3]

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[3] One may go on about the characteristics of a DP: in that much there can be as many distinct DPs as distinct logical system people may subscribe to, though that by the view of quite a few may mean just one. However, even in being a curtailed view it allows for a much greater commensurability between distinct normative system in as much as the logics may be intercommensurable. Intercommensurability of logics need not be limited to same logic but as long as one's logic allows one to make systematic judgments about what follows on the basis of another logic using the former as metalanguage in the same way as classical logic does for paracomplete or paraconsistent logics, one may be able to use it to make logical judgments about the other normative system.

However, I think for our current purposes the discussion of a DP in the main text above should suffice.

An immersed perspective as we see it then is characterized in contrast with a DP. It is just when one holds steadfast and committed to one's normative principle and is committed to making use of them when making normative judgments. Also, one cannot but fail to make a normative judgment following one's standards when a normative question arises. One is then committed to the correctness of one's normative system, and the wrongness of conflicting ones. Again this is not the same as taking a first-person perspective since it is completely plausible to take a third-person perspective and be committed to one's normative standards and be ready to employ them, among other things, to judge them as right and conflicting others as wrong.

Given these characterizations let us now consider again the purported example of an FD, the dispute between Dora and Norma about the taste of liquorice. Specifically, consider the way initially the example of an FD between Dora and Norma was introduced. To begin with, at least the dispute seemed to be faultless. The question to be asked now is what position did the reader take in assessing relativism's merits in explaining the example of FD. Did the reader take Dora's position or did the reader take Norma's position? The answer seems to be neither. The way the example was presented the reader was invited to take a position independent of the perspectives of either Dora or Norma. The reader took a Dissociated Perspective. In taking the DP, the reader keeps from evaluating the truth of the statement according to his standards and instead engages with the purely logical question of whether the statement would be true or not according to the standards of the subjects. In other words, the reader is not invited to and is not looking to, make a normative judgment about the taste of liquorice. S/he is invited to is to make a logical judgment instead. Since the reader is not making a normative judgment there is no question of the normative judgments of either Dora or Norma being at fault since they conflict with that of the reader's. Instead, the reader sees no fault from his/her perspective, which exemplifies a DP, since s/he disengages from his/her standards and can see that the judgments of Dora and Norma would logically follow from their respective standards or perspectives.

Using the notion of a DP one can object to the transition from (7) to (8) in the argument from immersion. Boghossian's rationale for the transition was that "if a disagreement was faultless it must be possible for a rational thinker to claim that it

is." (Boghossian 2011, p 62). Now, it seems we are in a position to point to such a rational thinker: the reader.

One point here needs clarification. The counter-argument here need not rest on the fact that the reader's in judging evaluating the dispute between Dora and Norma exemplified a DP. Boghossian could deny that being the case. He may look to suggest an alternate explanation for why in the case in question here the reader might be able to entertain some relativistic intuitions.

But, one may very well, instead of taking our description of the reader's position as a factual description of matters, take it as a description of a possible way to approach the issue. That is, we could say that even if the reader does not take a DP in evaluating the dispute it is very much possible for the reader to take a DP. Then it can be said that if it a person in evaluating the dispute between Dora and Norma were to assume the reader's position to make sense of faultlessness in this case while adhering to AR the person could see the dispute as faultless by taking a DP.

From the considerations offered above, one can conclude that Boghossian's move from (7) to (8) in the argument form immersion can be successfully blocked, and hence there is for AR no issue with faultlessness in the discourse. The key to blocking this move is, of course, to deny the presumed necessity of immersion.

4. Losing Disagreement?

It would seem then Boghossian's argument has been successfully blocked. But, Boghossian has suggested that the person looking from a dissociated perspective should not consider the disagreement between Dora and Norma as a *genuine* disagreement.[4]

To see how Boghossian's suggestion could be worked out let us see how he builds the case the other time he makes essentially the same point. Boghossian considers a possible response to his argument where it is suggested that Dora and Norma could, in fact, see the dispute between themselves as faultless. Boghossian's argument from perspectival immersion may be seen as relying on Dora herself not subscribing to AR and (**T***) but rather to something like (**T**). It is for that reason that Dora takes Norma to be mistaken. But what if Dora and Norma take the idea of

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[4] Boghossian made this suggestion in response to a question regarding the possibility of a DP raised by one of the authors of this paper in a question answer session with Boghossian where the author was part of the audience.

relative truth seriously and therefore understand making a mistake in terms of (**T***) and not (**T**)?[5] Would not in that case Dora and Norma be able to see not just their own but also the other's stance on the taste of liquorice as not mistaken and therefore the disagreement between them as faultless? It appears that Dora and Norma would be able to make sense of the fact that they can judge that *not-p*, recognize that the other judges that *p*, take their judgment to be "true" and the other's to be "false," recognizing all the while that when they say that their judgment is true and the other's false, they effectively mean "true and false relative to my perspective." That leaves Dora and Norma free to judge that the other's judgment is not a *mistake* since the fundamental norms governing the ascription of mistake will now be (**T***) and not (**T**).[6]

Boghossian rejects this because here we lose the sense of there being a *genuine* disagreement. He worries that if Dora and Norma know that there are different standards of truth about taste that they are both judging according to their standards then one can not consider the other to be disagreeing with them. As Boghossian puts it: How is it possible to regard this as a *genuine* disagreement?

> I know that Norma has different standards than mine. I regard her standards as just as correct as mine. I know that her judgment is true relative to her standards. And I also affirm that these sorts of judgment have no other kind of truth-value, no absolute truth-values.
>
> It's simply obvious, it seems to me, that if I have said all this, I cannot regard this as a real disagreement, no more than I can regard the guy who says "It is morning" in the morning to be disagreeing with the guy who says "It is afternoon" in the afternoon. (Boghossian 2011, p 66)

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[5] Boghossian (2011) in fact has slightly different sets of norms about belief. But as far as I can see they simply boil down to (T) and (T*) above as long as (T) and (T*). Just replacing the
[6] The last two sentences are mere rephrases of the following passage from (Boghossian 2011, p 65-66) slightly changed to suit the case here:
For I would be able to make sense of the fact that I can judge that p, recognize that someone else judges that not-p, take my own judgment to be "true" and the other person's judgment that not-p to be "false," recognizing all the while that when I say that my own judgment is true and his false, I effectively mean "true and false relative to my perspective." That leaves me free to judge that his judgment that not-p is not a *mistake,* since the fundamental norms governing my attitudes will now be Relative Belief and Assertion and not their absolutist counterparts.

Boghossian is here a bit too terse. Though, it seems quite intuitive it has not exactly been spelt out what is going wrong with disagreement here. But, let us try to see what systematic thought may underlie Boghossian's claim that here we do not get *real* or *genuine* disagreement. Wright (2006) understands the notion of a genuine disagreement as: *genuine disagreements involve genuinely incompatible attitudes being taken with respect to the same proposition.*[7] Kölbel's own characterization of a disagreement (*A* believes or judges that *p* and *B* believes or judges that not-*p*) is in line with this understanding of a genuine disagreement since it would seem that believing/judging it is true that p and believing/judging that it is false that p are genuinely incompatible. And how may we understand the notion of genuine incompatibility? It seems to us that two attitudes are genuinely incompatible if it is impossible for the same agent to rationally hold them at the same time towards the same propositional content.

Boghossian's suggestion seems to be that if Dora and Nora find no fault in the other's judgment because each of them knows that (1) can at best be relatively true and false and while it is true/false from their perspective it is the opposite from the other's perspective, then neither can be seen any more as simply holding the attitude towards (1) of judging it to be true/false. In their moment of relativistic insight, Dora and Norma cannot anymore make the judgment that (1) is true or false period, they can only make the judgment that (1) is true or false *according to their perspective*. In their moment of relativistic insight, the contents of the attitudes of Dora and Norma themselves get relativized. They are then indeed in the same position as what is envisioned by the indexical relativist, or the guys one of who says "It is morning" in the morning and the other guy who says "It is afternoon" in the afternoon (considering that such statements can be taken to have a hidden indexical for the time of utterance). And in the same manner, as the indexical relativist, the disagreement is lost.

However, what Boghossian has said about losing disagreement here requires the normative agents to accept AR. But, as we remarked earlier the truth or falsity of AR should not require that any normative agents believe in it. Dora and Norma may be perfect absolutists about truth. Furthermore, the issue under investigation in this

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[7] This sums up his intent as we understand it; it is not a direct quote.

section was whether the reader taking up a DP can see the dispute between Dora and Norma to be a case of an FD or not.

Can we say that the disagreement dissolves even from the reader's DP? A *prima facie* case corresponding to above can be made in terms of the reader who judges the dispute from a DP as well: when the reader judges Dora and Norma to be faultless the reader may not judge simply that (1) is true or false, but the reader must judge that it is true from Dora's perspective and false from Norma's perspective. But, these judgments are not genuinely incompatible. The same rational agent can perfectly well hold the judgment that it is morning in the morning and it is afternoon in the afternoon. Similarly, Dora, Norma, and the reader can all perfectly rationally hold both the judgments that (1) is true from Dora's perspective and that it is false from Norma's.[8]

The purported problem that Boghossian is alluding to is this: disagreement requires incompatible attitudes, but in judging faultlessness, the requisite relativistic understanding of the attitudes (understood in terms of AR) in question renders them compatible. The faultlessness of a dispute and its genuineness as a disagreement then cannot stand together in the eyes of any rational agent if AR is correct.

5. The Question of Attitudes

I think we have now been able to come to the point where we can see where Boghossian's case against AR is problematic. Whether we can take the dispute between Dora and Norma to be a case of genuine disagreement or not seems to depend ultimately on whether we can hold the relevant attitudes to be genuinely incompatible or not. Boghossian's suggestion, of course, is that we cannot. But, we think the problem here lies in conflating between two distinct kinds of attitudes.

We should not confuse the attitude of the judging [that p is true/false] from perspective N with the attitude of the judging [that p is true/false from perspective N].[9] In the first attitude, while the judgment is made based on norms that are only relative, the truth or falsity that is predicated to the proposition is not of relative truth

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[8] This was essentially Boghossian's response. See footnote 4 above.

[9] What is inside the square brackets here is supposed to be the content of the judgment. So, in attitude of judging [that p is true] from perspective N only has that p is true as content. The phrase "from perspective N" only shows the standards or perspective the judgment is made on the basis of. It is not indicating any part of the content of the judgment.

or falsity but absolute truth or falsity. In the second, the phrase "from perspective N" is itself part of the content of the judgment; the truth/falsity predicate is itself relative.

One thing is undisputed. When the reader in trying to entertain the AR position evaluates the dispute between Dora and Norma to see whether it is faultless or not the reader has attitudes of the latter kind. The reader judges that the propositional content of (1) is true according to Dora's perspective and also judges that the same propositional content is false according to Norma's perspective. These attitudes of judging are such that the truth or falsity predicate is relative. These are undoubtedly perfectly compatible with each other. But, are these the attitudes relevant to see whether the dispute between Dora and Norma is a case of an FD or not? We need to answer three questions including the one above:

Q1: Whose attitudes are relevant for judging that the dispute between Dora and Norma is a case of an FD?

Q2: Are the attitudes of Dora and Norma of the first kind or the second kind (from the two kinds just pointed out above)?

Q3: If Dora's and Norma's are of the first kind then are they genuinely incompatible with each other?

The answers to these three questions will show whether Boghossian has a case against AR or not.

In seeing from the reader's DP whether the dispute between Dora and Norma is a case of an FD or not if it were the attitudes of the reader then Boghossian would certainly be correct. The attitudes of the reader of judging that (1) is true from Dora's perspective and judging that (1) is false from Norma's perspective are perfectly compatible with each other. But, these are not the attitudes that we and the need to figure our the incompatibility between. The dispute is between Dora and Norma and we need to see whether the attitudes they are having are incompatible with each other or not. As such, in evaluating the dispute between Dora and Norma the reader must look at the attitudes of Dora and Norma to see if they are incompatible.

The question now is of whether Dora's and Norma's attitudes are of judging absolute truth and falsity or attitudes whose content is itself relativized in virtue of predicating relative truth or falsity. If we were talking about Dora and Norma themselves trying to see their dispute as an FD then they would have attitudes with relativized contents. To judge their dispute as faultless they would have to see that

they are each only judging (1) as true or false from their perspectives. In that case, Boghossian's case would be fine since we have already seen that the attitudes with relativized truth and falsity are completely compatible with each other. But, there is no need that Dora and Norma themselves must be able to see their dispute as an FD. That was the whole point in pointing to the reader evaluating the dispute from a DP. Until and unless Dora and Norma are not among the handful of people who also happen to be philosophical proponents of AR themselves they are not going to ascribe to (1) relative truth or falsity but absolute truth or falsity. The attitudes of Dora and Norma are therefore going to be of the kind where the content of the judgment is not relativized.

Thus, the proper way to understand Dora's and Norma's judgments about (1) is in the following way: Dora judges [that (1) is true] from Dora's perspective and Norma judges [that (1) is false] from Norma's perspective. The final question to ask now is 'are their attitudes compatible'. Dora's and Norma's attitudes are of predicating absolute truth and absolute falsity to the same propositional content. Normally, there would be no question about their incompatibility. However, we know that Dora makes her judgment based on her standards of taste and Norma makes her judgment based on her standards of taste. The judgments are made based on different standards; they are made from different perspectives. Nonetheless, their attitudes must be accepted as incompatible for the simple reason that normative agents, until and unless proponents of AR, in judging a proposition such as that expressed by (1) to be true or false can only judge it to be so from their normative perspectives and not from someone else's perspective. Furthermore, if one's perspective is not inconsistent then the agent can only rationally judge a proposition to be either true or false but not both. Thus, neither is it possible for a non-relativist agent who judges a proposition as true (from his/her perspective) to rationally judge the same proposition as false (from his/her perspective) nor is any other perspective available to the agent to judge the proposition false from that perspective.

Take Dora's case as an example. Dora judges (1) to be true. She does so from her perspective. From her perspective, only the truth of (1) follows not its falsity. It would be irrational for her to judge from her perspective that (1) is false. But, neither can she judge it to be false from Norma's perspective since that perspective is not available to her to make a judgment from, only her own is. As such, Dora cannot

rationally judge both [that (1) is true] from her perspective and judge [that (1) is false] from Norma's perspective. Same can be said for Norma or any other normative agent. Thus, no rational agent can judge [that (1) is true] from Dora's perspective and also judge [that (1) is false] from Norma's perspective. Thus, Dora's and Norma's attitudes are genuinely incompatible after all.

To sum up: for an agent who is not a proponent of AR judging whether liquorice is tasty or not is no different from judging whether the grass is green or not. All judgments are made on certain bases of judgment that one has internalized. Whether those bases are objectively valid or only a matter of one's perspective is not open to the non-relativist normative agent. Nor, is any other perspective available. This fact means that Dora's and Norma's attitudes are genuinely incompatible, which in turn implies that their dispute is a genuine disagreement. A person, such as a reader, who is investigating the dispute between Dora and Norma but is not looking to make any normative judgments but only logical ones, ie a person employing a DP, can see that the dispute is a genuine disagreement. Nonetheless, while such a person can see that no one can rationally have both the attitudes that Dora and Norma have, the person can also see that neither of Dora or Norma is really at fault. Dora and Norma can only make judgments from their perspectives which they both correctly do. Thus, the person employing a DP can see the dispute between Dora and Norma to be a genuine case of an FD.

Boghossian failed to accept this fact because he did not appreciate the availability of a DP. But, one can take up a DP and from a DP one can make sense of the fact that certain normative disputes may indeed be genuinely faultless and genuine disagreements.

6. Concluding Remarks:

We are not proponents of AR. We firmly believe that AR is not the correct way of understanding the notion of truth, in normative domains or otherwise. But, philosophical theories can be revealing in their failure. However, for that, it is important that we first sincerely give philosophical theories their due consideration. AR is a substantive philosophical position which needs to be taken seriously. We feel it will be sustained or it will fall depending on what sense we can make of the notion of relative truth. Boghossian's rejection of AR is however based on no such considerations. Instead, it looks to do away with AR on the cheap by first identifying

AR as the claim that genuine FDs are possible and then arguing that even given AR genuine FDs are not possible. Hence, Boghossian feels justified in claiming that AR is "inherently unstable". But, the inherent instability that Boghossian sees in AR is not a property of AR itself but an artefact of Boghossian's failure to appreciate the possibility of evaluating normative disputes from a normatively dissociated perspective.

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USE THEORY OF MEANING IN *TRACTATUS*

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Wittgensteinians have been debating for quite sometimes now on whether there exists a serious divide between Wittgenstein's early and later works; his writings would be understood better by highlighting the differences in approach and understanding of the nature and functioning of language or seeing the thematic continuation in it. In this paper, we would discuss in detail the major debates between the classical Wittgensteinians such as Ramsey, Anscombe, David Pears, Peter Hacker and Peter Geach, etc. and the new Wittgensteinians represented by Cora Diamond, James Conant, Juliet Floyd, Alice Crary, Michael Kremer and Rupert Read, etc.

Reading Wittgenstein:

Broadly speaking, there are two popular readings of Wittgenstein: anti-metaphysical or logical positivist reading and metaphysical reading. Positivists like Moritz Schlick, Rudlof Carnap, A. J. Ayer are influenced by Wittgenstein's early works where the method of logical analysis seems to give a perspicuous understanding of meaningful proposition. They kept picture theory of meaning at the center to propose verification principle. For them, what cannot be verified is just nonsense. Hence, metaphysics is rejected as nonsense. Being highly scientific in their temperament positivists found it irrelevant to recognize Wittgenstein's metaphysical or transcendental vision of reality.

On the contrary, the metaphysical reading claims that most of Wittgenstein's writings would remain unintelligible without understanding his transcendental vision of reality. Wittgenstein never rejects metaphysics as nonsense as understood by logical positivists. What cannot be expressed by the sense of a proposition is not necessarily incommunicable or imperceptible. Propositions of ethics and aesthetics are nonsensical in the sense that they belong to the realm of metaphysics which is ineffable.

These broad categorizations would not be of any help to define the variant interpretations of Wittgenstein proposed in the last two decades. In fact, the recent renewal of the debate has almost exclusively been concerned with variants of *ineffabilist* (metaphysical) readings of *Tractatus* as advanced by Elizabeth Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and H.O. Mounce and the recently advanced variants of *therapeutic*

(*resolute*) readings advocated by Cora Diamond, James Conant, Juliet Floyd, Alice Crary, Michael Kremer and Rupert Read. The ineffabilist reading argues that role of nonsense in the *Tractatus* is to make us grasp the ineffable truth which strictly speaking cannot be said significantly in accordance with the rules of logical syntax. Contrary to it, the therapeutic reading emphasizes the incomprehensibility of the idea of ineffable truth. Nonsense does not seek to convey the ineffable truth rather nonsense simply means to have no sense. The task of philosophy gets limited to cure us from the temptation to put forward philosophical doctrines or theories by showing that how such attempts lead to nonsense.

There are also interpreters who differ from the *ineffabilist* as well as the *therapeutic* readings of Wittgenstein, particularly of *Tractatus*. The most prominent among them are Daniel D. Hutto and Marie McGinn. Their interpretations have been labeled as *elucidatory* or *clarificatory* reading. They attempt to resolve the paradox faced by the other two readings. They are in agreement with the therapeutic or resolute readers that there are no ineffable truths about reality. But also they avoid reducing *Tractatus* as a work of post-modernist irony. They believe that Wittgenstein's remark achieve a certain order in the reader's perception of language and accomplish something important before they fall away.

After the publication of *Philosophical Investigations* it was believed by many commentators that Wittgenstein's early works particularly *Tractatus* has lost its philosophical relevance. These claims were mooted by his apparent rejection of *Tractatus* in *Philosophical Investigations* where he writes in the preface: "I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking. ...I have been forced to recognise grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book" (*PI*, Preface). He acknowledges the help he received from the criticisms of his ideas by Frank Ramsey and P. Sraffa who made him to realise "these mistakes." It gave an impression that Wittgenstein in his later writings has made a shift in his position on nature of philosophy and language.

However, recent resurgence of writings on *Tractatus*[1] clearly indicates that it has not at all lost its relevance among the Wittgensteinians. It is evident in the publications on Wittgenstein in the past two decades which are mostly on Tractarian themes than on his later writings. Even the variant readings of Wittgenstein, as discussed above, are based on reading *Tractatus* in different lights. The philosophical insights of *Tractatus* have been found useful to develop understanding on philosophical method, nature of language and logic, ethics, aesthetics and religion. The book cannot be dismissed and remains one of the most profound and rigorous works in philosophy. Wittgenstein himself later remarked to Elizabeth Anscombe that the *Tractatus* is not *all* wrong; it is not like a bag of junk professing to be a clock, but like a clock that does not tell the right time (Anscombe 1971: 78). Recent writers have recognised that the seeds of Wittgenstein's later thoughts are already contained in the *Tractatus*. It is imperative to read his later writings in the light of his earlier ones.

Wittgenstein's early work namely *Tractatus* cannot be overlooked at all also for the reason that ideas developed on philosophy, language, ethics and religion kept reflecting even in his later writings. He remained captive of those ideas throughout his life (Chandra 2002: 88). Cyril Barrett also writes, "the picture theory of propositions is preserved in *Philosophical Investigations* and its implications developed, but within the new context of logical grammar" (Barrett 1991: 125). It would not be appropriate to see his later works as against his early position in philosophy. Though he seemed to have moved from his old way of thinking but he could never come out of it completely. His later writings are more of filling the gaps he left in his earlier writings. In other words, in his later writings Wittgenstein is justifying his old thoughts in a new fashion (Chandra 2002: 84). When a comparison is made between the early and later writings of Wittgenstein, one is tempted to highlight the differences in the approach and understanding of the nature and

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[1] Some of the major works are: Alice Crary, and Read Rupert (eds.), *The New Wittgenstein* (London: Routledge, 2000). Daniel D. Hutto, *Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory nor Therapy* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). Cora Diamond, *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and The Mind* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991). P.M.S. Hacker "Wittgenstein, Carnap and The New American Wittgensteinians" (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 53, No. 210, 2003). Cora Diamond, "Logical Syntax in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*", (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 55, No. 218, 2005).

functioning of the language. There have been debates for more than two decades now between the classical Wittgensteinians and new Wittgensteinians on these issues.

Debating the Divide:

Classical Wittgensteinians have been finding the divide between Wittgenstein's early and later works quite significant for understanding his writings. The nature and the limits of language in *Tractatus* are determined by the syntactical structure of language, which is *a priori*. Hacker writes;

> The *Tractatus* purported to give an account of the essential nature of the world, thought and language while arguing that *stricto sensu* this endeavour transgresses the bounds of sense in trying to say something which is and must be shown by any symbolism, but cannot said. This account being definitive, the sole role for future philosophy is analysis (Hacker 2001: 330).

A rigid logical structure draws a strict boundary between propositions with sense and nonsensical propositions. However, in his later writings use of words and context get the center stage in determining the meaning. The 'form of life' comes to replace the 'logical form' in carrying out the meaning of propositions in everyday language. There is no rigid syntactical structure rather the distinction between the propositions is made based on the criteria of 'use', 'practice', 'purpose', etc. The *a priori* logical structure of language in the *Tractatus* gets replaced in later writings by the *a posterior* method of assigning meaning by looking into the working of language. This shift, for classical Wittgensteinians defines the divide between the early and the later Wittgenstein.

> Philosophy no longer strives to disclose the logical structure of the world, the objective language-independent essence of all things, for there is no such thing. Consequently the *de facto* practice of philosophy in the *Tractatus* is rejected. Its *de jure* prescription, however, contained much truth, though 'seen through a glass darkly'. ... Philosophy is an activity of conceptual clarification, although the conception of clarification has shifted dramatically away from the *Tractatus* paradigm of logical analysis (Hacker 2001: 332-333).

In the later works, Tractarian logical analysis seems to have failed to unfold the intricacy in the functioning of language. Philosophy is seen as purely descriptive in nature and its role is to describe the working of our language. To resolve the philosophical problems we are required to rearrange what we already know, that is, the rules for the use of words. The task of philosophy is now to give a clear view of our entanglement in the rules of the use of words.

In classical Wittgensteinians term the move is from essentialism of *Tractatus* to pluralism of *Philosophical Investigations*. In the *Tractatus*, language is used in a very narrow sense whereas in his later writing, language is conceived as dynamic and is related to multiple activities and usages. This multiplicity of different uses of language-games was missed out in Wittgenstein's early writing. *Tractarian* proposal of a pictorial relation between language and the world was found to be limited in its scope to explain the functioning of language. Wittgenstein's later writings break away from such rigid representation. Now language is seen as a series of games that is played out, each with its own rules. Meaning of a word is in its use in language. A word does not have an underlying essence or unitary meaning. It may have different meanings depending on the difference in the context of its use.

New Wittgensteinians reject this sharp distinction made between the early and later works of Wittgenstein. On the contrary, they emphasize more on the continuation in Wittgenstein's entire works. The very central notion of *Philosophical Investigations,* 'meaning as use' implicitly originates from his early writings. They argue that the problems Wittgenstein is concerned with are same in both of his writings. His position on the exploration of the nature and function of language remains the same. Philosophy is seen as an activity (*TLP*#4.112, *PI*§23). It is an activity of clarification of the working of language.

Classical Wittgensteinians interpretation of 'meaning':

The Classical interpretation emphasizes more on logical syntax in *Tractatus*. For them, it is the set of rules which determines whether a proposition fulfills the representational relationship with the reality that it depicts or not. Legitimacy of a proposition depends upon the fulfillment of these rules. "What a proposition expresses, it expresses in a determinate manner, which can be set out clearly: a proposition is articulate" (*TLP*#3.251). Syntactical rules determine the sense of a proposition. Max Black also holds that "if a proposition is to make sense then the syntactical employment of each of its parts must be settled in advance" (Black 1964: 134). To identify a proposition with sense is to understand the syntactical rules it must follow in arranging it's components. That is, all legitimate propositions are articulated and have sense. This interpretation would be very close to Fregean view of sense. Both, Black and Frege give emphasis on the well formed logical structure of

the proposition. A proposition which fulfills the syntactical rules would only be categorized as legitimate and will have sense. Hacker goes a step further by proposing that a proposition shares an internal relation with reality. In a picturing relation both proposition and reality share a common logical form.

Over emphasis on logical structure of language makes Classical Wittgensteinians' position more deterministic in defining the sense of a proposition. Language functioning in such deterministic way would not permit for introducing newer uses of signs in a proposition. The usages of signs in a proposition are determined by the previously established rules. Hacker interprets that a sign wouldn't be permitted to be used as a completely different symbol in a different mode of significance (Hacker 2003: 1-5). Meaning consists of a representational relationship between name and object. "In a proposition a name is the representative of an object" (*TLP*#3.22). Therefore, meaning of a word is seen as fixed and determined because it is set by the rules of logical syntax. In order to have a proposition with sense, the use of words must be covered by the previously established rules. Otherwise, no meaning would be assigned to those words and thereby, the proposition ceases to have sense. This implies that a sign has a determinate use set by the rules of logical syntax. So, Hacker argues that a proposition becomes nonsense if it violates the rules of logical syntax. For him, nonsense arises out of the illegitimate combination of meaningful words i.e. when the combination is contrary to the rules of logical syntax (Hacker 2003: 9). This way, language seems to be functioning as a machine whose operation is decided prior to its application.

New Wittgensteinians interpretation of 'meaning':

Contrary to the Classical Wittgensteinians' reading of *Tractatus*, New Wittgensteinians hold that meaning of a word in a sentence can be understood in relation to the context of its employment. Language is conceived as a tool which can be used for various purposes depending on the situations. Operation of linguistic expressions is not decided prior to its application; its operation keeps on changing in accordance with the usages or applications. New Wittgensteinians are right in believing that the sense of a proposition emerges out of using the signs in everyday practices and not merely from the logico-syntatical rules. Wittgenstein makes it clear how a sign is associated with the sense of a proposition, "In order to recognize a

symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense" (*TLP*#3.326). A sign has no meaning unless it is syntactically employed. So a symbol is a sign together with its meaning in a particular context. The actual use of a sign is what makes it into a symbol and determines its 'mode of significance.' The notion of use concerned in 3.326 is closer to Wittgenstein's later writings. It is the use which determines the meaning of signs and sense of a proposition. Therefore, sense of an expression is closely associated with its context.

New Wittgensteinians, in their reading of *Tractatus* give primacy to use of a word in determining its meaning. Logical syntax cannot alone provide the meaning of a sign; it is its use in an expression in which a sign symbolizes its meaning. "In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a role. It must be possible to establish logical syntax without mentioning the *meaning* of a sign: *only* the description of expressions may be presupposed" (*TLP*#3.33). Logical syntax is seen only as a necessary rule which gives legitimacy to a well formed proposition. The rules of logical syntax are not sufficient to determine whether a proposition is meaningful or not. It is a set of rules which governs the arrangement of signs in a sentence but does not regulate the way a sign is used.

Logico-syntactical rules define the correlation of names in a sentence and objects in a state of affairs but they cannot decide how such correlation would be in a particular mode of significance. The logico-syntactic employment of a sign determines a form but it does not determine content (Diamond 2006: 158-159). A sign, as a name in a propositional structure or form, may stand for an object in a state of affairs but that alone does not determine its meaning. In everyday language a sign is used in various contexts giving rise to different meanings. The meaning assigned to a sign is drawn from the language in its everyday practice.

New Wittgensteinians claim that the origin of the notion of meaning as use is implicitly found in the *Tractatus* at #3.326 which claims that in order to know the symbol by its sign, we must look at its use in a sentence (Diamond 2005: 79-81). This gets reiterated more explicitly in Wittgenstein's later writings: "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (*PI*§43). Wittgenstein suggests for asking not the meaning of a word rather how it is used in a particular context. He has already been saying this in *Tractatus:* if a legitimately constructed proposition has no sense, "it can

only be because we have failed to give a *meaning* to some of its constituents" (*TLP*#5.4733). New Wittgensteinians take propositions #5.473 and 5.4733 more seriously to make their point. For them, a nonsensical proposition is not the result of the illegitimate combination of symbols i.e. contrary to the rules of logical syntax. In such cases we fail to give meaning to the propositional symbols in the given context.

The proposition 'Socrates is identical' is *nonsensical* because we have failed in giving any adjectival meaning to the word 'identical' in this case (*TLP*#5.4733). Nonsensicality does not arise due to the illegitimate combinations of symbols i.e. for being contrary to the rules of logical syntax. Diamond points out that "if one reads 5.4733 in that way, it follows that Wittgenstein held that there is no such thing as a sentence which is nonsensical in virtue of use of the signs in it in ways which are excluded, because no ways of using signs are excluded" (Diamond 2005: 89). So meaning of a word in a sentence is not only understood in relation to the context of its use but the context of its use also creates the meaning of a word. The combination of words in the proposition 'Socrates is identical' is not illegitimate but it is only that the other newer uses for the word 'identical' has not been arrived at. Thus, it is not correct to say the word 'identical' has only a fixed use as a relational term and further use of that word wouldn't be permitted within the purview of the rules of language.

According to Diamond, Conant believes that these propositions like 'Socrates is identical' 'A is an object', 'Red is a colour', etc., wouldn't be nonsensical from such combinations of signs being violation of the rules of logical syntax. Conant considers the nonsensicality of such combinations to arise only "from the presence in them of a sign or signs which have no meaning in the particular sort of context" (Diamond 2005: 84-85). Conant's emphasis on the context of a word gives primacy in incorporating the change in meaning of a word in different propositional functions. So explaining the meaning of a word would simply be explaining its contextual use. Given this, we would then also characterize the meaning of a word as its use in a given context. A word can be identified with its meaning when it is used in a sentence in a particular context. That is to say, the use of a word in the language is its meaning. In this way, a proposition is nonsense when we have not given appropriate meaning to some of its constituents in a given context.

> *Anything* that is nonsense is so merely because some determination of meaning has *not* been made; it is not nonsense as a logical result of

determinations that *have* been made. - - - There is no 'positive' nonsense, no such thing as nonsense that is nonsense on account of what it would have to mean, given the meanings already fixed for the terms it contains (Diamond 1991: 106-107).

Tractatus #5.4733 resonates in *Philosophical Investigations* §500 where Wittgenstein writes, "a sentence is called meaningless when a combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdrawn from circulation." This implies that no meaning can be assigned to a word without knowing the context of its use. If the word or sign is useless, it is meaningless (*TLP#*3.328). We can always find a context of use in which the words would be doing something under such circumstances (Conant 1998: 241). Meaning of a word is drawn from the context of its use, that is, its employment in a propositional context. If a word and the context where it is employed do not fit together it would lead to nonsensicality. The proposition would become incompatible with the context of its use. A proposition is nonsense because of an *incompatibility* between the *Satz* and the context of use; the *Satz* and the context do not *fit* together, they disagree (Conant 1998: 223). Emphasis on everyday linguistic practices makes New Wittgensteinians' position more open in determining the sense of a proposition. Language functioning in such flexible way would permit for introducing newer possibilities of using signs in a proposition. So the idea, 'meaning of a word is its use in the language' gets reiterated and extended in Wittgenstein's later writings and becomes central to it. Highlighting such notion of meaning in all his writings, New Wittgensteinians see a clear continuation in Wittgenstein's early and later works.

From the above discussion, we conclude that Wittgenstein's later works can be understood well only in the light of his early works. In his entire writings, language is seen as an activity – our way of living; describing the language means describing our life and activities. For new Wittgensteinians, over emphasis on the representational relationship between language and the world as *a priori* logical structure would not help in developing a better understanding of the nature and functioning of the language. For them, the relation between language and the world reveals itself in the description of the functioning of working of language. Their emphasis is more on Wittgenstein's aim to bring philosophy closer to everyday life. This way philosophy, as an activity, is brought closer to human way of life as

represented in language. Language is seen as an autonomous entity and is dynamic and vibrant. It is capable of representing the life in its entirety.

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INTRINSIC VALUE IN NATURE: SOME CONTEMPORARY DEBATES *
SASHI MOHAN DAS

Introduction:

One of the most common tasks of environmental philosophers is to frame some theories according to which nature including non-human entities possesses intrinsic value. However, from time to time we have seen efforts to refute the claim being that not only are the particular theories as suggested inconsistent, but the very idea of intrinsic value in nature - at least in some allegedly important sense of "intrinsic value" - is in principle indefensible.

Environmental philosophy is one among several new sorts of applied philosophies, which arose during the seventies. That is, it may be understood to be an application of well-established conventional philosophical categories to emergent practical environmental problems. It may be understood to be an exploration of alternative moral and even metaphysical principles, forced upon philosophy by the magnitude and dimension of these problems. If defined in the former way, then the work of environmental philosophy is that of a traditional philosophical task; if defined in the latter way, it is that of a theoretician or philosophical architect. However, in ethics if interpreted as an essentially theoretical, not applied discipline, the most important philosophical task for environmental ethics is to develop anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism that inculcate a value theory in application. Indeed, as the discussion which follows will make clear, without a non-anthropocentric direction the innovatory aspirations of theoretical environmental ethics would be let down and the whole initiative would collapse in to its everyday routine to the applied counterpart.

Intrinsic value signifies recognition of fundamental goodness in the world. Though it may appear quite basic at first glance, the concept of intrinsic value is complex, with philosophically rich ontological, epistemological, and ethical dimensions. Philosophers have characterized these dimensions differently, and it would be misleading to suggest any one, monolithic concept of intrinsic value emerges from the philosophical literature. One may distinguish between two major schools of thought on intrinsic value, one generally aligned with the work of G.E.

Moore, and the other more closely aligned with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. These two camps diverge primarily in identifying different types of things as bearers of intrinsic value, which in turn leads to different ideas about how humans ought to conduct themselves in relation to intrinsic value.

The Concept of Intrinsic value:

Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that thing has "in itself," or "for its own sake," or "as such," or "in its own right." Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic. The term 'intrinsic value' and the less-used alternative term 'inherent worth' mean, lexically speaking, pretty much the same thing. According to the *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, "intrinsic" means "belonging to the essential nature or constitution of a thing" and "inherent" means "involved in the constitution or essential character of something intrinsic." The word "value" comes from the Latin word "*valere* to be worth, to be strong"; and "worth" comes from the old English word "*weorth* (worthy), of value." Lexically speaking, to claim that the value (or worth) of something is intrinsic (or inherent) is to claim that its value (or worth) belongs to its essential nature or constitution.

According to G.E. Moore[1] "To say that a kind of value is 'intrinsic' means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question." He says that intrinsic value is not subjective, but objective. Intrinsic value does not depend on the human beings valuing them. He makes a distinction between intrinsic value and intrinsic property. Examples of intrinsic value are beauty, goodness, etc. In *Principia Ethica*, Moore argues that the existence of beauty apart from any awareness of it has intrinsic value, but he allows that beauty on its own at best has little and may have no intrinsic value[2]. In *Ethics* Moore implicitly denies that beauty on its own has value[3]. Whereas examples of intrinsic property are yellowness, redness, etc. Intrinsic value

[1] Moore, G. E; The Conception of Intrinsic Value; *Philosophical Studies*, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1922, p. 260- 266.
[2] *Ibid.* 1-2, p. 53-54.
[3] Moore, G. E *Ethics* London: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 107.

constitutes a unique class of predicate because they do not have anything in common with other kinds of predicates of value. Both intrinsic property and intrinsic value depend on the intrinsic nature of the thing possessing them. However intrinsic value is not identical with intrinsic property, they are different. There is something in intrinsic value which is not present in intrinsic property. To conceptualize intrinsic value, Lemos,[4] tries to give a detailed account of intrinsic value and examine that intrinsic value is such that which is explicated in terms of the notions of ethically 'fitting' or required emotional attitudes such as love, hate and preference. Lemos elaborates that some properties are intrinsically good and some properties are intrinsically bad[5]. For example, pleasure and wisdom are intrinsically good and pain is intrinsically bad. Chisholm also says that 'state of affairs' is the bearer of intrinsic value.[6] Lemos suggests that it is not pleasure or perfect justice, considered as abstract properties that have intrinsic value. According to him wisdom, pleasure, beauty are 'good making properties'[7]. The distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'non-intrinsic' value for Chisholm, has been questioned in many ways and sometimes it became ridiculous. Chisholm, in course of his deliberation, tried to define what intrinsic value is and in doing so, he is concerned with the qualification that makes value intrinsic. In saying so, Chisholm states that the state of affair under which something is considered to be valuable is to be kept in isolation and such value is considered as 'extrinsic' and not intrinsic since in such cases the value is dependent on the states of affair.[8] For Chisholm, if a state of affairs is intrinsically good then it is intrinsically good in every possible world in which (or is true). But a state of affairs that is instrumentally good need not to be instrumentally good in every possible world in which it obtains.[9] He, in this context, mentions that all intrinsic value concepts may be analyzed in terms of intrinsic preferability.

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[4] Lemos, Noah M; *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, DePauw University , Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 3-19

[5] *Ibid*, p.3-19.

[6]Charles Stevenson, Richard Brant 'Values and Morals*: Essays in honor of William Frankena*, edited by Alvin I. Goldmen and Jaegwon Kin, Springer Netherlands, 1978.

[7] Lemos, Noah M; *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, DePauw University , Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.3-19

[8] Chisholm, Roderick M; Defining Intrinsic Value: *Analysis, Vol. 41, No.2* Apr., 1981, Oxford University Press: p.99-100

[9] *Ibid*, p. 99-100

Thus, we can see that intrinsic value is a multifaceted concept that can be considered from various angles of philosophical inquiry, in the following manner:

1. Ontological: What is intrinsic value? What sorts of things possess intrinsic value? Are there degrees of intrinsic value and can intrinsic value be summed or otherwise aggregated?

2. Epistemological: How can we recognize intrinsic value and, if relevant, differences in degrees of intrinsic value? Is intrinsic value a discoverable, objective property of the world, or a subjective attribution of (human) valuers?

3. Ethical: What obligations or duties do moral agents have in relation to intrinsic value? How should we balance these duties/obligations against other ethical considerations (e.g., issues of justice or rights)?

Ontology, epistemology, and ethics are the three major dimensions of intrinsic value, which philosophers use to develop and explain their particular interpretation of the concept. Different theories will be characterized by different ideas about the ontological, epistemological, and ethical status of intrinsic value.

Contemporary Approach of Intrinsic value in Nature:

In environmental philosophy, it is necessary to perceive environmental issues from different philosophical directions. Philosophers and ethicists have obligation to formulate a passable worldview through which the problems are seen, how we see nature and suggest norms by which our interactions with the environment are to be judged. A proper analysis shows that traditional Western ethics is basically anthropocentric. Human life is not comparable with any other lives. For them, only humans are intrinsically valuable. But contemporary environmental philosophy begins with 'moral extentionism' and deals with questions like 'to what extent of the nature/environment, is to be accorded intrinsic value? What is the criterion of according moral value?' Some philosophers like, Peter Singer, favours the criteria of "sentience"[10], while conservationists speak of biospheric egalitarianism. According to them, trees and plants have non-felt goals of their own. Even in an eco-system, species are to be accorded moral value. To ask whether to accord equal moral worth

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[10] Singer. P., *Practical Ethics*, Cambridge University Press. 1993, p. 264-65

to all beings, or accept degrees of value? Some accept degrees while others claim that this is an undue partiality.

While dealing with the debate related to welfarism vs conservationism questions like 'can we accept killing some wild beasts in order to maintain ecological balance' are asked. The welfarists' response is obviously negative. Conservationists permit keeping in view the integrity of the system. Some thinkers like Warwick Fox, do not find any necessary connection between value ascription and conservation. They think deep self-realisation is a prerequisite.[11]Some claims that environmental values are not universal and support relativist environmentalism. On the other hand third world environmentalism is different. Let us elaborate the debates thoroughly and comprehensively. The first debate is whether moral worth can be extended to the non-human entities and if it is then what is the criteria of such extension.   The argument, in favour of those who support moral extension beyond human, may be put forward in the following way.

- Moral concern deserves for anyone who has an interest in, or desire for, their own well-being.

- Humans show a desire for their own well-being, and thus they deserve moral respect. That is, the well-being of other beings ought to be respected and protected, because these other beings have a desire for their own well-being just as we do.

- Yet humans are not the only entities possessing such interests or desires. Other animals also show a desiring interest in their own well-being, and thus they too deserve moral respect just as humans.

The first and second assumptions are the basic premises of many ethical discussions, while the third one is the important extension in the reasoning of environmentalists and animal rights advocates. If both human and nonhuman beings desire their own well-being and have a sentient capacity for experiencing pain; then both kinds of beings, in similar ways, can be either benefited or harmed. Hence, both kinds of beings qualify for moral concern. To grant moral respect to the one kind, but not the other, is inconsistent. However, this extension limits only to the *sentient*

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[11] Fox, Warwick; 1993; "What Does the Recognition of Intrinsic Value Entail?" *Trumpeter* 10, p.101.

beings whereas environmental ethicists go beyond sentient beings. Aldo Leopold makes a significant entry in this regard in 1949 with the celebrated *A Sand County Almanac*. Leopold advanced the idea of biotic right, the concept that everything on this planet, including soil and water, is ecologically equal to man and shares equally in "the right to continued existence." Thus Leopold became the most important source of modern bio-centric or holistic ethicist. Leopold holds that there is as yet no ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it. The extension of ethics to this third element in human environment is an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity.[12]

Rolston's Approach:

Rolston[13] argued that there is no better evidence of nonhuman values and valuers than spontaneous wild life, born free and on its own. Animals hunt and howl, find shelter, seek out their habitats and mates, care for their young, flee from threats, grow hungry, thirsty, hot, tired, excited and sleepy. They suffer injury and lick their wounds. Here we are quite convinced that value is non-anthropocentric. These wild animals defend their own lives because they have a good of their own. There is somebody there behind the fur or feathers. Our gaze is returned by an animal that it has a concerned outlook. Here is value right before our eyes, right behind those eyes. Animals are value-able, able to value things in their world. They maintain a valued self-identity as they cope through the world. An animal values its own life for what it is in itself, intrinsically. Humans have used animals for as long as anyone can recall, instrumentally. And in most of their moral traditions, they have also made place for duties concerning the animals for which they were responsible, domestic animals, or toward the wild animals which they hunted. Animal lives command our appropriate respect for the intrinsic value present there. But this is only an ethic for mammals, perhaps for vertebrates, and this is only a fractional percentage of living things.

Rolston mentioned that a plant is not a subject, but neither is it an inanimate object, like a stone. Plants, quite alive, are unified entities of the botanical though not of the zoological kind, that is, they are not unitary organisms highly integrated with

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[12] Leopold, A. (1949). *A Sand Country Almanac*: *With Essays on Conservation from Round River*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 238-9

[13] Rolston, Holmes; *Art, Ethics and Environment: A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature*. Newcastle. UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006. p. 1-11

centered neural control, but they are modular organisms, with a meristem that can repeatedly and indefinitely produce new vegetative modules, additional stem nodes and leaves when there is available space and resources, as well as new reproductive modules, fruits and seeds. Plants make themselves; they repair injuries; they move water, nutrients, and photosynthate from cell to cell; they store sugars; they make toxins and regulate their levels in defense against grazers; they make nectars and emit pheromones to influence the behavior of pollinating insects and the responses of other plants; they emit allelopathic agents to suppress invaders; they make thorns, trap insects. A plant, like any other organism, sentient or not, is a spontaneous, self-maintaining system, sustaining and reproducing itself, executing its program, making a way through the world, checking against performance by means of responsive capacities with which to measure success. On the basis of its genetic information, the organism distinguishes between what *is* and what *ought to be.*The organism is an axiological system, though not a moral system. So the tree grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds, and resists death. A life is defended for what it is in itself. Every organism has a *good-of-its-kind;* it defends its own kind as a *good kind.* The plant, as we were saying, is involved in conservation biology. Does not that mean that the plant is valuable, able to value itself on its own?

 Edwin P. Pister's Approach:

Edwin P. Pister[14], a retired Associate Fishery Biologist by profession with the California Department of Fish and Game, worked long and hard to save from extinction several species of desert fishes living in small islands of water in an ocean of dry land. He and his allies took the case of the Devil's Hole pupfish - threatened by agro business persons pumping groundwater for irrigation - all the way to the United States Supreme Court; and won. Pister argues for *moral* responsibility to save them from extinction without considering about whether they had instrumental value or not but they had, Pister believed, *intrinsic value*. But this "philosophical" concept was hard to explain to colleagues and constituents. As one put it, "When you start talking about morality and ethics, you lose me."[15] Finally, Pister found a way to put the

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[14]Pister, P. Edwin; 1985, "Desert Pupfishes: Reflections on Reality, Desirability, and Conscience." *Fisheries*, 10/6:10-15.
[15] Pister, P. Edwin, 1987, "A Pilgrim's Progress from Group A to Group B," in *Companion to A Sand County Almanac*, J. Baird Callicott (edit.). Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987, p. 228

concept of intrinsic value across clearly. To the question *What good is it?* he replied, *What good are you?* That answer forces the questioner to confront the fact that he or she regards his or her own total value to exceed his or her instrumental value. Many people hope to be instrumentally valuable - to be useful to family, friends, and society. But if we prove to be good for nothing, we believe, nevertheless, that we are still entitled to life, to liberty, to the pursuit of happiness. (If only instrumentally valuable people enjoyed a claim to live, the world might not be afflicted with human overpopulation and over-consumption; certainly we would have no need for expensive hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, and the like.) Human dignity and the respect it commands - human ethical entitlement - is grounded ultimately in our claim to possess intrinsic value.

Callicott's Approach:

Drawing the line of Pister, J. B. Callicott[16] called this the phenomenological proof for the existence of intrinsic value. The question "*How do we know that intrinsic value exists?*" is similar to the question "*How do we know that consciousness exists?*" We experience both consciousness and intrinsic value introspectively and irrefutably. Pister's question "*What good are you?*" simply serves to bring one's own intrinsic value to one's attention. More importantly Callicott mentioned that if we fail to establish intrinsic value in nature then there is no meaning of environmental ethics as because intrinsic value is the most distinct feature of environmental ethics. If nature, that is, lacks intrinsic value, then environmental ethics is but a particular application of human-to-human ethics. He also acknowledged about moral truth to justify that nature has intrinsic value by refuting Bryan Norton's[17] anthropocentric approaches towards nature. In this context Callicott referred the instances of voluntary freeing the slaves of plantation owners in Southern America during the period of Abraham Lincoln. The concept is that if the slaves are freed then they will get a chance to form, re-form and improve their value system. The same argument can be produced in case of environment. Human beings, we

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[16] Callicott, J. Baird;1995, Intrinsic Value in Nature: a Meta-ethical Analysis, The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 3, Spring, Presbyterian College.
[17] Norton, Bryan (1992). 'Epistemology and Environmental Value.' *Monist* 75: 208-26.
(Notes: Bryan Norton fairly asks why we should want a *distinct*, non-anthropocentric environmental ethic. There is the intellectual charm and challenge of creating something so novel. And that, combined with a passion for championing nature, is reason enough for me, a

believe, have intrinsic value. Therefore, we think that to enslave human beings is wrong. And besides, slavery is economically backward. Similarly, other species, we are beginning to believe, are also intrinsically valuable. Therefore, to render other species extinct is wrong. And besides, we risk injuring ourselves and future generations of human beings in a wide variety of ways if we do not vigilantly preserve other species.

Callicott also put forwarded teleological argument for the existence of intrinsic value in nature.[18]The argument appears to be analogous to Aristotle's at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* for something - human happiness, Aristotle believed - that is an end in itself. The existence of means, in short, implies the existence of ends. Though one means may exist for the sake of another - say, a forge for the making of shovels - the train of means must, Aristotle argued, terminate in an end which is not, in turn, a means to something else: an end-in-itself. Otherwise the train of means would be infinite and unanchored. And since means are valued instrumentally and ends-in-themselves are valued intrinsically, if ends-in-themselves exist - and they must if means do; and means do - then intrinsic value exists.

Arne Neass' Approach:

Arne Naess took a strong stand questioning the venerable German philosopher Immanuel Kant's insistence that human beings are never used *merely* as a means to an end. But why should this philosophy apply only to human beings? Are there no other beings with intrinsic value? What about animals, plants, landscapes, and our very special old planet as a whole?

Arne Neass, a revolutionary environmentalist mentioned that there is existence of greatness in nature other than human. For him, "To meet a big, wild animal in its own territory may be frightening, but it gives us an opportunity to better understand who we are and our limits of control: the existence of greatness other than the human."[19]

Furthermore, Neass elaborates that there is one process that perhaps is more important in this respect than any other: the process of so-called *identification*. We

[18] Callicott, J. Baird; 1995, Intrinsic Value in Nature: a Meta-ethical Analysis, The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 3, Spring, Presbyterian College.
[19] Naess, A. 2005; The heart of the forest. In A. Drengson& H. Glasser (Eds.), *Selected Works of Arne Naess, X:* 551-553). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer

tend to see ourselves in everything alive. We observe the death struggle of an insect, but as mature human beings we spontaneously also experience our own death in a way, and feel sentiments that relate to struggle, pain, and death. Spontaneous identification is of course most obvious when we react to the pain of persons we love. We do not observe that pain and by reflecting on it decide that it is bad. What goes on is difficult to describe; it is a task of philosophical phenomenology to try to do the job. Here it may be sufficient to give some examples of the process of identification, or "seeing oneself in others." A complete report on the death struggle of an insect as some of us experience such an event must include the positive and negative values that are attached to the event as firmly as the duration, the movements, and the colors involved.[20] So, for him, there is a substantial majority with quite far-reaching ideas about the rights and value of life forms, and a conviction that *every life form has its place in nature* that we must respect. Neass, in the first of eight points charter what he coined as "the platform of deep ecology," or rather, one formulation of such a platform stated that the flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth has inherent value. The value of nonhuman life forms is independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes. In oppose to these views propagated by the philosophers as has been discussed so far, there are group of thinkers who have drawn a different line of thoughts in regard to the moral extension to non-human world.

Elliot's Approach:

Robert Elliot, taking into account of consequentialist and deontologist position, claimed to conceive that if wild nature has intrinsic value, then there is an obligation to preserve it and to restore it. There is a connection between value and obligation. If wild nature has intrinsic value it is because it exemplifies value adding properties. Elliot's favourite candidates are naturalness and aesthetic value. The aesthetic value draws together various other suggested value-adding properties other than naturalness, such as diversity, stability, complexity, beauty, harmony, creativity, organization, intricacy, elegance and richness. Particular such properties might be value-adding in their own right, but additionally they might, in conjunction with other properties, constitute the property of being aesthetically valuable, which is likewise

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[20] Naess, A. 1993; Intrinsic value: Will the defenders of nature please rise. In P. Reed & D. Rothenberg (Eds.), *Wisdom in the Open Air* (p.70–82). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

value-adding. In this context Elliot focuses on naturalness and considers some objections to naturalness and considers some objections to the claim that it is value-adding.[21]

Bryan Norton's approach:

Another advocate of this debate is Bryan Norton[22] and for him nature serves us in more ways than as a pool of raw materials and a dump for wastes. It provides priceless ecological services, many of which we imperfectly understand. And, undefiled, nature is a source of aesthetic gratification and religious inspiration. When the interests of future generations as well as of present persons in the ecological services and psycho-spiritual resources afforded people by nature are taken into account, respect for human beings or for human interests is quite enough to support nature protection, Norton argues. Thus, anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric environmental ethics "converge"; that is, both prescribe the same personal practices and public policies. Let us turn to the second debate i.e. whether to accord equal moral worth to all beings, or accept degrees of value? Some accept degrees; others say this is undue partiality.

Aldo Leopold, Homes Rolston III, Arne Neass favour equal moral worth to all beings, whereas Moorean group is talking about degree of values. Again, Charles Cockell and some other debated that environmental policy has a size bias. Small organisms, such as microorganisms, command less attention from environmentalists than larger organisms, such as birds and large mammals, hence they bear less "degree" of intrinsic value. The campaigns for the protection of endangered creatures almost always focus on those that are large and impressive. The list of species whose decline or abuse has caught the attention of environmentalists includes: Rhinos, elephants, tigers, whales, seals, lions, turtles, polar bears, many types of birds, domesticated animals, animals used for vivisection, and so on. Evident within the history of environmental ethics and environmental policy is the consistent importance of the size of organisms. Environmentalists do not often concern themselves with the

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[21] Elliot, Robert; 'Intrinsic Value, Environmental Obligation and Naturalness', The Monist, Vol. 75, No. 2, *The Intrinsic Value of Nature* (April,1992), p. 138-160; Oxford University Press

[22] Norton, Bryan; 1991, *Toward Unity among Environmentalists* New York: Oxford University Press.

decline of small rodents, insects, or crustaceans.[23] There are some notable exceptions. The protection of the monarch butterfly has been an ongoing concern for the North American Butterfly Association, and it is an example of a small creature that has attracted the attention of environmentalists and policy makers. In the United States, each state has a symbolic state insect, illustrating that some small organisms have.

To move on to the debate related to both welfarism as well as conservationism a massive contradiction between anthropocentricism and non-anthropocentricism is vividly acknowledged. To shift to the question "can we accept killing some wild beasts in order to maintain ecological balance?" has occupied a significant place in environmental ethics. Legally animals have no rights. Property rights are still the premier means of addressing the environment. But man centered approach towards environment is an illegitimate way of giving preference to human interest only. Specisism is discrimination on the basis of species only, without sufficient moral reason. Non-anthropocentricism helps to get rid of traditional attitude towards animals. The fact that it fails to mitigate the dichotomy between biotic and abiotic is mere abstraction and it leads to eco-centrism. Some sort of Anthropocentrism is unavoidable; a 'perspectival' anthropocentrism is objectionable. The main *objectionable* concern of Anthropocentrism is the human interest at the expense of non-human animals and non-inclusion of *intrinsic value* to non-human world. That only the human has reason, capacity of communication is factually incorrect. In this context a lot of examples like monkey and Rhinoceros can be provided. Even some non-anthropocentric approaches cannot go deep to the issues of endangered species and the ecosystem. Moral standing of the whole nature, including abiotic part is to be acknowledged. But at this juncture, we are in a pendulum of "The life boat ethics", where ethics is on one side and development is on the other side. The reason why this dichotomy continues is as because the welfarists say, 'no' to any damage to the non-human world and the conservationists permit keeping in view the integrity of the system.

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[23] Cockell,Charles S; Environmental Ethics and Size; Ethics and the Environment, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring, 2008), pp. 23-39, Indiana University Press

Criteria for acknowledging intrinsic value in nature:

The question 'what are the criteria of acknowledging intrinsic value in nature? needs to be answered in the light to grasp the very idea of intrinsic value in nature. The criterion will perhaps serve the required demand for the debate related to the value ascription and subjective objective dichotomy.

Before proceeding to examine the epistemological status of attributions of independent value to natural objects, it is necessary to distinguish two important different theories regarding that value. Some advocators of independent value in nature believe that nature is valuable in the strong, "intrinsic" sense that natural objects have value entirely independent of human consciousness. According to this theory, the value in nature existed prior to human consciousness and it will continue to exist even after human consciousness disappears. Other theorists adopt a less heroic version of the hypothesis, accepting that valuing is a conscious activity and that value, therefore, will be only "inherent" in nature. According to the inherentists, nature has value that is independent of the values and goals of human evaluators - it is not merely instrumental to human ends - but this value is attributed by conscious valuers, either human or otherwise.

Hence the question of intrinsic value reflects a long-standing conflict between rival epistemologies, with realists and relativists squaring off in a new arena. For their part, neo-pragmatists adopt an anti-foundationalist stance: the moral and ontological status of nonhuman nature need not be settled - indeed cannot be settled - before engaging in collective action on behalf of the environment. Radical pluralism at the level of conceptual frameworks need not preclude a workable accord on policy. On this view, solutions to environmental problems what Norton called contextual sensitivity which is different from metaphysical certainty.[24] In this context Norton assumed two concerns:

i)   The Epistemic Question: Can environmentalists claim that their goals and the value claims that support them are epistemically justifiable, that they are more than merely subjective preferences?

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[24] Nunez, Theodore W.; Rolston, Lonergan, and the Intrinsic Value of Nature, The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), p. 105-128, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

ii)   The Locational Question: Can environmentalists' values be located "out there" in the world itself, independent of human consciousness?

From the above two issues, it can be understood that defenders of independent value in nature are unified by a commitment to a particular conception of objectivity. According to this conception: For any characteristic, can be objectively attributed to an object x, only if subject S "finds," or "locates," in x; both and must, that is, exist independently of human consciousness. Because they share this basic criteriological assumption, the positions of Callicott and Rolston fall in direct opposition to each other: Rolston believes, but Callicott denies, that it is possible to achieve "objectivity" for environmental values, according to this locational criterion. Callicott, for example, states the issue as follows: "the very sense of the hypothesis that inherent or intrinsic value exists in nature seems to be that value inheres in natural objects as an intrinsic characteristic, that is, as part of the constitution of things. To assert that something is inherently or intrinsically valuable seems to entail that its value is objective." Callicott, however, believes that there are "insurmountable logical impediments to axiological objectivism."[25] Rolston begins his essay, "Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?" with a quotation from William James with which Callicott would agree. It concludes: "Whatever of value, interest, or meaning our respective worlds may appear imbued with are thus pure gifts of the spectator's mind."[26] Rolston states that "Nature, indeed, is infinitely beautiful, and she seems to wear her beauty as she wears colour or sound. Why then should her beauty belong to us rather than to her?"[27] He goes on to note that science itself seems hard to put maintain "objectivity."

For Ernest Partridge, the best approach to justify the intrinsic worth of wilderness may be through an account of the experience of wilderness. It should be an account detached, as much as possible, from second-hand reports of the experience, and based, as much as possible, upon the recollection of feelings evoked directly by that experience. To do this, one will call upon the nearest and most vivid source at his disposal: one's own experience. One needs to attempt, at the outset at

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[25] Callicott, J. B.; In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 159.
[26] Rolston H. III; *Philosophy Gone Wild* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1986), p. 91.
[27] *Ibid*, p. 91.

least, to relate this experience with the least possible amount of preconception or post-analysis. Thus Partridge's approach is *phenomenological*. Following this exercise, phenomenological "brackets" has to be removed and attempt to be made to account for and qualify this experience. This is, of course, as Partridge said a thought-experiment that one might wish to try himself.[28]

Conclusion:

There is a dilemma in most of our fundamental beliefs about intrinsic value are in direct conflict with the anticipated changes in environment/nature. This in fat is a big the challenge in any discussion on Intrinsic value. Thus, the debates on the concept and warrant of intrinsic value go right from the consequalists' form to the deontologists' structure that leads to the root of our basic thinking. In Environmental ethics ethicists have tendency to substitute our anthropocentric thinking with ecocentric thinking. Anthropocentric philosophy considers everything from the point of view of mankind, and the inalienable right to pursue his fortune as he sees fit. The egocentric person thinks only of himself in a social context as opposed to an ecocentric philosophy, which advocates respect for all nature and all creatures' basic rights. This issue is at the very heart of philosophy and religious beliefs. European philosophy and Christianity is founded on anthropocentric concepts. However, philosophically speaking this is the anthropocentric thinking which was the driving core of the approach to life. There was little concern for nature and other creatures as equal partners. This is seconded in European philosophy by our Greek heritage. This started with the sophistic thinking, which took its starting point in the human being and his ability to think as opposed to a competing concept of the human being in an all-embracing cosmos. From this developed the roots of logic and scientific thinking. In this regard, environmentalists in particular are antagonistic to Descartes, for his statement: "Cogito ergo sum". Everything starts with man and his ability to think. All values, all concepts are derived from man. It is thought provoking that the most basic and scientifically fundamental considerations of the renaissance were devoted to something as "useless" as astronomy. Galileo Galilei proved that the earth circled the sun and not the other way around and was condemned by the Church. He introduced experiments and applied mathematics, further developed by Isaac Newton, Pierre de

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[28] Partridge, Ernest; 1970, *Meditations on Wilderness, The Wilderness Experience as Intrisically Valuable*.

Fermat, G. W. Leibniz and many others to follow. Science became one of the pillars in European philosophy and formed the basis for the industrial revolution of the last century. In this context, the result was the western concept to conquer the world-not only the world in a geographical sense, but also in the sense of mastering the universe. Man can shape his own destiny without constraints. This anthropocentric attitude is quite understandable in view of what has been achieved. But that becomes one sided doctrine and has equally (rather more strongly) been criticized. The antipode to anthropocentric thinking is frequently associated with philosophers like Arne Neass, Homes Rolstom III and many others along with the American Indian. In Indian philosophy, man is intermingled with nature and must live in harmony with it. The spirits are the nature in all forms.

The Western human-nature dichotomy has long been criticized by environmental ethicists as a fundamental problematic of the modern age, which must be dissolved to curb the trend of increasing and irreversible environmental degradation. Dismantling the dichotomy could potentially de-center humans from the moral universe, into a more evolutionarily and ethically accurate position alongside the rest of the biota. And yet, if humans come to view themselves as part of nature, why or on what grounds would we ever limit the human enterprise? The great potential of a non-dichotomized view of humans and nature is balanced by an equally great risk, that the use of important conservation strategies like protected areas often justified by ethical appeals presupposing a separation of humans and nature may no longer be utilized even though these strategies may still be effective and justifiable on other ethical grounds. Therefore, the intellectual shift toward socio-ecological systems thinking, "humans and nature", is both promising and precarious. While this shift has begun to blur the boundaries between humans and nature, it also necessitates a careful and creative ethical framework suited to the unique challenges of protecting the complex world we inhabit.

Some thinkers made an effort in this direction, proposing new normative postulates for modern conservationists in a paper that stimulated lively discussion and debate. Two years later, however, this debate was stifled by the pragmatic call for conservationists to stop bickering over values, embrace their differences, and focus on outcomes on the ground. This pragmatic turn is somewhat puzzling, in that it suggests conservation is more of a practice than a mission, or more of a means than

an end. In its pragmatic stance, conservation appears to operate with the primary agenda of "working," a normative pursuit whose only principled commitment is to be effective. But we might stop to ask, effective to what end? What actually constitutes success? As individuals and as a community, how do conservationists define their mission in the 21st century?

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GANDHI'S VIEWS ON *VARṆA-VYAVASTHĀ* IN INDIA: SOME REFLECTIONS

BALARAM KARAN

Introduction:

Indian society is a multi-lingual, multi-ritual, multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic society and above all, it is full of multi-layer of castes. The custom of 'caste-culture' is almost as old as the Indian civilization. Once upon a time, the caste system was almost streaming in all the spheres of our society. But its adverse effects have stigmatized the Indian glory of the past. It has resulted in inequality and injustice in our social life. It has also procreated untouchability. Thus, it was eroding the base of Indian society gradually. The caste system exists still in Indian society, but in a different way from the past. Indian society has become more complicated by the various layers of castes, but the seed of the caste system is contained in the deepest form of *varṇa-vyavasthā*. Generally, '*varṇa*' means the division of society into four *varṇas*; brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas and śūdras.[1] But in course of time the *varṇas* were further sub-divided into numerous castes. Once upon a time, *Varṇa* system which was built upon different *guṇas* and karmas of the different people became in course of time perverted and it appeared under a new name i.e. caste system. Ancient v*arṇa* system which had an organismic and divine-origin approach to social organization appears to have emphasized functions based on *guṇas* and karmas rather than heredity, but gradually hereditary rigidity set in, and *varṇa* became identified with a hereditary occupation rather than *guṇas* and karmas. A wide variety of factors including the intermixing of the four *varṇas*, religious sub-divisions and separatism, geography and occupational diversity led, in the course of a few centuries, to the growth of a very large number of castes, sub-castes and sub-sub-castes, until about the middle of the nineteenth century, when there was an estimated total of about three thousand castes in India. This system was characterized not only by great complexities and restrictions relating to various forms of endogamy and exogamy, hypergamy and hypogamy but also by serious restrictions regarding inter-dining and various other forms of social intercourse.[2] Untouchability is the resultant of this caste system. So, naturally, the questions arise: what is *varṇa-vyavasthā* and how does it differ from the caste system? What is untouchability? How did it originate? And lastly, is it possible to eradicate this evil from the society and how? It is very difficult to answer these questions because these questions are full of

ambiguity and complexity. Its complexity has grown over time. M. K. Gandhi has given his views on solving these problems. I shall try to find out the answers to these questions through the path of M. K. Gandhi's perspective.

Gandhi on the *varṇa* system:

Gandhi's advocacy of *Varṇadharma* was primarily guided by his attachment to the *Gitā*. The *Gitā* stands for an organic, as distinct from an atomistic, conception of society.[3] Lord Kṛṣṇa said in the *Gitā*: "*Cāturvarṇyaṁ mayā Sṛṣṭaṁ guṇa-Karma vibhāgaśaḥ*".[4] It means Kṛṣṇa said, I have created mankind according to their *guṇa* and karma. *Varṇa* means colour like white, red, pita etc. But metaphorically *varṇa* stands for different *guṇas*. '*Guṇa*' stands for the three qualities of human beings i.e. *sattva*, *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*. Men used to be treated or classified according to their *guṇa* and karma. For this reason, the variations of *sattvadiguṇas* are present in all men, but it is also true that they are not present equally. These three *guṇas* are present in all men, but not equally. The differences in men are, thus, due to the difference in proportion of *guṇas*. Some *guṇas* are present more in one than in another. The difference of *guṇa-nyunādhikya* accounts for the difference in the different *varṇas*.[5] Thus in Brāhmaṇa, *sattvaguṇa* seems to be preponderant over the others; in kṣatriya, *rajaḥ*preponderates along with lesser *sattva*; in Vaiśya, *rajaḥ* preponderates along with lesser *tamaḥ*; in Śūdra, *tamaḥ* predominates.*Varṇabheda* is not only due to *guṇabheda*, butal so *karmabheda*. The karmas of *Brāhmaṇa* were *yajna*, *adhyayana*, *adhyapana*, etc., i.e., the performance of sacrificial rites for self and others, reading, teaching, etc., while those of *kṣatriya* is the protection of people from external aggression and internal disturbance, chastising the wicked, etc.; those of *vaiśya* are commerce, agriculture, raising of cattle, etc., and those of *śūdra* is to render service to the upper *varṇas*. They had to do all the manual work. Thus, we find that *varṇabheda* is due to *guṇa* and *karma*. On the contrary, *jātibheda* is due to heredity. *Gitā* emphasizes on *guṇa* and karma of the individuals, but not hereditary recognition.

Gandhi thought the teachings of the *Gitā* to be fundamental, universal and proclaiming the ultimate truth and he saw in the restoration of the true *varṇāśramadharma* the path of salvation. He took *varṇadharma* as representing the natural order of society. And the natural was perfect for him. When *Gitā* declares the four-fold division of *varṇa* to be based on*guṇa* and karma, Gandhi admitted the

validity of this claim but maintained that *guṇa* and karma were inherited by birth. He also admitted that "inherited qualities can always be strengthened and new ones cultivated", and accordingly functions which were not performed by his ancestors may be performed by an individual, but these new functions must not constitute his calling. According to his own words, "If my father is a trader and I exhibit the qualities of a soldier, I may without reward serve my country as a soldier, but must be content to earn my bread by trading."[6] It is meant by Gandhi that one may perform any other function in society in an honorary capacity, but must accept the calling of the forefathers for earning one's living. A *śūdra* has every right to acquire learning like a *brāhmaṇa* and even to become a teacher in an honorary capacity, but he must earn his living through scavenging or whatever similar occupation his forefathers used to have. But "He may not be called a *brāhmaṇa* in this birth. And it is a good thing for him not to arrogate a *varṇa* to which he is not born. It is a sign of true humility."[7] He proposed to accept one's hereditary calling as earning a livelihood. A man who earns his living through any occupation other than the hereditary one becomes a *patita*, i. e. a fallen person.[8]

According to Gandhi, the most salient feature of *varṇa* is that it is based on unchangeable heredity occupations. For him, *Varṇa* means pre-determination of the choice of man's profession. The law of *varṇa* is that a man shall follow the profession of his ancestors for earning his livelihood… *Varṇa*, therefore, is in a way the law of heredity."[9] It means that all of us should follow the "hereditary and traditional calling of our forefathers in so far as the traditional is not inconsistent with the fundamental ethics, and this only for the purpose of earning one's livelihood."[10]

Gandhi believes that man is born with some particular traits or characteristics from his ancestors and it helps him or her to express his or her ancestral occupation very easily and skillfully. So, everybody should follow his or her hereditary calling for earning a livelihood. Gandhi says that in the *varṇa-vyavasthā* all *varṇas* are equal and there can be no question of high or low based on the occupation. A scavenger has the same status as the clergyman. He has given an analogy for the understanding of it. The analogy between the limbs of the human body and the four *varṇas* Gandhi regards as very useful, because the limbs of the body cannot be superior or inferior to one another, but perform equally essential functions; and similarly the four *varṇas* perform equally essential functions in the body social and are devoid of any notions

of superiority or inferiority. The *brāhmaṇa*, who has been compared to the mouth of the Creator, is not in any way superior to the *śūdra* who has been compared to the feet. Gandhi observes that the *brāhmaṇa* has the opportunity of "superior service" but has no right to a "superior status". The four orders merely represent a permanent division of labour, but all labour has the same value.[11]The hierarchy and gradation were a subsequent development of this system and gradually hierarchy and gradation of 'high-low' were clung to this system. The so-called higher *varṇas* believed that some kinds of works are considered higher than the other types of works. Such as the work of clergyman, professors etc. are considered higher than the work of scavengers, leather-workers etc. They also believed that their occupations are higher than the other *varṇas*. Hence, these lower *varṇas* cannot go forward or follow the higher *varṇa'*s occupation; thence higher *varṇas* enjoined that everyone should follow his or her prescribed occupation as a fundamental duty. So that the lower *varṇas* do not choose the upper *varṇa*'s profession, for this reason, the upper *varṇas*had tightenedeveryone's occupationto be followed as determined by the*Śāstras*. Thus, hierarchy and the stratification of *varṇas*were created intensely day by day andthe *varṇa-vyavasthā* had deviated from its goal. The caste system is the perverted form of *varṇa-vyavasthā*. Gandhi said very sorrowfully that the present caste system is the antithesis of *varṇāshrama*. *varṇāśrama* of the *Śāstras* is today non-existent in practice. In this context, the question is raised: what is the caste system?

Caste in practice as distinguished from the *varṇa*:

In the later *Vedic* period the caste system was not exclusively rigid; rather it was a mid-way between the laxity of the *Ṛgvedic* age and the strong rigidity of the age of the *Sūtras*. The term *varṇa* was now used in the sense of caste not in the sense of colour in this age. In the *Sūtra* period caste system was rigid. Various restrictions were imposed. Restrictions regarding dining and endogamy are the sinister pillars which sustain the caste hierarchy. As a result, almost three thousands of sub-castes were created from only four *varṇas*. And untouchability had begun to creep in. Untouchability is the worst feature of the caste system which is so deeply embedded in the mind of the Hindu society that the entire outlook on life and politics is coloured by it. In the ancient *cāturvarṇya-vyavasthā* there was no rigidity to follow his or her hereditary occupation. Men should follow his or her occupation according to their *guṇa* and *karma*. A time came when one's family or ancestor's occupation was

rigidly followed instead of the principle of division based on *guṇa* and *karma*; then some kinds of occupation came to be considered as pure and others were impure. The notion of ritual purity indicated a conceptual foundation for the caste system, by identifying occupations and duties associated with impure objects as being themselves impure. According to the Brāhmaṇa ideology, the brāhmaṇas are the purest and the levels of purity decrease as we come to the other end where we have no purity at all. It has been stated that within caste ranking has been done based on the principle of purity and pollution. Generally, it is supposed that whoever accepts the ideology of caste system must be guided by the principle of purity and pollution. The higher castes are pure in comparison to the lower and the two have to be kept apart to safeguard the purity of the higher. The higher would become impure if they come into contact with the lower. So, to keep up the purity of the blood, inter-caste marriage was strictly prohibited in the four-fold division of the *varṇa-vyavasthā*. This emphasis on purity gave rise to untouchable people on the opposite end of society who were considered to be impure. Between the purest brāhmaṇas and polluted untouchables were the remaining three *varṇas*, ranked according to their level of purity. In this context, the question may be raised: who were the untouchables?

The term 'untouchability' is not defined in the Indian Constitution. But Durga Das Basu, an eminent constitutional expert, has tried to define the term 'untouchability'. In his words: "It has been assumed that the word has a well-known connotation, primarily referring to any social practice which looks down upon certain depressed classes solely on account of their birth and disables them from having any kind of intercourse with people belonging to the so-called higher classes or castes".[12] The theory of the early *Smṛtis* was that there were only four *varṇas* and there was no fifth *varṇa*. But in modern times the so-called untouchables are referred to as the *pañchamas*.[13] *Pañchamas* mean the fifth caste or outcasts or untouchables. They are 'outcaste' means *pañchamas* had no place in the fourfold division of *varṇa-vyavasthā*. Although Gandhi believed that untouchables are nothing, but the śūdras. According to his own words, "a *pañchama* (a member of a supposed fifth *varṇa*, lower than śūdra) should be regarded as a śūdra because there is no warrant for belief in a fifth caste."[14] Untouchability is largely an outgrowth of the caste system. Hallowed with tradition and sanctified by religion, it continued to exist in all its oppressive facets for centuries. It would consider the mere touch of an untouchable as

a sin. In some parts of India, especially in the south, not only untouchability was practised on a vast scale, but unapproachability and invisibility too. Gandhi believed that untouchability is the greatest blot on humanity and he wanted to eradicate such kind of evil with heart and soul. In this contextthe question is raised: which method did he follow to wipe out the untouchability?

Gandhi's suggestions for removing untouchability:

Gandhi believed that untouchability was like a weed, but not a part and parcel of Hinduism. According to him, "untouchability is not only not a part and parcel of Hinduism but a plague, which it is the bounden duty of every Hindu to combat."[15]Untouchabilityconflicts with the fundamental precepts of Hinduism.Gandhi put the entire responsibility for the 'cancer of untouchability' on the caste-Hindus and he said that the caste-Hindu have a sacred duty to the so-called untouchables. Here he did not call for revolution against the removal of untouchability, but he wanted to change the outlook of the upper caste Hindus. He says that "untouchability will not be removed by the force even of law. It can only be removed when the majority of Hindus realize that it is a crime against God and men are ashamed of it. In other words, it is a process of conversion, i.e. purification, of the Hindu heart."[16]Hence, it is the moral responsibility of the upper caste Hindus for the development of the untouchability. For this reason, firstly, Gandhi wanted to change the heart (or outlook) of the caste Hindus by moral pressure. He understood that all changes must come voluntarily from the heart. If the soul of men is purified, then society will change automatically. So, he wanted to stress on the self-realization of men. He understood that society will never be changed until and unless the men are being changed heartily. It is not possible to change society inwardly unless men are being changed inwardly. Inwardly, we are all equal. This equality is obviously of soul, but not of bodies. Hence, men cannot be changed by brutal force or even law. When men will be self-realized, then he will not discriminate and hate the others (untouchables). To Gandhi, the essence of Hinduism is truth and non-violence (*Ahiṁsā*). The active manifestation of non-violence is love and the absence of any ill will.*Ahiṁsā* is the only path to change society. He followed this '*Ahiṁsā*' principle as a tool for removing untouchability. Gandhi said that removal of this great sin of untouchability meant, "love for, and service of, the whole world, and thus merges into *Ahiṁsā*. Removal of untouchability spells the breaking down of barriers between man

and man between the various orders of being. We find such barriers created everywhere in the world."[17]

On the one hand, Gandhi wanted to give stress on self-realization of the upper caste Hindusfor removing the untouchability; on the other hand, he was directly involved in the welfare of the untouchables by organizing *Harijan Sevak Sangha* etc. Gandhi was struggling in his whole life for the upliftment of the untouchables through various social works. In his struggle to improve the status and dignity of the untouchables, he gave them a new name*Harijans*.'*Harijan*' means 'a man of God'.[18] Gandhi thought that the traditional concept of *varṇa*system can be cleansed of the untouchability, in which untouchables would be '*Harijans*' and their 'unclean' work would be accepted as honourable. Gandhi, meanwhile, was extending his *Harijan* movement all over India, in what was known as the '*Harijanyatra*', with considerable success in some regions. For example, after he had toured Mysore State in January 1934 the authorities responded by agreeing to fund the improvement of facilities for untouchables. Branches of the *Harijan Sevak Sangh* were established all over the state, and its workers were encouraged to open schools for *Harijans*. Gandhi launched a major campaign in 1933-34 against the practice of untouchability, touring India in person to put pressure on caste Hindus to open up access for untouchables to public wells, tanks, roads, schools, temples and cremation grounds. In response to Ambedkar, Gandhi had extended his battle for the untouchables into the civil sphere. Previously, his challenge had been restricted to temple entry. In 1936, untouchables were invited for the first time by the Maharaja to participate in the annual *Dashera Darbar*. The state also supported temple entry in principle, though it proved hard to implement in practice.[19]

Gandhi did not believe in the caste system in the modern sense for its limitations. To him, the caste system has its limitations and its defects, but there is nothing sinful about it, as there is about untouchability, and if it is a by-product of the caste system, it is only in the same sense that an ugly growth is of a body, or weeds of a crop. It is as wrong to destroy caste because of the outcaste, as it would be to destroy a body because of an ugly growth in it or a crop because of the weeds. The outcasteness, in the sense we understand it, has, therefore, to be destroyed altogether. It is an abscess to be removed if the whole system is not to perish. Untouchability is the product, therefore, not of the caste system, but of the distinction of high and low

that has crept into Hinduism and is corroding it. The attack on untouchability is thus an attack upon this 'high' and 'low'-ness. The moment untouchability goes, the caste system itself will be purified, that is to say, according to Gandhi's dream, it will resolve itself into true *varṇadharma*, the four divisions of society, each complementary of the other and none inferior or superior to any other.[20] Gandhi said that "the innumerable sub-castes are sometimes a convenience, often a hindrance. The sooner there is fusion the better."[21]He also said that "there appears to be no valid reason for ending the system because of its abuse." So, he wanted to abolish its outgrowths like untouchability, high-low division or gradation among men etc. but not the basic structure. Since in practice the caste system represents a social hierarchy based on the idea of high and low, and since, in any case, it is an unnecessary outgrowth of the four *varṇsa* which alone are fundamental and essential to the organization of society, he considers the multiplicity of castes to be undesirable and superfluous. "The division, however, into innumerable castes," he says, "is an unwarranted liberty taken with the doctrine (of *varṇāśrama*). The four divisions are all-sufficing."[22]

Some benefits of the *varṇa-vyavasthā*as stated by Gandhi:

The benefits of the *varṇa-vyavasthā* have been glorified by Gandhi in various ways; these are: firstly, according to Gandhi, *varṇa* is not a man-made institution, but the law of life universally governing the human family. Fulfilment of the law would make life livable, would spread peace and content, end all clashes and conflicts, put an end to starvation and pauperization, solve the problem of population and even end disease and suffering.[23]

Secondly, according to Gandhi, the law of *varṇa* emphasizes the duties rather than the rights of individuals (and since all labour is of equal value), "it ensures the fairest possible distribution of wealth, though it may not be an ideal, i.e. strictly equal, distribution." [24]

Thirdly, Gandhi was very much impressed by the *varṇa-vyavasthā* for its spiritual progress. According to him, "WhenI follow my father's profession, I need not even go to school to learn it, and my mental energy is set free for spiritual pursuits because my money or rather a livelihood is ensured. *Varṇa* is the best form of insurance for happiness and for real religious pursuit. When I concentrate my

energy on other pursuits, I sell away my powers of self-realization or sell my soul for a mess of pottage."[25]

Fourthly, According to Gandhi, *varṇa* would eliminate economic and occupational competition which he regards as unhealthy, since it "is today robbing life of all its joy and beauty", and is opposed to peace and harmony since it leads to confusion of *varṇa*and ultimate disruption of society"-a state of affairs which Gandhi considers to be the characteristic of the Western societies.[26]

Fifthly, Gandhi proposed for the same remuneration for all types of works, because all types of work or occupations are equally important for the all-round development of the society. No work is more high or low thananother; they have all same value in his *varṇa* system.

Some objections against the *varṇa-vyavasthā*:

From the above discussion, there are many problems and drawbacks whichmay be raised against Gandhi's *varṇa* theory. Here some problems and disputes are being cited: Firstly: It may confuse us when he mentioned thatthere are only four *varṇas*, all have equal status, and they are determined by birth. It may be changed by a person choosing another profession, but if *varṇas* are not as a rule determined by birth, these tend to lose all meaning.This statement is connected with the caste system a little bit in the sense of determining the particular place of an individual according to his*varṇa*. We find the same process in the caste system where heredity is also a determining factor of a man's caste. Gandhi's explanation of *varṇa* system thus leads to an inconsistency.

Secondly: Gandhi's another argumentin favour of the *varṇā*systemis unscientific. According to him,acceptance of the law of *varṇāśrama*, will remove competition and would thus prevent the disruption of society. But Gandhi has not shown or stated how intra-*varṇa* economic competition and intra-*varṇa* (as well as inter-*varṇa*) social competition is to be eliminated.

Gandhi's view seems to be absurd and unscientific on another ground. Because competition is oftenwelcome. It is often thought that competition makes a man sharp and it helps him to flourish.The competition gives a man the opportunity to express his or her intellectual calibre at the utmost level. So, Gandhi's *varṇa* theory does not match with reality.

Thirdly, another argument of Gandhi is absurd when he expected the same remuneration for all types of works. It is absurd for the reason that if all workers are paid the same remuneration, then no one will be interested to do that particular 'work' where more skill and hard labour are needed. Interest to the work of a man grows his skill and helps him to express his perfection. Undoubtedly, it is true all types of work are equally important for all-round development of the society. But it does not mean, the same remuneration will be provided for all types of work. Although in our society, people pay their respect and honour to the highly paid people. So, it may seem that we cannot deny the connection betweenwealth and dignity. But this position is difficult to accept. No one can give dignity to anybody, we have to achieve it or we have to become worthy of it. Hence, we cannot say the same remuneration for all types of work will provide same dignity to all the workers.Hence, Gandhi's argument does not appear to be acceptable.

Conclusion:

From the above discussion, we may conclude by saying that Gandhi's advocacy of *varṇa*system is unnecessary and futile. It cannot solve social problems; rather it creates another great problem. Today Indian society has become more complicated than the past. Our society has been stratified and classified by the various layers of castes. There is no specific reason behind it; becauseit has different reasonsin the different parts of India. Thus, it has created a critical and complex situation. So, it is very difficult to bring all the castes into the four basic *varṇas*. How this reduction will be possible, Gandhi was silent about this matter. If it is possible to reduce all the castes into four basic *varṇas*, then it will not be possible to remove all the social problems.Until and unless the root cause has been eradicated it will not be possible to solve the problem. The root cause of social problems is contained in its divisivemode or features. If we divide all the people into four *varṇas* (i.e. four *varṇas* named *brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśya* and *śūdra*) on any reason, then its consequence will always be negative. It is not desirable for us to divide humanity into four *varṇas*. Hence, we have to see man simply as a man. *Jāti*, *dharma*, *varṇa*, genderor any other issues cannot be the factor of recognition of a human being. These man-made institutions are imposed upon human beings; these are not inseparable traits of a human being. Hence, first of all,we have to come out from any kind of division (it may bethe division of brahmana, kshatriya, vaiśya and śūdra or any other divisions).

Division procreates hierarchy, gradation, a distinction among the men. So, if we can rise aboveall kinds of division, hierarchy, gradation, then we will be able to regard all kinds of work asequaland respect all people. Thus, it will be a step to establish equality in society.

Notes and References:

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4. *Gitā*, 4/13.
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6. *Young India*, November 24, 1927.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. *Young India*, October 20, 1927.
11. *Young India*, October 6, 1921; September 29, 1927.
12. Basu, Durga Das, *Introduction to the Constitution of India*, P. 108.
13. N. K. Dutt in *Origin and Growth of Caste in India*, vol. 1. P. 105, 1931, speaks of 'Nishadas, Chandalas and Paulkasas as the fifth *varṇa*, which is something against the *Smṛtis* tradition.
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TAGORE'S EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT
SOMA SARKAR

Introduction:

The fundamental purpose of education is not merely to enrich our selves through fullness of knowledge, but also to establish the bond of love between man and man. (Tagore, *Siksha*, p.10). In the world of Indian education, Rabindranath Tagore is a glorious personality. Tagore was a gifted man and his creative power emerged in different directions. There is no experience in human life where his thoughts have not touched. He was not only a poet but also a novelist, dramatist, essayist, philosopher, singer, actor, painter, social reformer and an educator. So we call him an institution in himself. He has influenced many aspects of human life, education also being one of them. Education is the benchmark of any civilization. It is an important part and basis of human life. Education is a process and kind of guided activity which can transform people. Since the beginning of civilization, people have changed themselves through education.

Rabindranath's vision of education was first given a real form in the school that was established at Santiniketan in Brahamacharyaashram (Ashram School) in Bolpur in the year 1901. On December 22, 1921, he established Visva-Bharati, an educational institution that was international in character, where Indian civilization intermingled with other civilizations. Tagore was a visionary. The founding of Visva-Bharati by Tagore was mainly to fulfill his dream of connecting India to the world. Tagore wanted to reconcile the east and the west through education. For Tagore, nationalism confined man within a barrier and the only salvation was embracing cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism does not see any boundaries between nations, states, culture and societies. His cosmopolitan view appeals to the breadth of the human mind. It teaches not only to tolerate otherness but by questioning the boundaries between the home and the world, it expands the reach of experience. In this paper, we will discuss Tagore's idea of education and show how Tagore's educational philosophy includes an attempt at inculcating cosmopolitanism.

Historical Background:

Rabindranath was born in Kolkata's famous Tagore family on May 6 in 1861. At that time, India's, especially Bengal's educational system was influenced by the English system of education. The British established English medium schools for the

promotion of English education in India. Thereby neglecting the ancient education system of India. During the Bengal Renaissance, the Jorasanko's environment of the Tagore family which was a free liberal environment for education influenced Tagore's fundamental education. Rabindranath Tagore's grandfather Prince Dwarkanath Tagore and his father Debendranath Tagore's were very interested and enthusiastic in education. During Maharishi Debendranath's time, the Tagore family was freed from most of the ancient Hindu religion. Debendranath Tagore ceremonially adopted the Brahmo-dharma. But his father Dwarkanath had served Hindu reforms long ago. Rabindranath received a great atmosphere in the Tagore household.

Debendranath's allegiance to mother language influenced Rabindranath's mind. Rabindranath inherited many things from his father such as the deep affection for the mother tongue and cultivation of mother tongue. That's why Rabindranath has expressed his view in different places to teach in the mother tongue. Debendranath was a worshipper of the Brahmo religion, which was a new form of refined Hinduism. Rabindranath and his father were all opposed to ritualism. For this reason, Rabindranath was against the pseudo prejudices of society and religion. So, he created a new society by the light of western enlightenment and rationalistic education. Just as he learned the essence of this ancient and contemporary education from his predecessors Rammohun and Vidyasagar, he also inherited it from his father. Therefore, the influence of Debendranath on forming the nature of Rabindranath's educational thinking is undeniable. Rabindranath Tagore's eldest brother Dwijendranath was a symbol of Swadeshi thinking but he was not anti-western in the pursuit of knowledge. On the other hand, his second eldest brother Satyendranath passed I.C.S abroad.

Tagore was born at exactly that time when English education flourished in India. But English education neglected primary and secondary education. At that time there was a distinction between two classes, the fortunate upper class and the rural people or lower class. That is why higher education was not possible for poor people. But at the end of the nineteenth century, the middle class was protesting against discrimination in English education. The advantage of the education system introduced by the British was only for the high-class people, but a large population of Indians belonged to the lower class.

India then was in an atmosphere of nationalism. So in his early life, Tagore's thoughts were influenced by nationalism. But later on, he became aware of the terrible consequences of nationalism, so he then followed cosmopolitanism. H. B. Mukherjee's *Education for Fullness* (2013) has pointed out how Tagore's view on education grows out of his broader understanding and insight into human life. He argues that in his early life Tagore was influenced by nationalism but when he matured, he recognized that nationalism and national values are not adequate in the modern world. He believed in the cosmopolitan attitude which is the base of his educational philosophy.

Tagore's Writings on Education:

Tagore's educational philosophy does not follow any traditional trend. So it is a difficult task to categorize him. There is extensive literature on Tagore's philosophy. Tagore himself wrote essays, letters, novels, stories, dramas, as well as delivered speeches explaining his educational thought. His 130 essays covering about 1750 pages on education give us access to his philosophy of education. In *Europe Pravasir Patra* ('Letters of a traveler to Europe' (1881)), he wrote about his first travel to England. At that time he was overwhelmed by the western culture which had an impact on his educational writings. But in his later writings, for example, *Megh O Rudra* (1894), and the *Sadhana* essays, especially 'Redress of Insult' (1894), he told people to fight against the injustice of oppressive rulers. Tagore was sceptical about the work of the British government. His ideas were expressed in 'Englishman and Indians' (1893), *Imrejer Atanka*('The Englishman's Dread' (1893)), 'Right to Justice' (1994), 'Political Scruple' (1894).In his Europe Yatrir Diary- 'Diary of a Pilgrim to Europe' (1891), he managed to connect eastern and western education. So we see that at the time his thinking changed.

Tagore's first major writing on educational problems was entitled 'Sikshar Herpher' (Our Education and its Incongruities, 1892), where he advocated a free, joyous, spontaneous system of education. His main aim was 'education for all'. He was firm in his stand regarding the importance of the mother tongue in teaching. Tagore said that it is not possible to know any language without knowing one's own culture and one's own mother tongue. But he didn't reject the English language. He insisted that English be taught as a supplementary language. In another article, 'Siksha- Samasya' (Problems in Education, June 1906), Tagore gives an elaborate

and significant explanation of what he regarded as the most important features of a national educational system. According to him, the Indian education system should not simulate the European system of education. Rabindranath Tagore said in 'The Problem of Education' *Towards Universal Man* (p.69), 'We must put the European model out of our minds, if only for the reason that European history and European societyare different from our history and our society. We must try properly to understand the ideals by which our country has been attracted and stimulated in the past.' One of our difficulties arises from the fact that, lacking knowledge of Britain, we are unable to put English education in its proper perspective. Never having seen it in relation to the society to which it belongs, we fail to find the way by which its Indian counterpart can be harmonized with Indian life.

So, he said that the Indian education system should be connected to the whole life of individuals organically. He says educational institutions should be spaced where people have the opportunity to interpret their ideas. Children's thinking will not increase if there are specific issues in educational institutions. The main thing is what the children want to learn. Children should be taught what they want to learn. He doesnot want them to engage in rote learning. In an important article, '*Tapovan*' (The Forest School of India, 1909), he introduced a new idea of the education of feeling which consists of the realization of a man's attachment with the universal spirit, soul and deeper intuition. According to him, the forest school's education is related to *Sadhana*. In *Sadhana*, he wanted to see the correlation between the individual and the universe. Here he shows that the intimate love, action and beauty are to be part of the educational process. Tagore wrote to C.F. Andrews in *Letters to a Friend* (p.38),

In India the range of our lives is narrow and discontinuous. This is the reason why our minds are often beset with provincialism. In our Ashram at Santiniketan we must have the widest possible outlook for our boys, and universal human interest. This must come spontaneously- not merely through the reading of books, but through dealing with the wider world.

In 'Strishiksha' (The Education of Woman, 1915) in *Siksha,* he emphasized the philosophy of curriculum. He did not believe in any discrimination between man and woman. He believes that woman and men have equal rights to education, which is important for building a peaceful society. In his institution, Tagore gave equal

place to the education of girls and women and had built a hostel for girls. He says in *Personality* (2011), that through education people can know their nature, choose what is right and what is wrong, and one can also choose who is the real ruler of our country so that they can improve our country. Another significant educational writing of Tagore is 'Alochana' (A Discourse, July 1925), where he emphasized the importance of the code of conventions because there are many rules for different occasions. In the Ashram Siksha, people can learn that different kinds of events are associated with different emotions. Here, he refers to his idea about 'the peripatetic' or mobile school, which involves teaching and learning while walking. He always insisted on the importance of learning directly from Nature and Life. Tagore's short story 'The Parrot's Training' (1918) does a creative critique of the common mode of education during the colonial times which is still prevalent as the traditional system of education. Opposing the system of parrot's training, Tagore believed in the ancient Indian belief '*sa vidya ya vimuktaye*' (Education is that which liberates the mind).

Tagore's educational ideology is expressed in his three novels 'Gora' (1909), 'Ghare-Baire' (1919) and 'Char Adhyay' (1934). In 'Gora', Tagore describes the nationalistic condition of Bengal at that time. Here he attacks Gora's nationalism and self-definition. Its theme is politico-psychological. In 'Ghare-Baire', Tagore describes the cosmopolitan view. Its theme was politico-sociological. Tagore's last novel is 'Char Adhyay' where his view is more developed. It is a politico-ethical view. These three novels form the core of Tagore's thought on politics, society and education. According to Tagore, '*swadeshikata*' is not the same as nationalism or nation-state. To achieve the universal love '*swadeshprem*', this is the main aim of Tagore's '*swadeshikat*a'. His goal is to develop the Indian society and establish unity in diversity. Tagore wanted to show in his novels 'Ghare-Baire' and 'Char Adhyay' that love, believe, universal friendship is more valuable than narrow nationalism.

Tagore was against the conventional educational systembecause this education does not make people happy. There does not exist any educational value here so it is not real education. He believed in Ashram School which is related to universalism. Tagore sincerely tried to improve India's educational system. He insisted on the ancient teachings of India. So he founded the Gurukul model school. As a result, the ashram school was founded at Santiniketan in Bolpur in 1901.This educational system aimed to ensure all-round development of all children. His main aim was to

make education simple. Real education must be helpful to understand their right throughout the country. He wanted to match the east and west's educational thought. He said, real education removes the barrier of nationalism and it reaches the spiritual and the international stage. He also said that education which is lively and dynamic and connected to our world is called real education. According to him, children learn from nature, not from the book. So he was against book-centered learning. The theoretical education is not real education; according to him, the practical education is useful for life. He distinguished d between the education of the senses and the education of the intellect in '*BodherSadhana'* ('Expansion of sympathy'). It also connects the inner perception with external perception.

Tagore's Experiments with Education:

Rabindranath Tagore's spiritual vision is an important aspect of his educational thought. So he said that self- realization is the important aim of education. The first step to self-realization is the complete development of the person. According to Tagore, if the student is not fully developed, then it is not possible for him to fully understand his conscience. He said self-realization means the realization of the universal soul in one's self. A human being aims to achieve this status. We cannot realize it without education. Tagore's cosmopolitanism was based on his spirituality. That is why he treated all people as equal. He saw God in human beings, so he was a worshipper of humanity. The manifestation of personality, which is the goal of education, depends upon self-realization and spiritual knowledge of the individual.

The clerical education that Indianswere given under British rule resulted in the loss of their self-esteem. As a result, Tagore was particularly distressed. He realized that Indians had no connection to the national heritage and life within the British-initiated education system. This education has crippled the nation rather than bringing about human self-development. That is why he wanted to establish an Indian educational system based on national heritage, culture and spirituality. He understood that the spiritual connection of human beings with education is necessary for the development of humanity. Tagore thinks that one of the major mistakes of British rule is the educational system in India. This educational system was isolated from the natural environment. By approaching nature, the child's body is organized and learns to realize the absolute truth. So inspired by the Ashram Siksha, he established 'Santiniketan'. Tagore was opposed to the so-called formal and restrictive education.

So he wanted education to be boundless and free. Tagore was keen to build Santiniketan to give form to his educational thinking.

Tagore's educational view is based on Upanishadic philosophy. According to him, education which helps people to develop their self-esteem and humanity is real education. So, Tagore believed that there is a harmony between God, man and nature. Tagore wanted to create an educational centre where people from different countries, different religions, and different cultures could exchange their ideas among themselves so that it can become a pilgrimage place for students. Visva-Bharati was a civilizational meeting place. The motto of this university is *Yatra visvam bhavati ekanidam*- 'Where the world meets in one nest'. Tagore wrote

> If ever a truly Indian university is established it must from the very beginning implement India's own knowledge of economics, agriculture, health, medicine and of all other everyday science from the surrounding villages. Then alone can the school or university become the centre of the country's way of living. This school must practice agriculture, dairying and weaving using the best modern methods… I have proposed to call this school Visva-Bharati (*Addresses by Tagore* (1963), p.9-10).

There is a significant role of freedom in Tagore's educational philosophy. Freedom is considered as an integral aspect of human development. Education is a man-making process; it explores the innate ideas that exist within a human being. It is not an imposition but a liberal process that provides utmost freedom for development. According to him, the education of the child without independence and happiness remains incomplete. So he favoured teaching by giving freedom. For him, freedom means spiritual liberation. Liberation is the greatest excellence in human life. The spiritual liberation of people is possible through the supreme excellence of education. That is why he thinks that spiritual freedom is greater and wider than physical freedom. When a human being has supreme knowledge, when he understands the distinction between the finite and infinite, then his transcendental knowledge is possible which transforms him from human to 'Supreme Man'. So, he wrote in his *The Religion of Man* (2011)

We must realize not only the reasoning mind, but also the creative imagination, the love and wisdom that belong to the Supreme Person, whose Spirit is over us all, love for whom comprehends love for all creatures and exceeds in depth and strength all other loves, leading to difficult endeavours and martyrdoms that have no other gain than the fulfilment of this love itself (p.359).

In the traditional education system, the freedom of the student has been diminished by the fact that the child is confined within a narrow boundary. Tagore believed that the education system was completely useless if it was set up dismissing the needs of the students. Tagore wanted to establish an intimate connection between the nature of the world and the students. One of the main aspects of Tagore's educational thought is 'education in nature'. That helps to expand children's thinking. They learn to be self-reliant at an early age. With this objective, he had opened Santiniketan, Sriniketan, and Brahmacharya Ashram. These places gave free choice to students to develop their interest in the field of their liking. In Tagore's educational philosophy the terms 'education' and 'life' are the same and inseparable. According to him, the process of education should always be dynamic and free. For him, the education which does not provide freedom and joy to the students is meaningless. Education needs love and active communication. So education stimulates responsiveness only when it is imparted through the path of freedom.

Tagore didn't just give ideas about educational thoughts; he tried to apply them in reality. Tagore's Santiniketan is the centre of this education system. Instead of book-centred education, he promoted vocational education. Students will be able to build their lives by adapting to a simple and working life at school. He thought that education aims to create a real 'Man'. The best development of a person can be achieved by acquiring social qualities. Education eliminates inadequacies. Tagore, however, strongly criticized book-centred knowledge and conventional test-based education. According to him, the development of independent thinking is the main goal of education. One of the aims of education is also to raise the scientific outlook among the students.

In 'Tapovan' Model, Tagore emphasized the importance of establishing an intimate relationship between the Guru and the Disciple in the education system. According to him, if the teacher is enthusiastic and talented, he can always teach the students by inventing new methods. He had a deep faith in the child's inherent ability and enthusiasm to know. Activity is the key to his education system. He preferred teaching through travel rather than teaching in the school rooms because it extends children's experience far beyond the school rooms. Tagore says about the role of the teacher in 'The Problem of Education', in *Towards Universal Man* (1961), that it is

"… to put life into his pupils with his own life, light their lamps with his own learning, and make them happy with his affection." (p.79)

His focus was on the spiritual development of the children as well as their physical development. Therefore, in his education plan, he organized play, dance and song in the open nature. The purpose of all forms of education is to realize the universal truth that accompanies us. He didn't want to make the school a prison, but rather a shelter for students. There should be a relationship between the teacher and the student which helps the student reveal different aspects of his /her personality. The real teacher's goal is to make the student learn with joy. In "Ashram Education" in *Introduction to Tagore* (1983), Tagore says that an ideal teacher should encourage the students all the time. They create interest in knowing everything in the students.

Tagore emphasized the importance of the mother tongue as a medium of education. To illustrate the importance of teaching through mother tongue, he compared mother tongue to mother's milk. One of the simplest and most natural means of students' self-development is their mother tongue. He believed that if English remains the medium of education, then this education is bound to become upper-class and urban-centric. This education will remain a dream for the lower and the middle class in the village. In his essay 'Shikshar Bahan' ('The Vehicle of Education', 1915), he stresses the importance of the mother tongue as the medium of education.DespiteTagore's sharp criticism against the adoption of the English language as a medium of instruction and his strong arguments for the mother tongue, he did not express any adverse attitude towards the English language. He mentioned the need to teach different languages, including English in his education plan.

Rabindranath Tagore's Cosmopolitan vision of Education

Now the problem before us is of one single country, which is this earth, where the races as individuals must find both their freedom of self-expression and their bond of federation. Mankind must realize a unity, wider in range, deeper in sentiment, stronger in power than ever before (Tagore, *CreativeUnity,* 2011, p.73). Tagore visualized a centre of education as a civilizational meeting place where a student can learn from the treasures of the various civilizations and develop a cosmopolitan attitude. The word *Cosmopolitanism* is derived from the Greek word *kosmopolities* which means 'citizen of the world'. It helps create fellow-citizens who share their cultures. Achieving cosmopolitanism is one of the most important goals of education.

Tagore's view of cosmopolitan attitude and life is fundamental to his educational vision. Tagore's educational philosophy is designed to nurture the cosmopolitan attitude. For him, socializing is a sharing of wealth and glory between east and west. Western scientific advancement and eastern traditional culture must be associated with each other to create a positive resurgence of true humanity. He believed that this co-existence could bring about all-round development and universal brotherhood. His Visva-Bharati was set up to transcend the boundary and become a meeting place of east and west. He was opposed to the idea of the nation; he was even more severely opposed to India joining the bandwagon of nationalism. For Tagore, cosmopolitanism is different from internationalism. According to him, cosmopolitanism is related to non-nationalist humanistic spirit, while internationalism is related to political geography and national identities. Tagore's Visva-Bharati is the meeting place for all civilizations where he encouraged rootedness. However, he also gave the place a flavour of the idea of universal culture as existing in all people and one kind of cosmopolitan view which transcends nations.

Kwame Anthony Appiah's article 'Cosmopolitan Patriots' (1997) describes Tagore as a 'rooted- cosmopolitan'.The term 'rooted-cosmopolitan' means 'someone who is rooted in his own cultural identity and yet who also considers him/herself as a citizen of the world'. Tagore was rooted in Bengal and yet was a member of the world fraternity. Appiah said, Tagore's philosophy of education was a marvellous syndrome ofthe interconnectedness of human beings with all life on earth, which is a natural conception of environmental awareness.

'Ghare Baire' has emerged as an important text for studying and devising the opposing theoretical positions of cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Ashis Nandy, in his book *The Illegitimacy of Nationalism,* talks about Tagore's cosmopolitan view. Ashis Nandy points out that the two types of patriotism are symbolized by 'Nikhil' which stands for the cosmopolitan attitude (he doesn't believe in any boundary of a nation)and 'Sandip', which stands for extreme nationalistic attitude, while the character of 'Bimala' stands for the situation of Bengal. She is confused between the two types of patriotism.

Martha Nussbaum has also worked on Tagore's cosmopolitanism. She argues in her article 'Cosmopolitanism and Patriotism' (1996) that we are deprived of the moral right of people to argue or create a question. As a result, we are afraid to give

up our independent opinion, for which we are limiting ourselves and our thinking. For this reason, we are all indulging in discrimination everywhere. Nussbaum agrees with Nandy's view that 'Ghare-Baire' shows 'two different forms of patriotism'. She points out in her book *For Love of Country* (1996), that Tagore sees deeply when he sees that at the bottom nationalism and ethnocentric particularism are not alien to one another, but akin- that to give support to nationalist sentiments subverts, ultimately, even the values of justice and right (p.5).

Conclusion:

Although Tagore was deeply moved by the Tapovan model in ancient India, he did not blindly admit anything. He tried to reconcile eastern and western ideologies. He sought to reconcile eastern civilization and culture with the repositories of western knowledge. He did not want to exclude everything as foreign, and he was opposed to accepting everything just because of its in indigenousness. That is why his plan included developing global citizenship beyond the boundaries of the nation. According to Tagore, that which teaches people to be creative, to think, to be free and express their open-minded ideas, that which people take with pleasure is absolute education. This education helps to develop humanity. He believed that education is not meant for livelihood alone, because mere subsistence cannot be the ultimate goal of human life. After all, livelihood only alleviates our poverty and satisfies our needs. It can never fulfil our life. He realized that only through genuine education would the student become conscious of their national culture and heritage and learn to understand their purpose. Along with this he also wanted the students to get acquainted with the cultures of other countries and to learn from them. He also wanted the students to have their own opinion. They should not be influenced by anyone to form an opinion. It was Tagore's wish that they become world citizens by getting rid of the narrow nationalistic boundaries. I feel that Tagore's educational ideal is best captured in his ambition of inculcating cosmopolitanism. Though it is rooted in his native land, for him the whole world is where people need to connect and be treated equally.

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TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD

KABITA ROY

Introduction

Kant's transcendental enquiry is called transcendental philosophy. The main objective of transcendental philosophy is to establish a *priori* knowledge about the world. But the question is why did Kant search for this type of knowledge? It can be said that some knowledge can be dubitable. Kant wanted to discover such knowledge which is indubitable. This anxiety leads him into an enquiry of *a priori* knowledge about the world.To do this, Kant took the help of the transcendental method. The term 'transcendental' refers to some basic features. Kant explained these features by introducing two prominent terms, namely 'transcendent' and 'transcendental'. Many Kantian scholars also deal with the term *transcendental.* We also describe how scholars like John P. Doyle and Andrew Brook understood Kant's views on *transcendental.* Kant's *transcendental* method is the result of his *transcendental* argument. Kant's epistemology is based on his *transcendental* argument. In this essay, our purpose is to explain how Kant applied the transcendental argument for the study of human cognition.

The Meaning of the term *Transcendental*

Doyle argues that the term 'transcendental' is not Kant's coinage. In this regard, he cites the views of Hans Leisegang."Transcendental", says Leisegang, "was one of those terms which Kant borrowed from the vocabulary of earlier philosophy and then changed for his own purposes."(p. 784).Kant applied a special status to the term. In his *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, Kant uses the term *transcendental* as a pure faculty for having a *priori* cognition. In this context, he stated that "The word transcendental... with me never means a reference of our knowledge to things, but only to the cognitive faculty" (*Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, p. 294).On the other hand, in his *Critique of Pure Reason,* he distinguishes between the terms 'transcendent' and 'transcendental'.

The distinction between the terms 'transcendent' and 'transcendental'

The origin of the above terms is the same. In both cases the word 'transcendent' is common. But their meanings are different. Kant applies these two terms for serving two different meanings. About 'transcendent', Kant says,

We shall entitle the principles whose application is confined entirely within the limits of possible experience, *immanent;* and those, on the other hand, which profess to pass beyond these limits, *transcendent*' (B352).On the contrary, in the context of *transcendental* Kant mentions that, 'that is, employment extending beyond the limits of experience(CPR, B353).

From the above argument, it can be suggested that the meaning of *transcendent* and *transcendental* is clear. Kant described the term *transcendent* as meaning 'is beyond experience'. On the other hand, he applies the term *transcendental* as meaning 'the precondition of human experience'. It is concerned with the applicability of pure concepts of understanding. Concerning this meaning, it can be said that Kant's *transcendental* is the second step of his transcendent in human experience. This is also regarded as a method in Kant's study of philosophy. This is called the transcendental method.

Kant's Doctrine of *Transcendental* Method

Just like the other methods such as the method of analysis, Kant's *transcendental* method plays an important role in his cognitive study. A proper study needs a proper method. Kant himself did not use the term 'transcendental method' in his book. Some Kantian scholars namely Andrew Brook, Sami Philstrum have used the term Kant's *transcendental* method. Andrew Brook has mentioned of Kant's transcendental method in his article named 'Kant and Cognitive Science'. In this paper, he has shown how cognitive scientists have been influenced by Kant's *transcendental* method. Brook says cognitive scientists have regarded Kant's method as the fundamental method for the study of human cognition. Like Kant, he claims that they were looking for the pre-condition of human experience. In this respect, it should be mentioned that in every field, whether in philosophy or science, a method is nothing but some set of presuppositions based on which it is possible to reach to a certain conclusion about the study. Here it should be mentioned that Kant's *transcendental* argument is regarded as his *transcendental* method. There is no difference between the transcendental method and the transcendental argument.

What is Transcendental Argument?

Kant's transcendental argument is the greatest discovery in his study of cognition. Kant developed this argument to study human thought, experience, and knowledge. But Kant does not define this argument anywhere in his *Critique of Pure Reason.* He has explained *transcendental* argument as the mode of deciphering the necessary conditions of human experience. Besides Kant, many philosophers like

Ralph C. S. Walker have worked on the *transcendental* argument. However, they have not given any definition of this argument either. But they use some premises to express the nature of Kant's transcendental argument. They have given a structure of this argument. Walker says that ''Transcendental arguments are concerned with the conditions under which experience, experience of a given sort, is possible'' (*Kant, the Argument of Philosophers*, p. 18). Now the question arises, how did Kant apply transcendental argument to understand human cognition?

Application of Transcendental Argument to Human Cognition

Kant mentioned two transcendental arguments. The first argument is concerned with David Hume's scepticism. This is also called as transcendental deduction and the second part of this argument deals with scepticism about general objects which is termed by Kant as the refutation of idealism. We will explain both kinds of transcendental arguments in detail. First we would like to deal with the sceptic's challenge.

Meeting the Sceptic's Challenge

Hume doubted in the certainty of human experience. Here it is important to note that, Kant was well aware of the possibility of doubt regarding pure concepts of the understanding. It is because of the nature of the human reason which transcended its entire limit. In this regard, Kant argues that,

> ... a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of knowledge, even for our inner sense) must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof (CPR Bx1).

Hume is an example of the above argument. According to Hume, experience alone can give knowledge; one need not accept the role of the concept. He thought so because the relation of concept cannot be empirically justified to an object. In this regard, Hume mentions the theory of 'law of association'. Through this law, Hume says, we experience an object after repeated observation. But for this task, we need not have any *apriori* concept. This becomes a difficult problem for Kant. It can be said that, as Kant applied categories as the pre-condition of human experience, they must be free from any doubt. If categories itself remain doubtful, if they do not have any objective validity then the experience which we will have through the help of categories again would be a matter of doubt. Barry Stroud, a contemporary Kantian

scholar, mentions the possibility of doubt about the object in general, or it can be said experience in general. In this regard, he claims that,

> You cannot show the sceptic that you are not hallucinating, and hence that you know there is a tomato on the table, simply by asking your wife if she sees it too - hallucinations of your wife's reassuring words are epistemologically no better off than hallucinations of tomatoes. At every point in the attempted justification of a knowledge claim, the sceptic will always have another question yet to be answered, another relevant possibility yet to be dismissed, and so he cannot be answered directly. (p.242)

Because of these reasons, Kant tries to justify the validity of the categories through the method of his deduction.

Deduction

The Dictionary meaning of the term 'deduction' is 'a definite conclusion about something'. Kant applied another special status to the word. He tried to prove the objective validity of the pure concept of understanding through the help of deduction. Kant distinguished between two different types of deduction, namely, empirical deduction and transcendental deduction. Kant made this distinction following his two different types of concepts - empirical concepts and pure concepts. Empirical concepts are those general concepts which we can get through our experience, for example, the concept of a table, chair etc.

Kant mentions two different types of *a priori* concepts, *apriori* concept of sensibility and *apriori* concept of understanding. Space and time are *apriori* concepts of sensibility and categories are the pure concepts of understanding. Empirical concepts are related to empirical deduction and pure concepts are related to the transcendental deduction. These two different types of deductions are about the object of the phenomena which is also called by Kant as appearance. These are also made based on the mode of knowing of the appearance. In this regard, Kant says,

> The explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate *a priori* to objects I entitle *transcendental* deduction; and from it I distinguish empirical deduction, which shows the manner in which a concept is acquired through experience and through reflection upon experience, and which therefore concerns, not its legitimacy, but only its de facto mode of origination. (A84, CPR).

From the above, it is clear that the title of these two different types of deductions is based on the relation of the *a priori* concepts to the object. Now it can be said that space and time as *apriori* concepts of sensibility and the categories as *apriori* concepts of the understanding always relate themselves to an object in an

apriori manner. That is why Kant called them transcendental deduction. Kant distinguished empirical deduction from the transcendental deduction. But he did not give any example of empirical deduction. As empirical deduction does not contain the object *apriori*, Kant did not give much importance to the empirical deduction. But he emphasises transcendental deduction which can fill up the gap in epistemology made by scepticism.

TranscendentalDeduction

Kant used transcendental deduction as a tool for justification of categories. Kant claims that we acquire knowledge through the application of pure concepts of the understanding. Deduction of the categories lies on some principle. In this context, Kant has given some argument which can be regarded as the main point of this deduction. This is, the *transcendenta*l deduction of all *a priori* concepts has thus a principle according to which the whole enquiry must be directed namely, that they must be recognised as *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience, whether of the intuition which is to be met with in it or of the thought. Concepts which yield the objective ground of the possibility of experience are for this very reason necessary. But the unfolding of the experience wherein they are encountered is not their deduction; it is only their illustration. For on any such exposition they would be merely accidental. Save through their original relation to possible experience, in which all objects of knowledge are found, their relation to any one object would be quite incomprehensible (CPR, A94). Let us see how Kant has applied the pure concept of understanding as to the possible condition of experience.

Pure Concept as the Necessary Condition of Human Experience

Kant claims that we acquire knowledge ofan object through representation. It means we cannot have direct knowledge of any object. What we have at first in our experience are only representations. Then through a certain process and by satisfying certain condition, representation converts itself into the object of knowledge. Here the question arises, what is the process through which representation turns into an object of knowledge? Kant tries to solve this problem by posing questions from both sides regarding the role of these two different modes of knowledge. In this context, he claims that 'Either the objects alone must make the representation possible or the representation alone must make the object possible' (B125/A93, CPR).

The first part of the above sentence, Kant argues, is directed towards the truth which is merely *empirical* and cannot be *a priori.* On the other hand, in the second case, Kant says that representation itself cannot be the cause of the production of an object of possible experience. It is because Kant believed that since representations are not *apriori*, they are not sufficient to know an object. Hence there are other possible sources for knowing. These are pure concepts of the understanding using which we can think of an object. In this regard, he says,

> The objective validity of the categories as *a priori* concepts rests, therefore, on the fact, that so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become possible. They relate of necessity and *a priori* to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can any object whatever of experience be thought. (B126/A93, CPR)

Thus, Kant has proved that concepts are the *a priori* condition for having our thought. As thought is possible, we can also know objects through these pure concepts. Kant says that through the help of pure concepts, we can even think of the object of the *noumenal* world although we cannot know of them. Kant was unable to establish the objective validity of categories. He justifies categories by showing that our thought is impossible without them. Before doing that, Kant would need to prove how the thought of categories is itself possible. But Kant did not do that because, to do that, he would have had to think of another presupposition as the precondition to prove the objective validity of categories. But it will create an infinite series of problem. Hence Kant avoids that route.

Another problem is that when Kant thinks of categories as the pre-condition of human experience he does not make clear what type of experience is implied. Is it *apriori* or *aposteriori*? This question is raised because Kant's categories are *apriori*. Then it is natural to think that categories would be the condition of knowledge which is *apriori*. But if Kant applies them as the condition of experience in general, then it becomes obscure by nature. Kant discussed the second *transcendental* argument in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason.* This argument is called 'refutation of idealism'.

Refutation of Idealism

Idealists are concerned with inner experience. According to them, only mind or ideas exists. About this claim, they have denied the objective validity of outer objects. In this section, we seek to focus on how Kant has refuted idealism and

established the reality of objects outside us. Kant was concerned with two different types of idealism, namely, the *problematic* idealism of Rene Descartes and *dogmatic* idealism of Bishop Berkeley. The main theme of this argument is to find out the mistakes of the view of that idealism which rejected the existence of external objects in space. Kant did not accept idealism. Kant believed in the existence of external objects in space and time. For this reason, Kant developed a *transcendental* method to establish the objective validity of the external object from within the subjective condition.

Dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley

Berkeley is regarded as a dogmatic idealist in the history of philosophy. His view is called dogmatism because he thought his beliefs were true and realism was false. He claims that only the mind and its ideas are real. He did not accept the existence of space. If space itself is impossible, then it is also impossible to have the existence of an object in space. That is why Berkeley also denied the real existence of an object in space. He argues that we infer outer objects based on the ideas of our mind. In this regard, Kant mentions Berkeley's view where it is said that

> '... Space, with all the things of which it is the inseparable condition, is something which is in itself impossible; and he therefore regards the things in space as merely imaginary entities' (CPR, B275)

Kant did not explain space as a relation of different objects like Newton and Leibnitz did. Rather he understands space as a form of intuition. But from the above quotation of Berkeley where it is said 'in space,' it can be said that Berkeley imagined space as the container which contains objects in it.

Kant has argued against the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley because whereas Kant has placed an overall emphasis on space and time as the condition of human experience, Berkeley has rejected space as fully imaginative. In this regard, Kant argues that Berkeley's claim of 'the things in space as merely imaginary entities' would have been true if it would have been the case that space is the property of things-in-themselves. But Kant did not explain space as the property of things-in-themselves. In this respect, Kant says, 'Dogmatic idealism is unavoidable, if space be interpreted as a property that must belong to things in themselves. For in that case space, and everything to which it serves as condition, is a non-entity' (CPR, P. 244).

In the transcendental aesthetic[1], Kant shows the importance of space for having cognition. He regards to space and time as *a priori* forms of sensibility. According to Kant, whatever object we experience, we experience it in space. Kant regards space as *a priori* because it is not an empirical concept. For this reason, he says,

> Space is *a priori* representation, which underlies all outer intuitions. We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think of it as empty of objects. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them (CPR, P. 68).

Kant did not explain the exact nature of the space. As Kant did not explain space based on the relation of the objects, why did Kant use the term 'space' to represent the form of intuition? There is no clear description of this problem in CPR. Kant used the concept of space and time in his writing but he did not give any deep explanation about them. This is a gap in Kant.

Problematic Idealism of Descartes

Kant argues that Descartes' idealism is easier to understand than that of the idealism of Berkeley. Descartes did not deny the existence of external objects. Kant thought so because he says, according to Descartes; the objects of the outer world can be dubitable. It means these are not as certain as the statement 'I am'. But Kant claims that 'even our inner experience, which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible only on the assumption of outer experience' (CPR, P. 244).

Kant mentions two different types of senses - outer sense and inner sense. They have their tasks. Outer sense gives us outer knowledge and inner sense helps to get knowledge about inner sense. Their task cannot be reversed. These senses can be regarded as two different windows using which we can observe the nature of two different worlds. In the context of outer sense, Kant says, 'By means of outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all without exception in space. In space, their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another are determined or determinable' (CPR, P. 67). On the other hand, about inner sense, he says,

> Inner sense by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state, yields indeed no intuition of the soul itself as an object; but there is nevertheless a determinate form [namely, time] in which alone the intuition

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[1] As he already has shown the importance of space in human experience in the section of transcendental aesthetic, he did not mention it in the section on the refutation of idealism.

of inner state is possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented in relations of time (CPR, P. 67).

Idealism assumed that only the immediate experience is an inner experience and that from it we can only *infer* outer things. (CPR, B277).

But Kant has proved that they are wrong in their opinion. In this respect, I would like to mention how Kant has explained the possibility of cognition of outer objects. Kant says,

> I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All determination of time presupposes something *permanent* in perception. This permanent cannot, however, be something in me, since it is only through this permanent that my existence in time can itself be determined (CPR, B276).

What is 'Permanent' in Kant?

Permanent means something is there outside us based on which we can even know ourselves. However, Kant holds that, ...perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me (CPR, 276).

Kant's permanent refers to the states of affairs of the object in space which is fixed. Moreover, states of affairs are not possible if there would not be any real object in space. From this, it is suggested that Kant admitted the possibility of experience about the world by presupposing the permanent existence of objects apart from us. Hence our outer experience is about only those objects which do not belong to us.

In contrast to the idealists' view, Kant holds that not only is the existence of the outer object accepted by our inner experience, but he says even our inner experience is determined by outer experience. As evidence for his view, Kant claims that 'The determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual thing which I perceive outside me' (CPR, B276). I agree with Kant that there is the existence of objects outside us. But how is it possible to understand my existence based on the existence of the object outside us? Kant did not give a clear explanation of this. But when Descartes says that 'I think therefore I am' it can be said that we can understand our existence based on the thought of the object of the outer world. It is so because our thoughts always have content. This content is nothing but the representation of the object outside us.

Kant accepted the real existence of the outer objects independently of our mind. This independent object is called things-in-themselves according to Kant. In

this domain, Kant took a realist position. But he claims that the representations of the outer object cannot have any independent existence apart from our mind. In this area, Kant stands in an idealist position. Kant named his idealism as transcendental idealism. Kant has given his theory of transcendental idealism to solve the problem of cosmological dialectic. Kant understood that to have proper knowledge, both sense and reason are required. As a result, he gave the theory of sensibility and understanding. These two theories solved the entire problem raised by empiricism and rationalism in the realm of epistemology. Similarly, Kant took the position of both realism and idealism. But Kant is not an idealist like Berkeley and Descartes according to whom the objects of the outer world may be doubtful or a mere inference. In this respect, Kant says,

> Our transcendental idealism, on the contrary, admits the reality of objects of outer intuition, as intuited in space, and of all changes in time, as represented by inner sense. For since space is a form of that intuition which we entitle outer, and since without the object in space there would be no empirical representation whatsoever, we can and must regard the extended beings in it as real; and the same is true of time. But this space and this time, and with them all appearances, are not in themselves things; they are nothing but representations, and cannot exist outside our mind. (CPR, B520)

It can be said in conclusion that Kant's *transcendental* method based on his transcendental argument is suitable to solve the epistemological problem in philosophy. In this relation, I wish to mention that in many cases, we have seen that Kant's argument was concerned with some critical problems like the problem of scepticism regarding the possibility of knowledge and it tried to solve it. It also faced another crucial problem, namely, idealism. Kant tried to solve this problem. He dealt with two different idealisms namely idealism of Descartes and the Idealism of Berkeley. He made clear the meaning of these two different idealisms and tried to solve the basic problem raised in idealism. This is the prominent part of Kant's transcendental argument.

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FEMINISTS' PERSPECTIVES ON PROSTITUTION*

PRIYANKA HAZRA

I

The debate over prostitution is probably as old as prostitution itself. And the discussion of the oldest profession is as alive today as it ever was. New books and articles are constantly being published, new scientific reports and theories are presented, and new committees and commission are formed. Yet while the scientific and literary discussion is very much alive, the philosophical discussion on prostitution seems never come to life. The question is 'How is this to be explained? And is there any justification for it? Could it be that prostitution is a topic unsuitable for philosophical treatment? Or could it be that, although suitable, it does not give rise to any interesting philosophical question?' It seems absurd to maintain that the subject is unsuitable for philosophical treatment, since it clearly involves many normative and evaluative issues. 'Could it be instead that prostitution as a moral question belongs to casuistry or to applied ethics rather then to moral philosophy proper? Could it be that it does not give rise to any "high level" questions or principles?'

The moral standpoint of prostitution is not so consistent but, the act is legal and regularized within some countries and punishable by death in others. Prostitution is commonly defined as a custom of having relations in exchange for economic gain. The most popular monumental perspective is that prostitution is an unqualified evil. According to this view exploitation, abuse, and misery are intrinsic to the sex trade. In this view, most prostitutes were physically or sexually abused as children, which helps to explain their entry into prostitution; most enter the trade as adolescents; most are tricked or forced into this trade by pimps or sex traffickers; drug addiction is rampant; customer violence against workers is routine and pervasive; working conditions are abysmal; and legalization would only worsen the situation.

Prostitution, in its simplest form is the sale of sexual acts. "Most social scientists define prostitution as sexual intercourse characterized by negotiation, promiscuity, and emotional indifference."[1] Prostitution, however, encompasses much

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[1] P. Goldstein, *Prostitution And Drugs* 27:1979, and J.Decker, *Prostitution: Regulation and Control* 8:9, p. 979.

more than a simple definition reveals. Complex dynamics exist among prostitutes, as well as between prostitutes and their clients, and between prostitutes and pimps. Debates regarding study of prostitution took off by the Archimedean society. According to them, prostitution is a controversial issue, and many philosophers have many views about prostitution, say for example, for Fredrick Angel, "Prostitution is one kind of domination of women by men". According to the Archimedean society prostitution is immoral, undesirable, and in many places illegal too. They raise so many issues on prostitution.

Adam Smith, in *The Wealth of Nations,* opines that there are 'some very agreeable and beautiful talents' that are admirable so long as no pay is taken for them, 'but of which the exercise for the sake of gain is considered, whether from reason or prejudice, as a sort of public prostitution.' For this reason, opera singers, actors, and dancers must be paid an 'exorbitant' wage to compensate them for the stigma involved in using their talents 'as the means of subsistence.' Smith was not altogether right about the opera market, but his discussion is revealing for what it shows us about stigma. Today, few professions are more honoured than that of an opera singer and yet only two hundred years ago, that public use of one's body for payment was taken to be a kind of prostitution.

Many authors remarked that prostitution is obviously linked with religious outlook and philosophical assumption about sex, female virginity and female adultery. It did not develop in all societies in the same time or, same way that exists today. In Greek society there exists a division between proper women and prostitutes. A woman who enters into the male society, even at the level of an unequal, has to lose her status of a proper woman. Some thinkers also try to show *Orphic* religion and Platonic ideals on this issue. Roman had many oriental divinities and in their society prostitutes are attached to the temples. There are various theories which classify prostitution into four basic categories like the traditional Anthropologist, the modern theorist, the socialist and the Marxists.

According to the Anthropologists, prostitution is inevitable because nature determines certain rules for men and women, and one of women's is to serve the sexual needs of men. This theory is shared by both the traditional Anthropologist and by some Modern theorists. The Socialist and Marxists depict the view that prostitution is an inevitable result of capitalism. Some Anthropologists also claim,

prostitution is a hold over from early matriarchal societies where it was practiced without the negative social stigma that is attached to it today.

Thus, the most reasonable theory is that prostitution is a function of a patriarchal and male dominated society. This view held by some traditional Anthropologists, who believe that patriarchy is a superior form of social structure, also supported by Feminists. According to the conventional morality, a prostitute is a sinful creature and ought to be banned from the society which should be strengthened by law. For them, all sexual institutions should be related only to reproduction. According to the religious view, sex outside marriage, homosexuality and prostitution are not allowed in order to make human beings happy. Sex is valued within marriage or, within a committed relationship. Kantian moral theory identifies subjectivity and dignity with a *self-determining will* locate within the limited willing activity of embodied individuals. The individual knows itself as a subject only means of the recognition of another subject within a particular social context. Sexuality is one way in which individuals express their subjectivity. Each empirical subject is partly determined by its choice with regard to sexual expression and it's mode of integrating sex, gender, and sexuality within its life as a whole. According to some theories, prostitution is undesirable because it is not in the best interest of a prostitute to what she is. It is held that society should try to prevent people from becoming prostitutes and try to rehabilitate those who already are prostitutes. According to Marx, prostitution is only a specific expression of the general prostitution of laborer and since it is a relationship in which prostitute alone is not responsible. Just as a prostitute provides the substitute of love for money, the worker hands over his work and his life for daily wages.

According to the traditional Anthropologists, patriarchy is superior to social structure. This view is supported by the Feminists. Women perceive that they have historically been victims of both direct and subtle forms of male oppression. Feminists' stance toward sex work is based on a perspective that regards paid sexual services and performances as inherently oppressive and exploitative. Radical feminism sees prostitution as the quintessential form of male domination over women - the epitome of women's subordination, degradation, and victimization. Feminists' beliefs vary widely as to the most effective way to end this oppression. Radicals and liberals, however, are divided about the role of prostitution, seeing it in a range of

perspectives from that of an ordinary business transaction to an activity that degrades all women.

Feminist claims that there are five reasons why a person becomes a prostitute. Firstly, there are women who inadvertently fall into poverty and turn to prostitution but have an emotional thread to find some things else to do. Secondly, a woman may be educated against her will for no reason of defect in her character and be turned into prostitution. Thirdly, there are women born into poor families with a long history of poverty and a lack of education. Fourthly, some women perhaps take prostitution naturally like, "the fish take into water". This category may include prostitutes through several generations such women often know what they do and confident that they can handle most of the dangers. Fifthly, in this smallest category is that of attractive women who are looking very smart. These women recognize an opportunity to make an extraordinary high income as prostitutes with the men those afford a premium price of sexual service.

II

Women perceive that they have historically been victims of both direct and subtle forms of male oppression. Feminists' stance toward sex work is based on a perspective that regards paid sexual services and performances as inherently oppressive and exploitative. Radical feminism sees prostitution as the quintessential form of male domination over women - the epitome of women's subordination, degradation, and victimization. Feminists' beliefs vary widely as to the most effective way to end this oppression. Radicals and liberals, however, are divided about the role of prostitution, seeing it in a range of perspectives from that of an ordinary business transaction to an activity that degrades all women. Feminist believes that there are five reasons of why a person becomes a prostitute.

- Firstly, there are women who inadvertently fall into poverty and turn to prostitution but have an emotional thread to find some things else to do.
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Radical feminists on prostitution:

Prostitution has received less attention from radical feminists, whose central issue has been pornography. Yet many of the issues most important to feminists are embodied in prostitution. The sex act, central to radical feminist analysis, is also the central fact of prostitution. Most of the questions that concern feminists surround that act itself, power relations between the sexes, the place of sex in society, the sexual double standard, economic coercion, the meaning of family and marriage. Because prostitution is 'the real thing,' not merely a depiction of sex, it highlights these issues to a greater extent than does pornography. Likewise, however, prostitution forces feminists to confront the problems of radical feminist analysis, such as the false consciousness issue, more forcefully than does pornography.

There are radical feminists who believe that prostitution is always an instance of 'violence against women'. They believe the removal of the patriarchy will force a fundamental reshaping of male sexuality, meaning there will be no demand for prostitution, and therefore no supply. In contrast, there are those so called 'sex-positive feminists' who view prostitution as a choice made by rational female agents. They believe that there are some non-violent areas that provide prostitutes with the financial independence. In this sense, demand for prostitution is not a negative force that needs to be removed. Instead efforts should be diverted towards removing prostitute women from poverty and promoting their safety. Prostitution is inevitable in the sense that even if alternative career options were available, sex work can be an enjoyable and fulfilling career that provides a valuable service to the male customers.

The supporters of 'sex-positive' position may seem eminently reasonable. However, it is based upon a dangerous assumption about male sexuality. This is the widely held view that 'men's sexual impulses are just as instinctive and uncontrollable as…the need for food and water'. Therefore, men's demand for prostitutes is seen as the inevitable result of both: men's *need* to satisfy their sexual

desires and there is a 'void between male and female levels of sexuality'. There will always be a demand for prostitution because men will always demand sex - and (unpaid) women will not always be willing or available to provide it.

This argument from biological inevitability relies not only on men demanding sex, but upon a contingent of women always being available to supply sex - due not to their *genuine willingness*, but out of economic necessity. If this contingent of women was not available for whatever reason, the argument from biological inevitability implies that men would turn to rape - as sex is not just a desire - but a *biologically driven need*. From this, the argument for biological inevitability can be taken to be saying that prostitution reduces the instance of rape. This is a worrying thought and one that suggests that male sexuality is fundamentally predatory, out of the control of individual men, and unconcerned with the genuine willingness of female sexual partners.

It is believed that 'sex-positive' feminism makes dangerous and patronizing assumptions about male sexuality which is unequivocally rejected. There are problems with Radical Feminism as their views often lack in degree, with their insistence that the client is always 'expressing a pure heart for the female body' and the prostitute never truly willing leaving no room for a discussion of the lived reality of some agents in the sex industry. It is, however, perfectly reasonable to admit that the sex industry encompasses a 'multiplicity of different experiences' - positive and negative - whilst still arguing that, overall, it is an avoidable force for bad in society and therefore something that we can and should look to eliminate. Anti-prostitution feminists hold that prostitution is a form of exploitation of women and male dominance over women, and a practice which is the result of the existing patriarchal societal order. These feminists argue that prostitution has a very negative effect, both on the prostitutes themselves and on society as a whole, as it reinforces stereotypical views about women, who are seen as sex objects which can be used and abused by men.

Liberal feminists on prostitution:

Liberal feminists take an individualistic perspective on women's liberation. So the priority, for liberal feminists, is about the ability of individuals to make choices. Liberal feminism also focuses on achieving "equality" through legislative reform. What this means is that liberal feminists don't aim to attack the root of the

problem, but rather make changes within the system that already exists in order to help enable women to hold equal status to men in society. They don't think these aims are bad, in and of themselves, but just don't think they will successfully address the problem of male power and female subordination. The main problem with liberal feminism is that its focus on individual rights and choices leads feminists to attempt to fix problems like violence against women and sexual exploitation through superficial means. Say for example: a prostitute may say "maybe if we just make more "woman-friendly" porn, the porn industry will cease to be completely misogynist and exploitative;" "maybe if we just regulate the sex industry, prostitution will cease to be a violent industry that preys on marginalized women and exists purely for male pleasure, at the expense of women's lives;" "maybe if women *consent* to shaking their body on stage for an audience and choose their own outfits, stripping/parody will no longer be about presenting women as pretty, sexy things to look at and become feminist;" "maybe if women choose to self-objectify in selfish, that act will become an empowering one;" and on and on.

Radical feminism looks at patriarchy as a system of power, not as something you can simply regulate or talk or imagine out of existence. According to them, taking back words or inventing new ones won't upset male power, nor will our own personal feelings of "empowerment." We can't simply change our own individual perspective on particular acts, trends, and behaviour in order to change reality. Radical feminism aims to attack gender roles and the social inequality and male violence against women that results from these prescribed gender roles. Therefore, from a radical feminist perspective, there can be no glorification of the "feminine" or "masculine" because of the following resons.

- those roles are oppressive, and
- they aren't real, but are invented and enforced by a patriarchal society.

"Feeling good" about self-objectification is fine on an individual level, but has nothing to do with feminism or with changing or challenging an oppressive system. If more women make porn that is "female-friendly", it won't destroy the porn industry or make that industry one that isn't a primarily sexist one that promotes the abuse and degradation of women. If we regulate the sex industry, it won't change the fact that prostitution exists on a foundation of colonialism, capitalism, and patriarchy

and is an industry that exists to benefit men and reinforce women's roles as subordinate. Women prostitutes have described it as 'paid rape' and 'voluntary slavery'. Prostitution is sexual harassment, sexual exploitation, often worse. The payment does not erase what we know about sexual violence, domestic violence and rape.

In response to liberal arguments that imposing morality is dangerous and totalitarian, feminists would argue that the liberal goal of keeping morality out of law is in any case illusory. To avoid 'legislating morality' is to accept prevailing moral standards by default. If the current morality sanctions male sexual dominance over women, liberalism simply permits, albeit in hidden fashion, the continued prevalence of such conservative moral norms. Also, of course, liberalism's basic tenets - the overriding importance of the individual, for example, ensure certain moral outcomes and thus are not value-neutral. Feminists, on the other hand, realize and accept that law will always institutionalize some system of values; admitting this openly allows a more honest and rational process of deciding which system to adhere to, instead of pretending that no choice has been made and thus permitting the de facto persistence and dominance of traditional behavior.

Further, a 'female' value system might look very different from past systems of morality that have sought to dominate i.e., the types of systems against which liberalism reacts. Carol Gilligan[2] claims to have found a fundamental difference between 'male' and 'female' approaches to ethical problems. Gilligan takes pains to point out that neither approach is exclusive to either gender. Part of that difference lies precisely in the absence, in the 'female' value system, of a clear cut division between right and wrong, and instead in a desire to solve problems to benefit all involved. If this is so, instituting female values would be instituting relativism as opposed to absolutism, and therefore could not by definition become totalitarian. The ultimate aim is not to create a system of 'female dominance,' but to benefit both men and women by reducing the element of dominance itself.

The reason most often given by prostitutes themselves for the work they do is the money. However, another reason relates specifically to the burdens placed on women in today's society is children. Many prostitutes are also mothers, and require

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[2] C. Gilligan, *In A Different Voice*, 1982.

the flexible time schedule, in addition to the money, that prostitution provides. Few other jobs, especially among those available to less-educated women, provide the necessary flexibility.

Essentially, women are defined in male terms by a state structure that believes it is neutral. Women, in turn, believe this view of them and accept its objectivity, and internalize it themselves. Therefore, they cannot define themselves independently. This view carries with it the danger of ascribing to women a 'false consciousness,' that is, assuming that women simply do not always know-cannot know-who they truly are, or what they really think. This can become a paternalistic attitude that those who have become aware of the truth have a better understanding of what is good for women.

Is prostitution a choice?

Arguments for legalizing prostitution depend on the strength of two arguments: that prostitution is a choice for those in it and that the harms of prostitution are decreased if it is legalized. There is little evidence that either of these arguments is true. But there are theories about prostitution never seem to die no matter how many facts we beat them down with. Only a tiny percentage of all women in prostitution are there because they choose it. For most, prostitution is not a freely-made choice because the conditions that would permit genuine choice are not present: physical safety, equal power with buyers, and real alternatives. The few who do choose prostitution are privileged by class or race or education. They usually have options for escape. Most women in prostitution do not have viable alternatives. They are coerced into prostitution by sex inequality, race/ethnic inequality, and economic inequality. Followings are some of the examples of invisible coercions:

- The woman in India for example, who worked in an office where she may conclud that she might a well-prostitute and be paid more for the sexual harassment and abuse that was expected of her anyway in order to keep her job. That's not a choice.

- The teen in California for example, who said that in her neighbourhood boys grew up to be pimps and drug dealers and girls grew up to be whores. She was the third generation of prostituted women in her family. Prostitution more severely harms indigenous and ethnically marginalised women because of their lack of alternatives. That's not a choice.

- A woman in Zambia for example, who said that five blowjobs would pay for a bag of cornmeal so she could feed her children. That's not a choice.

- The First Nations survivor of prostitution in Vancouver for example, who said, *We want real jobs, not blowjobs* for the rest of her 2009 speech and other writings by survivors who have gotten out and who are supporting sisters to escape. That's not a choice.

- The young woman for example, sold by her parents at the age of sixteen into a Nevada legal brothel. Ten years later, she took six psychiatric drugs that tranquilised her so she could make it through the day selling sex. That's not a choice.

III

From the contemporary perspective, prostitution is identified as a transnational issue requiring global solutions in relation to its regulation and legislation, but the question of what constitutes a properly feminist response remains a matter of dispute. Ongoing conflicts within metropolitan feminist circles over the meanings of sexuality for women, combined with the United Nation's acknowledgment of women's rights as human rights, have produced two divergent conceptions of prostitution as a legitimate target of governmental intervention. Extrapolating on the UN's recognition of gender discrimination and violence as issues that stem from and reinforce the secondary status of women, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) associated with the feminist abolitionist lobby contend that prostitution constitutes a form of violence against women and hence a violation of human rights. As a result, they are currently lobbying within the UN, and other political forums, for nations to work towards the eradication of prostitution by decriminalizing and providing support for women in prostitution, whilst simultaneously criminalizing those who create the demand for, and profit from, the sexual exploitation of others. Conversely, NGOs who endorse the platform of the prostitutes' rights movement maintain that abolitionist and prohibitory prostitution laws constitute a violation of the human rights of women to control their own bodies, lives, and work. In consequence, they are currently lobbying for nations to recognise all forms of 'voluntary' prostitution, by decriminalizing consensual commercial sexual practices, and placing 'the sex sector' under the jurisdiction of commercial and labour, as opposed to criminal, laws.

By claiming the *right* to enter into and redefine the 'masculinist' terrain of international law, however, women's human rights activists have effectively revitalized the once beleaguered claim of Feminism to speak for all women, albeit this time in the name of multi-vocal, transnational feminisms, as opposed to univocal, *White-Western-Feminism*. Despite repeated admonitions to the effect that transnational strategies must be viewed as interim measures, based on the provisional tactic of 'thinking globally, whilst acting locally', metropolitan women's rights activists evince an inordinate faith in the universal efficacy and transformatory capacity of feminist legally based strategies. This faith is justified by reference to the urgent need for remedial action regarding issues that harm and discriminate against women, and the unavoidable necessity of using the language of human rights because it is the only language that has the capacity to set legal remedies in operation. While these justifications may ring true, the underlying appeal to notions of an oppressed universal sisterhood, and hence commonsensical conceptions of 'real politics', has had the corollary effect of precluding theoretically informed attempts to disassemble the language of human rights, by intimating that such endeavours are purely academic, or even non-feminist, in the final analysis. The recent turn to international law has thus attracted many feminist human rights theorists into the trap of assuming that metropolitan feminist concerns can and need to be translated into a universally applicable set of policy recommendations.

Prostitution seems to engender some of the most difficult issues in feminism. Prostitutes are considered by feminists to be on the front line of patriarchal oppression. They exemplify the position of all women in patriarchal and capitalistic societies. They also carry the dual burden of a criminal record and the loss of respectability that their clients do not. For feminists, prostitution epitomizes everything that is wrong in patriarchal societies.[3] there are some questions to ponder here.Is support for prostitutes more important than a critique of prostitution? Are the prostitutes victims or agents? Do feminists who are not prostitutes have the right to speak on behalf of prostitutes or by doing so are they perpetuating the perception of

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[3] Carpenter, B. J. (2000). *Re-thinking prostitution. Feminism, sex, and the self*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.

prostitutes as the victims? These issues have been debated for decades and are still relevant today, simply because not much has changed[4].

In the 21st century, prostitution is still a crime in the U.S. Feminists are at an impasse because of their conceptual dualism; victim or agent, for or against, classist or sexist oppression. Dichotomous conceptualizations put feminists in a bind, as they cannot both support and critique prostitutes simultaneously[5]. The either/or stance ignores the possibility that these options are not mutually exclusive and the fact that prostitutes are not a homogenous group. The only resolution is through a new conceptualization that is not based on mutually exclusive choices, but instead incorporates the complexity of the prostitute phenomenon, and allows for the various voices of prostitutes to be heard and validated. Feminists will have to find a way to separate prostitutes from prostitution as a social institution, as it makes more sense to defend prostitutes' entitlement to do their work but to not defend prostitution itself as a practice under patriarchy. Feminists need to create a synthesis in the dialectic of the right to choose and the right to protection, within a new framework that can include both.

Race is generally absent from the feminist discussion of prostitution[6]. The feminist polarization is primarily focused on sex vs. class inequalities, ignoring the part race has in understanding inequality and prostitution. This is surprising given the fact that women of color tend to enter prostitution earlier and stay longer as compared to White women and that numerous studies report a disproportionate percentage of African-American women arrested and incarcerated for prostitution[7]. Both radical and socialist feminists have been criticized by Africana women for failing to incorporate the concerns and issues of women of color because they primarily focus on sexism (radical) and class inequality (socialist). Africana women suggest that race should take precedence over the other "isms" in explaining prostitution, especially street-level prostitution, although they view race as always being classed and gendered.

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[4] Jolin, A. (1994). On the backs of working prostitutes: Feminist theory and prostitution policy. *Crime & Delinquency*, 40, p.69-83.

[5] O'Connell Davidson, J. (2002). The rights and wrongs of prostitution. *Hypatia*, 17, p.84-98.
[6] Kramer, L. A. (2003). Emotional experiences of performing prostitution. In M. Farley (Ed.), *Prostitution, trafficking, and traumatic stress* (p.187-197). Binghamton, NY: Haworth Press.
[7] Nelson, V. (1993). Prostitution: Where racism and sexism intersect. *Michigan Journal of Gender & Law*, 1, p.81-89.

Thus, Africana women view prostitution as resulting from the intersectionality of structural racism, classism, and sexism and suggest that all are pivotal in understanding prostitution.

One may say that the feminist critique has created a shift from focusing on individual deficits (pathologizing prostitutes) to considering social discourses as constructing the institute of prostitution. Consequently, there are many efforts that have been redirected to the facilitation of more structural changes. What is missing is attention to the individual prostitute and her children. In the struggle to protect prostitutes as a marginalized and vulnerable group, the prostitutes as individuals have been forgotten. The prominent evidence for this is the current dearth of family therapy literature specifically addressing the mental health needs of prostitutes and their children as well as any clinical considerations for reaching out and treating this at risk population.

Despite feminists' advocacy of decriminalization, the prevailing policy in some countries is still criminalization. The negative view of prostitutes is still prevalent. It is possible that the longstanding cultural values regarding morals and promiscuity present greater obstacles to change than feminists anticipated. "Until such time as a woman's sexual conduct is of her choice (equality), and neither detracts from (promiscuity) nor enhances (chastity) her worth, prostitution will continue to exist and it will continue to be fraught with controversy".[8]

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ETHICAL CODES IN ADMINISTRATION IN ANCIENT INDIA
JOLY ROY

Though the science of politics or statecraft began with a pragmatic vision with the passage of time it was replaced by moral vision. It further evolved into other visions at modern period such as the integral vision of Sri Aurobindo, humanistic vision of M. N. Roy and so on. It is not certain when the notion of state was articulated and segregated from the ruler and its subject. Though the origin of this notion was not traceable but we can say that in *Dharmaśāstras* and *Arthśāstras* the reference of this separation was clear. In the above *śāstras* we get ample evidence that the state is an articulated notion and it had started shouldering various responsibilities with its complex structure. The thinking that we find in writings of Kautilya and other writers subsequent to him had a striking similarity with their contemporary Greek counterparts (e. g. in the writings of Pythagoras, Plato and so on). V. R. Mehata holds that Kautilya "was the first to make Political Economy an independent discipline; while paying lip service to the ideal of right, he propounded a theory of politics which dealt with the immediate practical concerns of polity."[1] In his treatise he clearly states the organic theory of state and holds that it comprises of seven organs. Most of the writers of his time agreed with his seven organs view except the *Mahābhārata* where we find reference of eight organs though what is that additional one organ has no mention there.

A reading of Kautilya makes us think that state was a necessity in order to overcome the anarchical situation prevalent in a stateless society. He was under the impression that only a powerful ruler can bring about order in a society. It is this feeling that caused him to espouse a strong ruler and putting him on the top of the system and vesting in him maximum power. Though the king had been vested with much power, he was put under strong regimentation. He had been entrusted with the task of protecting the righteous and checking the unrighteous.

Though *Arthaśāstra* mainly espoused rationalism however the *Arthaśāstrakāra* indulged in what German politician Ludwig Von Rochau called Realpolitik. Still, it contains ideas which gave rise to ethical codes for all political functionaries - right from king to the lowest level's public servants. The threads of

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[1] Mehata, V. R.: 2019, *Foundations of Indian Political Thought*, Manohar, p. 90.

these ethical codes were later brought about and explained in their own ways by Kāmandaka, Somadeo Suri, Sukrāchārya, Tiruvalluvar and by some other writers. In these *nītiśāstras* these thinkers clearly came out of Vedic dogmas and advocated *trivarga*, i. e. *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. The notion of *dharma* and its injunctions were given in *Dharmaśāstras*. Kautilya and other *Arthaśāstraskāras* were exponent of *artha*, i. e., the second goal of life. Vatsayana was the spokesman and defender of *kāma*. These thinkers urged for pursuing all these three *Purushārthas.* However, while pursuing this, "the *trivarga* ideal should be pursued keeping in view the importance of *artha*."[2] The *trivarga* ideal takes care of philosophy, theology, politics as well as morality. Chousalkar tries to establish that the views delineated in the *Arthaśāstra* had a close affinity with the *Lokāyata* philosophy. Hence, they broke *Dharmaśāstra* tradition and pinned their hopes on *artha* and *kāma* ideal. Thus they adopted a positivistic outlook and were confident that it will secure *Yoga-kshema* for ordinary people.

Some later treatises written under the influence of *Arthśāstra* envisaged the state as an organization meant for delivering the goods in the form of *dharma* and *artha*. Somadeo Suri's *Nītivākyamitra*, Kāmandaka's *Nītisāra* etc. amply exemplify our claim. All these are treatises on polity, but loaded with moral code of conduct for the rulers and the ruled. Both Somadeo and Śukrāchārya extol the state for providing us benefits in the form of *dharma* and *artha.*

Daṇḍanīti which is sometimes equated with the function of a state is actually a moral code that a king needs to take recourse to either to maintain order and deliver justice within the state though when applied to external affairs it is more a matter of expedience. This *nīti* usually meant, in case of a *vijīgisu* ruler, to get hold of things not yet possessed, safeguarding of those earned things, augmentation of these and finally distribution of such increased things to deserving people. *Arthaśāstrakāra* shows that *daṇḍa* when rightly used - which means neither its overuse nor its underuse - brings its subjects *dharma*, *artha* as well as *kāma*. Kautilya repeatedly tried to demonstrate that all the three ends of life can be achieved only when *dandanīti* is followed with utmost care. This application of *daṇḍanīti* in the science of

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[2] Chousalkar, Ashok S. (2018), *Revisiting the Political Thought of Ancient India: Pre-Kautilyan Arthashastra Tradition*, Sage, Publications India Pvt Ltd., p.154.

politics, as well as in daily administration, brings security and well-being for the masses.

Though indeed, many ancient Indian treatises such as *Arthśāstras* and other treatises written following these are less concerned with discussing niceties of ethical principles, still they follow certain codes which are laden with their desire to make human life in this world and in this life as happy and contented as possible. As Chousalkar holds defending Kautilya and *daṇḍanīti*: "Peaceful enjoyment of the object was possible only in the state which was properly governed."[3] Chousalkar was keen to show that application of *daṇḍanīti* was not immoral as it does not seek a king to take recourse to an expansionist policy at the cost of the welfare of the masses. On the other hand in the absence of such a royal authority (i. e. application of *daṇḍanīti*) the strong few will gobble up the week. Thus, this *nīti* is intended to protect the weak. In order to apply it properly, Kautily wanted the king to bring complete control over his senses which will facilitate him to dedicate himself for the welfare of the populace instead of indulging in self-aggrandizement.

When we lament over the issue that why our ancient treatises gave precedence to expedience to moral principles, we find the answer in the distinct nature of politics. *Manusmṛiti* could understand this unique nature of politics and that is why it said that ordinary moral laws are not fit for application in royal conduct. It was expressed in a different way by Bhisma in the *Mahābhārata* invoking the concept of *anushāsana*. *Anushāsana*, in brief, stands for good governance but it is a complicated notion that has different strands. Among these, important are kings proper education, his self-discipline, bringing sense organs under control, having people's welfare as a focal point, protection of the subjects and also protection of the kingdom from internal enemies and external aggressors. All these elements taken together ensure that the king will not administer his kingdom in whatever way he likes rather he is duty-bound to rule the state in a way which will enhance his people's welfare. Why the king's morality is different from ordinary morality, for example, deontological moral principle has been aptly stated by Chousalkar. He writes: "While defending his control over the state, the incumbent king cannot be expected to use

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[3] Chousalkar, Ashok S. (2018), *Revisiting the Political Thought of Ancient India: Pre-Kautilyan Arthashastra Tradition*, Sage, Publications India Pvt Ltd., p.158.

only fair means when his enemies are bent upon taking recourse to foul means. Hence … the interest of the state and its seven constituent elements are of the supreme importance and whosoever including his own close relatives work against the interest of the state, he or she should be punished."[4]

Not only ancient Indian thinkers held such an extreme view about statecraft or politics. Even the Machiavelli, the celebrated Italian diplomat who came to the scene much later, also supported and advocate almost similar view. He also held that the state has to don the garb of an angel as well as a demon as the necessity demands. If any force inimical to its existence poses a threat to it, it has to be contained ruthlessly. Even Manu placed the interest of the state at the paramount. Hence all these thinkers find no unethicality in employing fair or foul means by a ruler to defend the state and its interest. The concept of *Āpaddharma* championed in the *Mahābhārata* can be interpreted as a means of giving the ruler *carte blanch* to act in a way whatever he thinks fit to meet the demand of an extraordinary situation. No set pattern can be a guiding principle for a king in such an exigency. Even taking recourse to foul means for own safeguard as well as protecting and safeguarding the interest of the state is a right action. Once the ruler overcomes such unusual situation he should go back to previous practice and rule the state as the *dharma* demands. From this it becomes obvious that the art of governing is an arduous task and the king sometimes needs to be merciless, as held in *Panchatantra*, to make foes knuckle under. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that these are requirements of extraordinary situations and for the rest of the time, i. e. ordinary times, and the king's guiding principle is the welfare of his subjects.

One of the greatest contributions of the *Arthaśāstra* teachers was that they broke away from prevailing tradition in pinning their hope on fate and holding belief in supernatural forces (such as spirituality, asceticism and other worldliness) rather they relegated that to the background and reposed their faith on human strivings. There is no gainsaying the fact that on account of this courage and spirit people have brought about stupendous changes in this world and worldly affairs. It is actually human action and their strivings that are rewarded and people garner fruits out of this.

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[4] Chousalkar, Ashok S. (2018), *Revisiting the Political Thought of Ancient India: Pre-Kautilyan Arthashastra Tradition*, Sage, Publications India Pvt Ltd., p.160.

This is a new trajectory of development that was espoused and followed by millions and we can say that by giving this these great teachers' of *Arthaśāstras* handed down to us a progressive message that was unheard of anterior to that time. The positive alternative that they provided in 6th century BC was antagonistic to Vedic dogma, rituals and sacrifices. They also raised voice against the philosophy of renunciation and strongly advocated the path of economic development thus giving primacy to *artha*. Thus we find a direct contravention of *Dharmaśāstra* tradition which accorded pre-eminence to *dharma* ideals at the cost of the other two ideals.

Beni Prasad holds that ancient Indian political thinkers adopted a synthetic approach to politics and hence considered it (i.e., politics) inextricably related to religion and ethics. Though by and large, it is true we also find a deviation from this. For example, in the early phase of *Arthaśāstra* thinkers did not adhere to this method. Śukra, Brihaspati, and Bharadvaja derided *Vedas* and *Vedic* dogmas and considered them as a cover to trick people. Hence, these teachers a held that politics was an autonomous discipline and not part of religion. Holding that social and political institutions had origin in human need and effort they refused to accept them as divine creation. For them, the only reason should be guiding principle and all principles and claims be tested on this yardstick. In various places we find arguments which gave precedence to the autonomy of human will instead of invoking authority. For example, in *Rāmāyaṇa* Jabala questions the existence of God, soul, heaven and so on and urges to judge everything on another basis such as consequence of an action and fulfilment of interest. Again, in the *Mahābhārata* while interpreting *Āpaddharma*, we find an effort to explain *dharma* in such a way that its metaphysical import is done away with. It is on this basis that they gave primacy to *artha* and *kāma* as it is these that facilitate securing pleasure and avoidance of pain and sufferings. Writes Chousalkar: "It was argued by teachers that the exact nature of *dharma* could only be understood with reference to time, place and the purpose for which it was performed."[5] Thus the definition of *dharma* cannot be context-less or universal. Hence we find rationalism and relativism making serious inroads into idealism. However, from this we should not presume that *Arthaśāstra* teachers preached a type

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[5] Chousalkar, Ashok S. (2018), *Revisiting the Political Thought of Ancient India: Pre-Kautilyan Arthashastra Tradition*, Sage, Publications India Pvt Ltd., p.169.

of politics that was completely devoid of ethics. Chousalkar in backing up our claim writes: "The *Arthaśāstra* teachers were of the view that political actions of the rulers should not be judged on the universal moral considerations because for politics, the laws of morality were different."[6] These thinkers considered the existence of the state and sound functioning of all its organs bear a moral purpose. Without these two there will be total chaos and mighty people will exploit and oppress weaker people. Only a king's intervention can save weaker sections and civilized society can pull through. Thus it is not to serve his self-interest rather to subserve the need of aforesaid moral purpose that king was needed. Proper performance of its (i. e. state's) functions has a moral worth and it is at premium here.

The *Arthaśāstras* tradition freed politics from clutches of religion. By holding that politics, and particularly king's action, has a standard of its own which is distinct from common morality it ushered in a new direction. Again, on account of extrication of politics from religion, it urged the priestly class to refrain from intervening in state affairs and hence limited their activities.

Somedeva Suri was Jaina saint and author of repute. In is his *Nītivākyanmitram* he mainly gives his ideas about politics and political life. Usually, it is thought that this *magnum opus* of him was a type of commentary on Kautily's *Arthaśāstra*. But he skillfully narrated his opinion in such a way that it strikingly sounds new. He even presented his view by way of mixing *Dharmaśāstra* tradition with *Arthaśāstra* tradition. Kautilya separated politics from *dharma* and by and large even from ethical codes. *Nītiśāstra* tradition tried to bring back ethical codes in political life thus providing much-needed desideratum to *Arthaśāstra*. In order to do that Somedeva first clarified some of his fundamental views. For example, he defined knowledge by saying that it is that "with the acquisition of which man resorts to what is beneficial and discard what is harmful to him."[7] Again, he explains the relationship between consciousness and Supreme Reality. He also clarifies what, for him, is the right action as it is on this basis that political action of the ruler as well as his organs will be adjudged. He shows the tension between individual pleasure-seeking and

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[6] Chousalkar, Ashok S. (2018), *Revisiting the Political Thought of Ancient India: Pre-Kautilyan Arthashastra Tradition*, Sage, Publications India Pvt Ltd., p.170.

[7] Somedeva, *Niti Vakyanmitram*, translated by S. K. Gupta, Prakriti Bharti, Jaipur, 1987. p. 48.

societal life which puts a curb on his individual seeking. He almost like Epicurus holds that happiness is the gratification of the senses and satisfaction of the mind. In defining virtue and vice he goes on to say that successful fulfilment of one's welfare is a virtue and that stands on the way of achieving this is vice. He was an ardent advocate of interweaving theory and practice as he thought that if a theory is not put to practice it is otiose and if something is practised without a theory backup it sounds ineffectual. Thus after defining the fundamentals Somedeva goes to explain what he considers as righteous and unrighteous actions in the art of state administration.

Considering political action inevitable for the happiness of the people he held that even if a learned man lacks skill in the art of politics and spiritual proficiency his enemy can trounce him easily. His effort to show the gap between the ideal political order with the prevailing one hints at advent of what is today called political philosophy. Somedeva thought that the greatest enemy of human beings is lacking knowledge of discrimination and propriety. His prescribed list of duties given for householders such as offerings to Gods, performing the filial duty to parents, treating guests with warmth and safeguarding the weak and also his definition of householder show that his view remarkably moved beyond Kautilya and he is trying to make room for basic postulates of dominant principles of Indian religious thinking. We can say that Somedeva's effort to accommodate main threads of religious thinking with Kautiliyan statecraft smacks of his leaning towards the utilitarian point of view and in this sense; he can be called a forerunner of utilitarianism.

While discussing righteous and unrighteous acts we find him invoking the notion of *dharma* which is a bit unusual for a Kautilya follower. But if we recall the time of this Jaina saint his invoking this notion does not seem inconsistent as between him and Kautilya the *smṛiti* tradition flourished, it is easily understandable that Somedeva is trying to draw from both the sources and making effort to make it suitable for the people of his time. While defining *dharma* he holds that it is the basis of right conduct and helps a person in achieving worldly success as well as transcendental beatitude. The action that promotes it, is righteous and actions that go contrary to it, is unrighteous. His emphasis on worldly prosperity is not an unqualified one. A prosperous person needs to benefit it "with rightness of means and

continuity of tradition."[8] Thus Somedeva is trying to draw a balance between *artha* and *dharma*. In his framework there is no place who harbour intense selfish desires for enjoying wealth only on his own.

We discussed before that welfare of people is the final aim of the state. But this Jain saint held that this standard of welfare is not to be decided by the king himself but it is to be determined by the guardian 'of the moral sense' of the society. They also are required to do it on the basis of critical interpretation of texts and on the basis of reason and logic. Thus, it appears that though Somedeva's king was the centre of power, he was not absolute. Some checks and balances have been placed in his exercise of power.

V. R. Mehta considers Somedeva's recommendation of the fusion of politics and morals invaluable. He writes, it is "more realistic and reassuring in so far as he recognizes a bond between the rulers and the ruled in terms of superiority of principles of right which are created independently of the state apparatus. Some such bond is considered as basic to good government in all contemporary thinking."[9]

The Kāmandakakiya *Nītisara*'s paramount aim was the cessation of miseries. He was a disciple of Kautily who persistently persuaded the king to resort to all sort of trickeries in order to overthrow his enemies. But Kāmandaka did not go to that extent and he blended finely a number of moral conducts in the general conduct of kings and his subordinates. He found Kautiliyan technique (trickery) useful only for diplomacy. This small volume consisting of all of nineteen chapters address various facets of the science of polity.

In that book, he lays down a number of lessons that he considered significant for the ruler for acquisition, preservation and augmentation of the territory and wealth. Kāmandaka considers the king as the main 'cause of the prosperity and progress of this world.'[10] His activity brings 'delight to the eyes of men, even as the moon affords delight unto the (mighty) ocean. The king needs to guide his subject 'to the paths of rectitude.' King's foremost task is the protection of his subjects and he needs to do that by various means such as the even-handed distribution of rewards and also punishments. The subject also needs to reciprocate for the flourishing of the

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[8] Somedeva, *Niti Vakyanmitram*, translated by S. K. Gupta, Prakriti Bharti, Jaipur, 1987. p.2.2.

[9] *Ibid*., pp. 126-127.

[10] *Kāmandakiya Nītisara*, trans.Manmatha Nath Dutta, Scholar Select, p.3.

state by paying taxes and giving tributes in the form of enhancing agricultural products. Kāmandaka also recommends that maintenance of order in the kingdom is an important task of the ruler as without it prosperity is of no use in a state. He also exhorted the ruler that he should capture states that are hostile to him. Writes Kāmandaka: "A sovereign discharging his duties according to the rules of polity soon secures *Trivarga* for himself and for his subjects; acting otherwise he is sure to ruin himself and his subjects."[11]

For the attainment of prosperity, he gives certain stipulations. These are having courage, knowledge of political economy, and vigour. Further, he says that for acquiring knowledge of political economy requires having humility which in turn emanates from the knowledge of *śāstras*. He holds that persons who practice humility, the meaning of *śāstras* is revealed to him. By humility, he meant full control over the sense organs. Self-restraint though begins with the ruler gradually permeates to others in a fixed order. This order is his ministers, than his dependents, next his sons and thereafter his subjects. A self-controlled king who spreads the same thing to others earns prosperity. He enumerates a number of qualities which he considered as sources of prosperity such as sound knowledge of polity, wise judgement, courage, power of comprehension, firmness of purpose, purity of intentions, truthfulness, good conduct, controlling passions and so on. He laid great emphasis on controlling senses and hence he writes: "A king delighting in the perpetration of vile acts and having eyes (of knowledge and reason) blinded by the objects of (sensual) enjoyment brings terrible catastrophe upon his own head."[12] Hence he asks for the enslavement of sense which will usher prosperity and prosperity breeds happiness. He denounces that prosperity as 'useless' which cannot give happiness.

He advised kings to renounce six passions and to bring them under complete control. These are: lust, anger, avarice, fiendish delight in inflicting injury, hankering for honour and arrogance. Renunciation of these passions makes a man self-controlled and a self-controlled king who organizes his life following *śāstra*, even though he is weak, never face defeat in the hands of enemies.

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[11] *Kāmandakiya Nītisara*, trans.Manmatha Nath Dutta, Scholar Select, p.4.
[12] *Ibid*, p.10.

The *Śukra Nītisāra* is a systematic study of the moral polity. In śloka no. 3 Śukrāchārya writes: "By a process of selection, the essence of that *Nītiśāstra*, which was an extensive argumentative thesis, has been compiled in an abridged form by *Vasiṣṭha* and others like myself for the increase of prosperity of rulers of the earth and of others whose life is of short span."[13] In this Śloka the name of the ruler is taken as it is in their hands that the destiny of his subjects depends. Hence if they master this *Nītisāra* it will ultimately pave the way for happiness of his people. Soon after that Śukrāchārya underlines the need for this system of morals. In śloka no. 4 he points out the specialty of this *śāstra* is that it says that it is different from other *śāstras*. Other *śāstras* are specialized segment of knowledge, i. e. they have their own concerned field. Hence they are divided under different heads and are specialized in their respective area. Hence the utility of these specialized branches is limited. But the nature of *Nītiśāstra* varies from aforesaid specialized segments. The extent of this science is vast as it offers practical advice to all. Prof. Benoy Kumar Sarkar opines that *Nītiśāstra* is a 'synthetic, comprehensive and generalized science (or rather art) of society, equivalent to Sociology in its wide sense, and hence should be considered equivalent to neither *Ethics nor a treatise on Polity*, but to a system of morals, (social, economic and political)"[14] What is meant is that *Nītiśāstra* is valuable for all and for all matters and hence it is useful for men of all hues. Śukrācharya seems to accept that the state is a multi-organic entity and king being at the helm he needs to be well aware of his dos and don'ts. This knowledge will ensure the happiness of his subjects. Hence in the very first chapter he states that these principles are especially required for a king. These *nītis* king needs to observe for his own interests also.

In spite of its universality of this science, Śukrāchaya emphasizes three uses of the *Nītisāra*. These are: First, the wisdom it contains can tell us authoritatively the approach or stratagem that we need to undertake while dealing with enemies, neutrals and friends. It also grooms a king to be always circumspect by keeping them alert about happenings about international politics. Second, it provides a king with skills to win over his people. It also teaches him how to know human interests and motives and the right way of handling them. And finally, it illuminates him about diplomacy

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[13] *The Śukranītiḥ* trans. Benoy Kumar Sarkar ,edit with an Introduction by Dr. Krishna Lal, J, P. Publishing House, Delhi, 2018, p.1-2.
[14] *Ibid*, p. 2.

and other political affairs which helps him to navigate the ship, i. e. running the state, smoothly and efficiently.

Śukrācharya also warns that not following the precepts of *Nītiśāstra* can have disastrous effects on a state. It endangers problems of a state internally as well as externally and brings misery and damage for the king as well as his people. Peace and prosperity can grow in a state only if *Nītiśāstra*'s precepts are followed in maintenance of relations between the king and his subjects, between subjects themselves and also followed in handling issues relating to foreign affairs. If these precepts are followed results, i. e. good benefit, flows from its own.

If the ruler does not follow the precepts prescribed in *Nītiśāstra* the prosperity of the state takes a regressive turn, it becomes weak and inefficiency creeps into it. It is the art of politics prescribed there that keep every organ of the state well-functioning. By organs here Śukrāchaya refers to seven organs of the state: *Swāmi* or sovereignty, *Amātya* or ministers and officers, *Mitra* or friends. *Koṣa* or treasure, *Durga* or fort, Army or force and *daṇḍa*. In short non-following of *Nīti* weakens the kingdom, make the civil services confused, army inefficient and other organs of the state are thrown into confusion and chaos. He reminds rulers that he gets the authority of ruling through his *tapa* or penance. Hence instead of depending on any other thing (e. g. destiny), he should be the maker of the destiny of his people. Everything centres on King's activity. Thus Śukrācharya seems to hold an important truth - man is the maker of his own fate. Śukrācharya, in order to maintain order in society, prescribes *svadharma*. For Śukrācharya, a king's *svadharma* is to ensure that his subjects do not deviate from *svadharma*. He has been advised to use *daṇḍa* to ensure compliance with *svadharma*. Performance of *svadharma* is the most important penance. Such observations bring prosperity and order for the state.   In order to secure it king himself first needs to observe his own *svadharma*. King is considered as maker of his age.

1,330 couplets of great Tamil work by Tiruvalluvar available under the rubric *Tirukkural* is divided into three books out of which the first two books 'Being Good' and 'Being Politic' give us wonderful insights about the art of life and statecraft. The 69 short chapters of this second book address different aspects of the science of politics. He also admits seven organs of the state giving top echelon to the king. King is required to be always vigilant, informed and bold in order to have a strong hold

over his empire. He writes: Awake he must be, in eye awake, in brain informed and bold If on his kingdom the king's to have a hold.[15] In order to be a god on earth the king is required to rule the kingdom 'with a sense of justice'. While defining a mighty king Tiruvalluvar states his four essential characteristics - help, grace, poise and devotion. It is to his that learning Tiruvalluvar gives utmost importance. Contrasting it with the material wealth he says that even a wise man has no wealth, his poverty goes away whereas a wealthy man without knowledge will ultimately become impoverished.

He alerted king to be always circumspect and to act upon after due consideration. Three things he needs to consider before action: what the enterprise will cost, 'what it'll bring' and what would be its future benefit. In order to assess these, he has been advised to examine the matter having a discussion with his counsellors and acting on their assessed counselling. Then only his actions will be cautious and calculated. Says Tiruvalluvar: To plan well is to plan a win, not to chance to amble That plan's no plan which wants with luck to gamble.[16] Even a mighty king having an enormous army but with an ill plan will have to repent for their deed. The Tamil poet gave even emphasis on end and means considering both are of equal importance. Hence he reminds the king to give equal weightage to end and means and says people consider his deed's end as good 'only if the means ring a clean bell.'

In chapter-51 *Tirukkural* we find the guidelines given for the monarch to choose his executives. He tells that the person concerned should be given the option to choose virtue, wealth, pleasure and fear of life. If the person in question chooses the first one then the king may rest assured that he has hand-picked the right one. Tiruvalluvar advises the king to choose men having noble birth. Such a person will keep away from faulty deeds and will be remorseful for evil action. He also gives a clue to identify the nobility of a person. In a later chapter the poet specifies that a noble-born maintains honesty in word and deed and bears a sense of shame naturally. He does not drift away from the trail of good conduct and truthfulness. Smiling face, generosity, pleasant words and politeness are four marks of true nobility. Smile,

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[15] *The Tirukkural* by Tiruvalluvar (trasn. of Gopalkrishna Gandhi, Aleph Book Company, New Delhi, 2015) p. 43.
[16] *Ibid*., p. 51.

charity, pleasant words and civility - These four are marks of true nobility.[17] They never sacrifice their principle even for any amount of fortune. On account of their charitable works even if their resources drops off, still they continue to do charitable works. Hailing from a noble lineage they remain circumspect and do not do ignoble activities. A person's noble birth will be a matter of doubt if in him there is want of love for others. Citing the analogy of pleasant words with fertile soil, Tiruvalluvar says that as we can understand the nature of soil seeing the sprouts of seeds sown in it, similarly one's speech tells his nature of birth. Hence in the final *kural* of chapter - 96 he says that the fountain of one's goodness is the sense of shame and desirous of 'nobility must have humility.'

Realizing that human beings are imperfect, he ordained the king to select a man of good intention, not only look for perfection as it is difficult to get. It is merit and intention that are hallmarks of a good executive. Thus, for Tiruvalluvar, the deeds of a man are the mark of his nobility or meanness.For the greatness or the meanness of men Their deeds are the touchstone.[18]

From the above it becomes clear that *Dhramaśāstras*, *Arthaśāstras*, *Nītiśāstras* and epics laid down moral code of conduct for the king as well as for his administrator and his people. These sages could realize that without a strict code of conduct any sort of polity will be only enjoyment of power without corresponding duty and responsibility.

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[17] *Tirukkural* (Trans. By M. Rajaram, Rupa Publications India Pvt. Ltd, 2009, p. 104)
[18] *Ibid*

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NOTES TO THE CONTRIBUTORS

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