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EDITORIAL NOTE

Philosophical thought is an unavoidable part of human existence. Almost everyone has been puzzled from time immemorial by such essentially philosophical questions as “What is the meaning of life?” “Do we have any existence before we were born?” and “Is there any life after death?” Many people have some kind of philosophy in the sense of a personal point of view on life. Even a person who claims that considering philosophical questions is a waste of time is expressing what is important, worthwhile, or valuable. Thus those who reject all philosophy is in itself a kind of philosophizing.

We express our deep sense of gratitude and happiness to present the 12th issue of the UGC enlisted journal “Philosophical Papers: Journal of the Department of Philosophy” before the philosophical community. It is also a great opportunity for the seekers of philosophy to put their thoughts before readers. The Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal is proud to express that it provides the philosophical fraternity with a space for contributing papers. However, we regret the delay in publishing the present volume. Besides regular academic activities, the Department is also engaged in performing SAP (DRS-III) programmes under the guidance of Prof. Kantilal Das, Coordinator of SAP in Philosophy and an Unit of Psychological Counseling under the leadership of Prof. Jyotish Ch. Basak and Smt. Swagata Ghosh. We thank all of our colleagues and esteemed members of the Editorial Board to publish this volume possible. We are grateful to all the contributors, Prof. (Dr.) Somnath Ghosh, Honorable Vice-Chancellor, Finance Officer, University Grants Commission and the University Press, without whose cooperation, this endeavour would not have seen the light of the day.

Perception is a direct source of knowledge of reality while other sources of knowledge lead us to reality, indirectly. In Perception we are face to face with reality whereas the other means provide only an indirect knowledge to us. As per literal meaning "Perception" is the *Pratyakṣa*. The word ‘*akṣa*’ in ‘*Pratyakṣa*’ means the sense organ and ‘*Prati*’ means all the sense organ, therefore the word *Pratyakṣa* means the function of each of the sense organs in respect of their appropriate objects. All the Philosophical Schools call it to be the basic and fundamental source of knowledge. Perception is called *Pratyakṣa* because it takes place through the relation

to the senses (*akṣam akṣamprati*). Tapan Kumar Chakraborty in his contribution 'Is sense-object contact essential for perceptual knowledge' elaborates the controversy on perception in a lucid manner.

It is admitted by the Indian epistemologists that an object to be proved (*meya*) is dependent on the means of knowing (*māna*) i.e., *mānādhīnā meyasiddhih*. Most of the treatises in Indian Philosophy deal with *pramāṇa* first only to prove *prameya*. Raghunath Ghosh in his contribution makes an effort to show that this theory is a kind of myth. Each and every system has formulated the epistemological theory in such a way so that metaphysical or ontological presuppositions admitted by a system are protected, which ultimately leads to the conclusion- *meyādhīnā mānasiddhih*. It has been shown after reviewing epistemological theories formulated by different systems of Indian Philosophy.

Religious epistemology is the study of how subjects' religious beliefs can have, or fail to have, some form of positive epistemic status such as knowledge, justification, warrant, and rationality and whether they even need such status appropriate to their kind. The current debate in religious epistemology is focused most centrally upon the kind of basis upon which a religious believer can be rationally justified in holding certain beliefs about God like, whether God exists, what attributes God has, what God is doing, etc. and whether it is necessary to be so justified to believe as a religious believer ought. Engaging these issues are primarily three groups of people who call themselves 'fideists', 'Reformed epistemologists', and 'evidentialists. Kantilal Das in his contribution Wittgenstein on Religious Epistemology tries to focus these issues from Wittgenstein perspective.

It is often a devastating and life changing experience for a woman to discover that for one reason or another they cannot have children of their own. In some cases, such as those involving repeated unsuccessful attempts at assisted reproductive technology or having a non-functional uterus, the remaining option for these women and their partners is surrogacy. However, a major concern with surrogacy is the potential harm that may be inflicted upon the surrogate mother and the child. Jyotish Ch. Basak in his 'the Surrogacy Conundrum' emphasizes this issue.

Generally, it is believed that an artwork may not be real or mental or ideal, but the novel and unique ideas that it presents may have a special ontological stand. It can be

considered as a system of exceptionally outstanding concepts which are intersubjective - it may exist in collective ideology. However, ontology cannot be separated from sociology and ideology. An artist's personal ontology is rearranged just by the raw data of the natural world. The ontological status of artwork is said to be fixed by its identity, existence, and persistence conditions. Relevant ontological status may be shared with different things, and different artworks may have different status. Arundhati Mukherji in her contribution tries to explain that a work of art may exist both artistically and aesthetically. A finished work of art exists in the imaginative activity of the artist or producer, and on the observer's appreciation as well. However, it can be further rational and practical to nurture the value of art, keeping aside the issues in the ontology of art.

Contractarianism as an ethical theory derives from the social contract political theory of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes believed that the fundamental demand of the legal obligations that a state imposes upon its citizens stems from a tacit agreement that those citizens have with the state to the effect that the citizens will obey the laws of the state in exchange for the security, comfort, and prosperity that the state affords its citizens. Ngaleknao Ramthing in 'Contractarianism: A brief survey' attempts to examine the theoretical groundwork of contractarianism and explain how people strive to establish the basic factors that sanction the formation of human societies which give rise to the creation of governing authorities all through an initial set of covenants people agree to enter into so as to strengthen individual self-preservation and social living by being members of a greater society.

Gilbert Harman, one of the chief contemporary voices supporting moral relativism defends this age-old thesis in a new way on internalist grounds. A general outline of his thesis reveals that morality so far it strives to be objective, absolute and universal rests on false presupposition. Rather moral requirements are shaped by established conventions or agreements reached by various people. Since different groups of people subscribe to different agreements, the moral worth of actions is relative to different moral frameworks, and no framework can be held to be objectively privileged. He explains our moral beliefs in terms of our psychology, without any appeal to independent realm of values. Harman argues for his thesis on the ground of what he calls 'inner judgments', which has two characteristic features, the first of

which is that we can make such judgments about an agent only if it is supposed that he has reasons to be motivated by the relevant moral consideration. He takes three examples to substantiate his contention. He also distinguishes between the ‘moral ought’ from the ‘normative ought’ on the one hand, and, the ‘neutral’ conception of moral reasons from the ‘evaluative’ conceptions. Several critics object to Harman’s internalist position of moral relativism. Saswati De Mondal in ‘A critical assessment of Gilbert Harman’s Internalist thesis of moral relativism’ is doubtful whether this relativistic position, at least, in the present form, can bear the challenges raised against it.

Munmun Chakraborty in ‘Attributive Consciousness and Intentionality: an Analysis from Rāmānuja’s Perspective’ makes an ardent attempt to reveal the notion of intentionality inherent in Rāmānuja’s understanding of consciousness. She claims that the notion of intentionality which is primarily attributed to German philosopher Edmund Husserl is not a sole contribution of him rather explicated quite extensively by Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja not only mark out consciousness with object-directedness but also his realistic conviction impels him to challenge the eternal, independent and non-cognizable nature of consciousness. It is this objective account of consciousness which substantiates Rāmānuja’s inclination towards intentionality thesis and thus deserves special attention.

In the last quarter of nineteenth century and early part of twentieth century a Hindu religious cult prevailing among the hilly regions of central and Western Odisha propagate a new wave of humanism in the social and religious life, called *Mahimā Dharma*. It was a socio-religious movement. This Movement was initiated by the illustrious Mahimā Swami with the sole purpose to reviving the restoring truth, non-violence, equality and justice in the society. Bhima Bhoi is known as the spokesman and exponent of the philosophy of *Mahimā Dharma*. Its philosophy centers round on absolute *Alekha Param Brahma* who is the creator of the whole Universe. The holy phrase ‘*Mahimā Alekha*’ which is accorded as the status of *mantra* in the system contains the essence of the system. In *Mahimā* philosophy *Mahimā Gosain* is accepted as the incarnation of *śūnya* or *alekha*. Jhadeswar Ghosh in his *Śūnyatā: a Philosophical Reflection on Mahimā Dharma* realizes how the theology of the God is substituted by the new theology of the God *Alekha (śūnya)* in *Mahima* philosophy.

Discrimination, harassment or oppression in connection with any of these groups of people might be related to: ability, age, bodily appearance and decoration, class, creed, caste, culture, gender, health status, relationship status, mental health, offending background, place of origin, political beliefs, race, and responsibility for dependants, religion and sexual orientation. Procedures, policies and legislation appertaining to equality, value and diversity include morality, national law and international conventions. Kasturi Datta (Majumdar) in 'Equality vs. Value: Some Observations' tries to clarify these issues critically.

The concept of *Satyāgraha* has been stated in the *Upaniṣads*, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Bhagavadgītā* etc. But Gandhi got this idea of *Satyāgraha* from the Vaiṣṇavism. *Satyāgraha* means clinging to truth. According to Gandhi, truth implies love which serves as a synonym for force. Gandhi calls the Indian movement of *Satyāgraha*, the force which is born of truth and love or non-violence. *Satyāgraha* is the power of human soul and it is the maintenance of the glory of the human conscience. This conscience ensures the non-violence battle for the victory of the truth. *Satyāgraha* is a scientific method. Bhupendra Candra Das in his paper tries to explain that the capability and utility of *Satyāgraha* are found not only in getting political freedom but against social injustice, exploitation, social evils and oppression. *Satyāgraha* is not a weapon of the weak but it is a weapon of the strong and it claims for a disciplined civilized society and culture for the human being all over the world. Social, economic, political and religious problems can be solved with the help of *Satyāgraha* which is most powerful and permanent weapon.

In Plato's *Euthyphro*, Socrates raises the question, "Is what is holy, holy because God approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?" This question is the beginning of a debate among philosophers and theologians about the foundation of morality. Is an action right or wrong because God commands or prohibits it, or does God command or prohibit the action because it is already right or wrong? It is believed that all religions laid stress on *dharma* or righteousness. Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, Kant, Swedenborg, Spinoza, the *Vedas* and *Dharmaśāstras* are all striking examples in the history of East and Western philosophy. So not only is morality an intrinsic feature of almost all religions, but also morality is incapable of standing alone. In his contribution, Laxmikanta Padhi makes an attempt to show that in one respect in which it is said that morality needs religion is that the goal of moral life is

unreachable without religious practice. Some philosophers also maintain that morality needs religion in at least two other respects. In the end of his paper, he discusses that there are three ways in which morality depends on religion, although there are conceptual connections among the standard arguments.

As an ascetic, Buddha was restless in search of the real source of all sufferings and of the path or means of cessation from these sufferings. He sought answers to his questions from many learned scholars and religious teachers of his time, but nothing satisfied him. The message of his enlightenment laid the foundation of both the Buddhist religion and philosophy. Subodh Chandra Paul in his contribution attempts to explain the philosophy of integration in Buddhism from this perspective. Like all great teachers of ancient times, Buddha taught by conversation and our knowledge of Buddha's teachings depends on the *Tripitakas*. All these articulate simultaneously a philosophy, a psychology, and an ethics, all integrated into the framework of a program for liberation.

Quine's concept of naturalised epistemology aims at to revise First Philosophy (classical epistemology). Quine observes some serious loopholes and limitations of classical philosophy. Hasen Ali Ahmed in his 'Reflection on Quine's *Naturalised Epistemology*' tries to show that how Quine's view of naturalised epistemology has been developed on the basis of refined common sense (i.e. science). Much weightage has also been given on the coherence of stimulations and science, because the coherence of stimulations and science is the hallmark of Quine's naturalism or naturalised epistemology. The other important aspect that has been proposed in this contribution is to pin down whether Quine's naturalised epistemology has any affinity with realism or instrumentalism.

Jayeeta Majumder in 'Intentionality as a Central part of Consciousness: Husserl and Mohanty' deals with Husserl and J.N Mohanty's view on consciousness. In recent times, the German Philosopher E. Husserl engaged himself to analyze the structure of consciousness. Husserl's interest mainly is to search the fundamental structure of consciousness which is always directed towards an object. Mohanty also claims that phenomenology bear the same view like Vedanta which assigns a place of

prominence to consciousness. He mentioned that there is a kind of interaction between consciousness and world.

Peter Singer opines: “I am a utilitarian. I am also a vegetarian. I am a vegetarian because I am a utilitarian. I believe that applying the principle of utility to our present situation - especially the methods now used to rear animals for food and the variety of food available to us - leads to the conclusion that we ought to be vegetarian”. It is well known that many of the philosophers from antiquity were vegetarian: Pythagoras, Empedocles, Theophrastus, Seneca, Ovid, Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry, and others. And Plato, although apparently not a vegetarian, nonetheless greatly impressed by vegetarian thought. What is not so well by classicists is that there has been a rebirth in philosophical vegetarianism in the last decade that has generated an enormous debate of at least two hundred articles and books. As may be suspected, this debate has also rekindled interest in the current vegetarian thought, which is discussed in the contribution of Debanjali Mukherjee.

Eagam Khaling in his ‘Differences between Kant and Newton’s Three Laws of Motion’ explains that there are some similarities between Newton’s three laws of motion and Kant’s three laws of mechanics. The objective of his paper is to show some important differences between the two and also to argue Kant’s three laws of mechanics form an important part of Kant’s philosophy of natural science.

Ambedkar points out that there is a gulf of difference between *Varṇa* and caste so far as their definitions are concerned. But so far as the practice of them in our society is concerned caste becomes identical with *varṇa*. In that sense not only the caste but also the *varṇa* is the root-cause which gives birth to all problems of our society. Therefore, Ambedkar observes that both caste and *varṇa* should be annihilated. But Gandhiji fully disagrees with Ambedkar on this issue a humble attempt has been made in the contribution of Dr. Nirmal Kumar Roy. He deals with the arguments produced by both of the great men to stand their respective positions. Ultimately through careful and critical analysis, the view of Ambedkar has been substantiated.

NIRMAL KUMAR ROY
AND
LAXMIKANTA PADHI

IS SENSE - OBJECT CONTACT ESSENTIAL FOR PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE?

TAPAN KUMAR CHAKRABORTY

Perception is usually defined as *indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam jñānam* – knowledge arising out of contact between sense-organ and object. By sense organ meant any one of the external sense organ like eye, ear, tongue, nose and touch and also internal sense-organ like *manas*. By object is meant external object like jar, cloth etc. and also internal object like pleasure, pain etc. what is to be noted in this connection is that there is a direct contact between an external object and external sense-organ in the case of external perception. But *manas* are also present there because without its participation no knowledge takes place. Again, there must be a contact between *manas* and *ātmā* because knowledge is a quality of *ātmā* or self. In other words, *ātmā -manah-samyoga* is as essential in knowledge as *indriya-manah-samyoga* and *indriya-viśaya-samyoga*. Although these three are essential in perceptual knowledge, only *indriya-viśaya-samyoga* is simply mentioned leaving aside the other two because it is the extra ordinary cause (*asādhārana kāraṇa*) of perceptual knowledge. The truth of the matter is that *ātmā-manah-samyoga* and *manah-indriya-samyoga* are common of every kind of knowledge. Only *indriya – viśaya-samyoga* is the specific cause of perception. Further, the contact that takes place in perception between sense-organ and the object in any one of the six different types like *samyoga*, *samyukta samavāya*, *samyukta-samaveta-samavāya*, *samavāya*, *samaveta samavāya* and *viśeṣa-viśeṣana-bhāva*. In the perception of a substance by means of visual or factual sense organ, we have *samyoga sannikarṣa*. The eyes or hands come in contact with an object, say jar, as a result of which the jar is perceived. But in the perception of quality belonging to a substance, we have a different type of contact. In the perception of a red jar *guṇavisista dravya* for example, our sense-organs, visual or factual – come in contact with the object jar, where *guṇa* is present in the relation of *samavāya*. Similarly, in the perception of *guṇatva*, the contact that takes place is known as *samyukta-samaveta-samavāya*. The sense organ comes in contact with the object where *guṇa* is present in the relation of *samavāya* and *guṇatva* is present in the relation of *samavāya*.

Thus, we have *samyukta-samaveta-sannikarṣa*. Likewise in the perception of sound through ear, we have *samavāya sannikarṣa*. For, sound is a quality of *ākāśa*

which is present in the meatus ear-whole in the relation of *samavāya*. Similarly, in the perception of soundness, we have *samaveta samavāya sannikarṣa*. For, *śabdatva* is present in *śabda* is also present in the ear-whole in the relation of *samavāya*. In the perception of *samavāya* and *abhāva*, *viśeṣya-viśeṣana-bhāva sannikarṣa* is admitted. The sense-organ comes in the contact with the *adhikaraṇa* or locus which stands for *viśeṣa* in this case and *abhāva* which stands for *viśeṣaṇa* characterizes the object under consideration. Two points are worth noticing here. In the first place, those who do not admit the reality of *samavāya* do not accept *sannikarṣa* as six. For them, *sannikarṣa* can be of three different varieties like *samyoga*, *samyukta tādātmya* and *samyukta-tādātmya-tādātmya*. Secondly, those who do not admit the possibility of the perception of *abhāva*, do not accept the possibility of *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva-sannikarṣa*. Instead they admit the possibility of another *pramāṇa* known as *annupalabdhi* to account for absence or *abhāva*.

But that as it may, some sort of contact is to be admitted in order to account for perception. The Naiyāyikas, the champions of charity in thinking and expression, go to the length of suggesting that this contact in perception may assume two forms – *laukika* and *alaukika*, ordinary and extra-ordinary. The six types of contact mentioned before are ordinary. But some extra-ordinary types of contact are to be taken into consideration for the explanation of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, *jñānalakṣaṇa* and *yogaja* perception. We perceive, for example, all the members of a class through the knowledge of class-property as *sāmānya*. When we perceive a cow, we also perceive cowness which is a class property of cow. Thus, we have ordinary perception. Our visual sense-organs come in conjunction with a cow where the property of cowness is present in the relation of inherence. In short, the *sannikarṣa* that takes place here is *samyukta samavāya*. But we do not stop here. Through the perception of cowness present in a particular cow, we extend the domain of our perception. We perceive all the members of a cow – past, present and future-through the knowledge of cowness for cowness is a property belonging to all the cows. Here the knowledge of *sāmānya* or universal acts as a medium of contact and hence the name. In *jñānalakṣaṇa* perception, a universal contact takes place between the sense-organ and the object. Generally, a particular sense-organ is capable of grasping a particular type of object. For example, visual sense-organ can grasp color, but not sound etc. An auditory sense-organ can grasp sound, but not color etc. That a particular object (called *viśaya*-

vyavasthā) is due to the reason that a particular *indriya* which is capable of grasping a particular object is composed of that element of the object. For example, a visual sense-organ can grasp color because it is composed of *teja* (fire) which is a property of *rūpa* when this usual contact between the sense-organ and the object is broken and a usual contact between them takes place we have what is called *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. When, for example, we perceive fragrance of sandalwood through visual sense-organ, the unusual contact between fragrance (which is amenable to nose) and visual sense-organ (which is incapable of perceiving fragrance because the latter is not a property of the former) takes place. The reason behind this unusual contact is this. When in the past we perceived the fragrance of the sandalwood through nose, we also perceived the color, texture, shape etc. of the sandalwood through eyes. These two perceptions get mixed up and become complicated in such a way that whenever we see the sandalwood the memory of fragrance arises. The memory of the past fragrance get dislocated in time and space and serves as a contact having yielded the visual perception of fragrance of the sandalwood. Similarly, the *yogins* also acquire some extra-ordinary power through the practice of yoga to perceive distant objects, minute objects and the like. What is important to note is that perception cannot take place without some contact, whether ordinary or extra-ordinary.

II

This theory of sense-object contact in perception as essential is challenged by some outstanding philosophers belonging to Samkhya, Buddha, Advaita and even by although unbelievable, Navya Nyāya camps. The Samkhya philosophers look upon *pramāṇa* as a kind of *Cittavṛtti*. By *Citta* Samkhya understands *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra* and these are all unconscious. The consciousness of *purūṣa* gets reflected in *antaḥkaraṇa* or *citta*. As a result, *antaḥkaraṇa* appears so he conscious, though it is really not conscious. This *antaḥkaraṇa* which is lying inside turns outward towards an object and assumes the form of an object. *Antaḥkaraṇa* which is formless becomes bound by the object. As a result *antaḥkaraṇa* turns out to be identical with the object. This identification of the inside *antaḥkaraṇa* with the outside object is called *pauruṣeya vodha*. Thus *pramāṇa* stands for *pauruṣeya vodha* which is due to the merger of *citta* with its *Vṛtti*, i.e., *Viśayākār pariṇati*. According to *Sāmkhya*, this type of *cittavṛtti* may be of three different types. Accordingly, we have three different types of *pramāṇa* known as *drṣṭa*, *anumāna* and *āptavacana*. All the other

types of *pramāṇas* recognized in other systems can be successfully reduced to, and explained by, the above three just mentioned. What is important to note is that the *Sāṃkhya*ites avoid the use of the word *pratyakṣa*, perhaps because this word has direct reference to *akāṣa* or *indriya*. Instead, they prefer the word *dṛṣṭa* which they define as *prativīṣaya adhyavasāya dṛṣṭam*. Here the word ‘*dṛṣṭam*’ stands for *lakṣa* whereas the rest (i.e. ‘*prativīṣaya adhyavasāya*’) for *lakṣaṇa*. The purpose of definition is to differentiate the *lakṣya vastu* from *alākṣya vastu* and this is done with reference to *asādhāraṇa dharma* which serves as a *lakṣaṇa* or defining character.

Vācaspati Mīśra rightly observes that the purpose of *lakṣaṇa* as to distinguish it both from *samānajātiya* and *asamānajātiya*. *Anumāna* etc. are to be viewed as *samānajātiye* with *dṛṣṭa* for all of them are *cittavṛttis*. On the other hand, *viṣaya* like *ghata*, *pata* etc. are to be viewed as *asamānajātiya* with *drsta* because the object themselves are not *cittavṛttis*. So, the *dṛṣṭa cittavṛtti* (which is *lakṣa* here) is to be distinguished both from *anumāna*, *āptavacana* (which are also *cittavṛttis* and stand on the same footing with *dṛṣṭa*, hence *sāmanajātiya*) on the one hand and from object like *ghata*, *pata* etc. (which are not *sāmanajātiya* with *dṛṣṭa*) on the other. It is to be borne in mind that *cittavṛtti* arises out of amalgamation of *citta* with *viṣaya* no doubt. But this *cittavṛtti* is internal as its āśraya or locus is *citta*. But *visaya* in that sense is not a *āntara padārtha* like *cittavṛtti*. However, Vācaspati explains that *dṛṣṭa cittavṛtti* is different from both *anumāna* etc. and *viṣaya* as well. In order to do so, he first of all concentrates on *viṣaya* which is derived from the root ‘*siṅ*’ with a prefix ‘*Be*’ and a suffix ‘*ach*’ in the nominative case-ending (*Be+siṅ+ach in katṛvācyā*). ¹The root ‘*siṅ*’ means to bind. Hence the word ‘*Viṣaya*’ means that which binds in a definite way. Thus *viṣaya* binds *viṣayī* which is nothing but *antaḥkaraṇa -viṣayī-nām anuvadhanti*. As *antaḥkaraṇa* is formless, *viṣaya* binds it in its own form – *svena rūpena nirūpaniyam kurvanti*. It is to be noted that *viṣaya*, may be of different types - external like *ghata* etc. and internal like *sukla* etc. whatever the nature of *viṣaya*, *antaḥkaraṇa* must get related to *viṣaya* without which no *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* results or takes place. Hence Vācaspati Mīśra rightly remarks: *Viṣayam viṣayam prati vartate*

¹ *Samanasamanajatiya-vyavacchedo laksanarttah, p.45 Samkhyatattvakaumudi, Ed. By Narayan Chandra Goswami*

*iti prativiṣayam*¹. The term ‘*adhyāvasāya*’ means definite or certain knowledge. Such knowledge arises as a result of direct relationship of *antaḥkaraṇa* -*vṛtti* with *viṣaya*. According to Sāṃkhya, such *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* is *acetanā* or unconscious because it is transformation of *antaḥkaraṇa* in the form of *viṣaya*. *Antaḥkaraṇa* is unconscious. Yet it assumes the form of consciousness because reflection of conscious *puruṣa* falls upon it. It is to be born in viewed here that reflection of consciousness into *antaḥkaraṇa* is admitted by Vācaspati. But *vijñānavikṣa* and others speak of double reflection theory – consciousness not only gets reflected in *antaḥkaraṇa* but *antaḥkaraṇa* in its turn gets reflected in consciousness as well.

As a result, *katṛtvābhimān* of *puruṣa* along with *caitanyā-bhimān* of *prakṛti* takes place. In truth, *puruṣa* being formless cannot be *kartā* or agent, just *prakṛti* being unconscious in nature cannot be *cetanā* or conscious. Yet *prakṛti* takes himself to be *kartā*. This *ābhimānika jñāna* is due to the double reflection theory. Be that as it may, the word ‘*prati*’ used in the definition of *drṣta* demarcates it from *anumāna*, no direct relationship is established between *hetu* (say, *dhūma*) and *sādhyā* (say, *vahni*). But in the case of *drṣta*, direct relationship is established between *viṣaya* and *viṣayi*. Similarly, in the case of *smṛtijñāna*, relationship is established between a past object and a past observer. But in the case of *drṣta*, direct relationship between a present object and a present observer is obeyed and question. The significance of the term ‘*viṣaya*’ occurring in the definition of *drṣta* is to differentiate it from error (*viparyaya*); for the *viṣaya* of erroneous knowledge is *asat* or unreal, whereas the *viṣaya* of *drṣta* is certain (*niścita*). The word ‘*adhyāvasāya*’ is used to defer *samsāya* (doubt) from the domain of *drṣta* on the ground that the former is *aniścita* (uncertain) whereas the latter is *niścita* (certain). However, the Sāṃkhya view of *drṣta* does not makes any reference to *indriya* or *sannikarṣa*.

III

The Buddhists also do not subscribe to the view of perception originating from sense-object contact. For them, perception is the immediate knowledge of the object free from imagination and error². By imagination or *kalpanā* they mean employment of words to designate the object perceived. The underlying suggestion is

¹ *Samkhyatattvakaumudi*, p. 46

² *Kalpanapodam abhramantam pratyaksam, Nyayabindu*.

that when we perceive something 'blue', it is directly apprehended without a corresponding expression like 'it is blue'. Designation by words comes later. An unknown bird or flower is capable of being perceived, although it is not expressible in words. The *Naiyāyikas* seem to agree with this view. For, they also hold that words are not unfailing attendant of the object perceived. Had it been so, perceptual knowledge could not be distinguished from verbal knowledge. What is important to note here is that the *Nyāya* view differs from the Buddha view in two aspects, whenever we perceive the *Naiyāyikas* hold that there is an object of perception and the object is a substance (*dravya*) like *ghata*, *pata* etc. or a qualified substance (*guṇaviśiṣṭa dravya*) like *nila ghata*, *rakta pata* etc. The Buddhists, on the contrary, believe that we perceive, not a substance but a quality. For them, substance is nothing other than the sum-total of qualities. That is why they claim that what we perceive is blue, red etc. Secondly, the Buddhists believe only in the primary awareness of something without a corresponding name etc. as real or true. This type of perception is known as *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate perception as there is no *vikalpa* or *kalpanā* associated with it. *Kalpanā*, according to Buddhists, may assume five different forms like *nāma kalpanā*, *dravya kalpanā*, *guṇa kalpanā*, *kriyā kalpanā* and *jāti kalpanā*. *Kalpanā* is defining as *abhilāpa samsargayogya pratibhāsa pratiti*. The first appearance of an object without any qualification by name, universal etc. (*Nāmjātyādi yojana rahita*) is veridical perception. The subsequent mention of the object by name etc. vitiates the true nature of the object. This type of perception is *savikalpaka* as it is designated by words.

This type of perception is not acceptable to the Buddhists as real. The *Naiyāyikas*, however, admit both types of perception – indeterminate which is non-verbal or *aśabda* and determinate which is verbal. Incidentally it may be noted in passing that the grammarians do not admit any perception which is not expressible in words. They believe in *śabda* as eternal and equate it with Brahman or reality. Hence anything falls short of *śabda* is not admissible. The *Sāṃkhya*s, the *Mīmāṃsaka*s, The *Vedāntin*s believe in both forms of perception but their interpretations differ from one another.

It may be noted in this connection that two noted commentators on Buddhist Philosophy differ regarding the exact meaning of *kalpanāpoḍaṃ*. According to Vinitdeb, this epithet means *sangi*, i.e. object named. To designate *pratyakṣa* as

something named or nameable does not reveal the exact nature of *pratyakṣa* which is a name or *sangā*. That is why Dharmottara regards *pratyakṣa* as *uddeśya* or subject and *kalpanāpoḍaṃ* as *Vidheya* or predicate. For, he believes that it is by means of the predicate that the nature of subject is clearly expressed. It may be objected that *kalpanā* being itself a piece of knowledge cannot be added with or bereft of another piece of knowledge. To avoid complication, *kalpanāpoḍaṃ* is to be understood in the sense of *kalpanāsvabhāvarahita*. This means knowledge not affected by any kind of *kalpanā*. However, it is to be borne in mind that *kalpanāpaḍatva* alone does not make knowledge real. When we go by boat, we see the trees on land as moving. This knowledge is not real as the trees are devoid of any motion. Similarly, some persons suffering from some defects in their eye-sight look upon one moon as two. Their knowledge of double moon is clear although not real. That is why the epithet *abhrānta* is needed besides *kalpanāpoḍa*. *Abhrānta* means free from error, i.e. correspondence of knowledge with facts, actual state of affairs. The fact, here, is that there are static trees; but we have the fact is that knowledge of moving dynamic trees; there is one moon; yet we have knowledge of double moon.

Thus there arises a discrepancy between knowledge and fact, giving rise to illusion or error. This error occurs, or may occur, due to four reasons, known as *indriyagata*, *viśayagata*, *sthānagata* and *saviragata*. The perception of double moon is due to defects in eye-sight, known as *timira-roga*. Thus this error occurs due to defects in sense organ. Error due to object occurs when a particular *maśāla* (torch) gives rise to the knowledge of *alatacakra* owing rapid rotation of *maśāla*. The static trees appear as dynamic when viewed from the running boat. This is due to spatial reason. Error arising out of bodily reasons is due to the disability in the body out of the preponderance of *vāyu* or *pitta* or *slesmā* over others. It is not perhaps out of place to mention that Dinnaga is not willing to include *abhrānta* in the definition of *pratyakṣa*. For, he believes that error creeps in knowledge when we add words to it. Moreover he is not prepared to admit any reality to the external object beyond the domain of knowledge. As a result, no question of correspondence between knowledge and external object does appear. In other words, perception must be indeterminate in character and whatever is indeterminate must be free from error. Indeterminate knowledge is knowledge without characterization by language. Hence there is no need to add a redundant epithet ‘*abhrānta*’ to knowledge. Perceptual knowledge

worth the name must be free from error of any kind. It may be asked: why then Dharmakīrti does propose the inclusion of *abhrānta* in the definition of perception? Two possible answers may be put forward to account for this. In the first place, Dharmakīrti represents the Sautrāntika schools of Buddhism.

The philosophers belonging to this school believe in the external reality of the object along with internal reality of knowledge. As these philosophers are *Sarvāstivādis*, they want to exclude such conditions in perception which may vitiate perception. Secondly, it may be said that the necessity of using these two epithets rests on refuting the views of opponents-either from the side of the Buddhās or from the side of the non-Buddhās. It should be noted further that if we use the word *abhrānta* in the sense of *avisamvādaka jñāna*, as envisaged by kamalāsīla in his *Tattvasaṃgraha*, then a compromise can be achieved between Dharmakīrti and Dinnaga. Any student of Buddha Philosophy knows that *avisamvādaka jñāna* has the properties of *pradarśakatva jñāna* has the properties of *pradarśakatva* (revelation of the object), *pravastakatva* (movement forwards the object) and *prāpakatva* (getting the object) thus every *avisamvādaka jñāna* must be free from error. For it not only reveals the object, but helps us receive the object. If the knowledge which reveals the object does not lead to successful activity i.e., does not help us getting hold of the object it cannot be regarded as *avisamvādaka jñāna*.

IV

The most damaging theory criticism of the sense-object-contact theory is perhaps received from the Advaitins. They not only not adhere to the above view cannot escape from twin difficulties of *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti*. If, for example, perception is defined in terms of sense-object contact, then the definitions will the subject to *ativyāpti doṣa*. For, in that case other types of knowledge like *anumāna* etc. will come under the purview of *pratyakṣa*. Every knowledge is due to *manas* or *manojanya*. *Anumāna* being a kind of knowledge is also due to the intervention of *manas*. Hence perception will be applicable to *anumāna* also, as the latter is also arising out of contact between *manas* (which is an *indriya*, according to Nyāya) and *viśaya*. Again, the Nyāya definition of perception is subject to *avyāpti doṣa* as well; for it does not cover the perception of God. It is held in *śruti* that God perceives

everything even though he is devoid of sense-organs¹. Thus the determinant of *pratyakṣa* cannot be *indriyajanyatva*. The question may naturally arise; if *pratyakṣa* cannot be properly defined in terms of sense-object stimulation, what should be its proper determinant? To such query the Advaitins reply that the use of *pratyakṣatva* centre's round perceptual knowledge or *pratyakṣa pramā*, the instrument of *pratyakṣa pramā* known as *pratyakṣa pramāna* and the object of *pratyakṣa pramā* known as *prameya* of the three where the term *pratyakṣa* is used a capable of being used – *pramā*, *prameya* and *pramāna* – the identity between *pramāna* – *caitanya* and *prameya* – *caitanya* gives rise to *jñānagata pratyakṣa*; whereas the identity between *pramāṭṛ* – *caitanya* and *prameya* – *caitanya* gives rise to *viśayagata pratyakṣa*. Although *caitanya* or consciousness is really one in relation to *upādhi*. Thus we have *pramāna-caitanya*, *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* and *prameya* or *viśaya-caitanya* of the three, the relation of consciousness with objects like *ghata* etc. is known as *viśaya-caitanya* or *prameya-caitanya*.

When consciousness gets associated with *antahkaranavṛtti* we have *pramāna-caitanya*. By *vṛtti* is meant *viśayakara parināma*. Just as water is carried to a field through canal and assumes the form of the field, similarly *antaḥkāraṇa* which is *taijasa* in nature goes out to the object through the *indriyas* and gets united with the object. This *viśayakāra parināma* of *antaḥkāraṇa* is called *vṛtti*. Beside these two, we have also *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* arising out of *caitanya* delimited by *antaḥkāraṇa*, i.e. *antaḥkāraṇāvacchinna caitanya*. This *antaḥkāraṇāvacchinna caitanya* is called *pramāṭṛ-caitanya*. What is important to note here is that in the case of perception *antaḥkāraṇa* goes out to the object, say *ghata*, and assumes the form of *ghata*, i.e. turns into *ghatādiviśaya caitanya*. As *antaḥkāraṇa* has no form of its own, it assumes the form of the object to which it is united by going out. According to Advaitins, what happens in such cases, *vṛtti*, *ghata* and *ghatākār antaḥkāraṇavṛtti* being placed in the same place, both forms of consciousness (*ghatarūp viśayā vacchinna caitanya* and *vṛtirūp pramāṇāvacchinna caitanya*) get identified. Although *viśaya* and *antaḥkāraṇavṛtti* are the limiters (*vibhājaka*) of *caitanya*, they are different from each other. Yet by their occupation of the same place they remain identified at that time. In other words, they are not limiters of *caitanya* at that time. This sort of knowledge

¹ *Pasyati acaksu, sa sronatra akarna.*

(identity of *ghatāvacchinna caitanya* with *ghatākara-vṛtṭyā vacchinna caitanya*) is called perception of jar. But in the case of perception of pleasure, pain etc. , which are internal objects, the question of *antaḥkāraṇa* going out does not occur at all. In such cases, *sukhādivṛtṭyā vacchinna caitanya* and *sukhādivṛtṭyā vacchinna caitanya* remain always in the same place being united with each other. That is why, the knowledge of pleasure etc. is always perceptual. In the case of *parokṣajñāna* like *anumāna* etc., *antaḥkāraṇa* does not get a chance to go to *vahni* and get united with it, for the simple reason that the visual sense organ is not related to it. In time, *pratyakṣa* according to Advaitins, is not to be defined in terms of sense-object contact. It is to be defined as *jñānatvam pratyakṣatvam*¹. *Jñāna*, according to Advaitins, is not only revealing the object; it is also revealing itself. This self-revealing character of knowledge needs no proof, as it is self evident. If there be knowledge, it must be related automatically or perceived naturally. *Jñāna* is comparable to light without which everything remains in the dark. That is why, *jñāna* which is like light cannot be said to exist without being perceived. This is the nature of *jñāna*. *Śruti* also describes the nature of knowledge as ‘*sākṣāt*’ and *aparokṣa*. According to Advaitins, consciousness which is eternal, unchangeable, part less and indeterminate is alone real. It is *paramārsha sat* and is always immediate (*aparokṣa*).

Being eternal and part less, consciousness cannot be perceived by means of *indriyas*. It is the object (*viśaya*) that is perceived or perceivable by *indriyas* only. In the perception of *ghata*, there are two elements – *jñānāmśa* and *viśāmśa*. The *jñānāmśa* remains the same in every *viśiṣṭa jñāna*; it is the *viśayāmśa* that changes from one knowledge to another. It is the *viśaya* that gives a form to knowledge which is itself formless. As a result the infinite knowledge appears as finite in the form of object. The object is material, not self-luminous. It is the self-illuminating knowledge that makes the revelation of the object possible. Several points are worth noticing here. The Advaitins admit two types of perception – *jñānagata* and *viśayagata*. But regarding the order of these two types of perceptions Advaitins differ. According to Vācaspati and his followers, the *jñānagata pratyakṣa* precedes *viśayagata pratyakṣa*. The *vivaraṇa sampradāya*, on the other hand, go to the other extreme claiming the priority of *viśayagata pratyakṣa* over *jñānagata pratyakṣa*. Dharmaraj in this

¹ *Vedānta Paribhāṣa, Dharmaraj Adhvavindra, p.*

connection follows the time of Vācaspati etc. But he differs from Vācaspati in accepting *manas* as an *indriya*. Dharmaraj argues that *manas* have no definite object to receive like other external sense-organs. Pleasure, pain etc. which are usually spoken of as the object of *manas* are denied by Advaitins. According to them, pleasure, pain etc. are *sākṣivedya*, i.e. objects of direct awareness of *sākṣi*. Moreover, if *manas* were *indriya* in the true sense, it could not have been auxiliary (*sahakāri*) to other senses.

Further, there is no proof for admitting *maṇas* as an *indriya*. To take resort to Gitāvākya - *maṇaḥ ṣaṣṭāni indriyāni or indriyānaṃ maṇāścāsmi* – as proof is not admissible. For, the number six by which *maṇas* is mentioned can be fulfilled by and extended to, that which is not an *indriya*. In other words, *sāṃkhya pūraṇa* fulfillment of or number does not indicate always that it is to be done within a member of the same class. There is no such hard and fast rule in the expression ‘*yajmān pancamā*’ where the sacrificial *habi (iḍā)* is asked to be eaten by *yajmān* along with the four priests (ṛtwika) – *hotā, udgātā, adhvarju* and *Brahmī*. Here also the *panca sāṃkhya* belonging to ṛtwikas is to be understood as *yajmān* who is external to the list of ṛtwikas. Narrating the different *vādhaka pramāṇas* against *maṇas* as an *indriya*, Dharmaraj finally mentions an *sādhaka pramāṇa* from *śruti* as well – ‘*Indriyebhyaḥ parā’arthā arthebhyaśca param maṇaḥ*¹’ or *Indriyaṇi parānyāhuḥ indriyebhyaḥ param maṇaḥ, Manasastu parā buddhi yo buddheḥ paratastu seḥ*². Lastly, if *pratyakṣatva* is defined in terms of *jñānatva*, *anumanādi jñāna* seem to come under the purview of *pratyakṣa*, thereby giving rise to *ativyāpti doṣa*. The Advaitins solve this problem in the following manner. In the first place, in inferential knowledge like other pieces of knowledge, there are two parts – *jñānāmśa* and *viśayāmśa*. The earlier part in inference is surely perceptual and no question of *ativyāpti* does arise here. In truth, *caitanya* or *jñāna*, according to Advaita, is *anādi* (eternal). Hence there can be no cause of it, truly speaking. But this external consciousness gets itself manifested in *antaḥkāraṇavṛtti* which is regarded as the *abhivyanjaka* (medium of manifestation). This *antaḥkāraṇavṛtti* is *sādi* (i.e. having a beginning) as it is produced by *indriya sannikarṣa* etc. As *caḥsurādi indriyas* are to be admitted as generating

² *Gīta*, 3/42

antaḥkāraṇavṛtti, they are secondarily designated as *jñāna* and *pramāṇa*. In other words, according to Advaita Vedānta, the perception of eternal consciousness is as good a perception as the perception of jar. The difference between the two lies in the fact that the first one is primary (*mukhya*) while the second one is *gauṇa* (secondary) as it is *āropita or upacarita* (superimposed). In the former case there is no applicability or function of *indriyas*. The function of *indriyas* is noticeable only in the case of *gauṇa pratyakṣa*.

V

The last but not the least discordant note with the sense-object-contact theory is traceable to some Navya Naiyāyikas. They counter successfully the Advaita objection to the sense-object-contact theory, propounded and vindicated by the Ancient Naiyāyikas. They point out quite convincingly that the Nyāya argument of perception arising out of sense-object stimulation is neither subject to *ativyāpti* nor *avyāpti doṣa*. In the first place, every knowledge is *manojanya* no doubt. But the *maṇas* which is present in *anumānādi jñāna* serves not as an *indriya* but as a property of *maṇas*, i.e., *maṇastva*. In other words, *maṇas* as a property of *indriya*, i.e., *indriyatva* is a *kāraṇa* of perceptual knowledge; but *maṇas* as a property of *indriya*, is not a *kāraṇa* of inferential and other non-perceptual knowledge. Hence the charge of *ativyāpti* brought about by the Advaitins does not pass master critical examination. Secondly, the charge of *avyāpti* is wrongly leveled against the Nyāya view. The Naiyāyikas mention clearly that God's perception is not within the jurisdiction of other definition. This is evident from the explicit use of the word *utpanna* (produced) in the definition of perception as *indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam jñānam*. God's perception is *nitya* or eternal; but human perception is *jñāna* or non-eternal. However, to get rid of the possibility of the above charges and also the desire to extend the definition of perception to both human and divine cases, Gaṅgeśa, the founder of Navya Nyāya, define perception as *jñānakāraṇa kaṁ jñānam pratyakṣam*. Perception is a kind of knowledge which is not brought about by the instrumentality of any other knowledge to explain. In order to make inferential knowledge possible, we are to depend on three conditions, known as *pakṣadharmatā jñāna* (the presence of *hetu* in the *pakṣa* with certainty), *Vyāptijñāna* (the universal of concomitance of *hetu* with *sādhya*) and *parāmarśa jñāna* (arising out of the above two *jñānas* taken together). So, inferential knowledge is not *jñāna-akāraṇaka-jñāna* but *jñāna-akāraṇaka-jñāna*.

Similarly, *upamiti jñāna* being due to *sādṛśyajñāna* and *śābda jñāna* being due to *padajñāna* are examples of *jñāna-akāraṇaka-jñāna*. But perceptual knowledge which arises out of a contact between sense-organs and the object is *jñāna-akāraṇaka-jñāna*; for the sense-organs object and contact are all material or *jaḍa*. In other words, none of them, is of the nature of consciousness, *jñāna-svarūpa*. Thus perception is *jñāna-akāraṇaka-jñāna*, whereas inference etc. are all *jñāna-kāraṇaka-jñāna*.

A little reflection will show that this definition is not acceptable. For, all perpetual knowledge cannot be regarded as *jñāna-akāraṇaka*. *Savikalpaka* perception for example, is determined by *nirvikalpaka* perception. *Savikalpaka* perception is an example of *viśiṣṭa buddhi* where *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* are related to each other. In the perception like ‘this is a jar’ (Ayam ghatah), jar stands for *viśeṣya* and jar-ness stands for *viśeṣaṇa* and these two are related to each other by the relation of inference (*samavāya*). *Viśiṣṭa buddhi* presupposes the knowledge of *viśeṣaṇa* which is supplied by *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. Thus *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is essential for understanding and explanation of *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. This proves that *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* is brought about by *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* which is of the nature of *jñāna*. Thus *savikalpaka* is *jñānakāraṇaka* and not *jñāna-akāraṇaka*. It may be argued that though *savikalpaka* is not, *nirvikalpaka* is *jñāna-akāraṇaka-jñāna*. This position is not also tenable. For, *nirvikalpaka jñāna* is not a case of *viśiṣṭa buddhi* and therefore it is not characterizable either as a *pramā* or as an *apramā*. The term ‘*kāraṇa*’ can be significantly used in relation to *pramā* only which *nirvikalpaka* is not. It is argued further that a certain section of the Naiyāyikas look upon *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* as *pramā* then our reply would be that such knowledge too is brought about by the knowledge and desire of God. *Iswarecchā* and *Iswariya jñāna* are regarded as common causes (*sādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) for all types of knowledge. That is why; *nirvikalpaka jñāna* is also a specimen of *jñāna-kāraṇaka-jñāna*. Furthermore, *hānādibuddhi* is viewed as causes for all type of knowledge. So no knowledge worth the name is possible without *hāna*, *upādāna* or *upekṣābuddhi* preceding it. In this sense all knowledge is *jñāna-kāraṇaka* and *nirvikalpaka* being a specimen of knowledge is no exception. Thus the definition of perception as *jñāna-akāraṇaka-jñāna* does not appear as sound. This is the reason why later Naiyāyikas like Viswanatha resort to *jātighata lakṣaṇa of pratyakṣa*. In his *Muktāvali-saṁgraha* Viswanatha clarifies *Yatkincit pratyakṣadikam ādāya tat vyakti vṛtti anumityavṛtti*

*jātmattvaṁ pratyakṣātvādikāṁ vāyamiti*¹. To explain *pratyakṣa* is to be defined as one possessing *pratyakṣattva* (perception-ness) which is a *jāti* (universal) and which is present (*vr̥tti*) in all types of *pratyakṣa* and absent (*avr̥ttia*) in all types of non-perception like *anumiti* etc.

It may not be out of place to mention that Appay Dikshit in his *Vedanta-Kalpataru-Parimal* defines perception as *jñāñjanyajnanatvaṁ jñānaproksyamīti nirvaktavyam*². This means that *pratyakṣa* is not due to any other knowledge. It is to be accepted as *aprokṣa* or immediate. This definition has got a striking resemblance with the Navya Nyāya definition. But this definition also appears to be defective. When we perceive a person with a stick (*dandipurūṣa*), the stick appears as a *viśeṣana* (adjective). For without the knowledge of ‘*danda*’, *dandi* the person cannot be known or perceived. That is why the perception of *dandi* is arising out of the knowledge of *danda* characterizing the person as *dandi*. So the perception of *dandi* is *jñāñjanyaj-jñāna* and not *jñāñjanyaj jñāna*. In order to remove this defect, it is held that though *dandi* is due to the knowledge of *danda*, yet this *danda* is also a part and parcel of *pratyakṣa*. In other words, *danda* is also an object of *dandi pratyakṣa*. That is why; it is not *svavl̥ṣaya-aviṣayaka*. However, the opinion of Appay Dikshit as directed to counter the view of *Vivaraṇa prasthāna* which we have mentioned earlier. While the follower of Bhāmati proceed from *kāraṇa* to *kārya*, the followers of Vivarana go to the opposite direction, proceeding from *kārya* to *kāraṇa*.

VI

Let us now turn to critical examination of the views which avoid references to sense-object contact. The Sāṅkhya Philosophers use the term ‘*dr̥ṣṭa*’ in place of *pratyakṣa*. The reason seems to be this that the word ‘*pratyakṣa*’ is more related to sense-object contact theory than *dr̥ṣṭa*. The term ‘*ākṣa*’ which means sense-organ refers to the rival view more directly. Instead, *dr̥ṣṭa* means direct apprehension or cognition without referring to sense-organ. But a closer examiner of Sāṅkhya view reminds us that it is not free from traditional view of sense-object contact. The Sāṅkhya Philosophy consciously does not use the terms *indriya* and *sannikāśa*. But they cannot avoid the term *viṣaya* and *dr̥ṣṭa*, according to them, it is certain

¹ *Bhasapariccheda*, p. 264-265, Ed. By Pancanan sastri, Nirnayasagar Edition, p. 56

knowledge of the object *prativīṣaya adhya nāśaya*. The term ‘*prativīṣaya*’ occurring in the definition of *dr̥ṣṭa* is explained by Vacāspati as *viṣayam viṣayam prati vartate iti prativīṣayam*. This means that *prativīṣaya* stands for something which is directed (*vṛtti*) to the object. Thus by *vṛtti* Vacāspati means *sannikarṣa* or contact. *Vṛttiśca sannikarṣaḥ* now this *sannikarṣa* which takes place around every object is not possible without *indriya*. Hence *indriya* turns out to be the real meaning of *prativīṣaya*. ‘*Adhyavasāya*’ means certain knowledge which can take place when there is a contact between the sense-organ and the object. Out of this sort of contact between the two, *antaḥkāraṇa* assumes the form of the object. This is known *viṣayākār pariṇām* of *antaḥkāraṇa*. This *antaḥkāraṇa-vṛtti* which itself is unconscious assumes the form of consciousness owing to the reflection of *puruṣa* on it. This shows that Sāṃkhya cannot altogether overcome the influence of traditional thinkers.

To the Buddhist’s view of perception as *kalpanāpodam* (free from imagination) and *abhrāntam* (free from error), it can be safely held that they are not against sense-object contact. They are simply against employment of words about what is perceived through the contact between the sense-organ and the object. Their aversion to the use of language about what is seen is due to the fact that error creeps in through language. That perception arising out of sense-object contact is admissible to them is evident from the classification of perception into *indriyajñāna*. By *indriyajñāna* is meant *indriyasya jñānam* (knowledge through sense-organ) or *indriyāśṛta jñānam* (i.e. , knowledge obtained through sense-organ). Whatever be the meaning, knowledge through sense-organ is not denied. What is denied by them is the description and designation by language of that which is obtained through sense-organ. The Buddhist also accepts another type of perception known as *manovijñāna*. In the ninth *sūtra* of Nyāyabindu, Darmakīrti defines *manovijñāna* as *svaviṣayā-anantara viṣayasahakāriṇa-indriyajñānena-samanantara-pratyena janitam tat manovijñānam*. *Manovijñāna* arises after *indriyajñāna* and this is expressed by *Svaviṣaya-anantara*. The second type of perception arises immediately after *indriyajñāna*. But the second type is like the previous one, not identical with it. What happens in such cases is that the first knowledge leaves behind a similar type of knowledge, called *samāntara jñāna* before destruction. Thus a series is formed known as *jñāna-dhārā* or *jñāna-santati*. In this *jñānadhārā*, the preceding knowledge

is the *upādāna* of the subsequent knowledge known as *upadeya*. Thus *indriyajñāna* is taken to be *upādānajñāna* of *manovijñāna*. Hence the characteristics of *manovijñāna* are: (i) it arises out of *indriyajñāna*; (ii) its object is *samānjātiya* (similar, not same) to the object of previous knowledge, i.e. *indriyajñāna* and (iii) they are both specimens of the same stream - *dhāra* or *prabāha*. It follows from the above that *manovijñāna* is not possible without *indriyajñāna* as the former arises out of the latter. Hence sense-object contact is admissible even at the stage of *manovijñāna*. Besides these two types of perception, the Buddhists speak of other two varieties of perception known as *ātmasamvedam* and *yogijñāna*. We are not concerned with the elaborations or explanations of these types. What we are concerned with is that any type of perception worth the name must be immediate and direct. That does not mean that there is no sense-object contact there. What is important for them is that this direct cognition is not expressible in words. For Buddhists, every knowledge is momentary and perception is no exception. How can a momentary knowledge be divisible into four varieties is something to be pondered about? Incidentally, the Sāṅkhya Philosophers do not take the trouble of classifying *dr̥ṣṭa* at all. Nor any reason is provided. It is for the scholars to give a satisfactory explanation for this silence.

Admitting the Advaita position that *indriya* is not a determinant of *pratyakṣa*, yet the Advaitins cannot deny that empirical perception of jar etc. is due to *indriya* (*indriya-janya*). For, *ghatādi pratyakṣa* is nothing but the limited manifestation of unlimited consciousness. It is true that consciousness is not perceived or perceivable by any one of our sense-organs. But it is also true that without relation to the sense-organ the object is not perceived. We have remarked earlier that it is the object which gives some form (*rūpa*) to the formless consciousness. That is why our perception is to be taken as *sakhaṇḍa abhivyakti* of *akhaṇḍa caitanya*. That is why the Advaitins mentioned that it is the *ajñātasattāvṛtti* which is responsible for the manifestation of object which was not known before. The function of *vṛtti* is to dispel concealment of material object which has got *ajñātasattā*. That which has no *ajñātasattā* (like *antaḥkāraṇavṛtti* and its *dharma sukhadukha* etc. needs no *vṛtti* to dispel ignorance. The Advaitins believed that the rise and fall of this *vṛtti* account for the rise and fall of consciousness. Thus the two (*vṛtti* and *jñāna*) appear to be inseparately related as

jñāna only secondarily¹. This sort of knowledge to *vṛtti* is *aupacārik* (accidental) and not natural (*svābhāvika*). Admitting this *vṛtti* to be a kind of knowledge *indriyas* etc. are also admitted to be *prameya*, though secondarily. As a matter of fact, the word perception is used and capable of being used in relation to *jñāna* (known as *pramā*), the instrument of knowledge (known as *pramāṇa*) and the object of knowledge (known as *pramāṇa*) and the object of knowledge (known as *prameya*). In other words, the words *pratyakṣa* in our language stands for both *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*. *Pratyakṣa* as *viśeṣya* means *pratyakṣa jñāna*, whereas the same *pratyakṣa* as *viśeṣaṇa* may mean (1) *pratyakṣajñāna* (*Idam pratyakṣam jñānam*), (2) *pratyakṣa viśaya* (*Ayam ghatah pratyakṣah*) and (3) *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* (*Idam pratyakṣam pramāṇam*). That is why sometimes object (*ghata*) appears as primary (*mukhya*), sometimes the object of knowledge (*ghata-jñāna*) as primary. Accordingly, we have *viśayagata pratyakṣa* in the former case and *jñānagata pratyakṣa* in the latter. Whatever be the case, *antaḥkāraṇavṛtti* cannot occur without the participation of *indriya*. Though *indriya* is not directly related to knowledge, it is directly related to *antaḥkāraṇavṛtti* which is a direct relation to knowledge. In time, consciousness which is itself formless becomes manifested in the form of *ghata pata* etc. So the *ghata-viśayaka-caitanya* is *sakhanda* not *akhanda*, *indriya-jñāna*, not *ajñāna*. In other words, in the manifestation of limitless consciousness in the form of finite limited object *caksurādi indriya* can very well be regarded as cause. Further, the Advaitins also admit the direct perpetual knowledge of object arising out of *śabdajñāna* which is usually taken as *parokṣa*, not *pratyakṣa*. In the celebrated example of ‘*Daśamastamasi*’ (you are the tenth), the person counting immediately perceives himself to be the tenth man. Although this knowledge due to the having *arthe* above-mentioned *vākya*, yet it is not *parokṣa* but *pratyakṣa*; for the tenth man knows himself directly through sense-object-contact. In this case, *vṛttyavacchinna caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya* get identified. That is why; it is a case of *pratyakṣa*. This also shows that sense-object reference cannot be altogether ignored.

The Navya Nyāya tactic of replacing sense-object contact by *jñāna-akāraṇaka-jñāna* does not bear scrutiny. We have already shown that *pratyakṣa*

¹ *Jñānāvachchedakatvāt ca vṛttau jñānatvopacārah. Vedanta paribhāsā*, Ed. By Panchanan Sastri, p.

cannot be properly said to be *jñāna-akāraṇaka*. *Savikalpaka pratyakṣa* is explainable only if we admit that some times of *aviśiṣṭa jñāna* logically precede it. Again, no knowledge worth the name can take place without the will and knowledge of God. This explains why *nirvikalpaka jñāna* is also *jñāna-kāraṇaka*. Further, *hānādi buddhi* determines our activity towards perpetual knowledge. Even if, for the sake of respect towards Gaṅgeśa, it is admitted that perceptual knowledge is *jñāna-kāraṇaka*, it cannot be denied that it is *jaḍa-kāraṇaka*. Gaṅgeśa cannot deny that perception of jar takes place when there is a contact between *indriya* and *artha*. Hence, perception is *indriya - artha-sannikarṣa-kāraṇaka*. The sense organ, the object and the contact are all *jaḍa* or material in nature. And they have some hands to play in the generation of perpetual knowledge. It may be reminded that the Navya Naiyāyikas look upon *vyāpāra-viśiṣṭa-kāraṇa* as a *kāraṇa*. *Vyāpāra*, for them, stands for something which being produced produces the effect. In the case of perpetual knowledge (which is the effect), *sannikarṣa* acts as a *vyāpāra* or intervening cause. This *vyāpāra* is due to *indriya* called *vyāpāri* or *vyāpāraviśiṣṭa*. As for the Navya Naiyāyikas *vyāpara-viśiṣṭa-kāraṇa* is *kāraṇa*, the sense-organ is to be regarded as *kāraṇa* of perpetual knowledge. It is evident from the above consideration that the Navya Naiyāyikas cannot set aside the role of sense-organ in the generation of perpetual knowledge.

That Ancient Naiyāyikas accept the roles of *indriya*, *viśaya* and *sannikarṣa* is beyond question. They, however, differ from the Navya Naiyāyikas regarding the *kāraṇa* of perpetual knowledge. According to them, it is the last in the causal series that has a special claim for the designation of *kāraṇa*. For the production of effect is not delayed after its appearance. That is why the Ancient Naiyāyikas look upon *sannikarṣa* as the *kāraṇa*. It is *phalāyogavyavacchinna kāraṇa* and hence *kāraṇa*. The *phala* or the effect is perception of jar which produced by the co-operation of more than one cause. A positive effect needs at least three causes for its generation. The *indriya* and *viśaya* must be present along with *sannikarṣa* to give rise to the effect. But the *indriya* and the *viśaya*, through present, cannot produce the effect. They are thus not directly related to the effect. As soon as contact takes place between *indriya* and *viśaya*, perception results immediately. Thus *indriya* and *viśaya* are *phalāyoga*, but *sannikarṣa* which is different (*vyavacchinna*) from the two above, produces the perpetual knowledge of the object. Thus, for the older Naiyāyikas it is the contact or *sannikarṣa* which has something special. That is why *sannikarṣa* is to

be regarded as *kāraṇa* proper. Annambhatta, the author of Tarkasaṅgraha, does not fall in line either with the traditional or modern view. In his *Dīpikā*, he defines *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* as something different from *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa*. *Sādhāraṇa kāraṇa* is defined as one which is present before the production of any effect whatever space, time, *Adṛṣṭa*, *Iswarecchā* etc. are viewed as common causes for any effect, and be a jar or a cloth. An *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*, on the other hand, stands for a cause which is related to a particular type of effect. Jar, for example, is produced out clay; the cloth from threads. They are therefore, *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* in respect of the effect produced. Jayanta Bhatta, who is known for his originality in thinking, warns us not to accept any one of the causes as *asādhāraṇa*. According to him, *kāraṇa* is *sādhakatama*, i.e. most excellent of the causes. What is the most excellent cause? - asks Jayanta and answers, none in isolation, but all in conglomeration.

To explain, suppose a traveler is passing through a road at dead of night. On a sudden flash of lightning, he perceives women in front of him passing through the road. Now Jayanta asks the question: what should be the most excellent cause in the perception of the women? Certainly we are tempted to answer: it is the flash of lightning that helps the traveler perceive the woman ahead of him. In his mature characteristic witty way he remarks: let them be light, but no woman. Can the traveler still perceive the woman? Certainly not. Let the woman be there and lightning as well, but no traveler who will then perceive the woman? The truth is that the perception of woman cannot take place in the absence of any one of the causes. That is why; no cause in isolation can be regarded as *sādhakatama*. But when all the causes are taken together, the effect is seen to be produced. Hence *sāmagric* or totality is to be taken as *sādhakatma kāraṇa* or *kāraṇa*. This *sādhakatma kāraṇa* is *pramāṇa* which Jayanta defines as *vodhā-vodhasvabhāva sāmagric pramāṇam*¹. In other words *sāmagric* is not a cluster of *avodha padārthas* (like *indriya*, *viśaya*, *sannikarṣa*), nor a totality of *vodha padārthas* (like conscious entities). *Sāmagric* is a mixture of both conscious and unconscious elements - *vodha* and *avodha* taken jointly. Thus, Jayanta makes a compromise as it were between two divergent views. What is important to note is that sense-object reference cannot be dismissed altogether in the generation of perpetual knowledge. All philosophers agree on the

¹ *Nyayamanjuri*

immediacy (*sākṣātkāritva*) of perception but none can avoid mentioning sense-organ object and their contact for the explanation of perception.

MĀNĀDHĪNA MEYASIDDHI: A MYTH

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

It is normally admitted by the Indian epistemologists that an object to be proved (*meya*) is dependent on the means of knowing (*māna*). Most of the treatises in Indian Philosophy deal with *pramāṇa* first only to prove *prameya*. Even in the Nyāyasūtra Gautama has mentioned *pramāṇa* first in the list of sixteen categories which is followed by the second category called *prameya* in order to give us an awareness that *pramāṇa* has to be put in the list at the outset on account of the fact that through *pramāṇa* alone *prameya* is substantiated. In this paper an effort is made to show that epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*) as available in Indian Philosophical systems is not unbiased, but is vitiated through various metaphysical or ontological presuppositions, though it is claimed by them that through a *pramāna* a *prameya* is substantiated. Gradually we will see that this principle - '*manadhīna meyasiddhi*' is a myth on account of the fact that *pramāna* itself is not untouched by the presuppositions admitted by them. When a philosopher of a particular school is framing a definition of *pramāṇa*, it is to some extent '*subjective*', but not objective in the sense that he bears some presuppositions behind such enterprise. The genuinity of *pramāṇa* is proved by the Naiyayikas with the help of its efficacy to successful inclination ('*pravṛtti-sāmarthya*') as their knot is tied with the theory of *paratah-prāmāṇya* ('extrinsic validity of proof') in view.¹ Whether something is a *pramāṇa* or a pseudo-*pramāṇa* ('*pramāṇābhāsa*') is dependent on its successful inclination, which leads to the supposition that the theory of *pramāṇa* on which a *meya* ('provable object') is substantiated is not free from the influence of *meya*-related presuppositions or beliefs. The point will be clearer if I put forth some definitions of perception (*pratyakṣa*) accepted by different systems as an instance.

The Naiyayikas think that the perceptual knowledge is a cognition arising out of the contact of the sense -organ with an object, which cannot be described through language (*avyapadeśya*), non-deviated (*avyabhicārin*) and non-erroneous (*vyavasāyātmaka*).² To them an object or *artha* is a kind of category accepted by them and capable of being perceived (*yogyā*). There does not arise any question of perceiving an absurd entity, as the categorical scheme believed by them does not permit us to do so.

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, a follower of Advaita School, thinks that mere connection (*sannikarṣa*) between sense organ and an object may not be the cause of perceptual cognition. If the whole world is covered by Consciousness (*caitanya*) as believed by them, object (*artha*) is something covered with this Consciousness. These limiting adjuncts (*upadhi*-s) of one consciousness are called *viśayacaitanya*, *pramāṇacaitanya* and *pramāṭr-caitanya* respectively just as time, though one, has limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) in the form of hours, days, week, fortnight, month, year etc.³ After keeping these metaphysical presuppositions in mind Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has accepted two criteria of perceptuality: *jñānagata* (perceptuality of knowledge) and *viśayagata* (perceptuality of object). To him when there is a union between *pramāṇacaitanya* (consciousness limited by mental mode - *antaḥkaraṇavṛtī*) and *viśayacaitanya* (consciousness limited by an object), then there is the perceptuality of knowledge (*jñānagatapratyakṣatva*). It is to be borne in mind that they have made a distinction between perception of the knowledge of a jar and perception of a jar. In the case of the perception of the knowledge of a jar there is the union between *viśayacaitanya* and *pramāṇacaitanya* but *pramāṭrcaitanya* will remain isolated. If it is said that there is the perceptuality of object, it should be treated as different from the earlier one. It is *not* knowledge, which is perceived, but the *object only*. Such a situation cannot give rise to knower-known relationship (*jñātr-jñeya-bhāva*).⁴ Hence Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra says that in such cases there is only the knower in the form of consciousness (*pramāṇacaitanya*); but other two i.e. consciousness limited by mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtī*) and consciousness limited by an object are united in the knower (*pramātā*). It is described by him as ‘*pramāṭrsattātiriktasattākatvābhāva*’⁵ i.e. there will be an absence of the existence of other forms of consciousness excepting the existence of *pramātā* (knower). Herein lies some sort of metaphysical presupposition. In this case Dharmarāja is dealing with metaphysics in disguise of epistemology. When an individual thinks himself identified with the whole world, it is the stage of liberation due to the absence of reality of more than one (*advaita*). In this case an object is *not mere an object* but *subjectified object*.

If we turn to the Buddhists in general and Dharmakīrti in particular, they are also not free from some basic presuppositions like theories of momentariness,

dependent origination, causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) etc as a characteristic feature of being *sat* etc. Keeping these in view Dharmakīrti has formulated the definition of perception as '*Tatra kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam pratyakṣam*' i.e. perceptual cognition is the non-erroneous cognition of an entity free from mental ascriptions.⁶ Is it not true that such a definition is given keeping some presuppositions in mind? In fact the Buddhists believe in two types of reality in their ontological framework: unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and generality (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). The former which is momentary and free from mental ascriptions (*kalpanā*) having causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) and represents the domain of absolute reality (*paramārthasatya*) while the later is expressed through mental ascriptions like language etc belonging to the domain of covered reality or apparent reality (*samvṛtīsatya*). In short, the whole Buddhist philosophy centres on two ontological presuppositions- '*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam*' (i.e., that which exists is momentary in nature) and '*arthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇam sat*' (i.e., the causal efficacy or purpose-oriented action is the mark of existence). Hence there is hardly anything in different systems of Indian Philosophy which may be described as '*pure epistemology*' or '*unbiased epistemology*'.

The Naiyayikas believe that the realization of self ultimately leads to the realm of liberation. Though they have mentioned *pramāṇa* as the first category to prove the existence of *prameya* yet it cannot be ignored that the application of *pramāṇa* is to know the self truly (*tattva-jñāna*). When *pramāṇa* is applied, the total end-in-view of applying it is to conjoin an individual to liberation through self-realisation.⁷ Hence *pramāṇa* is not 'objective', because an agent cannot apply it 'freely', but 'subjective' or 'teleological'. Being overburdened with metaphysics Annambhatta also took '*Tat tvam asi*' ("That art thou") as an example of *jahad-ajahad-lakṣaṇā* (quasi-inclusive implication). Moreover, this has been taken as an example of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*) also by the Advaitins on the basis of sentence-holism (*akhandavākya*) which is purely metaphysical in nature. In the *Mahāvākya*- '*tattvamasi*' the word *tat* stands for Brahman having all pervasive reality (*vibhu parimāṇa*) and *tvam* stands for an individual being (*jīva*) having atomic magnitude (*aṇu parimāṇa*). Though there is difference between two, i.e., Brahman and *Jīva* yet there is an essential similarity (*svarūpa tādātmya*) between two. If it is so, how is the holistic nature of the sentence (*akhandavākya*) to be

understood? The answer is metaphysical. Due to some metaphysical presuppositions in the system the Advaita Vedantins believe the eternal relationship between a word and a meaning due to having its connection with *Sphoṭa* or *Śabdabrahman*. Moreover, it gives us perceptual cognition about liberation with the help of agamic statement-‘*Tat tvam asi*’. In order to highlight this metaphysical aspect they have introduced a specific type of *pratyakṣa* called *śabda-janya-pratyakṣa* (perceptual awareness generated through testimony).⁸

Metaphysical presupposition plays a greater role in Indian theories of error called *khyātivāda* as admitted by different systems. The Vijñānavādi and Śūnyavādi schools of Buddhism propagate *ātmakhyātivāda* and *asatkhyātivāda* respectively after keeping the theory of consciousness in the form of *Vijñāna* and *Śūnyatā* in view. Such is the case with the *anirvacanīyakhyātivāda*. In this case the represented object or the mistakenly known object is admitted as different from existent or non-existent (*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*), because it (i.e., snake in the case of rope) is neither existent due to its sublation by the latter cognition nor non-existent due to having its apparent awareness (*prātibhāsikasattā*). The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas who do not believe in the existence of erroneous cognition formulates the theory of *akhyāti* presupposing it in view.⁹ To them no error is actually possible. The error seems to happen due to the knowledge of discrimination between the given content (*grhīta vastu*) and remembered content (*smṛta vastu*). This idea is embedded in their theory, which prompts them to formulate a theory of error called *akhyativāda*.

The Naiyayikas admit that more than one *pramāṇa* can be applied to know a single object, which is called the theory of *pramāṇasamplava*. The nature of an object is not a factor for applying *pramāṇa*. As for example, ‘fire’ can be known through perception, inference or verbal testimony. But so far as the Buddhist view is concerned, a particular nature of an object determines the particular means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) through which alone it is revealed. An object having a unique characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) is revealed by perception alone. A *svalakṣaṇa* - entity cannot be revealed by inference and in the same way the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*-entity can be known by inference alone, but not capable of being known by perception. In Buddhism the nature of an object determines the way of knowing it. If an object is momentary having the nature of unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), it is capable of being

revealed by perception alone. Inference cannot reveal an object having such character. In the like manner, an object having associated with certain concepts (*kalpanā*) is not capable of being revealed by inference. In the Nyaya system, such restriction is not there, because the object I.e., fire may be revealed through perception, inference, verbal testimony etc due to having different nature of the object. This metaphysical presupposition leads the Buddhists to admit the system of *pramāṇavyavasthā*.¹⁰ On the basis of the above-mentioned arguments we may come to the conclusion that Indian Epistemology is always vitiated by metaphysics.

From above it can be concluded that when a particular epistemic theory is propagated by a particular system, the philosophers belonging to the school keep the ontological or metaphysical commitment in view. Such metaphysical presupposition influences someone belonging to the particular school in formulation of an epistemic theory. The metaphysical commitment guides a philosopher to undertaken some decision in the form of *pratijñā* (proposition). Afterwards the same proposition is proved through *pramāṇa*, which is in the substantiated form as we find in conclusion called *nigamana*. When Sankara gives the definition of *adhyāsa* (superimposition), it is in the descriptive level having no relation with the actual realization of the same i.e., not being the result of experience. After the realization of the Self, an individual can realize the truth of the statement describing superimposition. The first introduction with the concept of *adhyāsa* is taken as proposition (*pratijñā*) and the realization of the same at the end is the conclusion (*nigamana*). The former is a mere description given by somebody else through his personal experience while the latter is the result of an individual's own realization. Such is the case with other philosophical enterprise. Thus we can say that metaphysical presupposition guides an individual to frame an epistemic theory.

Belief in the theories of *karmaphala*, the role of God in handling this and autonomy of an agent gives rise to different forms of theories as admitted in Nyāya, Advaita Vedānta, *Śrīmad-Bhagavadgītā* and Pūrva Mīmāṃsa systems. Hence any formulation of theory presupposes some sort of belief. In our tradition we come across three theories regarding the law of *karma*. First theory is propagated by the Naiyāyikas. To them an individual being can enjoy the result of *karma* performed by him either in this birth or in the previous birth. The result is given as per the *karma* recorded against him, but not arbitrarily. This result of *karma* is attained by an

individual through the Divine interference. They have admitted the existence of God as the conveyer of the result of *karma*, because there is no man in this world having unlimited capacities to keep account of innumerable *karma*-s of innumerable human beings.

The Mīmāṃsakas are of the opinion that the Naiyāyikas view is not to be taken into account. To them, God of the Naiyāyikas is powerless as He is giving result to the human beings according to their recorded *karma*-s. God has no power of condone any wrong done inadvertently by a human being and hence He is to be taken as an impotent one. What is the utility of admitting the existence of such God? It is better to admit that *karma* alone can give rise to the result through instrumentality of *apūrva*. If the *karma*-s done by individual being is the ultimate decisive factor, then we should perform *karma* very sincerely and attentively. There is no point in investing our energy for the impotent God. To them *karma* automatically gives rise to result to an individual being without any Divine interference.

There is another theory regarding the law of *karma* followed by the *Bhaktivādī* schools. To them the results- good or bad, are given to us by God without any consideration of the activities done by him. To give some result or not is a kind of Divine sport (*līlā*) and it depends on His will. He is as if playing with the whole world as per His own will. The origination and destruction of this world depends on His desire, which is indeterminable by any means, as if a child is playing with the dolls as pointed out by Kazi Nazrul Islam in his song-‘*Khelichho e viśva laye virāṭa śiśu ānamane/ pralaya sṛṣṭi taba putulakhelā nirajane prabhu nirajane//*’. For getting His favour it is essential to surrender to Him and have some faith on Him. From the above it is established that each and every view regarding law of *karma* is correct if ontological beliefs of a particular school is taken into consideration.

Different causal theories have been accepted by different systems of philosophy being prompted by different presuppositions. The Advaita epistemic theory is backed by *vivarttavāda*, the Sāṃkhya believes in *pariṇāmavāda* and *satkāryavāda*, the Nyāya believes in *asatkāryavāda* etc. All these causal theories formulated by different systems are not arbitrary, but backed by their basic beliefs and presuppositions and these causal theories again serve as basic different epistemological theories.

From the above it is quite evident that *pramāṇa* is meant for proving *prameya*. It is to be taken as second order activity. For, *pramāṇa* which is meant for proving *prameya* is not free from metaphysical or ontological biasness. The definition of *pramāṇa* is formulated in such a way so their metaphysical presuppositions are preserved within a system leading to the falsity of the statement- '*mānādhīnā meyasiddhih*', rather it is a case of '*meyādhīnā mānasiddhih*'.

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4. *Ibid*, p.14
5. *Ibid*, p.25
6. *Nyāyabindu* 3
7. *Nyāyasūtra*-1.1.1. p.65
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WITTGENSTEIN ON RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY

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The main contention of this paper is to explicate and examine religious epistemology with regard to religious language and religious experience after Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein (1889-1951), being a leading proponent of linguistic philosophy, adhered to the view that philosophy is *all about of analysis, clarification and interpretation of language*. He considered analysis of language as a philosophical method towards establishing the relationship between language and reality (fact, culture, value) just by way of clearing the slums and muddles arising out of misinterpretation of language. In his early work *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921) (henceforth TLP) and 'Lectures on Ethics' (1920), Wittgenstein took **agnostic outlook** regarding religious language and religious experience. In his TLP, Wittgenstein was very careful about the nature of language and the nature of reality. Here he conceived language as propositional or truth-functional and reality as 'the totality of facts'. Accordingly, he drew *the limits of language* as well as *the limits of the world*. In this regard, he says, "*The limits of my language means the limits of my world.*" (TLP: 5.6). Anything belonging to the limits of language *can be shown* within the limits of world. On the contrary, anything lays outside the limits of language equally rests outside the limits of the world. He then said that only propositional (truth-functional) language containing logical proper names and relational terms would be treated as legitimate language capable of picturing facts in logical space. In this regard, he introduced the concept of pictorial form, pictorial relationship, etc. He thus conceived language as the totality of propositions and the world (reality) as the totality of facts and in turn established the relationship between language and reality with the help of his celebrated *picture theory*. He then said that the language of ethics and religion (he conceived religion with regard to ethics) lies beyond the limits of language and also the limits of the word and hence such type of language is not expressible in the desired sense. Thus, for Wittgenstein, religious language is inexpressible because it rests outside the limits of language. Accordingly, any attempt to talk about religion is to "run against the boundaries of language. This

running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely, hopeless.”¹ Wittgenstein in his TLP has set up a limit upon which ‘what can be said *meaningfully*’. Inside the limit everything can be said meaningfully and ‘on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense’.² He then remarked that metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics and religion lie on the other side and hence they are nonsense. They had nothing to say because there was nothing to say. Thus, Wittgenstein completely rejected the relevance of religious language and expression in his TLP. For him all meaningful propositions are truth-functions of elementary or atomic propositions which picture atomic facts in logical space. Wittgenstein rules out the possibility of any truths beyond empirical truths. As religious and theological truths were trans-empirical truths, such truths certainly transcended empirical facts. Simplistically, it can be said that Wittgenstein leaves no vacancy for an expressible body of religious doctrine.

It should be kept in mind that Wittgenstein was not *indifference* about religious life. Rather he took religious matters very seriously throughout his life. He inclined to say that what rests on the other side of the world is higher that cannot be expressed by means of truth-functional propositions. In TLP Wittgenstein said, “The sense of the world must lie outside the world...in it no value exists- and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere...”³ Like TLP, Wittgenstein held the same position about religious language and religious experience in his ‘A Lecture on Ethics’. Very similar to TLP, he conceived religious expressions as *nonsensical and absolutely hopeless*. Religious language is inexpressible. No purported theological statements are meaningful statements. Such statements are associated with absolute truth, a higher form of truth, which cannot be reduced to facts like relative values. Language associated with relative values is significant and language associated with absolute values is beyond significant. Naturally to talk or to write religion was to run against *the boundaries of language*.

¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, “A Lecture on Ethics”, in James Klagge and Alfred Norman (eds.) *Ludwig Wittgenstein- Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951*, p.44.

² Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Routledge Classics edition, London, 2002, p.4.

³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, London and New York, 1922, p.71.

Thus, it seems that Wittgenstein's position of religious language and religious experience is absolutely pessimistic in his TLP. Here he completely forfeited the relevance of religious language. His pessimism about religious expression continued even in his later philosophical writings. Even though Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* (henceforth PI) introduced natural language contrary to propositional language, but his pessimism about religion remained intact. In his PI, Wittgenstein never addressed questions of God and religion. He continued to hold that expressions of religious belief are not expressions of factual belief. Since religious expressions are no longer factual expressions and only factual expressions are meaningful, religious expressions are no longer meaningful. Religious expressions are nonsensical. Unlike the language of TLP, Wittgenstein in his PI remarked that the language consists of a plurality of different language- games regulated by its own autonomous set of rules and grammar. In his PI, Wittgenstein asserted that language is rule-following and following a rule is a practice in our society or community or within the *form of life*. In this regard, Wittgenstein criticized Augustine's position of language where individual words in language name objects, *where naming is correlated with the world*.¹ Thus, the PI of Wittgenstein was against any *interference of language* what he explored in Augustine and his TLP. In his PI, Wittgenstein held that in order to discern the meaning of words, one has to look at the use of words. He remarked, "Don't ask for meaning, ask for its use". Due to misinterpretation of language, metaphysics was born. When a philosopher tries to find some common essence behind the various uses of 'to be', metaphysics or the study of *being* is born. In such a case a philosopher is wrenching of words out of his living use and creates unnecessary and insoluble problems. As a result of that, philosophers find obdurate situation just like 'the fly the way out of the fly-bottle'.² For Wittgenstein, "Philosophical problems arise when language *goes on holiday*".³ Language is rule-following; language is autonomous. Therefore, there is no way to interfere language as Augustine and early Wittgenstein did. For Wittgenstein, "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language ... It leaves

¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Macmillan, New York, 1958, para.1.

² *Ibid.*, para: 309

³ *Ibid.*, para: 38

everything as it is.”¹ In this regard Wittgenstein cited the multifarious functions of the tools in a tool-box.² He also brought the metaphor ‘language-games’³ where he asserted that words had meaning only in the context of different language-games. Language, Wittgenstein opines, as diverse as life. Accordingly, if words have a use in life, they have a meaning. Therefore, there is no point in saying that words are nonsensical like the TLP and Vienna Circle. A word gets its meaning in the context of life, what Wittgenstein famously attributed it by using the metaphor ‘forms of life’.⁴ ‘Language-game’ functions under ‘forms of life’. They are entwined with each other. Here Wittgenstein took ‘looking and seeing’ approach to solve philosophical problems by means of language. He pointed to the ‘form of life’ and ‘language-games’ to locate the locus of philosophical questions and if he came to know that any philosophical question was in dubious nature, he recommended how we might dissolve it. Wittgenstein’s approach of different language- games and different forms of life may be compared with the Quinian metaphor of a ‘web of belief’⁵ in which some beliefs are more central than others but all are integrally related and supported by each other. Very similar to these, Wittgenstein of PI developed yet another metaphor ‘river-bed and the shift of the bed itself’ where he distinguished between the ‘movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.’⁶

According to Wittgenstein, our belief structure is complex and it equally indicates that our justification is equally complex. When our justification comes to an end, it is grounded in *an entire form of life* rooted in one’s entire cultural history of leaning. It gives a full satisfaction not arising as a kind of *seeing on our part*, but as *a part of our acting* rooted at the bottom of our language-games.⁷ Wittgenstein warned against attempt to define the meanings of words too precisely because realistically we can hardly find a common or precise definition of the term ‘game’, rather there are

¹ Ibid., para: 124

² Ibid., para 11

³ Ibid., paras 7, 23

⁴ Ibid., paras 19, 23

⁵ Stiver, D. R., *The Philosophy of Religious Language*, Blackwell, 1996, p.64.

⁶ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *On Certainty*, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, translated by Denis Paul and G. E., H. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969-1975. para: 96-97

⁷ Ibid., para:204

overlapping characteristics between the games at one end of a spectrum to another. He compared this similarity to “family resemblance”. Following Jerry Gill, one may say do not seek ‘the principle of sufficient precision’,¹ but to seek the kind of precision that is appropriate. Could one be exactly precise? Is it even necessary in the context of our life? Obviously it is not. The passion for precision is an example of the ‘bewitchment of language’ where language is supposed to be taken out of its context and thereby creating unnecessary metaphysical quandaries. As language is a matter of public-rules, there are reliable rules that can be *inter-subjectively* checked that would provide the basis for meaningful communication. Thus, the Wittgenstein of PI offered us a language where religious language as a language –game can be comprehended. For example, when a student writes on the board $2 + 21 = 13$, he commits a big mistake. Wittgenstein says, “For a mistake, that’s too big.”² The unexpected gap between what we would expect and what is given actually divulges that *a different language-game is going on*. Let us consider another example. When someone is ill and says, “This is punishment “and I say: “If I’m ill , I don’t think of punishment at all.”³ Thus, one cannot rule out the possibility of just believing the opposite. For Wittgenstein, there are different language games, different forms of life. In this regard, we can refer the article ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’ published in 1967 where Kai Nielson characterized some insights of religious experience. As an atheist he wants to go on arguing that *religion is a massive error*. First, the different modes of discourse as distinctive forms of life have a logic of their own. Secondly, forms of life taken as a whole are not amenable to criticism because each of which has its own criteria, norms of intelligibility, reality and rationality. Thirdly, there is no Archimedean point in terms of which a philosopher can relevantly criticize ways of life. According to Nelsen, the concepts that are familiar in religion are supposedly available only to those who share the ‘form of life’. Religion, for Wittgenstein, is a form of life which ‘has to be accepted’.⁴ Religious talk is supposed to a ‘language-game’ based on autonomy with its own rules and can intelligible only to the players.

¹ Gill, J. H., *Our Knowing God: New Directions for the Future of Theology*, Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1981, pp. 83-86.

² Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967,p.62.

³ *Ibid.*, p.55.

⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, op. cit., p.226.

How a form of life is to be identified? How does one can imagine a form of life? Wittgenstein said, “And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.”¹ It is equated with a kind of activity that customarily includes some speaking: activities such as giving and obeying orders, describing, surmising, and forming a hypothesis, telling a story, joking, counting, thanking, cursing, greeting and praying. Wittgenstein was equally concerned of social interaction out of which human life is formed irrespective of language and social structure. In this sense to imagine a language is to imagine an activity, such as, commanding and obeying. Language is the conversation that is interwoven with the characteristic activities of human life. It should be worth mentioned that it was Malcolm, a Wittgenstenian, who has been largely responsible to conceive language as a form of life. In this regard, Malcolm said, “I do not wish to give the impression that Wittgenstein accepted any religious faith - he certainly did not-or that he was a religious person. But I think that there was in him, in some sense, the possibility of religion. I believe that he looked on religion as a ‘form of life’ (to use an expression from the *Investigations*) in which he did not participate, but with which he was sympathetic and which greatly interested him.”² Being a Wittgenstenian, Malcolm conceives religion as a form of life because it is language embedded in action what Wittgenstein termed as ‘language-game’. Science is another form of life. Neither stands in need of justification. This indeed is a perfect example of *Wittgenstenian fideism*.

Phillips as one of the proponent of Wittgenstenian’s fideist made an influential remark on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion. Like Wittgenstein, Phillips revealed philosophy as a *clarifying therapy*. Philosophy is neither for nor against religious beliefs. There is no point in seeking external justification of religion. It would then be treated as a big mistake. Like Wittgenstein, Phillips introduces a non- cognitive interpretation of religious practice where eternal life and of prayer play the dominant role. Phillips’ view is close to Hare’s *blik theory*. Following Wittgenstein, we can allow that religious belief means to live by a picture, *a blik*, or an attitude not revealable by science. In this regard, we sense continuity between early and later Wittgenstein. Scientific language is still the language with which to

¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, para:19

² Malcolm, *Wittgenstein, Ludwig: A Memoir*, 1958, p.72.

depict reality. What is beyond the world may now be sayable - it is not simply the mystical- but it is still clearly noncognitive. The continuity and the relevance of religious use had further been strengthened with the contribution of Braithwaite outlook on Wittgenstein's 'meaning as use'¹ principle. Religion, according to Braithwaite, gives us stories which need not be true but support the intention *to lead in a certain moral way of life*. We find the same in Wittgenstein who held that the difference in religions lies in the difference in their stories and in the moral convictions associated with them. It should be remember that the ethical discourse and moral discourse had been conceived by Wittgenstein alike.

It seems to me that Wittgenstein certainly discussed about religion and theology. It seems also clear to me that his understanding of language-game and form of life contained every aspect of human life beyond cognitive account. Certainly, in TLP Wittgenstein anticipated the language of science based on cognitive account on the basis of which he ruled out non-cognitive account of language. However, in his PI, he introduced ordinary language which touches upon the stream of human life in variety of ways. Naturally, the point of cognitive account has not been resonant in ordinary language. Since the language he presumed in PI encompasses everything and leaves nothing, religion would be an inevitable part of discussion. The point is that to talk of religion does not make sense to say that one has become a religion man. It has been revealed from the confession of Drury that Wittgenstein discussed about religion. But still he had been regarded as an atheist. Why it had been the case? Why he did not regard a theist? He had been regarded as a religious person because he was hungry about religion. He had been treated as an atheist because he did not believe in God. That is why he had been treated as a *religious atheist*.

Let me relook the past development of philosophy of religion. Religion in the past was full of myths, mysteries, superstitions, and unscientific prejudices. It was continued before Hume and took a dramatic turn from Kant's onwards. Religion *per se* is God based. God is *sui-gensis* and beholder of any kind of religion. This trend of religion has been clogged by Kant by taking an *agnostic position of God* as the

¹ Braithwaite, R. B., "An Empiricist's view of the nature of religious belief," in *The Philosophy of Religion*, ed., Basil Mitchell, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971, p.77.

locus of religion. In this regard Kant acknowledged Hume. The agnostic position of God within the realm of religion had further been strengthened with the contribution of logical positivists' criterion of the Principle of Verification where religious statements were treated as meaningless because of non-cognitive account. The reflection of Kant and logical positivism was continued and reflected on Wittgenstein and Wittgenstenian's, (Post-Wittgenstenians) and Continental philosophers where attempt had been made to develop a non-God based kind of philosophy of religion and religious experience. Thus, to me there is no problem of considering or treating Wittgenstein as a religious man even though he took pessimistic approach regarding the existence of God. In this sense there remains nothing incoherence and inconsistent in the twin concept '*religious atheist*'. Wittgenstein, I do reckon, would be a religious atheist because of his own inclination towards establishing a non-God based religious theory within the form of life. The impact of Wittgenstein about religious language and religious experience has been enormous because with the influence of Wittgenstein there developed Wittgenstenian, post-Wittgenstenian and Continental (Post modernism) movement of philosophy of religious language and experience. Derrida and Martin Heidegger within the womb of Post Modernism had deeply been involved in exploring *divine reality* in ways differs from scientific reference.

Thus it seems to me that unlike the monolithic conception of language, Wittgenstein in his PI emphasized on multiplicity and differences. In *Lectures and Conversations*, Wittgenstein had explicitly distinguished between *factual belief and religious belief* and justified each of these beliefs in a different way. He did not think that religious belief was nonsensical. Religious language has its *own grammar* as distinguished from the grammar of factual language. Thus, in his PI, Wittgenstein explicitly rejected his early views that religious language is inexpressible. In fact, in personal conversion with Drury, Wittgenstein explicitly rejected his early view that *theology is impossible* developed in TLP and in 'A Lecture on Ethics'. Even it was reported by Drury that Wittgenstein at the end of his life confessed and characterized his earlier view as *the mark of stupidity*.¹ Wittgenstein, according to Drury, confessed at the end of his life that it is indeed possible to talk sense about God as well as

¹ Drury, "Conversations with Wittgenstein", in Rush Rhees (ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein- Personal Recollections*, Totowa, NJ, 1981, P.113.

religion and in fact he discussed about God and religion with Drury on several occasions. In his *Culture and Value* Wittgenstein made various observations about religion, religious conviction and religious doctrine. Having said this, Wittgenstein did not feel free to discuss about religion. He was generally reluctant to talk of religious matters. He preferred selected friends to talk of religious doctrines. This indicates that Wittgenstein was conservative to discuss about religion. However, it remained unknown why he had been selective while discussing religious matters. Thus, it is our general perception that Wittgenstein's attitude towards religious language and religious experience was pessimistic in nature if not *absolute pessimistic*. In *TLP* he took extremely negative approach about religious language and religious experience and considered these as nonsensical. He held the same position in his 'A Lecture on Ethics'. In his *PI*, his approach about language took a radical turn. The language of *PI* surely contained religious matters within the form of life.

In *PI* Wittgenstein conceived language having multidimensional and multifarious uses. We think Wittgenstein was pessimistic about religion because he was struggling to locate *the source of religion*. Even Wittgenstein himself confessed that his own view of religion was misunderstood. In his *Philosophical Remarks*, Wittgenstein made so many cryptic religious remarks and that is why he dedicated that book "to the Glory of God".¹ Thus, it may be said that *Philosophical Remarks* of Wittgenstein appeared as a semblance of religious dedication. It would indeed be a misnomer to conceive religious dedication as a misuse of language and it might not be treated as the source of his pessimism about religion. Even within the Wittgenstenians, we observe some overlapping remarks about the philosophical position of religion of Wittgenstein. This actually makes this issue even more interesting. Having said this, my position is that Wittgenstein to me had been a consistent doubter about religious language and religious experience. His pessimism, to me, is not about religious discourse, but about *the authentic locus and source of religious discourse*. His understanding of religious language and religious experience would be *non-God based religion*. Thus, he would be treated as a religious person from non-conventionalist point of view. He made it clear that he should not be treated

¹ DeAngelis, W. J., *Ludwig Wittgenstein- A Cultural Point of View*, Ashgate, 2007, p.117.

as a religious man if religion *per se* be conceived as the owner of God. In this regard he says, “I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.”¹

Wittgenstein was an atheist. He did not believe in God’s existence as the locus of religion. This does not however make sense to say that Wittgenstein was not a religious man. In fact Wittgenstein ‘had a deep religious hunger’² according to Searle. For Searle, Wittgenstein’s attitude towards religion and religious experience was altogether different from the middle-class Anglo-American. His position about religion is interesting. He had been regarded as an atheist even though he wanted to talk about God. Phillips remarks, “Searle says that Wittgenstein had ‘a hunger for God’, but did not call himself a believer.”³In this regard, Phillips addresses on two separate theses which are apparently confusing. First, to understand religious belief one must take account of the use of religious concepts in people’s lives. The second has been called Wittgenstenianian’s fideism which states that ‘religious belief can only be understood by those who play the religious language-game. Thus, Wittgenstein’s thought is fideistic because it leads to holding unfounded beliefs. Wittgenstein held the first and not the second. Wittgenstein’s objective is to gain conceptual clarity out of conceptual puzzlement and in this regard he would clarify the grammar of belief and disbelief and makes philosophy as a therapy.

Wittgenstein’s perception of philosophy of religion and religious experience is radical in nature because he conceived religion as *a form of life*. For him religion integrates culture, ethics and values. Many would say that Wittgenstein was influenced by Spengler because like Spengler, Wittgenstein observed a sort of *cultural decline* in 20th century modern civilization. The forms of artistic expression which had once stood at the centre of a high culture had lost their power and gave way to a civilization. The fate of religion is very much the same as art. There we notice a gradual decline of religion and culture. The religious experience we observed in Post Kantian, Post-Positivism and in Wittgenstein and Wittgenstenian is altogether

¹ RW, P.79.

² Searle, “ Language-Games and Religion”, included in *Wittgenstein and Religion*, D. Z. Phillips, The Macmillan Press Ltd., p.23.

³Phillips, D. Z., *Wittgenstein and Religion*, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1993, p.30.

different from the religion of the past. Kant was skeptical about the existence of God; logical positivists in general completely denied the possibility of religious language and religious experience. Wittgenstein was absolutely pessimistic about the possibility of God based religion. Even in the 21st century, the Post-modernists, namely, Derrida and Heidegger talked in favor of *divine God* and were completely against the *existence of God*. The new interpretation of religion in some sense or other is a deviation from the religion of the past. Religion of later Wittgenstein and Post-Wittgenstein is radical because by way of releasing religion from the *womb of God*, they interpreted religion in altogether a different way. Whether non-God based religion is at all possible or not is a matter of serious philosophical discussion.

In fact within the womb of civilization, classical or traditional religious experience and practices lost their life, their vitality and their meaning. There is no room of religion within the realm of Western civilization. In fact, we notice the same in Wittgenstein as well. Wittgenstein in his TLP stated with *civilized language or scientific language* where the sense of proposition determined on the basis of cognitive account played the upper hand. Naturally, there would be nothing wrong in supposing that Wittgenstein's account of the language of TLP had been marked as declining of culture to a great extent. The pessimistic approach of Wittgenstein towards religious experience, I do reckon, would be treated as a *semblance of cultural decline*. Wittgenstein's position of religious inexpressibility of TLP is absolute. However, in his PI his position of religious inexpressibility is not absolute. Unlike TLP, Wittgenstein in both *Lectures and Conversations* and *Culture and Value* expressed a consistent set of observations about religious language. In his later writings, Wittgenstein focused mainly on the real grammar of religious language and its proper function. Like TLP, Wittgenstein was pessimistic about religious language and religious experience in his PI, but unlike TLP, he thought that religious language and religious experience were not meaningless. I think that Wittgenstein believed that religious discourse is meaningful and unproblematic in the right cultural setting. He admitted the relevance of religious discourse in a passing manner in PI and in great detail in his *Lectures and Conversations* and *Culture and Value*. In his *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein had pointed out that religious discourse as cultural discourse is well placed in our life. Religion is a way of life. He further predicted that in future

times and settings will appear 'when religious discourse is capable of successfully doing its job, the grammar of such discourse works something like this'. Thus, the future of religion will survive without believing the existence of God, without priests and vicars and will function against the background of the religious discourse of the past. Religion must work on the basis of *internal grammar* and must be freed from the externals. The future of religion will be needed cultural surroundings, the forms of life. Of course, religious expressibility is highly problematic to Wittgenstein both in TLP and PI and the issue that religious expression is problematic remained intact. However, unlike TLP, in his later writings he brought cultural surroundings necessary for meaningful religious expression. Many would say that Wittgenstein in this regard was influenced by Spengler's cultural insularity. In fact, it was revealed from his remarks on Frazer in which he (Wittgenstein) takes Frazer to ask for doing the significance of certain primitive religious practices with regard to his own time and culture. Having said this, it seems to me, Wittgenstein's outlook about religious language and religious experience had been marked as distinct nature from where the interpretation of religion, religious language and discourse may find a new orbit. His religious epistemology sets up a new foundation of philosophy of religion where one can talk matters about religion without believing the existence of God.

THE SURROGACY CONUNDRUM

JYOTISH CHANDRA BASAK

The surrogacy controversy that was under discussion for quite sometime came to the forefront recently for some decision of our Indian government. Very recently the Union cabinet approved the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2016. By its approval the Union cabinet intends to usher in a new era to regulate the uncontrolled growth of an industry that is expanding at a breakneck speed. The chief features of the Bill are establishment of a National Surrogacy Board in the Center and State Surrogacy Boards at the state level. The Bill does not ban surrogacy completely rather makes attempt to effectively regulate it. It prohibits commercial surrogacy; which is at present practised without let or hindrance, however it allows Indian infertile couple to take recourse to altruistic surrogacy after at least five years of their marriage subject to fulfilment of certain other conditions. The Bill claims to protect the *rights* of the surrogate mothers and the children born out of this method. Other claims made in the Bill are: it will control ‘unethical practices of surrogacy’, ‘prevent commercialization of surrogacy’, thwart exploitation of substitute mothers and children born out of them. This initiative sparked off a debate that we intend to delve deep.

The genesis of surrogacy debate is shrouded in mystery. It is sometimes claimed that the advent of in vitro fertilization (IVF) method, popularly known as ‘test tube baby’, and the subsequent birth of Louise Joy Brown in 1978 with the usage of this procedure (IVF) ensued present-day gestational surrogacy controversy. Another opinion traces it back to Biblical times. From the *Book of Genesis* we come to know the story of Sarah, wife of Abraham, who was unable to bear a child and, therefore, availed the services of Hagar, Sarah’s servant, to beget a baby. It is also claimed that *Mahabharata* has reference of this process. Dronacharya was born, it is contended, out of artificial insemination. Here the donor was sage Bhardwaj.

Though it is a matter of debate if the above instances are really proper cases of surrogacy, some recent controversies regarding the modern surrogacy method kept wrangling over the issue alive. What stoked the debate further is the recent initiative of the government to give concrete shape to some regulatory framework for curbing indiscriminate practice of this proxy motherhood.

The Surrogacy Bill mainly harps on unethicity of this practice. In this connection we need to remember that India is not trailblazer in regulating the

practice of surrogacy. There are countries such as USA, UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, France, Australia and some other countries which have regulations for better monitoring this practice, though the regulations may vary from country to country. In order to find out whether our Government is treading on a right direction by laying down such regulations a few words are necessitated to find out what prompted government to do so.

There is no gainsaying the fact outsourcing of baby- making industry is growing in India at a very quick pace and as per one statistics currently it is an industry of 2.3 billion US dollar. Some prominent centres which facilitate surrogacy are found in Hyderabad, Anand and in almost in all metropolitan cities. Day by day such centres/clinics are mushrooming in almost all cities as this is considered as a mode of earning quick bucks.

India has become a hub for this renting-out-the-womb industry for various reasons. Out of these causes absence of proper monitoring mechanism, availability of surrogate mothers at a very cheaper rate, proliferation of IVF clinics and advanced medical facilities at affordable rate, India's integration to the process of globalization are noteworthy. The growth of this industry is also embroiled in controversies. Some such controversies are Baby Manji Yamada case where the commissioning parents were a Japanese couple and the case went to the Supreme Court; Harihara Varma vs Girija Menon, dealt by the Kerala High Court; Rama Pandey vs Union Of India & Ors, dealt by the Delhi High Court. In one such case the Gujarat High Court in 2008 called for extreme urgency for legislation which is capable of addressing issues arising out of surrogacy. Even the Supreme Court of India previously in one related case underscored the need of bringing about regulatory framework for restricting rampant use of this process. The 228th report of Law Commission of India urged the government to prohibit commercial surrogacy and only selectively allow altruistic surrogacy.

It is evident that the problem was brewing for quite sometime. Hence, governmental effort for framing regulatory framework was not out of place. This unchecked growth, unethical practices, legal disputes are some of the causes that prompted government to bring about such a bill. The bill intends to put a brake on unethical practices, exploitation of poor surrogate mothers, abandonment of children

in some cases after birth and intricate racket of intermediaries. A government sitting idle in such a situation will be charged with dereliction of its duty.

A close perusal of the aforesaid reasons will make it evident that ethical issues are at the core of all the reasons cited. Ethical principles actually provide the bedrock for any legal framework. Therefore, let us explore the ethical controversies surrounding the issue in question. Some of the ethical issues that marred the controversy are: exploitation of surrogate mothers, children born out of this method and infertile couples . Argument is also put forward to show that in this practice buying and selling of babies take place which detract from their dignity. Dehumanization of reproduction and commodification of women body are further allegations against this practice. Identity problem of the child and sometimes complications about custodial rights are some moot points. Privacy rights, disputes relating to disposal of organic/genetic materials when they exist outside the bodies of either of the originator are also causes of concern.

Exploitation issue is the leitmotif of most of the arguments given against allowing surrogacy. Among usually exploited are surrogate mothers and children born out of them. Let us begin with the exploitation of surrogate mothers. Prohibition of surrogacy in the name of exploitation of surrogate mothers has resemblance with the prohibition of child labour. It evokes in our mind the dilemma between poverty and exploitation. When the question of exploitation comes to the fore a question that arises are who are these women who work as surrogate mother. Why do they come to this profession? Do they come voluntarily? Let us try to search for answers to these questions.

A survey conducted by the Centre for Social Research in collaboration with the WCD Ministry in 2013 is an eye opener in this regard to question who work as surrogate mother. The survey revealed that 68% of surrogate mothers in Delhi and 78% in Mumbai come from a background of housemaids. Thus the answer is: it is poor women who come forward for volunteering this service for various reasons. These poor women who eke out on meagre earning, it is a source for earning money for their family, for their livelihood, for better upbringing of their own children. It is hardly conceivable that a poor infertile women will be able to get the service of a women from a well off family for a carrying a child for her. Hence, pecuniary benefit lures poor women to this profession. And if they do not have problem, why should

society interfere, a society which is shrinking its budget in social security sector for more than one reason and unable to ensure these poor women a decent living. It is not surprising that hailing from this background they will consider any regulatory framework to curb surrogacy repugnant and will consider governmental action as foul play. They also contend that they are doing a 'noble job'. Arguably they are right. "Motherhood and the ability to have children is a gift that nature has given to lucky women... I don't think there is anything wrong in 'gifting' and 'sharing' this divine power and engaging in something that is mutually beneficial to all the parties involved," aptly argues one surrogate mother.

Surrogate mothers are actually a victim of existing unfair lopsided social order. Given a choice between exploitation and poverty, umpteen people will choose the former. These women are coerced into this role by unjust social order, they are exploited by the intermediaries, on account of their utter cupidity (as we have evidence that surrogates are sometimes given one fifth of the sum given by commissioning parents), by the commissioning parents in various ways, but the moot question is where else these surrogates could have looked for an alternative source of income? A menial household work with a mere pittance which is very much insufficient for their livelihood, for decent education of their own children? If it is incident to poverty, is it wrong to aspire a decent living for them, better education for their children? Libertarians opine that if liberty of individuals is maximized, society is served best. Following this line proponent of surrogacy favour giving increased opportunity of choice to surrogates which is beneficial for society as a whole. Successful surrogacy arrangement brings opportunity coupled with jubilation for intended parents - they happily take home a child with unbounded joy, surrogate mother in turn receives pecuniary reward that she badly needs. If her contribution is appreciated by the commissioning parents, it gives immense satisfaction to her knowing that she could help someone in realizing a priceless goal. Champions of surrogacy also consider it as a humane solution to the problem of infertility. It is expected that demand for surrogate mothers will grow in the coming days as the infertility rate is going up for various reasons and increasing number of women are joining the workforce and deferring childbirth to a later stage. Issuance of circulars by two conglomerates, Microsoft and Face book, almost two years back to their women

employees for deferring childbirth by means of cryopreservation is worth recalling in this regard.

The opinion of Justice Harvey R. Sorkow given during hearing of celebrated Baby M case may be recalled here incidentally. Emphasizing the sanctity of the contract he says in surrogacy contract neither party is in a superior bargaining position. A surrogate mother is on an equal footing with the commission parents. Each party has what the other party wants. Hence a deal is entered and a bargain reached. None of these sides has the expertise that leaves the other party at a weaker position. Thus the question: can a society interfere with the *voluntary* decision of a surrogate mother which society countenances unfair social order? Though the issue of the voluntariness of the decision of a surrogate mother is an unsettled one as is evident from the judgement of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the same case. There are subtler reasons for not regarding the decision of a poor woman to choose a career of a surrogate mother as voluntary.

Exploitation of children is another contentious issue cited for curbing the practice of commercial surrogacy. It is a multifaceted problem as exploitation takes various forms. One such problem is that the child is not allowed to be nourished naturally. It is imperative for health reasons that the child after birth should be nourished by breast-feeding, however, this opportunity is missed by children in most of the cases as commissioning foreign parents take them away without giving them ample time to be nourished. We also find instances when a commissioning parent is reluctant to take the responsibility of the child if born with deformities. The surrogate mother's life style (such as smoking, drinking, leading a reckless life) may also jeopardize the interest of the conceived child.

It is hotly debated that having a child in this process amounts to buying and selling of babies. This creates a lot of problem for the baby born out of a substitute mother. The irresolvable identity problem that they face has been beautifully portrayed in a popular TV serial a couple of years back. They are, it is held, regarded as commodities, to be bought and sold. Justice Sorkow, however, rejects the argument that surrogacy amounts to buying and selling of babies. If in most of the cases the child is genetically related to the commissioning father, how can he buy? he asks. The payment made to the surrogate mother is for the *service* she rendered and not for the *product*, i. e., the child, contended the judge. This indeed is a very

complex issue. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey observed in the aforesaid case when it said that in a civilized society there is something that money cannot/ should not buy. It emphatically stated that commercial surrogacy involves baby selling. It is a case of baby selling since as per contract the payment is made only upon the surrender of custody of the child and termination of surrogate mother's parental right. Thus this amounts to sale of a baby also the sale of a mother's right that she naturally acquires over her child. The primary motivating force of intermediaries are profit making. This profit motive pervades and predominates the arrangement at every level and ultimately it is this factor that rules the entire deal. An exploration of the core of this controversy reveals that it actually hinges on two lines of thinking: one group subscriber of utilitarian line and another family of deontological line.

When it is argued that in a civilized society everything cannot be bought and sold the protagonists here have in mind women's reproductive capacities and babies begot using the process of surrogacy. The assumption behind this is that if it is allowed, they are treated as commodities fit for buying and selling and by doing this we *degrade* them and fail to value them appropriately. The advocacy of such a view underscores the point that in a civilized society we adopt different modes of valuation. Hence it will be wrong to value everything using a single mode. One mode of valuation may be appropriate for certain goods and practices, this same mode may be out of place for other goods and practices. For instance, proper way of valuing material commodities is to judge their utility which is definitely not the case in case of a human being. A human being is not a commodity and hence their mode of valuation will be different. He/she is worthy of respect, not an object to be used. Thus it is not the *use* mode of valuation that is fitting for surrogate mothers and children they produce; rather *respect* mode will be befitting for them. Elizabeth Anderson, a professor of the University of Michigan, strongly espouses this view and argues that surrogacy degrades children by viewing them as commodities. It uses children as tool for profit making rather than as beings worthy of love and care.

In commercial surrogacy women bodies are treated as factories. This is demeaning. A surrogate mother is paid not to form natural relationship with the child she brings to term. Here antagonists of this process discern a paradigm shift - there is an effort here, as Anderson shows, to replace parental norm (which is at the core of ordinary reproduction) with economic norms (in case of contractual parenthood). By

repressing natural parental love of a surrogate mother, it degenerates a surrogate mother's labour into a form of alienated labour. It is a form of alienation as she is foisted on to forgo parent-child relationship, an emotional bond with the gestated child, which social practices of pregnancy promote and cherish so fondly.

Theological concerns on this issue also reinforce the view that it amounts to dehumanization of reproduction. The main reason they cite for disapproval is that conception outside sexuality is unnatural. Procreation not resulting from bodily love is not in conformity with God's plan and hence dehumanizing. They express disquiet and disapprove demoting reproduction to a scientific exercise in the process of renting the womb.

Feminists also voice their concerns by saying that it is a form of exploitation of women and children. They refuse to accept the view that this is merely a personal matter of surrogate mothers and invoke the slogan all personal issues are actually political issues. It also has the potentiality of promoting trafficking in human being.

In the beginning it has been said that the controversy is predominantly a moral controversy. Had there been only one criterion, one ethical standard, for judging rightness or wrongness of an action, it would have been a very easy job for deciding whether commercial surrogacy was right or wrong. However, ethical principles are diverse and intricate which makes deciding ethicality of an issue very difficult. The arguments stated above pose a serious challenge to popular ethical theory of utilitarianism. Jeremy Bentham's view that justice is merely a matter of maximizing pleasure over pain faces a severe jolt. Everything cannot be judged by its utility as it will degrade those goods and practices that call for valuing according to higher norms. Deontologist Immanuel Kant would have argued in favour of a different mode of valuation. Traditional pregnancy, resulting from union of a male and female partner, promote an emotional bond between parent and the child but in a contractual pregnancy that requires a mother not to form that bond is degrading and hence is an anathema to a deontologist.

Further question that comes to the fore is about the restrictions posed which allow only those couple to have access to the services of a surrogate who for medical causes are unable to bear a child. There is plethora of instances when women physically capable of bearing child take recourse to surrogacy as sometimes they are too busy to keep confined themselves for a long period during pre and post

pregnancy. It might also be the case that sometimes aesthetic standard requirement of the career that they pursue hinders them to carry a child. Again, when this service is denied to homosexuals, the question that comes to the fore: are we trying to indoctrinate heterosexual norms on them that they find repugnant?

Decision not to allow foreign commissioning parents is another facet of the problem. A country that has opened its market to the global community in almost every area, it is difficult to justify putting a complete ban in surrogacy to foreign parents who look for taking advantage of Indian market for having baby through Indian women who is gifted with high fertility but cursed with poverty. Thus it is feared that the proposed Bill by putting a blanket ban on foreign nationals to take advantage of this burgeoning industry could cause a huge loss to the surrogate mothers as these are the people who are best paying customers. As per one statistics 48 per cent commissioning couples come from abroad. On account of this it is possible that the proposed legislation may be challenged in the court. The comity of nations might be at loggerheads with this ban.

As an alternative to surrogacy the draft Bill talks about adoption. It is understandable in a world when population pressure is increasingly putting strains there is little logic in creating new babies with the help of surrogate mothers. It will be prudent to divert scarce medical resources for researches which facilitate saving lives and improve quality of existing lives instead of spending on the development of reproductive technologies. Adoption brings an opportunity for rehabilitation of these unlucky children. But it will not be out of context to remind that we live in a country where infertility is regarded as a curse and is considered as stigma for a couple. Only an affected person can realize how personally devastating it is. It is indeed not easy to get rid of this stigma. That is why information about artificial insemination is kept concealed to protect the male partner from the stigma of infertility. The celebrated movie *Chori Chori Chupke Chupke* depicted this social issue very deftly. People therefore fall back upon surrogacy for fulfilling their dreams of parenthood which nature rudely thwarted. In Indian ethos the concept of *pitri ma* which has to be repaid by procreating a child underscores this point. Infertile couples harbour an indomitable desire to bring into being a child who represents an extension of their own bodies, who is genetically related to them. Their desires represent a quest for transcendence, a desire for creativity. Challenging this eternal verity of life is bound to be spurned. It is

also true that there is a mismatch between infertile couples and available infants for adoption. The process of adoption is also very complicated and lingering? In such a situation: Is it right to put a ban on such a quest?

Government proposes in the Bill to allow only altruistic surrogacy and in such cases a surrogate mother need to be a close relative. Altruistic surrogacy might have been practised in the past. But a modicum of intelligence tells us that at current time it will not be an easy proposition, given the current social structure, to find a close relation who will be forthcoming to help out her infertile relatives.

What is found that in the present dispensation the Bill is an indiscreet one. Instead of putting too rigid a ban, the situation calls for effecting better regulation with a humane face. The current one may not be enough to address all ethical and legal niceties. More moderation and incorporation of soft teeth may be required. Intransigence on the part of the government may snowball into a major controversy.

DO ARTWORKS HAVE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS?

ARUNDHATI MUKHERJI

Art and aesthetics deal with deviant expressions. When we enter into the world of literary language specially, we face not only certain problems of ontology, but of linguistics and epistemology too. The problems that are here and dealt here with are of the extent to which language mirrors thought and thought reality. Human beings have the capacity to think of non-existent objects, impossible state of affairs and many kinds of peculiar deviant things. When we give utterance to these unusual thoughts, or write about these thoughts we produce certain things that have a peculiar deviant character. The deviant expressions are common in poetry and also they can be represented through any artwork. However, peculiar expressions carry peculiar thoughts with novelty, and novel thoughts are, therefore, expressed via the artworks, and the novelty consists in the fact that they conceive of the world in an unprecedented way. Such thoughts therefore, can be said to represent new conceptions, new ideas, and can be understood by us. Many thinkers claim that an artwork presents itself as an object of knowledge of its own kind which may have a special ontological status. Although an artwork may not be real or mental or ideal, yet it can be taken as a system of norms of ideal and outstanding concepts which are intersubjective. One can infer artwork to exist in collective ideology, changing with it, and fastened safely through individual mental experiences.

Ontology, as we all know, is the study of the kinds of things there are (exist) in the world. Now if one talks about the ontology of art, one may say that art takes the matter, form and mode, in which art exists. Artworks are, however, human creations, so not natural kinds, but may be taken as social constructs. The way we categorize them depends mainly on human interests, and so for this, ontology perhaps is difficult to be separated from sociology and ideology.

We may probably agree that there is a relationship between meaning and concept - now we need to consider a close relationship between concepts and facts in the world. The crucial question is, whether the "facts" as they appear in one's conception are limited to and may not surpass the facts as they obtain in the world. The fact is, there is no such limitation. A distinction may be considered between ontology tout court and one's personal ontology. The former means just what there is

in the outer natural world. This ontology provides the raw materials or data for individual ontologies. From these given materials, one may build all kinds of personal faculties; a human being may alter, modify and rearrange the materials of the natural world in infinite ways. In this process one is limited only as to the given materials; as to their rearrangement, one enjoys lavishly. By the raw materials we understand not only substances, but also attributes like, properties, relations, states etc. Thus, in the art-world, one can conceive of all sorts of objects and states of affairs that surpass what is given by the raw materials of the world, and the creator surpasses by the creator's own imagination. The imaginative abilities of the humans strive to transcend the limits of experience and dive into the sea of creation. In Kant we see that he loves the word "genius" rather than "creativity". For Kant, a genius is a rare phenomenon, and it is the faculty of presenting novel ideas of aesthetics. "Genius" is a natural gift or talent of human being. This natural talent is elegantly expressed through poetry as an artwork.¹

However certain significant questions are involved with the ontological status of artwork such as: 1) What sort of an object is a work of art? 2) Are they physical objects, ideal objects, and imaginary entities? 3) When can we say that an artwork is existing? 4) Under what conditions do they survive and cease to exist? 5) When is it damaged? 6) When is it destroyed? 7) How are different kinds of artworks related to the mental states of creators, to physical objects or to any other things? 8) Again, what kind of relationship is there between them and the creator, audiences, physical objects or other kinds of structures? 9) Is this artwork a kind of thing seen by people in the art gallery? 10) Again, which features are essential to artwork? and so on. This ontological status of artwork is said to be fundamentally fixed by its identity, existence, and persistence conditions - these fix what category of object it is. In fixing this, what properties of the artwork are essential or accidental, what kind of changes interfere with its preservation etc, are also may be fixed.

Philosophers have probably placed all artworks in every ontological category, considering some to be physical objects; others abstract structures, imaginary entities, action types or tokens and so on. However, if we at all try to answer the important question, "what is the ontological status of artwork?" - we would have to keep in

mind that the relevant ontological statuses may be shared with many other things, and artworks of different kinds may have different statuses.

What is a work of art? Some artwork may be understood as a kind of abstract entity having no spatio-temporal location. Again, for many, artworks should be recognized as something which come into existence and can be destroyed. Some says, that some artworks are a kind of abstract artifact taken as genuine creations. Some again says that works of art are non-physical like numbers and non-psychological, but which are of someone to a time and historical content. Some take artworks as created universals and embodied through the intentional activities of the creator.

Common sense understanding takes artworks as things created at a certain time, in particular cultural and historical circumstances, through the imaginative and creative acts of a creator. Once created, we normally think of artworks as public and somewhat stable kind of entities which may be, read, seen or heard by us. Even if exact copies are made from the works of painting and sculpture the work itself is identical with the original. As individual entities these works are capable of being bought and sold, moved to reside with their new owners. Also such works can be maintained and go through certain changes in their physical constitution and can be destroyed as well. Music and literature as artworks may have many performances and copies and may be destroyed without the work itself going out of existence. Works like these themselves are not bought and sold - rather, reproduction rights or copyrights to the works may be sold. Further, music or literature may survive as long some copy of it remains - though it may be destroyed if all copies and memories of it get lost.

The divergences show that artworks cannot be of the same ontological type - concrete artworks like painting and non-cast sculpture differ in status from music and literature. The ontological divisions need not go strictly with the categories of music, drama, visual art etc. However, to common sense understanding it is extremely difficult to determine the ontological status of artwork. Let us now try to briefly survey certain major views regarding ontology of art. Roman Ingarden's work on Art is mainly a work on ontology. His ontology of the literary work was taken to argue against transcendental idealism. To him, literary works and the characters and objects represented in them are just the examples of purely intentional objects - objects owing

their existence and essence to consciousness. Ingarden tried to determine the ontological status of artwork, its relation to concrete entities like copies of score, painted canvasses, sound events, also to creative acts of artists and the conscious states of observers.² He says, that the literary work's "complexity and many-sidedness" contribute to its aesthetic power and "enriches our lives".³ He keeps out the written and printed text from literary work. He says that the printed cannot belong to the elements of literary work of art itself, rather it forms its physical foundation and plays a modifying role in reading.⁴

Echoing Ingarden, Gadamer says that an artwork manifests itself uniquely and it is adequate to call it a "creation" (Gebilde) or a self-sufficient creation. It is always pointing beyond itself to what it is not, and in this sense artwork is transcendent object. For Ingarden, Gebilde refers to a work that exists on different levels, and its completion depends upon many levels and brought into play first by the creator and then by the reader or observer. An artwork never fully comes into being until the observer or reader constructs it, and this job is called by Ingarden "concretization".⁵ The act of construction brings object and subject into being as players in the re-creation of artistic play. No doubt that the subject engaged in aesthetic experience and the object confronted retain some kind of independent ontological status. Yet both take on a new identity - each is now to be identified with the game in which they are in, as one.

The ontological status of the artwork goes further when artwork is taken as self-sufficient creation, that is, when artwork comes into being as a product, and stays on its own, independently of its creator's intention. When I read a novel, whatever the author intended to convey is of no immediate concern to me - what is of concern to me are the characters, events that become alive for me, it is then I who love them and I do so in accordance with my beliefs and convictions. Ingarden says that since the world of artwork comes into being through my participation in its construction, it derives many of its characteristics and features from me. But no doubt the artwork also imparts something to me. In describing art as essentially imitative is to claim that it imitates human nature by reflecting it. When we return from the world of the artwork, we, therefore, bring bit of that world with us - this reflects the intersubjectivity and opens up novel ways of looking at things as well. Thus, in this

way Gebilde may play a significant and crucial role in our emotional, intellectual and cultural development.

Some philosophers talk about a plurality of modes of being, and some have attributed modes of being other than existence to works of art. Joad would say that the artwork is a subsistent object, neither mental nor material, which, like other universals, is a part of the universe possessing a special kind of being in its own right. Another view of the ontology of art is that artworks are just physical objects. However, this physical-object hypothesis of Wollheim has been challenged. Wollheim argues that there is an “incompatibility of property” between works of art and physical objects.⁶ For Wollheim, artworks are type and their embodiments tokens.⁷ But the question is, can a type be hung on a wall, transported, destroyed? Again work of architecture is not token of types but physical objects and to make them into types by infinitely reproducing them would be to destroy their aestheticity.

Further, suppose that John sees David Copperfield on his table. Is David Copperfield, therefore, identical with this book that John can see and touch? Obviously not, for, another copy lies on Ruth's table, and a single artwork cannot be identical with two separate physical things. The result is that the novel David Copperfield is identical with no physical thing. It is not a physical object, any more than is a piece of music, which is distinct from all its performances.

According to Margolis, artwork is not numerically identical to the physical object. He says that a visual artwork can be lively but not a physical object. He talks of three distinct things - physical object, the artwork which it “embodies”, and the type (an abstract particular) of which the artwork is a token. A sculpture is a cultural object and gains its aesthetic properties via an artist - once the stone has been transformed, it now obtains those properties. An artwork is more than a physical object - it is a physical object plus something else - something is actually added to the physical object, which is new shapes and qualities. Margolis would say that if there is an absence of specific proper attention, the artwork ceases to exist, even though the physical system stays perfectly. Again the same artwork gets its existence back when the same proper imaginative attention is turned upon the physical system that constitutes the supervenient base of the artwork, thereby reviving the correlative

aesthetic pattern. Artworks for Margolis are physically embodied culturally emergent entities⁸.

An important point concerning art-objects can be raised that all existing material things are art-objects, and all art-objects are nothing but material things. It stands, that there are no material things like tables, cars etc. which would go out of the orbit of art-objects, and on the other hand, that there are some artworks which would enjoy a special ontological status. The point is that an art-object may not be taken necessarily as a special kind of thing - rather it should be taken as a simple material thing as referred to by one of its aspects, i.e., qua beautiful. Since all things have qualities, they must have some sort of unity and complexity and so, anything has some aesthetic value. Even the ugliest thing can be aesthetically judged. Hence, it is clear that, everything has a valid interpretation as an art-object. Further, one may fail to observe any distinction between artworks, human made objects and natural objects. They can all be given the same status of art-objects. So there is no reason to distinguish between beauty and higher level aesthetic value as many thinkers do.

Many philosophers, however, raised question concerning the intermittence problem. We know that some works of art like Yeats's poem, Rabindranath Tagore's poem, Rembrandt's prints etc existed long, at least ever since their creation. But many works of art are not observed throughout the many centuries, or are not continuously seen - in this case can we still say that the works have their existence, or shall we have to say that they totally ceased to exist? It is said that if somebody, however, takes artworks as powers, or as having some kind of power, then, the intermittence problem could be kept aside. But then, viewing artworks as imaginary objects has the consequence that artworks exist intermittently, depending on the presence or absence of the supporting mental states.⁹ It is said that an artwork's continuous existence depends on the "passive disposition" of a physical object and the "dynamic disposition" of the appreciator as well.

Sartre however says, that imaginary objects, for their existence and essence depend on our acts of imagination. Let us have a little talk on the imaginative experience in art. Collingwood denies that any artwork is a physical object. He believes that imaginative creation is necessary and sufficient for creating an artwork. For example, the music is not a collection of noises, rather, the work of music and

indeed the other arts too, must be something “in the composer's head” and not a series of heard notes or a physical sequence of sound waves. Thus, music is an imaginary thing - it is the tune in the composer's head.¹⁰ Collingwood suggests that seeing the artwork as such requires imagination. He contends that the noises made by the singers, and heard by the audiences, are not the music at all - they are only means by which the audiences can reconstruct the imaginary tune that existed in the producer's head. Thus, artwork themselves are never painted canvasses, series of noises, or any other external objects - rather, these are only means that a creator may provide to help viewers or audiences for reconstructing something like the total imaginary experience the creator had in creating the work.¹¹ Hence, creator's this “imaginative experience of total activity”, recreated by competent audiences, is the real work of art according to Collingwood.

Sartre similarly argues that artworks are never real objects that can be simply perceived - but rather they are imaginary entities, for, the aesthetic object requires imaginative acts of consciousness.¹² Sartre also says, that the artworks are imaginary thing in the sense of systematically being the object of some kind of error about their mode of existence. For him, Beethoven's seventh symphony is outside of the real, outside of existence - we do not hear the symphony at all, rather hear the composition in our imagination. These statements open the door of the possibility of imagining artworks without believing in their existence. Unlike Collingwood, Sartre thinks of artwork as “unreal” objects, created and sustained by acts of imaginative consciousness, and existing only as long as they remain the objects of such acts. However, it is true that seeing artworks as imaginary activities or objects rather than as physical objects creates more problems.

As normally understood, artworks have certain intentional, meaning oriented, aesthetic properties. The artworks are different from their constituting matter - because the two may have different identity or persistence conditions. One may say that Physical-object hypothesis must be construed as the weaker view. Artworks are individual concreta constituted by physical objects, but not identifiable with their constituting matter. Again some would say that as concrete individual, artwork is not abstract or imaginary entity, nor even a mere physical entity.

However, according to Wollheim and Wolterstorff some arts like paintings, sculpture are physical objects, but in works of music, drama or literature there is no particular physical object process that can be identified either with the work of art itself or its constituting basis. Thus, not all sorts of art are physical objects. Some artworks present a physical object and some an abstract object. Thus for Wollheim, literature and music have a tinge of abstractness - they are types, of which copies/performances are tokens. Again, Wolterstorff takes artworks to be “norm-kinds.” He talks of ontology of multiple artworks. He makes use of the concept of “kind” - a music-work is a kind of performance. Kinds are not physical objects, but their instances are. Margolis's objection is that kinds are abstract entities and thus, unlike artworks, are neither created nor destroyed. Another view would say, what a creator creates is not a physical object, but a kind of physical object. Even the *Monalisa*, then should be thought of not as physical painting, but as a kind of painting, which has only one instance.

Currie, however, defends the view that all artworks are abstract types, “capable, in principle, of having multiple instances.”¹³ For him, paintings are just like novels and works of music in having multiple instances of equal ontological and aesthetic standing. He admits, artworks are action type - an artist discovers a structure, via a heuristic path, at a time. For Croce, however, artwork does not consist in a physical event or object, but rather in a mental intuition, which is grasped by the viewer or audience in the process of aesthetic understanding. But this kind of ideal theory of art faces difficulty, when we ask, what this intuition is, and how to identify this intuition with which any artwork is taken to be identical?

Beardsley, however, starts with the ontology of aesthetic objects which are a subset of perceptual objects. For Beardsley, neither aesthetic objects are presentations, nor are they classes of presentations, for, they must have some perceptual properties. Essentially presentations are sense-data of aesthetic objects. But that does not reduce aesthetic object to a presentation - it only analyses statements about them into statement about presentations.¹⁴ To Beardsley, aesthetic objects are also not artifact. Artwork is physical, we can perceive it, it is intersubjectively there in space and time, can have an outward appearance in a different way with different perspectives and at different times, may not be

understood once and for all, and it has certain properties. However, Beardsley afterwards shifted to a form of non-reductive materialism to see whether artworks can be treated as physical objects. This materialism perhaps, works well with singular artwork like paintings - but may create problems in “multiple artworks” like music compositions which have many performances. For that reason Beardsley, perhaps, is driven back to ontological pluralism. Davies’s view has a pragmatic constraint to the effect that artworks should ontologically be grasped in a way as to accord with those features of our critical and appreciative habits upheld on rational reflection.¹⁵ He talks of token events, rather than event-types.

According to Monistic thinkers all artworks fall within one ontological category, universals. If so, then, all artworks will come out false or uninformative. A realistic account holds that once artworks are brought into existence, they do not depend on anyone's beliefs or responses. It also holds that anything is discovered from something, if it exists already over there. Division between multiple and singular artistic items should not be taken as decisive for an ontology of art, for, it rests upon contingent thesis about what is technologically possible. Benjamin believes in the influence of technological change on our basic conception of artworks. He takes technological change as part of a liberating or progressive historical process. Some argued that technological possibility should not be taken as decisive for the monistic ontology of art - the significant point to be marked is, what is really metaphysically possible.

What about repeatable artworks? Poems, dramas, symphonies can be performed repeatedly. Repeatable artworks can be called abstract objects, lack spatio-temporal location, have multiple instances like copies, tokens, each of which again are concrete physical object possessing spatio-temporal location. The question is, if there are at all repeatable artworks, then to what ontological category they belong? Rohrbaugh would say that repeatable artworks have occurrences (Rohrbaugh, 2003, pp. 197-199), means, if there are such artworks; they are abstract objects, because no concrete object has instances. Foregoing briefly displayed diversity of views. Observation is: no work of music, literature, sculpture, painting etc. can be identified with an imaginary entity, a physical object, or an abstract type or kind without

abandoning or revising the ordinary understanding of art that is mingled with our beliefs, habits and practices.

Now, can we have criteria for evaluating ontologies of art? More clearly, what makes problem in aesthetic theories? Answer is, problems are problems of common sense - so aesthetic theories should give up certain common sense beliefs. Causal theories of reference provide argument, that common sense views are fallible. Again, modifications or alterations of common sense beliefs about the ontological status of artwork do not make sense and cannot be justified by a causal theory of reference. Moreover, pure causal theories of reference suffer from a 'qua' problem.¹⁶ However, coherence with background practices and beliefs is used in assessing various positions about the ontology of artworks. So, consistency with such beliefs and practices may be the significant criterion of success for a theory of the ontology of artworks. But categories like imaginary objects, physical objects, abstract kinds of various sorts do not fit completely with common sense beliefs and practices regarding artworks. A radical view about ontology of art is that despite popular belief, all artworks are action-types rather than individuals, or that literary works are eternal abstracts which can neither be created nor destroyed and so on. If this is correct, such view cannot be presented as discoveries about the real truth of the ontology of artworks that may overthrow common sense.

Can particular works of art be individuated? A work of art can be particular in the sense that it can be created and also can be destroyed, and thus, cannot be universal. Also it cannot be universal because it possesses physical and perceptual properties. But it is a peculiar kind of particular, because (1) it can instantiate another particular, and (2) it can be embodied in another particular. The first one has something to do with individuating artworks and anything, may, contingently depend on that. But the second one has to do with the ontologically dependent nature of actual artwork. An artwork is a peculiar kind of particular, unlike physical bodies. It can be said that type artworks are particulars. They are heuristically introduced for individuation. But every artwork is a token-of-a-type. However this does not mean that there are no types or that a creator cannot create a new kind of artwork. Actually, there are no types that are separable from tokens, because there are no tokens except token-of-a-type. The very process for individuating tokens entails individuating types.

Particular artworks cannot exist as embodied in physical objects. This is to say that artworks are culturally emergent entities - i.e., that artworks display certain properties or qualities that physical objects cannot display. These properties are intentional or functional and include symbolism, expressiveness, style, representation etc. Artworks appear and exist like physical objects, but they are something more than that. Hence, one may say that artworks are culturally emergent entities, they are revealed as novel entities, tokens-of-a-type which exists embodied in physical objects. A possible solution can be given by providing a method for determining the ontological status of artworks. The method is to make explicit the assumptions about ontological status built into the practices and beliefs of those dealings with artworks, and to assess their place in an overall ontological framework. It is tough to solve the problems of the ontology by the selection of the ontological concepts to serve the needs of aesthetics. Rather, the solution of the problem may lie in the return to a fundamental metaphysics and the development of wider systems of ontological categories.

Entities may, however, be divided into two categories - mind-independent physical objects and imaginary objects that are mind-dependent. If we take our beliefs and practices seriously regarding artworks like paintings, they would fall between those categories, as entities materially constituted by physical objects, but also dependent on forms of human intentionality. Such artworks are external to mind, whether observed or not, existing once created; unlike imaginary objects, they are perceptible, and may be destroyed. But unlike purely mind-independent physical objects it is metaphysically necessary that they can come into existence only through intentional human activities. Again, unlike mere physical objects, they uniquely have essential visual, meaningful and aesthetic properties or qualities which depend on human perceptual powers, culture and practices. We find, a difference between mind-external and mind-internal entities - but we must recognize the existence of entities that depend in different ways on both the physical world and human intentionality.

However, if we are to include artwork-like things in our ontology, we should accept a finer-grained range of ontological categories. If one tries to determine the categories that would be suitable for artworks as we know them through our ordinary beliefs and practices, the pay-off then perhaps, lie not just in a better ontology of art, rather in a better metaphysics. Further, according to Thomasson's view ontological

categories are determined by our social and linguistic practices. All kinds of artworks, are not available on their own - they cannot just be inserted into traditional ontologies, but they are part of a revisionary meta-ontology which can only be accepted or rejected as a whole. Thomasson talks of new ontological framework and his arguments for this show analogy between artworks and other socially created thing by social convention - e.g. scientific theories, marriages etc¹⁷. To him, human intentionality is essential for having suitable convention and for such objects to come into being. Gilson in his Mellon lectures in the National Gallery, Washington, 1955 (Published in 1957) claimed that an artwork has both aesthetic existence and artistic modes of existence with the substantial one. Artwork exists artistically qua product of the creator's activity or process. While, an artwork exists aesthetically when it is the object of somebody's aesthetic experience.

The existence of a finished artwork goes on to depend on the imaginative activity of the creator and also on the audience's or observer's appreciation. Some Philosophers have called this imaginative attitude as “conscious self-deception” – but they are really valuable and significant both for the creation and appreciation of art object. Although we just cannot dismiss art by calling it a fiction, we may somewhat describe it as a kind of lucid illusion in which we play with thoughts of certain situation which we know to be not existing. Artist's artwork however, can be compared to a child's imaginative play with a toy.

My observation is, that an artist or a creator can have an inner mental entity that is private and the creator expresses that private thing through art. It stands that art may merge with the private. However, phenomenologically internal objects called emotions with physical objects are there in the public outer world. Now if this be so, the concept of art can hardly exist ontologically and yet artworks exist empirically in this world. However, interesting issue concerning ontology is in the question of what makes an object a work of art? If an artwork is an object added with something else, the problem is to solve for that “something else” and no other, which lead us to search for the necessary condition for art-hood. It is quite rational to say that something is an artwork only if it has content with aim and meaning, an expression, an appearance and understanding of the content. This shows that in art what appears as external is totally the presentation of the inner. In the art-world we conceive of something which

veils its appearances in a very different and deviant way from the usual or what is ordinarily taken. But this changed outward form or appearance of the ordinary is essentially a contribution to the ontology of art in which “meaning” is significant.

Further, observation includes that there are some philosophers who go to such a height that the questions which are raised concerning ontology and identity of art are considered not even worth thinking about. They take these questions of art as marginal, as less important to the subject matter of aesthetics. In this context, I think, it is much better to give more emphasis not on the ontology of art, rather, on the serious practical questions on the value of art. Because to talk about the value of art according to my opinion, is evidently of the first importance, because it throws more significant light upon human life. One should note that in order for us from our metaphysical vantage point to conceive of the garden as sleeping, we have to transcend our world. So, the status of the expression is not a mere cognitive catachresis - it draws forth an act of construal, an act in which this situation described by the expression is conceived of as a possibility. The locus of such possibilities is an aesthetic world or metaphoric world.

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CONTRACTARIANISM: A BRIEF SURVEY

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The social contract was originally associated with Hobbes (1651), Locke (1689) and Rousseau (1762). They were the most famous philosophers which formed the theoretical groundwork of contractarianism. The social contract theory is sometimes regarded as an actual historical fact to which the origin of the state is ascribed. It is also often used only as an idea to express certain fundamental relations existing in political life. There are different exponents of this theory each of them project varying ideas as far as the state of nature is concerned. Some project it as a state of brute savagery where the law of the jungle prevailed; others regard it to be a state of ideal innocence and bliss and still yet others consider of it as a state of insecurity though not of savagery. However, despite the differences in the ideas attached to the theory, the theory represents one common direction and that is, the state or society is the outcome of deliberate human effort or in other words, the society originated in, or based on, an agreement between the people and the government, or between all the individuals composing it where every member of the party partakes in the existing contract.

The social contract theory or contractarianism endeavors to systematically establish the basic factors that sanction the formation of human societies which give rise to the creation of governing authorities all through an initial set of covenants people agree to enter into so as to strengthen individual self-preservation and social living by being members of a greater society. The theory explains the ways in which people form states and maintain social order by entering into a mutual agreement with one another to make a state by contract, each surrendering personal freedom as necessary to promote the safety and well-being of all because the benefit of living in a civil society far outweighs the right to do absolutely anything in the state of nature.

The social contract theory holds that social living pre-supposes certain social norms and every individual in the society seems to be willing to enter into a contract for his own advantages so also for the greater advantages of all which far outweighs than those who remain in the state of nature where there prevails no social law. Primarily the social contract theory is based on human nature and the situation under

which human society came into being. According to social contract theory, right and wrong are simply an agreement made among rationally self-interested individuals who are willing to give up the unhampered pursuit of their own desires and interests for the security of living in peace with the contracting members. The notion of the social contract implies that the people transfer some rights to a government or other authority in order to receive or maintain social order through the rule of law. It can also be said to be an agreement by the governed on a set of rules by which they are governed. The most important contemporary political social contract theorist is John Rawls, who effectively advocated social contract theory in the second half of the 20th century, along with a moral contractarian, namely, David Gauthier. However, this paper does not intend to give a detail explication of the social contract theory as it is beyond its scope.

Hobbes in his book *Leviathan* depicts the state of nature as thus: “In such condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time, no arts, no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”¹ The state of nature, as Hobbes depicted, was so hostile and uncertain and in such situation which was full of complexities and hostilities, social living practically was a far distance. Hence, in order to escape from the state of nature individuals were required to be cooperative and submissive with one another and committing of such would assure a social system build on covenants between individuals and thus subsequently leads to a formation of what he calls the commonwealth. Each individual has construed the objects of agreement between the contracting parties and thus agreed upon entering into a covenant by surrendering their rights for the greater benefits and security of their social living on the condition that others do in the same manner. It was a contract of each with other. Hobbes states that the only way to assemble the common power is to confer all their power and strength upon one man,

¹Hobbes, T., (1960) *Leviathan*, Blackwell, Oxford, p. 82

or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will; which is as much to say, to appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to bear their person; and everyone to own, and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall Act or cause to be Acted, in those things which concern the Common peace and safety.¹ The covenant agreed upon involves both the renunciation or transfer of right and the authorization of the sovereign power. Essentially, the people are responsible for creating the covenant to help them in their interest. Thus, the covenant made between the parties consists of a set of rules or principles where all rational individuals mutually agree to follow and enforce it to enhance a better cooperative social living and common peace.

Rousseau (1712-1778) was one of the greatest thinkers, a genius and a keen moralist. He believes in the fact that the natural person was guided by instinct and not by reason which is quite in agreement with Hobbes. However, unlike Hobbes who depicted the state of nature as hostile and uncertain; Rousseau states the more we reflect on it, that is, the state of nature, the more we shall find that this state was the least subject to revolutions, and altogether the very best man could experience, so that he can have departed from it only through some fatal accident, which, for the public good, should never have happened. The example of savages, most of which have been found in this, seems to prove that men were meant to remain in it, that is the real youth of the world, and that all subsequent advances have been apparently so many steps towards the perfection of the individual, but in reality towards the decrepitude of his species.² Rousseau in his famous work *The Social Contract* states: “The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man... Then only, when the voice of duty takes place... man, who so far had considered only himself, find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations... His faculties are so stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his soul so

¹Hobbes, T., (1991) *Leviathan*, ed. R. Tuck, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 120

²Rousseau, J. J., ((1958) *A Discourse On the Origin of Inequality in the Social Contract and Discourses*, (trans) G.D.H. Cole, Dent, London, p. 198-99

uplifted... instead of a stupid and unimaginative animal, made him an intelligent being and man.”¹

Rousseau recognizes society as inevitable for human life was not possible without it and hence endeavors to understand human society and institutions in their rational aspect. The fundamental problem of social contract theory as far as Rousseau is concerned, is to find a form of association able to defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of every associate, and of such a nature that each, uniting himself with all, may still obey only himself, and remain as free as before. He conceives the State as a body aiming at the well-being of all its members and subordinates. Rousseau says the voice of duty demands that individuals to set aside his private, self-enclosed and self-centered inclinations in favor of social rules that can impartially promote the welfare of everyone in the same manner. The coming together of individuals into forming the kind of contract by setting rules to be cohesively used for the welfare of the people. Rousseau² wants to establish a relationship between citizens that will provide each with adequate protection backed by the community while preserving the free will and liberty of each. Rousseau’s suggestion is the simultaneous alienation by each person of his rights to the absolutely sovereign community. Rousseau defines freedom as “that condition which by giving each citizen to his country, guarantees him from all personal dependence.”³ Thus, the process of each giving himself to the community creates an impersonal sovereign.

For Rousseau freedom was moral self-determination or the capacity of the individual in exercising one’s autonomy. He stated: “The Sovereign cannot impose on the subjects any fetters that are of no use to the community. It cannot even will to do so, for under the law of reason nothing takes places without a cause... The commitments that bind us to the body politic are obligatory only because they are mutual, and their nature is such that in fulfilling them one cannot work for someone

¹Rousseau J. J., (1959) *The Social Contract and Discourse*, Trans., by G.D.H. Cole, New York, Dutton, p. 18

²Barker, E., (1962) *Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau*, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 180

³Ibid., p. 184

else without also working for oneself. Why is the general will always right, and why do all constantly want the happiness of each of them, if not because everyone applies the word each to himself and thinks of himself as he votes for all.”¹ The law that is within the general will should be that they were in the general interest of everyone. Is there any thread of losing the freedom under such sovereign body? Rousseau did not see any thread of tyranny under general will because the General Will is not the people’s representatives, they are merely its agents and they cannot decide anything faintly and the law which the people has not ratified in person is empty, it is no law at all and thus the contract enabled the citizens to be as free as the individuals, for “In giving himself to all, each person gives himself to no one. And since there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right that he would grant others over himself, he gains the equivalent of everything he loses, along with a greater amount of force to preserve what he has.”²

Locke, on the other hand, develops a concept of will as a moral faculty. According to him, the will is governed by a person’s judgment and understanding as opposed to the Hobbesian pleasure-pain mechanism that is pushed around by external forces. Locke (1632-1704), an English political philosopher is one of famous advocates of the social contract theory who has been credited with developing the idea that human beings have a ‘natural rights’ to liberty and a ‘natural right’ to private property.³ According to Locke, in the state of nature, all man would be in ‘a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another... without subordination or subjection (to another)... But... the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought

¹Rousseau J. J., (1959) *The Social Contract and Discourse*, Trans., by G.D.H. Cole, New York, Dutton, p. 168

²Ibid., p. 168

³Aaron, I. R., (1971) *John Locke*, Oxford University Press, London, p. 352-376

to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possession.’¹ The law of nature teaches each man the right to liberty and property and each man live an independent life with no one to interfere and be interfered. But the state of nature in which each live independent lives is constantly in thread as there is an insecurity of being harm by others. Consequent upon the apprehension of the unsecured life due to constant thread of uncertainty in spite of all the so called natural rights individuals organize themselves into a political society and erected a government whose primary purpose is to provide the protection of their natural rights that were lacking in the state of nature. John Locke says that at the time person leave the state of nature to unite via a social contract in forming political society, they must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society.²

The objective of coming together into forming a political society is for the safety and protection of their rights and thus the consent of the people is extended in order that their rights are protected from being harmed by others. Locke’s position has been rightly summarized by Patrick Riley: Locke’s view... was that even though God has ‘appointed’ moral and political ‘ends’ in the form of natural laws and rights, the “consent and contrivance’ of men is necessary if those “ends” are to be effective on earth because men must voluntarily set up a “known and indifferent judge” who will require men to conform their conduct to God’s appointed ends: “The law of nature would ... be in vain, if there were nobody...(that)... had a power to execute that law.” And the “power” which “executes” that law must be set up by consent and contract, since there is no natural political authority.³

A social contract is a mutual agreement between two parties. It involves prior commitments to individualism, freedom, private property rights and the possibility of free market exchange. The approach also involves ‘commitments to reasonableness and basic institutions acknowledging the privileged and foundational role of reasoned and voluntary human commitment’. Though the social contract theory seems to be

¹Locke, J., (1963) *Two Treatises of Government*, rev. ed., Peter Laslett, Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 309-311

²Locke, J., (1965) *Two Treatises of Government*, (rev.), (ed.), Peter Laslett, Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 377

³Riley, P., (March 1976) “Locke’s on ‘Voluntary Agreement’ and Political Power”, *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol.29, No.1, p. 136-145

attractive and promising, the theory has been criticized by many thinkers. Hampton¹ criticized Hobbes in her “Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition”, arguing that the characterization of individual in the state of nature leads to a dilemma because Hobbes’ state of nature as a potential war of all against all can be generated either consequent upon passion or rationality. Hampton points out that if the passions account is correct, then the contractors will still be motivated by these passions after the social contract is drawn up, and so will fail to comply with it. And if the rationality account is correct then the rational actors will not comply with the social contract any more than they will cooperate with each other before it is made.

William² in one of his important articles “On Being the Object of Property” offers a criticism on the ground of the contract metaphor. He says by defining some as contractors and others as incapable of entering into contract, the whole classes of people can be excluded from the realm of justice. Held states that the social contract theory of Rawlesian and Hobbesian type which begin with independent man in the state of nature are wrong since such a state of nature is quite impossible and therefore cannot validly serve as a starting point for any theory, positive or normative, of human nature, inasmuch as any so called independent men would have begun life as babies dependent on mother.’³

While, the contractarian view of morality defines right action in terms of the rules of contract. This view maintains that social living presupposes certain moral rules which every individual in society accepts such rules for his own personal advantages and thus developed a simple criterion to decide what actions are morally good and morally bad. However, this theory fails to account the significance of addressing the issues arising from the nature of the agreement between the

¹Hampton, J., (1998) “Political Philosophy”, in *The Attempt to Privatize Business Ethics: A Critique of the Claims of Contractarianism to be the Ethical Framework for Global Business*, G.V. Donleavy (ed.) (2010), *Journal of Business System, Governance and Ethics*, Vol. 5, No 1, p. 60

²William, P. T., (1988), “On Being the Object of Property”, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 41: 1, 5-24, Autumn, in , in *The Attempt to Privatize Business Ethics: A Critique of the Claims of Contractarianism to be the Ethical Framework for Global Business*, G.V. Donleavy (ed.) (2010), *Journal of Business System, Governance and Ethics*, Vol. 5, No 1, p. 63

³Held, V., (1993) *Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture Society and Politics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 195

contracting parties. Is the agreement unanimous? If the agreement is not a unanimous one, then what holds for those who are not a party to the agreement? Moreover, the theory has been often criticized on the ground that it is based on historical fiction with little practicability. It is not untrue to make a little mention here that the contractarian, despite its formidable arguments, is far from being accepted and thus unfolds scopes for further enquiry.

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A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF GILBERT HARMAN'S INTERNALIST THESIS OF MORAL RELATIVISM

SASWATI DE MONDAL

Gilbert Harman, an American ethicist of our days, defends in a new way the age-old thesis of moral relativism, which is often viewed as 'a kind of philosophical folly'¹. This article is an attempt to bring forth a general outline of Harman's version of moral relativism, which is essentially an internalist thesis in that it tries to explain our moral beliefs "in terms of our upbringing and our psychology, without any appeal to an independent realm of values and obligation"². Apart from an explicatory role this writing plays, it also tries to critically assess Harman's internalist contentions in the light of the discussions made by several critics and philosophers. We shall first draw in a nutshell an outline of his thesis in general and then in the section that follows shall discuss his internalist position in particular, followed by a critical evaluation of his views.

I

Harman, as one of the most influential contemporary voices of moral relativism argues that this thesis is to be understood as a logical consequence of the naturalist attitude towards the world. Given the truth of the scientific conception of the world, ethics so far it strives to be objective, absolute and universal, rests on false presupposition. He, however, believes that a plausible version of naturalism involve a moral relativism that says that different people are subject to different moral demands and not subject to 'a single true morality'. The moral requirements are shaped by the moral conventions of the agents in which they participate. Thus morality arises out of established conventions or agreements among various groups of people. Now different groups of people subscribe to different conventions and have different understanding of moral requirements. Therefore, the moral worth of actions reflected in moral judgments about the rightness or wrongness of actions is relative to a moral framework and no moral framework is objectively privileged as the true one.

Regarding this aspect moral relativism is distinguished from moral absolutism on the one hand, while on the other, it is to be distinguished from moral nihilism. Unlike nihilism, it asserts that morality should not be abandoned. Even in some of his later work (1996) Harman claims that "Relative moral judgments can continue to play a serious role in moral thinking."³ Harman's argument for moral

relativism rests on the property of what he calls 'inner judgments'. It has the feature that where the agent has reason to do something, the speaker also endorses those reasons. For according to Harman, it would be quite odd to maintain that to say that an agent ought to do something when he has no reason for doing it. Now, he claims that inner judgments are to be understood only in the context of moral agreements. Moral agreements, which provide the agent's motivating attitude to perform certain actions, come about when the agent along with a number of people come about to subscribe to a set of norms. Harman in a number of places (1975: 4-11, 1977: chapter8-9) defends moral relativism, at least in part, on internalist grounds. In the same line with Mackie he maintains that moral requirements must provide reasons for action and moral obligation must be relativized to people's desires and aims, and hence, moral relativism is true.

David Copp notes that Harman's position, "if successful, would accomplish several noteworthy goals. It would establish a 'previously unnoticed distinction between inner and non-inner moral judgments' [Harman (1975), p.22] and a theory of the logical form of inner judgments. It would substantiate thereby a species of internalism, and it would show that there is a coherent thesis which is an interesting version of moral relativism."⁴ Anyway how far Harman's internalist thesis is tenable can only be evaluated if we first proceed to enter into his position in a greater detail.

II

Harman's thesis can be termed as a species of internalism, because it implies that a person ought morally to do something only if he has certain desires, intentions and goals, or, more generally, certain motivational attitudes that give him reason to act in that way. We may be reminded that internalism in ethics, broadly speaking, "is the view that there is an internal or conceptual connection between moral considerations and action or the sources of action."⁵ It has often been formulated as a thesis about the connection between morality and motivation. Brink identifies some distinguishable components of this thesis. The first is that moral considerations necessarily motivate or provide reason for action. Besides it is held that it is the concept of morality that provides reason for action, so the motivational power is inherent and in a sense a priori. From this it may also be held that rationality or the motivational power of moral considerations cannot depend on external considerations such as the fact about agents or what the content of morality turns out to be. Now

this thesis may be understood as internalism about motives and internalism about reasons for actions. Without entering into the details of this distinction, we here just point out that Harman's position belongs to the variety of internalism about reasons for action.

Harman in his well-known article "Moral Relativism Defended" tries to formulate moral relativism as "a soberly logical thesis - a thesis about logical form"⁶ and wants to reach the contention that "morality derives from an implicit agreement and moral judgments are true or false only in relation to such an agreement"⁷. We have just mentioned that Harman bases his argument for moral relativism on what he calls "inner judgements". Such judgments are judgments to the effect that someone morally ought or ought not to have done something, or that someone is morally right or wrong to have acted in a certain way; and not judgments to the effect that someone is a savage, an evil or an enemy. Again the judgment that certain institution is unjust is excluded by Harman from the purview of inner judgments for the reason that according to him we can "make inner judgments about a person only if we suppose that he or she has reasons to be motivated by the relevant moral considerations."⁸ Those who lack such motivating reasons are not susceptible to inner moral judgments, but to some other judgments.

In distinguishing between inner judgments from other types of non-inner moral judgments Harman points out that judgment in assessment of an agent, but not in relation to some of his actions may be termed as 'personal assessment', while judgments in assessment of a situation or an action which are not also in assessment of an agent may be called 'action assessment'. Both these types of judgments are excluded from Harman's conception of inner judgments. Now Harman gives three examples to illustrate his position; the first two are imaginary, while the third one is regarding the historical figure Hitler. The first example is regarding some intelligent beings from outer space, may be from Mars, landed on earth, which have no concern for human life and happiness go on injuring people; while the second concerns the case of a contented employee of Murder Incorporated, who was raised from his childhood to honour his own murder group, but showing nothing but contempt for the rest of the society gets the assignment of killing a bank manager Mr. Orcutt. Now the question that Harman raises is that: can we really say that they morally ought not to

have acted in that way? That they were morally wrong to have done the harm they do?

Harman answers in the negative, because he points out that injuring human life mean nothing negative to those creatures, which might have given them any reason to avoid such harms. Although we might judge that they are dreadful enemies or an enemy for our peace-loving society and so must be resisted; but it would be pointless to hold that it would be wrong for them to attack human beings. To say such things would imply that our moral considerations carry some weight with them, but actually they do not. The considerations held by us do not give them sufficient moral obligation not to engage in the kind of activity in which they involve themselves.

The third example is regarding the historical figure Hitler, who, as we all know, ordered the extermination of the millions of Jews. Harman maintains that although we can recognise that Hitler was an evil man, that what he did should never to have happened, but it sounds 'odd' to say that it was morally wrong of Hitler to have done so. Oddity, according to Harman affects the purported judgment as it sounds 'too weak' a thing to say, because in acting what he did "he shows that he could not have been susceptible to the moral considerations on the basis of which we make our judgment. He is in the relevant sense beyond the pale and we therefore cannot make inner judgments about him."⁹ In the absence of the relevant motivational attitude, Harman maintains, it makes no point to attribute a judgment involving 'moral ought'.

Here it is necessary to mention that Harman draws a distinction between two usages of 'ought'- the 'normative ought' and the 'moral ought'. To take the example of the employee of Murder Incorporated coming at the bank for killing the manager, somebody may judge that the assassin ought not to kill the people. Here the 'ought' judgment is used to assess the designated situation and thereby to hold that such situation should not take place; so it is a case of what 'ought to be' –the 'normative ought'. On the other hand, a 'moral ought' is actually an 'ought to do' in so far as it is used to describe a relation between an agent and his purported action. Here the agent and his motivational attitude to do the action plays a significant role, whereas in the case of 'normative ought' no such role is assumed. Harman explicitly mentions that he is concerned only with this last sense of 'ought' that is, the 'moral ought' in discussing his thesis of moral relativism.

Now, he talks about two important characteristics of inner judgments. The first characteristic as just discussed above is that they imply that the agent has reasons to do the thing under consideration. The second, to be discussed below, is that the speaker in some sense endorses the agent's reasons and supposes that the audiences also approve them. He explains the second point thus: "If S says that (morally) A ought to do D, S implies that A has reasons to do D that S endorses. I shall be concerned only with any speaker, S, who assumes, controversially, that such reasons would have to be their values, goals, desires, or intentions that S takes A to have, and that S approves of A's having those values, goals, desires, or intentions because S shares them. So if S says that (morally) A ought to do D, there are certain motivational attitudes M which S assumes are shared by S, A, and S's audience."¹⁰ Harman wants to argue that the shared motivational attitudes M are to be identified with intentions to keep an agreement, supposing that others similarly intend. "For I want to argue that inner moral judgments are made relative to such an agreement...I want to argue that the source of the reasons for doing D that S ascribes to A consists in A's sincere intention to observe a certain agreement."¹¹ From what has been quoted above, it may be maintained that Harman conceives of inner moral judgment in the backdrop of a speaker- hearer community and the relevant approval by the speaker regarding moral matters is assumed.

As we have just seen that according to Harman, an inner judgment implies that the agent has reasons for action that are endorsed by the speaker. Now the question is: how should this implication be understood or explained? It seems that Harman does not always clearly sort out remarks about the relevant implication. In this regard it would be of help to follow the discussion of David Copp¹². Copp maintains that Harman, on the one hand, may suppose the implication in question to be "a conversational implication", thereby excluding it from being relevant to a theory of logical form, and just meaning that the speaker in making an inner judgment implies that he shares the relevant attitude with the agent. On the other hand, Harman's position could be that "although this implication is a case of logical implication which should be reflected in an account of the logical form of inner judgments, his theory is not meant to be a complete account of this."¹³ Now from Harman's writings the first reading seems to be the intended one. It seems that whether a judgment is an inner judgment is not merely a matter of its logical form,

but it is necessary to establish what the speaker implies in order to establish that he implies endorsement of the relevant attitude. One may contend that the common examples of immoral actions may be, by some cynical politicians, who are chiefly interested in acquiring power without proper concern for the public consideration, but contrarily, doing harmful things for the society - are they not really morally wrong?

In answering, Harman takes a rather extreme position in so far as he maintains that to respond affirmatively in such cases is actually to beg the question. To explicate his position, he distinguishes between “two conceptions of moral reasons, two senses in which someone might be said to have moral reason, a ‘neutral’ conception of moral reasons and an ‘evaluative’ conception.”¹⁴ In the first conception of moral reasons it is claimed that if an agent does not do a postulated action then he either lacks certain nonmoral information or suffers from certain defects of the weakness of will or fails to appreciate certain reasoning or something like that. In the evaluative conception of moral reasons, on the other hand, an agent’s doing an action is evaluated, without thereby committing that any failure to do the postulated action necessarily indicates the defects just mentioned above. He asks thus: “why should an agent care about what the speaker takes to be reasons for the agent to accept a given rule, if the relevant considerations carry no weight with the agent?”¹⁵ According to Harman, if it is true that different people are subject to different moral considerations, then it is also true that they have reasons to observe different moral requirements. Since moral requirements are varied there cannot be one single true morality applicable to all human agents. Thus it is claimed that the demands of moral relativism in this regard champions over that of moral absolutism.

III

It is undeniable that the relativistic conception of morality gets a new shape in Harman’s thesis. He tries to establish his philosophical position free from the charge of inconsistency often raised against it. It seems to us that whether or not there are some basic moral demands that apply to everyone is a big question not to be dismissed so easily. But, in any case, his internalist thesis of moral relativism draws several objections. For the sake of brevity, we here present only a few of them. In addressing Harman’s initial thesis about the logical form of inner judgments, David Copp raises some issues merit discussion.

First, the division of moral discourse into internalist and non-internalist domain can be put into question. For Harman, inner judgments go with internalism. But Copp maintains that we may often “be inclined to justify an inner judgment on the basis of personal assessments and action assessments.”¹⁶ For instance, we may approach to judge that a person was bad on the ground that what he did was wrong; thus in a way, we may conclude that it was wrong of him to do it. Harman would be committed to reject this pattern of reasoning as they are not internalist in nature. Let us suppose that someone judges that Hitler was evil, because Hitler did A, and people commonly think this act was evil. From this might it not really be judged that it was wrong of Hitler to do A? Harman would answer in the negative. This is so, because if the judgment that it was wrong of Hitler to do A is an inner judgment, then this judgment would be false on the ground that Hitler lacked requisite motivational attitudes. On the other hand, if the judgment was not an inner judgment, Harman would reject the inference and the resulting conclusion that it was wrong of Hitler to do A, because the conclusion would imply, while the premise would not imply that Hitler had relevant attitude. Copp contends that “both options distort the logic of ordinary reasoning about these matters. Since a theory of the logical form of moral judgment is to account for the logic of moral discourse, this is a serious failing.”¹⁷ Harman’s plausible reply might be that, to a relativist the above pattern of reasoning would not seem acceptable. But to this Copp resists that the relativist’s claim is not strong enough to rule out the contending patterns of reasoning as invalid.

Besides on our ordinary understanding of morality, Copp goes on, a person’s lacking an appropriate attitude does not exempt him from the charge of wrong- doing, because it may so happen that he is at fault for lacking the attitude. For this reason Hitler cannot rebut our charge against him that he has done wrong in ordering the genocide. The critic contends that the problem with Harman is not that he does not understand this point, but that “he is committed to denying it by his theory of logical form. As a result instead of addressing the substantive issue mentioned above, Harman obscures it. He would have to say either that our ordinary views on this issue are contradictory (see NM, p. 89), or that our assessment of Hitler, for example, is not an inner judgment”¹⁸, because we are not ready to withhold it on the ground that ‘Hitler was beyond the pale’. If the former reason is upheld then it would undermine

the plausibility of Harman's thesis, because in the language of Copp, "other things being equal, a theory of logical form is flawed if it rules a seriously held substantive moral view to be inconsistent. The latter response would undermine the interest of Harman's theory. In effect, it would make the theory true by stipulation, and it would leave open the possibility that our moral code never issues in inner judgments."¹⁹ Neither response open to Harman would count as satisfactory in the face of the objection that lack of any appropriate motivation cannot be treated as a sufficient defence from a charge of wrongdoing.

In assessing Harman's thesis Prof. B.K. Matilal points out some serious shortcomings. Harman openly admits that people like Hitler or the members of the Murder Inc. can only be called evil, but cannot be judged as wrong-doers in our vocabulary. In fact he considers this view to be partly supportive of the position that psychologically speaking it is more satisfying to call Hitler evil than to state that what he has done is simply wrong. Against this view Matilal objects that "what is psychologically satisfying may not be a good evidence for a correct doctrine. How can we separate the concept of evil from that of wrong-doing?"²⁰ Matilal further argues thus: "Harman uses science fiction (Martians), common fictions (Murder, Inc.) and 'fictionalized' history (Hitler) to individuate group moralities. Our point is not that such groups or persons do not exist in our midst (with the exception of the Martians) but that unless we 'fictionalize' or imagine them to be entirely beyond our pale, i. e. entirely unlike us, the argument loses its substance. These creatures have to share with us only a narrow form of rationality (to make the so-called 'inner moral judgments' possible) but nothing much else. We may decide to call them monsters (Hitler), mentally deranged or impaired persons (Murder, Inc.) or subhuman, but then we have already judged them by our own moral standards."²¹

Besides Matilal observes that Harman's version of relativism shifts our attention from the act to the agent, and for this reason this theory may be said to be agent-centred. But if an alternative explanation of the phenomenon on which Harman's argument depends – the phenomenon of conflict-free conviction of a moral agent in his own framework – can be made plausible, then such relativistic theory can be shown to have little purchase. Harman finds it unfair to morally condemn a person for doing something by using a moral standard to which that person is not committed.

But against this position Matilal draws our attention to the fact of multiplicity of our commitments and also to the fact of multiple group membership. The member of Murder, Inc. is not only a member of that group, but may also be a father, a son or a lover and in such different roles he must have different commitments. So what is the point of bracketing out all other commitments and making him immune to any moral compunction as to whether to kill the bank manager?

In this regard Matilal draws a parallelism with Arjuna, the great warrior, in the celebrated Hindu text the Bhagavad-Gita, who faced deep moral conflict in the eve of the battle of Kuruksetra whether to kill his revered relatives in the battlefield or to accept a more modest life. He was suffering from the relative pressures of several commitments or 'dharma's', for example, as a member of the royal family, as a devoted grandson or as a warrior. Finally he overcame the moral dilemma from which he was suffering in the advice of Lord Krishna, who asked him to accept the ethical code of the Ksatriya caste in this case. The common people as well as the great Arjuna cannot but feel commitments to a number of norms. Now, according to Matilal, "multiplicity of commitments is a well- attested phenomenon, but this cannot be a sufficient ground for any significant form of relativism."²²

IV

It comes to us that Harman's internalist thesis although presents itself as a viable alternative seems not to be well defended so as to bear the challenges raised against it. So if his relativistic position is to attain some significant place in the metaethical discussion, it seems that it must also be supplemented with an adequate explanation of moral norms or principles that people commonly share among them. The diversity of moral views is a familiar phenomenon, and Harman offers his relativistic position as the best explanation of it; but that should not give one proper ground to overlook the similarity which is also present among people. Why certain requirements give moral reasons for action? Why are there certain requirements to which most people are committed? Are there certain common human needs that act behind these reasons? These are some of the important questions that should be properly addressed in any discussion on moral relativism. Apart from the critical notes mentioned above it has to be pointed out that Harman, keeping his relativistic

stand, should have been careful enough in taking into consideration at least some of these issues.

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ATTRIBUTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITY: AN ANALYSIS FROM RĀMĀNUJA'S PERSPECTIVE*

MUNMUN CHAKRABORTY

Philosophers who associate the notion of intentionality with the names of German philosophers Edmund Husserl and his master Franz Brentano are hardly aware about the classical Indian philosopher Rāmānuja whose view genuinely contributes to the thesis of intentionality more than any other existing thinker in the realm of Indian philosophical tradition. Rāmānuja does not aim to develop any systematic thesis on intentionality like Husserl nor he uses any terminology similar to the modern notion of intentionality yet his understanding of the nature of consciousness seems convincing to a scholar like J.N. Mohanty, who strongly advocates for an intentional nature of consciousness following Husserl. It must be mentioned here that while all most all schools including orthodox and heterodox sets have explored and examined the nature of consciousness, each of them contribute distinctly and among which Rāmānuja is exceptional. Hence, Monism though seems very prominent is not the only voice that signifies Vedānta. Since philosophy in India is multifarious. For that reason, it is better not to go for any hasty generalization which often some popular thinkers commit.

However, the question here is: how does Rāmānuja argue for an object-directed nature of consciousness being a Vedāntin? Indeed, it would not be a mistake to call him a non-dualist. Of course, it is known to us that like Śāṅkara, he does not consider reality as unqualified and indescribable rather characterizes it with essential qualities. Needless to say, Rāmānuja's view about the object-directed nature of consciousness is a logical outcome of his notion of 'Qualified Monism'. The present paper would like to bring out this aspect of Rāmānuja's understanding which has affinity with Husserlian phenomenology. It is his critique of unqualified, non-cognizable and eternal notion of consciousness that brings him close to the Husserlian tradition. And quite explicitly he is found to propagate the thesis of intentionality as the intrinsic nature of consciousness. Therefore, in the following pages, the aim is to analyse his view about transient, qualified, self-luminous and cognizable nature of

* This contribution is a subsection in my PhD dissertation for which I am thankful to my supervisor Prof. A. Nataraju.

consciousness that substantiates his claim for object-directed or intentional nature of consciousness.

Rāmānuja is foremost to bring out thorough transformation in the sphere of the Vedāntic tradition by qualifying consciousness with attributes. The philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita as espoused by Rāmānuja in his commentary on triple text yields theism where Brahman is a symbol of adoration and love and not a mere rigid construction of the intellectuals. Reality is considered to be non-dual but is endowed with infinite spirits and matter. Thus, Rāmānuja's philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita goes on to challenge the Absolute Monism of Śaṅkara. By denying the notion of indescribable Brahman he ascribes to Him all positive qualities on the evidence of experience which can never provide us an object without any quality. All our knowledge is qualified, thereby all objects are. An object without qualities is a nonbeing. Even if we try to prove a qualityless object, that very attempt will prove its quality by differentiating the object from others. Likewise, to describe something through negation is also an indirect way to attribute quality to that thing. Hence, the Advaitins' method to describe Brahman through '*netineti*' distinguishes the nature of Brahman from the objects of the world. This, in other way makes the Brahman qualified. Thus, by stressing that Reality is not finite, they characterize it as infinite. By claiming that consciousness is not factual, they denote it as eternal and so on. For, qualities like infinite, eternal, all-pervading etc. can never subsist without any substratum and that is the all-embracing Brahman.

Critique of Unqualified Consciousness

Before considering the notion of consciousness or knowledge as formulated by Rāmānuja it is imperative to state at the very outset that the Rāmānuja's philosophical approach is altogether influenced by his realistic conviction. Rāmānuja, like the Advaitins, does not condemn the ontological or ultimate existence of the object. Instead, he has placed both object and subject on the same order of reality denying any priority of the latter over the former. The epistemological position of Rāmānuja about the nature of consciousness and its relation to the object is influenced by this metaphysical adherence, which will reflect in our subsequent discussion.

All knowledge pertains to some means, but there is no means of knowledge that can find out an attributeless, non-differentiated entity. All the major *pramāṇas*,

says Rāmānuja, are capable of establishing only qualified objects. Scripture, as a valid source of knowledge, consists of sentences and words that represent different meanings to us. And, these meanings denote different qualities of objects. Similarly, perception also provides us with objects of different qualities. Perception, either determinate or indeterminate, manifests an object with its essential features. Though, in case of indeterminate cognition all qualities are not apprehended, yet it is not an unqualified cognition. Again, inference as based on perception of invariable relation between *sadhya* and *hetu* testifies only objects with essential features. Thus, none of the three major *pramāṇas* can apprehend any attributeless entity. Likewise, there is no question of thinking of an unqualified consciousness. Even if the Advaitins are denying attributing any positive quality to consciousness, they cannot abstain from ascribing the negative qualities which differentiate it from other objects. Indeed, Rāmānuja holds that consciousness has the positive qualities of self-luminosity, intentionality, manifesting object and so on. For, if consciousness exists, it must have attributes to prove its being. And, thus he is emphatic to remark on *Brahma Sūtra*, “*Samvit siddhyati vā na vā, siddhyati cet saddharmatā syāt, na cet tuccatā gagana-kusumādivat*”¹ Translation: If pure consciousness is proved to be real, it follows that it has attributes; if it is not, then it is non-existent, like a sky flower².

Dependence of Consciousness

Going against Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja sternly challenges the self-evident nature of consciousness as for him consciousness depends on the object to disclose itself as well as to prove itself. Consciousness is very much like other ordinary things depends on the means of knowledge for its manifestation and is thereby considered to be an object of cognition. When two people are talking about a particular subject the one cannot understand anything unless he is conscious of the fact that the other is talking about. Here, conscious state of the former becomes an object of cognition to the latter; the same occurs in case of inference and other processes of cognition. This

¹ Radhakrishnan, S. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 635

²Ibid., p.635

consequently shows that consciousness is neither always self-luminous nor self-proved¹ rather depends on the cognitive means to manifest as well as to prove itself.

Critique of Eternal Consciousness

The consequence of bringing consciousness down to the level of object is the direct refutation of the eternal and immovable nature of it. Eternalness consists in the persistent being of something which according to Rāmānuja cannot be conferred to consciousness. If consciousness were eternal and unlimited by time, all its objects that are revealed to different persons at different times would also be everlasting, ‘for objects conform to their respective states of consciousness’.² Our ordinary experience makes it certain that an awareness that reveals the existence of ‘pot’ at present moment does not reveal it at all times to everyone. It follows that the revelation of consciousness is limited in time and space.

Furthermore, it cannot be claimed that just because the previous non-existence of consciousness is not established by Advaitins, it is eternal. Since, the non-existence of consciousness is proved by consciousness itself. Just as the way consciousness reveals the object of the past and future existence besides its present existence, consciousness reveals its own previous non-existence that does not require any co-existence of the two. Though, in case of direct perception the co-existence between consciousness and object is required but it is not required in case of other means of knowledge. This absence of consciousness cannot be proved by direct perception nor can it be known by inference. Even the scripture cannot give us any knowledge of its absence. The only valid source says Rāmānuja that proves this non-existence is *anupalabdhi* or non-perception. Explaining his point Rāmānuja writes,

“according to this means of knowledge which is accepted as valid by the Advaitins, if an object capable of being apprehended is not so apprehended when all the conditions necessary for such a cognition are present, it is a proof that it does not exist.”

Thus, *anupalabdhi* which is regarded as a valid means of cognition by Advaita approves the non-existence of consciousness.

Revelation of Consciousness via Revelation of Object

¹ Rāmānuja, (Translated by Swami Viresswarananda and Swami Adidevananda), *Brahman-Sūtras: Śrī-Bhāṣya*, Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, 2012, 1.1.1.

² Ibid., 1.1.1.

It is the upshot of this characterization that Rāmānuja conceives object-directedness as inevitable for consciousness. If the being of consciousness is pervaded by the being of object then it must be correlated with the latter in all cases of its revelation. In other words, consciousness being dependent and related to its object must be conditional or intentional in nature. It follows thereby that regarding the reflexivity of consciousness Rāmānuja's view is unique and contrary to Śāṅkara. Since, according to him, self-luminosity follows solely from the revelation of object that consciousness seeks to embrace. Consciousness therefore even after being qualified by self-luminosity, it is not essential to consciousness rather it is an apparent quality of it. It is not apparent in the sense that it is mere illusory or unreal but it is apparent in the sense that it is not the absolute and fundamental nature. Rāmānuja's contention seems obvious from his remark in *Śrī Bhāṣya*,

“Consciousness is not self-luminous always and to everybody, but it is self-luminous only when it reveals objects and not at other times, and it is so only to a particular knower and not to everyone....”¹

The above quote shows Ramanuja's inclination towards intentionality of consciousness. Reflexivity or self-luminosity thus seems to be a conditional nature of consciousness in the sense that consciousness seems to be luminous only when it is intended towards an object. In fact, it is this object-directed nature of consciousness which is meant by him as the cause of self-luminosity. A reflection of same understanding is found in Prof. Mohanty's argument as he said, ‘consciousness is intentional, that is, directed towards an object (which however need not be an external, real thing in the world)’². Again, writes Husserl,

“Intentionality is what characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense and which, at the same time, justifies designating the whole stream of mental processes as the stream of consciousness and as the unity of one consciousness....Under intentionality we understand the own peculiarity of mental processes ‘to be the consciousness of something.’”³

¹Ibid., 1.1.1

² Mohanty, J.N. *Lectures on Consciousness and Interpretation*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978p.33

³Husserl, E. (Translated by F. Kersten), *Ideas Pertaining to A Pure Phenomenology And To A Phenomenological Philosophy*, , USA: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1983, pp.199-200

It is surprising that even if Rāmānuja has never used the term intentionality while delineating the nature of consciousness, yet his account of consciousness can be counted as a masterly exposition of intentionality. Here, Rāmānuja to make his point more explicit has referred the experience of sleep state. As the state of deep sleep does not support the presence of any object, consciousness as well abstains from being luminous. In fact, in the absence of object, consciousness in deep sleep is also found to be absent. In other words, there is not a single state where consciousness seems to be luminous without any internal or external object. Reflexivity therefore, cannot be regarded as the fundamental nature of consciousness rather it is a partial nature of consciousness correlating it to a particular object and subject. Moreover, Rāmānuja goes on to add that besides the state of deep sleep, there are numerous states of consciousness, which are not reflexive. Otherwise, all objects would have been revealed to all people. Experience shows that my awareness of an object does not reveal the object to other at the same time, nor my own past experience of the object reveal it to me at this moment. If, for instance, I have past experience of a wild cow, I would state that ‘I perceived it before’, instead of saying ‘I perceive it now’. Here, my past conscious state is an object of my present conscious state. Similarly, the conscious state of one person can be an object of consciousness to other. Or else, any meaningful engagement would not be possible. Thus, it is not sound to hold that only an unconscious entity is liable to be an object of consciousness. An object differs from consciousness due to its constitutional variation and not because it is apprehended by the latter. He writes, ‘to be an object of consciousness is not necessarily to be a non-conscious thing’¹. This objective account of consciousness as viewed by Rāmānuja undoubtedly refutes any claim about its inexplicability. It equally challenges any such attempt that delineates consciousness as non-cognizable. Since, according to him, consciousness being an object of immediate knowledge, it cannot be non-cognizable. And if it is strictly non-cognizable, it cannot be immediate too. It is thus absurd to hold that consciousness is immediate yet non-cognizable.

It is to be referred here that the account of intentionality and reflexivity Rāmānuja sought to maintain throughout his epistemological discourse is based on

¹ Rāmānuja, (Translated by Swami Viresswarananda and Swami Adidevananda), *Brahman-Sūtras: Śrī-Bhāṣya*, Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, 2012, 1.1.1.

his understanding of consciousness that is quite distinct, indeed, opposed to the Advaitic interpretation. Consciousness to Rāmānuja is not pure, eternal, self-evident and absolute existence rather like an object it is qualified, fleeting, other-dependent and relative to the object. Consciousness discloses itself by going towards an object and by manifesting at the same time. The only peculiarity that makes it different from an object is its ability to be conscious of other object and oneself.

Absurdity of Pure Consciousness

While proving the impermanency and limitedness of consciousness, Rāmānuja was very much aware about the dichotomy that Advaita has made between phenomenal consciousness and transcendental or pure consciousness. But being a realist, Rāmānuja denies any such gulf between these two; as for him, experience allows us to confront only with experiences which are always delimited by time and related to some object. Experience is never experienced as devoid of any object or what Advaitins term as pure consciousness. Since consciousness is always realised in manifesting an object which in other way ensures its luminosity. Making his intention more clear Rāmānuja affirms in the tone of Husserl,

“So in the absence of objects, consciousness would turn out to be a pure myth or imagination, for consciousness, according to the Advaitins, is not an object of any other act of knowledge and, there being no objects revealing which it can manifest itself also, there will be no proof of its existence as pure consciousness”¹.

In the same way, it would be a mistake to contend that pure consciousness is experienced in the state of dreamless sleep where the ‘I’ and the object are absent. For, after waking up from deep sleep, no one remembers anything except the knowledge that he or she had a sound sleep. Indeed, what persists in deep sleep is the ‘I’ alone and neither the object nor the self-revealing consciousness. As consciousness in order to exist needs to be pervaded by the existence of object which cannot be present logically in dreamless sleep where both the mind and the sense organs stop functioning. Thus, there is not a single state where the Advaitic notion of pure consciousness can be established. All we realize are the different successive

¹ Ibid., 1.1.1.

states of consciousness invariably related to the objects which are non-eternal in nature. This in other way confirms the object-directed nature of consciousness.

Contingency of Consciousness

From the foregoing discussion one could easily make out that Rāmānuja is hostile to admit any such notion of absolute consciousness. To believe that consciousness or awareness does not undergo any modification because it is beginningless seems unconvincing to him. For anything that has existence is bound to endure changes; thus, cannot be claimed to be absolute. The concept of *avidyā* or Nescience, for instance, which is conceived as beginningless by the Advaitins is also subject to modification and has a definite end after the achievement of right knowledge. In the similar way, consciousness which is regarded as beginningless and endless by the Advaitins, suffers changes due to its close proximity with the material body which is different from it. In other words, it is this association with material entity that confirms the contingency of consciousness. More importantly, consciousness being essentially qualified by contraction and expansion is condemned to be contingent; which, consequently, entails that Advaitic notion of pure consciousness is a myth.

Polarity among Self, Consciousness and Object

So far, we have examined Rāmānuja's position, it is clear that he is ardent to maintain a distinction between self and consciousness. It is surprising that Rāmānuja though is not ready to hold any ontological distinction between consciousness and object (of course, he does not admit any identity between the two) he is quite rigorous in keeping an important epistemological and metaphysical distinction between self and consciousness. Indeed, it must be noted that his adherence to the object-directed nature of consciousness to a large extent results from this mysterious distinction he maintains between self and consciousness.

In his view the nature of consciousness is such that it is associated at the same time to both the subject and the object. Since knowledge itself cannot be the proof for its own existence nor it can be known by an unconscious object; it thus needs a witness to be apprehended. The witness to which knowledge reveals itself to be known is the knowing self or *ātman*. Since, there cannot be an experience of pain

or an experience of happiness or an experience of pot without any experiencer or a subject who undergoes all experiences. It is the self who lives through all these experiences. This experience or *anubhūti* is the attribute of the self. For instance, when one states “I know this is a wild cow”, it implies that the subject “I” has knowledge of a wild cow; and not that the subject itself is the knowledge of a wild cow. Again, this knowledge of the wild cow is not similar to the object ‘cow’. Likewise, consciousness being the knowledge differs from both the self and the object. Indeed, consciousness is more like a connecting knot between the knower and the object of knowledge. Expounding this mysterious nature of consciousness, Rāmānuja states in his commentary on *Brahma-sūtra*,

“*Anubhūtitvaṃ nāma vartamānadaśāyāṃ svasattayaiva svāśrayam*

pratiprakāśamānatvaṃ svasattayaiva svaṣayāsādhanatvaṃ vā”¹ Translation: the essential nature of consciousness consists in its manifesting itself at the present moment through its own being to its substrate (self), or in being instrumental in proving its own object by its own being².

Consciousness, thus, in the philosophy of Rāmānuja, plays a dual role of being both the substance and the attribute. It is an attribute of the self though it is not indistinguishable from the self. Self is conscious and not consciousness; self has the power to manifest itself alone but cannot reveal the object. Consciousness, on the other hand, reveals itself as well as the object of it, yet it is unable to know any of them. It is the self who recognises the object and consciousness through its attribute of consciousness. It is to be noted that the distinction Rāmānuja has maintained between self and consciousness is based on his illusive understanding of self-luminosity and self-consciousness. While consciousness is regarded by him to be self-luminous it is not self-conscious; since it has only the power of manifesting itself and other. Whereas, the self is both a self-luminous substance and self-conscious subject; it is self-luminous as it is independent in manifesting itself without the aid of any other knowledge, yet the self is the substratum where consciousness inheres. It is also a subject, as it is simply not manifesting itself like knowledge rather it is the

¹ Rāmānuja, (Translated by Swami Viresswarananda and Swami Adidevananda), *Brahman-Sūtras: Śrī-Bhāṣya*, Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, 2012, 1. 1. 1

² Radhakrishnan, *S.Indian Philosophy*, (with an introduction by J.N.Mohanty), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, Vol. II., 2011, p. 637

knower who cognizes the object. To be precise, self alone, for Rāmānuja, is the cognizing being, the knowing subject who comprehends the object only when the object is revealed by its attribute of consciousness.

The relation between self and consciousness is explained best by Rāmānuja with an illustration of lamp and light. As light being an attribute of flame illuminates the lamp and the objects around it. Similarly, consciousness being an attribute of the self illuminates itself and the objects around it to the self. As light is inseparable from flame, consciousness is inseparable from self. However, the light is also qualified by rays that are subject to contraction and expansion. Just as the way knowledge is qualified by its unique attributes of contraction and expansion. In terms of its relation to the self, consciousness is an attribute of the self, whereas, in terms of its relation to the qualities, like contraction and expansion, consciousness is the substance.

The peculiarity of this relation is that it is the consciousness which is the essence of self since self is intrinsically self-conscious; yet consciousness is called to be an attribute of the self as it is always found to be present in self and depends on it¹. However, consciousness is not to be considered an ordinary attribute of self like the ‘redness’ of pot, rather an essential attribute of the self as it is always akin to the self just as the way ‘brightness’ is akin to sun. Indeed, consciousness is that permanent attribute of the self that belongs to it even in the state of liberation. As Rāmānuja writes, “*Jñānasvarūpasyaiva tasya jñānāshrayatvam maṇidyumaṇipradipādivat*”²

Translation: consciousness (knowledge) is a unique adjunct of the self and is eternally associated with it³. According to Rāmānuja, consciousness as the attribute of the self is known as *dharmabhūtajñāna*; whereas consciousness as the essence of the self is called *svarūpajñāna* or existential consciousness that is the ātman or knower. Certainly, the notion *dharmabhūtajñāna* has immense significance in the philosophy of Rāmānuja as it is this *dharmabhūtajñāna* through which the subject recognizes everything and that in reality upholds the relation between the subject and the object.

¹ Rāmānuja, (Translated by Swami Viresswarananda and Swami Adidevananda), *Brahman-Sūtras: Śrī-Bhāṣya*, Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, 2012, 1.1.1.

² Ibid., p. 61

³ Sharma, C. D. *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1963, p. 344

By way of conclusion, it can be argued that the notion of consciousness as *dharmabhūtajñāna* is pertinent to the understanding of intentionality thesis as found in phenomenology. Going beyond the longstanding idealistic account of knowledge that ultimately rules out any such pragmatic or epistemic interpretation of knowledge, the philosophy of Rāmānuja aims to theorize consciousness to formulate a constructive account of it. Drawing a distinction between self and consciousness, he intends to reduce the so called gulf between consciousness and object. The essence of consciousness is admitted in its association with the object that it manifests before its own manifestation and not in holding any isolation from the object. Consciousness is no longer opposed to the object since the being of the object is the precondition for the revelation of consciousness. In brief, being an advocate of substantialist theory of self, he denies any independent existence of consciousness apart from the self where does it subsist. Thus, the worth of Rāmānuja's account of consciousness as J. N. Mohanty claims is his attempt to circumvent the conflict Advaita is facing between reflexivity and intentionality. He has shown us a more appealing way to endorse the compatibility between self-luminosity and object-directed nature of consciousness. Moreover, Rāmānuja's intention to make intentionality or object-directedness prior to reflexivity shows the close resemblance of his thought with Mohanty and other phenomenologists. It would not be wrong to claim here that Rāmānuja has anticipated all the great phenomenologists including Mohanty of 21st century. The thesis of intentionality was meticulously formulated by Rāmānuja around 12th century which is today associated with the names of Brentano, Husserl and other western phenomenologists.

**ŚŪNYATĀ: A PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION
ON MAHIMĀ DHARMA**

JHADESWAR GHOSH

In the last quarter of nineteenth century and early part of twentieth century a Hindu religious cult prevailing among the hilly regions of central and western Odisha propagate a new wave of humanism in the social and religious life, called *Mahimā Dharma* or Alekha Cult. It was a period of transition from medieval to modern times in the history of India as well as Odisha. The beginning of this movement can be assigned to various factors underlying in the socio-economic and cultural life predominant at that time. The widespread corruptions, malpractices, oppression destabilized the society and further compartmentalized the caste and class ridden society. The coming of the British and their colonial policies brought no immediate relief to the people who suffered at the hands of the native autocratic rulers and chiefs. The myopic policies of the rulers both native and foreign dampen the spirit of freedom and progress of the people. A natural calamity is the greatest hindrance always for the life of Odisha. The people were worst-hit on account of the repeated famines, in accessible roads, non-recognition of the native language, division among the native rules some of whom exploited the men of the soil, some others supported the British rule and, were in conflict among themselves. In this hour of all round confusion, the *Mahimā* Movement was initiated by the illustrious *Mahimā Gosain* with the sole purpose to reviving the restoring truth, non-violence, equality and justice in the society. It is difficult to have a systematic study of the *Mahimā* Movement and *Mahima Dharma* as the founder *Mahimā Gosain* has left no religious scripture of this faith. From 1862 to onwards, he started his journey for the propagation of the new *Mahimā Dharma* among the people, enacted a number of disciples and entrusted them with the task of spreading the message of love, piety, truth and justice among the lowly, deprived and desolate people. He preached in a lucid manner the various concepts of śūnya, mukti, ahimsa etc., which formed the philosophy of *Mahimā Dharma*. *Mahimā Gosain* was the founder of the movement. The early life of *Mahimā Gosain* is still covered in obscurity. History depicts, in 1828 AD a man probably known as Mukunda Das came to Kapilas and initiated practised yoga. Later he came to be known as *Mahimā Gosain*. In 1872 *Mahimā Gosain* started spreading his spiritual and social philosophy in different parts of Odisha. The philosophy of *Mahimā Dharma* has been beautifully and lucidly described by *Santha*

Kabi Bhima Bhoi whose writings are available for the study of this religion. In his innumerable writings he demonstrated the passionate cry of the common people for their birthright i. e., equality, fraternity and social justice in the society. Many thinkers say that the history of Mohimā Movement will be incomplete without *Santha Kabi* Bhima Bhoi. The illustrious Mahimā *sanyāsi* like *Abadhuta* Biswanāth Bābā and Mahindra Bābā have contributed to promote study of this religion. The first official history of Mahimā Dharma was written by Biswanāth Bābā.¹ The household devotees like Nāran Sahu, Arta Ballav Mahanty, Ratnakar Pati, Mayadhar Mansingh, Satrugna Nath, Sarbeswar Das, Chitaranjan Das, A. Eschmann, Nilamani Senapati, Harihar Patel and others have led the spirit of Mahimā Dharma. Bhima Bhoi's poems and *bhajan*s unambiguously symbolize the models of profound schools of thought. As Mahimā Swāmi had not written or composed any of his ideologies concerning the faith of him, it was Bhima Bhoi who carried out the unrealized tasks of his master. He demonstrates a unique synthesis of *jñāna*, *karma* and *bhakti* attaining in the actualization of the absolute thought as *Mahimā* and *Śūnya*. He did not write poetry for the sake of literature. He has written what he felt the sorrow and suffering of the underprivileged people of that period. His conception of *Śūnyavāda* can be found much similarity with the absolutism of *Advaita Vedānta* and the *Śūnyavāda* of *Buddhist* but it is not a specified replica of the two philosophies. His fundamental philosophical prospect is the universal humanistic appeal.

Mahimā Dharma and Bhima Bhoi:

We know about the philosophy and poetry of Bhima Bhoi but it is difficult to have a thoroughgoing account of the life-history of Bhima Bhoi.² We do not know for certain when and where he was born, who his parents were, his early education etc. However, it is clear from his writings that he belonged to the indigenous family known as Kandha. He spent his early life in the village Jatasingha near Subalaya of Subarnapur district, Odisha. The village culture of Odisha which was encouraged in the *Bhagavat Tungis*³ stimulated Bhima Bhoi to open his creative thinking. It was, so to say, the spiritual and cultural atmospheres of the *Bhagavat Tungis* developed the literary acumen and metaphysical insight of Bhima Bhoi. He received no formal education, but he had a magnificent recollective memory and sweet voice. At an early stage of his poetic life he started composing *bhajan*s the first of which is said to be

*vandanā pāda padmaku; dhyāyi guru payaraku.*⁴ In his locality Bhima Bhoi had already gathered popularity as a spiritual singer and composer before his conversion to *Mahimā dharma*. Bhima Bhoi's literary canon is prolific. His important works, comprising *Stuti Chintāmani*, *Bhajana Mālā*, *Brahma Nirupaṇa Gitā*, *Ādi-Anta Gitā*, *Aṣṭaka Bihāri Gitā*, *Cautisā Mālā*, *Nirveda Sādhana*, *Śruti Niṣedha Gitā*, *Manu Sabhā Maṇḍala*, *Padma Kalpa*, *Brahmchālka*, *Purna Samhiṭā*, *Brahma Sanjukta Gitā*, *Navin Bihāri Gitā*, *Ahimsā Dharma Brahma Gitā*, *Kaḷi Yuga Gitā* and others.

The *Mahimā Dharma* was a socio-religious movement. In this movement there is no consideration of caste, creed, colour, occupation, social status, prestige, power, position, wealth etc. In this Dharma, the common human being is the main concern. A man belonging to any category is admitted to the *Mahimā* faith for the purpose of realization and prayer of *Brahma* for a simple and sacred life. With the passage of time the cult also had its influence in the neighbouring states like West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.⁵ Like all other religious reform movement of the time, it emerged as a reactionary movement against orthodox Hinduism. The *Mahimā dharma* had revolted against Hindu idol worship, against the age long caste society predominated by the *Brahmins* and against the surpassing rich people. The sole purpose of the movement is to reestablish the much needed equality, truth and justice in the society. The teachings were simple and apprehensible by the rural people. *Āsramas* and *tungis* were built to accommodate the *sādhus*, and *sanyāsīs*. *Mandiras* such as the *Dhuni Mandira* (fire temple), *Śūnya Mandira* (empty temples) were built. Rules, regulations, *ritis*, *nitīs*, have come into existence with the coming up of these *Mandiras*. All system of Indian Philosophy contains a practical aspect called *sādhana*. Thus the theoretical aspects of philosophy can be applied to everyday life. The *Mahimā* cult also laid sufficient stress on disciplined habits to control the body and the mind. They take no dinner; touch no food which is too salty or too sweet or too bitter. They do *sarana* and *darsana*, pray food only once from a family, stay only a day in a village.⁵ They exercise truth, non-violence and believe in one God and one caste. For Mahimites the religion is not to be advocated but applied. The followers should avoid falsehood, egoism and do practice non-violence, truthfulness, kindness, peace, simplicity, forgiveness and control of six-passion like lust, anger, covetousness, fascination, pride, spite. They should not use luxurious and

expansible bed for comfortable sleep. They should dedicate themselves to *Parambrahma* in body, mind and words. Bhima Bhoi became the spokesman and exponent of the philosophy. The devotional appealing prayer poetries composed by Bhima Bhoi are greatly responsible for the spread of *Mahimā Dharma*. In one *bhajana* he says: [In one *rāga* I composed four songs. I am the helpless Bhima, but my Guru is all-powerful, under his fearless banner I have taken shelter and drink the nectar from his feet. With his grace I see the inner and outer reality with the eyes of knowledge.]⁷ The concepts like *Alekha*, *Mahimā*, *Puruṣa*, *Brahman*, *Śūnya* are the key conceptions of Bhima Bhoi's literature. His metaphysical notion of *Mahimā* is the concept of *Śūnyabrahma* which follows necessarily from his conception of *Alekha Mahimā Brahman*. It is significant to note that the term '*Mahimā*' and '*Brahma*' are synonymously used in the *Mahimā* literature. The ultimate reality is addressed as *Mahimā*. *Alekha* is significant of the nature of *Mahimā*. *Alekha* literally means something which does not have a fixed contour or determinate form. *Mahimā* and *Alekha* are the denotative and connotative aspects of one and the same reality.⁸ The holy phrase '*Mahimā Alekha*' which is accorded as the status of mantra in the system contains the essence of the system.

The Concept of *Śūnya* and *Mahimā Dharma*:

The etymological significance of the word *śūnya* denotes its preferred translation is "void". But neither the orthodox tradition (*āstika*) nor the heterodox (*nāstika*) tradition use the term with such negative implications. Thus, the term *śūnya* is not entirely negative in its implication. The term *śūnya* is variously interpreted. To some it means nothingness, to others a permanent principle, transcendent and indefinable, immanent in all things. *Śūnyatā* is an important Buddhist teaching which claims that nothing possesses essential nature or *svabhāva*, enduring identity because everything is interconnected in a chain of co-becoming and in a state of constant flux. All things being impermanent, nothing can be seen as having an independent, lasting form of existence. All phenomena come into being because of conditions created by other phenomena. The Mahāyāna tradition has put a special emphasis on *śūnyatā*. The way Nāgārjuna uses the term *śūnyatā*; it should stand neither for void nor for absolute negation. When Nāgārjuna argues that things are empty of *svabhāva* it is not this notion of essence he is concerned with. The philosophically more important

understanding of *svabhāva* is an understanding in terms of substance. Śaṅkarācārya, in his commentary analyses this term as ‘*savisesa rahita tvat śūnyata*’ (it is without determination, hence like *śūnya*).⁹ It is interesting to note that Sankara’s theory of *Brahman*, which comes closest to Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of *śūnya*. *Śūnya*, as per Nāgārjuna’s theory, stand for ultimate Reality (*tattva*). While defining *tattva* he ascribes to it certain characteristics, which do not allow us to be convinced that the word *śūnya* means total annihilation, as interpreted by Śaṅkara. According to Nāgārjuna, *śūnya* is a principle about which neither existence nor nonexistence, nor a combination of both, nor the negation of both, can be predicated. In other words it is an indeterminate, ineffable and non-describable principle. Śaṅkara too interprets *Brahman* as indescribable (*avyakta*) and *nirguna* (transcending determination through ascription of qualities) and *nivikalpa* (beyond concepts).

In Bhima Bhoi’s conception *śūnya* does not mean mere void. It is the ultimate reality. It is the ultimate end and beginning of everything. The ultimate being infinite cannot be known by the finite intellect. According to Bhima Bhoi, the *śūnya* owes its origin to the potency of the nameless entity, i.e., *alekha* or *anāma*. In *Mahimā* philosophy *Mahimā Gosain* is accepted as the incarnation of *śūnya* or *alekha*. When there was nothing there was only *śūnya*. *Śūnya Brahman* is the same as *Purna Brahman*. It is beyond all kinds of descriptions. But it is the source of all existence. *Śūnya* also has an ontological sense in *Mahimā* metaphysics. Bhima Bhoi, the devotee bears on his entire poetic creativeness to describe the guru or *avatāra*. The guru is unique and the divine glory is beyond description. It is said that, *Mahimā Dharma* always went against image worship. More or less the religious and philosophical tents of *Advaita Vedānta*, *Buddhism* and *Jainism* were travelled into the cult which gained popularity among the depressed section of the society. The Buddhist believes that in the ultimate there is nothing, but to the *Alekhist*, there is only one after all the appearances disappear. That again has no appearance. Like *Advaita Vedānta*, the Mahimaites believe in Monism, but it does not accept *Māyā* as the cause of creation. It is taken up more with the injury and suffering of the people. The ultimate reality, *Mahimā* being philanthropic and kind to the followers knows the limitation of the finite being. The most remarkable contribution which brought Bhima

Bhoi the national and international recognition is expressed in the words: “Let my life suffer eternally in the hell, but let the entire world be salvaged”.¹⁰

The primary aim which stands out in and through the writings of the philosopher-poet Bhima Bhoi is his utter concern and empathy for the fellow men and passionate eagerness to help them come out of the state of decadence and suffering. According to Bhima Bhoi, the empirical knowledge and the practice of rites and rituals are not the path of salvation. *jñāna*, *karma* and *bhakti* known as the golden path to the realization of the Brahman (*śūnya*). Salvation for him meant a life of perfection. He did not seek for a *vedāntic mukti* of losing one’s identity. Bhima Bhoi encourages his followers to follow the tents of *yama* and *niyama*. One must abandon *kāma* and *moha* as it images the very purpose of *sādhana*. Here to say that Bhima Bhoi’s humanism surpasses man does not imply that it is transcendental – rather it means removal of ignorance and search for the innate divinity. Bhima Bhoi’s verses resound with this oneness and uniqueness of *Alekha*:

He is neither the teacher nor the disciple; no master nor slave has He,

Neither a Brahman, nor an infidel, He is the greatest of all.

He belongs to no tribe, casteless, He is the most blameless,

The two rule the world as one mind and one soul.¹¹

Humano-centric Versus God-centric

The concepts like *Alekha*, *Mahimā*, *Puruṣa*, *Brahman*, *Śūnya* are the key conceptions of Bhima Bhoi’s literature. In this movement the common human being is the main concern. Like all other religious reform movement of the time, it emerged as a reactionary movement against orthodox Hinduism. It is said that, *Mahimā Dharma* always went against image worship. Unlike other religions, it is not so much God-centric but humano-centric. The devotional appealing prayer poetries composed by Bhima Bhoi are greatly responsible for the spread of *Mahimā Dharma*. In his philosophy we find that the theology of the God is substituted by the new theology of the God *Alekha* (*śūnya*), the formless one descends in human form to help the impermeable declining human society to move the path of dharma. The *śūnya* owes its origin to the potency of the nameless entity, i.e., *alekha* or *anāma*. It admits that the world is a real creation of Him, through Him (*Mahimā*). In *Mahimā* philosophy *Mahimā Gosain* is accepted as the incarnation of *śūnya* or *alekha*. When there was

nothing there was only *śūnya*. *Śūnya Brahman* is the same as *Purna Brahman*. The Buddhist believes that in the ultimate there is nothing, but to the *Alekhist*, there is only one after all the appearances disappear. Like *Advaita Vedānta*, the Mahimaites believe in Monism, but it does not accept *Māyā* as the cause of creation. The empirical knowledge and the practice of rites and rituals are not the path of salvation. Salvation means a life of perfection, *jñāna*, *karma* and *bhakti* known as the golden path to the realization of the Brahman (*śūnya*). Loving and serving to all living and non-living is the character of a liberated soul and the path to liberation as well. Humanism means that it is not transcendental - rather it means removal of ignorance and search for the innate divinity.

Notes and References:

1. The present paper is a part of lecture that I gave at the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Kolkata in a Refresher Course on 'Contemporary Indian Philosophy'. I thank everybody who participated in the discussion.
2. See Priyadarshi Bahinipati, *The Mahima Dharma: Interpreting History, Trends and Tradition*, Gyanajuga Publication, Bhubaneswar, 2009, p. 45.
3. See S. C. Panigrahi, *Bhima Bhoi and Mahimā Darsana*, Santosh Publication, Cuttack and the collaboration with P. G. Department of Philosophy, Utkal University, 1998.
4. The *Odiya Bhagavata* of the saint-poet Jagannath Dash which was read recited and discussed by the villagers every evening in the *Tungis* in a peaceful atmosphere was a great source of inspiration for Bhima Bhoi.
5. See S. C. Panigrahi, *Bhima Bhoi and Mahima Darsana*, Santosh Publication, Cuttack and the collaboration with P. G. Department of Philosophy, Utkal University, 1998.
6. See Priyadarshi Bahinipati, *The Mahima Dharma: Its Peregrination in the Twentieth Century*, *Search*, DDCE, Utkal University, Vol. 1, January, 2013.
7. See Bhagirathi Nepak, *Mahimā Dharma, Bhima Bhoi and Biswanathbaba*, *Orissa Review*, pp. 25-30, May-2005.
8. Trns. Sitakanta Mohapatra – "Saint – poet Bhima Bhoi an Assessment," in *Santh Kavi Bhima Bhoi – All Orissa Adivasi Cultural Association*, 1996, p. 2 (English section) and I have closely follow the exposition of Professor S. C. Panigrahi's "*Bhima Bhoi and Mahimā Darsana*".
9. See Professor S. C. Panigrahi's "*Bhima Bhoi and Mahimā Darsana*".
10. See S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (1923) Vol. I, Oxford University Press.

11. Bhima Bhoi, *Stutichintāmaṇi*, *Prāninka ārata dukha apramita dekhu dekhu keva sahu, mojobana pachhe narke padithau, jagata uddhāra heu.*
12. Bhima Bhoi, *Stutichintāmaṇi*, *'nuhanti se guru nuhanti se siṣya, nahin sāanta sevaka nuhanti brāhmaṇa nuhanti chāndāḷa nuhanti se bada loka nāhin tānka jāti nāhin tānka gotra na thai bachha bebhara beni jana eka ātmā mana hoi karuachhanti sansāra'*

EQUALITY VS. VALUE: SOME OBSERVATIONS

KASTURI DATTA (MAJUMDAR)

Nowadays Philosophy does not merely deal with theories. It opens up new arena to discuss different social problems from ethical perspective. 'Gender discrimination' is one of such issues. The discussion on "Gender and Equality" would be relevant if and only if there is still inequality among men and women in the society. Apparently it seems that women have achieved an equal status with men in contemporary society. Modern Indian women have gradually emerged from the shadows and are trying to secure their own position in the society. But the majority of Indian families are governed with patriarchal norms. As a result the discriminatory attitudes of Indian husbands to their working wives multiply the workload (both household and professional work) of women. These men do not stand in the way of their wives' career, since they are exposed to 'liberal' ideas through education, media, western values; but their upbringing in 'conventional' values affect their attitudes towards their working spouse. Conventionally male gender traits are rationality, abstract thinking, neutrality, objectivity and so on. The binary opposite of these male gender attributes are attributed to women. Women are expected to be guided by their emotions, (not by reason), they are supposed to be committed, (not neutral), their approach to problems is subjective, (not objective). Here it is to be mentioned that "gender" is a cultural category; it is the mark of behaviour of women and men imposed differently to them by different culture for smooth functioning of the society. Apparently it sounds beneficial, but problems arise in the discriminatory attitude of the society towards the 'gender differences'. Thus 'gender' does not end with behavioural 'differences', it also introduces 'discrimination' which devalues women. Gender is taken both as a descriptive category and as a normative category. When gender is understood exclusively as a normative category then the contention is that both men and women should learn to acquire certain gender norms. When gender is seen both as a descriptive category and a normative category the implication is that since men and women do behave in such and such a manner in real life (descriptive account) they ought to behave in such and such a manner (normative account).

'Value' is a concept of ethics; values determine what is right and wrong and doing what is right or wrong is what we mean by "ethics". As a student of Philosophy

I would like to discuss the problem of gender-discrimination from ethical standpoint. My purpose is to show how role division between women and men hinders our moral standard which is reflected in our moral values.

The role of men and women follow from the descriptive aspect. According to this role- model women are best suited for household work since their 'nature' makes them fittest for such work, whereas men should go out to earn a living where assertiveness is required. Therefore if men act as bread-winners and women perform their own prescribed roles properly, they can secure their rights and dignity. Now a question raises- how the 'role division' of men and women results in discrimination? If we look back to history, it is found that in the ancient period there was no division of work for men and women. History tells us that in pre-agricultural period women took part in expeditions. The Ṛgveda states that women in the Vedic Age (the period between Ṛgveda and Vedāngasutras) fought in the battle field; for example, Mudgalini won a battle (RVX;102:2). Again Vadhrimati and Sasiyasi, (two women) were known for their 'heroism'. Ṛgvedic women enjoyed economic independence also to a certain extent. The early vedic family was the patriarchal type, although women had some control over the entire household. Patriarchy never denied women their rights and privileges. From 4th century B.C. to 3rd century B.C. girls were given education. In this society the practice of child marriage did not exist. So if women wanted to pursue knowledge without getting married, they were allowed to do so without any constraints. Ṛgveda (our first literature, between 1200 and 1000B.C.) knows many women poets, namely, Lopāmudrā, Ghoṣā, Apālā. After the Aryans began to take non-Aryan wives, women rights to initiation and to study the sacred texts were withdrawn. Women were also deprived from the right to their own bodies. They became the property of their husbands and were bound to serve them at the cost of food, clothes and shelter. Actually a change occurred in the socio-economic and political life of Vedic people. Instead of remaining as nomadic people, they began their agricultural life. Consequently men liked to handover the property which they acquired from agriculture to their legitimate heirs. Due to this, wives were forbidden to meet other unrelated males, to ensure that a wife could not cohabit with any male other than her husband. In this way they were imprisoned within the house and completely dependent on their husbands for their livelihood. Slowly and steadily

household chores became the primary duty of women, but their labour was not considered as 'productive' in the economic sense, rather it was taken as reproductive and supportive.ⁱ Therefore also in ancient times, the work which had no direct economic contribution to the family was not valued as 'work' at all, although it was essential for man's survival.

The division of roles between men and women persists in the society also in the present time, though in a modified way. Nowadays women have entered the job market due to financial needs or because of awareness of the need for independence, still household work is taken as the primary duty of women. Most working women feel guilty for not giving full-time labour for the household chores. Moreover, they are expected to be homemakers along with those women who confined themselves exclusively to home-making activities.ⁱⁱ Hence, the apparent change in the scenario does not imply conceptual change. But, no work can be labelled as universally feminine or masculine task; for example, in North-Eastern hill areas 'weaving' is considered to be a feminine work whereas in the lower parts of Himachal Pradesh the same work is done mainly by men. Similarly, the 'embroidery work' which is generally performed by women, is a male activity in Kashmir.ⁱⁱⁱ On the other hand, 'cooking' is taken as a feminine task in almost all parts of the country; but when it acquires the status of paid labour outside the house, then men willingly opt for this job; for instance, all the chefs/cooks in almost all hotels and restaurants in every part of the country are men. Although no strict division can be maintained between masculine and feminine work, still household work is taken as 'essentially' feminine work, since female gender attributes (such as caring, subjectivity, emotionality etc.) are considered as favourable for child rearing, taking care of the family members and the like. From their childhood girls and boys are trained differently in regard to the work pattern, attitude etc. by the parents and teachers. In few families boys are asked to share domestic work such as, cooking, washing etc. Women also internalise society's norm and prejudices. Even in the present time household work is devalued in the society. If the work-schedule of a working woman is less than her husband then it seems that she has less work-pressure, no matter how much she is loaded by the household chores. Thus the 'equal' participation of women in the paid jobs does not confirm equality. A working woman has to face gender specific hurdles in doing

work equal to men. It can generally be said on the basis of a survey in India that 90% of the men folk never lend their hands in routine cooking and less than 1% men wash utensils.^{iv} Today's working women are over-loaded by their dual roles. Most of them wake up early in the morning, prepare children for their school, cook themselves or arrange everything for the cook, prepare themselves for the office, rushed to office; returning home guide their children in their studies and prepare dinner. In this whole-day work few men share the work load, although women equally share the financial burden of the family with men. Moreover our conventional 'values' teach us that a working woman cannot be a good mother, since she cannot fulfil her role as a 'mother' properly. Thus some women feel guilty for not caring their children accurately. Here it can be mentioned that, some leading social scientists opine that the children of working mothers are more independent, outgoing and perform better than those whose mothers are not working.^v

Legal rights in favour of women workers instead of giving benefit hamper the scope of their recruitment, not directly, but in an indirect way. It has been stated in article 42, of the Constitution that "The State shall make provisions for serving just and humane conditions of work and for maternity benefit"^{vi} and article 15(3) states: "Nothing in this Article shall prevent the state from making any special provision for women and children."^{vii} Again, three important clauses of Maternity Benefit Act (1961) are - (1) A pregnant woman worker has a right to get 12 weeks (6 weeks before delivery and 6 weeks after delivery) maternity leave; (2) Management must have the provision of crèche for the children of working mothers if the number of working women is 50 or more than that; (3) It is compulsory for management to build separate lavatory and rest room for women workers.^{viii}

Apparently it seems that these laws ensure due benefit to women workers. On the contrary women are deprived of getting jobs in industrial work due to these laws. Industrialists always try to make more profit from production, but if they have to spend more for the welfare of the labourers then the percentage of profit would decline. Now, if the number of female labourers be equal to male labourers then in order to secure the legal rights of women, employers have to spend more. Consequently it would affect the level of profit. Therefore to maintain the level of profit they give lower wage to women or expel them after marriage. Hence, only legal

rights cannot protect the interest of women workers. The root of the problem lies in the social values which ascribe different roles to men and women. According to this role-model, 'caring' is an essential feminine (gender) virtue which prescribes all the 'work' which are related to 'caring', such as, household activities etc. as essential for women. . It has been observed that women's withdrawal from the labour force is perceived as a means to improve family status. To satisfy the prescribed role, women lag behind men in the sphere of paid jobs and to cope with their dual roles they have to suffer a lot.

We have to find out whether culture or society influences our psychological development which in turn generates gender development or whether biology has a significant role in gender construction. Sigmund Freud admits the influence of super-ego as a psychological agency which is constituted by societal, cultural and traditional factors. These factors play a vital role in the context of oedipal resolution of individuals, though Freud did not directly state this fact. The 'way' of (oedipal) resolution has a great significance in producing behavioural/gender characteristics. In Freud's own words: "The super-ego owes its special position in the ego, or in relation to the ego, to a factor which must be considered from two sides: on the one hand it was the first identification, one which took place while the ego was still feeble, and on the other hand it is the heir to the Oedipus complex and has thus introduced the most momentous objects in the ego. The super-ego's relation to the later alterations of the ego is roughly similar to that of the primary sexual phase of childhood to the later sexual life after puberty. Although it is accessible to all the later influences, it nevertheless preserves throughout life the character given to it by its derivation from the father complex - namely, the capacity to stand apart from the ego and to master it... As the child was once under a compulsion to obey its parents, so that ego submits to the categorical imperative of its super-ego."^{ix} It seems from the Freudian view that there is a portion in psychological apparatus which does not necessarily follow from biological characteristics, rather external factors play vital role in forming this region which is named by Freud as super-ego. Sara Heinamaa, a contemporary feminist gives a radical view to refute the biological explanation of gender construction in her article "Women-Nature, Product, Style?-Rethinking the Foundation of Feminist Philosophy of Science". Contemporary medical theories consider chromosomes, sex

glands and hormones as the determinant factors of 'Sex'. Contemporary theories hold that, human body is a product of interaction between bio-mechanism and socio-environmental factors in which it usually participates. Therefore, 'gender' does not necessarily follow from 'biological constitution' and it can differ from society to society and from culture to culture since external factors play vital role in constituting gender attributes.

'Sex-gender' relation is the basis of all human relations. The position of men and women in a society reflects the perspective of that society regarding gender issues. Conventional treatment towards role division of men and women generates many problems in every aspect of life which in turn hampers their relationship. Discrimination is not a positive sign of a society, so there must be some loop-holes in the traditional conception. Therefore to approach the moral standard of life, i.e. 'equality', we have to exercise our conventional values with different perspective. To maintain a healthy relation, men and women should have mutual dependence on one another or they should complement each other (as they possess no 'fixed' gender attributes, but 'flexible' gender characteristics). This approach towards life may change the discriminative attitude which may assure 'equality'.

FOOTNOTES:

- I. Sukumari Bhattacharji, *Women And Society In Ancient India*, Basumati Corp. Ltd., Calcutta, January, 1994, p.2
- II. P.S Joshi, *Cultural History Of Ancient India*, New Delhi: S.Chand, 1978; p.7
- III. MSI:10,11;III:6:3;IV:6:4;X:10:11
- IV. Sukumari Bhattacharji, *Women and Society in Ancient India*, Basumati Corporation Ltd., January, 1994; p.10-11
- V. Towards Equality: Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India, Govt. of India, Dept. of Social Welfare, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, December, 1974; p.84
- VI. Ibid
- VII. Kalyani Bandyopadhyay, *NareeShrenee O Varna*(Bangla), (A book on the socio economic status of low class-caste Women in India) Mynascript India, Howrah, January, 2000; p.169
- VIII. 'The Statesman', 2nd December, 2000
- IX. Kalyani Bandyopadhyay, *NareeShrenee O Varna*(Bangla), (A book on the socio economic status of low class-caste Women in India) Mynascript India, Howrah, January, 2000; p.73
- X. *Ibid*
- XI. *Ibid*, p.74
- XII. Sigmund Freud, "Ego and The Id and Other Works", S.E. Vol.XIX(1923-25); p.48
- XIII. Lynn Hankinson Nelson & Jack Nelson(eds), *Feminism Science and the Philosophy of Science, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science*; Vol.256, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London. 1996

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SATYĀGRAHA AND ITS PRACTICAL RELEVANCE

BHUPENDRA CHANDRA DAS

The concept of *Satyāgraha* has been stated in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata, the Gitā etc. Even before Gandhi, it was also practiced by Indians and Western thinkers. Some Western thinkers believe that the word *Satyāgraha* is derived from New Testament. According to some others, Gandhi took this concept from the writings of Tolstoy. But actually Gandhi got this idea of *Satyāgraha* neither from Christ nor from Tolstoy, but from the Vaiṣṇavism.

The word '*Satyāgraha*' is originally derived from Sanskrit word. It is a compound word. It is formed of *satya* which means truth and *āgraha* which means clinging, insistence and adherence. That is to say, *Satyāgraha* means clinging to truth, adherence to truth. Gandhi defines the term '*Satyāgraha*' in the following way: "Truth implies love and firmness (*āgraha*) engenders therefore serves as a synonym for force. I thus began to call the Indian movement of *Satyāgraha*, i.e., the force which is born of truth and love or non-violence and gave up the phrase passive resistance in connection with it."¹

According to Gandhi, *Satyāgraha* is 'firmness in a good cause'.² He asserted in *Young India* that *Satyāgraha* was a new name for "the law of self-suffering"³. *Satyāgraha* implies a ceaseless and relentless pursuit of truth in which there is no place of hatred, ill-will. It does not mean passivity, weakness, helplessness. It is a way of life or an attitude of mind which depends on the firm desire for maintaining right causes, correcting wrongs. *Satyāgraha* indicates the power of human soul and it is the maintenance of the glory of the human conscience. This conscience ensures the non-violent battle for the victory of truth.⁴

Satyāgraha is the way for the practice of *ahimsā*. It is the technique of *ahimsa* to which he gives the name of *Satyāgraha*, which is translated in English as Truth-force sometimes as Soul-force or Love-force. According to Gandhi, truth is God, and *Satyāgraha* is 'Āgraha' of 'Satya' and thus it means holding fast to truth. It, therefore, demands a deep sincerity and a vigorous love for truth. Therefore it is God's way or it is the way of Truth. It follows that *Satyāgraha* is essentially based on love. *Satyāgraha* seems to have religious pursuit, according to Gandhi. There is one God behind everything and being, and so the same God resides in every one of us. This is

the fundamental thing of love and if one has no basic love for human being, it is not possible for him to practice the technique of *Satyāgraha* or the technique of *ahimsā*.

According to Gandhi, a belief in rebirth is another religious presupposition of *Satyāgraha*. *Satyāgraha* claims selfless and sincere pursuit of truth without having any consideration of any gain or fruit. But one will be able to suffer the technique of *Satyāgraha* if he somehow believes that he will get the results of his good work, if not in this life, in subsequent life. In '*Speeches and Writings*' he says, "With the knowledge that the soul survives the body, he (*Satyāgrahi*) is not impatient to see the triumph of truth in the present body".⁵ Gandhi points out that if we start resisting evil with evil, violence with violence, anger with anger, then we are only adding fuel to fire. The most effective force against these evils can be the one which would force them to evaporate and *Satyāgraha* can be the only way.

Satyāgraha creates conditions for the anger of the opponent to spend itself out. So it is very much effective for evaporating evils. It provides the opponent a chance to see and realize his mistake and to correct his ways accordingly. It depends on the firm belief that there is an element of essential goodness in every man because man contains divinity within himself. We find evils because this element is pushed to the background or it is clouded by passion, hatred and anger. Therefore we have to awaken this aspect of man. When this element of goodness is aroused, the individual himself will realize the wrong that he had been performing. *Satyāgraha* has been described as a method of conversion rather than a method of coercion. Coercion implies violence. The aim of *Satyāgraha* is not to embarrass the wrong-doer. *Satyāgraha* does not appeal to fear or threats. It appeals to the heart and to the good sense of the wrong-doer. Its intention is to bring about a change of heart. Another presupposition of *Satyāgraha* is that there are no 'enemies' or 'opponents', but there are only wrong-doers. A wrong-doer will also develop some kind of a resistance if he is physically forced to be otherwise, but if he is made to see and realize the wrong, he will himself repent and change.

So the essence of *Satyāgraha* is love. We must have love for the opponent also. The success of *Satyāgraha* is not possible if there is hatred or distrust of any kind. We should have a trust in the goodness of the opponent. We should love him thinking really that he is also one of us. We must also respect the opponent. According to the doctrine of *Satyāgraha* we should persuade the wrong-doer to give

up his wrong and this can be done very effectively when we approach him with respect and love. A wrong-doer cannot find his wrong at once; he will take time to win over his anger and hatred. The *Satyāgrahi* must wait patiently for the good sense of the wrong-doer to be aroused or realization of his fault.

According to some, *Satyāgraha* means passive resistance, but actually it does not mean this because there are difference between *Satyāgraha* and Passive Resistance. These are as follows: (1) *Satyāgraha* is not a passive state, but it is more active than violence. (2) There is an element of force or violence in case of passive resistance. In it, there remains the scope for the use of arms on particular occasions. In *Satyāgraha*, violence is completely not allowed even in the case of very adverse situation. (3) In Passive Resistance, there is always present an idea of harassing the other party. But in *Satyāgraha*, there is no idea of injuring the opponent.⁶ (4) In Passive Resistance laws are disobeyed and this implies that passive resistance does not have respect for law. But in *Satyāgraha*, there is a very great respect for the higher law, i.e. the law of Truth and God. Any process of *Satyāgraha* is governed by this type of respect. (5) There is no scope for love in passive resistance. In *Satyāgraha*, there is no scope for hatred. A feeling of love is the basis of *Satyāgraha*. (6) There is an element of coercion in passive resistance because it tends to compel the other party to do a thing. The *Satyāgrahi* prays to the mind and heart of men with the only aim of bringing about a transformation. To liquidate antagonism, not the antagonist is the fundamental thing of *Satyāgraha*. In this way, *Satyāgraha* depends on the conviction that through love, *ahimsā* and conscious suffering, the forces of evil can be neutralized, for this is the Divine way, the way of Truth, the way of God. So it is universal.

According to Gandhi, a *Satyāgrahi* must have some qualities, which are as follows: A *Satyāgrahi* must be honest, sincere, open-minded, loving, firm, fearless, selfless, simple, truthful, non-violent and punctual. Humanity is one of the chief virtues of a *Satyāgrahi*. A *Satyāgrahi* should do the practice of fasting. He should follow some of the essential virtues of life, such as, *asteya* (non-stealing), *aparigraha* (contentment), *brahmacarya* (celibacy) etc. He must also have a living faith in God and it is a most fundamental requirement of *Satyāgrahi*. There are different kinds of *Satyāgraha*. Some of the main kinds of *Satyāgraha* which have been followed by Gandhi or his followers (even sometimes by the Marxists) have been mentioned

below: (i) Negotiation (ii) Arbitration (iii) Agitation (iv) Economic Boycott (v) Non-cooperation (vi) Civil Disobedience (vii) Direct Action (viii) Fasting. Some other popular measures have been added to this list in due course: (ix) Strike (x) Picketing (xi) *Dharnā* (xii) Non-payment of Taxes etc.

All these methods would fail if the intention is not pure and if these are not applied with a spirit of love. The example of non-payment of taxes may produce quickest possible result or the possibility of a ready response which is a fatal temptation. This non-payment will not be non-violence but it will be criminal and fraught with the most possibility of violence. In like manner, the present form of *Dharnā* is condemned and rejected by him. In the cases like non-payment of taxes and '*Dharnā*', *Satyāgraha*, according to Gandhi, becomes *Durāgraha*. The ethical and religious requirements of *Satyāgraha* are very strict and rigorous and any deviation would distort the whole process. It should be based on sincerity of purpose and on an essential love for the opponent.

Gandhi's favorite forms of *Satyāgraha* are perhaps Disobedience, Non-cooperation, Direct Action and Fasting. Disobedience is regarded as a protest against unjust laws. Non-cooperation is actually a cleansing process. It affects the *Satyāgrahi* more than the opponent and is able to give the *Satyāgrahi* a power to face evil and to endure suffering. Non-cooperation is a kind of refusal on the part of the exploited to be exploited. The exploited is also to be blamed for being exploited because he has allowed himself to be exploited. It is refusal of the exploited to lie down under the forces of exploitation. The example of this kind of *Satyāgraha* is '*Swadeshi*'. Direct Action is an open and mass rebellion, but essentially non-violent. The example of this type of *Satyāgraha* was the Quit India call given in 1942. To Gandhi, fasting is the most effective form of *Satyāgraha* because its objective is self-purification and it can mend even the excessively firmness of the opponent with the help of honestly choosing the path of death. But this should be considered as last weapon of the *Satyāgrahi*. This weapon should be used at the last moment, only when other means have failed to pursue the other party. Fasting forces the opponent to see reason and concentrates the energy of the soul of the *Satyāgrahi*. In this context, Gandhi, in his *Young India*, says, "It is my firm belief that the strength of the soul grows in proportion as you subdue the flesh."⁷ and "My religion teaches me that whenever there is distress which one cannot remove, one must fast and pray."⁸

According to Gandhi, *Satyāgraha* is a non-violent method of action and consists in being non-violent towards other people and in undergoing suffering oneself, for the purpose of opposing or remedying injustice. Here the question is, is *Satyāgraha* as so understood, actually a non-violent method of action? In response to this question, it can be stated that when, as a part of *Satyāgraha*, I undergo suffering myself, then I injure myself. I injure me by myself, as when I go on fast, or I injure myself by allowing others to injure me, by allowing others as if to act in my place or on my behalf to injure me; in this latter case I injure myself by proxy, so to say. I injure myself by proxy when, for example, let my adversary assault or even kill me. As a result, I would like to maintain that when, as a part of *Satyāgraha*, I undergo suffering myself, and then I perform a violent action in relation to myself. So Gandhi's definition of non-violence should be as follows: Non-violence, in the negative sense, consists in non-injury to others as well as to one's own self. Non-violence, in the positive sense consists in love or charity towards others and towards one's own self.⁹

In fact, so far Gandhian theory is concerned, *Satyāgraha* is a scientific method. The capability and utility of *Satyāgraha* are found not only in getting political freedom but against social injustice, exploitation, social evils and oppression. It should be noted that *Satyāgraha* is not a weapon of the weak but it is a weapon of the strong and it claims for a disciplined civilized society and culture for the human being all over the world. Social, economic, political and religious problems can be solved with the help of *Satyāgraha* which is the most powerful and permanent weapon. It is applicable even today against any perpetrated evil in the society.

Notes and References:

1. M. K. Gandhi, *Satyāgraha in South Africa*, 1st Edition, S. Ganesan, Madras, 1928, p. 173.
2. *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. XVIII, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi, 1965, pp. 22-23.
3. *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. XVIII, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi, 1965, p. 133.
4. V. P. Varma, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi and Sarvodaya*, Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 5th Edition, 1980-1981, p. 162.
5. M. K. Gandhi, *Speeches and Writings*, Madras, 1934, p. 504.
6. N. K. Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 221.
7. *Young India*, 23.10.24.
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DOES MORALITY DEPEND UPON RELIGION?

LAXMIKANTA PADHI

I

The expression “philosophy of religion” did not come into general use until the nineteenth century, when it was employed to refer to the articulation and criticism of humanity's religious consciousness and its cultural expressions in thought, language, feeling, and practice. Historically, philosophical reflection on religious themes had two objectives: first, God or *Brahman* or *Nirvāṇa* or whatever else the *object* of religious thought, attitudes, feelings, and practice was believed to be, and, second, the human religious *subject*, that is, the thoughts, attitudes, feelings, and practices themselves. Philosophical analysis of religion is often not welcomed with open arms by systematic theologians in theology. This suggests that the God of philosophers has little or nothing to do with the God of Abraham, Isaac or Shankara and Ramanuja. Theologians say that philosophers are applying their analytic tools to an idol, an exaltation of their construction. Conversely, they hold living God simply not to be susceptible to analytic scrutiny. The mystery of God, as worshipped and adored in the community of faith, is beyond the capacity of human and philosophical mind to analyse which is considered as a tension noted between the philosophers and the theologians.

Philosophy of religion is the philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions. It involves all the main areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, and philosophy of language, philosophy of science, law, sociology, politics, history, and so on. The importance of philosophy of religion is chiefly due to its subject matter: alternative beliefs about God, *Brahman*, and the sacred, the varieties of religious experience, the interplay between science and religion, the challenge of non-religious philosophies, the nature and scope of good and evil, rebirth, *Karma-phala*, death. At the beginning of the 21st century, philosophy of religion can enhance cross-cultural dialogue. Philosophers of religion now often seek out common as well as distinguishing features of religious belief

and practice. This study can enhance communication between traditions, and between religions and secular institutions.

Ethics is a normative discipline of human conduct, whose main goals are prescriptive and evaluative rather than descriptive and explanatory. Social scientists offer descriptive and explanatory accounts of standards of conduct; ethicists criticize and evaluate those standards. In thinking about standards of conduct, it will be useful to distinguish between *ethics* and *morality*. Morality consists of a society's most general standards. These standards apply to all people in society regardless of their professional or institutional roles. Moral standards distinguish between right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice, justice and injustice. Many writers maintain that moral duties and obligations override other ones: if I have a moral duty not to lie, then I should not lie even if my employment requires me to lie. Moral standards include those rules that most people learn in childhood, e.g. "don't lie, cheat, steal, harm other people, etc." Ethics is not general standards of conduct but the standards of a particular profession, occupation, institution, or group within society. Question may be raised that why do we have two words in English, what appears to be the same thing. We have two words because; one word is derived from Greek and the other is from Latin. 'Morality' is used to denote the standards or values of a society as they exist 'on the ground', and 'ethics' refers to the critical analysis of those values by people such as philosophers. One may say that morality provides the raw data for the ethicist's deliberations.

Religion and Dharma

The term "religion", is originated in Western culture, has a set of various meanings, and is often referred to as an equivalent of the Sanskrit word *dharma*. The word "religion" has equivalents in the Sanskrit terms, like: *dharma*, *īśvarabhaktiḥ*, *devabhaktiḥ*, *bhaktiḥ* and *īśvarasenā*. The term *dharma* is defined as, that which is established or firm, ordinance, law; usage, practice, customary observance or prescribed conduct, duty; right, justice virtue, morality, religion, religious merit, good works; nature, character,

peculiar condition or essential quality, property, mark, peculiarity; sacrifice; religious abstraction, devotion. The word *dharma* is derived from the root *dhṛ*.

Major meanings cover the following:

- to hold, bear, carry, maintain, preserve, keep, possess, have, use, employ, practice, undergo
- to preserve soul or body, continue living, survive (*ātmānam, jīvitam, prāṇān, deham, śarīram, etc.*)
- to place, bestow or confer on
- to conceive, be pregnant (*garbham*)
- to inflict punishment (*daṇḍam*)
- to draw the reins tight (*praharān*)
- to fulfil a duty (*dharmam*)
- to be firm, keep steady and
- to continue living, exist.

Thus, it is clear that the range of dictionary meanings for the word *dharma* is much broader than that of the term 'religion'. According to Tagore, 'in Sanskrit language, religion goes by the name *dharma*, which in derivative meaning implies the principle of relationship that holds us firm, and in its technical sense means the virtue of a thing, the essential quality of it; for instance, heat is the essential quality of fire, though in certain of its stages it may be absent. [...] *Dharma* represents the truth of the Supreme Man'.¹

II

If we examine the relationship of religion to ethics we actually find two basic problems. a. Does morality depend upon religion? and b. Are religious ethics essentially different from secular ethics? These questions are related but they are not the same. Many religions in the world like Judaism, Christianity are ethical monotheism. They not only promise salvation to the faithful but tie ethical responsibility into the matrix of salvation in a very close way by making the moral life either a necessary condition for God's favour or a consequence of it.

¹ Tagore, R. (1931). *The Religion of Man* New York: Macmillan Company, PP.141

The question remains: whether moral standards themselves depend upon God for their validity or whether there is autonomy of ethics/morality so that even God is subject to the moral order? In Plato's *Euthyphro* Socrates raises the question, "Is what is holy, holy because God approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?"¹ This question is the beginning of a debate among philosophers and theologians about the foundation of morality. Is an action right (or wrong) because God commands or prohibits it, or does God command (or prohibit) the action because it is already right (or wrong)? According to the Divine command theory, "an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God."² This ethical theory maintains that "what ultimately makes an action right or wrong is its being commanded or forbidden by God and nothing else."³ An ethics of Divine commands is frequently expressed in terms of right and wrong being determined by the will of God. Thus, without God, there will be no universally valid morality.

While Divine command theory bases morality on *God*, an alternative approach to ethics bases right and wrong on human nature which is called natural law theory. According to natural law theory, the basic principles of morals are objective, accessible to reason, and based on human nature.⁴ An action is right if it serves to fulfil human nature, and wrong if it goes against human nature. Our human nature includes various inclinations and tendencies. The task of reason is "to discover, sort out, and order these inclinations in accord with appropriate human fulfilment." Thus ethical views are autonomous and even God must keep the moral law which exists independently like the laws of Logic. Of course God knows what is right but in principle we act morally for the same reason that God does. We both follow

¹ Janine Marie Idziak (ed.), *Divine Command Morality: Historical and Contemporary Readings* (New York and Toronto: Edwin Mellen, 1980), p. 41.

² W. K. Frankena, *Ethics*, 2nd edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 28.

³ Ibid.

⁴ D. J. O'Connor, *Aquinas and Natural Law* (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 57.

moral reasons that are independent of God. If there is no God, nothing is changed. Morality is left intact, and if we choose to be moral, we have the very same duties, we would have as theists.

Virtually all religions include a code of moral conduct. In fact, the only feature of religion that comes close to being universal is a practical one: to offer human beings a way to cope with the human condition, particularly suffering and death. Most religions give a diagnosis of the human condition and an explanation for the existence of suffering and death, as well as a remedy for the problem. Moral behaviour as defined by the particular religion is part of the remedy, but each religion teaches that the ultimate goal of moral living is unattainable without the practice of that religion. So not only is morality an intrinsic feature of almost all religions, but most also taught that morality is incapable of standing alone. Morality needs religion. And one respect in which it is said that morality needs religion is that the goal of the moral life is unreachable without religious practice. Some religious philosophers maintain that morality needs religion in at least two other respects: (1) to provide moral motivation, and (2) to provide moral ends with its foundation and justification. These three ways in which morality may depend on religion are logically independent, although we will see that there are conceptual connections among the standard arguments for these positions.

III

What is important here is the way natural law theory makes morality ultimately dependent on God, while giving it sub-ultimate metaphysical grounding and justification in something all humans have in common. It is not necessary, although it is often advantageous, to refer to God's revealed word in order to know what morality teaches and why. The moral law therefore, depends on God only at the deepest level of the metaphysics of morals. The way morality needs God in natural law theory does not threaten the functioning of societies internally nor in their relations with each other. In natural law theory and also in the *Dharmasāstras*, wrongdoing is a violation of

a law. If the ultimate lawgiver is God, and God is a being with whom the agent has a relationship through the practice of religion, wrongdoing is something more than merely doing what is morally wrong. It is a sin, an offence against God.

All can understand the idea of doing what is wrong even though many believe that every act of wrongdoing is more than mere wrongdoing. We need to be cautious of the idea that when the Christian or a Hindu speaks of “sin” and the nonreligious person speaks of “moral wrong,” they are talking about the same thing. It is not just a matter of the Hindu/Christian having distinctive beliefs about the implications and consequences of wrongful acts. One may suggest that the concept of sin and the concept of moral wrong are different concepts, although they are not separate, and Christians or Hindus are able to understand what is meant by morally wrong because of their ability to understand discourse outside their religious community and the extent to which it overlaps with their own. There are concepts analogous to sin such as *avidyā* (ignorance) in *Advaita Vedānta*. And *avidyā* is a kind of ignorance that involves desiring, feeling, and choosing wrongly as well as thinking wrongly.

The question ‘why should I be moral’ is not obviously a unimportant question, whereas ‘why should I care about offending God’ is foolish to anyone who understands the context in which such a question would be asked. It seems that the relation between morality and religious motivation is a serious one in modern secular ethics because the thinning process thins out the aspects of moral concepts most directly relevant to motivation. This problem is perhaps most evident in the case of the concept of happiness. It is very difficult to be motivated by the mere concept of that at which all humans aim, whereas it is much easier to be motivated by the shallow concepts of salvation, enlightenment, or Aristotelian *eudaimonia*. The deeper the concept, the wider its conceptual applicability, but the price is a reduction of motivational strength.

One of the aims of philosophy of religion is to understand the relation between morality and religion from a perspective outside that of any religion.

This is not to deny that there can be a distinctively Christian philosophy, Hindu philosophy, and so on. But one needs to address the issue of whether morality can be independent of religion and, if so, what it would look like, and that is the distinctive task of the philosopher. There are important arguments that morality needs religion to reach its goal, to provide moral motivation, and to provide morality with its foundation and justification. Let us address the implications for the task of developing a common morality.

IV

One such important arguments that morality needs religion or that moral theory needs theology holds that there is a goal/objective of morality, and that point is inexplicable within a naturalistic, autonomous moral theory. In this class of arguments there are some of the best-known moral arguments for the existence of God. These arguments require the identification of a particular goal of morality, for example, a system of cosmic justice in which the good are ultimately rewarded and the bad are punished, or the idea that there is an end of history, a goal at which all human life aims, that human life is pointless without such a goal, and the goal is unattainable without a supernatural power. Many of these arguments are in the class of transcendental arguments, or arguments that purport to identify the preconditions for the truth of some premise. These arguments begin with a premise giving the content or point of morality, and the argument attempts to show that the truth of such a premise requires the truth of important religious propositions such as the existence of God or *karma* afterlife.

One may find a classic argument of this type in Kantian morality. It is true that Kant accepted the ancient Greek and medieval Christian teaching that all human beings necessarily seek happiness. Where he differed from his predecessors was on the relation between virtue and happiness. The Greeks and medieval philosophers agreed that there is a strong connection between a virtuous life and a happy life, although the Greeks worried about the place of good fortune in happiness and the Christians maintained that the happiness we

seek is not fully attainable in this life. Nonetheless, with some variations, they believed that the ultimate goal or end of moral life is a unitary good in which happiness and virtue are integrated and virtually inseparable. In fact Kant denied that. Virtue and happiness are neither conceptually nor probabilistically connected, according to Kant. They are two different ends. Kant argued that because both virtue and happiness are goods, the highest good, or summum bonum, would be a world in which human beings combine moral virtues with happiness. Thus, it would be a world in which their happiness is proportional to their virtues.

Keeping in mind the idea of highest good, Kant offers the following simple argument for theism. Morality obligates each of us to seek the good, and so it obligates us to seek the highest good. But morality cannot obligate us to seek the impossible. Hence, the highest good must be attainable. It is not attainable without a cause adequate to the effect, which is to say, unless there is a God with the power to proportion happiness to virtue. God's existence is therefore, a necessary condition for the possibility of the highest good, and so it is a necessary condition for our obligation to be moral. The rationale behind Kant's argument is profound even though his description of the highest good is distinctive. What may seem particularly problematic about the argument is that Kant himself creates a problem for value theory and then argues that there must be a God to solve the problem.

Thus, for Kant morality puts an impossible demand on us if there is no God; the Thomistic argument understands nature as structured in such a way that it aims at the impossible if there is no God. The former argues that in the absence of God there is something wrong with morality, whereas the latter argues that in the absence of God there is something wrong with nature. Aquinas, like the Greeks, assumed that nature is orderly and teleological in structure. There would be no point to the existence of natural desires unless they are capable of fulfilment and therefore, the conditions for their fulfilment

reveal important metaphysical truths. In contrast, modern thinkers are generally wary of drawing any conclusions from human needs and desires.

If we believe that our natural human desires cannot be satisfied in this life, the typical response is to conclude that we should change the desires. This modern option displays a remarkable degree of confidence in the power of therapy. Perhaps a less naive alternative is to conclude that life really is absurd. This is the position of an important strand of atheistic existentialist literature which accepts the Thomistic idea that human desires and aims are irremediably thwarted without God, but rejects the premise that human desires cannot be irremediably thwarted.

Camus' essay "*The Myth of Sisyphus*" is a touching depiction of this view of human destiny. It contains the following axiom: "Oh my soul do not aspire to immortal heights but exhaust the field of the possible." Camus' kind of atheism makes an interesting contrast with the atheism of the Enlightenment, which simply rejects the soundness of arguments for theism while attempting to keep the most of the views in traditional ethics. The denial of God's existence is an intrinsic feature of Camus' view of the human condition. The absurdity of life is his price for accepting the major premise of the moral argument for the existence of God. The transcendental arguments focus on the conditions for the meaningfulness of human life.

Let us explain some anti-skeptical arguments arguing that morality obligates only if there is a God that supports Kant's moral transcendental arguments for the existence of God.

1. Morality obligates us, no matter what we think or believe and no matter what we feel or choose. We have no option but to engage in the moral life. Morality obligates us unconditionally.
2. Morality requires us to be motivated to act in moral ways and to act on those motives in the appropriate circumstances. Many moral acts also aim at producing particular outcomes.

3. No one is required to engage in an activity if he/she reasonably judges that he/she is taking a risk that it is pointless or self-defeating and is unable to judge the degree of the risk.
4. Moral life requires some degree of confidence that the effort to be moral is not pointless or self-defeating.
5. Our trust in our moral beliefs, the accuracy of our motivational states and our probable success in reaching moral outcomes is a condition for confidence that the effort to be moral is not pointless or self-defeating.
6. If we are radically skeptic, we cannot have any confidence in the truth of our moral beliefs, the trustworthiness of our motivational states and our probable success in reaching moral outcomes thus, the effort to be moral may be pointless or self-defeating.
7. Therefore, morality does not obligate us unless we have reasons to believe that the skeptical assumptions are false.

Moral obligation requires that there be a guarantor/ sponsor of our trust in our moral beliefs, motives, and success in action. As Kant claims it, we must suppose the existence of a cause adequate to the effect: a Providential God. According to this argument, our motive for being moral is not threatened as long as we believe that there is a God, but morality does not actually obligate us unless the belief is true.

V

Western perspectives of religion maintain that morality arises from God. Natural law theory makes morality rest on God's nature. Divine Command theory makes morality rest on God's will. There is also a theory which is called Divine motivation theory that makes morality rest on the motives that are the primary constituents of God's properties. In each case, the theory may not be committed to the idea that morality needs religion, as it is possible that even though morality in fact derives from God, morality would exist even if there were no God. But if morality derives from God, it depends on God in actuality whether or not morality would have existed in some other

possible godless world. This is the view to be investigated briefly. Other than natural law theory, the principal theory of a theistic foundation for morality is Divine command theory. Divine command theory has a long and important history in religious ethics, although it is often misunderstood.

Morality is dependent on divine commands, but they are dependent on the commands of a deity with a certain nature. If God's nature is not love, morality would fall apart. There is no intrinsic connection between a command and the property of being loving, so to tie morality to the commands of loving God is to tie it to two distinct properties of God. There is no need to solve the problem of whether God could make it right that we maltreat the innocent by making any such modification to the theory, since being loving is one of God's essential motives. The right thing for humans to do is to act on motives that imitate the divine motives. Maltreating an innocent is not an act that expresses a motive that imitates the divine motives. Hence, it is impossible for maltreating the innocent to be right as long as (1) it is impossible for such an act to be an expression of a motive that is like the motives of God, and (2) it is impossible for God to have different motives.

Moral pluralism is a challenge to every kind of moral theory, whether or not it is religiously based. Apart from the issue of the justification of one moral system over others, there is the problem of developing a common morality. It is not important for this purpose that everyone agrees on the foundation of ethics or the substantive goal at which the moral life aims; nor is it important that everyone have the same motive to be moral. It is not even important that everyone think of wrongdoing the same way - as a sin, *pāpa*, *avidyā*, a violation of someone's rights, or something else - as long as they agree on what is wrong, and they only have to agree on that within a certain core area of human behaviour. What are the prospects for a common morality? One based on natural law? Divine commands? Universal reason? It is widely believed that there is virtually no hope for a common morality based on divine

commands. Natural law and Kantian universal reason may both provide some help, but so far with only limited results.

Let us suppose that a wide range of virtues is represented by all or almost all of the moral paradigms in the major cultures, both religious and nonreligious, in different parts of the world, even though there are some differences in the particular acts that are thought to express the virtues. This will help us to find common morality. A common morality would in principle be that morality that derives from the overlapping character traits of moral examples in a wide range of culture. Particular moralities distinctive of individual cultures would include the non-overlapping traits of their examples. Religiously based moralities have an important function to serve in the development of a common morality. In contrast, secular ethics in the Western world differs from religious ethics, not so much in having different examples, but in not having examples at all. This is particularly true of consequentialist and deontological ethics, both of which aim for universality by constructing entire moral systems out of the thinnest of moral concepts. A complete universal agreement is no doubt impossible in any case, but an effective common morality is more likely to arise from dialogue between richly developed religious moralities the most abstract systems. If this is right, religious ethics has an important function in society quite apart from its importance in religious communities themselves.

Religion thus, has an important role in our practical life and this leads to the question of morality, which is intimately connected with religion. Morality implies a system of practical rules of conduct of a human in the light of his/her religion. When a human is filled with religious emotion, he/she may either plunge into an ecstatic state or may feel an inner urge to give expression to it, and it is his moral sense that roused and directs the way through his/her feelings and can glide on. Due to the sweetening of emotions and its purifying influence moral principles of truthfulness, charity, sympathy and love blossom forth in the mind like so many flowers and the religious artist has his/her

greatest satisfaction. Morality is the technique of his self-expression. It gives concrete forms to his/her dreams, helps him/his to actualize his/her vision by practicable details. Morality loses its true significance if separated from religion in a higher sense i.e. spiritual attainment. Theories in social ethics may fail to serve their purpose if not founded on some higher principles i.e. spirituality and religion. Religion merely in the sense of certain beliefs and the observance of some form of rituals is however, different from this.

In a way of conclusion, it can be said that right and wrong do not have to be understood in terms of God's will. Morality is a matter of reason and conscience, not faith. Religious considerations do not provide definitive solutions to many of the controversial ethical issues that we face today. The arguments which are discussed in this endeavour do not assume that Hinduism or Christianity or other theological system is false. They merely show that even if such a system is true, morality remains an independent issue. The religious believer has no special access to moral truth. Believer and nonbeliever alike receive equal powers of reasoning from nature.

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PHILOSOPHY OF INTEGRATION: IN THE LIGHT OF BUDDHISM

SUBODH KUMAR PAL

The main problem of human history consists in dissension among men resulting from some fanaticism or ignorance. But the main principle of human society is that of harmony. Where the realization of this principle is feeble, the feebleness happens to invade the country from all quarters. The first and foremost problem is that the people who have gathered together must be made to unite. But this unity should be one of sincere kinship and not merely of other conditions. Every history holds the dominant advice, '*Samgacchadhvam Samvadadhvam Sam vo Manāsi Jānatam*'- 'move together, talk together, and know everyone's mind as one'. The practice of this *mantra* is nowhere as difficult as in India.

It is true that not violence, but peace is the root which should be nourished to make life worth living to enable man to stand erect in order to conquer all adversities and violence by the message of love and compassion. This is the true spirit of humanity which is one and is common to all irrespective of geographical boundaries. Here comes the great sage, Lord Buddha who declares most courageously that the mission of man is to embrace man within oneself and in this universal embracing shines the true humanity of man which is eternally luminous and shows the path ahead.

The most outstanding event in the cultural history of India In the sixth century B.C is the emergence of Buddhism, led by Lord Buddha, the Enlightened. The Buddha is considered to be the first historic figure in Indian civilization to conceive the fundamental unity of all beings, and to give effective expression to a feeling that humanity has a common bond and common end. The message of this great teacher and humanitarian - the doctrine of unity, and universal brotherhood of man may now sound stale, but the idea was undoubtedly revolutionary in the extreme at the time of 2500 years back. Lord Buddha seems to have been the only prophet who did everything for others and absolutely nothing for himself. He gave up his home and all the enjoyment of life to spend his days in search of the medicine for the terrible disease of human suffering. That is why; Buddha is called 'physician of the worldly disease' (*bhava-roga-vaidya*). In an age, when men and priests were more interested in discussing the essence of deity, he discovered that people had

overlooked the existence of human suffering. Buddhism in general represents the way of compassion. The Buddha is an embodiment of compassion and hence he is regarded as the compassionate protector of all beings. As ‘thirst’ (*tanha*) has been taken as the root cause of all ‘worldly diseases’ (*bhava-roga*), the path as shown by Buddha is to be restored to and hence he is called a ‘physician of the worldly diseases’ (*bhava-roga-vaidya*). To him the individuals following his path should practice loving kindness which implies not to harm the life of all beings. It is advised always to protect mankind as well as animals and vegetations. It is his wisdom through which one can see all human beings in the universe as equal in nature. The well-being of all human and non-human being is inter-related and mutual.

The contribution of Buddhism towards human integration throughout the centuries is indeed exemplary. It holds the view that the goal of human life is to attain perfection, enlightenment and liberation. All these come through the disinterested performance of action. He was the only man who was ever ready to give up his life for animals to stop sacrifice. He once said to a king, “If the sacrifice of a lamp helps you to go to heaven, sacrificing a man will help you better; so sacrifice me”. (1) The teaching of the Lord Buddha constitutes a rational, pragmatic, spiritual philosophy, leading to individual happiness, enlightenment, wisdom, peace and bliss. Buddhism, in its initial stage, is not so much a religion. It emphasizes certain fundamental verifiable truth about humanity: the fact of human suffering (*duhkha*), the cause of suffering (*duhkha-samudaya*), the cessation of suffering (*duhkha-nirodha*) and the way leading to this cessation of suffering (*duhkha-nirodha-mārga*). The noble eightfold path (*aṣṭāṅga mārga*) consists of right faith, right resolve, right speech, right action, right living, right effort, right thought and right concentration. (2). So, there is an ethical and spiritual path by following which misery may be removed and liberation may be attended.

It is clear that self-indulgence and self-mortification are eventually ruled out in Lord Buddha’s ethical and spiritual ‘middle-path’. In his very first Sermon at Sāranāth he said ‘there are two extremes, O monks, from which he who leads a religious life must abstain. One is life of pleasure, devoted to desire and enjoyment: that is base, ignoble, and unspiritual, unworthy, unreal. The other is life of mortification: it is gloomy, unworthy, unreal. The Perfect One, O monks, is removed

from both these extremes and has discovered the way which lies between them, the middle way which enlightens the eyes, enlightens the mind, which leads to rest, to knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nirvana' (3).

Lord Buddha was primarily an ethical teacher and a social reformer than a theoretical philosopher. So, it is needless to say that the teaching of Lord Buddha scrupulously avoids metaphysical speculations and philosophical theories and dogmas. Buddha was very much practical and he was very much concerned about the problem of humanity. It is interesting to note in this connection that Lord Buddha was once asked about the origin of the world, creation, end of the world, and so on. He was answered beautifully with the following analogy: "Two things only, my disciples, do I teach misery and the cessation of misery'. Human existence is full of misery and pain (*Sarvam dukkham*). Our immediate duty, therefore, is to get rid of this misery and pain. If instead we bother about barren metaphysical speculations, we behave like that foolish man whose heart is pierced by a poisonous arrow and who, instead of taking it out while away his time on idle speculation about the origin, the size, the metal, the maker and the shooter of the arrow (4)

Lord Buddha believed in the well-being of all. He discovered an evil. According to him this evil is curable by becoming unselfishness; it is not curable by force. For, the cause of evil is our desire to be superior to others and our selfishness. The moment when the world becomes unselfish all evil will vanish. So long as society tries to cure evil by laws and institutions, evil will not be cured. Force against force never cures and the only cure for evil is unselfishness. So, we have to make unselfish men and women by proper teaching. Buddhism being essentially a religion of love and compassion forms the basis of unqualified integration. Because of his limitless compassion for all living beings, the Lord Buddha began preaching the *dharma* to all people, irrespective of any caste, colour and creed. He thus sent the Bhikkhus to dedicate their lives 'for the good of the many, as well as for the happiness of the many' (*Bahujana-hitāya bahujana-sukhāya*) : 'Go forth, O Bhikkhus, on your wonderings, for the good of the many- for the happiness of many, in compassion for the world, for the good , for the welfare , for the happiness of gods and men. Let not two of you go the same way. O Bhikkhus, proclaim that *dharma* which is gracious at the beginning, at the middle and at the end '. (5) In this

connection, it is relevant to quote Vivekananda, ‘all religions teach us to do good for our brothers. Doing good is nothing extraordinary - it is the only way to live. Everything in nature tends to expansion for life and contraction for death. It is the same in religion. Do good by helping others without ulterior motives. The moment this ceases contraction and death follow.’(6)

Lord Buddha preached universal brotherhood and equality of man. It taught that compassion and service to all life, is the dynamic way of translating those teachings into practice. Human integration automatically follows and naturally ensures from the deep conviction that all life is one and that humanity is one indivisible whole; and that each self is , as it were interfused with all other selves; and that what affects one, equally affects others. So, the teaching of Lord Buddha is: ‘A mother protects her only child at the risk of her own life. Like a mother cultivate a boundless love towards all beings’. Again, his teaching is: ‘do not deceive another, do not despise any person whatever in any place. In anger or in ill-will do not wish to do any harm to anybody.’ The integration, the Buddhists think does not only remain among social beings but also it remains in mental and environmental world. In the modern time we find that human beings have misused their power and destroyed the animals, forests and mountains resulting in environmental crisis. The greedy minds due to excessive ‘thirst’ (*tanhā*) of mankind lead to such changes and the destructions of the ecological balance. The ‘thirst’ (*tanhā*) in human mind does not pollute his mind alone but the whole environment. So, mental unrest due to the non-fulfillment of desire can affect the whole environment.

The external environment is seriously polluted because of the pollution of the internal environment in the mind having the lack of peace. The excessive greed is one of the reasons for internal pollution, which is the impediment of peace. This disease may be eradicated if an individual finds some satisfaction and contentment through the Buddha’s teaching. That the external pollution is related to our internal one is evidenced in the *Dhammapada*. It is said that just as the maker of an arrow makes the end of it straight, so, an individual should simplify his mind, which is wavering, fickle, uncontrolled and unprotected. (*Dhammapada 1/3*). The contentment in the context of Buddhism does not mean the eradication of all desires but to live in harmony with all beings and nature. It is said in the *Dhammapada* that a pure and

developed mind alone can understand others mind (*panditavagga, verse no. 3*). It is further emphasized that when the world is burning (*Prajjalite*) there is no opportunity for adopting laughter (*hāso*) and joy (*ānanda*). In the like manner, if our mind is covered with darkness, would we not seek for light? (*jaravagga, verse no. 1*). Those who believe in the teaching of Buddha will control their desire and live in harmony with nature keeping the environment in healthy condition. It is rightly mentioned in the *Dhammapada* that one who sees only the apparent beauty, who is not self-restraint in enjoying consumable things, who is lazy and weak is always attacked by one's enemies just like a weak tree. On the other hand, an individual refraining from seeing apparent beauty becomes self-controlled and respectful and hence he is not overpowered by the enemies just like a firm and stony mountain. (*Dhammapada 1/7-8*).

The historical account of Buddhism shows that for thousand years the Buddhist monasteries have developed a harmonious living with nature. The calm and cool atmosphere of the forest and mountain help the Buddhist practitioners to develop their inner mind, which ultimately makes them 'feel' for the protection of animals. With loving and tolerant heart the Buddhists live with natural vegetation, wild animals in the forest in harmony and for mutual survival. In the *Sutta-nipata* we find a deep appreciation of beauty and diversity of nature. Buddha says "know ye the grasses and the trees...Then know ye the worms, and the moths and the different kinds of ants...know yet also the four-footed animals small and great...the serpents...the fish which range in the water...the birds that are borne along with on wings and move through the air..."

The consideration for other individuals as a matter of moral obligation is not limited to other human beings alone but to other species. Buddhism seeks to transform in the way through which an individual conceives himself. The environmental ethics in Buddhism is not totally a matter of identifying and securing rights, but it is a matter of undertaking a practice of affirming and realizing the trans-human potential for enlightenment as an effect. The deeper inside in an individual is generated through the cultivation of it in human and trans-human species and hence it can become potential for enlightenment. This can express itself as a compassionate

environmental sustaining altruism. Such an idea has been expressed by Shantideva in 'Bodhichāryābatāra' in the following manner:

'Just as the body which is constituted with hands and other limbs should be protected as a single entity, the whole world divided into so many parts should be treated as undivided one so far as its nature is concerned. If it is taken as divided it would suffer no doubt. I should remove suffering of others because it is suffering like my own. I should help others too because they exist as I exist'. Shantideva adds that if someone is reluctant to remove sufferings of others, it would be like refusing to use one's hand to remove the thorn of one's foot, because the pain of the foot is not the pain of the hand. To get an ecological balance we should develop an ecological sensibility and actualize that sensibility in practice. So in Buddhism the phenomenon of inter-relatedness is deeply felt and hence a comprehensive developmental path leading to 'peace' is sought.

Buddhism gives emphasis on the threefold training of human mind and eight factors of the enlightenment, which are the basis of ethical sensibility to the environment. In the Mahāparinibbānasutta, *Dighanikāya* discusses about the threefold course of training like cultivation of ethical conduct (*śīla*), meditation (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*prajñā*). These three are inter-connected in the sense that the first is left behind when the second is undertaken. Without the development of these it is not possible for one to lead a happy and peaceful life. Wisdom (*prajñā*) goes beyond knowledge attained through reading books or hearing the tales. The practice of morality (*śīla*), and mental development (*samādhi*) develops a penetrative insight and realization into the nature of everything in its proper perspective. When the realization (wisdom) appears, the trained mind becomes an unshakable dynamic force that can handle any human problem without anxiety and thereby can remove the worldly problems. When the ethical conduct is firmly established the meditation becomes effective. Through the effect of meditation the transformative power of wisdom becomes possible. (*Mahāparinibbānasutta* of *Dighanikāya*, 5/67-68)

From the above discussion we may draw the following conclusion. Only advice to protect environment or to adopt *Ahimsā* will fall flat upon others until and unless they are enlightened with wisdom. The true solution of the environmental crisis will be neither technological nor legal. It must be stereological. It must involve

the evolution of a significant number of human beings to a higher level of awareness, to a higher ethical sensibility. It does not mean that the technological and legal efforts to safeguard the environment are pointless. But we think that these are only a stopgap measure but not the ultimate solution. To Buddhism there is a potentiality in human being to evolve into a higher ethical sensibility. This will happen through the concerted practice and discipline. The whole Buddhist tradition consists precisely in a sustained effort to devise effective methods for undertaking this transformation.

According to Buddhism everything has in itself, intrinsically and basically, the faculty of 'Bodhi' or the enlightenment factor. All are endowed with the 'Buddha-Nature', and so have the possibility of becoming 'Buddha', at sometime or other. The 'Buddha-Nature' is variously described as 'suchness' or 'tathātva' or the ground of all- the *Dharmakāya* or *Dharmadhātu* or *Śūnyatā*. The pursuit of the holy life is for the sake of getting enlightenment. It is to arrive at the state of Nirvāna. Nirvāna is negatively worded, since it is not possible to describe it in human terms. It is, therefore, termed as 'Śūnyatā'. Therefore, in Buddhism, the main object is the enlightenment of not only self, but all creation also. So, final conclusion is that love and compassion, wisdom and service, the feeling of the self about all life, form the foundation of philosophy of integration in Buddhism.

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1. *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, vol-iv, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, 1989, page-136.
2. Mahāvaga, 1.6.18; *Samyukta- Nikāya*, (iii), page-106; *Majjhimanikāya*.1.p.47ff.
3. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p.127
4. *Majjhimanikāya*, 63
5. Mahāvaga,1,ii,i
6. *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, vol-ii, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, 1989, page-494.

REFLECTION ON QUINE'S *NATURALISED EPISTEMOLOGY**

HASEN ALI AHMED

Many contemporary thinkers have attempted to equate Quine's naturalised epistemology with instrumentalism. However, Quine has a strong reservation to think in this way. For Quine, realism is a broad philosophical school and it has various philosophical implications. However, he claims that his understanding of naturalised epistemology may be equated with a very specific form of realism what he calls *robust realism*. Thus, Quine's theory of naturalised epistemology is praiseworthy for philosophical consideration because it not only appears as a rival theory of classical or traditional epistemology but also appears as dogma-free philosophical theory. It thus holds the central position of modern philosophical analysis.

Quine is known as the best analytic philosophers of the second half of 20th century. His position and contribution in the sphere of analytic philosophy is groundbreaking. His celebrated article "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" brings a strong message against the established theories. In this paper, Quine criticises Kant's concept of analytic proposition as well as Carnap's concept of reductionism. Quine also develops conceptual relativism that goes against Kant and Strawson as well. Strawson, with the influence of Kant, talks in favour of a unified core of conceptualism. Quine rejects it. Instead of that, he talks in favour of conceptual relativism. Having said this, his philosophy of language as a whole is either underestimated or misinterpreted. Even many philosophers and commentators have failed to understand how Quine's views hang together to form a coherent whole. Quine's perception of conceptual relativism and his attempt towards developing naturalised epistemology actually set up the trend of contemporary philosophy of language.

There is no question of doubt that Quine's philosophical thinking is wide ranging because Quine has contributed on almost every topic that has engaged analytic philosophers since Frege. Quine's philosophy is very much systematic and works as a single whole in a coherent manner. Here it is worthy to note that Quine's philosophical method has mostly been *scientific*, *empirical* and *behavioural* in nature.

* This contribution is a subsection in my PhD dissertation for which I am thankful to my supervisor Prof. Kanti Lal Das.

While developing in his philosophy, Quine in turn rejects and criticizes so many other well established philosophical theories based on rigid rule and principles, logical rules. In this regard, Quine rejected the so-called traditional metaphysics, the analytic-synthetic distinction as expounded by Kant, logical reductionism, modal logic, essentialism, atomism and any form of scepticism. According to Quine each of these doctrines in diverse ways requires the existence of meanings, propositions, attributes, relations, or numbers. Quine further contends that naturalised epistemology is to be comprehended with regard to commonsense. For him, emphasis should be given on naturalism and physicalism instead of mentalism and phenomenalism. Thus, Quine's naturalised epistemology is directed towards holism in opposition to reductionism and atomism. He thus offers us a pragmatic and indeterministic philosophical approach. Besides, Quine's theory of indeterminacy of translation, radical translation, inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity are the other major concepts prevailing in the realm philosophy of language.

Although Quine focuses mainly on so many philosophical aspects, his philosophy of language is predominantly concerned with naturalised epistemology. In fact, Quine has been regarded as a leading proponent of naturalised epistemology. Naturalised epistemology is the scientific study of man's acquisition of science. Thus, Quine's central theme is naturalism. For Quine, naturalised epistemology is manifested through common sense and science. For him, science is self-conscious common sense. Quine in his "Epistemology Naturalised" (1969) has made an attempt to reply all substantive questions of knowledge and meaning by using various methods and techniques of natural sciences. Of course, he is not associated with any form of knowledge other than ordinary knowledge. Ordinary knowledge, according to Quine, appeared in common sense and in science. He sees that these are not different in kind. Quine's focus on knowledge, moreover, is based on the idea that scientific knowledge builds up as we try hard to develop common sense. By this he meant that the methods and tools of natural science are the sources of our knowledge of the world around us. Quine's emphasis is chiefly on naturalism that must be based on science. Quine considers epistemology as a part of science as it is practiced by mankind. As he says, "Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter on psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz. a

physical human subject.”¹ Quine, therefore, is important in philosophy of science for his conception of philosophy as continuous with science and that his philosophies are an extension of science. Quine’s proposal is that philosophers should reflect on science within science and there is no theory of knowledge distinction from science. According to Quine philosophy as a whole has no standard which goes beyond of our most successful science. Thus, Quine’s philosophy is intimately related to human knowledge because while developing his naturalised epistemology, Quine gives over emphasise on common sense and natural science. Both common sense and natural science is the by-product of human knowledge.

Quine’s fundamental philosophical doctrine is what he calls *naturalism*. He explicates naturalism as “the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described.”² As naturalism deals with human knowledge, it requires no method, no stance and more importantly philosophers have no vantage point to deal it. In his first philosophical monograph *Word and Object*, Quine begins an epigraph taken from Neurath: “We are like sailors who must rebuild their boat on the open sea, without ever being able to put into dock and reconstruct it from the best components.”³ The final paragraph of this book starts like this: “The philosopher’s task differ from the others’ in detail; but in no such drastic way as those suppose who imagine for the philosopher a vantage point outside the conceptual scheme that he takes in charge. There is no such cosmic exile.”⁴ Thus, for Quine philosophers must confine and work in *themiddle of things*, i.e. in the middle of our system of knowledge. Here Quine mainly focuses on theoretical activity instead of human culture in general.

Quine outlines naturalism within science. But what does he actually mean by science? Quine uses ‘science’ broadly. By science, he explicitly includes psychology, economics, sociology, and history under the heading. The other distinctive feature of science is that it remains parity with common sense as well as everyday knowledge. According to Quine, science is our most successful attempt at knowledge because

¹Quine, W. V., “Epistemology Naturalized”, in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, Columbia Univ. Press, New York and London, 1969, p. 82.

²Quine, W. V. *Theories and Things*, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 21.

³See Hylton, P., *Quine*, Routledge, 2007, p. 7.

⁴ Quine, W. V. *Word and Object*, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1960, p. 275.

science deals with the theoretical or cognitive aspect of our lives. Quine sees knowledge as *seamless* and science is continuous with common sense. Philosophy should aspire to something like the standards of clarity and explanations found in the most successful sciences. Quine in his *Ways of Paradox* says, "...scientist can enhance objectivity and diminish the interference of language, by his every choice of language."¹ Philosophers are primarily concerned with minimising clarity and objectivity to 'purify the language of science'.² It is important to note here that even though Quine is an empiricist, he does not think that experience is all about philosophical and scientific clarification, as Quine elsewhere holds that 'like all those experience is ill suited for use as an instrument of philosophical clarification and analysis'.³ For instruments of scientific and philosophical clarification, Quine seeks sentences and dispositions, because Quine thinks that sentences are observational and dispositions to assent are fairly accessible through observable symptoms. In this way they are conjecturing causal connections which are basically neurological what Quine calls it *thought or belief*.

Thus, Quine in his *naturalism* brings back the relevance of stimulation. He says that language views the world in virtue of the relations to sensory stimulation. That is why Quine in the opening paragraph of "The Scope and Language of Science"⁴ calls attention to the physical forces which intrude into one's sensory surfaces. According to Quine, physical forces impinging on appropriate part of the body give rise to stimulations on the sensory nerves which are *about the world* in virtue of their relations to such stimulations. Quine attempts to justify it by saying that the only source of our knowledge of the world around us is energy, i.e., the dispositional power of language. Quine calls it 'stimulus responses' that encroaching on our sensory surfaces and equally stimulating our sensory nerves. Accordingly, the relation of noises to sensory stimulations is central to cognition because it is concurrent with the way the world is around me at that moment. This makes sense to say that the world affects us only through stimulations. Quine says that it is "a finding of natural science itselfthat our information about the world comes only through

¹Quine, W. V. *The Ways of Paradox*, Harvard Univ. Press, 1976 (1966), p. 235.

²Ibid.

³Quine, W. V. *Theories and Things*, p. 185.

⁴Quine, W. V., "The Scope and Language of Science", in *Ways of Paradox*, op. cit., p.235.

impact on our sensory receptors.”¹ According to Quine, our system of (putative) knowledge forms a highly interconnected system where there are some observational sentences which are directly correlated with *sensory stimulations* and others are not directly correlated with stimulations but are somehow connected though indirectly with observation sentences. Critiques may raise a quip by saying, how does abstract part of philosophy directly connect with sensory stimulations? Quine’s plausible response would be like that as our body of knowledge as a whole is connected with sensory stimulations, the sentences which serve to systematise that knowledge get their point and their claim to be a part of our knowledge. Accordingly, they still count as being related to sensory stimulations in an indirect fashion. Thus, the sentences associated with the very abstract part of philosophy would be the potential part of our knowledge and they would definitely be counted, through indirect fashion, as being about the world.

The stimulus response theory of Quine is popularly known as *behaviourism*. It is also known as *holism*. While developing his naturalism, Quine does not make any distinction between common sense and science. By science, Quine means natural science. Natural sciences have a close proximity with common sense. Common sense becomes an integral part of knowledge if it is backed up by natural sciences. That is why, while illuminating the concept of naturalised epistemology, Quine talks in favour of both common sense and natural sciences. Moreover, both common sense and natural science are integral parts of behaviourism. According to Quine science is “refined common sense.”² Science, for Quine, is not a substitute for common sense but an extension of it. There remains parity between science and common sense. Science in this sense is a continuation of common sense. Quine says, “The scientist is indistinguishable from the common man in the sense of evidence, except that the scientist is more careful. This increased care is not a revision of evidential standards, but only the more patient and systematic collection and use of what anyone would deem to be evidence.”³ Quine further contends that our information about the world comes only from stimulations as a paradigm of his naturalism, i.e. of his method of

¹Quine, W. V. *Pursuit of Truth*, Harvard Univ. Press, 1992 (1990), p. 19.

²Quine, W. V. “Posits and Reality”, included in *The Ways of Paradox*, op. Cit. p. 253.

³Quine, W. V. “The Scope and Language of Science”, included in *The Ways of Paradox*, op. cit. p. 233.

working from within. A system of beliefs which successfully predicts sensory experience counts as *knowledge*. It is through sensory experience, and only through sensory experience, that we know anything at all about the world. But how do we know that it is through sensory experience that we know anything at all about the world? Quine replies that we know this in the same way in which we know anything else. This is made possible because Quine's understanding of knowledge is based on conceptual relativity. Being a conceptual relativist, Quine does not accept any stringent dogma within the realm of philosophy. He speaks in favour of relative knowledge based on common sense and natural science where human stimulus is deeply been involved. Thus, his understanding of knowledge is stimulus knowledge.

So far we have been envisaging the role of sensory stimulation in Quine's view of knowledge. He tells us that knowledge is no more than a means of predicting stimulation. He does not think that objects which count as real are independent of us. Quine calls his view of realism as *robust realism*. Even Quine's view has something in common with *instrumentalism or functionalism* because scientific theories are simply instruments as they are not real entities at all. Like natural objects they do not really exist for making predictions. However, there is also a crucial difference. Instrumentalism or functionalism presupposes a contrast between two kinds of entities of which one is real and other is fictional. Fictional entities are postulated by scientific theories to help us attain knowledge of ordinary physical objects, which are counted as real. In this sense instrumentalism is anti-realism. Quine is no instrumentalist; for him there is no point of contrast between naturalism with instrumentalism. One cannot say concurrently that our sensory surfaces are real and that physical objects are mere fictions. For Quine, sensory surfaces are physical objects; sensory stimulations are physical events on par with any other. It distinctly indicates the importance of Quine's naturalistic approach to knowledge. Secondly, unlike functionalism, there is nothing *given* in Quine's naturalism. In this sense Quine's naturalism is *presuppositionless*. For Quine the concurrence of stimulations is independent of theory, but we do not know about them independent of theory. Even though Quine advocates epistemic naturalism and deviates from the *logistic interpretation of naturalism* advocated by Ayer, Chisholm and Carnap, but he does not advocate a detachment of his own epistemic naturalism from the word 'real'.

Quine says, “We cannot significantly question the reality of the external world, or deny that there is evidence of external objects in the testimony of our senses; for, to do so is simply to dissociate the term reality”¹ What we can do, suggests Quine, is that we always plea for a *better revision*. Better philosophy would be relative, transitional, because there remains indeterminacy of translation in philosophy of language. Indeterminacy can be overcome through constant revision. We do revise our philosophical theories on the basis of our previous foundation, i.e. on the basis of our *conceptual scheme*. There is no alternative to working from within some conceptual scheme. As it is our own, we know no better than this. Therefore, there is no sense to the idea of some wholly extra-theoretical reality with which our theory could be compared. For Quine, our theory must be judged primarily by its ability to make correct predications. Therefore, we can ask no more of our theory of the world besides our theory. Accordingly, Quine claims that there is no notion of the world or reality that would far more authentic behind our theory. Quine says, “Our talk of external things, our very notion of things, is *just a conceptual apparatus* that helps us to foresee and control the triggering of our sensory receptors in the light of previous triggering of our sensory receptors. The triggering, first and last, is all that we have to go.”²

Quine’s attention is that our knowledge is a human artefact and is compatible with accepting the objects it tells us about as fully real. Knowledge is our own creation. Knowledge is the theory building process. It is within science that reality is to be identified and described. Quine uses the word ‘science’ broadly. He explicitly includes psychology, economics, sociology and history under the heading science. He then says that science is continuous with common sense, with everyday knowledge. Thus, Quine’s naturalised epistemology acknowledges that science is our most successful attempt at knowledge. Hence philosophy, as part of our knowledge, which aims to be successful, will aspire to scientific standards. Our philosophical endeavours are the varied results of our reflecting on the theory from within.

¹Ibid, p. 229.

²Quine, W. V. *Theories and Things*, op. cit. p. 1.

INTENTIONALITY AS A CENTRAL PART OF CONSCIOUSNESS: HUSSERL AND MOHANTY*

JAYEETA MAJUMDER

Philosophers since time immemorial have struggled to comprehend the nature of consciousness and pin down its essential properties. If we look back, we found that the English word ‘conscious’ originates from the Latin word ‘conscius’. Here, the term ‘conscius’ derives from two Latin words ‘con’ and ‘scio’, ‘con’ means ‘together’ and ‘scio’ means ‘to know’, in other words, it means having joint or common knowledge with another. Basically, consciousness is a kind of quality of self-awareness, or of being aware of an external object or something with oneself. If we try to analyze consciousness, we find that, it is a kind of awareness or subjectivity. It is possible to know about consciousness through our experience and feelings. The mind is directed towards it, or we may say that, it is the control system of mind. It can be understood in many ways. Max Velmans and Susan Schneider comments in *The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness* : “Anything that we are aware of at a given moment forms part of our consciousness, making conscious experience at one the most familiar and most mysterious aspect of our lives”¹.

Husserl’s concept of intentionality of consciousness:

There are many philosophers, who are engaged in trying to search about the nature of consciousness. In recent times, the German philosopher Edmund Husserl, who is a pioneer in this field of consciousness, engaged himself to reveal the structure of consciousness. It is the best known and most significant matter in his phenomenological method. Husserl’s interest mainly is to search the fundamental structure of consciousness. The nature of consciousness is such that it is always directed towards an object. This is known as the principle of intentionality. He wants to describe the structure of it through the process of bracketing. The reduction of the actual existence helps us to reach that. In his earlier writings, he already mentioned that his actual motive is to establish phenomenology as a presuppositionless science. He maintains that phenomenology is not just a subjective act of worldly object, rather it has some objective acts also. Consciousness is always about something that posses object directedness. When I am thinking about golden mountains, I am not thinking

* This contribution is a subsection in my PhD dissertation for which I am thankful to my supervisor Prof. Debika Saha.

about nothing, but about something. Intentionality of consciousness reveals all of our fantasies and hallucinations, and he concludes that they are also intentional. It means we are thinking about something that does not exist in this world, though we may think about them. Intentionality is all about the relationship between consciousness and its object. This idea is borrowed by him from Franz Brentano. In this context, 'intentional' has nothing to do with 'on purpose'. Brentano wanted to establish psychology as a science, like any other sciences. He talked of an inner perception which would indicate our psychological phenomena, our desire, our sadness or rage with an immediate awareness. He actually tries to distinguish the psychological from physical phenomena with the help of the concept of intentionality. He thought that every psychical act directs something. This peculiar sort of the intentional existence belongs to psychical phenomena. Husserl received the concept of intentionality, which is beneficial to use for philosophical purpose. There is a difference between Husserl and Brentano's thought regarding this concept.² It is a technical term which is unique in our mental acts: they extend beyond themselves towards an 'other'. Intentionality of consciousness is the central part of Husserl's *Philosophical Investigations*. He maintains that the consciousness is always intentional. As he pointed out that it is a kind of 'openness to' or relation to'. According to him, the characteristics of intention is that it refers to something objective. For him, the main structure of consciousness is the relation. When we are thinking about something, that something refers to an object. So, thinking act and the thinking object are very important. Here, Husserl pointed out that, object of our consciousness is sometimes immanent; sometimes the objectivity is not real. But, we can think about them. Here he distinguished between physical phenomena and psychical phenomena. The physical phenomenon is something which relates to the world, whereas a psychical phenomenon is something which belongs not to this world, though we can think about that. This is the reason for his commenting that to reach to the transcendental subjectivity we must ignore the actual existence of the intentional object.

Husserl understands intentionality as consisting of three major ideas i.e., intentional act, intentional object and intentional content. In *Logical Investigations*, Husserl first introduced these ideas. There he maintained that these three ideas are

correlative elements in the structure of thought and consciousness. Now, let's find out what does these three elements means:

Intentional act: Intentional act follows when it is possible to perceive, believe, evaluate, and remember something. The intentional act can be distinguished from its object, which is the topic, or state of affairs that the act is about. While seeing a table, it can be analyzed in terms of its intentional act, that visually perceives, and in terms of its intentional object of table, that is the intentional state of seeing. But, there is some distinction between intentional act and intentional object. When we perceive Taj Mahal for the first time and when we perceive that same object next time, the object is same but the intentional act is different from each other. Because, when we perceive it next time, we are remembering something that is the Taj Mahal. Here, two acts are different but at the same time these two notions are correlative.

Intentional content: One of the major elements of intentionality is the intentional content. Intentional content of an intentional act is subject who thinks about something. After reduction of the actual existence of the worldly object, what remains is the content. Some thinkers says that, when one can perceive the moon, he or she actually does not just perceive the moon, one perceives is “as bright”, “as half full” or “as particularly close to the horizon. For that matter, one perceives it “as the moon” rather than as some heavenly body. Intentional content can be thought of along the lines of a descriptions or set of information that the subject takes to characterize or be applicable to the intentional subjects of his or her thought.

Difference between intentional object and intentional content: Husserl himself makes a difference between object and content in his phenomenological method. Object is something that must exist in the actual world or corresponding to it there must be something that has an objective reality. In contrast, content is something, it is actual existence under the bracketing. Content does not corresponding to the actual existence of the worldly object. We may say that, content of an intentional act does not bother about its actual existence. We all know that intentional act is something when it is possible to believe, perceive, evaluate or imagine something. Here, imaginary things are not existent in the objective world, though we can think about them. In this way, one can think about golden mountains, and this act must be an intention act.³

Mohanty's view on Consciousness:

Mohanty's view on consciousness is very much similar with Husserl's concept of intentionality. Mohanty claims that phenomenology and Indian Buddhist philosophy bear the same view like Vedanta which assigns a place of prominence to consciousness. Mohanty, thereby seeks to overturn a certain prejudice that has been dominating Western philosophy namely, the belief that the term 'consciousness' is essentially Western concept. But he believes that this is one sided view. For example, Heidegger claims that the concept of consciousness has its historical roots in Western metaphysics. Mohanty maintained that, there is a kind of assimilation of both traditions. There is no doubt, when we used the Sanskrit term 'cit', it refers to consciousness. Both the traditions believe that one cannot naturalise consciousness. It is not possible to think the absence of consciousness, as thinking is the nature of consciousness. 'To doubt or deny that consciousness does not exist is analogous to doubting or denying that I am'. This claim may sound essentially Cartesian though Mohanty maintained that here consciousness should not be confused with a soul or with a substance that is different from the body or world. He mentioned that there is a kind of interconnection between consciousness and world. They both cannot exist without the other. It is relative insofar as there can be no thought without an awareness that we are thinking about something. It is intentional because to think means to think of something. It is intentional insofar as consciousness, 'even as transcendental contains sensory contents', a point exemplified in Husserl's treatment of the lived body and the Buddhist way of dealing with the sensory system. So, our initial understanding is that there is much in common between Buddhist philosophy and phenomenology. Mohanty enquires that, what kind of knowledge is possible after the acceptance of the correlation between world and consciousness. By providing a major role to consciousness, phenomenology faced always a problem of relativism and historicism. Mohanty does not deny transcendental idealist view that objects only constitute themselves, relates with the consciousness. For him, these means knowledge is not only relative to one's perspective but, it is also relative to our cultural practises. So, relativism is not applicable here, because we can appeal to an objectivity that can be imposed into the plurality of our world view. In fact, objectivity emerges from within. Mohanty rejects the view that maintains consciousness is subjective, and it contrasted with anything that is objective, like

material objects. He supports the German philosophical standpoint about this matter. German philosophical standpoint is that, consciousness is objective and that the body is what is subjective. Mohanty shows that, consciousness has two levels. One is the acts of consciousness and other one is the contents of consciousness. Both acts and contents of consciousness are temporal but in different ways. There is no one-to-one correlation between acts and contents but the correlation holds in a many-to-one. The same content may be the correlate of many numerically different acts and the entire thing, comprising to the many correlations, is consciousness. Consciousness is neither just the content nor just the act. Thus, he refuses to remark that consciousness is merely subjective.⁴ Mohanty divided consciousness into two different levels, such as, Mundane consciousness and Transcendental consciousness. Now, let us analysis these in the following below,

(a)Mundane consciousness: Mundane consciousness is something that belongs to the world. This type of consciousness is possible for humans, or sub- human animals. It means more precisely that, it constitutes organic and inorganic materials within nature. That means mundane consciousness is for human and animals only.

(b)Transcendental consciousness: Transcendental form of consciousness is possible only philosophically through the mundane (human and animals) consciousness. In general, we understand ‘transcendental’ as something that goes beyond our experience, or the world, or the nature. But, it is possible only within the world. Whenever we know something transcendental, we know it only within the world, without the help of the world or nature it is never possible. ⁵ There are so many other things about the mundane and transcendental consciousness that Prof. Mohanty analysed in details, but it is not possible to go into details within this short scope.

A comparative analysis between Husserl and Mohanty:

There are some similarities as well as some differences between Husserl’s and Mohanty’s thought about intentionality of consciousness. Both Husserl and Mohanty rejects historicism, Husserl also rejects naturalism and Mohanty rejects relativism. Historicism is a kind of philosophical theory that considers everything from a historical point of view. But, it concludes that there is nothing that can be

interpreted as stable. They deny the objective truth of the world. It judged everything on the basis of fact. But, as we all know, facts are something that might be true or false. But, as a phenomenologist, our goal is to search necessary foundation of knowledge on the basis of absolute truth. So, they denied historicism. On the other hand, Husserl also rejects naturalism. Naturalism is a kind of theory that considers that only physical entities are real. But, in phenomenology we find not only objective reality but also subjective reality. The same arguments that historicism accept holds true for relativism. Relativism believes that everything is factual, but phenomenology deals with absolute truth.

There is another point where they both agree. Like Husserl, Mohanty accepts that consciousness does not always refer something objective; rather it has its subjective side too. Many philosophers criticise this. The very nature of consciousness is always about something. Whenever we are thinking about something, it always refers to something objective. But, it has supports its subjective notion. We all know that Husserl actual search is for to go to pure subjectivity or pure ego. He is actually looking for our inner subjective truth.

Mohanty himself acknowledged that, Husserl's phenomenology guided his search into Indian thinking about consciousness. Husserlian thinking consists of three major components regarding consciousness: Intentionality, temporality and foundational role of consciousness. Similarly, J. N. Mohanty searches these three perspectives from the Indian tradition. Mohanty refers about this point in his edited book entitled, *Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy*. There he mentioned that these three ideas are very much similar with Husserl's concept of consciousness as well as something different from the Indian thinking. Now, let us discuss about Mohanty's interpretations about it.

- In Husserl's theory the concept of intentionality plays an important role. There are two parts that intentionality bears: Consciousness is always directed towards an object and every conscious stage has a correlative meaning. Regarding the first point there is a dispute among Indian philosophers. The Naiyaikas and Mimamsakas ascribe intrinsic object directedness to consciousness, whereas the 'spiritual' philosophers insist on the intrinsic object-less-ness of consciousness. The main point of contention

that arises here: whether the object directedness could also be ascribed to consciousness even when the later is purified from all naturalistic elements as Husserl claims.

Besides the above there are other two related issues: Does consciousness has form of its own or does it apparent form really derived from that of its object? According to Buddhist philosopher, consciousness has its own intrinsic form. But, the Naiyaikas and the Mimamsakas admit consciousness as such is formless.

- There is no doubt that everything is associated with time. But, Husserl's thesis regarding the temporality of consciousness should not be identified with this fact. Even after the bracketing of every naturalistic events consciousness as something 'purified' and transcendental is still temporal and this temporality of consciousness is the source of the objective time of nature and time of history. Here the question arises, does Indian philosophy recognize the temporality of consciousness in this sense? It is difficult to answer this question straight forwardly.
- Regarding the last components Mohanty points out, it may observed that in the Advaita Vedanta tradition consciousness only manifests, reveals evidences. The domain of objects is neither created by a god head nor an emanation of Brahman but it is created by Avidya or ignorance. In Husserl's phenomenology consciousness always directed towards an object.⁶

It is our tendency to relate between Advaita Vedanta and Husserl. But the case is not like that. Advaita Vedanta interprets Brahman as absolute real and world as non-real. Everything manifests by Brahman. But, Husserl does not deny the objective world. He maintains that, to reach to pure ego we just have to reduce ourselves from the worldly object. He is not looking for search the reality of the world. His actual concern is for pure subjectivity and that is his prime interest in phenomenological search.

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VEGETARIANISM AND ITS MORAL IMPLICATIONS*

DEBANJALI MUKHERJEE

The term vegetarianism is used to describe a diet that excludes the flesh of animals, has a long, complex history. Many of the world religions and philosophies have praised it as the ideal diet, but vegetarians have also been condemned and killed for their refusal to eat meat. The term vegetarianism was in fact coined in 1847 by the founders of the vegetarian society of Great Britain. Thus vegetarianism involves a question about the quality of human life and about the way in which humans should treat non-human animals. The choice to eat or not to eat flesh foods has typically reflected deeply ingrained philosophical and religious beliefs. Among these the foremost has been the idea of human kinship with the nonhuman world. While the underlying motives for vegetarianism differ widely throughout different cultures and historical periods, certain themes predominate. These include: the idea of transmigration of souls, compassion for nonhuman animals, asceticism, purification of the body and soul, health benefits, the dehumanizing effects of meat-eating, environmental considerations, and the unnaturalness of eating flesh foods. Some of the additional underlying themes include the association of meat with class, caste, and gender.

Vegetarianism has two major philosophical roots in the ancient world, Jainism in the East and Pythagoreanism in the West. Both schools of thought arose in the sixth century BCE at approximately the same time, and scholars continue to speculate on the cross-fertilization of ideas between the East and West. The Jainas' notion of *ahimsā* refers to the desire not to cause injury to other living beings and the concomitant idea of compassion for all living beings. Jainas argue that all life goes through a series of incarnations, with the highest incarnation belonging to humans who have attained enlightenment or *nirvāna*. By eating flesh foods humans attract negative *karma* to their soul (*jīva*), and impede their chances of attaining enlightenment. Vegetarianism condemns the practice of animal sacrifice, intimately connected to meat-eating in the ancient world. Buddhism also contains the ideas of *ahimsā*, transmigration of souls and compassion for animals. Buddhism helped to spread vegetarianism throughout Asia, and influenced the development of a strong

* This contribution is a subsection in my PhD dissertation for which I am thankful to my supervisor Dr. Laxmikanta Padhi.

vegetarian tradition in Hinduism. Pythagoras is regarded as the greatest influence on vegetarian thought in the Western world. According to Porphyry, it was not necessary to kill animals to curb the problem of animal overpopulation, since nature would find a balance by itself. From an environmental perspective, we can see that livestock are one of the most serious causes of environmental harm, and livestock production and meat eating are odds with sustainable development. On the contrary, plant agriculture and vegetarian diets are sustainable, environmentally pleasant practices. That's why it is logically beneficial to boycott livestock by adopting a vegetarian diet.

Why be a Vegetarian?

One may ask: why do we adopt vegetarianism? To respond, a vegetarian would not be willing to kill an animal for his gain, but this does not really explain the reason for becoming a vegetarian. Morality is something to be aspired after, rather than as a fundamentally selfish tool that keeps society functioning. Justification for eating meat means of disregard morality or moral behaviour towards animals. Actually animal cruelty is a terrible thing; millions of animals are being abused. If we have health, religious, spiritual, or simple dietary preference concerns, then we should consider the moral implications of what happens to our livestock.

From a moral perspective, vegetarianism may be understood as the view that due to some moral principles, one ought not to eat certain edible animals and animal products. Say for example suppose someone marooned on a desert island inhabited by edible birds, and suppose there is no edible plant life on the island and that person has a gun. In this situation, for the non-vegetarian the choice is easy, but not for the vegetarians. They can choose the path of non-vegetarians, because a bird's life is less valuable than one's own. But suppose that instead of birds the island is inhabited by some humans. Then is it morally permissible to eat humans? A vegetarian holding a moderate position might argue that it is *prima facie* wrong to kill an animal for food but there are certain human rights that is the right to life, can override this *prima facie* wrong. On this view there are cases in which it would not be right to kill a human being but it would be right to kill an animal. But still there is an important question for the moderate is, on what plausible moral principle can the distinction between animals and human beings be made? If we go through the utilitarian perspective, we find that both Singer and Regan appealed to the moral consideration

for animals. Tom Regan suggested respecting animals as being with inherent value equal to our own,¹ and Singer tried to reduce the pain and suffering of animals². Both contend that we are wronging those animals, whom we breed into existence, make to suffer, and slaughter.

Peter singer's Argument:

Singer argues that the interest of every sentient being that is affected by an action ought to be taken into account and give the same weight as like interests of any other sentient beings. He thought that sentient beings have a serious interest is not being made to suffer. So, for him practices which inflict suffering on sentient beings without good reason are morally wrong. Therefore, we ought neither to participate in, nor perpetuate morally wrong practices. Actually, Singer's utilitarian contention is that through vegetarianism, decrease in the demand for factory farmed meat will reduce animal suffering.

Tom Regan's Argument:

Regan thought that all beings with inherent value have equal inherent value, and a right to be treated respectfully. All moral agents have a duty to respect the rights of all such beings. Regan granted that, utilitarianism pre-supposes the principle of "equality of interests". The principle of equality of interests merely makes it explicit that because the principle of utility is the sole basis of morality, no other principle will limit the application of the principle of utility, or affect the way in which it operates. Regan claims that utilitarianism does not provide adequate grounds for the obligation to be a vegetarian. Rather he thought that an ethical theory based on rights does provide adequate grounds for the obligation to be a vegetarian. Actually he thought that the commitment to vegetarianism is so strong that he will be prepared to abandon any ethical theory which is unable to produce the judgment that it is wrong to eat animals.

Why is Vegetarianism a Moral Issue?

¹ "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.5, No.2 (October 1975) 181-214 and *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley ; University of California Press, 1983)

² *Animal Liberation* (New York; Avon Books, revised edition 1990) and *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition 1993)

Some philosophers think that the aim of moral theory is to systematize our common moral intuitions. As in the scientific theories the scientist matches the observed data, similarly in the ethical theories the moral philosophers match the data of moral convictions. When we apply utilitarianism to the issue of how should we treat animals, one vital point comes out immediately. Utilitarianism in its classical form aims at minimizing pain and maximizing pleasure. Many non-human animals experience pain and pleasure; therefore they are morally significant entities. They have moral standing. In this respect, they are like humans and unlike rocks. The principle of utility in utilitarianism attributes animal moral standing and ascribes to their interest equal weight with the like interest of humans. This principle of utility also lies in the consequences of denying animals of equal moral standing.

Humans do not need meat for a healthy diet, sentient beings have a serious interest for not to be suffered. Thus humans have only a trivial interest in meat. Therefore, we ought neither to participate in morally wrong practices. Historically many moral philosophers have either denied animals moral standing altogether or discounts their interests because they are not human. For example –Moore, and recently John Rawls has denied animals a place in his theory of justice, arguing that we owe justice only to those who have the concept of justice. If someone abstains from eating meat because of test or financial status, then there is no moral or philosophical question to be raised, but when a vegetarian attempts to persuade others that they should adopt vegetarian diet then it requires philosophical attention. A vegetarian might argue a number of ways morally to the rearing and killing of animals for the human table. The vegetarian in this sense does not merely require us to change or justify our eating habits, but to consider our attitude and behaviours towards members of other species.

There are two approaches a vegetarian might take in arguing that rearing and killing animals for food is morally offensive. He might argue that eating animals is morally bad, because of the pain inflicted on animals in killing them to be eaten, or he could object to the killing itself. Thus vegetarians need to be tolerant if they want to convert others into vegetarians. We need to preserve them either as respected fellow-workers or simply as companions in the joy of life and friendship.

In many societies controversy and debate have arisen over the ethics of eating animals. Robert Nozick and Peter Singer have recently advocated not eating meat on moral grounds¹. Eating animal flesh may generate different types of moral questions. If we accept that animals have rights, then killing animals for food is morally wrong. An animal that is raised for food, is being used by others rather than being respected for itself. In philosophical term, it is being treated as a means to human ends not as an end-in-itself.

When one asks “what is morality”, the answer is that moral behaviour means acting in a way which is fair to all. This means we need to extend the same rules to all. Also we need not harm others simply because of our own gain. We can see that some people who are omnivorous don’t usually claim that animals aren’t morally important. In fact they focus on our relationship with those animals which are usually consumed for food. They argue that right kind of relationship with animals is necessary for, or at least contributes to a meaningful life. The relationship involves caring for the animals, seeing they are well-treated during their lives. Thus to be a vegetarian on moral ground is to show respect and caring for nonhumans entities. Non-human animals are living beings seeking life and freedom, and avoiding harm and danger. In every ‘livestock system’, no matter how high the welfare standards are supposed to be, non-human animals will suffer. The Five Freedoms, frequently used to measure welfare, will never be met completely. They include the freedom:

- from hunger, thirst and malnutrition;
- from pain, injury and disease;
- from discomfort;
- from fear and distress;
- to express natural behaviour.

Is vegetarianism an emotional issue?

One may ask if an individual stops eating meat, does it reduce the number of animals killed by other means at all. In many societies controversy and debate have been raised over the ethics of eating animals. Our attitude towards animals suggests that we have taken the role of “creator”, “protector”, and preserving nature for our own purpose. So ugliness in persons, in deeds, in life, in surrounding nature- this is

¹ Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York, basic books 1947) p.p-35-42,
 2. Singer p.”*Animal Liberation* New York Review of Books, April-5 1973, p.p-24 idem, *Animal Liberation* (New York review of books 1975).

our worst foe. We no longer want to hear the bleating of sheep, the bellowing of bullocks, as when they are cutting to pieces in slaughter house.

A vegetarian might ask, what is the moral difference between killing a micro-organism and an animal. Some vegetarians argue that there is a difference between the two. We must avoid killing an animal because without taking meat one may live. And if some microorganisms killed in the same process, this is unfortunate but necessary for human life. Vegetarians who eat only vegetables, fruits, and nuts do not completely remove all micro-organisms from their food even with repeated cleaning. Vegetarians may attempt to justify the eating of microorganisms in a different way. They may think that since micro-organisms can't feel pain, they can eat them without scruples. They also think that we do not need meat in order to live but in order to digestive working of the body killing and eating micro-organism is necessary for human life.

A vegetarian might ask, how would someone feel if he is slaughtered and eaten? Lot of animals are killed for food, but why shouldn't we? If we accept that animals have rights, then killing animals for food is morally wrong. According to Gandhi, a selfish basis would not serve the purpose of taking a man higher and higher along the paths of evolution. What is required, the answer is an altruistic purpose. According to him; man is more than meat¹. It is the spirit of man with which we are much concerned. Therefore vegetarians need to have the moral basis that a man was not born a carnivorous animal, but born to live on the fruits and herbs that the earth grows. For him the basis of vegetarianism is not physical, but moral. Also for him, if someone says us that we will die if we dont take beef, tea or mutton even on medical advice, then we would prefer to die. That is the basis of Gandhi's vegetarianism. Even sometimes meat eaters shows a selfish refusal to share with starving human beings food that could have been made available to them, and thereby shows disregard for the principle of distributive justice. We can cite an example here to focus more, as given by John Harris. Suppose that tomorrow a group of beings from another planet were to land on earth, beings who considered themselves as superior

¹ The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism By Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma) Gandhi *Speech delivered by Gandhi at a Social Meeting organised by the London Vegetarian Society, 20 November 1931*

from us as we feel ourselves to other animals. In this context, would they have the right to treat us as we treat animals for breed, and food?¹ We may think that it is morally permissible for us to eat non-human animals but wrong for superior aliens to eat us. Most of us think that aliens are persons but animals are probably non- person. And if personhood is the ground for the right to life then it is morally permissible for us to kill and eat animals. But it is wrong for the aliens to kill and eat us, even though they kill us painlessly.

Another argument may be raised from the question of speciecism. If we ask that what is the justification for eating plants but not animals? Vegetarians may reply that animals are sentient creatures, they feel pain and have other feelings but no plant is sentient, no plant can see, hear or feel.² Some recent discoveries on plants give us some pause on this. Thus, if we know that plants feel pain then our killing them would, or at least should take a humane form. Some may argue that human beings are more valuable because of their intelligence but why does higher intelligence mean that one species is more valuable than other species? There are other species besides us that have high intelligence that is chimpanzees and dolphins. Then why should our moral attitude be towards eating members of these species?

In a way of conclusion it is argued that the killing and eating of meat indirectly tends to brutalize people. Eating meat influences people to be less kind and more violent to other people. On the contrary, not eating meat tends to make people kinder and less violent. But there is no logical connection between eating meat and being insensitive to the inhumane treatment of animals or humans rather a psychological one. For example the most well known person Hitler was a vegetarian. The Vegetarian News Digest argued that, “there is no information that indicates Hitler eliminated flesh food for humanitarian reasons”³. Hitler did not eat meat is irrelevant to this argument. Here we are only concerned with whether or not eating meat tends to make people less brutal. However, at present we have no logical reason to accept. Peter R. Cheeke once wrote that, “if most urban meat-eaters were to visit an industrial broiler house, to see how the birds are raised, harvested and “processed”,

¹ Harris, p.110

² John Harris, “killing for food” in *Animals, Men, and Morals*, edited by Stanley Godlovitch, Roslind Godlovitch, and John Harris (New York: Taplinger press, 1971) p.108

³ Quoted in Carson p.134

in a poultry processing plant, perhaps many of them would swear off eating chickens and perhaps meat”.

Thus a necessary condition for being a person is to have the capacity of realizing a context or situation of himself. There are some animals which are very intelligent such as dolphins and chimpanzees that have such kind of concept and also it is true that some adult human beings do not have such concepts. In this sense some animals and human beings may not have the right to life although most human beings and animals do have such a right. So from the view of rights, it can be said that many animals probably have no right to life, but all of them have a right not to have pain inflicted on them. People often point to some food item and ask, can you eat this? Our answer always will be “sure, we can eat what we want”. So, whenever we decide what kind of vegetarian we want to be, we should always think about what we want to include or avoid in the table.

Now, there is no doubt that the actual treatment of animals used for food is immoral and should be changed. So, if someone wants to change the present practice of treating animals used for food, the best means is to stop eating meat. This seems to be one of Singer’s basic arguments. Becoming a vegetarian is not merely a symbolic gesture.....Becoming a vegetarian is the most practical and effective step one can take towards ending both the killing of non-human animals and the infliction of suffering upon them.¹

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10. Regan Tom Singer p, *Animal Rights and Human Obligation* '1889, 1976 by Prentice Hall, New jersey p.27

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KANT AND NEWTON'S THREE LAWS OF MOTION

EAGAM KHALING

Kant's thick work on the concepts of motion as a part of his transcendental philosophy is found in his critical period publications such as *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and *Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science* (1786). Kant's quest for synthetic *a priori* propositions (judgments) in physics, mathematics and metaphysics and the scientific explanations in his philosophical works make him out to be a philosopher of science¹. Michael Friedman considers his work on Mechanics to be Newtonian in many ways. Newtonian science has remarkable contribution in the historical development of modern science. It believed that there are some similarities to Newton in Kant's concept of motion and in the formulation of his three laws of mechanics in *Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science*. Here my aim is to show the differences between Kant's Three Laws of Mechanics and Newton's Three Laws of Motion.

Kant's differences from Newton's three laws of motion

Kant's philosophy of physics* cannot be treated directly without referring to the development of modern science. There lie many differences between the two (philosophy of physics and modern science) though Kant's philosophical enterprises in the subjects of pure mathematics and physics are of no less importance². Kant's philosophy of physics is not meta-physics. Kant's understanding of metaphysics is different from philosophers like Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke and Berkeley. By 'Metaphysics' Kant understands a supposed science of the super-natural (super-

¹ According to Moti Bir Rai, Kant can be considered as a philosopher of Science and this can be known only by comparing him with other philosophers of science. Kant writes that the categories like substance, cause, interaction, etc. are indispensable for both science and everyday life. Philosophically minded scientists like Plank, Einstein, Wyle, Heisenberg, Born, Bohm and others have extensively written on these topics. All these writers refer to Kant. For detail see his, 'Kant as a Philosopher of Science', *Journal of the Department of Philosophy*, Vol. II, University of Calcutta, 1976-77, pp. 87-97.

² S.G. Martin considers *Critique of Pure Reason* as one of the finest works of Kant. According to him, Kant's name might not be heard frequently at the present but his early scientific essays were surely sufficient to secure him a permanent place in the history of science. See the author's 'Kant as a Student of Natural Science', *The Monist*, Vol.2, No.1, Oxford University Press, 1925, p.258.

* Here, 'Kant's philosophy of Physics' indicates all his philosophical views on natural science.

natural objects like God, Immortality, Freedom and etc.). Kant's enquiry in *Critique of Pure Reason* shows that metaphysics as a science is impossible because it lacks empirical intuition. On this line of understanding, it is always good to use his philosophical views in the study of contemporary philosophy of physics. Kant has taken many ideas from Newton but it does not mean that his philosophy of science is Newtonian in character¹. We have a reason to agree with Jr. Gordon G. Britton, when he expresses the following view in his *Kant's Theory of Science*:

I take this to imply that a transcendental inquiry is not concerned with the correctness of, for instance, Newtonian physics, but rather with the philosophical interpretation to be placed upon it. To put it in a slightly different way, Kant's use of "transcendental" here is designed to make a sharp distinction perhaps for the first time in the history of thought, between scientific and philosophical questions (p.130).

Philosophers dealing with Kant's philosophy of science relate him to Newtonian science. History tells us that it was the Newtonian science that was thought as consistent during the time of Kant. Apart from this notion, no one can ignore the concept of object as impossible without the concept of motion in Kantian philosophy of science². We cannot directly relate (as Michael Friedman thinks) the Kantian concept and formulation of motion to that of the Newtonian formulation. Kant has something different to show to Newtonian mechanics keeping himself confined to the scope of his subject. A similar kind of view is also presented by Eric Watkins in his article '*The Laws of Motion from Newton to Kant*' (pp.312-16). Watkins first mentions Newton's three laws of motion and thereafter compares it with the three laws of mechanics from Kant's *MFNS*³ (pp.80-84).

In regard to Newton's three laws of motion, S. Chandrasekhar thinks that the consideration of the laws and their corollaries in totality was essential for understanding the laws of motion; and this was well realised by Maxwell who

¹ Examples for the argument "Kant has taken many ideas from Newton but it does not mean that his philosophy of science is Newtonian in character" and similarities between the two are not included in this particular paper because (it needs to be discussed separately) of a thought that it might divert the main objective of the discussion.

² Kant has equalized matter with motion and vice-versa. Physics is incomplete without motion because whatever is movable in space is matter. See his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Translated and Edited by Michael Friedman, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.15.

³ MFNS is the abbreviated form of *Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science* and CPR for *Critique of Pure Reason*.

reformulated Newton's first and second laws of motion to render more precise enunciation¹. The table given below will help us to find out some differences in the formulation of Newton's three laws of motion and Kant's three laws of mechanics:

	Newton's Three Laws of Motion from Principia	Kant's Three Laws of Mechanics from MFNS
The First Law	Everybody continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it.	With regard to all changes of corporal nature the quantity of matter taken as a whole remains the same, and is neither increased nor decreased.
The Second Law	The change of motion is proportional to the motive force impressed; and is made in the direction of the right line in which that force is impressed.	Every change of matter has an external cause. (Everybody remains in its state of rest or motion in the same direction and with the same velocity unless it is compelled by an external cause to forsake this state).
The Third Law	To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction: or, the mutual action of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.	In all communication of motion, action and reaction are always equal to one another.

In the above table, we get the concept of inertia and momentum in Newton's first law of motion but in Kant's first law of mechanics we get the law of conservation. Kant states that quantity of matter must be conserved throughout the communication of motion but Newton does not. Kant's first law of motion as a statement of the conservation law is a consequence of his First Analogy of

¹ S. Chandrasekhar starts by mentioning how Newton has proceeded to his second lesson to formulate the basis for his entire dynamics in the form of three laws of motion and five corollaries as an essential part of the laws and he did this only after writing the introductory lesson on fundamental notions. The repaired three laws are: (i) Everybody continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it. (ii) The change of motion is proportional to the motive force impressed; and is made in the direction of the right line in which that force is impressed. (iii) To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction: or, the mutual action of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts. See his *Newton's Principia for the Common Reader* Kolkata, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 22-31.

Experience¹. But Newton's first law of motion is about uniform motion in a straight line. It tells us that velocity of everybody is constant unless changed by force. According to it, acceleration is produced by force. It assumes the existence of force and defines it as the only agent that can produce acceleration. The property offering resisting force in opposition to any body that changes or tends to change its velocity is called inertia.

Newton's second law is about a method of measuring force. Generally, a force is measured by balancing it by a known force as in the operation of weighing a body. For instance, a force ' f ' acting on a mass ' m ' for ' t ' sec and changing its velocity from u to v . The momentum of a body at any instant is defined as the product of its mass and its velocity, $M = mv$. We do not get a mention of Newton's first law of motion in Kant's second law of mechanics. Kant provides a different formulation of Newton's law of inertia, citing change of matter and external causality rather than change of motion and forces. This second law of mechanics is also connected to his Second Analogy of Experience².

According to Watkins, Kant's third law of mechanics and Newton's third law of motion for all practical purpose are more or less identical. He further adds to it that Kant goes beyond Newton by providing an *a priori* proof of the truth of this law and a satisfactory ontological account of how action and reaction occur³. The ontological account provided for the communication of motion (action and reaction) can only be understood from Kant's rationalist metaphysical background. We may quote Moti Bir Rai from his 'Kant as a Philosopher of Science':

When Kant deals with community (action and reaction), he is dealing with the *a priori* conditions of empirical knowledge. To abandon the principle of community is equivalent to giving up belief in gravitation. If material bodies do not gravitate, then

¹ In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished. See Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Translated by John P. Mahaffy, London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1958, p.212.

² All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect. See Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Translated by John P. Mahaffy, London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1958, p. 218.

³ See Eric Watkins's 'Kant's Justification of the Laws of Mechanics', *Kant and the Sciences*, Edited by himself, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.146.

both Newton and Einstein must be credited with having solved a pseudo-problem. Gravitation is a technical name for what Kant calls reciprocal action (interaction) between and among material bodies. (p.96)

That the views of Kant in his laws of mechanics are divergent from Newton's three laws of motion is also shown by Howard Duncan in his article 'Inertia, the Communication of Motion, and Kant's Third Law of Mechanics' published in *Philosophy of Science* (p. 93-119). According to Duncan,

- I. Kant's first law of mechanics is his version of the standard mechanical principle that matter is neither created nor destroyed in natural event. But Newton's view in his first law of motion is different from Kant's first law of mechanics because it is not about the conservation of mass (matter) in the communication of motion (p.100).
- II. From a different perspective, Kant's second law of mechanics is the principle of the lifelessness of matter, a principle which Kant thought to be necessary for the possibility of a science of nature. In the second law, Kant rejects the Newtonian force of inertia which carries the connotation of a striving by a body to remain in a given condition. For Kant, inertia signifies merely the complete inefficacy of a body in itself. But Newton's first law does not follow from the lifelessness of matter alone, which means that any change in the state of a body is not self-caused (p.101). Gordon G. Brittan points out in *Kant's Theory of Science* that the so-called 'force of inertia' is for Kant the paradigm of a living force (p.161). According to him, Kant intended to eliminate the concept of inertial force and this elimination has three aspects: i) The inertial force precludes the possibility of mathematical physics. ii) The concept of inertial force is empty. iii) Nothing but the opposite motion of another body can resist a motion, but this other's rest cannot resist a motion.
- III. Kant's view of reaction in his third law of mechanics is the motion of a body that is opposed to the motion of another body upon it. It expresses Kant's law of inertia or the lifelessness of matter, a body can have no causal effect upon another, and, therefore, cannot be reactive, unless it is in motion. Thus drawing from his second law, a reactive as well as active body must be in motion;

reaction is the motion of a body and is measurable as moving force. Therefore, Kant's view 'a reactive body can be such even if in a state of rest' is divergent¹ to Newton's view 'inertial force is an essential and active property of bodies' (p. 101-2).

The differences (and divergence) of Kant's formulation of three laws of mechanics from Newton's three laws of motion were due to their different philosophical programmes. Kant's programme was a programme of doing philosophy of science. He was not directly concerned with any kind of experiment and generalisation of the laws but with the consideration of laws of mechanics as synthetic *a priori* judgments. Kant's three laws of mechanic in *MFNS* are related to the 'Analogies of Experience' in *CPR*. The principles incorporate certain categories which are *a priori* and the laws incorporate certain principles which are synthetic *a priori* propositions. When these principles are applied and valid of objects of experience or reality then they become synthetic *a priori* judgments. For Kant, the three laws of mechanics are synthetic *a priori* judgments. His programme in the formulation of the three laws of mechanics was to establish his main project of showing a possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments in physics. Therefore, the main reason for the above differences between Kant's three laws of mechanics and Newton's three laws of motion was due to Kant's own programme of establishing the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments in physics.

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¹ Eric Watkins also states this in another way in his 'The Laws of Motion from Newton to Kant', *Perspective on Science* (Vol. 5, No. 3, 1997, p. 314), "Kant does, parenthetically, restate a principle very similar to Newton's laws of inertia following his own formulation (so that one might think that the difference between the two is due to a looseness in translation from the Latin and is thus merely apparent), but such a principle could be simply an instance of his more general law rather than an equivalent formulation."

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CONTROVERSY BETWEEN AMBEDKAR AND GANDHI ON CAST AND VARNA: SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS

NIRMAL KUMAR ROY

B.R.Ambedkar, a renowned social reformer and the father of Indian constitution, who sacrificed his whole life to ensure the wellbeing of the whole society in general and the downtrodden people in particular was invited by the *Jat-Pal-Todak Mandal*, an organization of caste Hindu social reformers of Punjab to preside over its Annual Conference which was to be held at Lahore, the headquarters of the Mandal, in 1936. It is important to note that the one and the only aim of the *Jat-Pat-Todak Mandal*, as it is understood by Ambedkar, was to annihilate the Caste System from amongst the Hindus. Ambedkar prepared a long, informative scholarly and thought provoking presidential address. The members of the reception committee of the Mandal went through the speech and came to the conclusion that though the speech as a whole is worthy of being highly certified but some of the passages are detrimental to the purpose of the Mandal. So, Har Bhagwan, on behalf of the Mandal, requested Ambedkar to drop those passages from the speech he prepared to deliver from the presidential chair. But Ambedkar declined to drop even the comma and the semi colon from his speech. As a result the conference was declared postponed since die. Ambedkar thought that owing to the cancellation of the conference people were deprived of the opportunity to know the views of him on the problems imposed by the Caste System in our society. Long before the cancellation of the conference the presidential address prepared by Ambedkar had been printed and the copies of the same were lying on his hand. Therefore, Ambedkar decided to put the printed copies in the market so that people can avail the opportunity to know his views. Like many others Mahatma Gandhi himself also went through the printed presidential address prepared by Ambedkar and came to know the following important views of Ambedkar :-

Ambedkar observed that most of the problems our society suffers from like untouchability, starvation, disintegrity, degradation of morality, oppression etc. are nothing but the corollary of the caste system. This caste system, in turn, is the result of the *Varṇa Vyavasthā*. And *varna Vyavasthā* is directly sanctioned by Hindu Scriptures. So, it can be said that caste system too is indirectly sanctioned by the

Hindu Scriptures. As the caste system has ultimately been sanctioned by the Hindu *Śāstras*, it cannot be eradicated without discarding the authority of the Hindu *Śāstras*. In this context it is worthy to note that according to Ambedkar, untouchability also cannot be brushed away without denying the authority of the same as it is an unavoidable corollary of the caste system. Ambedkar held that the Hindus observe caste and untouchability not because they are inhuman but because they are deeply religious. Inhuman behavior of the Hindus are the result of their firm faith inculcated upon their minds by the *Śāstras*. So they will change their attitude and conduct when they will cease to believe in the authority and sanctity of the *Śāstras*. In this context Ambedkar very beautifully says, “Make every man and woman free from the thralldom of the *Śāstras*, and he or she will inter-dine and inter-marry, without your telling him or her to do so”. So, Ambedkar thought that in observing caste and untouchability the Hindus are not wrong, what is really wrong is nothing but the Hindu religion itself, which is the root cause of all the major problems of Hindu society. So, our society can be made cure from the disease only through the destruction of the faith of the people upon the sanctity and authority of the *Śāstras*.

After reading the presidential address prepared by Ambedkar Gandhiji had a close examination of the same and came to the conclusion that each and every reformer needs to go through his address to be benefited. But at the same time he also pointed-out that it is important to go through his address not because it is not open to objection, but simply because it is open to serious objection. Gandhiji nicely presented the objections in the following way:

- First, Gandhiji said that the texts which Ambedkar quotes to stand his own position mentioned in his address are not authentic and original. So, his position cannot be accepted to be true.
- Second, to realize the spirit of Hindu religion as well as to understand the actual import of it what is necessary is to interpret its *Śāstras* accurately. But Gandhiji says that the learned persons are not the right persons to interpret the *Śāstras*, the right persons to interpret them are only the Saints and Sages. So far as the interpretation and understanding of the Saints and Sages go there is no room for caste and untouchability in Hinduism. Ambedkar is a

learned person no doubt, but he is not a Saint. Consequently, his interpretation and understanding of the Hindu *Sastras* cannot be proper. Gandhiji himself observed that infact Hindu religion has nothing to do with the caste and untouchability. Caste, Gandhiji said, is nothing but a custom, but he frankly admits that he is fully ignorant of its origin. Gandhiji further pointed out that our religion has the room for *Varṇas* and *Āśramas* but they have nothing to do with the caste and untouchability. There is nothing wrong in the *varṇas* and the *Āśramas* which are sanctioned by religion. The law of *Varṇa* says nothing about our rights, it says only about our duties. It prescribes our professions and nothing else. It advises us to follow the callings of our ancestors for our livelihood which is conducive for ensuring the wellbeing of our society. All the callings are equal in status; none of them is superior or inferior. Due performance of them carries same merit before God. So to ascribe superiority or inferiority to any one of them is to violate the very law of *Varṇas*. Likewise, in *Varna* there is no place for untouchability as well.

I am not agreeing with Gandhiji so far as his second objection is concerned. This fact cannot be denied that there are some elements (layers) in religion which lie beyond the reach of our intelligence. But this does not mean that no element in religion can be understood through intelligence. I think whether caste system and untouchability follow from Hindu Religion can very well be understood through intelligence. Well educated persons like Ambedkar are intelligent enough. So, this is not that an educated person is not a right person to understand whether caste system and untouchability follow from Hindu Religion.

In the third argument Gandhiji pointed out that Ambedkar judged Hindu Religion in the light of its worst specimens but not by its best ones. But it is not the proper way to understand any religion. Religion has to be judged not by its worst specimens but by the best it might have produced. If Hindu religion is judged in the light of the religion professed by Chaitannya, Tukaram, Ramkrishna, Ram Mohan Roy, Debendra Nath Tagore, and Vivekananda and so on, the so called good specimens only then the actual spirit of it can be understood. In this case no one can deny the merit of Hindu Religion.

Ambedkar has beautifully countered each and every aforesaid objection raised by Gandhiji against him. He categorically said that any reader of his speech would understand that Mahatma has entirely missed the issues raised by him. Ambedkar further mentioned that Gandhiji has raised some false allegations which are not issues that actually arise out of what he liked to call his indictment of the Hindus. So, the questions put forth by Gandhiji are fully beside the point and the main argument of the speech was lost upon him.

In order to counter the first argument raised against him Ambedkar frankly admits that he is not the right person to determine which *Śāstras* are actually authentic and original and which are not but all the *Śāstras* or the texts cited by him are in fact, taken from the writings of Tilak. No one will deny the authority of him on the Sanskrit language and on the Hindu *Śāstras*. So, this objection virtually does not stand as because the originality and the authority of the texts cited by Ambedkar have been recognized by Tilak. Even if somebody continues to insist that this objection is valid then the objection actually goes against Tilak but not against Ambedkar.

The reply given by Ambedkar to the first objection, I think, is well grounded. If the books which have been cited by Ambedkar to be authentic are taken from the list made by Bal Gangadhar Tilak then the responsibility is of Tilak, not of Ambedkar.

In reply to the second objection Ambedkar said that according to the Mahatma only the saints and the sages are the right persons to interpret Hindu *Śāstras* and as far as the interpretations of them are concerned there is neither the place of caste system nor the place of untouchability in Hinduism. Here, Ambedkar said that if what the Mahatma observes were true then the saints should have raised their voice against the caste and untouchability prevailing in our society. But no saint has ever been seen to do so. Moreover, they themselves are the staunch believer in the systems of caste and untouchability. Most of the saints used to live and died as members of caste. Ambedkar cited a classic example of Jnyandeo, one of the best specimens of the Hindu religion mentioned by Gandhiji, who was so passionately attached to his status as a Brahmin that when the Brahmins of Paithan would deny him to their fold he moved heaven and earth to establish his status. Here one may cite the case of saint Eknath as an example which goes against the view of Ambedkar. Eknath used to

touch the untouchables and dine with them. So, what is claimed by Ambedkar that none of the saints is seen to touch the untouchables cannot be accepted. But in response to this objection Ambedkar said that saint Eknath did so not because he did not support the cast system and untouchability but because he wanted to show the magic power of the holy river Ganges. He did believe that through the touch of the untouchables one positively be polluted. But that pollution could be washed away by a bath in the sacred river Ganges. Ambedkar further said that even if the saints would have been seen to break the caste system it would not have affect upon the life of the common people, because it is taught that saints should not be followed by common people. It is taught that a saint might break caste but the common people are strictly prohibited to do the same. On the basis of the discussion so far it can be said that it is nothing but a false consolation that there were saints who understands or interprets *śāstras* differently from the learned persons.

So far as the reply to the second objection is concerned I partially agree and partially disagree with Ambedkar. In his second reply Ambedkar said that if, as a matter of fact, caste and untouchability do not follow from Hindu religion and it is truly understood by the saints then they should have raised their voice against the caste and untouchability which gives birth to so many problems in our society. I fully agree with Ambedkar on this point. But I am in doubt about how much Ambedkar's claim that the saints themselves follow the caste system is justified. Dr. Ambedkar, in order to substantiate his own position, cited a classic example of Jnyandeyo who was passionately attached to his status as a Brahmin. But so far as my understanding goes Brahmin is one of the *Varṇas*, not a caste. Chatterjee, Mukherjee, Bannerjee and so on are the instances of caste. So, Jyandeyo claimed for *Varṇas* not for caste. Besides this the objection of Ambedkar that all the saints themselves follow the caste system in their own life cannot be accepted. At least some of the saints like Ramkrishna Deva, Swami Vivekananda, Sri Chaitannya Deva and some other did not follow the same in their own lives. Moreover, they raised objections against the caste system prevailing in our society. So, at least this objection of Ambedkar is not true.

In order to counter the third objection mentioned above Ambedkar said that he himself agreed with every word of the statement that a religion has to be judged not by its worst specimens but by the best it might have produced. But he pointed out

that this did not dispose of the matter. Here the question comes - why are the numbers of worst specimen so many and the number of the best specimen so few? Ambedkar himself assumed two probable alternative answers to this question. The first answer is that the worst ones by the very nature are so perverse that they are not worthy of being morally educated. And the second answer is that the religious ideal is absolutely wrong which has given a wrong moral twist to the masses and in spite of the wrong ideal the best have become the best just by giving the wrong twist a turn to the right direction. According to Ambedkar, the second answer is the only logical and reasonable answer. In that case the Mahatma's argument that a religion should be judged in the light of its best specimens shows us no solution to the objection raised by Ambedkar.

In the next step Ambedkar showed that Gandhiji himself did not follow in his life what he preached. He said that the Mahatma was a Bania by birth. So his calling is trading. But neither his ancestors nor he himself even touched trading to earn their bread. The forefathers of the Mahatma took ministership as their profession which is a calling meant for the Brahmins. Gandhiji before becoming a Mahatma took law as his callings. Subsequently, abandoning law he became half saint and half politicians. The sons of the Mahatma too did not resort to trading for their livelihood. Ambedkar said of the youngest son of the Mahatma who was a faithful follower of him. He born as a *Vaishya*, got married a Brahmin daughter and took a profession of newspaper magnate. Most surprisingly the Mahatma, Ambedkar said, is not known to have raised any objection against his son for this. This clearly implies that in the name of *Varṇa Vyavasthā* Gandhiji deceived common people. Besides this, Ambedkar pointed out another logical consequence of this theory which is morally indefensible. According to this doctrine one must pursue the calling of his forefather. If so, the one must continue to be a pimp, if his grandfather was a pimp, likewise a woman must continue to be a prostitute because her grandmother was a prostitute. Is it not a morally indispensable position? I think the observation made by Ambedkar here is appropriate. As long as the proverb, "*Apani ācāri dharma apare sekhāo*" - is concerned Gandhiji's teaching to follow *Varṇaśrama dharma* has lost its moral strength.

The real Brahmins who are living on alms freely given to them, who are otherwise called hereditary Brahmin priest, according to Mahatma, are carrier of the spiritual treasures. But Ambedkar drew our attention to the dark side of the hereditary *Brāhmin* Priest. He says that a Brahmin can be a priest to Vishnu, to Shiva, to Buddha, to Kali, who are the God of love, the God of destruction, the greatest teacher of mankind teaching the noblest doctrine of love, the Goddess having regular sacrifice of an animal to satisfy her thirst for blood respectively. Likewise, he can be a priest to so many Gods and Goddesses having antagonistic attributes. No honest man can be a devotee to all of them. But here it is said that this is due to the catholicity and spirit of toleration, the greatest virtue of Hindu religion that one *Brāhmin* can be a priest of so many Gods and Goddesses having opposite characters. But Ambedkar sharply reacted to this reply and said that toleration here is nothing but another name for insincerity. In that case a person must be deemed to be bankrupt of all spiritual treasures. A person pursues such a calling simply because it is ancestral, and for nothing else. One cannot have any love and faith upon such a calling. It is nothing but a mechanical process handed down from father to son barring conservation of virtue.

Ambedkar said that there was a time when the Mahatma was a full-blooded and blue-blooded *Sanatani* Hindu and a blind supporter of caste system. He defended it with the vigor of the orthodox and strongly opposed the inter-dining, inter-drinking and inter-marrying. He had a firm conviction that restraint about inter-dinning etc. helps a lot in cultivating will-power and conservation of certain social virtues. Now he is greatly changed. No more he believes in the caste system. He admits that caste is harmful both to spiritual and national growth. Keeping this in view someone may think that the Mahatma has made much progress as he now believes only in *varṇa* but not in caste. But Dr. Ambedkar does not agree with them. He says that *varṇa* as it is understood by Gandhiji is nothing but caste. He actually confuses one for another. Ambedkar says, “The essence of Vedic conception of *varṇa* is the pursuit of a calling which is appropriate to one’s natural aptitude. The essence of the Mahatma’s conception of *varṇa* is the pursuit of ancestral calling irrespective of natural aptitude”. So as defined by the Mahatma, *varṇa* actually is nothing but another name for caste simply because the essence of both of them is one and the same, i.e pursuit

of ancestral calling. Actually *varṇa* and caste are distinct as chalk and cheese. *Varna* advocates determining ones calling on the basis of one's worth irrespective of ones birth and caste, on the other, cast advocates to do the same on the basis of one's birth irrespective of one's worth. So, the Mahatma, in fact, advocates the caste system in the name of *Varṇa Vyavasthā*. Ambedkar says that the Mahatma has no definite and clear conception about the distinction between *varṇa* and caste and about the necessity of either for the conservation of Hinduism. Does he regard *varṇa* as the essence of Hinduism? In reply to this question Ambedkar says that it is not possible to give any categorical answer. The readers of his article on "Dr. Ambedkar's Indictment" will reply in the negative. But the readers of his article in reply to Shanta Ram will respond affirmatively. In putting the objection against Sant Ram Ambedkar says that how can a Muslim remain one if he rejects the *Quran*, or a Christian remain as Christian if he rejects the *Bible*? Here Ambedkar beautifully raises an objection against Gandhiji following the same reason. He says that if caste and *varṇa* are convertible terms and if *varṇa* is an integral part of Hinduism then how does the Mahatma claims himself as a Hindu as he rejects caste which is nothing but *varṇa*? Ambedkar here puts some objections – why this prevarication? Why does the Mahatma hedge? Has he failed to realize the truth? Or does the politician stand in the way of the Saint? Ambedkar assumes two alternative answers to these questions. One answer is – it may be due to his childlike temperament. And the second answer is – it may be due to the double role played by the Mahatma. His dubious role is the role of the Mahatma and a politician. He wants to spiritualize politics. A politician wants to deceive the society as he believes that a society cannot bear the whole truth and he must not speak the whole truth as it is bad for his politics. The Mahatma is always supporting the caste and *varṇa* due to the fact that if he opposes them he may lose his place in politics. It is not so important to note that which one exactly is the source of this confusion, what is worthy to note here is that by preaching caste in the name of *varṇa* he deceives himself and the others as well.

I think the objection that has been raised here by B.R. Ambedkar against Gandhiji is most important. Ambedkar says that Gandhiji, in fact, hopelessly fails to understand the distinction between *varṇa* and caste. According to Gandhiji both *varṇa* and caste propose to follow the calling of our ancestors'. But Ambedkar says

that this is not the case at all. *Varṇa* proposes to follow the calling which is suitable to our worth irrespective of birth. Caste proposes to follow the callings of our forefathers on the basis of birth irrespective of our worth. The significance of this objection of Ambedkar is far-reaching. Gandhiji strongly recommends for *varṇa*. He says that each and every person should follow the *Varṇa Vyavasthā* as there is nothing wrong in it rather it ensures the wellbeing of our society. But caste, Gandhiji observes, should be annihilated for it gives birth to so many problems in our society. If Gandhiji really confuses *varṇa* for caste then the advice to follow the *Varṇa Vyavasthā* amounts to advice to follow the caste system and to advice to annihilate the caste is the same as to advice to annihilate the *Varṇa Vyavasthā*. So, Gandhiji suffers from serious contradiction. Therefore, the question comes - does Gandhiji really confuse *varṇa* for caste? I think a close scrutiny should be made on this point.

Apparently the distinction between caste and *varṇa* is crystal clear. Caste is determined on the basis of birth but *varṇa* is determined on the basis of worth. Here so far as the caste is concerned there is no problem but problem crops up in the case of *varṇa*. Is the process of being *Brāhmana*, *Kṣatriya*, *Vaisya* and *Shudra* according to one's worth automatic or is it regulated? The first alternative cannot be true. Had it been automatic then saying of *Varṇa Vyavasthā* and advising to follow the same in *Śāstra* would have been meaningless. In that case there would have been no difference between *Varṇa Vyavasthā* of Hinduism and the absence of the same in other religious systems of the world. This implies that the second alternative is true. But here the question arises - who will regulate the system? Will it be regulated by human being or by God? If the first alternative is accepted then a number of problems will arise. We know that to err is human. So, there is every possibility that a man may commit the mistake in assessing the worth of a person. Secondly, the chance of manipulation cannot be overcome. The verdict of the authority concerned may not be obeyed by all. So, there is also the chance of chaos and anarchy. All these problems can be overcome if the second alternative is taken to be true. In *Śāstra* like the *Śrīmad Bhagavat Gītā* and the *Vedas* it is clearly mentioned that God Himself regulates the system of *varṇas*. In *Gītā* it is said, “*Cāturvarṇam mayā śṛṣṭam guṇa karma vibhāgasa*”. It means four *varṇas* have been created by God Himself on the basis of worth (*guṇa* and *karma*). But it is absurd to maintain that God comes to us physically

and regulate *Varṇa Vyavasthā*. How does the He regulate the *Varṇa Vyavasthā* then? The only rational answer, I think, is that He regulates this system through the law of *Karma*. Following the worth of *karma* performed by a particular person God determines the birth of that person. More clearly to say on the basis of merit of *karma* performed by a person God determines whether he will take his birth in a Brahmin family or a *Shudra* family. So following the law of *karma* God regulates one's birth and thereby He indirectly regulates one's *varṇa* too. If one takes his birth in a Brahmin family then he becomes Brahman by *varṇa* but if he takes his birth in a *Sudra* family then he turns into *Sudra* by *varṇa*. Thus it is seen that birth turns into an identifying mark for both of the caste and *varṇa*. So, in that case both caste and *varṇa* propose one to follow the callings of one's forefathers. Thus it is seen that there is nothing wrong in the observation of Gandhiji. If this is the case then how can caste be distinguished from *varṇa*? In reply it can be said that in the case of caste birth stands both for identifying mark and defining characteristics but in the case of *varṇa* birth stands only for identifying mark but not for defining characteristics. Besides this Caste is the creation of the ill intention of some people living in our society, but *varṇa* is the creation of the Good will of God.

If we agree with the above observation of Gandhiji then some problems inevitably crop up. According to the foregoing explanation the under given cycle follows - From *karma* follows birth, from birth follows *varṇa* and from *varṇa* again follows *karma*. This cycle continues endlessly. In that case a Brahmin will remain a Brahman and a *Shudra* will continue to be a *Shudra* forever. If so then a *Shudra* can never enter into the territory of a *Brāhmaṇa* and vice-versa. But this does not accommodate with the spirit of the *Śāstra*. When Srikrishṇa in *Gītā* says, “*śvadharme nidhanaṁ śreya paradharma bhayāvah*” then it implies that the fact is otherwise. It implies that the *Śāstra* inspires one to make an upliftment in the sphere of *varṇa*. One who belongs to the *varṇa* called *Shudra* should try his best to enter into the territory of *Kṣatriya* or *Brāhmanas*. In *Śāstra* we came across some instances of some persons who took their birth in lower *varṇas* but became capable of attaining higher *varṇas* owing to their worth, i.e. *guṇa* and *karma* in the same life. The Saint Visvamitra is the living example of this case. The name Prahallada is also well known who took his

birth in the family of *Rākṣasa* but became the renounced *Bhakta* of God. So, the position of M.K. Gandhi mentioned above is not supported by Hindu *Śāstras* too.

Had the observation of Gandhiji been true Vishvamitra could not have been a *Brāhmaṇa* who was *Kṣatriya* by birth? So, it needs to re-examine. I think, in the above explanation given to substantiate the position of Gandhiji one important point has been ignored. In the *Śrīmad Bhāgavat Gitā*, Krishna categorically mentions the criterion for creating four *varṇas*. This criterion consists of two units – one is *guṇa* and the other is *karma*. In the earlier explanation *guṇa* which, perhaps is given the priority in the *Gitā*, has been ignored. So, *varṇa* determining factors are two – *guṇa* and *karma*. One may take one's birth in a *Shudra*-family but his *guṇa* may not be *Shudra*-like, his *guṇa* may be *Brāhmaṇa*-like. In that case though one is *Shudra* by birth but the calling he has to follow is not the calling of a *Shudra* but the calling of a *Brāhmaṇa*. Vishvamitra for example, was *Kṣatriya* by birth but as his *guṇa* was *Brāhmaṇa*-like he became *Brāhmaṇa* and followed the callings of a *Brāhmaṇa*. So, one's birth or one's callings of forefathers has nothing to do with the calling of a person. Thus it is shown that the observation of Gandhiji that *varṇa* proposes one to follow the callings of one's ancestors is not acceptable. So far as our observation is concerned, here deviation comes from the *guṇa*. One can come out of the traditional circle due to the new *guṇa*.

If we have a close look into the spirit of the *Śāstra* then it can be understood that the deviation may be taken place due to *karma* even. When in *Gitā* Sri Krishna says, “*Svadharme nidhanaṁ sreya Paradharmā Bhayāvah*” it implies that if a *Shudra* follows and performs his *Svadharmā* that is the calling of his forefathers as perfectly as possible then that *karma* will lead him to take his birth in the upper *varṇa* that is in *Kṣatriya* or *Brāhmaṇa varṇa* in his next life. And in that case the view of Gandhiji cannot be countered like the above way.

A pertinent question arises - when Sri Krishna says to Arjuna, “*Cāturvarṇa mayā sristam guṇa karma bhivāgasa*” then what does it actually mean? Does it mean that the classification into four *varṇas* are being made by God through birth, if so, then why? If the classification is made on the basis of the *karma* performed by one in the previous birth, then what is the problem? If the same classification is made on the basis of the *guṇa* and *karma* that is the natural aptitude and capacity of the persons of

their present birth, is it not more scientific and logical? The instance of Vishvamitra and Prahallada substantiate this position. Besides this the spirit of *caitanya charitamṛta* also supports the same view – “*Kivā vipro kivā nyasī śūdro kane noi/jei kriṣṇa tattvabettvā sei guru hoi!*”

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3. *śreyān svadharmo bhūṅkṣyati paradharmāt svanuṣṭhitāt/Svadharme nidhanam śreyah paradharmo bhayāvahah!* (*Srimadbhagavat Gītā*, tṛtīya adhyāya, śloka 35)
4. *Cāturvarṇamāyā sṛṣṭam guṇakarmavibhāgaśh/ tasya kartāramapi mām vidhyakartārām avyam!* (*śrimadbhagavad Gītā*, caturtha adhyāya , śloka 13)

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