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EDITORIAL NOTE

It is indeed a matter of great pleasure that the ninth issue of the Journal of the Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, entitled: *Philosophical Papers* is ready for its publication. For various reasons there was some delay in its preparation. During the course of its preparation all members of the Editorial Board and all the faculty members of this Department helped immensely and thereby tied us with our indebtedness to them. Various authorities of the University also facilitated in a number of ways by providing logistics. We owe our gratitude to them. Without the active help and cooperation of the University Press, it would not have been possible to complete the work. We must thank them for all that they have done. We also thank the contributors for agreeing to contribute their research papers in our annual Departmental journal.

The dialogue between the skeptics and the non-skeptics has been continuing since Pyrrho in western tradition. Skeptical tradition is also found in Chinese and Indian traditions. The challenges thrown by skepticism have shaped the discussion on epistemology in all these traditions. Theories have been developed to meet these challenges. It is needless to say that in modern and contemporary philosophy we still find deliberations on skepticism. Such is the power of it. Ram C. Majhi in his research article 'Dretske's Theory of Relevant Alternatives from a Skeptical Position' shows the importance of skepticism in philosophy and refers to Dretske's theory of relevant alternatives to examine if it can meet the skeptical challenge that knowledge of external world is not possible. Dretske believes that his theory does meet the challenge. However, Dr. Majhi is of the opinion that the theory of Dretske was developed ignoring the spirit of skepticism espoused by philosophers such as Sextus Empiricus, Chuang Tzu, Nagarjuna and Nietzsche.

Logic has been the focal point of both Indian and Western philosophy, and no student of philosophy can overlook their obvious similarities as well as their differences. Attempts have been made to reformulate Indian logic into Aristotelian schema and first-order predicate calculus. Ruchira Majumdar presents a brief sketch of *Navya-Nyāya* logic, which is the most prominent among the Indian logical systems in general, and then she compares it to traditional the Western logic of Aristotle. Finally,

she has made an effort to reconstruct the *Navya-Nyāya* logic into modern symbolic logic.

The objection against philosophy is that philosophy has nothing to do with ensuring the progress and development of our life and society. When some criticize philosophy in this way, they, actually, fail to understand the meaning of life and society. They also commit a blunder in understanding the meaning of the terms ‘progress’ and ‘development’ which are not synonymous. In fact, development or upliftment of our life and society does not only mean the material development, like financial or technological upliftment, it also includes the spiritual progress. Nirmal Kumar Roy tries to show that the people who object have seen only the one half of the whole truth and the other half has been overlooked by him. He refers to the philosophical thinking of Socrates, Rabindranath, Gandhi, Vivekananda and Indian ethical perspective especially, the *Vedanta* tradition which promote that philosophy, in no way, is less important than science and technology in our practical life.

Benu Lal Dhar in his scholarly article entitled ‘Some Contemporary Philosophical Theories of Human Rights: A Review’ mainly focuses on the human rights theories of T. H. Green, Margaret MacDonald, Carl Wellman and Joel Feinberg. He delineates at length various dimensions of human rights theory which significantly contributed in understanding human rights in contemporary times. He shows that Green and MacDonald developed their own theory in question by way of rejecting natural rights theory whereas rest two thinkers though not clearly repudiated natural right theory but they developed their theory independently of it. Dhar shows how Wellman conceived natural rights as ethical rights. He also pictured very beautifully the irreducible duality found in the concept of right that was recognized by Green and Feinberg.

Kripke’s unsubstantiated claim that new riddle of induction is a form of rule-following skepticism, has prompted the question: Is new riddle of induction really a form of rule-following skepticism? In answering this question, Gopal Sahu argues that Goodman’s new riddle of induction poses a paradox of induction underlying the rule-following skepticism. The new riddle of induction on the face of it may not appear to be a version of rule-following skepticism. Sahu argued that Goodman had anticipated the rule-following skepticism and he formulated the paradox rule-following pertaining to induction. Kripke’s formulation of the rule-following

skepticism raises the issue in the generalization of the future behaviour from the past observation, the problem of meaning and justification and the problem of other minds. Goodman in his formulation of the paradox makes use of the rule-following consideration in generalizing observed from unobserved. The inductive inference similar to the functions of rules acts as the normative-constraints over infinite number of projections of the predicates. The possibility of the same evidence statement giving rise to incompatible hypotheses is similar to that of the multiple interpretations of the rules, is the basis of both the new riddle of induction and rule-following skepticism. Thus, Gopal Sahu substantiates Kripke's claim in answering the question in affirmative.

Perception is the most elementary and fundamental source of knowledge. To the ordinary mind, it is so simple and reliable that it presents no problem at all. We generally believe that our judgment based on perception must be true. Even some logicians and philosophers uphold the common sense view that perception is the ultimate ground of all knowledge and there is no room for doubting perceptual judgment. Though there are several problems in perception or the evidence of perception. The perception of an object takes place in certain space and time. But when we consider the perception of time, several problems may arise and Samar Kumar Mandal in his scholarly article entitled 'The Problem of Time-Consciousness: Kant and Husserl' explores the problems relating to perception which is regarded as the most reliable source of knowledge. While discussing this issue he concentrates mainly on two stalwarts of European continent - Kant and Husserl. The issue is so vital that it cuts across a number of branches such as metaphysical, epistemological and also philosophy of mind. He shows, while discussing the Kantian framework, how knowing consciousness itself occurs in time. In order to show that the ultimate subject of consciousness is non-temporal, a distinction is introduced between ordinary knowing consciousness and the ultimate knowing consciousness. This distinction however begs the question of relation between these two sorts of consciousness. Though Kant faces this problem Husserl's framework could avert this difficulty.

Ngaleknao Ramthing starts on Utilitarianism with an intention to identify as to how this theory corroborates with various ethical and social issues. The teleological view of morality links the idea of right action with the idea of consequence and the idea of

consequence with the idea of good. It considers good as a central concept and defines other correlated concepts such as right, obligation, ought and duty in terms of it. Utilitarianism of all varieties is a teleological theory of ethics. It connects the idea of right action with the idea of general happiness. Ethical egoism is also a teleological theory. It connects the idea of right action with the idea of self-interest. Teleological theories are, thus, value-based theories.

Jhadeswar Ghosh in his essay entitled: *Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology*, makes an attempt to defend W. V. O. Quine's naturalistic approach to epistemology. Quest for the foundations of knowledge, i. e., effort to find out certain self-evident truths, is a persistent endeavour of philosophers and mainly of traditional epistemologists. It is this endeavour which gives rise to host of questions. For example, it is asked how we can corroborate our theory of the world by deriving it from self-evident truths. This and similar problems goaded philosophers to think in a radically different way and such an attitude is known as naturalistic trend in philosophy. This trend consists in, the author shows, understanding language through a natural process. While doing this Quine criticizes old-time epistemology and favours its replacement by natural science. Thus, Quine is of the view that it imperative to revise our traditional notion of knowledge. A revision of this makes way for naturalism. Although the Quinean stand did not go unchallenged, Ghosh is of the opinion that the raised objection can be met without much trouble.

Swagata Ghosh in her essay 'The Relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛiti*: a Critical Analysis' discusses the essence of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛiti*, the two pillars of *Sāṅkhya* system. In addition to that she revisits relationship that holds between them. While doing this she critically examines the *Sāṅkhya* metaphysics. A number of similes are given by the *Sāṅkhya* philosophers to show the relationship between these two fundamental realities. These similes have been misinterpreted by their critics. The author did a great job by re-evaluating them.

Sadek Ali in his 'No-Sense theory of Proper Name: A Philosophical Reflection' distinguishes between sense-theory and no-sense theory of proper names. Fregean theory has been termed sense-theory and Mill, Russell, Searle and Kripke's theory have been termed no-sense theory. Taking a close look at no-sense theory he finds out difference between Searle and Russell's view as he writes Searle's descriptions stand for aspects or properties of an object, whereas logical proper names stand for

the real objects. This is done on the basis of a metaphysical cleavage between objects and aspects of objects. The author discusses the arguments given in favour of no-sense theory of proper names and possible objections against these arguments. In the later portion of his essay he shows how the no-sense theory proponent ensures the referential foothold of reality whereas their opponent remained noncommittal regarding this referential foothold.

Buddhiswar Haldar starts his paper with the questions how and when does an individual think his existence justified in our society? And how to remove the feeling of absence of tolerance from human beings: how a human being's existence be justified in the society by performing good deeds or activities. Generally, the concept of existence is called *sat* and has been interpreted in various ways in Indian tradition. Therefore, it depends on the nature of Reality realized by an individual and hence the subjective elements in understanding the same cannot be ruled out. Haldar tries to show that Reality is of different types as realized by different individuals. Reality realized by the Buddhists is different from that of the Jainas and *Advaitins* and hence, the concept of being is also changing. Thus he shows an internal link among all the interpretations in a hermeneutic manner. Among the diversities a unique point admitted by all can be highlighted in favour of the concept of being.

Bhaswati De in her 'Justifying Physician-assisted Suicide' deals with the vexing issue of euthanasia and shows that how the debate right from the time of its genesis plagued the human mind and the intransigent nature of the problem. It is on account of this that the problem resurfaced recurrently and the stands taken by the participators of the debate became a matter of interest. In order to clarify the concept of voluntary active euthanasia she first peels of the concept by distinguishing from other similar concepts and then explaining main arguments propounded by debators for and against physician-assisted suicide. She also explains the arguments of assisted suicide advocates who argue that human beings with terminal illness should have the right to end their suffering and die with dignity. On the other hand, the opponents of euthanasia fear about future possible abuse and thus become slippery slope argument relevant. The author also examines the ethicality of the above stands. She rightly states that the resolution of the issue demands a closer scrutiny of concepts such as 'autonomy', 'self-determination', 'freedom', 'control', etc.

Nabnita Bhowal in 'A Priori Knowledge' shows the origin of this knowledge. She then explains the Kantian notion of *a priori* knowledge with its distinguishing marks. An analytical study has been done of this notion. At the end she shows how the Kripkean view of this notion along with combination of judgements that Kant thought not possible has posed a challenge to the Kantian view.

Pankaj Kanti Sarkar in his 'Some Critical Observations on Anthropocentrism' makes an attempt to show how anthropocentrism, once regarded as a very popular approach is beset with problems. While discussing this he gives reference of both Western and Indian theories. He appears to have preferred non-anthropocentrism on the plea that it gives due dignity to all species of the biotic community. It is because every actor in the environment has equal moral worth and without the contribution of one the delicate balance of the environment cannot be maintained. Moreover, they all be given due dignity for their own sake and not for any human gain. Sarkar shows how the oriental tradition has given respect to this line of thinking from time immemorial. Since 1980, some philosophers of language have taken a turn toward the philosophy of mind, and some have engaged in metaphysical exploration of the relation or lack there of between language and reality. Davidson once says "I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore, no such thing to be learned, mastered or born with." Interestingly, Martin Heidegger in the West and Bharṭṛhari in the East have attempted to revive the relevance of metaphysical reality by means of language. Reality, for Heidegger, is Being and language, for Heidegger, is poetic in nature. Reality, for Bharṭṛhari, is *Brahman* and language for Bharṭṛhari is *Śabda*. While developing the relationship between language and reality Baishali Majumdar in her paper tries to show that both Heidegger and Bharṭṛhari have emphasized not only on the metaphysical reality but also have conceived that language and reality are same.

Pinki Das takes a look at the ancient spiritual outlook to the environment found in Indian literature mainly in *Vedas*, *Upaniṣadas* and *Purāṇas*. She shows how these ancient sources are abounding with environmental concerns. These texts preach us to view the relationship between man and nature as one of adoption and co-existence rather than mastery and subjection over nature. Thus, we find a tradition of worshipping nature in various forms even today. In order to explain her stand she

takes clue from the definition of environment given in the Environment Protection Act, 1986. She underscores the need of following Vedic vision to live in harmony with environment.

Feminism and Post-Colonial theory, to a certain extent have followed a 'path of convergent evolution'. Both feminism and Post-Colonialism follow a similar theory in their defense of the marginalized 'Other', within the dominating repressive structures. These bodies of thought have attempted to invert the prevailing hierarchies of gender, culture and race. At one point of time a collision occurred between the third-world women and the imperial feminists. The third-world woman or in other words, the Post-Colonial woman has become a victim of both imperial ideology, native and foreign patriarchies. Thus the Post-Colonial or the third-world woman underwent double colonization. Keeping in mind, Mahalakshmi Bh.in her paper attempts to show about Post-Colonial gender consciousness in Salman Rushdie. It discusses both postcolonial theories as well as feminist perspective.

JYOTISH CHANDRA BASAK
AND
LAXMIKANTA PADHI

DRETSKE'S THEORY OF RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES FROM A SKEPTICAL POSITION

RAM C. MAJHI

The dialogue between the skeptics and the non-skeptics has been continuing since Pyrrho in Western tradition. Skeptical tradition is also found both in Chinese and Indian traditions. The challenges thrown by skepticism have shaped the discussion on epistemology in all these traditions. Theories have been developed to meet these challenges. It is needless to say that in modern and contemporary philosophy we still find deliberations on skepticism. Such is the power of it. Here, an attempt has been made to explain Dretske's theory of relevant alternatives to see if it can meet the skeptical challenge that we do not know anything about the external world. Dretske and his critics Cohen and Sanford believe that the theory does meet the challenge. In contrast to what they believe, I would rather say that the theory calmly ignores the spirit of skepticism that Sextus Empiricus, Chuang Tzu, Nagarjuna and Nietzsche speak of. Dretske, of course, is not addressing the skeptical positions that can be made out of what they say. Nevertheless, Dretske need to address the issues raised by such skepticism in order to claim that one really knows what one has claimed to know.

I

The Pyrrhonian skeptic's argument 'includes practically all the ingredients of what now a days is called "the argument from illusion"¹ and the thrust is to show that there is 'equipollence' between conflicting beliefs about reality, that there never is reason to adopt one such belief in preference to a rival one.² The Pyrrhonian skeptical position is not merely a tactical and methodological one to be adopted provisionally in order to be overcome later. It is not doubt but *aporia* - bafflement as to the very sense of making objective claims that the skeptic draws our attention to. Thus, a Pyrrhonian skeptic has a purpose different from the purpose of a Cartesian skeptic.

¹ Benson Mates, *The Skeptic Way*, p.57 and quoted by Cooper, 1999, p.44.

² Cooper 1999, p.44.

Chuang Tzu observes that everyday judgements do not constitute knowledge of reality (if such there be). He considers a number of examples that show irresolvable disagreements in judgement, test and argues that attempts to resolve them always presuppose some prior prejudice. He uses a version of the argument from dreaming.³ Further, language is a convenient artifice. Its utility for purposes of communication need not imply any correspondence between our statements and an independent reality.⁴ Our knowledge of things is merely conventional. We know things by making distinctions conventionally; take these distinctions seriously and say that we have knowledge of the real things. A true knower accepts these distinctions and the knowledge of things there of for practical purpose while at the same time he is aware that there is no commitment to the knowledge of how things really are.

Nagarjuna observes that none of our claims about objects, persons can possess more than relative truth. This implies that we can not have genuinely objective knowledge. He raises several objections to *pramāṇa* theory. He argues that the objects of knowledge (*prameyas*) are ascertained through the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*). Further, the *pramāṇas* have to be objects of knowledge in order to be reliable. This means that some objects of knowledge are ascertained on the basis of themselves. This involves one in an undesirable circularity. The alternative is to fall in to an infinite regress. In order to avoid all these we have to forgo the concepts of the objects of knowledge and the means of knowledge. Once we do that, the prospect of knowledge is a bleak one.

Nagarjuna, further, points out that in *Nyāya* School; the *pramāṇa* is defined as one that enables the ascertainment of *prameyas*, objects of knowledge such as physical bodies. But the existence of such objects is then asserted on the evidence of *pramāṇas*. The *pramāṇa* theorist is caught up in a

³ 'I -----dreamt that I was a butterfly ----- but I could not tell, had I been Chuan Tzu dreaming I was butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming I was now Chuan Tzu', *ibid*, p. 61

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 61.

circle. The brilliance of Nagarjuna is appreciated by Cooper. For him, Nagarjuna was the first philosopher to raise in a precise manner doubts as to the very sense of a correspondence between two supposedly independent terms- thought and the world.⁵

In modern times Nietzsche says, ‘if Kant is right, then sciences are wrong.’⁶ This is because scientific claims purport to be true of an independent reality, not a merely anthropomorphic world. He believes that we are condemned to skepticism towards claims about the independent reality and our truth claims about that reality is nothing but lies. For Nietzsche, the laws of logic or physics are our naturalistic compulsions in terms of specifically human desires, interests and welfare. Creatures with different drives would not be under similar compulsion to accept those laws.

Logic is merely slavery within the fetters of language writes Nietzsche.⁷ There is arbitrariness and contingency in our linguistic and hence conceptual categorisation. Had we developed a very different language, we would have ended up with very different conceptual categorization altogether. Language is metaphorical to such an extent that we use a single word for many different things. The so-called truths are mere metaphors. Nietzsche allows, however, the possibility of truth and falsity, knowledge and error at the pragmatic level of human existence. Social activities like communication and cooperation demand that we designate things. Such conventional designations are there of course for Nietzsche. So does their failure as falsity, and the knowledge and error that arise out of successful or unsuccessful acquisition of the fact about those.

These four great skeptical positions are drawing our attention to the limitations of our reason, our language and our senses, in short, to our anthropomorphic situation with regard to our prospect for the knowledge of

⁵ Cooper, 1994, p. 88

⁶ As quoted by Cooper from ‘the Philosopher’, in *Philosophy and Truth*, Aron Breazeale, 9th ed), p. 32.

⁷ Cooper, 1994, p. 194.

the world itself. These serious limitations that hang upon us due to our anthropocentric existence can never be avoided. This is a predicament. The skepticism that emerges out of reflection on this is what I will call *the skepticism from the anthropocentric predicament*.

II

Now the question is this - can the theory of relevant alternatives resolve this skepticism that arises from the anthropocentric predicament? I find two responses from Dretske. One is to accept the power and the influence of skeptical attitude. He says, for example,

“Perhaps we cannot know the exotic things that the skeptic says we cannot know that we are not tricked by cunning demons or misled by extraordinary circumstances.”⁸

The second response is to down play the importance of skeptical considerations and make it irrelevant for securing everyday knowledge, the knowledge of ordinary objects. This is obvious from his saying. He writes,

How can you make the evidence conclusive (thus securing an absolute conception of knowledge) while, at the same time, admitting that there are possibilities it does not exclude (thus making it relationally absolute)? A theory embodying relevant alternatives, with the consequent denial of closure, is, I think, the only way.⁹

Not only Dretske, but Cohen and Sanford too believe that the theory of relevant alternatives has the potency to withstand the onslaught of skeptical Challenges. Before evaluating this let us consider that theory. A visually irrelevant alternative, for Dretske, is something incompatible with what one knows (by seeing) to be the case but which one cannot know (by seeing) to be the case¹⁰. Thus, for example, if one sees a duck swimming in a pond and thereby knows that a duck is swimming in the pond, and a hypothesis that he is dreaming or that he is being deceived by evil demon or that a cleverly designed machine is in the water, then such hypothesis cannot be seen to be

⁸ McLaughlin, 1991, p. 191.

⁹ *ibid* p.196

¹⁰ *ibid* p.186

not the case. Such hypothesis is incompatible with the knowledge that a duck is swimming in the pond. That hypothesis one cannot know to be not the case in visually irrelevant to know that a duck is swimming in the pond. Further, an alternative, irrelevant to S's seeing that P may be relevant to knowing that P.¹¹ In the light of what has been said about irrelevant alternatives for seeing that P we may formulate the following for knowing that P.

A proposition *Q* is an irrelevant alternative to *P* if **S** knows that *P* and *Q* is incompatible with *P* If
S knows that *P* and *Q* is incompatible with *P* and **S** can not know that not *Q*.

Now any version of skeptical hypothesis, be it dreaming, evil demon or brain-in-vat hypothesis becomes, an irrelevant alternative according to this formulation because it is not possible for any knower to know whether he is a brain-in-vat, dreaming or deceived by an evil demon and since any of the hypothesis is incompatible with knowing any empirical proposition.

The skeptical hypothesis that may be granted out of the consideration of the anthropocentric predicament does not arise from doubt or possibility of error as understood is ordinary epistemic situation. It may be granted that Dretske is not addressing this type of skepticism. Nevertheless, it can be argued that like the Cartesian skeptical hypothesis, this type of skeptical hypothesis questions the possibility of knowledge. The skepticism emerging from the consideration of this predicament gains its strength by questioning the suitability of our knowing apparatus to capture the truth. Moreover, our language fails to express the truth. One who reflects on the limitations of the senses, reason and language and ends up with a kind of skepticism that presupposes conceptions of knowledge and truth radically different from the conceptions of those who believe in our capacity to know truths. Dretske belongs to the second category of thinkers. For him, the concept of knowledge exhibits a kind of contextual relativity and in any epistemic situation, the

¹¹ *ibid* p.187

evidence for knowing a proposition excludes all the relevant alternatives that compete with P. Further, in normal epistemic situation, philosophic skeptical hypotheses do not count as relevant alternatives.

What counts as a relevant alternative to proposition P depends on the background condition in which P is known and relevancy varies from case to case. Take for example the case of a refrigerator being empty. The proposition that a packet of ice-cream is in the refrigerator is an alternative to the proposition that the refrigerator is empty. So is the alternative that some parts of the refrigerator are there. But the former alternative will be a relevant one for one who is looking for refrigerator parts. For the food seeker's knowing that the refrigerator is empty, his evidence need not exclude the possibility of whether the refrigerator contains parts. Whether any food is available in the refrigerator is a relevant alternative that must be excluded before attributing the food seeker with the knowledge that he knows that the refrigerator is empty.

In the context of the food seeker, absence of any food makes the refrigerator empty. In the context of the parts seeker absence of any part makes the refrigerator empty. In both the cases the refrigerator is absolutely empty provided no specific desired item is present there. At the same time the refrigerator is absolutely empty relative to the context. The refrigerator with no food is not empty for the parts seeker. Dretske also gives another example of relationally absolute concept - the flatness of a road. A road may be flat according to one standard because it has no bumps, say for vehicles while a table may not be flat from the standard set by microscopic vision. Dretske thinks that the concept of knowledge exhibits similar but no identical contextual relativity. He says after the discussion of a visual perception.

There is every reason to suppose that the concept of knowledge exhibits the same contextual relativity, the same sensitivity to a range of understood contrast, as the verbs that describe the way we reached that

knowledge.¹² The context depends on the purpose and interest of the knower, not of the attributor. Cohen, interpreting Dretske assumed that the purposes, intentions, presuppositions, etc., of attributors of knowledge - speakers and listeners - play a role in setting the standards of relevance.¹³ Dretske, however, restricts the dependency of context on the purpose and interests of the knower. The reason for such restriction lies with the intention to block that the skeptic's standard is relevant. Otherwise it would imply that the ordinary knower does not know what is ordinarily said to be known by him. This implication of Cohen's construal, Dretske is not ready to accept because he supposes that Skepticism as a doctrine about what ordinary people know cannot be made true by being put into the mouth of a skeptic¹⁴. Why not? The reason, Dretske gives, is intuitions on our ordinary knowing.

Someone with very high standards, someone who considers almost any alternative relevant- a skeptic, for example - will, I think, speak falsely if he denies that you and I, in perfectly ordinary circumstances, know the things we take ourselves to know¹⁵. Now, considering the skeptic's view and Dretske's we have to agree that there is fundamental disagreement between them. The skeptic believes those skeptical considerations such as that arise from the anthropocentric predicament are too important to be ignored and hence make knowledge of the external world questionable and questions the ontology that emerges from such alleged knowledge.

Dretske, on the other hand, assumes the knowledge of external world and analyses the concept of knowledge in such a way that the knowledge of empirical world remains secure and whatever doubt we may have from philosophical considerations becomes irrelevant. I do not find any philosophically compelling reasons to prefer the Dretskian perspective to skeptic's perspective or the other way. There is an insight to Dretske's

¹² *Ibid*-p. 187.

¹³ *ibid* p.191

¹⁴ *ibid* p.192

¹⁵ *ibid* p.192

approach to the concept of knowledge - that it operates with, some presuppositions about ourselves and the world around us and his suggestion that concept of knowledge be treated within that perspective is welcome for we want to believe that we know many things. The skeptic, banking on an insight reminds us the limitation of our knowledge, what we know, possibly what we do not and in some sense, we cannot know.

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PHILOSOPHY AND OUR PRACTICAL LIFE

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I think it will not be an exaggeration to say that each and every student and teacher of philosophy uses to face a bitter question: has philosophy got any importance in our day to day life? This question is raised not only by the lay men but by the so called educated persons of our society. Perhaps, putting this question they like to mean that philosophy is not as practical as science and technology. If for the sake of argument, this view is taken for granted then I think that this objection is equally applicable in the case of literature and music. Literature, music and philosophy none of them can satisfy our practical need in the same way in which science and technology do. In this sense, they can be brought under the shade of one and the same umbrella.

But if a close scrutiny is made then it can be understood that philosophy like science is also equally important in our practical life. Initially, one cannot agree with me on this point. He may argue that science and technology have made our life easy and comfortable through various remarkable inventions. No one can deny the fact that it is due to the contribution of science and technology that our society has reached at the top of its progress and development. In each and every step of our life we use to take the help of science and technology. Our life and society today go hand in hand with science and technology. The moment they give up the hands of science and technology they will lose their existence. In this sense obviously, philosophy is not important in our life and society. Philosophy has nothing to do with either making our life easy and comfortable or helping our society to be developed and progressed in this way. Keeping this in view it is said that it is better to think of bread rather than keeping engaged in philosophical thinking.

But I think this objection against philosophy is groundless. When the upholders of the above objection maintain that philosophy has nothing to do with ensuring the progress and development of our life and society then they,

actually, fail to understand the meaning of life and society. They also commit a blunder in understanding the meaning of the terms ‘progress’ and ‘development’ of the same. In fact, development or upliftment of our life and society does not only mean the material development, like financial or technological upliftment, it also includes the spiritual progress. Man is said to be superior to other animals like cow, dog, etc. The superiority of man lies in the fact that human being unlike animal not only consists of body he also consists of mind and soul. Rabindranath Tagore says that there is something ‘surplus’ in man which actually animal lacks. The surplus entity is called spirit or soul. This surplus entity is called by Rabindranath in various ways like a *Jīvan Devatā*, *Moner Mānuṣ*, *Baro Āmī*, *Viśva Mānaba*. So unlike animal the need of human being is of two folds: the need of his body and the need of his mind or soul. And none of them should be ignored. An ideal person must be balanced. A person developing only one of the aspects either physically or spiritually is nothing but a handicapped one.

This view is beautifully expressed particularly in the philosophy of Swami Vivekananda. He says that Islamic body and Vedantic brain should be combined together. Only our body can be satisfied with the development and progress brought about by science and technology. So, in bringing the spiritual upliftment the science and technology have no role to play. Spiritual upliftment can be taken place only by philosophy. Thus it is seen that the development and progress occurred by science and technology is partial. So, no person or society can be developed in true sense without the co-operation of philosophy. The persons by whom the above objection has been raised have seen only the one half of the whole truth but the other half has been overlooked by them.

In this context, the opponents may further argue that their view has been denied by virtue of the admission of soul which is different from our body. But soul, actually, is nothing but the invention of philosophy itself. As they do not believe in philosophy, they do not believe in philosophical inventions like soul. So, their view cannot be properly denied on the basis of

soul. This argument also can be countered. Even if the existence of soul is somehow denied, the existence of mind cannot be ignored by them. The existence of mind or consciousness of body has been admitted even by the crude materialists like *Cārvākas*. The existence of the same has been re-affirmed by psychologists. Psychology is a science. So, the admirer of science and technology cannot deny what is admitted by psychology. The psychologists are of the opinion that like body our mind also has some demands. They also observe that our body and mind are closely connected. So, one can be effected by another. If the demand of our body is not satisfied then it adversely affects our mind and the *vice-versa*. This truth has been reflected in the philosophy of the great French thinker Rene Descartes. He describes this view elaborately in his remarkable philosophical theory called interactionism. In that sense again we have something surplus in us and this is our mind. So, we cannot be satisfied with the fulfillment of the demands of our body only. Had it been so, we could not claim ourselves to be superior to lower animals like cow and dog. In this context we can remember the famous statement of John Stuart Mill, can be remembered “It is better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than to be a satisfied pig”. The demand of our body may be satisfied by science and technology but the demands of our mind are satisfied mainly by philosophy. Mind is a faculty of our curiosity, doubt, emotion, wonder and reasoning. Some of the philosophers are of the opinion that philosophy begins in wonder, but some, on the other hand, hold that it begins in doubt; some again think that it begins in curiosity. So, philosophy is introduced to satisfy our doubt, wonder and curiosity, in a word to satisfy our mental needs. Sometimes a series of questions peep into our mind, like - who am I? Am I merely a body or a soul? What does actually death mean? Is everything finished with the destruction of this body? Is there really any place like heaven and hell? How has this world been created? Has it been created automatically or by God? Is there really God? If the answer is positive, then what is the nature of Him? Is he personal or impersonal? If personal, then is

He loving? Is he omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient? If God is loving and omnipotent both then why are there so evils in the world? Is there really any law of *Karma*? If the law of *Karma* is taken for granted then why are the moral and good persons seen to suffer a lot and non-moral or bad persons, on the other, are seen to enjoy their happy life? Is there really any state called *Mokṣa*? If *Mokṣa* is a fact then how it can be attained? To have the answer of these questions we knock the door of philosophy. The day on which these questions cease to be raised in our mind we shall remain no more a man, either we shall turn into a beast or a machine. If these mental needs are not satisfied then, sometimes persons are seen to be mad. A society is composed of different individuals. So, if the individuals are healthy then the society also will be healthy. The importance of philosophy in making an ideal man and good society cannot be ignored.

From the discussion so far we may tend to think that we go to the door of philosophy in a very rare occasion. But a close scrutiny shows that in our day to day life almost in each and every step we use to take the help of philosophy either consciously or unconsciously. Philosophy has a number of branches, and our day to day life is being influenced more or less by all the branches. Let us first deal with logic. Human being is called a rational being. Rationality is an inherent nature of us. In fact, logic is the grammar of our thinking. We cannot think as we like. Our thinking has to follow certain guidelines. It is logic which provides with these guidelines. If a person breaks these guidelines at the time of thinking or speaking (speaking is the expression of our thinking) his thinking or speaking becomes inconsistent and the person concerned be treated as abnormal. One has to follow these guidelines more strictly at the time of a particular process of thinking called argument or inference. An argument will either be valid or invalid. If an argument is as per rules or guidelines framed by logic then it will be valid but if otherwise, it will turn into an invalid one. In our everyday life very often either we establish our own view or we deny the view of our opponents on the ground of arguments

and thus we take the help of logic. If one can speak logically, one can gain popularity within a short span of time. Socrates, for example, was exceptionally expert in arguing logically; consequently, he became successful very easily in defeating the so-called scholars of Athens at that time and winning the mind of the people. Even logic directly helps to lead the livelihood of some persons like advocates and sometimes that of the politicians. The very motive of the profession of an advocate is to establish the stand of his own client and to reject the stand of the client of his opponent primarily through the exercise of argument. Likewise, today the principal purpose of political leader is to establish his own stand by refuting his opponent's stand through the exercise of argument. So, they must be acquainted with the rules which make an argument valid. In that case they are indebted to logic.

Now let us turn to ethics. Western ethics in general and Indian ethics in particular are highly practical. If logic is the grammar of our thinking then ethics is the grammar of our life. If life is taken as language, then ethics is positively the grammar of it. Without grammar no language can be meaningful. Likewise, no life becomes meaningful and worthy if it does not follow any ethical code. Ethics is the guiding principle of human life. If one does not bother to follow ethical or moral principles in one's life, he will not be treated as a human being; but as a beast. So, it is stated that "*Dharmaṇa hīnāḥ paśubhiḥ samānāḥ*". It is important to note that here the term *dharma* has been used in the sense of ethics. In Indian Philosophy '*dharma*' and ethics are so closely related that one cannot be distinguished from another. *vidhi* and *niṣedha* are like punctuation of our life. If we go through a sentence without having any pause then it does not make any sense. Similarly, in the case of leading our life if we do not care for any pause, i.e. do's and don'ts then our life also does not bear any meaning. Punctuation are the indications of where and how much pause has to be taken at the time of reading a sentence. In the same way *vidhi* and *niṣedha* are the marks which indicate where and how

much pause we have to take in leading our life. In Indian Philosophy four *puruṣārthas* i.e. *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*, have been prescribed. From this list of *puruṣārthas* it is understood that Indian philosophy has given due importance to *artha* and *kāma*. But at the same time it also warns us that in the case of enjoying *artha* and *kāma* we have to follow certain guidelines imposed by the *śāstras*, say for instance, *śāstra* suggests us to use money which are essential for leading our livelihood as simply as well as poorly as possible and the excess money one earns has to be distributed among the poor. Likewise, our life has been classified into four stages (*āśramas*) *brahmaçarya*, *gārhasthya*, *bānaprastha*, and *sanyāsa*. Among them only in the stage of *gārhasthya* restricted sexual life is suggested to enjoy. If we lead our life abiding by the guidelines of *śāstras*, our society will turn into an ideal and healthy one. So, I think, no conscious person will blame philosophy as lacking practical importance as it helps to construct an ideal person and ideal society. Yoga philosophy strongly recommends us to follow *Aṣṭāṅgika yoga*. Among them particularly *āsana* and *prāṇāyāma* help to keep us physically fit. Can any one deny the practical utility of physical exercise? *Āsana* and *prāṇāyāma* are nothing but one type of systematic pattern of physical exercise. Medical science is regarded as having practical importance only because it helps us in curing our disease. Likewise, Yoga philosophy helps us both in curing and preventing the disease. The statement ‘prevention is better than cure’ is perfectly applicable in the case of *āsana* and *prāṇāyāma*. Then why is philosophy not considered as having practical utility? In my view *Yoga* philosophy goes further than Medical science. *Āsana* and *prāṇāyāma* help to keep our mind sound and thus they also help to attain *mokṣa*, the ultimate goal of human life. The rest of the *angas* of *yoga* are also highly important in our practical life. Among them *yama* in particular is worthy to mention. *Yama* consists of five units’ *ahimsā*, *satya*, *asteya*, *brahmaçarya* and *aparigraha*. The proper exercise of these units in our society alone is sufficient to make our society a heaven. If all of the members of a society follow the path of *ahimsā*,

satya, *asteya* and *brahmaçarya* then that society will turn into not a less peaceful place than the heaven. The same is true in the case of *Buddhism*. If any society follows the *aṣṭāṅgika mārgas* such as *samyak dṛṣṭi*, *samyak saṃkalpa*, *samyak vāk*, *samyak karmānta*, *saymak ājīva*, *saymak vyāyāma*, *samyak smṛti* and *samyak samādhi* advocated in *Buddhism* then our society will be so peaceful that we cannot imagine. The proper exercise of the three steps of *Brahmavihara* i.e. *maitrī*, *karuṇā*, and *muditā* is enough to bring a revolutionary positive change in a society. Jaina philosophy also is not exception to it. *Samyak jñāna*, *samyak darśana* and *samyak caritra*, the *triratna* of Jaina philosophy are really as valuable as jewels in our day to day life. In this school the supreme importance has been given to *ahiṃsā*. Mahatma Gandhi has rightly understood the importance of *ahiṃsā* and *satya* in our life. Here he tried his best to implement these two ideals in our society. He has practically shown how an individual as well as a society can be benefited through the proper implementation of these two ideals.

I think the *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* also can play an important role to solve the problems of our day to day life. The *Bhagavad-Gītā* has been written in the form of dialogue held between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna. Here Arjuna is, in fact, nothing but the representative of the whole people of our society. So, the problem of Arjuna amounts to the problems of us and of our society. Arjuna was able to overcome the problems of his life by following the teaching of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. So, it is quite legitimate to think that if the ethical principles of the *Gītā* are implemented properly in our society then, no doubt, our society can be made free from the problems it faces today.

All the problems of our society are created, directly or indirectly, by us. Through our different types of activities we give birth to all the problems of our society. But the activities of us are the reflections of our own thinking. Our thought again, in turn, is governed by our mental set-up. This mental set-up is constructed by a number of factors of which our education and culture

are the principal ones. At present our education and culture are mainly materialistic. So, all our thinking and activities are motivated and determined by this materialistic teaching and culture. Due to this type of learning and culture the demands of us are increasing at a rapid rate crossing all the limits. To meet this limitless demand, we are becoming highly selfish; we have no scope of thinking for the welfare of our near and dear ones of the society. We do not hesitate to satisfy our own interest even at the cost of other's life. We know that darkness can be pushed back only by light. Likewise, materialistic teaching and culture can be pushed back only by the spiritualistic teaching and culture. I hope the *Gītā* can provide our society with such type of spiritualistic teaching and culture following which all problems mentioned can be solved.

Now let us turn into *Vedānta* Philosophy. Once people used to think that, *Vedānta* Philosophy is purely theoretical. It does not have any practical utility. But Swami Vivekananda shows how much practical *Vendānta* philosophy may be. Vivekananda says that if the ideology of *Vedānta* philosophy is applied in our society then our society can be made free from the problems it suffers today. He himself has followed the ideology of *Vedānta* Philosophy in his day to day life and showed how the crisis prevailing in our society can be overcome. Mainly two concepts of *Vedānta* school- “*Sarvam khalvidam Brahmaṁ*” and “*Jīva Brahmaiva nāparaḥ*” have been strictly followed by Swamiji. He also advises the whole world to follow the same. Following *Vedānta* Philosophy Vivekananda declares that man is not as limited and finite as he appears to be. In fact man himself is God. So he is actually as unlimited and infinite as God. In his own words ‘*Yatra Jīvah tatra Śīvaḥ*’ and ‘*Nararūpe Nārāyaṇa*’. Vivekananda has seen that today the young generation is suffering from the lack of self-confidence. No one can be successful if he does not have any confidence upon himself. Therefore, Swamiji says “First believe in yourself and then in God”. If one considers himself to be God then the question of lacking self-confidence does not arise. In this case the problem the young generation is facing such as hopelessness;

mental disease etc. can be overcome easily. Other problems of our society such as selfishness, intolerance, killing, religious fundamentalism, rioting, communalism etc. arise mainly from the lack of the sense of oneness. If the members of our society are being taught about the concept of *Advaita Vedānta* that the Ultimate Reality is only one and all of us have come into being from the one and the same reality then our society will be capable of overcoming those problems also. Realizing this truth Swamiji says without any hesitation “The whole world is my family” and “My sisters and brothers of America”. If we know that all persons are virtually God then all of us are equal, in that case, the sense of superiority and inferiority, upper and lower are dismissed. We will be ensure about rendering our service keeping the lesson taught by Swamiji in mind, “*Vahurūpe sammukhe tomār chhāri kothā khunjichha Iswar, Jīve prem kare jei jan sei jan sevichhe Iswar*”. Thus the philosophy of *Advaita Vedānta* formerly known as the philosophy of jungles, of saints and sages, has been brought by Swami Vivekananda into our society and light has been shown to our society by Swamiji about how through the application of the ideology of this philosophy unity in diversity can be established. But unfortunately, our society today ignores this truth taught by Swamiji and *Advaita Vedānta* and our society is facing the adverse result of it hand in hand. A famous German philosopher, Schopenhauer rightly says, “In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and as elevating as that of the *Upaniṣads*. It has been the solace of my life; it will be the solace of my death.”

Western ethics is also not exception to it. Today it is seen that Western ethics is spreading its different branches in the various field of our practical life, such as environmental ethics, business ethics, and medical ethics and so on. All of them belong to the territory of Practical Ethics. The name ‘practical ethics’ implies that side by side there is also an ethics which is theoretical. But I think this is nothing but a misconception. Any type of ethics is necessarily practical. The theories of the ethics which are not known as practical is generally either teleological or deontological. In that ethics also these theories

are prescribed to follow in our day to day life of course, but not in any utopian society or world. Practical ethics is nothing but a process of keeping the old wine in a new bottle. Here, in this practical ethics more or less the same traditional ethical theories, may be to some extent in the reformed way, are being applied in a specific field of our day to day life and an attempt to solve the problems within this field accordingly is being made. Now let us give some hints about how the different branches of practical ethics deal with their respective problems of our practical life. Today our society is highly concerned with some ethical problems within the medical field among them the problems of euthanasia, suicide, surrogate mother, cloning are most important. In the case of environmental ethics the most burning problem is – whether the environment has any value of its own. Are water, fire, air and even the lower animals valuable only because they are used by human being or are they valuable for their own sake, independent of the use of the human beings? In other words, whether anthropocentrism or non- anthropocentrism is ethically acceptable? Which view is acceptable is a controversial issue. But I think here Indian philosophical and ethical ideology play an important role in preserving environment and maintaining ecological balance. Actually, environmental problems arise mainly because of the abuse of the environment. And the environment is abused by us due to the materialistic attitude we have shown towards it. But the attitude towards environment made by Indian ethics excepting *Cārvāka* ethics is primarily spiritualistic. In *Jaina philosophy* environment is treated as having life. Keeping this in view practically the *Digambar Jainas* does not even use to put on clothes. *Vedānta* Philosophy advocates, “*Sarvaṃ Khalvidam Brahma*”. So each and everything of the universe is Brahman. Naturally, the question of abusing the environment simply does not arise. The reflection of the same type of thinking is also traced in Hindu religion. In Hindu religion the sun, the moon, air, water and even the lower type of animals are worshiped. The tiger, ox, peacock, rat, for example, are said to be the carrier of *Durga*, *Shiva*, *Kārtika* and *Gaṇeśa* respectively.

Besides, God is believed to be incarnated in the form of tortoise, fish, pig etc. in different ages. Land and river like *Gangā*, *Yamunā* and *Sarasvatī* are looked upon as mother. So, they are highly respected. From the discussion so far one can easily understand that if the Indian philosophical and ethical ideology is nourished in our society then the environmental pollution, like the pollution of land, the pollution of air and water can easily be checked. In the broad sense pollution is of two types - environmental pollution and social pollution. In fact, the source of both of them is our mental pollution. Indian Philosophy helps us to purify our mind. Thus, through the purification of our mind Indian Philosophy saves our society from being polluted environmentally as well as socially.

Indian philosophy says of four *puruṣārthas*. People may tend to think that out of them the first three i.e. *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* are important in our practical life, but the *mokṣa*, the last one bears no importance in our practical life. But here I beg to differ from them. *Mokṣa* or *mukti* as it is stated by Indian Philosophy generally has its two stages - the first one is *jīvan mukti* and the second one is *videha mukti*. Indian Philosophers observe that our life is, in fact, full of sorrows and suffering. Buddhism for example, says '*sarvaṃ duḥkham*'. The ultimate aim of each and every human being, according to Indian philosophy, is to get rid of this sorrow and suffering. This can be done only through the attainment of the state of liberation. So, the sorrow and the sufferings we get rid of by attaining the state of *mokṣa*, the summum bonum, is the sorrow and the sufferings of this life in this world but not that of any utopian life in any utopian world. Besides this, the person attaining *jīvana mukti* continues to work. But he has nothing to gain for himself. His activities are only meant for ensuring *lokasaṃgraha*, the betterment and wellbeing of the society. Here we can cite the famous statement of *Sri Krishna* in the *Śrīmadbhagvat Gītā*, "*Karamanyevādhikāraṣṭe mā phalesu kadācana. Mā karmaphalaheturbhūrmā te sangatastvakarmani*".¹ So, again through the exercise of the disinterested activities performed by a person attaining *jīvana*

mukti the betterment and the wellbeing is ensured in this society. Thus it is proved once again that *mokṣa* which is considered by Indian Philosophy to be the ultimate goal of our life does not lack practical utility also.

It is most unfortunate to mention that even a great number of rulers of most of the countries are ignorant about the importance of philosophy. But the great thinkers like Plato and Aristotle repeatedly mentioned that an ideal ruler of a country should not merely be conscious of the importance of philosophy but at the same time he also himself be a philosopher. An ideal ruler must be a philosopher mainly for two reasons. First, the responsibility of governing the whole country is shouldered by him. He has been entrusted with that responsibility. So, he gains enormous power which he can use or abuse as he likes. Hence the loss or the gain for a country that may be ensured by him cannot be compared with that of any ordinary person. Secondly, the ideology of a ruler is generally followed by the other members of a country. So, if the ruler of a country himself leads a moral life then it is expected that the other members of the country also will do the same and in that case that country will turn into a heavenly place. But if the ruler of a country, on the other hand, leads an immoral life then it is generally expected that the other members of that country also will lead an unethical life and in that case that country will turn into hell. This truth is realized in our day to day life. Today a number of rulers of most of the countries are seen to lead an unethical life, as a result our society is suffering a lot from its ill consequences. The history and the *śāstras* bear witness that all the ideal rulers of the past were highly conscious about the moral and logical principles. King Janaka was a leaving example of it. Keeping the importance of Philosophy in governing a country in view different *Samhitās* advise the rulers to have knowledge about *Anvīkṣikīvidyā* (Philosophy) along with the knowledge of *Trayī*, *Vārtā* and *Daṇḍanīti*.² More or less the same types of advice is traced in *Mahābhārata* which prescribes the king to go through logic along with *Śabdaśāstra*.³ *Sri Krisna* and *Valarāma* also were seen having profound knowledge of *Anvīkṣikīvidyā*.⁴

We are highly concerned with the education system of today. At present education necessarily means the education about science and technology, and hence it lacks value education. As a result our society is running through the different types of crisis. The relationship between the teacher and the taught, the relationship among the students, the relationship among the teachers are going to be bitter day by day at a rapid rate. Every now and then one student is being tortured physically as well as mentally by another student. The teacher is seen to be heckled and assaulted by his students. Snatching, stealing, murdering and raping become a common phenomenon in our society. Our society will be in a position to overcome this crisis if value education is implemented properly.

We, all of us face a common question today - is science blessing or curse? The obvious reply to the question runs thus - science is neither blessing nor curse independent of its use. So whether science will be good or bad is purely dependent upon its manner of use. If science is used for ensuring the betterment and well being of our society then it is a blessing, no doubt. But if it is used otherwise then it is a curse. But without philosophical and ethical ideology science cannot be used for ensuring the betterment and well-being of the society. If any society gives up the hand of philosophy then science and technology lead to the destruction of our society, but if, on the other hand a society is based on the moral ideology then science and technology positively be used leading to the betterment of our society. So the observation that philosophy has nothing to do with ensuring the progress and development of our society cannot be accepted.

Here the critics may argue that for leading a moral life we need not go through ethics, a branch of Philosophy. In our everyday life some persons are found to lead moral life strictly though they do not go through ethics and philosophy. It may happen than they do not offer Philosophy either an honours

or an elective subject or they do not read ethics themselves even at their home or they are purely illiterate.

In reply to this objection it can be said that actually education is of two types- formal and non-formal. In the case of formal education one gets educated formally. Say for example, one takes admission in a particular institution and is taught by teachers and ultimately he earns certificate as recognition of his qualification. But in the case of non-formal education no such formality is maintained. Yet he learns a lot from his family and society both. One from the very childhood to the last day of his life uses to take moral or value education from his family and society either consciously or unconsciously. From the very childhood we use to learn from our seniors- we should tell the truth, our parents, teachers and all other seniors should be respected, we should help the poor, we should stand by others in their ill days, we should not break our promise, we should not hurt others either physically or mentally and so on. So all of us in the case of leading moral lives are indebted to moral philosophy. In order to make this point clear an example may be cited. Almost all of the vegetable sellers do not take mathematics either as honours or elective subject; some of them do not go to school even. In spite of this, most of them are more expert than us in common mathematical calculation. They have learnt the process of calculation in non-formal ways. But after all they are indebted to mathematics. They use to learn the process from their parents and become expert in the course of running their business. The same is true in the case of Philosophy.

In respect of bringing the betterment and the upliftment of an individual the role of philosophy is far reaching than that of science and technology. The role of science and technology in ensuring the betterment and wellbeing of the individual and society is confined within this life and this spatio-temporal world but philosophy does the same within and beyond. If one sincerely follows the path as it is suggested by philosophy one can attain

mokṣa, the summum bonum, the highest goal, the highest wellbeing of human life.

The concept of God plays an important role to maintain and restore rules and regulation in our society. Whether God really exists or not is a controversial issue. But it is a fact that a great number of people of our society do not evolve in unethical and anti social activities just due to the fear of God. Those who believe in God consider Him Omnipotent, Omnipresent and Omniscient. Consequently, they believe that whatever is done by us either moral or immoral must be recorded by God. We can escape the eye of the police if any illegal and immoral activity is done by us secretly and carefully. But nothing can be done escaping God. As God is Omniscient He can even know what we are thinking about. God is also conceived as a good judge. So, if we perform good and moral activities then we must be rewarded, but if we do the bad and immoral activities we must be punished by God either in this life or thereafter. Keeping this in mind a good number of people are abstain from doing immoral activities. This, in turn, helps to make our practical life peaceful and pleasurable. Thus it is shown that philosophy, in no way, is less important than science and technology in our practical life.

References:

1. *Śrīmadbhagvatgītā*, 47/2.
2. “*Traividebhyastrayīm vidyāddaṇḍ nītiṅca sāsvatīm/
anvīkṣikīncātmavidyām vārtārambhāṅśca lokataḥ//*” - *Manusainghitā* 7/43
3. “*Prajāpālana-yuktaśca na kṣatīm labhate kvacit/
yuktiśāstraṅca te jñeyam sabdaśāstraṅca bhārata//*”.- *Anuśāsana parva-
134/148*
4. “*Sarahasyam dhanurbedam dharmān nyāya pathāṅstathā/
Tathā cānvīkṣikīm vidyām rājanītiṅca śadvidhām//*” .-10/45/34
5. *Nyāyapathān mīmāṃsādīn / anvīkṣikīm tarkavidyām - Śrīdharasvāmī.*

RECONSTRUCTION OF INFERENCE: FROM INDIAN PERSPECTIVE*

RUCHIRA MAJUMDAR

A. Brief Sketch of *Navya-Nyāya* Logic:

The *Nyāya* School of philosophical discourses is based on the texts known as *Nyāya-Sutras*, introduced by Maharṣi Goutama in and around 2nd century CE. The system of *Navya-Nyāya* has its origin in the discourses of Gangeśa Upadhyaya and was developed during the 13th to 17th centuries by Indian logicians like Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, Jayadeva, Vasudevā Sārvabhūma, Viśvanātha and Raghunātha Shiromani, Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa, Jagadīśa Tarkālankāra, Gadādhara Bhattāchārya, and many others. Annama Bhaṭṭa developed a consistent *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system by combining the ancient and new schools of *Nyāya* system along with the *Vaiśeṣika* school of thought. The *Navya-Nyāya* school of philosophy admits four *pramāṇas* of which *anumāna* is one of those. *Pramāṇa* stands for *pramāṇ-karaṇam* and it follows that valid inferences lead to true cognition which is called *anumiti*.

Constituents of *Anumāna*:

An *anumiti* is the product of several causal inferential conditions which are combinedly designated as *anumāna* (inferential process). If we consider the internal structure, of the cognitive states, constituting *anumāna*, we find three basic elements, viz,

. *Pakṣa* (p) -the subject of inferential cognition.

.*Sādhya* (s) - The property which is admitted in the *pakṣa*.

.*Hetu* (h) -The inferential mark or reason on the basis of whose pervasion with *sādhya*, the latter is inferred in the *pakṣa*. The form of an *anumāna* is ‘p has s because of h’, i.e., s is inferred to be present in p, on the basis of h. It is by

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virtue of the inferential relation of pervasion which h has in respect of s, that we can infer the presence of s in p.

The Relation of *Vyāpti*:

The relation of pervasion can be explained in the following way: If a thing x related to another thing y in such a way that wherever and whenever x is present, y is also present then x is pervaded by y. In that case, x can function as the *hetu* or inferential mark for y. For example, if we know that smoke is related to fire in such a way that wherever and whenever smoke is present, fire is also present, then smoke can be said to be pervaded by fire. In that case smoke can operate as the *hetu* or the inferential mark for fire.

Mechanism of *Anumāna*:

The cognitive process of *anumāna* can be explained with the help of the stock example of *Navya-Nyāya*, viz., ‘The hill has fire because of smoke’. The agent goes near a hill and perceives smoke, which is connected with the hill at the root (*avicchinna*), in the hill. This perception reminds him of the truth that smoke has the relation of pervasion (*vyāpti*) with fire, and this remembrance leads to the perception of the hill possessing such smoke as is pervaded by fire. From these three cognitions, he concludes that the hill has fire. Thus, the *anumiti* that hill has fire is causally preceded by three prior cognitions, viz.

- a. *Pakṣadharmatājñāna* -The perception of smoke in the hill (the h is in p).
- b. *Vyāptijñāna* - The recollection to the effect that smoke stands in the relation of pervasion with fire (the h has pervasion with s).
- c. *Parāmarśa* - The perception that smoke as pervaded by fire characterizes the hill.

The second recollective cognition depends on a previous non-recollective cognition of the same relation, which does not form a part in the actual inferential process. These three causally interrelated cognitions centre on the *hetu* in the following way:

- a. Cognition- 1 - the *hetu* which was perceived to be present in the *pakṣa*.

- b. Cognition - 2 - is remembered to be pervaded by the *sādhya*.
- c. Cognition- 3 - which leads to the perception of the *hetu* as characterized by the relation of pervasion with the *sādhya*, to be present in the *pakṣa*.

We can explain this inferential process in the following way:

Stage 1: Agent A perceives *hetu* in the *pakṣa*. This is a perceptual process.

Stage 2: Agent A recollects his previous perceptual knowledge that smoke is pervaded by fire, i.e., wherever there is smoke, there is fire.

Stage 3: Agent A perceives that smoke, which is pervaded by fire, is present in hill.

Stage 4: Agent A infers that fire is present in hill.

Legitimacy of *Hetu*:

An *anumiti* is valid and true, only when it is done on the bases of a legitimate *hetu* and the truth of *parāmarśa*. There are five legitimacy conditions of a *hetu*. These are:

Pakṣasatta -Existence of the *hetu* in the *pakṣa*.

Sapakṣasatta- Existence of the *hetu* in similar instances of *pakṣa*.

Vipakṣasatta - Non- existence of the *hetu* in dissimilar instances.

Avādhitatva - Uncontradicted.

Asatpratipakṣatta - Absence of counter *hetu*.

Classification of Inference:

Naiyāyikas have classified inference from several standpoints. From the standpoint of purpose, Navya-Naiyāyikas have classified inference under two heads, viz., (a) *Svārthanumāna* (inference for oneself) and (b) *Parārthānumāna* (inference for others). While the former is short and does not require formal statements, the second is elaborate and stated explicitly in formal statements. *Svārthānumāna* can be stated as following:

1. *Pratijñā*-The hill has fire.
2. *Hetu* - Because the hill has smoke.
3. *Udāharāṇa*-Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen.

In this way, we can get a syllogism consisting of three members or propositions, if we want to formulate it. Hence such inference is called *Triavayavīnyāya*, i.e., three membered syllogism. *Parārthāthānumāna*, on the

other hand, has five formulated members or propositions, and hence is called ‘*Pañcāvayavīnyāya*, i.e., five-membered syllogism. These five members are:

1. *Pratijñā* - The hill has fire.
2. *Hetu* - Because the hill has smoke.
3. *Udāharāṇa* - Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, for example, a kitchen.
4. *Upanaya* -The hill has smoke.
5. *Nigamana* - Hence, the hill has fire.

In this type of inference, *pratijñā* sets forth the conclusion to be established. The *hetu* states the reason for the conclusion. *Udāharāṇa* depicts the pervasion of the *hetu* with *sādhyā*, supported by an example. The *upanaya* is the application of the universal proposition to a particular case. The *nigamana* is the conclusion drawn from the preceding propositions.

There are other classifications of inference in the older *Nyāya* system and we are not going into those. There are other important but indirect factors of the inferential process, but we may skip them for the brevity of our present discussion. In the above lines, I hope I could give a very brief, yet clear description of the *Navya-Nyāya* view about the logical mechanism of inferential process, wherefrom the inferential knowledge takes its origin, which is, however an epistemological achievement. Thus, in *Navya-Nyāya*, logic and epistemology go hand in hand.

B. Comparison between Traditional Aristotelian Logic and *Navya-Nyāya* Logic:

At the very outset, I want to draw attention to the following two points:

1. In India, philosophy has been a comprehensive study and it does not admit of branching into metaphysics, logic, epistemology etc., as done in western philosophy. In the west, logic and epistemology are treated as two separate but closely related branches of philosophy. While logic deals with the inferential process, the inferential knowledge becomes the subject matter of epistemology. In Indian philosophy, however, the theory of inference includes both process and resulting knowledge and

constitutes the theory of *Pramāṇa*, which can be explained as logic and epistemology in the same bracket.

2. In the western formal logic, validity is conceived as independent of truth. An inference can be valid without giving true conclusion and vice versa. Even when a semantical concept of validity is used in formal logic, it is not concerned with the actual truth or falsity of the premises or conclusion. It only restricts that in a valid argument, true premises cannot yield false conclusion.

The *Navya-Nyāya* theory, on the other hand, rests on a theory of validity, which claims that validity without truth is an impossibility. In other words, a valid inference is sure to yield a true conclusion. Thus *Navya-Nyāya* theory of logic provides an infrastructure of inferential processes where valid inferences are source of true knowledge and thus is adequate for epistemology. Under these perspectives, we can start to compare the traditional Aristotelian logic and the *Navya-Nyāya* logic. We can observe that though they share some common features, yet they also differ in important respects.

Resemblances between Aristotelian and *Navya-Nyāya* Logic:

1. Both the *Navya-Nyāya* and the Aristotelian syllogism contain three terms, and these terms correspond almost one-to-one. For example, the *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu* of *Navya-Nyāya*, correspond both in function and occurrences to minor, major and middle terms respectively, of Aristotelian syllogism.
2. Though a *Navya-Nyāya parārthānumāna* has five members, it can be shown to be uniform to Aristotelian syllogism, for as we find the *nigamana* is just repetition of *pratijñā*, and *hetu* and *upanaya* are two different modes of presenting the same truth, viz., the *hetu* is in *pakṣa*.

Let us explain this point with a concrete example:

Aristotelian Syllogism

Major premiss: All M is P

Minor premiss: All S is M

***Navya-Nyāya* Syllogism**

Pratijñā: The hill has fire

Hetu: Because the hill has smoke

CONCLUSION: All S is P.

Udaharaṇa: Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g., kitchen.

Upanaya: The hill has smoke.

Nigamana: The hill has fire.

3. The *Navya-Nyāya* focuses on the relation of *vyāpti* or pervasion of *hetu* with *sādhya* as the ground of inference. In Aristotelian logic also, the inferential relation between the middle term and the major term construes the ground of inference. Thus, in both systems of logic, the inferential relation between the middle term and major term is the pivot of the inferential process.

Difference between the Two Systems:

There are some differences between these two systems of logic. We may observe the main points of differences in the following way:

- In *Navya-Nyāya* logic, inference is conceived as mediate inference only, there does not appear to be any theory of immediate inference like the processes of Conversion, Obversion etc., of Aristotelian logic.
- The distinction between formal truth and material truth so commonly made in western Aristotelian logic is not made in Indian logic, especially *Navya-Nyāya*. The reason is, inferences which are formally valid but not materially true, are not conducive to *pramā*, and Indian *Pramāṇa* system does not admit anything short of *pramā*.
- As inference is a mode of knowledge, the theory of inference is essentially a theory of epistemic notions. But since it involves the logical process of *anumāna*, it is also a theory of logic. Thus, Indian theory of inference is a logico-epistemological theory. However, the Aristotelian logic is a strictly logical theory.
- In Indian logic, there does not appear to be any theory of propositional logic, i.e., a theory of inference in which unanalyzed propositions are used as units of analysis, instead of terms. Thus Bochenski is right when he says, 'Indian logic seems to be almost entirely lacking in

propositional logic.’ Aristotelian logic, on the other hand, is essentially propositional.

- In *Navya-Nyāya* logic, the terms or the constituents are non-linguistic metaphysical entities, but in traditional Aristotelian logic, terms in syllogism are just linguistic entities. For example, when one says, ‘The hill has smoke’, he is talking about the physical entities like hill and smoke. In Aristotelian syllogism, on the other hand, when one says, ‘All men are mortal’, both ‘men’ and ‘mortal’ are linguistic terms, and questions are raised regarding their distribution and occurrences.
- In *Navya-Nyāya* logic, the apparently subject-predicate statements are actually relational statements. When we say, ‘The hill has fire’, it is analyzed as ‘The fire is in the relation of conjunction with the hill’. But, in Aristotelian logic, the propositions are categorical and non-relational in categorical syllogism, which occupies the central position.
- The *Navya-Nyāya* theory of inference is both deductive and inductive, while Aristotelian syllogism is strictly deductive. The third proposition of a five-membered *Navya-Nyāya* syllogism, i.e., the *udāharaṇa* indicates that the universal major premise is an induction generalised from instances already observed. Thus, it transpires that both deduction and induction are integral parts of *Navya -Nyāya* syllogism.

From the above discussions we can conclude that there is a close relationship between Indian *Navya-Nyāya* logic and Western Aristotelian logic.

C. Reconstruction of *Navya-Nyāya* Logic into Modern Symbolic Logic:

In this part of the paper, I would briefly mention the attempts made by eminent scholars like Stanislaw Schayer to work out a reformulation of *Navya -Nyāya* syllogism into First order Predicate logic, so that the Indian heritage of logical thoughts becomes easily accessible to the western scholars proficient in mathematical logic. Once they can understand the intricacies and depth of Indian logic, Indian logic would get wide popularity among the scholars.

Moreover the amalgamation of Western and Indian logical thoughts would surely lead to a great advancement of logic. As Klaus Glashoff indicates, there have been two revolutionary developments in the recent history of western logic during the period from about 19th century to 20th century. These may be specified as:

- a. Beginning in the middle of the 19th century, traditional Aristotelian logic has been completely abandoned in favour of mathematical logic (classical logic) as invented by Frege and Russell.
- b. From about the middle of the 20th century onwards, classical logic split into numerous different logical systems with different goals, each of them representing different generalisations, restrictions or even incompatible alternatives to Frege and Russell's classical logic. As on today, there are many existing varieties of logic. These are Classical predicate logic, Higher order logic, Deontic logic, Many-valued logic, Modal logic, Tense logic, Relevant logic, Paraconsistent logic, Free logic, Non-monotonous logic, Institutionistic logic, Epistemic logic, Partial logic, Fuzzy logic, Quantum logic, Erotectic logic, to name a few. All these systems are designed for different Special applications in the fields of Mathematics, Philosophy, Linguistics, and Computer Science and so on.

We may start our observation of the task of reformulation, with Stainslaw Schayer who wanted to do away with Aristotelian logic as a means of interpreting Indian logic. He proposed a new calculus to modernize the *Navya-Nyāya* format of inference. We can explain his proposal with the help of an example, where, (a) = on this mountain

1. *Pratijñā* Ψ (a) There is fire on a
2. *Hetu* ϕ (a) There is smoke on a
3. *Udāharāṇa*=statement of pervasion (x) ($\phi x \supset \Psi x$) For every locus x: if there is smoke in x, then there is fire in x.

4. *Upanaya*= statement of the *hetu*'s Presence in *pakṣa* $\phi(a) \supset \Psi(a)$

This rule also applies to $x=a$ (for the *pakṣa*).

5. *Nigamana*= statement of *sādhya* $\Psi(a)$ Because the rule applies to $x=a$ and

The statement $\Psi(a)$ is true.

Glashoff points out that items 3 and 4 of this new calculus is problematic since the *Navya-Nyāya* text may not fit the this formula. However, regarding item 3, we may point out that, we can use '⊃' (horse-shoe) in the symbolic representation of the relation of pervasion. In that case, we can formulate the crux of the *Navya-Nyāya* format of argument in the format of the First order predicate logic in the following way:

1. $(x)(xR1h \supset xR2s)$

2. $pR1h$

3. $pR2s$

We can explain this format in the following way: The first statement states the relation of pervasion between *hetu* and *sādhya*, as it states that, 'Wherever h is present (in the relation R1), s is also present (in the relation R2)'. R1 and R2 are different relations since different relations determine these occurrences. Thus the relation of pervasion x corresponds to that of material implication and something like paradox of material implication arises in the theory of pervasion also. The second statement indicates that the *hetu* is in *pakṣa* in the relation of R1, and thus is a statement of *pakṣadharmatājñāna*. Finally, the third statement expresses the conclusion that *sādhya* is in the *pakṣa*, in the relation R2. However, in this form, the *Navya-Nyāya* schema of inference also corresponds to traditional Aristotelian syllogism of the form:

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

∴ Socrates is mortal. (BARBARA)

Which, in the First-order predicate logic would be formulated as:

1. $(x)(Hx \supset Mx)$

2. $Hs \therefore Ms$

3. $Hs \supset Ms$ (1)UI

4. Ms (3),(2) MP

In (3) we use the applicative rule and in (4) the implicative rule of inference.

We can also show that a negative form of *Navya-Nyāya* inference can be formulated in the schema of First order predicate logic in the following way:

1. $(x) (xR1h \supset xR2s)$

2. $\sim (pR2s)$

3. $(pR1 h)$ (1), (2) , MT.

Which corresponds to Aristotelian syllogism of the form:

1. All philosophers are happy.

2. Tom is not happy.

3. Tom is not a philosopher. (CAMESTRES)

Thus we can reformulate the basic structure of *Navya-Nyāya* schema of inference into Aristotelian syllogism as well as the First order predicate logic. We may conclude our deliberation with the humble observation that, our attempts at formulating the *Navya-Nyāya* structure of inference into modern symbolic logic is only at the commencement period. There are many more nuances and subtleties of the theory, which may be a difficult task to reconstruct into the language of modern mathematical logic. It has been claimed by many scholars that use of symbolic logic, which is free from restrictions of various languages, is conducive to a truly universal understanding of different philosophical traditions. Accordingly, this paper is a brief attempt at a universal understanding of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophy, which is the epitome of Indian logical skill.

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SOME CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A REVIEW

BENULAL DHAR

It was total departure from the natural rights tradition when in later half of the nineteenth century some philosophers began to develop theories of human rights. This trend of developing human rights theories independently of the natural rights paradigm continues till recent times, although the influence of the natural rights thinking on the contemporary analysis of rights is not totally done away with. These philosophical theories of rights increasingly become free of the world-view that has shaped the theories of natural rights. The theories of natural rights are replaced by the theories of *human* rights. It was T. H. Green (1836-1882) who first put forward a radical critique of natural rights and elaborated his own views on the concept of rights. Again, after the adoption of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 many contemporary philosophers join this chorus in their own unique ways to develop the theories of human rights. In the present article, we would review the theories of human rights developed by T. H. Green, Margaret MacDonald, Carl Wellman and Joel Feinberg. These thinkers invent various new dimensions of human rights from their own perspectives, which are considered to be significant contributions in understanding the conception of human rights in contemporary era.

I. Rights as Recognised Claims:

The nineteenth century British political thought was dominated by the two contrasting doctrines, namely, utilitarianism and idealism. Though both the theories seem to concern themselves with a common issue, namely, the individual liberty but they differ in their method and approach to the matter. Individual liberty under the patronage of the utilitarians was a popular creed. In their zeal to safeguard the individual liberty the utilitarians developed somewhat negative attitude towards the authority of the state. In his *On Liberty*, J. S. Mill argues that those conducts of individual which affect

himself alone, the state has no excuse for intervening in his affairs. T. H. Green, as a member of the idealist camp, finds it as his task to revive the confidence in the authority of the state without impairing the ideal of individual liberty. He makes an attempt to strike a balance between the individual liberty and the authority of the state. And in doing so, he gives a pivotal role to rights in his writings.

Green puts forward some arguments against the natural rights doctrine in the context of evaluating the views of Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau and Austin, although it has already been severely assailed by Bentham and his fellow utilitarians. He rejects the doctrine of natural rights on three grounds: (i) The doctrine assumes that these rights have been brought into society from a pre-social state of human life, (ii) Yet this doctrine insists that these rights can be held against society, and (iii) it also asserts that an individual is entitled to enjoy these rights without regard for his duties that he owes to the society.¹

Green is primarily concerned with moral rights, that is, the rights that are justified on moral grounds. Like Mill, Green cannot conceive of individual as one who enjoys his life in solitary orbit of self-regarding activities, in isolation from his fellow-beings. For him, individuals are social beings, and it is only as part of social nexus that they have rights. But the society is not conceived by Green as the sum-total of discreet and isolated individuals but is united by a conception of the common good which an individual is able to recognise as a member of the society as his ideal good. Hence Green writes,

No one therefore can have a right except (1) as a member of a society, and (2) of a society in which some common good is recognised by the members of the society as their own ideal good, as that which should be for each of them. The capacity for being determined by a good so recognised is what constitutes personality in the ethical sense; and for this reason there is truth in saying that only among persons, in the ethical sense, can there come to be rights.²

What Green clarifies in the passage is that rights cannot belong to man merely as individual but as social being, provided that he can recognise in that common good an ideal good which is same for himself and for others as well.

Green believes in the primacy of self-realisation for which an individual is required to pursue a common good as a member of the society. This conception of self as the good to be realised and its pursuits can take place only within a social context. For, a man is able to realise his potentialities only in community with others towards a common good.

Conversely, when a person is capable of being determined by the conception of a common good, he can be said to possess rights. As a social being, a person *ought* to possess rights, which ‘expresses the relation of man to an end conceived as absolutely good, to an end which, whether desired or no, is conceived as intrinsically desirable. The moral capacity implies a consciousness on the part of the subject of the capacity that its realisation is an end desirable in itself, and rights are the condition of realising it’.³ In other words, the possession of rights relates a person to an end which is not valid for some *other* end considered valuable but something that has an absolute worth. And the common good as an end has an absolute worth and is, for Green, intrinsically desirable, that is, desirable in itself. Rights are the conditions for realising this end having absolute worth. Rights are claimed for making the common good a reality in the life of man by providing a power to him. Further, rights enable a person to freely exercise his power and thereby to secure the treatment of one person by another on equal footing. But in doing so, each person should realise that the free exercise of his power depends on allowing the free exercise of power of every other member of the society.

The point that is central to Green’s scheme of rights is the idea of common good. It is the concept of common good on the basis of which Green analyses the condition necessary to the realisation of human potentialities and the extent to which the state could be used to pave the way for the pursuit of self-perfection. The common good is conceived as an ideal not yet attained by the individual; it is ‘the absolute end’ of man as a social being. The ideal of common good enables a person to recognise his power as a right leading to the growth and development of his potentialities. Hence a right is

a power of which the exercise by the individual or by some body of men is recognised by a society, either as itself directly essential to a common good, or as conferred by an authority of which the maintenance is recognised as so essential.⁴

Green holds the view that right is a power exercised by person and recognised by society as essential for the realisation of the common good. He is reluctant to use the term 'natural' in the context of rights, in the sense that they actually exist when a man is born and continue to exist as long as human race. For Green, rights can be 'natural' only in the sense that they would apply to fulfilling 'a moral capacity without which a man would not be a man'.⁵ In other words, rights are 'necessary to the end which it is the vocation of human society to realise'.⁶

One of the reasons for Green to repudiate the doctrine of natural rights, as we have already pointed out, is that it de-links rights from duties that individual owes to his society. He says: 'Because a group of beings are capable each of conceiving an absolute good of himself and of conceiving it to be good for himself as identical with, and because identical with, the good of the rest of the group, there arises for each a consciousness that the common good should be the object of action, i.e. a duty, and a claim in each to a power of action that shall be at once secured and regulated by the consciousness of a common good on the part of the rest, i.e. a right'.⁷ In other words, as a moral being I have a capacity for duty towards the realisation of the common good and in order to fulfill my duty I should have a right - the latter being the condition of fulfilling my duty. Green points out that although all rights here are taken as relative to moral ends or duties, but this must not be confused with the popular assertion that every right implies a duty, or that right and duty are correlative. In this context, the correlativity of right and duty is accepted, in the sense that the 'possession of a right by any person both implies an obligation on the part of someone else, and is conditional upon the recognition of certain obligations on the part of the person possessing it'.⁸ What is meant here is that the fulfillment of man's vocation as a moral being is his basic duty and this duty cannot be carried out except through the exercise of rights.

According to Green, any right contains two aspects: on the one hand, it is a claim of the individual, and the recognition of it by the society on the other. Green writes,

In analysing the nature of any right, we may conveniently look at it on two sides, and consider it as on the one hand a claim of the individual, arising out of his rational nature, to the free exercise of some faculty; on the other, as a concession of that claim by society, a power given by it to the individual of the putting the claim in force.⁹

A person claims certain rights which are more or less articulate and pronounced for the development of his moral personality. For, the moral personality can be developed only through the exercise of rights, that is, 'through the recognition by members of a society of powers in each other contributory to a common good, and the regulation of those powers by that recognition'.¹⁰ This claim arises out of his rational nature because of the free exercise of some faculty. But this claim would remain merely a claim unless it is conceded by other members of the society. When the claim made by the individual is co-ordinate with the recognition of the claim by others, only then there exists a right. An individual's moral capacity to identify his ideal good in the common good and to regulate the exercise of his power concerning the good that others recognise are what make it obligatory to have rights. In order to exercise a right it is not enough to have a claim of the individual but this claim has to be recognised by the members of the society.¹¹ A claim of the individual is put into force only when it is recognised by others. Thus moral personality can be developed only through the two-faceted rights, and thereby it would be contributory to the common good. But these two distinguishable aspects, Green says, belong to the same common consciousness.¹²

Now, the question is: Why rights are as crucial for the person as a moral and social being? Green's reply is that 'a right is a power claimed and recognised as contributory to a common good'.¹³ In other words, rights are necessary in the life of a person for his development and thereby to realise his end as a moral being - the end that is absolute and intrinsically desirable.

Green seems to argue that although an individual has rights only as a social being; the focal point of growth and development is *not* the social group but the individual. It is for the self-development of the individual that rights are invoked in social life, although political and social contexts are not without significance. As Paul Harris and John Morrow writes,

Green argues that the essential social dimension to individual self-realisation means that the individual must regard social institutions and practices (political organisation, customs, mores, law) as collective efforts after a common good. They are the result of the need to secure and maintain the conditions within which individuals can pursue their self-realisation in their own ways, and of the need to harmonise the ways in which they do so. As such, these institutions and practices need to be acknowledged by the individual as deserving his allegiance and consideration as essential to his own self-realisation – provided they continue to act as means to the common good and not as impediments to it.¹⁴

Further, Green points out that right cannot be held against society or state; they are only sustainer and harmoniser of social relations on which all rights are founded.

II. Rights as Taking a Stand:

In ‘Natural Rights’, Margaret MacDonald has leveled some specific and pointed criticisms against the traditional doctrine of natural rights but her criticism moves along sympathetic lines. In the last section of the essay, she puts forward her own views on rights. Her article ‘while in the broad stream of what is sometimes called “analytic philosophy” is near in spirit to the Logical Positivism of the 1930s than to the linguistic or conceptual analysis of the post-war years’.¹⁵ She is concerned here to understand the nature of propositions/assertions expressing right-claims and to classify them into one of the following three types among indefinite number of utterances. These are: (i) Tautological or analytical propositions, (ii) Empirical or contingent propositions, and (iii) Assertions of value. She makes an attempt in this article to show that some of the difficulties we face with the doctrine of natural rights is because of confusions of propositions about them either with analytical or

with empirical propositions, whereas the assertions concerning right-claims, according to MacDonald, are ethical assertions.

Though MacDonald has directed a few specific points of criticism against some of the premises of the doctrine of natural rights, but she has not entirely dismissed it as a tissue of confusions. She says, ‘The exponents of the natural Rights of Man were trying to express what they deemed to be the fundamental conditions of *human* social life and government. And it is by the observance of some such conditions, I suggest, that human societies are distinguished from anthills and beehives’.¹⁶ She further points out that the natural rights of man conceived by its exponents *independently* of civil society and government in order to lay stress on their fundamental nature, that is, to lay emphasis on the natural rights of man as the ultimate moral and social values without observation of which human society would no longer remain fit for human survival. These are the conditions of a good society. But these conditions are *not* given by Nature as the latter cannot dictate what ought we to do. For MacDonald, Nature as such does not harbour values to provide directions to human beings in their social and political life. It is man who determines standards through his choices and preferences independently of Nature. As she writes,

In short, ‘natural rights’ are the conditions of a good society. But what those conditions are is not given by nature or mystically bound up with the essence of man and his inevitable goal, but is determined by human decisions.¹⁷

Among the three types of human utterances mentioned above, assertions about natural rights, according to MacDonald, fall within the third category. That is, utterances about natural rights are neither tautological or analytical nor empirical or contingent but are value-assertions which ‘include all those which result from human choice and preference, for example in art and personal relations, as well as in morals and politics’.¹⁸ Now, what are the characteristics of value-assertions? According to MacDonald, an important feature of such assertions is that they are ‘more like records of *decisions* than propositions’.¹⁹

For her: ‘To assert that “Freedom is better than slavery” or “All men are of equal worth” is not to state a fact but to *choose* a side. It announces *This is where I stand*’.²⁰ The point here is that utterances that concern ultimate social values like human rights are *decisions*, rather than propositions, as a result of human choices and preferences. They do not state facts but are meant to take a stand or to choose a side. While taking a decision, one has to choose a side with regard to certain ultimate social values, for example, whether we prefer freedom or slavery.²¹ Thus decisions which concern the ultimate structure of society are more like choosing our favorite poems, novels, pictures, etc. but not like choosing to accept the law of gravitation. In fact, one *cannot* choose to accept the scientific law like the law of gravitation but rather he is bound to accept it. In case of choosing this or that novel, one is at liberty. Here, two important characteristics of such decisions are to be noted.

Firstly, the decisions about fundamental values of society are neither *explicit* decisions nor taken at a particular date. These decisions come from those people who live and work in society and take part in operating its institutions. Secondly, these decisions are not taken on the basis of any evidence. MacDonald considers the doctrine of equality according to which all human beings are to be treated as of equal worth. But on what ground the equality has to be accorded to men? According to the natural rights theorists, it is having reason as a natural fact that provides the ground for equal treatment of all human beings. That is, the decision here is taken on the basis of possessing by men a natural characteristic called ‘reason’. Now a question arises: If in course of time a person no longer remains in possession of the natural characteristic called reason and becomes lunatic, then can the decision about treating him as having equal worth like other human beings hold true? Is the lunatic entitled any longer to claim his natural rights? MacDonald’s reply to such a query is that losing rationality does not make him a mere animal. He is very well entitled to his human rights even though he has lost his rationality. Thus reason or any *one* natural characteristic cannot be the basis of the value-

assertion that all men are of equal worth. Now, does it follow then that the decision concerning the equal worth of human beings is arbitrary? MacDonald answers this question in the negative. She argues that although any evidence cannot be adduced (as we do in the case of a scientific laws, such as the law of gravitation) in support of decisions concerning the ultimate social values, but they can be supported and defended in the way a lawyer defends his clients or a literary critic of his judgement that one poet is better than another.

To elaborate her position, MacDonald considers the situation that arises in a court room. The statements of fact of certain case is known to both the prosecuting and defending lawyers and the presentation of the statements of facts before the jury is not enough for winning the case. What is needed by the defending lawyer is to marshal those facts in a manner that would go to favour his client. His presentation involve not mere stating the facts but his voice, gesture, etc. all of which are supposed to influence the decision of the jury on his client's favour. It is in the like manner that the decision which concerns the rights of man to liberty and equality can be supported and defended but cannot be proved by evidence. MacDonald concludes,

There are no certainties in the field of values. For there are no true or false beliefs about values, but only better or worse decisions and choices. And to encourage the better decisions we need to employ devices which are artistic rather than scientific. For our aim is not intellectual assent, but practical effects. These are not, of course, absolutely separate, for intellectual assent to a proposition or theory is followed by using it. But values, I think, concern only behaviour. They are not known, but accepted and acted upon.²²

The crux of MacDonald's arguments is as follows: According to natural rights theorists, the law of nature and natural rights are standards by which existing human conditions are judged and this standard is known by reason which is regarded as intrinsic property of man. But MacDonald argues that the characteristic of being rational is simply an empirical fact which does not constitute man's specific nature, and hence cannot set the standard of what ought to be. According to her, they cannot be known by reason as the latter is capable of knowing only analytic or tautological propositions. The assertions

which concern natural law and natural rights, according to MacDonald, are neither analytic nor empirical propositions but are ethical assertions. The latter are records of decisions as a result of human choices and preferences that *cannot* be proved but can only be defended in the way a lawyer defends his client or a literary critic defends a particular poet. A good counsel or a literary critic does *not* prove anything as a result of his arguments but uses his materials with results in order to impress and convince the jury. Similarly, the assertions of equality and liberty being in the nature of ethical assertions cannot be demonstrated by any inductive means but can only be decided and defended.

III. Rights as Constellations of Hohfeldian Elements:

Wellman in his article entitled 'A New Conception of Human Rights' develops the idea that rights are constituted by a group of normative elements identified by Wesley Hohfeld in legal terms during the first quarter of the twentieth century. According to Hohfeld, legal rights could be constituted by any of the four elements: a liberty, a claim, a power, or immunity. But he regards the claim-rights as a pre-eminent type of right among the four elements. Wellman agrees with Hohfeld that any of these four elements may be fundamental to a given right, but he does not think that each right is constituted by just the one element. For Wellman, every right is a complex normative structure, which typically involves several of these elements. Let us now briefly explain Hohfeld's conception of a legal right consisting of four elements, each element having a unique second party correlative.

A legal *liberty* to do A - which consists in the absence of duty on the agent's part to refrain from A - is matched with other people's lack of a claim that A not be done by the agent. For example, I am at liberty to purchase a car of Maruti Company in that I have no duty not to, and others have no claim against me not to. A legal *claim* correlates with a legal duty of some second party. A legal *power* to do A consists in a person's legal competence to perform an act which will create, or at least bring to bear, certain legal

consequences for a second party and is matched by a liability to be acted on. For example, a policeman has the legal power over fleeing suspect to place him under arrest and the suspect is liable to be arrested by the police. And a person's *immunity* from A is necessarily correlated with a lack of power on the part of others to do A, and thus the correlative of an immunity is a disability. For example, I have legal immunity against others when I practise the religion of my choice.

Since Wellman thinks that the problem of defining the content of rights has been better solved by law than ethics, he takes legal rights as his model of human rights. He finds it particularly helpful to define the content of legal rights following the Hohfeldian terminology that explicates them in unambiguous and practical terms. Wellman intends to preserve all the four features, defined by Hohfeld, in his 'new' conception of human rights. The Hohfeldian conception of a legal right is not an aggregate of disparate legal liberties, claims, powers, and immunities but a *cluster* of all these four features. Wellman conceives an analogous concept of ethical right as a complex system of ethical advantages, a cluster of ethical liberties, claims, powers, and immunities as follows.

Firstly, X has an ethical liberty to do A if and only if X does not have any duty not to do A. Here duty is taken to be based on some specific moral reason and need not be a duty *to* any determinate second party. I am at liberty to spend my spare cash as I wish or to practise any religion of my choice. Secondly, X has an ethical claim against Y that Y performs some action A if and only if Y has a duty to X to do A. For example, you have an ethical claim against me that I refrain from striking you or my child has an ethical claim against me that I support him. Here, the duty is a duty to someone who would be seriously injured by its non-performance. Thirdly, X has the ethical power to bring about some ethical consequence C if and only if X possesses the competence required for performing some act with this ethical consequence. For example, I have the ethical power of making a promise, and this act not

only creates an obligation to do what I have promised but also empowers the promisee to release me from my promise if he so chooses. By the term 'competence' in the definition, Wellman refers to the qualifications or characteristics one must possess in order that one's action can actually bring about some sort of ethical consequence. Thus everyone is not competent to make promise or to release the promiser. Fourthly, X is immune from some specified ethical consequence C if and only if there is no other party who is competent to do some action with this ethical consequence. For example, I am immune from the loss through any act of another of my ethical claim against second parties that they refrain from striking me.

According to Wellman, just as a legal right is a complex system of legal advantages, so an ethical right is a complex system of ethical advantages consisting of liberties, claim, power, or immunities. What give these four constituents a unity is its core. Each and every right has a core which defines the essential content of a right. In other words, it is the defining core that holds together the constituent elements of a right. The defining core of my right to be repaid is my ethical claim to repayment. The essential content or defining core of my right to free speech is my ethical liberty of speaking out on controversial issues. The same defining core lies at the centre of my every power-right or immunity-right. Wellman writes,

When we classify rights as claim-, power- or immunity-rights, it is to their defining cores that we refer. Whatever other legal elements may be contained in any right, they belong to this right because of their relation to its core. Thus, a legal right is not a mere aggregate or collection of disparate legal liberties, claims, powers and immunities; it is a system of legal advantages tied to its defining core.²³

Just as there is a system of legal advantages tied to its defining core, so there is a cluster of ethical advantages integrated with their essential content. It is the defining core or essential content that gives stability to an ethical right and also maintains its unity even when its associated elements are changing. Thus Wellman distinguishes between the *defining* core and the *associated* elements in his conception of an ethical right. For example, the creditor's right

to repayment includes not only a defining core, the *claim* against the debtor for repayment, but also a *liberty* to request or not to request for repayment, and a *power* to waive the repayment, and an *immunity* to be protected from arbitrary or willful cancellation of the indebtedness.

Now, Wellman distinguishes human rights from other ethical rights. The right of a promisee, a teacher, or a citizen is not a human right, for they are not the right one has simply by virtue of being human. Traditionally, human rights are generally defined as those ethical rights that every human being possesses by virtue of being human. Wellman proposes a narrower conception of human rights which is as follows: 'I define a human right as an ethical right of the individual as human being vis-à-vis the state'.²⁴ In this definition, Wellman excludes other individual or organisation as an addressee of human rights. He adduces two reasons in support of his exclusion of other individual or organisation: (i) In his definition Wellman thinks it appropriate to follow the major human rights documents which proclaim the state as the addressee of human rights; (ii) He finds the ethical relation of the individual human being to other individual or organisation is quite different from his ethical relation to the state in that the latter has a much more greater role in human affairs. In order to mark the distinctive role of the state Wellman proposes to reserve 'the expression "human right" to refer to a right any individual has as a human being *in face of* the state'.²⁵ Hence, Wellman provides his final definition of human rights as follows: 'A human right is a cluster of ethical liberties, claims, powers and immunities that together constitute a system of ethical autonomy possessed by an individual as a human being vis-à-vis the state'.²⁶

Wellman now turns to illustrate his 'new' conception of human rights with respect to the right to privacy. The term 'privacy' is opposite of being public. That is, it is a condition which is not open to public. Generally, it is regarded as unethical to invade one's private realm. Every human being requires privacy in his home, family, personal correspondence, etc. This also

includes some relationships such as those between husband and wife, doctor and patient. One is in need of privacy in these and other areas of human life for the development of his personality, for his sense of security and for the maintenance of certain sensitive relationships. Thus the privacy is considered to be an important good, which ought to be protected with respect to all persons. Wellman finds out three distinct elements in the right to privacy as its defining core or essential content: 'a claim to freedom from invasions of one's privacy' 'a claim to legal protection from invasions of one's privacy by the state or other individuals', and 'the ethical claim of the individual against the state that it sustains the conditions necessary for the existence of privacy for the individual'.²⁷ Wellman also brings out some associated ethical elements which contribute to the satisfaction of the three defining core of the right to privacy. The illustration of the right to privacy with respect to his 'new' conception of human rights, Wellman hopes, would pave the way for similar analyses to be given for other human rights.

IV. Rights as Claims:

Feinberg begins his analysis of the nature of rights by means of a thought-experiment. He imagines a land called Nowheresville which is just like our own world except that no one in it has any rights. But the denizens of Nowheresville possess other moral qualities in abundance: they are benevolent, compassionate, sympathetic and deserving of the benefits of modern civilisation. But it remains that they lack the power to claim something as their due. That is, they cannot claim *to* something and *against* someone else, which is based on some system of rules - be it legal or moral.

For Feinberg, rights are claims, and what are called claim-rights are traditionally distinguished by legal writers from liberties, immunities and powers with which they are often confused. In case of legal claim-rights, rights logically entail other person's duties. One example of such rights is the creditor's right to be paid by his debtor. Here, the creditor's right against his debtor and the debtor's duty to his creditor are but the same relation viewed

from two different standpoints. But Feinberg argues for the primacy of claims over duties. If Nip has a claim-right against Tuck, then this implies that Tuck is bound by some duty to Nip who is free. The duties derivative from claims is missing in Nowheresville, for the denizens of the land lack the power to claim.

In order to establish his view that right is a sort of claim, Feinberg finds it feasible to explain the idea of a claim in informal analysis rather than by means of a formal definition. For him, one can learn more about what a claim is by attending to the activity of claiming. He begins by pointing out that ‘*claiming* is an elaborate sort of rule-governed *activity*. A claim is that which is claimed, the object of the act of claiming...’.²⁸ He distinguishes between (i) making claim to..., (ii) claiming that..., and having a claim. First of all, the activity of claiming involves ‘making claim to something’. A claim is an activity in which individuals demand things as their due. For example, when an insurance policy holder places a demand to the insurance authority by presenting his policy deed to pay him the amount of money which is his due or an inventor stakes a claim for his patent right. These are the claims of the insurance policy holder or an inventor. Thus only the individual who has a title to something, or who has qualified for it, can make a claim as a matter of right. What is distinctive about rights is that they can be claimed only by those who have already possessed them. In legal sense, ‘making claim to’ means that the thing claimed is bound to happen. This is, for Feinberg, the ‘performative sense’ of term ‘claim’.

Feinberg now turns to the second employment of the term ‘claim’, namely, ‘claiming that’. Claiming that one has a right is to make an assertion that one is possessed of a certain right and to demand that it be recognised. This is what is called by Feinberg ‘the propositional claiming’ as opposed to ‘performative claiming’. In propositional claiming, it is not enough to make assertion of a claim but to make it listen to by those concerned. In other words, in case of ‘claiming that’, to assert that something is the case goes together with the demand that it is to be recognised. In order to ensure that the demand

is to be recognised, it is to be asserted under ‘appropriate circumstances’ which may include when one is challenged or when one’s possession of something is denied or acknowledged. Thus ‘having a right’ is to be in a position to making a claim. Feinberg writes,

Having rights, of course, makes claiming possible; but it is claiming that gives rights their special moral significance... Having rights enables us to ‘stand up like men’, to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of anyone. To think of oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduly but properly proud, to have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to be worthy of the love and esteem of others. Indeed...what is called ‘human dignity’ may simply be the recognizable capacity to assert claims.²⁹

Feinberg also analyses the third component involving the term ‘claim’. Here, his question is: ‘what is to have a claim and how is this related to rights?’ Feinberg replies that ‘...having a claim consists in being in a position to claim, that is, to make claim or claim that’.³⁰ This suggests that it is primarily a verbal rather than a normative activity. As the claim is an activity, it is quite different from *things*, such as coins, pens, pencils and other material possessions. Even the title in the form of tickets, certificates, receipts, etc. is not the same thing as the claim. The title is rather the evidence that establishes the claim as valid. According to this view, there may be a claim without ever claiming that to which one is entitled or even without being aware that one has the claim. Because one might be unaware of the fact that one is in a position to claim or might not be inclined to take the opportunity of that position for any reason, such as the fear that the government machinery is not working or debased and will not give effect to the valid claim of an individual.

On Feinberg’s view, rights are not mere claims but *valid* claims. He rejects the view according to which all claims as such are valid and hence it is superfluous to use the adjective ‘valid’ before the term ‘claim’. He argues that all claims are *presented* as valid whether they are in fact valid or not. Only those claims, which are *in fact* valid, are acknowledged as rights. Hence Feinberg admits that there *are* certain claims which are *not* valid; these claims are merely *presented* as valid.³¹ In a parallel to the *prima facie* case in the

judiciary, there may be *prima facie* sense of ‘claim’. In the judiciary the initial evidence, which is put forward by a plaintiff is serious but not conclusive, is called *prima facie* case. Similarly, there may be *prima facie* case of a claim but not amounting to a right.

In Feinberg’s view, if someone has a right, then this implies that he has a claim *to* something and *against* someone else. He writes, ‘A man has a moral right when he has a claim the recognition of which is called for - not (necessarily) by legal rules - but by moral principles, or the principles of an enlightened conscience’.³² In other words, there must be a set of reasons based on legal rules or moral principles to support a person’s claim *to* something and *against* someone. But there may be someone having claim-to without knowing whom that claim-to might be against. Imagine a hungry and sickly orphan child living in a slum. Does not this child have a *claim* to be fed, taken care of and taught to be read? In Feinberg’s view, a valid claim calls for, but does not entail, the duties of other person to satisfy the claim. If it is practicable for a claim to be satisfied, then it is enough justification for calling on relevant duties of determinate persons.

Thus in Feinberg’s theory, a right is always a combination of two elements (namely, a valid claim *to* something and *against* someone), although any of these two elements may be more clearly perceived in a particular case. He, however, speaks of special ‘manifesto sense’ of right, which lacks addressee. ‘Natural needs’, Feinberg analyses,

are real claims if only upon hypothetical future beings not yet in existence. I accept the moral principle that to have an unfulfilled need is to have a kind of claim against the world, even if against no one in particular. A natural need for some good as such, like a natural desert, is always a reason in support of a claim to that good. A person in need, then, is always “in a position” to make a claim, even when there is no one in the corresponding position to do anything about it. Such claims, based on need alone, are ‘permanent possibilities of rights’, the natural seed from which rights grow.³³

The manifesto rights are a special class of rights, in the sense that they are based only on the validation of claims-to but a full-fledged right requires

the combination of a valid claim-*to* with a claim-*against*, which are justified under a system of valid rules.

V. Conclusion:

Among the four thinkers the views of whom we have dealt with in the foregoing analysis, Green and MacDonald reject the conception of natural rights and develop their views on rights in their own unique ways. The remaining two thinkers, namely, Wellman and Feinberg have not criticized the natural rights paradigm of rights but develop their views independently of it. For MacDonald, the utterances that concern ultimate social values like human rights are decisions as a result of human choices and preferences. If we think that human rights are beneficial for us, then they must be defended by means of arguments. And in order to defend the ultimate social values like human rights, we have to choose a side, that is, to choose, for example, whether to defend liberty or slavery. This is more like choosing one's favourite poems, stories, work of art, etc. and not like choosing a scientific law, such as the uniformity of nature. But Wellman, following Hohfeldian model of legal rights, conceives analogous conception of ethical rights as a cluster of ethical liberties, claims, powers and immunities. Unlike Hohfeld who thinks that any of these elements is fundamental to a right, Wellman proposes that a right is constituted by these four normative elements together. What gives these elements a unity is the defining core or the essential element of a right. Human rights, according to Wellman, are a specific kind of ethical rights the addressee of which is the state. Green and Feinberg recognise rights as possessing an irreducible duality. For Green, a right is both a claim of the individual and its recognition by the society. Similarly, for Feinberg, a right is a claim *to* something and *against* someone based on some legal or moral rules. For him, the claim has a primacy over duties. It is not a claim put forward merely as a claim but a *valid* claim.

NOTES AND REFERENCES:

1. Freedon, M. *Rights* (Delhi: World View Publications, 1998), p. 20.
2. Green, T. H. *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*, (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1967), p. 44.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 44-5.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-8.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
11. Elsewhere Green says, 'There can be no right without a consciousness of common interest on the part of members of a society. Without this there might be certain powers on the part of individuals, but no recognition of these powers by others as powers of which they allow the exercise, nor any claim to such recognition, and without this recognition or claim to recognition there can be no right'. See T. H. Green's *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*, op. cit., p. 48.
12. As Amal Kumar Mukhopadhyay clarifies, 'In all this discussion the main thesis Green tries to establish is that the origin of right lies both inside and outside the individual. On the one hand, it flows from his moral personality. On the other, it is derived from social relations'. See his *The Ethics of Obedience: A Study of the Philosophy of T. H. Green*, (Calcutta: The World Press Private Limited, 1967).
13. Green, T. H. *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*, op. cit. p. 110.
14. Harries P. and Morrow, J. 'Introduction', *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 6-7.
15. Milne, A. J. M. *Freedom and Rights: A Philosophical Synthesis*, (New York: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1968), p. 57.
16. MacDonald, M. 'Natural Rights', *Theories of Rights*, edited by Jeremy Waldron, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 33.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
20. *Ibid.*
21. As MacDonald writes, 'Lawyers and art critics are not frauds, but neither are they scientists. They are more like artists who use material with results which impress and convince but do not *prove*. There is no conceivable method of *proving* that Keats is a better poet than Crabbe or that freedom is better than slavery. For assertions of value cannot be subjected to demonstrative or inductive methods'. See his 'Natural Rights' *Theories of Rights*, op. cit. p. 39.
22. MacDonald, M. 'Natural Rights', op. cit. p. 39-40.
23. Wellman, C. 'A New Conception of Human Rights', *The Philosophy of Human Rights*, edited by Morton E. Winston, (California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1989), p. 90.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. Feinberg, J. 'The Nature and Value of Rights', *The Philosophy of Human Rights*, op. cit., p. 68.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

31. Feinberg writes, 'Nearly all writers maintain that there is some intimate connection between having a claim and having a right. Some identify right and claim without qualification; some define "right" as justified or justifiable claim, others as recognized claim, still others as valid claim. My own preference is for the latter definition'. See his 'The Nature and Value of Rights', *The Philosophy of Human Rights*, op. cit., p. 70.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

33. *Ibid.*

IS NEW RIDDLE OF INDUCTION A FORM OF RULE-FOLLOWING SKEPTICISM?

GOPAL SAHU

Kripke, while presenting and discussing his celebrated problem, “rule-following scepticism”, and “quus” counter-example,¹ claims that the Goodman’s new riddle of induction is “strikingly close to rule-following skepticism” and “deserves comparison.”² He further, claims that, “Goodman’s ‘grue’ would play the role of the ‘quus’” and “Goodman’s problem may prove impossible without consideration of rule-following”.³ However, despite this tall claim, Kripke has not elaborated, discussed and compared neither the new riddle nor grue predicate with his rule-following skepticism or quus rule. Even Goodman has not referred to this problem in his subsequent edition of his book or in any of his writing. There are a few works on this claim or to relate these two problems. In this context a very pertinent question naturally arises in our mind is: Is new riddle of induction really a form of rule-following skepticism?

In answering this question, we argue that Goodman’s new riddle of induction poses a paradox of induction underlying the rule-following skepticism. The new riddle of induction on the face of it may not appear to be a version of rule-following skepticism and Goodmanian scholars may not agree with us in our interpretation of the new riddle. We believe that Goodman had anticipated the rule-following skepticism and he formulated the paradox rule-following pertaining to induction. Kripke’s formulation of the rule-following skepticism raises the issue in the generalization of the future

¹ Kripke, S. A., *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (henceforth WRPL)*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1982, p. 1-54.

² Goodman, N., *Fact, Fiction and Forecast (henceforth FFF)*, 2nd edition, Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., Indianapolis, 1965, p. 59-122.

³ *WRPL*, pp. 58-59

behaviour from the past observation, the problem of meaning and justification and the problem of other minds.

Goodman in his formulation of the paradox makes use of the rule-following consideration in generalizing observed from unobserved. The argument is based on the fact the projection of the predicate on the basis of the given evidence statement is similar to an act in accordance with a rule and the projection of the predicates and generalizations are only different aspects of the rule-following. The inductive inference similar to the functions of rules acts as the normative-constraints over infinite number of projections of the predicates. The possibility of the same evidence statement giving rise to incompatible hypotheses is similar to that of the multiple interpretations of the rules. Thus the new riddle of induction is nothing but the problem of rule-following skepticism, however in a different setting.

New Riddle of Induction:

Induction is a form of inference in which we argue that the predicate asserted to be true for the narrow universe of the evidence statements is confirmed for the whole universe of discourse. All emeralds examined so far are found to be green and none found to be non-green is a truth about “emeralds” examined so far. The predicate “green” states a truthfulness about narrow universe of the color of “emerald”, for the truthfulness of the statement is restricted to the present time and the predicate “greenness” asserts about the color of “emerald” up to now. The whole universe of “emeralds” includes all cases of emeralds examined and non-examined, past and future. The narrow universe of discourse is given and is called the evidence statement and the wider universe is called the hypothesis. Since all the emeralds we have so far observed have been green, we project the predicate “green” to the wider universe of emeralds and adopt the hypothesis that all future emeralds probably are going to be green also.

The problem in such inductive projection of predicate, as Hume⁴ has already conclusively argued, is not based on any logical principle because there is no contradiction involved in denying the statement of the inductive inference. Hume argues that the statements regarding wider universe are neither logical statements themselves, nor are they logical outcome of the evidence statements or inductive practices. The past instances or the evidence statements do not impose any logical compulsion over the occurrence of something yet to happen or on future events. There is no casual and logical connection found to be holding among the objects of the world. Hume's argument proves that the projection of a predicate like green about future emeralds may be correct, but is done without a proper justification. On the other hand, there is no logical compulsion to eliminate the projection of the unwanted predicates about the wider universe. We have neither any answer nor any logical clue to distinguish conformable hypotheses from accidental ones.

Given Hume's finding on the projection of predicate, Goodman argues that a paradox can be generated in the inductive rules. The paradox of induction proposes a contradiction in induction by arguing that the same evidence statement gives equal inductive support to two contradictory or incompatible predicates or hypotheses, i.e. the projections of predicates or adaptation of hypotheses may disagree or conflict for the unexamined instances of the wider universe. Goodman calls this paradox as "the new riddle of induction".⁵ The new riddle of induction poses the paradox by arguing that it is possible to envision a system of predicates rival to our own, such that a finding by us that all examined emeralds possess greenness will be equivalent to a finding that all examined emeralds possess non-greenness up to the present time. On the basis of such findings, the inference that the remaining

⁴ Hume, David, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, edit., L. A. Selby-Bigge, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

⁵ *FFF*, pp. 59-122.

emeralds possess greenness is inconsistent with the inference that the remaining emeralds also possess non-greenness. Both the hypotheses have as much inductive support for both hypotheses as both of them have equal numbers of positive instances in favor of them and no negative instances against them up to now. However, the future projection or predicates about the wider universe of discourse will be inconsistent with the inference that remaining emeralds possess non-greenness.⁶ There is no logical compulsion to exclude the unwarranted projections like “blue” and include the lawful projection “green” for the adaptation of the hypotheses that “all emeralds will be green” from the evidence statements that “all emeralds examined before a certain time is green”. Goodman argues that this is possible if we can imagine a predicate such as “grue” which is to be understood as applying to a thing at a given time t if and only if either the thing is then green and the time is prior to time t , or the thing is then blue and the time not prior to t . He presents the grue counter-example as follows:

Now let me introduce another predicate less familiar than “green”. It is the predicate “grue” and it applies to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue. Then at time t we have, for each evidence statement asserting that a given emerald is green, a parallel evidence statement asserting that the grue. And the statements that emerald a is grue, b is grue, and so on, will each conform the general hypothesis that all emeralds are grue. Thus according to our definition, the prediction that all emerald subsequently examined will be green and the prediction that all will be grue are alike confirmed by evidence describing the same observations. But if an emerald subsequently examined is grue, it is blue and hence not green.⁷

The grue predicate is defined commonly as “a predicate which applies to a thing x , if x is examined before a time t and found to be green or x is

⁶ Elder, C. L.: “Goodman’s ‘New Riddle’- A realist’s Reprise”, *Philosophical Studies*, 59, 1990, p. 116.

⁷ *FFF*, p. 74.

examined after t and is blue”. Schematically the predicate “grue” can be defined as:

$$x \text{ is grue} =df \ (x \text{ is observed before the time } t \ \& \ x \text{ is green}) \vee \\ (x \text{ is not observed before the time } t \ \& \ x \text{ is blue})^8$$

The new riddle poses a paradox by revealing that incompatible and rival hypotheses can be inferred from the same evidence statement. Evidence statements, for example “all emeralds examined so far are green”, leave us with no choice to select hypotheses of incompatibility, i.e. “all emeralds after t is grue (blue)” and “all emeralds examined after t is green”. Though we know which of the predicates is genuinely confirmed, both the genuine predicate, i.e. green and its rival predicate, i.e. grue are equally confirmed according to the definition of grue. Thus Goodman says, “...it is clear that if we if we simply choose an appropriate predicate, then on the basis of these same observation we shall have equal confirmation for many predication whatever about other emeralds - indeed about anything else.”⁹ There is no satisfactory inductive principle to exclude the unwanted and unacceptable predicate “grue” and include the legitimate predicate “green” in the projection of the hypotheses. All adaptation of the hypotheses, based on the evidence statements is only unjustified leap. Our future moves and predictions are all indeterminate - there is no right or wrong projection of predicates *per se* and incompatible hypotheses are equally acceptable.

⁸ This is the common definition of the predicate “grue”, but formulated differently by different philosophers. Philosophers who have defined grue in this way are: Barker, S. F. and Peter Achinstein.: “On the New Riddle of Induction”, *Philosophical Reviews*, Vol. 69, 1960, p. 511, Hacking Ian.: “On Kripke’s and Goodman’s Users of ‘Grue’”, *Philosophy*, Vol. 68, 1993, p. 270., Jackson, 1975, Grue, p. 114-119 and Martin, M. R.: “It is not that Easy Being Grue”, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 40, 1990, pp. 300. See Elder, p. 116. Jackson, 1975, *Grue*, p. 113 gives a logical proof of the grue problem and argues that all interpretations of grue do not generate the paradox of induction, such as Martin’s definition. Robert Martin defines Grue as follows is grue at time n if, and only if: (1) x is earlier than t and x is green at x , (2) x is at t or later, and x is blue at n .

⁹ *FFF*, p. 76.

Rule-Following Skepticism:

Human behaviors and actions are rule-governed. They are explained and regulated in terms of some or other rules. The action and behaviors that are performed on the basis of the rules can be called as the applications of the rules. So our stopping at the red signal is an application of the traffic rule “do not cross the road when there is red signal”. The applications of a given rule are the extensions of the rule and can be called as an action-type.¹⁰ The action-type is an open-ended class having infinite members. For example, the applications of the rule “+ 2”, such as 1002, 1004, 1006 etc. are unlimited and unbounded.

Rule acts as a constraint over an indefinite number of cases; therefore, it is relevant for an indefinitely large number of action-types. The employment of the rule presupposes the independent identification of its infinite applications or laying down the conditions of its application in advance. This characterization of rule makes it a normative issue. Hence, rule is a “normative-regularity” or “normative-constraint”¹¹, which regulates our actions and behaviors by providing *the necessary* and *sufficient* condition to fit a particular action as the extension of the given rule.

Rule as a normative regularity to govern and explain our actions has to satisfy two conditions: First, rule should help us to pick up the appropriate and correct action among the available set of behaviors. This condition can be called the *correctness* condition of rule. The explanation of certain action-type by subsuming it under a rule is dependent on the successful identification of the action-type. The correct identification naturally helps us to eliminate the incorrect and inappropriate applications of a rule. Thus for example, the rule “plus” instructs the users not only to select the action-type “2 plus 2 equals to 4”, but also it eliminates the action-type “2 + 2 equals to 5”. The correctness condition of rules also signifies that the rules are universal in character having

¹⁰ See Pettit, P., “The Reality of Rule-Following”, *Mind*, Vol. 99, 1990, p. 2.

¹¹ Pettit, P., *op. cit.*, p. 4.

open-ended applications. If one follows a given rule, then one always does the same thing when the appropriate occasion arises. However, the correct and successful identification or determination of the applications of rule is not enough. This does not provide the reason that whatever is correct is also reasonable or warranted. This is the reason the appropriate and correct chess-move made by the computer cannot provide the adequate explanation as to why it moves the chess piece as it made.

Secondly, rule should provide justification for the action-type so selected. This condition can be called the *adequate*¹² condition of the rule. The adequate criterion of rule not only helps us to choose the correct action-type, but also it provides the reason as to why a particular action-type is the correct one or is the only one in accordance with the given rule. The adequate condition predetermines in some unique way the application of a rule. Rule does not help us to simply identify objects fall under its scope, but it also compels us to adhere to the norms set by it for our future use. The algebraic formula “plus” should “determine my answer for indefinitely many new sums that I have never previously considered... my past intention/use determines a unique answer for indefinitely many new cases in the future”.¹³ The adequate condition helps one to justify and defend oneself at the time of conflict and criticism and helps one to remove confusion and inconsistency. This condition also explains the necessary change and meaningful deviation of rule whenever required.

Kripke has raised serious doubt whether a follower can really follow the rule considering the requirement of its following. They challenge that the follower cannot identify a rule that can satisfy the normative constraint with his limited cognitive capacities. The object of infinite requirement does not affect our senses as a physical object and we are not causally related to its

¹² Boghossian, P.A., “The Rule-Following Consideration”, *Mind*, Vol. 98, 1989, p. 508 ff.

¹³ *WRPL*, p. 11.

infinite applications in the ordinary way.¹⁴ In following a rule we always go beyond the given. The past experiences, though successful and correct, are always finite and do not provide the license to go beyond. We are neither omniscient to identify the unlimited applications which are yet to take place. If our accumulated practice of the rule-following is not enough to keep track of the future applications of the rule, and if we do not have control over the future operation of the rule, it is quite possible that we may not be following the same rule which we used to follow in earlier cases to justify the same action. This possibility will give rise to the problem of multiple interpretations of the rule. On the one hand, there may be more than one contradictory action-types fitting to a given rule and on the other hand, the same action-type can be accounted for by two contradictory rules. Rule-following seems to be an irrational act.

To understand the problem, let us discuss the thought-experiment designed by Kripke. He asks us to imagine a person who has applied the plus-rule successfully and correctly involving numbers up to 57. Now we can say that, since the person has fulfilled the correctness criterion, he has grasped the plus-rule and can employ it in infinite cases. Thus, for example, if he is asked to operate the plus-rule between the numbers 57 and 68, he will come with the number 125, though he has never applied the plus-rule to the number 68 before. At this juncture, Kripke introduces the concept of “quus-rule”¹⁵ which, according to him, is identical to plus-rule if the numbers involved are less than 57, otherwise it is 5.¹⁶ That means, the function “68+57 = 125” is correct according to plus-rule and at the same time the function “68+57 = 5” is also correct as per quus-rule. The skeptic is asking “how do we know that 68 plus 57 as we meant “plus” in the past should denote 125 and not “5”? We cannot

¹⁴ Pettit, P., *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁵ Kripke symbolized ‘quus’ as \oplus and defines ‘quus’ as: $x \oplus y = df x + y$, if $x, y < 57$ = 5 otherwise, *WRPL*, p. 9.

¹⁶ *WRPL*, p. 9.

know whether the person is following plus-rule or quus-rule since both the rules will hold valid, though, we know that the person who used to follow the plus-rule in the past, the answer he indents for $68+57$, should be 125 rather than 5.

Kripke argues that the person cannot provide the reason to choose between plus-rule and quus-rule. Kripke argues that the quus rule is incorrect and we know that we do not misinterpret plus-rule with quus-rule, but it does not seem to be *a priori* impossible. This is possible because his calculation by hypothesis does not go beyond the numbers involving 57 and thus by the same hypothesis he does not explicitly instruction that 125 is the result. The hypothesis is true for the infinitely large number of the cases of plus rule is not in the follower's mind. The applications so far made are always limited. Thus, Kripke argues that there is no way one can say whether plus or quus rule is being followed. It is possible that by plus I always mean quus, I should misinterpret all my past uses of the plus rule. The skeptic argues that there are equally compelling reasons for both plus and quus functions having been applied in this case.

What is skeptical about here is that, as Kripke says, “we follow the rules as we do without reason or justification.”¹⁷ “Plus” as we understand it forces us to say that “ $68+57$ ” equals to “125”, but the rule of plus function has nothing in it to identify the plus-rule as distinct from quus-rule. Skepticism doubts two things: First that, there is any “fact about past history - nothing that was ever in my mind, or in my external behavior - establishes what I mean by a word.”¹⁸ Second, even if we have meaning, we are not justified in having it. There is no logical justification that a particular word would necessarily mean this and not anything else, for, “there is no justification for one response rather than others.”¹⁹

¹⁷WRPL, p. viii

¹⁸WRPL, p. 13.

¹⁹WRPL, P. 21.

New Riddle and Rule-following:

While discussing his rule-following skepticism, Kripke has claimed, without elaboration, that the new riddle is not only a form of rule-following skepticism, but can better be understood in the context of rule and its following. He further says that there is a parallel between the 'grue' predicate and 'quus' rule. Here we want to substantiate his claim.

The new riddle of induction presents a paradox similar to the problem of rule-following skepticism. The evidence statements like the accumulated practice of following the rule are not enough to keep track of the future projection of the predicates. If we do not have control over the future operation of the rule, it is quite possible that rules will have consequences independent of the followers. The follower may not be following the same rule which he used to follow in earlier cases to justify the same action. The follower who used to follow the green-rule earlier is confused to differentiate it from that of the grue-rule. Now this possibility will give rise to the problem of multiple interpretations of the inductive rules. There may be more than one contradictory action-type, viz., grue-action type and green-action type, fitting to the same given rule. The follower commits a contradiction if he chooses both the interpretations of the rules. The paradox of induction arises because the given evidence statement imposes no restriction over the future projection of the predicate. According to the function of "plus", the sum of '57 and 68 should be 125', but it can also be 5, provided the condition that the follower of the plus rule has not computed the plus function beyond a number involving 57. But the plus rule cannot support both 125 and 5.

Compare the "grue" predicate with the "quus" counterexample of Kripke. "Quus" function proves that different and contradictory interpretations can fit into the "plus" function. We see that Kripke and Goodman's problem are the same problem but applied to two different areas only, i.e. one to the issue of justification and the other to meaning. Kripke himself has argued that his problem is the same as that of Goodman's grue

problem. Kripke has expressed his rule-following skepticism by using “grue” counter-example. In Kripke’s words: “who is to say that in the past I did not mean grue by “green”, so that now I shall call the sky, not the grass, “green”?”²⁰

In fact, the import of the new riddle of induction can best be understood in the light of the understanding of the nature of rules and their following. Once we see the problem of the new riddle of induction in the context and light of “rules” and their following, there is some sound reason for treating Goodman’s riddle as holding the rule-following skepticism. The inductive rules have infinite applications over infinite time and space. The projection of the predicate “green” about the wider universe is open-ended. The emeralds even found in the distance planet will be green. The follower of the inductive rules should be able to identify the emeralds as green found in the remote place. However, the problem of induction is that the infinite applications of the rules are not present in the mind of the followers. The external behaviours of the follower do not give any indication that the future would remain the same. The predicate “green” does not exhibit any inherent characteristic that all unobserved sample of emeralds would be green as well. The follower has to have some mechanism to know the applications of the inductive rule prior to the projection of the predicates in advance. Therefore, the task of the inductive rule is twofold. First the inductive rule should contain a mechanism to provide the legitimacy in projectible hypotheses that have been actually projected and second, the inductive rule helps us to rule out all those projected hypothesis that are not to be considered projectible, and thus “the two folds problem of projected unprojectable and unprojected projectable.”²¹ The first condition is concerned with the question of when, how and why the inductive generalization from a given evidence statements to the wider set is possible? In other words, how we acquire, modify and

²⁰ *WRPL*, 20 fn. Also see, pp. 20-54.

²¹ *FFF*, p. 92.

eliminate our hypothesis on the basis of the given set of beliefs? The question is: how the hypothesis which is always more than the given, gets conformation from the evidence statements? This condition of the inductive rules is similar to the correctness criterion of the rule.

The inductive rule takes care of not only the fact that “when, how and why the proceeding from a given set of beliefs to a wider set is legitimate.”²², but also it explains “why one prediction rather than another,”²³ from a given evidence statement. The issue of justifying induction involves the description of “an accurate and general way of saying which hypotheses are confirmed by or which projections are validly made from, any given evidence.”²⁴ The inductive rule provides a general and accurate mechanism to license or justify such projection of the predicates. On the one hand, the inductive rules guide us to project the appropriate predicate among the rival and available predicates, on the other, these rules provide the justification for such selection.

The issue of the projection of the genuine predicate or the adaptation of the hypotheses, therefore, is essentially a normative issue, similar to the problem of rules and their following, because its basic task is to find out the correct prediction by prescribing the appropriate inductive rule. The regulative rules of induction permit the right kind of projection of hypotheses from a given set of evidence statement and prohibit the projection of unwarranted, conflicting and unfamiliar predictions. The question is different from the descriptive question: how do we project beliefs or how exactly are the new beliefs formed from the given set of beliefs? Goodman himself seems to approve such an interpretation of the inductive rules in arguing that the inductive projection is concerned with issue of validity and normativity. The normativity of the inductive rules is similar to the function of the rules and inductive inference to that of applications of the rules.

²²FFF, p. 58.

²³FFF, p. 60.

²⁴FFF, p. 84.

Thus, the process of projection of the predicate or adaptation of hypotheses is very similar to the process of ascertaining the applications of the rules in advance. In the context of induction, we can very much ask the question how we know that the predicate which we are projecting so far will hold in the future. Or how do we grasp all the predicates of a particular inductive rule on the basis of the given evidence? How much evidence is enough to enable us to say that now we can validly adopt the hypotheses? The projection of the predicate on the basis of the given is very much similar to the fact of having expectation and the fulfillment of the expectation. We form beliefs, build expectation and act accordingly on the basis of the inductive prediction. The riddle of induction is, in other words, is how to gap the bridge between the evidence statements and projection of the infinite and open-ended hypotheses on the basis of the given evidence statements. The new riddle of induction basically is a problem of the bridging the gap between the evidence statement on the one hand, the adaptation of the hypothesis or the projections of the predicates on the other. The problem, therefore, is the problem of bridging the gap between the rules and their extensions on the basis of the some principle. This is to find out a normative rule which satisfies the correctness and adequacy condition.

Conclusion:

However, skepticism may not be the direct concern of Goodman. Goodman himself may not agree to present or interpret his riddle as a piece of philosophical skepticism. He may not like to be tagged as a skeptic, more so a rule-following skeptic. In fact, Goodman has not used the word 'skepticism' in the discussion of the "grue" counter-example. As one Goodmanian scholar argues, as the traditional problem of induction can be interpreted to be arguing, "the impossibility of deducing any universal proposition from any evidence which can be provided by experience", so "what Goodman presents here is...the demonstration that there can be no purely formal logic of

induction.”²⁵ Barry Allen²⁶ says he sees “a precise analogy” between Goodman’s riddle and Kripke’s skeptical question. He says, “the skeptical argument is Goodman’s riddle of induction, tailored to field linguistics rather than mineralogy.”²⁷ Even if we do not say that the new riddle of induction does not pose a skeptical paradox, his theory of projection as an answer to the riddle is similar to the skeptical-solution in more than one ways. Thus, Ian Hacking rightly says, “It can be said that Goodman prompted the rule-following skepticism without his officially taking a skeptical stance himself.”²⁸ However, there are some superficial dissimilarity between what Goodman characterizes the problem of induction and the issues involved in rules and their following because induction is a problem of induction whereas the rule-following is mainly a problem in meaning.

²⁵ Shoemaker, S., “On Projecting the Unprojectible”, *Philosophical Review*, 84, 1975, p. 179.

²⁶ Allen, Barry, “Gruesome Arithmetic: Kripke’s Sceptic Replies”, *Dialogue*, p. 12.

²⁷ Allen, Barry, *op. cit.* 12.

²⁸ Hacking, Ian, *On Kripke’s and Goodman’s uses of ‘Grue’*, p. 274.

THE PROBLEM OF TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS: KANT AND HUSSERL

SAMAR KUMAR MONDAL

The relation between time and consciousness experience gives rise to various philosophical issues involving understanding the nature of free will and responsibility as well as of personal identity. Again, metaphysical and epistemological theories, which have their root experience, have to face problems as to how the experience of temporally extended events and changes in those events are possible.

At least three issues are involved in understanding the relationship between time and conscious experience.¹

- How are we able to perceive or conceive of time and temporal entities?
- Does time exist independently of conscious experience?
- Does the conscious experiencer exist in time in the same way that ordinary natural objects are thought to exist in time.

These issues of time consciousness, temporal realism, and the special temporal nature of the experiencer are fundamentally interconnected. These three issues have different basic problems. This paper is devoted to explore the basic problem of time-consciousness, and its solutions from the continental philosophical point of view. The problem is how it is possible to perceive or to conceive temporal extension and temporal passage.

Perception is the most elementary and fundamental source of knowledge. To the ordinary mind, it is so simple and reliable that it presents no problem at all. We generally believe that our judgment based on perception must be true. Even some logicians and philosophers uphold the common sense view that the perception is the ultimate ground of all knowledge and there is no room for doubting perceptual judgment. Though there are several problems of perception or the evidence of perception. Generally the idea of perception involves the idea of a subject as perceiver and the idea of an object that is

¹ McInerney, P. K., *Time and Experience* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 3.

perceived. The perception of an object takes place in certain space and time. But when we consider the perception of time, several problems may arise and one of the most important problems is that, how we can perceive the time or temporal extension and temporal passage.

According to Kant, issues involving time and time consciousness are central issues of metaphysics, theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind. “Time is a necessary representation that underlies all intuitions. We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove time itself, though we can quite well think time as void of appearances. Time is, therefore given a priori”.² Kant was not a phenomenologist in the technical sense in that he does not follow the specific procedures codified by Husserl for phenomenological investigation. But the deep influence of Kant’s thought concerning the synthesis underlying consciousness, how objects and objectivity are thought, and how there can be consciousness of temporally extended occurrences, is obvious in the work of Husserl and his followers.

Kant maintains that perception is an essential condition for knowing consciousness in that perception is the basis for knowledge of specific facts and specific laws. In perception we make knowledge claims about the world and what we perceive provides the basic evidence for empirical knowledge claims. According to P.K. McNerney, Kant’s theory of time-consciousness has to incorporate this fact that knowing consciousness itself occurs in time because knowing consciousness changes its claims. Since he thinks that the ultimate subject of consciousness is non-temporal, a distinction has to be introduced between ordinary knowing consciousness (OKC) and the ultimate knowing consciousness or transcendental ego (TE).³ The transcendental ego does not exist in time and does not change its views about the world and the ordinary knowing consciousness within time. That is why ordinary knowing consciousness may change its own opinion about the world.

² Smith N.K., trans. *Immanuel Kant’s Critique of pure reason* (The Macmillan press Ltd., 1982). A31.p-74-5.

³ McNerney P. K., *Time and Experience* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 65.

Throughout the Transcendental aesthetic, Kant considers “time is not a discursive, or what is called a general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are but parts of one and the same time; and the representation which can be given only through a single object is intuition.”⁴ Things-in-themselves are not temporal. Time exist only an essential structure of human sensibility. Our reception of intuitional data requires a form or framework of time within which intuitional data appear. He also claims that the intuitional data and temporal relations will undergo conceptualization, but the basic form of the perception of temporal extension and temporal order is intuitional.

As a form of intuition, time is a structure that is essential to our (receptive) sensibility. There have been two interpretation of the ‘reception’ of the intuitional data. According to the first interpretation, a thing-in-itself causally produces intuitional data which are distinct entities within the mind. According to P.F. Strawson, ‘all our outer perceptions are caused by things which exist independently of our perceptions and which affect us to produce those perceptions’.⁵ The second interpretation is, intuitional data are the direct appearing of things-in-themselves to the mind. ‘According to Kant, the relation between the appearance and the thing-in-itself is causal. The thing-in-itself is the mysterious cause of what we see. But we ourselves can only experience it through our kind of consciousness. Heidegger uses the analogy of an illness to describe the same causal understanding of appearance’.⁶ According to both interpretations, the framework of time is only a feature of the mind itself. The framework of time consists of temporal location at which intuitional data could occur. The consciousness of the temporal feature of states of substances might be explained entirely in terms of the grasping of the intuitional framework of time.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.65.

⁵ Strawson, P.F., *The Bounds of Sense*, (Methuen @ co., London, 1966), P.250.

⁶ Large, William, *Heidegger's Being and Time*, (Edinburgh Univ.Press,Edinberg,2008), p.13-4

According to Kant, in the empirical intuition things are perceived coexistent and their perception can follow upon one another reciprocally. Coexistence is the existence of the manifold in one and the same time. But time itself cannot be perceived.

“Things are coexistent so far as they exist in one and same time. But how do we know that they are in one and the same time? We do so when the order in the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold is a matter of indifference, that is, whether it be from A through B,C,D to E, or reversewise from E to A. for if they were in succession to one another in time, in the order, say, which begins with A and ends in E, it is impossible that we should begin the apprehension in the perception of E and proceed backwards to A, since A belongs to past time and can no longer be an object of apprehension.”⁷

This account of time-consciousness in terms of an intuitional framework explains how we represent simultaneity and earlier-later relation between states of substances i) past, present, and future ii) the intuitional framework would have to be enriched by adding a central or focal temporal location. The temporal location that ‘stands out’ is the present, whatever is earlier than this location is past, and whatever is later is future. The non-temporal transcendental ego represents an earlier-later framework of time, within which states of OKC and intuitional data occur.⁸ The transcendental ego representing of this form of intuition does not occur in time or have any temporal properties. The synthetic activities that are necessary for OKC’s time consciousness are also characteristics of the transcendental ego. The synthetic activities must also be non-temporal, since there is no mind-independent time within which they could occur.

Here a serious problem may arise concerning OKC’s experience of intuitional data as it happen in time. As OKC exist only as represented by the transcendental ego that is why OKC cannot receive intuitional data through affection. Only transcendental ego can receive such data. So, how can this data

⁷ Smith, N.K., trans. *Immanuel Kant’s Critique of pure reason* (The Macmillan press Ltd., 1982). B258, .p-234.

⁸ McInerney, P. K., *Time and Experience* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), p.85.

be experienced by OKC as data that it can seek out or not seek out through further perceptual experiences?

If we accept the OKC, the question may arise that what is the relation between OKC and Transcendental ego? If we accept that OKC is the representation of transcendental ego, we have to accept that both are the same. H.J. Patton raises a question, that is, how can there be one and the same self or subject if we distinguish the I which thinks (apperception) from the I which intuitively itself (inner self). According to him, if I am an intelligent and thinking subject, how can I know myself as a thought object, so far as I am given to myself in intuition? And how can such knowledge be knowledge of myself only as I appear in intuition and not as I really am in myself for understanding?⁹ Now we will see the position of Husserl regarding time and consciousness.

Husserl's phenomenological method is a special type of reflection upon our being conscious.¹⁰ All reflection upon consciousness reveals both a variety of conscious orientation (mental act) and that toward which consciousness is oriented (intended object). Husserl maintains that phenomenological reflections provides direct access both to the mental act side and to the intended object side of the intentional relation. Since features and components of these sides are always coordinated with each other. Husserl concerned with one of the traditional problems of time-consciousness, that is, how perception of temporally extended external objects is possible?

The temporal features with which Husserl was concerned were these that are commonsensically attributed to things in time. Husserl attributes to perceived entities all the six standard features. Such as:

⁹ Patton, H.J., *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience* Vol.-II, (New York: London, The Humanities Press, 1965), 398-9

¹⁰ McInerney, P. K., *Time and Experience* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 94.

- 1) “*Temporal location*- that any non-conscious worldly entity exists at some definite location in one temporal coordinate system in which all other worldly entities exist.
- *Temporal extension* or duration- that any non-conscious worldly entity occupies some point or set of contiguous points of this temporal coordinate system (particularly if the temporal coordinate system is understood as a dense continuum of points).
- *Length of duration*- that there is a definite size to the temporal extension of an entity, that its size can be expressed as a multiple or fraction of any arbitrarily selected temporal extension.
- *Temporal divisibility* - that any non-conscious worldly entity’s duration that occupies more than a single point can be divided into equally real temporal parts without any change in its non-temporal properties.
- *Earlier-later relations*-that the temporal parts of an entity are temporally related as earlier as or later than each other, and that the temporal parts of any two entities are temporally related as earlier, later, or simultaneous with each other.
- *Past-present-future features*-that if there is a date at which a temporal part of an entity is present, there is an earlier date at which it is future and a later date at which it is past, and that it passes from being future to being present to being past.”¹¹

The problem of external time-consciousness has traditionally been posed in terms of perception. One important question may arise as to how it is possible to perceive temporally extended entities and their temporal passage.

Husserl contends that any perceptual act- phase intuits an object that has duration, that is, a temporally extended portion of the world.¹² At any time, t_n , one feature of the perceptual act-phase perceives what is ‘now’, that is the object-phase that occurs at t_n . According to him “for every now that has

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 50

¹² *Ibid.*, 99

been newly linked on to its predecessor. The actual now is necessarily something punctual and remains so, a form that persists through continuous change of content.”¹³ The retentional feature reaches through time to contact just- past phases that themselves have a now-consciousness feature that perceives an object-phase giving as now (at t_{n-1} , t_{n-2} , etc.). Retention is actual at one time, its intentional object is at an earlier time. Retention reaches to earlier moments in time and directly intuits earlier moments as earlier. It is the direct givenness of the past as past. Husserl even goes so far as to claim that retention is absolutely certain. Retention is just past act phase. Husserl has very little to say about protention. In several places he portrays it as like retention except that it concerns the just future rather than the just past. As such it would directly intuit later phases of mental life as just-future. Presumably his thought is that we have a direct intuition of the continuation of our mental life into the just-future.

Husserl’s theory provides particularly insightful account of how perceptual act-phases are unified into one perceptual act that perceives the temporal passage of worldly entities.¹⁴ The now conscious feature of a mental states consists of all those components that intend what is temporally focal or now as contrasted with the temporal background in both portraying a previous now-consciousness feature as just-past and look it to its intentional correlate that is experienced as now for the now-consciousness feature, retention is able to experience a worldly entity-phase as just having been perceived as now. Similarly, protention can experience a worldly entity-phase as just about to be perceived as now.

My observation in this paper is that the problem which occurs in Kant’s theory of time consciousness is that whether OKC and transcendental ego are same or not. If we accept that these are same, the question arises: what

¹³ Boyce Gibson, W.R., trans. *Edmund Husserl IDEAS* (New York, Macmillan co.,1952) p.237.

¹⁴ McInerney, P. K., *Time and Experience* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), P.100.

is the necessity to distinguish between phenomena and noumena? Again, if we accept that they are different, another question arises: what is the relation between OKC and transcendental ego? If we accept that the activity of OKC occurs in time and it is changeable, the transcendental ego cannot be non-temporal. This problem would not arise in Husserl's framework in respect of the perception of time consciousness. Because the essence and the object both are present to the perceiver directly and there is no other criterion by which we perceive the essence of the object. The order of consciousness that belongs to the essence of consciousness as the essence of all consciousness and complexes of experience as well as temporal order belongs to the experiences as objective. According to Husserl,¹⁵ the temporal form is not a phanaiological form in the ultimate sense, not a form of absolute being, but only a form of appearances. So the consciousness of time is an objectivating consciousness. Consequently, without identification and differentiation, without the positing of the present, the past, the future etc. there would be no enduring, no resting and changing, no being in succession, and so on.

¹⁵ B. John Barnett, trans. *Edmund Husserl on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (Kluwer, 1991) p.306.

TELEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ETHICS

NGALEKNAO RAMTHING

Human beings are called moral because they are subject to judgment of right and wrong; we can pass moral judgment of right and wrong on what they do in and around human society. Non-human beings like animals and insects are called non-moral because moral judgment of right and wrong are irrelevant to them. The same analysis also applies to the term “ethical”. Its antonym may be either “unethical” or “non-ethical” depending upon its use. The terms “moral” and “ethics”, however, are employed interchangeably in the philosophical discourse.

Ethics as a branch of philosophy deals with what is right and good; and other correlated concepts like duty, obligation, ought, value, virtue relating to human conducts. In 20th century philosophy, distinction is made between ethics and meta-ethics. “Ethics” is taken to be normative ethics which aims at presenting a moral system of norms, principles, rules, judgments of values, obligations, duties, virtues and rights by arranging them systematically in hierarchal ordering by assuming certain primitive concepts and fundamental postulates. It prescribes the adoption of a certain way of life as morally the best life. To accept a moral system of thoughts means to commit oneself to leading or adopting the way of life it prescribes and recommends. “Meta-ethics”, on the other hand, is taken to be a philosophical analysis which aims at understanding and explaining what is involved in doing ethics or ethical evaluation. Meta-ethics is a critical reflection on ethics. Meta-ethics in relation to ethics is a second-order of enquiry and ethics in relation to meta-ethics is called a first-order of enquiry because ethics aims at presenting a moral system of values, while meta-ethics is a reflection on it. Ethics is generally characterized as theoretical ethics and the application of theoretical concepts, values and principles to specific context or realm is characterized as applied ethics. Applied ethics is, thus, a contextual ethics. The realms falling within the applied ethics include medical ethics, legal ethics, environmental ethics,

computer ethics, media ethics, business ethics, sportsmanship ethics, nano-ethics and many more. Moral considerations are related to human's motive, intention, attitude and behavior with his fellow beings and with the environment. The question of morality always arises within the context of social reference.

There are different ethical theories or approaches such as teleological, deontological, contractarian and virtue-ethics. Each particular ethical theory deals with various ethical issues in society. The teleological view of morality links the idea of right action with the idea of consequence and the idea of consequence with the idea of good. It considers good as a central concept and defines other correlated concepts such as right, obligation, ought and duty in terms of it. Utilitarianism of all varieties is a teleological theory of ethics. It connects the idea of right action with the idea of general happiness. Ethical egoism is also a teleological theory. It connects the idea of right action with the idea of self-interest. Teleological theories are, thus, value-based theories. The deontological view of morality connects the idea of right action with the idea of duty and considers duty as the supreme concept. Virtue-ethics propounds none of these views of morality. It connects the idea of right action with the idea of the conduct of virtuous person, the one who exercises virtues in practice. The contractarian view of morality defines right action in terms of the rules of contract. This paper is a cursory over Utilitarianism with an intention to identify as to how this theory corroborates with various ethical and social issues.

The Utilitarian approach can be referred to as a consequentiality approach. The term 'Utilitarianism' was coined by Jeremy Bentham which was later refined by John Stuart Mill. Both Bentham and J.S. Mill were famous philosophers whose writings have shown their keen interest in legal and social reforms. They used the utilitarian standard 'greatest happiness of the greatest numbers' in assessing and counteracting the social and political institutions of their time with strong vigor and determination, and consequent

upon which utilitarianism has been associated with social improvement. The roots of the modern version can be traced back to the Epicurean school in the fourth century B.C.

The basic assumption of utilitarianism is that human beings seek happiness and general happiness is the supreme good. Actions are right to the extent they produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Utilitarianism is a teleological approach which solely emphasizes on general happiness as the foundation and objective goal of all human moral action. It maintains that consequences alone determine the rightness and wrongness of our moral action. Utilitarianism is often represented as having two types, namely, act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. Act-utilitarianism is a simpler approach which provides an easy decision procedure, for example, an action is right if and only if it produces the greatest amount of pleasure over pain for greatest number. Act-utilitarianism requires that each action should be examined against the pleasure-pain test. Rule-utilitarianism, on the other hand, gives more emphasis on the rules of morality and to role obligations, e.g., an action is right if and only if it conforms to a set of rules the general acceptance of which would bring the greatest balance of pleasure over pain for greatest number. Rule-utilitarianism requires that moral rules that claim to guide classes of actions should be examined against the pleasure-pain test. Thus, those rules are to be preferred which will lead to the greatest pleasure, all things considered. Although there are many subtleties to these two approaches the basic component that unites them is the requirement that maximum pleasure be produced. The bases of Utilitarianism are grounded on three important tenets.

1. Rightness and wrongness of actions are solely based on their consequences.
2. In calculating the consequences the one that gives greatest happiness of the greatest number is what matters most ethically.

3. In calculating pleasure or happiness, each individual counts for one and no one for more than one. Each individual's happiness is equally importantly counted as anyone else's.

In *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*¹ Bentham begins with the claim that "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure."² "It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong; and on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In other words, many may pretend to abjure their empire, but in reality he will remain subject to all it all the while... the principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law."³ He asserts that pain and pleasure are the only motivators, telling humans what to do in their lives, both personally and morally. Bentham believes that a society in which an individual endeavored to maximize his own happiness would be far better off than in one in which he had to maximize the happiness of others. Bentham was motivated by the idea that "Public Good" ought to be the object of the legislator: General Utility ought to be the foundation of moral reasoning. Good and bad acts can be evaluated according to him in terms of the quantities of pleasure and pain. To him, all the significant differences among pleasures are quantitative only; pleasure and pain is nothing more than the types of sensations which vary only in quantity, intensity and duration.

According to Bentham, the right course of action from an ethical perspective would be to choose the one that produces the greatest amount of happiness because in his view utility alone is the ultimate measure of right and

¹ Bentham, J., (1948) *The Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Hafner, New York, p.1

² *Ibid.*, p.1

³ *Ibid.*, p.1

wrong and it is that determines which actions/policies/decisions are right. By “the principle of utility” Bentham means “the principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; or what is the same thing in other words, to oppose that happiness.”⁴ What seems important for him is the prospect of utility that can surpass the opposite of happiness because in the ultimate analysis it is the consequent, that is, the amount of happiness that determines the moral worthiness of the action. As is generally well acquainted, an action is right if it produces the maximum amount of happiness over pain because utilitarianism allows individual agents to have moral preferences and to act in the interest of others, when action toward others generates a net utility benefit for the individual.

Although John Stuart Mill departs from Bentham’s conception that all significant differences among pleasures are quantitative; he accepts in principle his doctrines regarding the basic role of pleasures and pains in morality. Mill believes that significant differences among pleasures are qualitative. According to him, human beings are capable of intellectual and moral pleasures which are superior to the sensuous or the physical ones. Based on this postulate, Mill states that happiness is of two types: higher and lower. The higher type, that is, mental pleasure or happiness is more difficult to attain and hence more rewarding. His famous dictum is: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the pig is of a different opinion it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party in comparison knows both sides.”⁵ He states that every human action has three aspects, namely, the moral aspect of right and wrong, the aesthetic aspect and the sympathetic aspect of its liveableness. Thus, it clearly indicates that the higher

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.2

⁵ Mill, J. S., (1957) *Utilitarianism*, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, p. 10

pleasures have a greater degree of utility for him than the lower pleasures, because those who have experienced both will give up the lower for the higher.

Mill states: “Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”⁶ What is significantly taken into account as far as the action is concerned is the amount of happiness that surpasses the proportion of the reverse, that is, the proportion of pain. In other words, pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends. According to the greatest happiness principle, the ultimate end whether we are considering for our own personal good or that of other people is the surplus of happiness both in terms of quantity and quality over pain and suffering. The principle of utility which has been stated above is not confined to only a few individuals but rather it applies to every individual without exception because each individual’s welfare is equally important and therefore the right actions are those actions which produce the greatest happiness of all the concerned. Mill rightly observes: “... the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conducts, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”⁷

What is required for our action to be ethically right is to see whether the consequent gives maximum happiness on the Mill’s account. The result of the action is what matters in the consequentiality approach. Utilitarian contends that the significant basis of an act is the amount of happiness or evil it produces. From the utilitarian perspective, a good man is the one who strives to maximize the sum total of happiness for the greatest number. The utility of any policies or actions should be evaluated on the basis of the benefits derived from it. In any situation the right policies or actions are the ones that produce

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16

the greatest net profits or the lowest net cost. However, it is to be noted here that by maintaining the principle of greatest happiness for the greatest number Utilitarianism does not mean in any way that the right action is the one that produces the most utility to the person performing the action but rather the action is right if it produces the most utility for all persons effected by the action.

A critical reflection shows that the utilitarian approach is not satisfactory because of these reasons. Though, utilitarianism is widely referred to as one of the best ethical theories, there are some difficulties in subscribing the approach as a sole method for moral decision-making. First, the fiercest criticism is the uncertainty of its domain. It emphasizes on the greatest happiness but the problem here is whose happiness is to count in designing policies to maximize the greatest happiness?⁸ There are different groups of people living in a society with varied diversities. Smart writes: “Perhaps strictly in it and at a particular moment, a contented sheep is as good as a contented philosopher. However it is hard to agree to this. If we did we should have to agree that the human population ought ideally to be reduced by contraceptive methods and the sheep population more than correspondingly increased. Perhaps just so many humans should be left as could keep innumerable millions of placid sheep in contented idleness and immunity from depredations by ferocious animals. Indeed if a contented sheep is as good as a contented idiot, then a contented fish is as good as a contented sheep, and a contented beetle is as good as a contented fish. Where shall we stop?”⁹ Though Smart attempted to address the problem of whose happiness to be counted, he too ended with an interrogative note, which indicates that the issue of whose happiness is to be counted is uncertain. If such is the basis of the utilitarian principle, it cannot be relied upon. Because in business activities,

⁸ Posner, A. R, ‘Some Problems of Utilitarianism’ *Perspectives in Business Ethics* Laura P. Hartman & Abha Chatterjee (edit. , 3rd edition, Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Limited, New Delhi, 2005, p. 16

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16

utilitarian calculation requires that we assign values to the benefits and harms resulting from our actions and compare them with the benefits and harms that might result from other actions. In doing so, what is morally right seems to exclude the duties and autonomy of minorities. By demanding the highest maximization of values, consequentialism appears to impose unlimited moral sacrifices on the part of the minorities which perhaps may lead to a kind of violation of the principle of justice to the minorities and at the same time violate moral integrity of the minorities. Therefore, measuring and comparing the values of certain benefits and costs always involve violation of moral rights of individual.

The second problem is centered on the issues encountered when we try to measure and compare the utility. How can the utilities of different actions of different individuals be measured and compared? There seems to be no measuring rod as far as the utilities of different actions pertaining to different individuals are concerned. There is no accurate criterion for measuring the degree of satisfaction of one individual against the degree of satisfaction of another and hence no objective basis.

The third problem is that utilitarianism fails to take into account the considerations of justice. Mill observes: "The happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not... (one's) own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator."¹⁰ Though Mill talks about happiness not only of oneself but that of all concerned, and yet the claim seems to be indefensible because in the ultimate analysis the action is to be evaluated with reference to its consequences. Therefore, while taking moral decisions in consonant with fairness and justice, utilitarianism fails to be relied upon as the sole principle for guiding our decisions in spite of all its positive contribution.

¹⁰ Mill, J. S., (1957) *Utilitarianism*, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, p. 16

NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO EPISTEMOLOGY

JHADESWAR GHOSH

The naturalist approach to epistemology is an important issue in the second half of twentieth century analytic philosophy. The image of analytic philosophy is now widely understood in terms of a commitment to naturalism is largely a result of the influence of W.V. Quine. The search for the foundations of knowledge has been the profession of traditional epistemologists. They claim that human knowledge is founded on certain self-evident truths. This is accepted without an elaborate justification. This raises many issues. As a result a new conception of philosophy has emerged with a radical different attitude which is known as naturalistic bend in philosophy. The naturalistic turn consists in understanding language through a natural process.

The term ‘naturalized epistemology’ was coined by Quine to refer to an approach to epistemology which he introduced in his essay “Epistemology Naturalized.”¹ Quine’s contributions toward the naturalizing of epistemology is directed against old-time epistemology, i.e., against first philosophy and in favor of its replacement by natural science. Quine’s naturalistic epistemology has invited many criticisms. My aim in this paper is to defend a Quinean form of naturalistic approach to epistemology by which the subject matter of epistemology is properly understood in a certain aspects of nature and the method used in epistemology ought to be the method of empirical science. This defense will consist in a criticism of certain more or less well-known objections against Quine’s project. I will elucidate Quine’s notion that naturalistic turn consists in making language less a matter of a priori grammar but more a matter of the natural world which indicates that the linguistic rules and meaning of linguistic expression all evolve through a natural process.

The abandonment of Foundationalism:

The problem of knowledge of the universe has been the cornerstone of traditional epistemology. According to the traditional view, the main aim of

epistemological enquiry is to determine what knowledge consists in and what makes knowledge possible. Typically, knowledge is viewed as a particular variety of true belief, namely justified true belief. It assumes that knowledge has a hierarchical structure, that it has a base and an apex, such that the base-level beliefs provide the foundation for the apex-level beliefs. This is accepted without an elaborate justification. Foundationalist who claims that human knowledge is founded on the self-evident truths that mark the unassailable basis of all knowledge. An important aspect of the classical debate between rationalists and empiricists concerned the nature of immediate justification. For the rationalists, the notion of immediate justification was linked to those of indubitability, infallibility or incorrigibility as borne out by intellectual intuition, whereas for empiricists, immediately justified beliefs were those directly based on sensory experience. Kant himself, though dissatisfied with the claims of the rationalists and the empiricists, offered a similar foundationalist response to the skeptic in his discovery of the *a priori* foundations of human knowledge. Foundationalism, and in particular the Post-Fregean varieties of foundationalism, can be offered as a prime example of this traditional approach. It is one of the main conceptions of how the traditional epistemological program should be carried out. The post-Fregean approaches to epistemological investigations, traditional epistemology conceives of epistemological enquiry as an *a priori* form of enquiry based on logical or conceptual analysis. It is also the main target of the naturalistic critique. Quine is an empiricist. This may suggest that, for him, all knowledge is a posteriori. It is indeed often supposed that naturalism is hostile to a priori justification of belief. Since the concept of justification is fundamentally a normative concept, epistemology is at heart a normative discipline. That epistemology is essentially a normative venture can be considered as the first central tenet of traditional epistemology.

Exponents of naturalistic approaches to epistemology argue that the problem of justification as envisaged by foundationalism is insoluble and

hence that the foundationalist project is certain to failure. The main reason put forward by Quine in favour of a naturalization of epistemology is that he distinguishes two parts in the traditional foundationalist programme. Conceptual reduction aims at reducing, via definition, the meaning of physical and theoretical terms to the meaning of terms referring to the phenomenal features of sensory experience. Doctrinal reduction aims at reducing theoretical and physical truths to truths concerning sensory experience. However, these two central ambitions of radical empiricism remain unfulfilled: there is no successful first philosophy. According to Quine, we have known, at least since Hume's discussion of induction, that the doctrinal part of the programme cannot be completed. And, as Quine laconically puts the point, "The Humean predicament in the human predicament".² The most profound radical empiricist, Rudolf Carnap, readily acknowledged the impossibility of deducing science from immediate experience, he nevertheless kept pursuing the other primary aim of radical empiricism, namely, the defining of the concepts of science in sensory and logico-mathematical terms. According to Quine, Carnap's heroic attempt at *rationaly reconstructing* scientific discourse in observation terms and logico-mathematical auxiliaries was doomed to fail because not every sentence of scientific theories has a fund of experiential implications it can call its own. When this observation is coupled with the verificationist theory of meaning, the result is that not every sentence of scientific theories has a meaning it can call its own. And, if this is so, then it is clear that Carnap's program of rationally reconstructing theoretical discourse on the basis of observation terms and logico-mathematical auxiliaries is hopeless. However, each side of the program is hopeless: the conceptual sidefairs because, due to Quine's holism about meaning and the doctrinal sidefail because, as Hume showed in his discussion of induction, theory cannot be logically deduced from observation. So, Quine concludes, the traditional approach to epistemology has failed irredeemably.

Search for an alternative:

Rejecting the doctrinal side of the foundationalist programme Quine offers a new field i.e. the empirical study of the human subject in interaction with environment. Conceived in this way, “epistemology... simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science”.³ Quine coined the label ‘Epistemology naturalized’ for his new philosophical field. The new setting of epistemology is psychology. Quine thinks epistemology is “contained” in natural science, given that the subject of epistemological study is a physical, human one.

The differences between naturalized epistemology and traditional epistemology are indeed impressive. While both traditional and naturalized epistemology look at the relationship between input (sense data) and output (beliefs) in a person, only traditional epistemology looks at the relationship in an evidential or justificatory light. Quine's naturalized epistemology on the other hand, looks at the relationship in a purely causal light. Quine freely admits that this form of epistemology amounts to little more than scientific psychology. Naturalized epistemology throws out any sense of justification of beliefs, focusing on merely the environmental causes of such beliefs. As such, it lacks the normative or prescriptive element found in traditional epistemology. Naturalized epistemology does not address what the rules are for justification, or whether any belief is justified.

How should we characterize in general terms the difference between traditional epistemological programs, such as foundationalism and coherence theory, on the one hand and Quine’s program of naturalized epistemology on the other? Quine’s stress is on the factual and descriptive character of his program; he says, “Why not see how (the construction of theory from observation) actually proceeds? Why not settle for psychology?⁴“Better to discover how science is in fact developed and learned than...”⁵ We are given to understand that in contrast traditional epistemology is not a descriptive, factual inquiry. Rather, it is an attempt at a ‘validation’ or rational

reconstruction of science. Validation, according to Quine, proceeds via deduction, and rational reconstruction via definition. Thus, it is normativity that Quine is asking us to repudiate. Traditional epistemology is normative to the extent that it aims at justifying the whole of natural science by deducing it from its observational basis. On the contrary, naturalized epistemology aims at describing and explaining the relations between scientific theories and their observation basis. This shift of goals has methodological consequences of major importance. Epistemology is to be “a chapter of psychology”, a law-based predictive-explanatory theory, like any other theory within empirical science; its principal job is to see how human cognizers develop theories (their “picture of the world”) from observation (“the stimulation of their sensory receptors”). Epistemology is to go out of the business of justification. Quine is urging us to replace a normative theory of cognition with a descriptive science.

The reciprocal containment of epistemology and ontology:

Ontology and epistemology are concerned with different issue. Ontology focuses on the issue of what there is; and what is a question of *truth*. Epistemology focuses on the issue of how we know what there is; and how we know what there is, it is a question of *method* and *evidence*. Evidence is, for Quine, sensory evidence, so epistemology is, for Quine, empiricism. It follows that empiricism is not a theory of truth but a theory of evidence. It does not purport to tell us what there is, but only what evidence there is for what there is. It is in this sense that Quine suggests that empiricism is the epistemology of ontology.⁶ The relationship between ontology and epistemology is complex and subtle, and it is best characterized, in Quine’s own word, as “reciprocal containment”⁷

Quine abandons traditional epistemology (first philosophy) but he does not abandon epistemology itself. Traditional epistemology, rationalistic or empiricist, attempted to deduce to rationally reconstruct ontological claims concerning the external world from a conceptual foundation that, itself, was

not to be a part of that body of ontological claims. There are three central assumptions of such epistemology: that if there is an external world, then its existence needs proving; that any such proof would be viciously circular should it depend essentially on any existential claim about the external world; and that knowledge, by its very nature, must be indubitable. Quine rejects all the three of these central assumptions of traditional epistemology. The deduction of and the reconstruction of knowledge of the external world on the basis of some epistemologically prior footing are impossible dream.⁸ To repudiate first philosophy is not to repudiate epistemology in toto: there is still naturalized epistemology, an epistemology that presupposes ontology- the ontology of natural science.

So Quine's epistemology, his theory of method and evidence, is empiricism, and his ontology, his theory of what exists, is that of contemporary natural science. From within this naturalistic framework of the reciprocal containment of epistemology and ontology, of empiricism and natural science, we rightly construe epistemology as our attempt to provide a scientific account of our knowledge of what exists, it follows that epistemology is our attempt to provide a scientific account of science itself.

The scope and the limits of epistemology naturalized:

Quine's proposal has met with a number of objections. First, it was objected that the failure of the foundationalist programme did not justify a general condemnation of the epistemological enterprise as traditionally conceived. An objection of this kind has been put forward, for example, by Jaegwon Kim in his "What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?"⁹ he says "that justification is a central concept of our epistemological tradition, that justification, as it is understood in this tradition, is a normative concept, and in consequence that epistemology itself is a normative inquiry whose principal aim is a systematic study of the conditions of justified belief".

Kim focuses his criticism largely on Quine's essay "Epistemology Naturalized". It is important to note, however, that this essay was merely a

summary of a project Quine had already been pursuing for years. As early as “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quine had sought to undermine the positivist insistence on an analytic/synthetic distinction that had separate philosophy from science. He rejected the distinction, not just because philosophers had not drawn it clearly, but on principled grounds deriving from confirmation holism. According to this view, only blocks of theory as a whole can be confirmed or refuted, so any individual statement can be held true or revised come what may; therefore, analytic statements are not a distinctive type of statement that is confirmed no matter what. With this rejection of analyticity, he held statements of science and statements of mathematics or logic to be on equal epistemological ground. Quine wants to defend an empiricism purified of ill-founded dogmas. Yet, for him, two cardinal tenets of empiricism remain unassailable. One is that whatever evidence there is for science is empirical evidence and the other that all inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence. Traditional epistemology, insofar as it sets itself the task of providing *a priori* criteria allowing us to decide among theories or sets of beliefs on the basis of their epistemic merits, meets with a principled limitation in the guise of confirmation holism. Hence, the necessity for Quine of pursuing epistemology in a new setting, by giving empirical answers to questions insoluble by *a priori* methods. It seems to me that this difficulty constitutes for Quine the main motivation for a replacement of traditional epistemology by naturalized epistemology.

Further Kim's objection is that the type of investigation intended by Quine, although it may well be a perfectly legitimate scientific enterprise, is not a variety of epistemology. Given their lack of common concerns, it is immaterial to ask whether one could replace the other or be a better way of doing what the other purports to do. One may wonder whether Quine is really asking for us to give up any form of normative epistemological enquiry, whether, in other words, his naturalistic epistemology should be seen as a brand of eliminativism vis-a-vis normativity. Certainly, this is the impression

he gives in "Epistemology naturalized". But in more recent writings, he has attempted to correct this impression: "Naturalization of epistemology does not put away the normative and settle for the indiscriminate description of ongoing procedures".¹⁰ As long as Quine's epistemology can concern itself with examining the relationship between evidence and language, Quine thinks it still has an important task to accomplish, even if this involves no reference to "knowledge" or "justification". Quine's naturalism, after all, is pragmatist. He is not concerned with preserving the *traditional* concepts of "justification," "knowledge," or even "epistemology".

Barry Stroud in his recent book, *the significance of philosophical Skepticism*¹¹ dealing exclusively with Quine's version of naturalized epistemology. Stroud provides no account of Quine's doctrine of the reciprocal containment of ontology and epistemology.¹² Stroud argues that insofar as Quine's naturalized epistemology purports to be 'an enlightened persistence... in the original epistemological problem,'¹³ it is a failure, for it does not answer the skeptic.¹⁴ Quine argues that epistemological skepticism presupposes scientific knowledge about the world. Once this fact is recognized, it is clear that the defender of science is free to use scientific knowledge in defending science against the skeptical challenge. Stroud concludes that the naturalized epistemologist has not answered the skeptic, for the epistemologist cannot use the now discredited science in constructing his defense of science.

Hilary Putnam, in his article 'Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized'¹⁵ maintains that Quine rules out normative epistemology, while the Quine of 'On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World'¹⁶ advocates it. On the one hand, Quine emphasizes the descriptive nature of his program; on the other hand, he emphasizes the normative nature of his program. Regarding the normative, Putnam says, "I believe that... this is what the 'normative' becomes for Quine: the search for methods that yield verdicts that oneself would accept"¹⁷ Another writer who shares Putnam's uneasiness with Quine's

program is Harvey Siegel.¹⁸ According to him “Quine’s appeal to psychology can only help in accounting for the psychological mechanisms and processes of theory development-not in the relational evaluation of theory”¹⁹

Richard Rorty²⁰ expressed his disappointment that Quine has not gone further in distancing himself from traditional epistemology. Rorty focuses on the justification-explanation and public-private distinctions. Epistemology is concerned with justification, it is public (i.e., social). Empirical psychology is concerned with explanation, it is private (i.e., it is concerned with internal mechanisms and processes that is, naturalized epistemology is in no legitimate sense of epistemology. Rorty is not merely saying that Quine’s naturalized epistemology cannot answer traditional philosophical questions concerning knowledge, he also saying that such questions are themselves ill-conceived:

Can we find relevance to traditional philosophical problems concerning *knowledge* in actual or expected results of empirical psychological research? Since I wish to say that these ‘philosophical problems’ should be dissolved rather than solved, it is predictable that I should give a negative answer.²¹

Roger Gibson in *Enlightened Empiricism*²² provides argument against the critics. Stroud’s arguments simply overlook two crucial points about Quine’s theory of knowledge, viz., that epistemology is contained in ontology and that Quine’s genetic approach in answering the central question of epistemology results in the externalization of empiricism. Stroud’s second point that nerve hits cannot serve as evidence for beliefs, Gibson says that Stroud’s claim that naturalized epistemology is rightly considered as merely the physiology of belief formation is mistaken because it overlooks Quine’s genetic approach toward dealing with the epistemological problem. On Quine’s approach the question of the relation between the ‘meager input’ and the ‘torrential output’ becomes two questions: How are observation sentences acquired on the basis of sensory stimulation? And ‘How do observation *sentences* serve as evidence for theoretical sentences? This is the externalizing of empiricism that Quine’s genetic approach requires is one of Quine’s major philosophical contributions. Skeptical doubts do not arise in a vacuum; they

are immanent to a theory. Skeptical doubts, no less than the epistemology they motivate, and no less than the scientific claims that motivate them, are immanent to a theory. Thus, the skeptic, no less than the scientist and the epistemologists, is a busy sailor adrift on Neurath's boat. Gibson tried to provide Putnam and Siegel with an intelligible account of how naturalized epistemology is, consistently, both descriptive and normative. For Quine science requires no stronger justification than what it derives from conforming to observation and the hypothetico-deductive method, for he rejects first philosophy.

Finally, Gibson suggested that Rorty's failure to see Quine's epistemology as 'public' is due to his ignoring Quine's genetic strategy for investigating the relation between evidence and theory. Rorty's misinterpreting Quine's explanation of how observation sentences are related to sensory stimulation. According to Quine, this relation is a matter of conditioning, not 'correspondence', 'mirroring', or 'referring'. In order to understand this Quinian account, one should recall that every observation sentence can be taken both holophrastically and analytically, i.e., analyzed into its component terms and particles. In his 'Reply to Hilary Putnam', Quine explains this distinction as follow:

When the infant or the field linguist learns one of his early observation sentences by ostension, he learns it holophrastically. It is holophrastically that these sentences are conditioned to ranges of stimulation, and it is holophrastically that their stimulus meaning is their meanings. Even when they are one-word observation sentences, it is anachronistic at first to reckon them as terms, referring to things. A one-word observation sentence or a component word of a longer observation sentence will make its way into standing sentences of increasingly theoretical character, and the child is then on his way to acquiring the word as a term and as referential. I have speculated on this development in *Roots of Reference*. In the case of the field linguist, the corresponding development proceeds rather though his devising of what in *Word and Object* I called analytical hypotheses. At that stage a semantic wedge is indeed driven between the stimulus-synonymous sentences 'Lo, a rabbit', 'Lo, rabbithood,' 'Lo, undetached rabbit parts', and the rest. Analytical meaning then supervenes upon holophrastic meaning, and resists satisfactory general explication.²³

It is the naturalistic point of view, represented by that half of the reciprocal containment thesis which asserts that ontology contains epistemology, or, more to the point, that natural science contains empiricism. This aspect of Quine's reciprocal containment thesis is frequently slighted or entirely overlooked by his commentators and critics, yet it is essential to a proper understanding of Quine's philosophy.

Conclusion:

Thus, for Quine naturalization means the elimination of normative epistemology. The naturalistic turn consists in making language less a matter of *a priori* grammar but more a matter of the natural world which indicates that the linguistic rules and the meaning of the linguistic expressions all evolve through a natural process. The natural processes are of the type of causal and deterministic structures such that an empirical science of those structures is possible. In this sense a science of language and meaning is possible that tells how the semantic relations have evolve in time and also how the meanings have come into existence as a part of the social life of the people concerned. The moral is to draw that we should revise the traditional notions of knowledge and objectivity. Quine offers a new field the empirical study of human subject in interaction with environment. It follows that epistemology is our attempt to provide a scientific account of science itself. If we explain our knowledge from within our evolving and changing theory of the world, the significance of philosophical skepticism might yet decline. Therefore our traditional notions of knowledge stand in need of revision, naturalism can offer a new dimension towards epistemology.

NOTES:

1. Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, (1969, pp.69-90) and several of his later papers and books.
2. *Ibid.* p.72.
3. W.V. Quine, *The Web of Belief*, p.75.
4. *Ibid.* p.12

5. W.V. Quine, "Ontology and Ideology Revisited." *Journal of Philosophy*, 80(1983). P.500.
6. W.V. Quine, *Epistemology Naturalized* p.83.
7. *Ibid.* p.74.
8. Barry Stroud. *The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
9. Kim, J. 1994. "What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?" In *Naturalizing Epistemology*, second edition, ed. H. Kornblith. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
10. Quine, 1986, p. 664.
11. Barry Stroud. *The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
12. Barry Stroud. *The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism*, pp. 209-28.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.* pp. 243-54.
15. Hilary Putnam. "Why Reason can't be Naturalized", *Syntheses* 52(1982): pp.499-502.
16. W.V. Quine, "On Empirically Equivalent System of the World" *Erkenntnis* 9 (1983):pp.499-502.
17. Hilary Putnam, "Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized".
18. H. Siegel, "Empirical Psychology, Naturalizing of Epistemology and First Philosophy," *Philosophy of Science*, 47 (1980) 667-76.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Richard Rorty *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*.
21. *Ibid.* pp. 219-20.
22. Roger Gibson's *Enlightened Empiricism, an Examination of W.V. Quine's Theory of Knowledge*.
23. W.V. Quine, *Reply to Hilary Putnam* pp. 7-8, see also *Pursuit of Truth*, pp.8-9.

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**THE RELATION BETWEEN *PURUṢA* AND *PRAKṚTI*: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS***
SWAGATA GHOSH

I

This paper is an attempt to revisit the prevalent notion of the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* as admitted by the *Sāṃkhyācāryas*. The paper attempts at explaining the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* in accordance with the Sāṃkhya metaphysics, but it also holds a critical position to reconsider certain aspects. The Sāṃkhya school of philosophy is considered to be one of the oldest schools of the orthodox system of Indian philosophical tradition. Compared to the other philosophical systems the issues relating to this particular school have been somewhat less dealt with, yet it has a number of interesting areas which provide considerable food for thought. The true essences of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* have been discussed along with the primary emphasis on their relation. Various arguments that essentially constitute discussions as held by the Sāṃkhya community themselves have been put forward to establish the said relation. Next, the analogies given in order to explain the nature of this relation have been re-evaluated from a critical paradigm.

II

The Sāṃkhya school of philosophy admits two fundamental realities (*tattva*) - the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti*, of which the former is conscious yet inactive and the latter is unconscious but active. The *Puruṣa* is attributed as eternal (*nitya*), pure (*śuddha*), conscious (*buddha*), free (*mukta*), unchangeable (*kūṭastha*) and capable of not being transformed (*apariṇāmī*). The *Prakṛti* too is eternal, but it is capable of being transformed (*pariṇāmī*) and it is the

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primordial cause (*ādikāraṇa*) of the creation of the world (*jagat*). *Prakṛti* consists of three *guṇas* - *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. When the *Prakṛti* is not in the state of creation, the three *guṇas* remain in the state of equilibrium. However, due to the proximity of *Puruṣa* with *Prakṛti*, the equilibrium gets disturbed and the creation of the world commences, which is referred to as the transformation (*pariṇāma*).

Now, various questions may arise regarding the basic metaphysical presuppositions of the Sāṃkhya, that is, the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, which acts as the basis of the entire Sāṃkhya system as a *mokṣavādī* school.

From the elementary notion of Sāṃkhya philosophy, it is evident that *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* are completely different entities. So the natural question arises: Can there be any relation between two such entities at all? And if any relation is admitted, then what can be the nature of that relation? Also, what might be the significance of such a relation in the context of liberation?

In the 20th *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa speaks of the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* -

*Tasmāttatsaṃyogādacetanaṃ cetanāvadivaliṅgam/
Guṇakartṛtve ca tathā karteḥ bhavatyudāsīnaḥ //*¹

According to the *Sāṃkhya* system, the manifested evolutes of *Prakṛti* are dependent entities, whereas *Prakṛti* itself is subtle and independent. Now, the non-agency of the *Puruṣa* and the independence of the *Prakṛti* clearly depict that *Prakṛti* acts as the agent. However, we know that for a thing to be an agent there must be consciousness in it. But to consider unconscious *Prakṛti* as an independent agent of an action is contradictory to our cognition.

We know that agency can only be the property of a conscious being and thus, it is said that '*Cetanaḥ ahaṃ karomi*'. An agent would first acquire the direct knowledge of an object and its material causes; then he would desire that and subsequently, he would have the volition to attain it. The statement

¹ *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 20

which expresses the intention of the agent is, *Cetanaḥ ahaṃ cikīrṣan karomi*. Here, the term *cikīrṣan* means ‘desire to do’. From this it is evident that, the coexistence of knowledge, desire and volition in the same locus (*adhikaraṇa*) constitute the agency of that - *Upādānagocarāparokṣajñāna-cikīrṣā-kṛtimatvaṃ kartṛtvam*².

According to Vācaspati Mīśra, the fact that agency is constituted by the coexistence in the same locus (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of volition and consciousness, is known through experience. However, by the term ‘*cikīrṣan*’, the co-locatedness (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of the desire to act along with the other conditions is also to be considered. Hence, we can say that clear and distinct knowledge of object, desire to act and volition towards it, together constitute the property called agency.

However, such definition of agency is not accepted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers. It is because their basic metaphysical presupposition is that *Puruṣa* is conscious, but it is inactive, and hence, it cannot be an agent. *Puruṣa* is devoid of any desire or volition. Again, *Prakṛti* is unconscious matter; though it has desire and volition in the form of the modes of the internal sense organ (*antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti*), yet it is devoid of knowledge. So, how can there be co-locatedness among the trio - knowledge, volition and desire? Then either we have to admit volition in *Puruṣa* or knowledge in *Prakṛti*. Otherwise it would not be possible to determine an agent of the vast creation called world (*jagat*). Now if it is admitted that knowledge (*jñāna*) resides in *Prakṛti*, that knowledge would also be present in all the evolutes of *Prakṛti*; and so, entity of greater dimension (*mahat*), five elements (*pañcabhūta*) etc. would all be considered as conscious (*jñānavān*). This again contradicts our natural cognition of the worldly matter. Also, if *Puruṣa* is regarded as an agent then its essential nature (*svarūpa*) of being inactive would be hampered.

² *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Viśayaparicchedaḥ, p.135

To resolve the issue, we find that in the 20th *Kārikā*, it has been claimed that the essence of agency is not constituted by the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* of volition (*kṛti*) and consciousness. Rather, they emphasize that agency and knowledge or consciousness never co-exist, they always reside in different loci. Such a claim is endorsed by the term *tasmāt* in the *Kārikā*. Thus, usages like ‘I, being conscious and desirous to do, am doing’ (*cetanaḥ ahaṃ cikīrṣan karomi*) are erroneous.

The Sāṃkhyas hold that *Prakṛti* or the three *guṇas* are unconscious, and yet they are the agent; whereas *Puruṣa*, in spite of being conscious, cannot be regarded as the agent. The very idea of *Puruṣa* as the agent is incorrect, because if agency of *Puruṣa* is admitted, then we would have to accept transformability (*pariṇāmitva* or *vikāritva*) of *Puruṣa*. Hence, it is to be admitted that volition (*kṛti*) is the property of *Prakṛti* only.

Here, again it might be asked that only the presence of volition does not lead to agency, consciousness is mandatory, then how can unconscious *Prakṛti* be the agent? In answer to this the *Sāṃkhyācāryas* hold that *tat saṃyogat acetanaṃ cetanāvat iva*, that is, the unconscious behaves like the conscious or the unconscious appears to be conscious, due to its relation or its proximity with *Puruṣa*. And thus, the agency of the unconscious *Prakṛti* is established. Though they admit that knowledge or consciousness is a pre-condition of being an agent, but here, admitting agency of the *Puruṣa* becomes paradoxical due to its essential nature (*svarūpa*). Hence, there being no other alternative, agency is to be attributed to the unconscious *Prakṛti* or the three *guṇas*. Thus, clearly it is claimed that due to the proximity of *Puruṣa* with *Prakṛti*, the unconscious appears to be conscious.

At this point, the next vital issue which comes up is: what is meant by this proximity of *Puruṣa* with *Prakṛti*? And if it indicates some kind of relation between the two, what would be the nature of that relation? Often, we find that this proximity is being termed as contact (*saṃyoga*), but such a usage only leads to more complexity rather than simplifying matters. Since, *Puruṣa*

and *Prakṛti* are both ubiquitous (*bibhu*), so the contact between them cannot be caused by the volition of either of the relata (*anyatarakarmajanya samyoga*). We know that *samyoga* is defined as attainment preceded by non-attainment (*aprāptipūrvikā prāpti*). But, if two entities are ubiquitous, then there cannot be non-attainment between the two. Then, can the question of *samyoga* in this sense at all arise? Moreover, since the former *samyoga* is not possible, the question of contact generated by the volition existing in both the relata (*ubhayakarmajanya samyoga*) does not arise at all. Also, the Sāṃkhyaś do not admit whole (*avayavī*) over and above parts (*avayava*), so contact caused by another contact (*samyogajanya samyoga*) is also impossible in this case.

Then the question persists that in what sense has the term ‘*samyoga*’ been applied in the *Kārikā* ‘*tasmāt tat samyogat*’? It is just an indicator of a relation? And if it is so, what kind of relation can it be? Is it like the relation between fire and heat? Now, if the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Triguṇa* be a natural relation like that between fire and heat, then the *Puruṣa* can never be liberated. We never find fire devoid of heat, so if the relation be such in the present case, then the *Puruṣa* can never differentiate between itself and *Prakṛti* leading to the impossibility of liberation of *Puruṣa*. Next, it may be asked: Is the relation in question like that between the eyes and color? It is not like that either; because, the eyes can perceive the color due to its own potency or power, but we do not find any such potency in either *Puruṣa* or *Prakṛti* to establish relation between them. Admitting any such potency would again lead to the question of non-liberation of *Puruṣa*. Again, the question arises: Is it like the relation between fish and water? Now, if the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is to be described in such terms, then we have to admit subject-object relationship (*viśayaviśayibhāva*) between the two. The relation between fish and water is not a mere contact (*samyoga*), it is not the case that earlier the fish was unrelated to water and then later it came in contact with water. So, the subject-object relationship between fish and water cannot be considered in

explaining the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. The subjectivity (*viśayatva*) of *Puruṣa* is eternal and undifferentiated (*avyāvṛtta*), and the objectivity (*viśayatva*) of *Prakṛti* is also such. So, admitting that relation between them would also lead to non-liberation of *Puruṣa*.

The obscurity regarding the term *saṃyoga* in case of the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Triguṇa* thus remains. However, to salvage the situation from such unclarity, Vācaspati Mīśra claims that here the primary sense of the term *saṃyoga* is not to be considered at all. Rather it has been used in a secondary sense, where *tat saṃyogaḥ* means *tat sannidhānam* (proximity).

Now, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, we find, *Asaṅga hi ayam puruṣaḥ*³, that is, *Puruṣa* is always unattached and indifferent. It is unrelated to any other thing. And any question of its relation to some other only refers to proximity (*sannidhāna*). Just like the *ākāśa* is in proximity to the pot, so is the case with the *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. Due to such relation the unconscious *Triguṇa* appears to be conscious, and the non-agent *Puruṣa* appears to be the agent. The attributes of *Puruṣa* as an agent and the consciousness of *Prakṛti* are unreal; they are just reflections (*pratibimba*) or super-imposed (*āropita*) properties due to their proximity (*sannidhāna*). Such appearance is again due to the non-ascertainment of the difference (*bhedāgraha*) between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. Due to such a state, the bondage present in the inner sense organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) appears to reside in the *Puruṣa*, and hence *Puruṣa* is termed as bound (*baddha*). In essence consciousness and agency reside in different loci, that is, consciousness in *Puruṣa* and agency in *Triguṇa*; but as both the entities are ubiquitous (*bibhu*), they represent the property of one another due to their proximity (*sannidhāna*).

Now in the 21st *Kārikā*, Ācārya Īśvarakṛṣṇa speaks of the interdependence between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. In the previous *Kārikā* it has been established that there is a relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, but the intriguing part remains: how can it be possible for two such completely

³ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4/3/15

different entities to be at all related in some way or the other? The consciousness and non-agency of *Puruṣa* is in direct contradiction with the unconscious agency of the *Prakṛti*. So, two such realities cannot be related to each other unless they fulfill one another's purpose in the process. Such a sense of complementation has been termed as 'apekṣā', which means *sva-sva-kāryajanana-sahakāritva*, that is, helping each other to achieve its respective accomplishment of action. They each seek the help of the other to accomplish their purpose. Thus, they may be said to be in the relation of the helper and the helped (*upakārya-upakārahāva*). This point has been expressed in the 21st *Kārikā*, which says:

*Puruṣasya darśanārthaṃ kaivalyārthaṃ tathā pradhānasya/
Pangvandhavadubhayorapī saṃyogastatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ//*⁴

From the above *Kārikā*, we find that the *Pradhāna* or the *Prakṛti* wants to be perceived by the *Puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* being the primordial cause (*ādikāraṇa*) is the possessor of three *guṇas* (*guṇamayī*) and is, thus, the producer of all the objects of desire or need. It is termed as *nikhilabhogyaprasavinī* and the *bhogyā*, meaning that which gives birth to all enjoyable entities and that which is to be enjoyed respectively. But the enjoyable entities have no value unless there is an enjoyer (*bhoktā*). Here, the *Puruṣa* is the enjoyer (*bhoktā*), and the property of being an enjoyer (*bhokṛtva*) of the *Puruṣa* helps in the realization of the property of being enjoyed (*bhogyatva*) of the *Prakṛti*. Thus, the *Prakṛti* awaits its perception by the *Puruṣa* in order to attain its fruitful end. That is why, though the *Puruṣa* is of opposite nature to *Prakṛti*, yet it desires or waits to be related to the *Puruṣa* for its own realization.

Now, another vital question which arises at this juncture is that, the *Puruṣa* has no such need as the *Prakṛti*, then why would it want to be related to the *Prakṛti*? Just the need of the *Prakṛti* would not propel the *Puruṣa* to be related to the *Triguṇa*; it must possess a desire or need of its own as well. Certain fulfillment of mutual need or desire can only lead to a relationship. We

⁴ *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 21

find answer to this in the *Kārikā*, where it has been said *puruṣasya kaivalyārtham*. This phrase explains why the *Puruṣa* awaits the *Prakṛti* as well, *Puruṣasya apekṣāṃ darśayati* ⁵. Though the *Puruṣa* is essentially unbound and indifferent, yet if it remains so, the *Prakṛti* would lose its significance; so, both await each other. Vācaspati Miśra explains why and how *Puruṣa* awaits *Prakṛti* as follows- *Tathāhi bhogyena pradhānena sambhinnaḥ puruṣastadgataṃ duḥkhatrayaṃ svātmanyabhimanyamānaḥ kaivalyaṃ prārthayate*.⁶ It means that the *Puruṣa* awaits the *Prakṛti* or the *Pradhāna* for its own liberation. Cessation of the three kinds of sufferings is known as *kaivalya*. Such *kaivalya* is the ultimate aim of *Puruṣa*.

Indian thinkers have coined many terms to denote liberation like *aparvarga*, *mukti*, *nirvāṇa*, *mokṣa*, *kaivalya* etc. The nuances acquired by the Indian thinkers have got specific import. The term *kaivalya* used in the sense of isolation is at par with the Sāṃkhya metaphysics. The term is originated from the word *kevala*, which indicates the liberation in the sense of loneliness or isolation arising out of the knowledge of discrimination (*vivekajñāna*) alone.

Now, again a question may be raised that *Puruṣa* being eternally liberated (*nityamukta*), that is, the most desired liberation being its true essence and it being ever free from sufferings, why would it at all await *Prakṛti* for its liberation again? Vācaspati replies to this by saying that *Pradhāna* is useful to *Puruṣa*. From time unknown, *Puruṣa* is unaware of the distinction between itself and the *Prakṛti*. So, the *Puruṣa* thinks that the sufferings residing in the *Prakṛti* (*prakṛtigata duḥkha*) are actually its own. *Puruṣa* is undoubtedly free from all sufferings at all times, but due to its inability to distinguish between itself and *Pradhāna*, it considers sufferings existing in *Prakṛti* (*prakṛtigata duḥkha*) to be its own sufferings. This happens because of the inherited or self-credited (*ābhimānika*) relation, due to which

⁵ *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, p. 198

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 198

the *Puruṣa* thinks itself to be the sufferer, and usages like ‘*Ahaṃ duḥkhī*’ are prevalent. As long as such relation persists, *Puruṣa* is considered to be bound. *Puruṣa* is unaltered, indifferent and unrelated. Hence, it is always devoid of any kind of sufferings. But due to the inherited (*ābhimānika*) relation, *Puruṣa* is unaware of its distinction with the *Prakṛti*, and so it remains bound by the three kinds of suffering. *Puruṣa*, thus, tries to attain liberation from them. It is well-known to us that, an object which is already attained, act as the impediment of the desire for attaining that object. Then it can be argued that, why at all eternally liberated *Puruṣa* would desire liberation? It is said that, the *Puruṣa* wants to achieve liberation because it desires freedom from the three kinds of suffering (*trividha duḥkha*) which it experiences due to its feeling of oneness with the *Prakṛti*. Hence, the *Puruṣa* though it is eternally free (*nityamukta*), yet its desire for liberation is meaningful.

Now, it can again be asked that, even if we accept that *Puruṣa*’s desire for liberation is meaningful, but why would it await *Prakṛti* for achieving that end? Here, Vācaspati Mīśra replies that, *Tacca sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātī-nivandhanam*.⁷ *Puruṣa* tries to find means of attaining that *kaivalya* and it is achievable only by the knowledge of discrimination from *Prakṛti* in the *Puruṣa* admitted as an existent entity (*sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātī*); here the term ‘*anyatākhyātī*’ means acquiring knowledge of distinction.

Prakṛti and *Puruṣa* are mutually different. But, due to the non-ascertainment of the distinction between them, through the inherited relation with the three types of suffering, *Puruṣa* considers the sufferings to be its own. Now, with the attainment of the knowledge of distinction between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* (*anyatākhyātī*), the inherited (*ābhimānika*) relation gets destroyed and consequently usages as *ahaṃ duḥkhi* lose their import. In Sāṃkhya philosophy, this *anyatākhyātī* is also known as *vivekakhyātī* or *tattvajñāna*. *Jñāna* or *buddhi* is the evolute of *antaḥkaraṇa* or *mahattattva*. When the *mahattattva* becomes pure and potent through listening, concentration and

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 199

contemplation (*śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana*), then the *mahattattva* transforms into *tattvajñāna* or *vivekakhyāti*. Thus, *Puruṣa*, being desirous of liberation, awaits such *mahattattva*, since it aids in attainment of the highest *puruṣārtha*. Hence, awaiting the *mahattattva* amounts to awaiting the *Prakṛti*. *Mahattattva* is the first evolute of *Prakṛti* and from that *mahattattva*, *vivekakhyāti* is produced, which instrumentally leads to liberation or *mokṣa*. Thus, to acquire the *bhedajñāna* or the *anyatākhyāti*, that is, the distinctive knowledge, it is essential for the *Puruṣa* to seek the help of *Prakṛti*. Evidently then, the *Puruṣa* awaits *Prakṛti*, which acts as its prime helper in the attainment of the highest *puruṣārtha*, and it is obvious enough that no one ignores such a helper, rather awaits such. Thus, Vācaspati mentions here, *Puruṣa* waits for *Pradhāna* in order to attain its liberation -*kaivalyārtham puruṣaḥ pradhānaṃ apekṣate*.⁸

Now, it may again be argued that, though we admit that the *Prakṛti* helps the *Puruṣa* in attaining *kaivalya*, but is *kaivalya* the only *puruṣārtha* for which *Puruṣa* awaits the *Prakṛti*? Just as *kaivalya* is a *puruṣārtha*, similarly enjoyment (*bhoga*) is another *puruṣārtha*. *Puruṣa* awaits *Prakṛti* for liberation and enjoyment (*bhoga*) as well. The relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is essential for enjoyment. *Puruṣa* is the eternal enjoyer; hence, the relation producing this enjoyment must also be eternal. *Prakṛti* also is the eternal object of enjoyment and it reveals itself to the *Puruṣa* for its own purpose of attaining fulfillment. Thus, it appears that the said relation is the cause of enjoyment. But here, it might be asked that how can, a relation which is the cause of enjoyment, again be the cause of liberation of *Puruṣa*? In reply, Vācaspati Mīśra says that there is a series of relations between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. They become related to each other again and again. The relation which is instrumental for enjoyment is not the cause of liberation. Enjoyment and liberation are totally opposed to each other, so the same relation cannot be the cause of two such completely contradictory ends. Different relations are,

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 199

thus, to be admitted for the respective ends. Hence, it is claimed that though the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti* are eternally related, yet they again get related to each other for *kaivalya*.

At this point, two more questions arise, one is that, if the *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* relates to one another repeatedly, how can it be determined that which relation is the cause of enjoyment and which one is the cause of liberation? Moreover, it is intriguing to think that *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, both being eternal and ubiquitous, they are never away from one another; rather they are always in proximity to each other. So, how can the question of the two realities being repeatedly related to one another, at all arise? In this regard, the *Sāṃkhyācāryas* have remained silent. It is important to note here, that two ubiquitous realities, can neither be away nor in proximity to one another, since the very technicality of the term *bibhu* suggests that there cannot be any issue of spatial proximity or remoteness (*daiśika paratvāparatva*) in such cases, and also, both of them being eternal, similarly there can be no question of temporal proximity or remoteness (*kālika paratvāparatva*) between them either.

However, regarding the former question raised here, the *Sāṃkhyācāryas* would reply that *Prakṛti* reveals itself or gets transformed at every moment. Hence, at each point of time, it is new and different from the previous. If things are admitted in this way, it can be said that the *Puruṣa* gets related to a new *Prakṛti* each time and thus, a series of relations are produced. Among those relations, some are the causes of enjoyment and the others are that of liberation.

III

Now, Īśvarakṛṣṇa draws our attention to another aspect of the relation between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. It has already been discussed that there is a mutual relation of the helper and the helped between the two. To explicate this, he puts forward an analogy from our ordinary life, which is expressed by the term *pangvandhavat*⁹ in the *Kārikā*. It refers to a lame person, meaning an

⁹ *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 21

individual unable to walk or to move on his own and another blind person, meaning one who is unable to see; whereas, the lame person can see and the blind person can walk. Now, they decide to help each other in reaching their desired destinations. Here, the lame man being able to see, may be regarded as one who possesses knowledge (*jñānavān*) but he is inactive (*niṣkriya*), whereas, the blind man may be considered as active (*kriyāśīla*) but devoid of knowledge (*jñānahīna*). If the blind man carries the lame man on his shoulders and the lame man directs him, then both of them can reach their desired aim. Thus, they mutually await one another, because otherwise, they both would have to lead fruitless lives.

Here, quite evidently, the lame man represents the *Puruṣa* and the blind man stands for the *Prakṛti*. *Jñāna* refers to consciousness and activity refers to agency and transformability as well. By this analogy Īśvarakṛṣṇa tries to uphold that just as the lame and the blind man help each other to fulfill one another's purpose, similarly, the *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* complement each other in attaining their own realizations. But certain objections come up here, which may show that the analogy is not very appropriate. First, it is to be noted that in the above analogy the lame and blind, both are conscious, whereas, on the other hand *Puruṣa* is conscious, but *Prakṛti* is not. Secondly, the lame-ness and the blind-ness refer to certain physical disabilities of a conscious being, but the inactivity (*niṣkriyatva*) of *Puruṣa* and the unconsciousness (*nirjñānatva*) of *Prakṛti* do not express any such disability, they are indicators of the absence of action in *Puruṣa* and that of knowledge or consciousness in *Prakṛti* which are their respective essences. So, the given analogy may not be considered to be a very appropriate one, but in spite of that it might be looked at as a gross analogy only, keeping in view the contradiction in terms of metaphor and entities or objects metaphorized - *dṛṣṭānta-dārṣṭāntika virodhaḥ*.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Vedāntadarśanam*, Tarkapāda.

However, it may be argued in favor of the Sāṃkhyas that the charge of contradiction between the metaphor and the objects metaphorized (*dr̥ṣṭānta-dār̥ṣṭāntika virodhaḥ*) does not stand in the eye of logic on account of the fact that there cannot be total affinity between them, but a partial one. When a face is metaphorized as moon, there is no absolute identity between the two. There is no affinity in terms of shape, size and other aspects of the moon, but there is similarity only in terms of glamour (*lāvanya*) between the moon and the face. If this point is kept in view, the metaphor between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* and the blind and the lame man does not face any contradiction.

Now, other analogies have also been given in this context. The potency of fire to burn is pre-existent in fire, but it can only be manifested when the fire comes in contact with inflammable objects, like, branches of trees. Similarly, the *vivekakhyāti* is pre-existent in *Puruṣa*, but the *Puruṣa* becomes aware of it only after its relation or proximity with *Prakṛti*. Again from the other way round, fruits of a tree have the potency to satisfy hunger, water has the potency to quench thirst, but their potentials can only be manifested in relation to an enjoyer (*bhoktā*). Likewise, the actions of *Prakṛti*, being instrumental to serve the purpose of *Puruṣa* (*puruṣaprayojanasādhakatā*), can only be expressed due to its relation with *Puruṣa*. Hence, the *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* await each other like the blind and the lame man, and the relation between them is aimed at their respective realizations.

At this juncture, it may be interesting to think that the above analogies present a notion as if *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* are something external to or different from the ordinary worldly objects and individuals. Arguing from the Sāṃkhya stance, it can be claimed that the enjoyer (*bhoktā*) referred to above is none but the *Puruṣa*, and the fruits, water etc. are nothing but the evolutes of *Prakṛti*, that is, *Prakṛti* itself. So, the analogies are not really analogies, but they are rather speaking of the two basic realities - *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* only, but in somewhat finite terms.

Finally, to emphasize on a particular issue already discussed, it has been questioned that, since the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* has been established as the helper and the helped, and hence, they await each other, then why is it necessary to admit the various evolutes of *Prakṛti*? Moreover, it has been shown that the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is the cause of *Prakṛti*'s realization of enjoyability (*bhogyatva*) and liberation of *Puruṣa*. Then, quite naturally it might be asked that what constitutes the cause of the production of *mahat* and the subsequent forms of it? In reply to this, Īśvarakṛṣṇa asserts – *tatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ*.¹¹ This implies that the said relation itself is the cause of the creation of *mahat* etc. The above relation cannot act as the direct or the active cause of enjoyment or liberation, it can be so only through the creation of *mahat* etc. However, this does not mean that the same relation once acts as the cause of *mahat* etc. and then again that of enjoyment and liberation. It is not so. The relation only helps in the production of *mahat* etc. which then leads to their enjoyment by the *Puruṣa*, and eventually to the liberation of the self. This whole thing is meant by the phrase '*tatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ*'.

Thus, we may summarize the whole content that enjoyment and liberation are the two ends of *Puruṣa* (*puruṣārtha*). The relation of proximity between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is admitted, but it cannot be the direct cause of the two *puruṣārthas*. Due to the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *Prakṛti*, the world is created through the production of *mahat* etc. in definite order. This leads to the enjoyment by the *Puruṣa*, but it is to be kept in mind that only those evolutes, like pleasure and pain (*sukha* and *duḥkha*), which are related to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, can be enjoyed. Hence, *mahat* etc. are absolutely necessary for enjoyment. Again, knowledge is the mode or evolute (*vṛtti*) of *antaḥkaraṇa*, and knowledge here, specifically referring to *tattvajñāna* or *vivekakhyāti* can only be instrumental to *kaivalya*. Hence, for enjoyment as

¹¹ *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, p. 202

well as *kaivalya* the production of *mahat* etc. is necessary. Thus, we can claim that there is the relation of proximity (*sannidhi*) between the *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* and consequently, both attain their respective realizations or ends.

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NO SENSE THEORY OF PROPER NAME: A PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION*

SADEK ALI

Whether proper names do have sense or not is a debatable issue in the arena of linguistic philosophy. Frege for example holds that proper names do have sense. On the contrary, Kripke maintains that proper names do not have any sense. Thus, Kripke's theory of proper names is philosophically known as 'no sense theory of proper names'. This main objective of this paper is to examine and analyse with critical outlook whether proper names do have sense or not. If proper names do have sense, then in what sense they have sense and if proper names do not have sense, then again in what sense they do not have sense.

In the history of linguistic philosophy the concept of proper name has widely been pronounced. When linguistic philosophers were involved into a tug of war regarding the very nature of language and accordingly proposed linguistic revision for overcoming the unspicuousness of ordinary language, they eventually proposed proper names as the minimum vocabulary of ideal language. Proper names have been chosen as the minimum vocabularies of ideal language because they are denotational in nature. It has been claimed that every name denotes an object or a name stands for an object.

But what is meant by 'stand for'? Do proper names 'stand for' in the same way that definite descriptions 'stand for'? Such questions can easily be answered by giving the answer of the question: "Do proper names have sense?" Searle raises the quip: Is there any similarity between the way a definite description picks out its referent and the way a proper name picks out its referent? Is proper name is a shorthand description? Again two diametrically opposite response can be witnessed. One response stands with

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the conviction that proper names do not have sense. They are meaningless marks. They have ‘denotation (direct referent) but do not have connotation’.¹ The concept of logically proper name of Russell, the concept of name as rigid designator of Kripke would belong to this camp. The other response stands with the conviction that proper names have sense. They are not meaningless marks. They have mode of presentation. Frege’s theory of proper name belongs to this camp. I think this distinction would be made clear if we sense properly Russellian distinction between logically proper names and ordinary proper names or Kripkian distinction between rigid and non-rigid or accidental designators. According to Russell a logically proper name is *known by acquaintance*, whereas an ordinary proper name is *known by descriptions*. An ordinary proper name is a disguised description, a surrogate description. Kripke, however, interprets a rigid designator in terms of actual and possible-worlds. For Kripke a rigid designator is one which designates the same objects in all possible worlds of an actual world. That means if a rigid designator designates a certain object in the actual world; it equally designates the same object in all other possible worlds. In the language of Modal Logic it can be said that a rigid designator is at par with the concept of necessarily true. The proposition P is necessarily true (Lp) in an actual world, namely, W1, if and only if it would be true in all other possible –worlds, such as, W2, W3, etc., of W1. On the other hand, a non-rigid designator is one which does not designate the same object in all possible-worlds of an actual world. In this sense, non-rigid designator may be called a relative, ad-hoc designator or accidental designator.

Let us make this distinction clear by citing a few examples. ‘The square root of 4’ is a rigid designator according to Kripke for it designates the same object in all possible-worlds of an actual world. Contrary to this, ‘The President of USA in 1970’ is non-rigid designator for it does not designate the

¹ Mill, J.S. *A System of Logic* London and Colchester, 1949, Book 1, Chapter 2, para- 5.

same individual in all possible-worlds. Even though it designates Richard Nixon in the actual world, but this is made possible due to the actual outcome of the relevant Presidential election. However, the result of this election might have been different and there underlies no apparent contradiction if the outcome of the result would be different from what actually happened. Thus, according to Kripke 'the President of USA in 1970' is a non-rigid designator because it would designate any man other than Richard Nixon who in fact incidentally won the election. Even though Russell did not mention the concept of possible-world and actual - world while introducing his concept of logical proper names like Kripke, but I think the philosophical implication of both Russell and Kripke remained the same as both would accept the *no sense theory of proper name*. According to Russell a logically proper name is known by acquaintance and in this sense a logically proper name does not describe the object at all. Thus in the case of a logically proper name one can acquaint with an object in every possible-world. That means there is no chance of denotational failure in case of a logically proper name. However, the only difference between Russell's logical proper name and Kripke's rigid designator is that for Kripke a rigid designator would designate the *same object* in all possible- world; whereas for Russell a logical proper name, proper name in short, denotes an object with which one must be acquainted. The philosophical implication of non-rigid designator of Kripke and definite description of Russell would remain the same. According to Russell an ordinary proper name even though looks like a proper name, but in true sense it would be a disguised description. Accordingly, it can be said after Russell that unlike a logical proper name, a description (an ordinary proper name in Russell sense and non-rigid designator in Kripke's sense) describes some aspect of that object. Thus it can be said that a logically proper name of Russell and the rigid designator of Kripke does not describe any object whatsoever; whereas an ordinary proper name of Russell and a non-designator of Kripke describes some aspect of the object. Searle says, " To know that a

definite description fits an object is to know a fact about the object, but to know its name is not so far to know any facts about it. ...we can often turn a definite description (a referring expression) into an ordinary predicative expression by simply substituting an indefinite article for the definite.”²

What we sense from the above observation is that a logically proper name is not connected with any aspects of the object as descriptions are; rather a logically proper name is *tied to the object itself*. According to Searle descriptions stand for aspects or properties of an object, whereas logical proper names stand for the real thing. This actually leads us to the metaphysical cleavage between objects and properties or aspects of objects and it has been attached with the distinction between proper names and definite descriptions. Even Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* says, “The name means the object. The object is its meaning.” (*TLP*: 3.203)

Arguments in favour of no sense theory of reference:

Those who adhere to the view that proper names do not have sense would defend themselves on the basis of the following arguments:

Firstly, if a proper name has a sense then it can be said that the reference of the proper name is determined by its sense. As sense is conceived in terms of *mode of presentation*, there, of course, will remain certain well defined conditions whatever the conditions may be and the object under consideration is designated by the name if and only if it would satisfy those conditions. Now the point is that if the reference of a proper name is determined in this way, then a proper name cannot be a rigid designator because in such a case ‘there is no guarantee that the object which satisfies the condition associated with the proper name in the actual world would also satisfy it in all other possible worlds’.³ It would even be the case some other objects would satisfy those conditions in another possible-worlds. Thus, it seems clear that that if the reference of a proper name is determined by its

² Searle, J.R. *Speech Acts*, University Press, 1997, p.163.

³ Sen, Pranab. *Logic, Induction and Ontology*, p.233.

sense or mode of presentation in Fregean term, then it would be a non-rigid designator as it may happen in the case of non-rigid designator like ‘the President of the USA in 1970’. But for Kripke, a proper name is a rigid designator. Therefore, a proper name does not bear any sense. But how do we know that a proper name is a rigid designator? We have already outlined in terms of actual-possible world concepts in what sense a proper name is held to be a rigid designator. Elsewhere Kripke gave us a straightforward answer of bearing in mind that a proper name is a rigid designator. Here Kripke claims that a proper name is a rigid designator because otherwise we could not make *counterfactual assertions* with their help. That means *counterfactual assertions* would indirectly ensure that proper names are rigid designators. For example, we can say that the man who was actually the President of the USA in 1970 might not have been the President. For it was just a contingent, an *ad hoc* matter of fact that he won the election and we can use the name of the person and accordingly make the counterfactual assertion by saying, ‘Nixon might not have been the President of the USA in 1970’. However, according to Kripke, this counterfactual assertion does not work unless the proper name ‘Nixon’ designated the same individual in both the actual world in which Nixon is a President and the possible world in which Nixon is not a President.

Secondly, from Russellian point of view it can be said that proper names (logical proper names) do not have sense. Russell, of course, has admitted that ordinary proper names do have sense because ordinary proper names are not genuine proper names. They are *disguised* descriptions. Therefore, for Russell only logical proper names are genuine proper names. Logical proper names do not have sense because they are known by acquaintance and there is no scope of descriptions or mode of presentation in the Fregean sense. In this regard, Russell conceived *demonstrative pronouns*, such as ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘it’, etc., as logically proper names. According to Russell any object that has been associated with the utterance of any one of the demonstrative pronouns must be acquainted with the person who utters it.

Here there is no scope for description or knowing the aspects or properties of an object under consideration.

Possible objections against the no-sense theory of proper names:

There are some possible objections that can be raised against the no-sense theory of proper names which are as follows:

- (a) According to Searle we can use proper names in existential propositions. As every proper name denotes an object, there is no point of making such assertion that the object as denoted by a proper name is null or void or empty. For example, 'There is such a place as Africa' is a straightforward existential statement. According to Searle, here the proper name cannot be said to refer, for no such subject of an existential statement can refer. If it does, then we have to admit that 'existence would be a real predicate'. But we come to know that 'existence cannot be a real predicate'. Every existential statement states that a certain predicate is instantiated. The same has been reflected in Frege's thought when Frege put it that 'existence is a second order concept'. What Searle insists here is that an existential sentence does not refer to an object, nor does it state that it exists; on the contrary, it expresses a concept and accordingly states that the concept can be instantiated. This would lead us to assume that a proper name must have some conceptual or descriptive content. Russell of course has attempted to overcome this charge by conceding such expressions as *disguised descriptions*. However, Seale thinks that there is something wrong in the Russellian assumption.
- (b) It would be a general perception that sentences containing proper names can be used to make identity statements which would convey factual information instead of linguistic information. For example, the sentence, 'Everest is Chomolungma' can be used to make an assertion having geographical import as an alternative of lexicographical import. The point here is that if it were to be the case that proper names do not

have senses, then the sentence under consideration did not convey no more information than does an assertion made with the sentence ‘Everest is Everest’. Unlike the sentence ‘Everest is Chomolungma’, the sentence ‘Everest is Everest’ is an obvious identity sentence and it gives no information whatsoever. The sentence ‘Everest is Chomolungma’ is an informative identity statement and the sentence ‘Everest is Everest’ is an obvious identity statement. To know that an informative statement can be regarded as an identity statement can lead us to assume that proper names must have descriptive content and they must have sense. The force of this argument is Fregean in nature. Unlike the no-sense theorists, Frege has anticipated that proper names do have sense or mode of presentation.

- (c) How do we know that a particular name denotes the same object in all possible worlds of an actual world? One can know it with the help of the *Principle of Identification*. According to Searle the principle of identification requires that an utterance of a proper name must convey a description just as the utterance of a definite description must if the reference is to be consummated. This would lead us to assume that at least a proper name is a kind of shorthand description. Russell, of course, anticipated *shorthand descriptivity* in the case of ordinary proper names, but the proponents of sense-theorists of proper names would like to say that the concept of shorthand descriptivity is very much present even in the case of rigid designators as anticipated by Kripke and logically proper names as expounded by Russell.

The above three objections against no-sense theory actually hinge on the solitary assertion that proper names are *shorthand description*. However, according to Searle such conclusion cannot be right apart from its bizarre implausibility. It is incoherent with so many other obvious truths. If it were supposed to be the case that proper names are shorthand descriptions then there would be some descriptions which would be treated as equivalent in definition

for proper names. Can we have the definitions of proper names? Certainly we do not have. Even if we go through dictionaries of proper names, we may find descriptions of the bearers of the names, but in most cases their descriptions are not definitional equivalents for the names since they are only contingently true of the bearers. Moreover, it can be said that if proper names are shorthand descriptions because of the fact that there are descriptions which are definitional equivalents for the names, then it may perhaps be the case that proper names can be substituted for descriptions. However, Searle claims that if we try to give a complete description of the object as the sense of the name, odd consequences would arise. For Searle any true statement about the object using the name as subject would be analytic and any false one is self-contradictory. More importantly, the meaning of the name would change every time there was any change at all in the object. Accordingly, the name would have different meanings for different people. Thus, we can say that proper names are a shorthand description is not tenable.

Let us evaluate Kripke's position against the sense theory of proper names. If proper name has a sense, then there is associated with every proper name a certain condition such that a proper name designates an object *if and only if* the object under consideration satisfies the condition. It has further been presupposed that the condition *fixes the reference* of the name because the fulfillment of the condition is logically necessary and sufficient for the object's being designated by the name. For example, the condition involved in the description 'the length of the standard meter bar in Paris' is associated with the designator by 'One metre'. Now instead of 'one meter', we may use a different condition for fixing the reference of the designator, e.g., the length which is equal to 39.37 inches. Thus, it would be possible that the meter bar slightly changing its length and may still be designated by the same designator. Now if one holds that a proper name has sense would equally maintain that some condition or other is associated with every proper and such condition may be transparent or changing from time to time from situation to

situation as it may happen in the case of ‘ the length of the standard meter bar in Paris’. However, if the condition is to constitute the sense or meaning of the name, the relation between the condition and the name must be more intimate, coherent than a mere fixing of the reference as suggested by the sense theorists’ of proper names. According to Sen, there must be a *logical connection* between the two.⁴

Kripke elsewhere maintains that if the reference of a name is determined by its sense, it cannot be a rigid designator because in such a case a name designates an object if and only if it satisfies a certain condition. In this regard, Professor Sen expresses reservation regarding Kripke’s position. According to Kripke ‘the square root of 4’ is a rigid designator because it refers the same object, namely, the ‘square root of 4 is 2’ in all possible - worlds of an actual world. One may, however, argue by saying that ‘the square root of 4’ could still be a rigid designator even if its sense determines its reference because the sense consists of a property, what may be termed as the real essence of things, which is indispensable to the number it designates. In defense of Kripke what we can say here, of course following Locke, is that the real essences of things are not in general knowable and cannot be regarded as the identifying marks of proper names. What is necessary for the use of proper names, Sen opines, is to look for the means of identifying objects they are intended to refer to. In this way we would be in a position to assess which objects they are supposed to be a name of. This can even be done by the help of the accidental characteristics according to Sen. I think that Kripke’s position that ‘if the reference of a proper name is determined by its sense then it cannot be a rigid designator’ is too strong and it would be very difficult to sustain keeping the nature of the literature of the theme is concerned. The standard of proper name as rigid designator, which Kripke set forth is admirable and it would perhaps be regarded the primary or basic criterion of determining a proper name as rigid designator, but when we anticipate the

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 234.

view that 'natural kind terms are rigid designators', then one can take the advantage of descriptive contents at least secondarily.

Relating to the question: 'Do proper names have sense?' Searle finds a weaker and a stronger interpretation. The weaker interpretation states: "Are any such statements at all analytic?" and the stronger interpretation states: "Are any statements where the subject is a proper name and the predicate an identifying description analytic?"⁵ To say that statements containing proper names are analytic is to say that they refer to the same object in all possible situations or all possible-worlds of an actual world. This has been accepted by Kripke as he maintained that a proper name is such that it would refer to the same object in every possible-world. That means the object as referred to by a proper name in every possible-world would remain the same and this in turn presupposes the criterion of identity. In Searlian language it can be said that 'the object at time t.1 is the same as *what* the object at time t.2.'⁶ Here Searle anticipates a gap that has been indicated by the word *what* and it has to be filled by a descriptive general term, like, it is the same mountain, the same person, the same river, etc. where each gives rise to a temporal criterion of identity. Searle claims that this would actually give an affirmative answer of the weaker interpretation of the question: Do proper names have sense? Here some general term is analytically tied to any proper name, e.g., Everest is mountain, the Mississippi is a river, etc. one may, however, raise an objection by saying that if we continue to call an object 'Everest' on the basis of the criterion that the property of being called 'Everest' is sufficient to guarantee that it is the same on the basis of the principle of identity then we involve into a circularity, because in such a case we call an object 'Everest' and to give as the reason that it is called 'Everest' would be circular. What I observe here is that the concept of analyticity involved in the weaker interpretation as cited above actually hinges on the principle of identity which would be informative

⁵ Searle, J.R. *Speech Acts*, op. cit. p.166.

⁶ *Ibid.* p.167

in nature. In this regard, at least we can say that proper names do have connotations.

We think that partial fulfillment of the weaker interpretation of the very question do proper names have sense, does not entail the same answer to the stronger interpretation. Searle thinks that the stronger interpretation actually plays the all important role in determining whether a proper name has a sense in the Fregean sense. Frege conceives sense in terms of 'mode of presentation' and mode of presentation of an object actually determines the referent of the object. However, single descriptive predicate does not give rise to an identifying description. For Searle, the sentence 'Socrates is a man' may be analytically true because the name 'Socrates' has the same mode of presentation, but the predicate term 'man' is not an identifying description. Even though 'Socrates' belongs to the class 'man', but the term 'man' does not identify Socrates in isolation. As far as the principle of identification is concerned, it can be said that anyone who uses a proper name must be prepared to substitute an identifying description of the object referred to by a name. If anybody fails to fulfill the principle of identification just stated, then he would not be in a position to identify the object he is talking about. That is why; Frege has claimed that a proper name must have a sense or the mode of presentation and that the identifying description constitutes that sense. According to Frege, so long our descriptive backing for the name remained the same; we are not in a position even of speaking the same language. We think that the identifying descriptions of an object denoted by a name contain so many sub-informations. The identifying description of an object may vary from situation to situation not in terms as a whole, but in terms of its inner sub-informations. However this does not hamper the overall status of identifying description because the relationship of sub-information of identifying description is not conjunctive but disjunctive in nature. In Wittgenstein's sense it can be said that there remains a *family resemblance* among identifying descriptions of an object as referred to by a name in every

possible situation. Accordingly, the identifying description of 'Aristotle' in one situation may be different from the identifying description of 'Aristotle' in another situation and it may continue. But this does not vitiate the principle of identification because there remains a similarity and dissimilarity, criss-cross and overlapping, something common and something uncommon within the sub-descriptive contents of identifying description. The mode of presentation would remain the same in every situation because of the application of *disjunctive rule* among the sub-descriptive contents of identifying description. Thus, it can be said that the disjunction of the descriptions of Aristotle is analytically tied to the name 'Aristotle' and the same will happen in every other object as well. It thus gives a quasi-affirmative answer to the stronger interpretation as mentioned above.

So far I have examined the arguments for and against of the very question: Do proper names have sense? I think it would be very difficult to affirm or deny the same without begging question. If it has been asked whether proper names are used to describe *specific characteristics* of objects, the answer of this question would be negative. However, instead of this, if it has been asked whether or not proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer, the answer would be affirmative, of course, in a very loose sense. There is nothing wrong to suggest that the identity statement using proper names, namely, 'Everest is Chomolungma' states that the descriptive backing of both names is true of the same object. If the descriptive backing of the two names as cited above is the same or one contains the other, the statement would be analytic, if not it would be synthetic. Frege perhaps was right when he claimed that we could make factually informative identity statements using proper names having sense. But at the same time he was wrong in supposing that this sense is as straightforward as in a definite description. For example, 'The morning star is the evening star' is a case in point. Searle comments that although the sense of these names 'morning star' and 'evening star' is straightforward, they are not

paradigm proper names; they stand in the periphery of definite descriptions and proper names. It would even be the case that the principle of identification works although different persons describe the same object differently. That means to say that different identifying description would refer to the same object if the descriptions are true with reference to the object. The sense may be different; the reference would be the same. Thus, what we observe here is that even if it has been presumed that proper names have sense, but the sense they possess would be imprecise one.

Why do we have the proper names at all? An obvious answer to such question is that we do require proper names in order to refer to individuals. Interestingly, we can do the same with the help of description as well. Mill, Russell and Kripke have identified proper names in order to refer to individuals without admitting the sense of proper names; whereas Frege takes the help of descriptive contents of proper names to do the same. One may refer 'Aristotle' either in terms of denotation or in terms of connotation, either in terms of *di-re* or in terms of *di-dicto*. The denotational aspect of reference is philosophically known as 'no sense theory of proper names', the connotational aspect of reference is philosophically known as 'sense theory of reference'. However, the literature of the theory of proper names is not strict and precise as it is supposed to be the case. From Mill onwards we have observed so many overlapping interpretations of the concept of proper names. Even though Mill actually gave the seeds of proper names, but his interpretation of the concept of proper names, I think, is far more grammatical than philosophical. Frege and Russell took the clue from Mill. But again there we notice overlapping among Mill, Russell and Frege. There are some similarities and dissimilarities among them as far as their interpretations of the concept of proper names are concerned. Russell classifies proper names into logically proper names and ordinary proper names and then claims that logically proper names are known by means of acquaintance and ordinary proper names are known by descriptions. Thus, if we understand Russell in terms of logically proper

names, then there we notice a considerable debate between Russell and Frege because logical proper names are associated with ‘no sense theory of proper names’, but Frege admits ‘sense theory of proper names’. On the other hand, if we interpret Russell in terms of ordinary proper names, then he would be closer to Frege as far as naming theory is concerned. However, the discrepancy between Russell and Frege regarding proper names is well known in philosophy of language because Russell has been treated as a firm believer of logically proper names than ordinary proper names. His elsewhere remarks that logically proper names do not bear any sense and ordinary proper names even though apparently look like names but in real sense they are disguised descriptions.

If we take note on Kripke’s proper names, we again find that Kripke was very close to Russell than Frege. His understanding of name as rigid designator is a replica of Russell’s theory of logically proper names. However, at the same time there we sense a conceptual deflection between Kripke and Russell. Russell’s interpretation of logically proper names favours ‘no-sense theory of proper names’ in the absolute sense, but I do not think the same in Kripke’s case. Kripke has introduced the concept of possible-world, a modal notion, while interpreting his concept of proper names as rigid designators. But interestingly, Kripke’s vocabulary of proper names incorporates ‘natural kind terms’ where the relevance of descriptive concepts is prominent. Moreover, Russell’s criterion of principle of acquaintance as applied in logically proper names is a direct prescription; it is form of *one to one identification* and it deifies any form of conceptuality in this process. However, Kripke’s prescription of proper names as rigid designators incorporates different form of description or criterion of identification of natural kind terms. Thus, in a sense, Kripke’s natural terms are unlike Russellian logical proper names. Having said this, the only distinctive similarity between Kripke and Russell is that both of them ensured the referential foothold of proper names, logically proper names in Russell and

proper names as rigid designators in Kripke. The other similarity is that both of them believe ‘no-sense theory of proper names’.

We have already stated that Russell differs from Frege, because Russell believe the ‘no-sense theory of proper names’, whereas Frege does not. Russell ensures the referential foothold of reality, whereas Frege ensures ‘the sense theory of proper names’ and perhaps would be non-committal regarding the referential foothold of reality. Thus, in a sense the domain of proper names as conceived by Frege is larger than the domain of proper names as conceived by Russell and Kripke. Kripke differs from Frege because unlike Frege, Kripke acknowledges the ‘no-sense theory of proper names’. However, I think, Kripke’s interpretation of natural kinds terms has a simile with Fregeian interpretation of mode of presentation. What I claim here is that Fregeian sense or mode of presentation is very much relevant in the natural kind terms of Kripke, but the only difference between them is that such mode of presentation does not ensure the sense aspect of proper names as rigid designators. There is no question of doubt that the concept of possible-world being a modal concept ensures *an entailment relationship* between a proper name and what it designates in all possible-worlds. Russell’s formulation of logically proper names ensures *an implicative relationship* between a name and what it denotes. Thus, both Russell and Kripke have ensured the referential aspect of proper names. Contrary to them, Frege insists on the sensual aspect of names and is non-committal about the referential aspect of names.

I think the concept of proper name as rigid designator actually hinges in Mill’s theory proper names. Mill at once tells us that a proper name is a name of the thing itself. It actually means that a proper name designates the object which it designates irrespective of the properties it may or may not have. Only in this respect one can say that a proper name stands for the thing itself. If we strict to this formulation, then there is no point of denying the view that a proper name is a rigid designator. Russell’s anticipation of the

demonstrative pronouns was an insightful reflection of Mill's theory of proper name. In recent time, Kripke and Kalpan's view of proper names are the reflection of Mill. Accordingly, it can be said that a proper name being a designator stands for the object itself if and only if it refers to it directly. To say that a proper name being a rigid designator stands for the object itself and it refers to the object directly equally means to say that a proper name does not bear any sense. From Kripkian perspective it can be said that a proper name being a rigid designator actually paves the way of nullifying its possibility of sense.

THE JUSTIFICATION OF HUMAN EXISTENCE: AN ETHICAL APPROACH*

BUDDHISWAR HALDAR

The world of twenty-first century is the world of crisis. Injustice, harassment, anger, violence are very common to our day to day life. Terrorism is the most important news item of newspaper, magazine, television, web-log etc. Human society, from the primitive Stone Age has reached the diplomatic world of today and occurrences of violence increase rapidly. We find everywhere social integration is hampered. As a result human welfare is at stake. The root cause of this undesirable violence is the absence of tolerance in admitting multiplicity in terms of race, caste, creed or religion and so on. So it can be said that if we can eradicate such feelings from the core of human mind, the occurrence of such unwanted cause can at least be restricted. Now, the question arises how to remove such feeling from human beings and how a human being's existence be justified in the society by performing good deeds or activities.

In Indian tradition it has been acclaimed that the assumption of birth as a human race is rare and it also depends on an individual's results of actions performed in this birth or in earlier birth. Such a birth would become in vain if he does not utilize his existence as a human being. Generally, a question may be raised: how and when does an individual think his existence justified in our society? The concept of existence is otherwise called *Sat* in Indian tradition. This concept has been interpreted in various ways in Indian tradition. Therefore, it depends on the nature of Reality realized by an individual and hence the subjective elements in understanding the same cannot be ruled out. It will be shown in the following pages that the Reality is of different types as realized by different individuals. The Reality realized by the Buddhists is

* Some portions of this paper have taken from my PhD dissertation, for which I am thankful to my supervisor Prof. Raghunath Ghosh.

different from that of the Jainas and *Advaitins* and hence, the concept of being is also changing.

It has already been said that the notion of being is, to some extent, subjective to an individual, which is evidenced from the following facts. To a section of people this justification of existence lies in the realization of self. It is said in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* that the thing, which cannot provide us Immortality, is taken to be non-existent one (*yenāhanāmnamṛtamsyāmtenāhamkimkuryāma*). The same picture is also found in the *Kathopaniṣad* where Nachiketā did not find justification of his existence in mere enjoyment of wealth etc. and hence to him self-realization alone justifies of his existence.

Again, the Jainas believe that the Reality is of the probable form (*syāt*). To them the term *syāt* is used in such context in the sense of relativity and their theory '*syādvāda*' may be translated as the theory of relativity. Reality or *sattā* has its infinite dimensions that are all relative and some of them are capable of being known. All the sentences depicting Reality are necessarily relative, conditional and limited. This is not self-contradictory on account of the fact that the real nature of Reality is indeterminate and complex and hence affirmation and negation of an object may be from a different standpoint. The absolute statement about the nature of Reality is erroneous. To them Reality is infinitely complex (*anantadharmātmakamvastu*) and it can allow all opposite predicates from different standpoints. It is real as well as unreal (*sadasadātmakam*). If it is viewed from the substance, it is real, universal, permanent and one. If it is viewed from a different mode, it is unreal, particular, momentary and many. The Jainas are in favour of quoting the story of the six blind men and the elephant. The man who touched the ear of the animal described elephant as a country-made fan. In the same way, the man touching the leg describes the same as a pillar. Another person who had realized only the trunk described it as a python etc. All the six persons were quarrelling among themselves regarding the real nature of an elephant, but a

person is noticing the parts of the elephant considering it as a whole. All philosophical differences are based on mistaking a partial truth as the whole truth.

Such type of Reality has also been admitted by the *Mādhyamikas* who think that the Reality is *śūnya* in nature i.e., indescribable (*avācya* or *anabhilāpya*) as it is beyond the purview of four categories of intellect (*catuṣkoṭivinirmukta*). It is Reality, which goes beyond existence, non-existence, both and neither. From the phenomenal point of view it means relativity (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and from the absolute point of view it means Reality (*tattva*). The Reality is indescribable because it is neither existent nor non-existent; the Absolute is indescribable because it is transcendental and no categories of intellect can be adequately describing it.

From the above standpoint it can be said that the Being or Reality is not of one type and hence it can be of any type depending on the ontological and metaphysical presuppositions of the believers. By way of rounding off the concept an effort has been made to show that some social and ethical background prevails behind the formulation of this concept. The same social and moral idea remains in the concept of *sat* as propagated by the Buddhists, *Naiyāyikas* etc. though it is not openly written or discussed in their philosophical or commentarial literature. Here an attempt is being made to throw some light on this aspect which seems to be apparently novel with the help of some arguments. In this connection different meanings of the term *sat* have been highlighted. It has also been pointed out that these meanings have some bearing social harmony and peace. In other words, the concept of *sat* is used in Indian tradition in the sense of *justified existence* as mentioned earlier.

Let us seek to clarify the concept of *sattā* from the Indian ethical point of view. An individual having *sattva* element may also be called *sat* in as much as the term '*sattva*' is derived from '*sat*' and hence, a balanced person can also be described in terms of *sat* as he possesses the balanced quality i.e., *sattva*. Let us try to understand the literal meaning of the term '*sat*'. The literal

meaning of it is 'existence' or 'that which exists'. One who is existent is called *sat*. It may be argued that each and every living being is existent and hence all the entire existent persons should be described as *sat* leading the non-availability of the negation of it. In reply, it can be said that a man who exists physically is not taken as *sat*, but a man who has justified his existence is called *sat*. If a man does not perform any work, good or bad, he is not at all known to others and hence his existence is not known to others or his existence is not justified in the sense that he has not made his existence *meaningful*. If a man is known to all and has made his existence meaningful by way of performing many social works, he is called *sat* or existent. Thus, a man may be remembered due to some actions having some positive value in the society is called as *sat* (existence). This *sattva* or *sattā* (existence) does not mean a man's mere physical existence.

It may be argued that a man may prove his existence negatively or positively. In other words, one may think to prove one's existence after performing many antisocial and immoral works. In this case can he be taken as *sat*? In reply it may be said such persons are negatively famous or negatively prove their 'existence' and hence, their existence should be denied for which they should be regarded as *asat*. A man may be remembered due to some actions having some positive value in the society or he may be so due to some works having negative value in the society. The former is *sat* while the latter is *asat*.

It follows from the above discussion that through the performance of various duties in various spheres of his (towards our family member, social member etc.) by way of performing good works like social welfare, service of mankind etc. our existence is justified and hence we are called *sat* who is otherwise known as honest. Let us try to understand the term '*satatā*', the Sanskrit-rendering of the term 'honesty', which is originated from the term '*sat*'. If my relative gives me an object for my use, it would be my sacred duty to enjoy the use of it in order to show honour to him and to his faith on me, but

not to destroy it. If I destroy the object without using, it is also a kind of dishonesty. In the like manner, our valuable 'existence' which we have got through natural courses should be made justified, failing which we may be charged as dishonest (*asat*) due to the misuses of our valuable property i.e. existence.

The Buddhists, I think, also believed in this concept of sat. They admit that an object is to be understood as sat if it has got some casual efficacy (*arthakriyākāritvam*). In other words, an object is sat if it has capacity to serve our purpose and to fulfil any action. On the other hand, the object which does not serve our purpose is called *asat*. The jar, pot etc. would come under the first category (i.e. sat) as they have got the above-mentioned capacity. The hare's horn etc. is called *asat* as they do not have such capacity.¹ I believe that this doctrine which is applicable to this epistemic world can be extending to other places. In other words, behind the formulation of the definition of sat or *asat* and coinage of the terms sat etc. there is functioning some idea related to social welfare and sense of morality, which needs some focus here. These Buddhist notions of sat may also cover an individual who is described as sat in the sense mentioned above. A man may be described as sat or *asat* after keeping his *arthakriyākāritva* by way of doing social welfare, adopting *maitrī* and *karuṇā* etc. or *anarthakriyākāritva* respectively in view. Just as an object having causal efficacy in the positive sense is sat in the true sense of the term. On the other hand, our existence which is not endowed with such causal efficacy or which is endowed with causal efficacy in the negative sense is called *asat*. Hence *sattā* or *asattā* of an object or of us is determined in terms of causal efficacy or non-efficacy respectively. To the Buddhists the human body is nothing but an object. As it is a body of human being, the *sattā* of it is determined in terms of causal efficacy connected with human value or social value, which leads him to the path of *maitrī* and *karuṇā*. Hence, the causal efficacy of human being is different, which is not expressed in an explicit way in Buddhists literature. The same idea can be traced when they described sat as

svalakṣaṇa or unique. Just as the causal efficacy of water lies in the object itself, but not in the word ‘water’, the causal efficacy lies in human being, but not in the name, race or caste etc. possessed by him. From this it is understood that an individual has to prove himself as *sat* by his own causal efficacy in the form of good works, but not through his name, race, caste etc.² Hence, the Buddhists have coined the term *kalpanā* in order to refer to this name, race etc. They have preferred to mention them as *kalpanā* or imagination on account of the fact that they have no value in proving a man *sat*. A man having unique character and free from imaginary attributes is self-luminous. A man is *svaprakāśā* and hence, he does not need to mention his name, father’s name, race etc. to make him famous or *sat*. If a person without doing any work related to the welfare of society claims himself as *sat* due to having his high post or high family etc. he is not taken as *sat*. In other words, a man who is self-luminous through his own auspicious deeds is *sat*. The view has found its echo in the religious poem composed by Kabir, which runs like this: “*Vaḍāhuyā to kyāhuyā jaisevaḍikhejur/ Pānthakochāyānāhi phallāge atidūr*”³

That is, what is use of being born in a high family? Just as big date-palm tree has no significance to the society in as much as it does not provide the travellers with shadow and the fruits exist in such a high place that they cannot be plucked by the social beings, a man born in a high society or having high education etc. is insignificant to the society if he does not engage himself in auspicious works like social welfare etc. From this it is known that a man proves himself really existent by way of doing such good works, but not through his birth in high family or race etc. In this situation an individual can maintain harmony between his own welfare and that of social members and thereby he becomes *sat*.

The same idea has been expressed by Bhartṛhari in the *śloka* of *Nītiśataka*, which runs as follows:

“Eke satpuruṣāḥparārthagatakāh Svārthānparityajya ye/
Sāmānyāstuparārthamudyamabhṛtā Svārthā-virodhena ye,
Temīmānavarākṣakāḥparahitam Svārthāyanighnanti ye
Ye tughnantinirarthakam Parahitamtekena jānīmahe”//4

i.e. “There are some *satpuruṣas*, good people, who engage themselves in the good of others sacrificing their own self-interest; the *Sāmānyas*, the generality of people, on the other hand, are those who engage themselves in the good of others so long as it does not involve the sacrifice of their own self-interest. There are those others, the *Mānavarākṣakas*, a devilish man, who sacrifice the good of others to gain their own selfish ends; but alas, what am I to say of those who sacrifice the good of others without gaining thereby any good to themselves or to anyone else.”⁵

The *satpuruṣa* or good men have got their overwhelming goodness which is not at all vitiated by their selfish motive and hence they become glorified or they have glorified their existence. If they would engage themselves to serve their own self-interest without paying any heed to the welfare of others, they are not *sat*.

On the other hand, the people ‘who destroy others’ welfare in order to have more pleasure or comfort in their own lives are called *Mānavarākṣasas*, the devilish men or *asuras*. At this stage an individual tries to develop or satisfy his biological or physical needs, but fails to develop his morality though he has so called proper education. Due to lack of moral education a man dares to adopt unfair means in order to fulfil his own interest. Here self-interest is fulfilled sometimes at the cost of others’ life. Hence, this type of people is known as devil in the form of man. The person having this devilish attitude (*asuratva*) is called as ‘anti-social’ who fails to maintain harmony with the society or social needs. But this type of man can be transformed to *sattā* from the world of *asuratva*, the devilish attitude.

It is true that at present day society the melody is complete by lost due to having this devilish attitude in man and it can be regained if this attitude is removed. *Satpuruṣās* can be brought again. For this our nation’s moral health is to be improved. Swami Ranganathananda observes: “The moral health of

the nation entirely depends upon this immense group. Steadying itself by drawing inspiration from the small minority of the *satpuruṣa* group above it....the self- criticism which is evident in our nation today, and which is a sure sign of the basic health of our society will slowly generate the necessary moral forces to cure the nation of its present ailments. The ailment is a moral ailment and the remedy has to be a moral remedy. We all desire that our nation should be healthy; physically as well as mentally....Cynicism, self-centredness and utter unconcern for others are more deadly than the most deadly physical diseases and viruses that cause them; for they corrode the nation's resolve to be free, to be united and to march onward to progress. We cannot be blind to the fact that this disease has already invaded our body-political, including our youths. We have to take energetic measures to arrest the further progress of this disease and to eliminate it from the body politic. And the nation has to be alert thereafter to see that these deadly mental viruses do not invade our society again".⁶

The *Vedānta* philosophy can provide us some solution to such problem. It offers a wonderful idea to life and world and it teaches us "Oneness". It shows that diversity remains only in name and forms but not in actual Reality. Reality is one. This message of unity in the midst of diversity is very essential to have happy society without hatred, anger, violence and full of fellow feeling. According to Shankara, One and Absolute, i.e. *Brahman*, appears as many as the world. Due to the ignorance we cannot realize it. Whenever we overcome this ignorance, we can realize that this Absolute is imminent in all being and the world with its diversity vanishes. But this knowledge or realization of Absolute as Shankara told is not for all. Although the teachings of Oneness are very effective for social integration, classical *Vedānta* being abstract failed to attract ordinary people and to achieve such. Swami Vivekananda, a follower of *Vedānta*, brings a light on it the abstract living and a matter of strengthening everyday life. In his *Practical Vedānta* his abstract ideal offered the message of divinity of man, harmony of religious

and the unity and solidarity of humanity. His idea of “universal religion” is rooted in *Vedānta*. This idea of universal religion has been formed from the life and the teaching of his Master Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa. Sri Ramakrishna realised the harmony of all religion and the truth of essential unity of man’s spiritual life. Vivekananda spread this view and tried to train men about religious tolerance which may lead to broader mind to accept all religions as all religion make their way to same goal.

The Buddhists theory of being can again be substantiated in terms of its causal efficacy in the subsequent manner. A section of the Botanists believe and justify that each and every plant is medicinal on account of the fact that all the plants including the negligible ones have got some medicinal value. To them some plants may seem to be redundant so far as their causal efficacy is concerned at very outset. But ultimately they will prove their causal efficacy so far as their medicinal value is concerned. From this theory a decision can be taken that they have got places in the lap of Nature because they have some utility or causal efficacy either in the protection in the environment or in the protection of human beings. From that fact of their existence from the time immemorial it can be presumed that they have some contribution for the sustenance of this earth. Now-a-days the Zoologists also have properly realized the importance of the animals and insects for the protection of the environment. We now often come across with various Government organizations and projects like tiger project, crocodile project, etc. to save our assets in the forest (*banajasampad*). In fact, in lap of Nature nothing can be redundant. Had it been so, it would have been destroyed absolutely without keeping any trace in the earth or keeping any chance of their survival. Hence by the fact of their existence from a longer period of time it may easily be presumed or inferred that they have got causal efficacy for the protection of the environment and human being, which again reminds me the Buddhist phrase- *Arthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇam sat*.

Society is a process but not a product, a becoming and not a being. A social structure is sustained by moral law. A man's truly moral life would be a social life. Society is the field for the realization of the ultimate end. Thus, social order alone could bring the good of man, society and universe. In society, everyone has to offer his service directed to the welfare to the others. In terms of their welfare acts, all and an individual attempts to bring social reform. Since, social order is based on ethical values. Thus, society is the laboratory for moral and spiritual development of man. Whereas man is not to end as man, he is potentially and essentially divine and this divinity is to be realized by living a value-oriented life. The concept of value is in consonance with the inner ethos of Indian tradition, but it gives a new meaning to it. Thus, the practice of value gives us depth, power and purpose to experience.

Again, some moral principles can be applied in our daily life for the fulfilment of our needs and for the enrichment of our lives. These principles, if we practiced and implemented properly, can give rise to peace and harmony in society and can provide the younger generations with self-confidence, patience, universal-brotherhood, equality, freedom, courage, vigour strength and a broader outlook. Thus, a new model of revolutionary society is to consist of the goal of qualitatively better society and a peaceful world social order where welfare of all will be concerned of all and social norms shall prevail. It is the only revolutionary model that will help the world to protect of our environment and to obtain sustainable development, the only one that will bring about a peaceful world which will be governed by the norms and values and by a moral man and will be characterized qualitatively superior humane, social relationship. But, it will demand sacrifices and inner changes on the part of many of the people of the society.

From the above standpoints, I personally think in accordance with the Indian ethical standard as well as a human being, each and every human being that they should justify their existence by way of doing some good works or welfare acts, self-sacrifice to others by way of good superiority, they should be

broader in heart and attitude. So they can provide peace, solace and well-being to others. Thus, the people can remember them after their demise.

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JUSTIFYING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE*

BHASWATI DE

Debates about the ethics of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide date from ancient Greece and Rome. When it emerged into public consciousness in the mid-1970s, the debate got off to a rousing start, as philosophers, doctors, theologians, public-policy theorists, journalists, social advocates, and private citizens become embroiled in the debate. On the one side were liberals, who thought physician-assisted suicide and perhaps voluntary active euthanasia were ethically acceptable and should be legal; on the other side were conservatives, who believed assisted dying was immoral or dangerous to legalize as a matter of public policy.

In ancient Greece and Rome, euthanasia was an everyday reality where many people preferred voluntary death to endless agony. The emergence of this issue reflects a basic shift in the epidemiology of human morality, a shift away from death due to parasitic and infectious disease to death in later life of degenerative disease - especially heart disease and cancer, which now together account for almost two-thirds of deaths in the developed countries. In the earlier periods of human history, physicians could do little to stave off death; now, improvements in public sanitation, the development of immunization, the development of antibiotics, and the many technologies of modern medicine have combined to lengthen the human lifespan, particularly in the developed world. For much of human history, life expectancy hovered between 20 and 40; in the development countries, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is nearing 80 and, unless infectious disease becomes more prevalent again, is expected to increase. The result is that, in the developed world, with its sophisticated health-care system, the majority of the population in these countries dies at comparatively advanced ages of degenerative diseases with characteristically long downhill courses, marked by terminal phase of dying.

* This paper is a subsection of my doctoral dissertation for which I am obliged to my supervisor Dr. Debika Saha.

On average, people die at older ages and in slower, far more predictable ways, and it is this new situation in the history of the world that gives rise to the assisted-dying issues to be explored here.

This widespread acceptance was challenged by the minority of physicians who were part of the Hippocratic School. The ascent of Christianity reinforced the Hippocratic position on euthanasia and culminated in the consistent opposition to euthanasia among physicians. The proposals for euthanasia revived in the 19th century with the revolution in the use of anesthesia. In 1870, Samuel Williams first proposed using anesthetics and morphine to intentionally end a patient's life. Publication of Williams's euthanasia proposal prompted much discussion within the medical profession. By the 1890s, the euthanasia debate has expanded beyond the medical profession to include lawyers and social scientists. Probably the most notable event occurred in 1906 with introduction of Ohio bill to legalize euthanasia, a bill that was ultimately defeated. Two more Parliamentary bills were introduced; this time in Britain in 1936 and 1969. They never sparked widespread public discussion or concern in the medical profession. The euthanasia issue was like a recurring decimal with periodic reappearances. With the increasing acceptance of patient autonomy and the right-to-die in the United States, the euthanasia debate has once again become a matter of public concern.

Physician-assisted suicide (PAS) generally refers to a practice in which the physician provides a patient with a lethal dose of medication, upon the patient's request, which the patient intends to use to end his or her own life. The patient, not the physician, will ultimately administer the lethal medication. Some other practices that should be distinguished from PAS are as follows:

1. **Terminal sedation:** This refers to the practice of sedating a terminally ill competent patient to the point of unconsciousness, then allowing the patient to die of her disease, starvation, or dehydration.

2. **Withholding/withdrawing life-sustaining treatments:** When a competent patient makes an informed decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment, there is virtual unanimity in state law and in the medical profession that this wish should be respected.
3. **Pain medication that may hasten death:** Often a terminally ill, suffering patient may require dosages of pain medication that impair respiration or have other effects that may hasten death. It is generally held by most professional societies, and supported in court decisions, that this is justifiable so long as the primary intent is to relieve suffering.

The debate over euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide pits arguments about autonomy and about relief of pain and suffering on the 'support side', versus arguments about the intrinsic wrongness of killing, threats to the integrity of the medical profession, and potentially damaging social effects on the 'against' side.

Principal Arguments in Favor of Physician- assisted suicide:

The Argument from Autonomy: Decisions about time and circumstances death are very personal. Competent person should have right to choose death.

Justice: Justice requires that we "treat like cases alike." Competent, terminally ill patients are allowed to hasten death by treatment refusal. For some patients, treatment refusal will not suffice to hasten death; only option is suicide. Justice requires that we should allow assisted death for these patients.

The Argument from Relief of Pain and Suffering: Suffering means more than pain; there are other physical and psychological burdens. It is not always possible to relieve suffering. Thus PAS may be a compassionate response to unbearable suffering.

Individual liberty vs. state interest: Though society has strong interest in preserving life, that interest lessens when person is terminally ill and has strong desire to end life. A complete prohibition on assisted death excessively limits personal liberty. Therefore PAS should be allowed in certain cases.

Openness of discussion: Some would argue that assisted death already occurs, albeit in secret. For example, morphine drips ostensibly used for pain relief may be a covert form of assisted death or euthanasia. That PAS is illegal prevents open discussion, in which patients and physicians could engage. Legalization of PAS would promote open discussion.

Others have argued that PAS is unethical often these opponents argue that PAS runs directly counter to the traditional duty of the physician to preserve life. Furthermore, many argue if PAS were legal, abuses would take place. For instance, the poor or elderly might be covertly pressured to choose PAS over more complex and expensive palliative care options.

Principal Arguments Against of Physician- assisted suicide:

Sanctity of life: This argument points out strong religious and secular traditions against taking human life. It is argued that assisted suicide is morally wrong because it contradicts these beliefs.

The argument from potential abuse: the slippery-slope argument: Here the argument is that certain groups of people, lacking access to care and support, may be pushed into assisted death. Furthermore, assisted death may become a cost-containment strategy. Burdened family members and health care providers may encourage option of assisted death. To protect against these abuses, it is argued, PAS should remain illegal.

Passive vs. Active distinction: The argument here holds that there is an important difference between passively "letting die" and actively "killing." It is argued that treatment refusal or withholding treatment equates to letting die (passive) and is justifiable, whereas PAS equates to killing (active) and is not justifiable.

The argument from the integrity of the profession: Here opponents point to the historical ethical traditions of medicine, strongly opposed to taking life. For instance, the Hippocratic Oath states, "I will not administer poison to anyone where asked," and "Be of benefit, or at least do no harm." Furthermore, major professional groups (AMA, AGS) oppose assisted death. The overall concern

is that linking PAS to the practice of medicine could harm the public's image of the profession.

Fallibility of the profession: The concern raised here is that physicians will make mistakes. For instance there may be uncertainty in diagnosis and prognosis. There may be errors in diagnosis and treatment of depression, or inadequate treatment of pain. Thus the State has an obligation to protect lives from these inevitable mistakes.

Moral and legal framework of the physician:

Physicians vary in their moral beliefs and actions regarding PAS. A non-judgmental stance should be taken despite complex legal and moral issues. In a questionnaire-based study conducted on 2761 physicians, 60% agreed that PAS should be legal in some cases. However, only 46% were willing, if PAS were legal, to prescribe lethal medication. 31% were unwilling to prescribe for moral reasons even if PAS would have been legal. 7% reported having written a prescription knowing that the patient intended to use it to take his/her own life. Some physicians provide lethal prescriptions to terminally ill patients even in jurisdictions where the practice is illegal.

Oregon is the only state in US to have legalized PAS and not euthanasia, and that too under certain circumstances in 1997. There is no moral or legal obligation for physicians to comply with a patient's request for PAS even in Oregon. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODDA) applies only to people who have reached the age of majority (legal age) and have been diagnosed as being terminally ill. It offers the successful applicant assisted suicide; a doctor gives the patient a prescription for a fatal dose of barbiturates that the patient can take. This state legislation has received nod of the Supreme Court of United States opening the door to many more such laws across the United States for ending the lives of the terminally ill. In a 6-3 vote, justices ruled that a federal drug law could not be used to prosecute Oregon doctors who prescribed overdoses intended to facilitate the deaths of terminally ill patients. In Netherlands PAS and euthanasia have been practiced openly for

approximately 20 years. These practices have been codified into law and formal guidelines have been established in 2001.

In the U.S. about doctor-assisted suicide has gradually increased. The question of whether or not a physician should be able to assist in the planned death of a fatally sick person has been argued by many different sides. Assisted suicide advocates, such as Right to Die organizations, argue that human beings that are terminally ill should have the right to end their suffering and die with dignity. For others who oppose euthanasia, fear of a “slippery slope”, which involve predictive empirical issues about possible future abuse. The issue of assisted death is widely acknowledged throughout the world.

Is physician-assisted suicide ethical?

Killing is understood as morally wrong in virtually all cultures and religious systems. Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and many other religious traditions prohibit killing; so do the moral and legal codes of virtually all social systems. Since suicide is a form of killing, this argument observes, suicide- and with it assisted suicide- is wrong (‘sinful’, ‘taboo’, ‘reviled by God’, and so on) as well.

We know that the ethics of PAS continue to be debated. Some argue that PAS is ethical. Often this is argued on the grounds that PAS may be a rational choice for a person who is choosing to die to escape unbearable suffering. Furthermore, the physician's duty to alleviate suffering may, at times, justify the act of providing assistance with suicide. These arguments rely a great deal on the notion of individual autonomy, recognizing the right of competent people to choose for themselves the course of their life, including how it will end.

Surveys of individual physicians show that half believe that PAS is ethically justifiable in certain cases. However, professional organizations such as the American Medical Association have generally argued against PAS on the grounds that it undermines the integrity of the profession. Surveys of physicians in practice show that about 1 in 5 will receive a request for PAS

sometime in their career. Somewhere between 5-20% of those requests are eventually honored.

It is important to recognize that euthanasia is not a new concept to medical profession. There is a need to understand and analyze the arguments and counter arguments given for euthanasia so that formal guidelines can be worked out regarding this vital issue, for the primary goal of all the medical practitioners is to infuse control in all patients to live gracefully and to die peacefully.

Surveys of patients and members of the general public find that the vast majority think that PAS is ethically justifiable in certain cases, most often those cases involving unrelenting suffering. If a patient's request for aid-in-dying persists, each individual clinician must decide his or her own position and choose a course of action that is ethically justifiable. Careful reflection ahead of time can prepare one to openly discuss your position with the patient, acknowledging and respecting difference of opinion when it occurs. Organizations exist which can provide counseling and guidance for terminally ill patients. No physician, however, should feel forced to supply assistance if he or she is morally opposed to PAS.

Nevertheless, there are some issues that would make the debate of assisted-dying far more open to resolution. First, the debate needs to enlarge the range within which it is conducted. This involves expanding the scope of the issue or issues that are seen as central beyond slippery-slope concerns to the positive case that is offered for accepting and legalizing physician-assisted suicide. There are basic philosophical issues here about autonomy and self-determination, freedom and control, about the moral issues in suicide: these need direct scrutiny.

The benefits of polarized, *for-and-against* discussion have now been largely gained in ongoing argument about assisted dying; it is time to turn to exploring the possibilities for resolution. Advance personal policy making together with public policy that recognizes a default-with-other-options may

be only one of these, though it is true, that it is a promising combination for both theory and practice. Certainly, there may be other fruitful avenues for exploration, but it is high time to turn to the consideration of such possibilities. After all the majority of people in developed countries will die the kinds of death from diseases with long terminal courses in which these issues arise, and it is crucial to find way of resolving the debates. If these debates continue to fuel public polarization and political controversy, it could make all our deaths worse; if resolution can be found, that would be a gain for us all.

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A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE*

NABANITA BHOWAL

I

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was historic in many important respects. It has made seminal contributions in the post-Kantian era. The critical philosophy that he espoused there, has been influencing philosophical discourse since 1781 onwards. In the Introduction of that book Kant asserts that we are in possession of certain modes of *a priori* knowledge. Actually there he talks about four sorts of judgements or knowledge: *a priori*, *a posteriori*, analytic and synthetic. In order to clarify the nature of these judgements he contrasted *a priori* with *a posteriori* knowledge and analytic judgement with synthetic one. The necessity of explanations of these judgements was caused by his indomitable desire to show the possibility of a particular combination of judgements which his predecessors mostly considered impossible. The combination was between synthetic judgements and *a priori* judgements. In brief Kant wanted to demonstrate how synthetic *a priori* judgements are possible. The detailed explanation of various sorts of judgements in the Introduction paved the way for his demonstration.

However, we should not presume that Kant was the first philosopher to talk about *a priori* knowledge in philosophy. The concept of *a priori* was, of course, in philosophy even before Kant. In a number of philosophers' writings before Kant the notions of *a priori* and *a posteriori* was used, though of course without mentioning these terms. Like many issues in philosophy we can trace the mention of these sorts of knowledge in ancient Greek philosophy. For example, in the dialogue *Meno* (380 B. C.) where Plato talks about theory of recollection we find the hint of a knowledge which is akin to *a priori* knowledge. Again Aristotle in his *Posterior Analytics* draws our attention to this sort of knowledge. Leibniz also drew our attention by distinguishing between truths of reason and truths of fact. And Hume, who woke up Kant

* This paper is a subsection of my doctoral dissertation for which I am grateful to my supervisor Prof. Jyotish Chandra Basak.

from his dogmatic slumber, as Kant said, distinguished between relations of ideas and matters of fact. All these may be regarded as precursors of the aforesaid Kantian distinction. However, this should not give us impression that Kant was merely harping on the points that his predecessors spoke of by using different expressions. Kant's contribution was that he brought the concept to the forefront of discussion and gave prominence and clarity to it. Introducing the concept (i.e. the concept of *a priori*) in the Introduction he contrasted it with the *a posterior* knowledge. While the two terms referred traditionally to forms of demonstration and also to the kind of knowledge gained in those demonstration, Kant extended their range beyond kinds of knowledge first to judgements and then to the very elements of knowledge.

There are writers who opine that the distinction drawn between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge is epistemological as it contrasts two kinds of *knowledge*. Some even go to the extent of saying that the distinction connotes two kinds of epistemic justification, the sort of justification appropriate to knowledge.

II

The expressions '*a priori*' and '*a posteriori*' are basically of Latin origin. These literally mean 'from what comes before' and 'from what comes later'. In the Introduction of the First *Critique* we find that Kant does not discuss at length the nature of *a posterior* knowledge. This shows that *a posterior* knowledge did not pose any big problem to Kant. Discussion at length the nature of *a priori* knowledge makes us think that it was his focal point. He defined *a priori* knowledge thus

Knowledge that is... independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses... is entitled *a priori*, and distinguished from the empirical, which has its sources *a posterior*, that is, in experience.

The term 'independent' figured in the above definition is important. In saying that something is known independently of experience, it was not intended that we could have known it even if we had never had any experience. In fact, experience is a prerequisite for any sort of knowledge including *a priori*

knowledge. First of all, if we do not have any experience, our cognitive faculties would never have developed to the point that we could entertain any proposition at all. The intent is that once our faculties are ready to take part in the process of cognition and are functioning properly, there are some propositions that we can know to be true without any further need of experience. Again, some of component concepts in a given proposition are concepts that can only be acquired through experience, e.g., the concept of 'event', 'red', etc.. In such cases experience would be necessary for us to grasp the proposition. But once we have framed it in our consciousness, we may be able to ascertain that it is true without any further aid from experience. This point can further be explained by taking the help of recent analysis of knowledge. It has been claimed that someone knows a proposition only if:

- He believes it,
- It is true, and
- He is adequately justified in believing it.

Experience may be necessary for the obtaining of belief condition, i.e. condition (i) of knowledge. But experience is not necessary in a given case for the obtaining of justification condition, i.e. condition (iii). Without this the knowledge will still qualify as *a priori*. Frege, in his *Foundations of Arithmetic*, also explain the concept of *a priori* in the same way. He there writes that *a priori* judgement is not a judgement about the conditions, psychological, physiological, and physical, which have made it possible for us to form the content of the proposition in our consciousness, nor is it a judgement about the way in which some other man has come... to believe it to be true;...it is a judgement about the ultimate ground upon which rests the justification for holding it to be true.¹

In the Introduction Kant asserts that all our knowledge begins with experience, but does not arise necessarily out of it. A close reading makes it

¹Gottlob Frege, *The Foundation of Arithmetic*, translated by J. L. Austin, Evanston, Ill.: North Western University Press, 1980, p. 3.

evident that, for Kant, all knowledge begins with experience since unless the senses stimulate the faculty of knowledge into action, knowledge in the sense of knowledge of *objects* cannot arise. Thus we can say that experience is the occasioning cause of our knowledge, as we have shown in a previous paragraph. When it is said that *a priori* knowledge is prior it actually means that it provides the principle of possibility of all our knowledge and also its principle of possibility is not dependent on experience.

In order to make crystal clear the concept of *a priori*, Kant distinguishes between relatively *a priori* knowledge and absolutely *a priori* knowledge. For Kant relatively *a priori* knowledge is not *a priori* proper. It is not so as it ultimately depends, directly or indirectly, on experience. He gives an instance to prove his point: 'This house will fall down if its support is withdrawn'. This is a relatively *a priori* judgement because though it is not based on the observation of the actual fall of the house, still it is deducible from an empirical general rule 'All material bodies fall down when their supports are withdrawn' along with the statement that this house is a material body. *A priori* knowledge is absolutely independent of experience in the sense that it is neither immediately based on sense observations nor mediately based on experience by way of being either an empirical generalization or deducible conclusion from an empirical generalization.

Kant also makes distinction between pure and non-pure *a priori* knowledge. An *a priori* knowledge is pure if it does not contain an element of empirical knowledge. To put it otherwise, an *a priori* knowledge is pure if the judgement as a whole is *a priori* and all its constituent concepts are *a priori*. It may happen that a judgement as a whole is *a priori* but at least one of its concepts is empirical. Such judgement has been given the name non-pure *a priori* judgement, e.g., 'Every event has a cause', the concept of 'event' being empirical. Some commentators, however, (e.g. Korner) are of the opinion that an *a priori* judgement consists of *a priori* concepts and an *a posteriori* judgement consists of *a posteriori* concepts. However, this interpretation is not

defensible. For Kant, a judgement consisting of *a posteriori* concepts may yet be *a priori*, though, of course, non-pure *a priori*. To prove this point we can give the example 'All red flowers are red' is *a priori*, being analytic, although both its subject and its predicate concepts are *a priori*. Thus, we can say that whether a judgement is *a priori* or *a posteriori* does not depend on the nature of its constituent concept. Kant argues in various ways that they (*a priori* knowledge) are not only independent of experience, but also even the conditions of experience.

Kant gives us two criteria of *a priori* knowledge: necessity and strict universality. In the ultimate analysis it appears that both the criteria are different sides of the same coin. By necessity Kant means the impossibility of the opposite. Kant distinguishes between two senses of impossibility - logical and transcendental. A proposition is logically impossible if it is self-contradictory, i.e. one which either involves or can be shown by analysis to involve an explicit concept of contradiction. A logically possible proposition is transcendently impossible if the state of affairs projected by it is unconstructible, i.e. incapable of exhibition in intuition (in space and time). For example, the proposition 'All bodies are extended' is necessary, because its opposition (contradiction) - viz, 'some bodies are not extended' - is the self-contradictory, being reducible to the contradiction 'Some extended substances are not extended'. However, the proposition 'Two straight lines cannot enclose a space' is necessary, as its opposite - 'Two straight lines can sometimes enclose a space' - is, though logically possible, yet transcendently impossible, in so far as the two-sided figures projected by it is not constructible, i. e., not in principle capable of exhibition in the intuition of space. Thus it can safely be said that for Kant a necessary proposition is one of which the opposite (contradictory) is either self-contradictory or unconstructible (i. e. counter-intuitive). Further deliberation will make it clear that a proposition which is necessary in the first sense is analytic, while a proposition which is necessary in the second sense is synthetically necessary. In this connection it will not be

out of place to state that, for Kant, *a priori* proposition is necessary in a wider sense than the one in which a merely analytic proposition is necessary.

Another important criterion is the universality. By universality is meant universal validity - validity under all possible circumstances. A true universal proposition in this sense does not admit of the possibility of an exception. For example, we cannot conceive of the possibility of an exception to the truth expressed by the proposition '7+5=12'. Universality in this sense should not be confused with universal quantification. These two should not be confused as same as not all universally quantified propositions are universal in this sense. For example, 'All swans are white' is universally quantified, but is not universal in this sense as it admits of the possibility of an exception. Moreover, a universal proposition in the Kantian sense may or may not contain a universal quantifier, e.g. '7+5=12'.

It may well be said that universality need not be a sign of *a priori* because it can well be explained empirically through induction. In order to ward off this confusion Kant distinguishes between comparative and strict universality. Inductive universality is only comparative, and not a strict one. An inductive generalization expresses a rule to which no exception has been found so far, but to which an exception is nevertheless allowed as possible. There is a conceivable circumstance in which it is possibly false. Hence it is not strictly universal. Strict universality consists in excluding the possibility of an exception and it is this feature which cannot be explained by induction. It is this sort of universality that Kant ascribes to *a priori* knowledge. Strict universality by virtue of its strictness is already a form of necessity.

A close study reveals that the purity of *a priori* knowledge is known by way of abstraction. For example, *a priori* forms of intuition - space and time - are discovered by abstracting from experience everything which the understanding thinks through its concepts thus isolating sensibility and then separating off everything which belongs to sensation, so that nothing may remain except pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is all

that sensibility can supply *a priori*. The same is equally true for the *a priori* concepts, categories, which are the *a priori* conditions upon which the possibility of experience rests. These remain as underlying grounds when everything empirical is abstracted from appearances. Establishing the purity of *a priori* principles, however, itself requires a criterion as otherwise it will be impossible to ascertain when the process of abstraction has reached its terminus in the *a priori*. The criteria of universality and necessity are used to registrar the arrival at an *a priori* judgement or element. If this intuition or concept necessarily holds for every experience then it is *a priori*. Kant uses this argument on several occasions. From the analysis of *a priori* knowledge and judgements Kant moves quickly into the proofs for the existence of *a priori* principles. The first proof appeals to their necessary role in experience. In the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant asserts that it is possible to show that pure *a priori* principles are indispensible for the possibility of experience, and so prove their existence *a priori*. Otherwise how could experience derive its certainty, if all the rules, according to which it proceeds, were always themselves empirical, and therefore contingent, asks Kant. Here the purity of the *a priori* is used to support its universality and necessity.

III

Since the publication of the first *Critique* it was a common practice for philosophical circles to think that the notions - such as *a priori* -necessity, a posterior-contingency - coincide though they are not exactly synonymous. It was also believed that pairs such as - a priori - contingent and a posterior-necessary are not compatible or cannot go together. This common belief got a shock from the American philosopher Saul Kripke. Kripke in his *Naming and Necessity* tries to show that there is no reason to interlink these concepts. It is this issue that will be discussed in this section.

Kantian exposition of the concept of *a priori* judgement did not remain static. Rather it has raised several vital philosophical questions which were

addressed by his successors. From our preceding discussion of *a priori* knowledge it can be seen that this concept revolves around a three crucial distinctions: first, the epistemological distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge, second, the metaphysical distinction between necessity and contingency, and finally, the semantical distinction between analytic and synthetic truth. Moreover, some of the pertinent questions asked about *a priori* knowledge are: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for one's having *a priori* knowledge? Can we humans satisfy those conditions? Are every proposition knowable *a priori* are analytically as well as necessarily true? Can there be *a priori* knowledge of some synthetically true propositions or of some contingently true propositions? W. V. O. Quine's attack in his 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' has made the notion a bit more complicated and what is being asked now is whether the very notion of *a priori* knowledge is philosophically misguided.

In order to give clarity to the concept of *a priori* and to pave the ways for proving his overriding aim (how synthetic *a priori* judgements are possible?) Kant takes recourse to semantical, epistemological and metaphysical explanations: semantical distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, epistemological between *a priori* and *a posteriori* truths, and a metaphysical distinction between necessary and contingent truths. Since then it has become almost customary to equate *a priori* with necessity and *a posteriority* with contingency. This was taken for granted by philosophers. However, in the second half of the twentieth century Saul Kripke made an effort to break this myth. Contrary to Kant's claim Kripke shows that there are necessities which are very much *a posteriori* and also there are *a priori* contingent truths. Kripke argues the above mainly in his *Naming and Necessity* and in his essay 'Identity and necessity'. *Naming and Necessity* was a transcript of three lectures that Kripke delivered at Princeton University, U S A. It is mainly a critique of descriptivist theories of proper names which are

attributed to Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Descriptivist holds that proper names are cognized by virtue of their association with a description or cluster of descriptions. However, Kripke considered this view as a flawed one and advocated an alternative theory what he called causal theory of reference. Taking recourse to modal logic he tried to substantiate his claim that proper names are rigid designators. It is mainly in the third chapter of the book that he cracked the usually held association between necessity and a priority and contingency and a posteriority. Hilary Putnam in his "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" comments that since Kant there has been a split between philosophers who thought that all necessary truths were analytic whereas another group thought that some necessary truths were synthetic *a priori*. But none of these philosophers thought that a metaphysically necessary truth could fail to be *a priori*.² It is exactly here wherein the importance of Kripke's argument lies. In order to prove his points Kripke takes the help of Descriptivist theory of names, causal theory of reference, the notion of rigid designator, and modality. In the notion of modality we find the concept of possible worlds. Possible worlds are imagined worlds where we could think of ways how things could have been. It is understood and compared with actual world. Actual world is the world the way things actually are. The concept of possible worlds is used to explain modal notions like logical possibility, necessity and contingency.

Kripke's main aim was to remind that three notions - necessity, analyticity, and a priority - are conceptually distinct and that we should not use these three labels interchangeably. Kant has claimed that sense experience does not teach us that something could not have been otherwise. For Kripke this claim would have been plausible if it would have meant that sense experience by itself is not sufficient to teach us that something is necessary,

² Putnam, Hilary (1975). "The Meaning of 'Meaning'". *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 7: 131–193.

that some additional a priori element is required. While classifying knowledge of necessity as a priori, Kant in fact has assumed that experience is never required, apart from any a priori element, to teach us that something is necessary. It is here that Kripke disagrees with Kant. Kripke in his *Naming and Necessity* gives a number of examples of such a posterior necessities. Moreover, he is of the opinion that in addition to *a posteriori* truths that are necessary, there are also a priori truths that are contingent. The connection that Kripke accepts is that whatever is analytic is also *a priori* and *necessary*. On the other hand, *a posteriori* necessity or an a priori contingency will be synthetic. Let us see how Kripke shows this.

One of the examples given by Kripke about contingent a priori is case of 'meter'. Meter is held to designate rigidly a certain length, the reference-fixing specification being that it is to be the length of a certain bar that it had at a certain time *t*. For Kripke, it is a priori that the bar was one meter long at a particular time and at the same time it is also contingent on account of the fact that the temperature and hence the length of the bar could have been different what they were actually at that specified time. By this example Kripke underscores the conceptual distinctness between the categories of necessity and a priori.

In addition to above points Kripke shows in *Naming and Necessity* that there are *a posteriori* judgements. We need to keep in mind that Kripke's main concern in that book about naming. It is with reference to the above that he brings the issue of *a posteriori* necessity. He shows what is essential and what is accidental for individuals such as Hesperus or Aristotle. Next he takes examples of natural substances such as gold/water, then objects of natural kinds such as tigers or cats and ultimately instances of natural phenomena such as heat or light. In the 3rd lecture Kripke tries with a number of examples to prove that there are certain facts that are necessary though they are knowable *only* a posterior. It is a known fact that Aristotle taught Alexander. We can imagine, he says, a counterfactual situation or a possible world where

Aristotle need not have taught Alexander. Again, ‘Hydrogen is made of atoms containing one electron’ is an example of *a posteriori* necessity. This is a necessary proposition as hydrogen could not have a different atomic structure. Anything with a different atomic structure would not be hydrogen. And this fact is definitely known *a posteriori*. Physicists discovered this truth after a great number of detailed experiments and observations. Thus Kripke claims that the above statement is necessary as well as *a posteriori*. Another obvious example of *a posteriori* necessity is identity involving proper names; e. g. Marilyn Monroe is Norma Jeane Baker. This is also necessary as Marilyn Monroe could not have been Norma Jean Baker. This would require her somehow not to have been herself, which would be absurd. Again, the statement is not *a priori*. Somebody could understand this statement perfectly well and yet not know it is true. It is easily understandable in an imaginary situation where someone who grew up with Norma Jean but lost touch with her, and had heard of Marilyn Monroe but not seen any of the films.

In ‘Identity and Necessity’ also Kripke is engrossed with the question of necessity, contingency etc. He raises the question how are contingent identity statements possible as whatever exists is necessarily self-identical? He answers by saying that contingent identity is not possible though contingent identity statements are possible. It is possible because referring expressions in some identity statements pick out different objects at different possible worlds.

Edmund Husserl in his *Logical Investigations* talks about *a priori* knowledge. He is at one with Kant in saying that it has two features that we discussed in detail. However, Husserl thinks that the notion of *a priori* needs closer examination. He writes that this sort of knowledge (*a priori*) is obvious and even trivial but ‘its systematic demonstration, theoretical pursuit and phenomenological clarification remains of supreme scientific and philosophical interest, and by no means easy.’³ There he talks about formal *a priori* and pits it against material *a priori*. Pure logic including mathematics

³ *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay, ed. D. Moran, Routledge 2001, p. 73

covers the whole domain of the formal *a priori* knowledge. In addition to that, Husserl opines, all domains of knowledge contain an *a priori* part. This rest of the portion he calls material *a priori*. This formal and material *a priori* is another way of characterizing⁴ analytic *a priori* and synthetic *a priori*, says Dermot Moran. The expression '*a priori*' undergoes a considerable change in Husserl's philosophy. He talks about objective *a priori*. He explains objectivity as the place where the *a priori* is exercised.

Kripke's examples of empirical identity statements such as 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', statements of material origin, such as 'This lectern was originally made of (a particular piece of) wood' and statements of kind essence and identity, such as 'Gold has atomic number 79' have some special significance. Since these are not *a priori*, they cannot simply be true by convention. If conventionalism was already on the wane, Kripke's examples, and similar ones from Putnam seemed to kill it decisively. As these truths are not logically necessary, but are still necessary absolutely, they have sometimes been called 'metaphysically necessary'. However, it needs to be noted that even if these necessary truths were not true by convention, they might still owe their necessity to convention. The arguments for proposed necessary *a posteriori* truths each involve commitment to some general principle, for instance, that if a material object originates in bit of matter M, then it essentially originates in M. These principles are plausibly *a priori*, for the arguments rest on the familiar appeals to what we can imagine, or would be willing to say. The conventionalist proposal, then, is that these principles are analytic, and that while these conventions do not determine which modal statements are true (what bit of matter something did originate in), they are responsible for these truths being necessary (the principle determines that nothing with a different origin can count as this object). So conventionalism

⁴ Coppock, P., *Journal of Philosophy* 81: 261-70.

does not require that all necessary truths are true by convention, but only why they are necessary.

The above view and other modern elaborations make it clear that being *a priori* is to be sharply distinguished from being necessary, from being true purely in virtue of meaning, and from being knowable infallibly. Examples and reflection on the nature of the properties both show that there are *a priori* propositions which are not necessary. If a proposition is to be knowably true *a priori* in the actual world, it requires only that there is some non-empirical route to its justifiability; but that is very different from necessary. Conversely, in the presence of examples of the necessary *a posteriori*, it is clear that a proposition's being necessary does not ensure that it is *a priori*.

The above remarks, however, do not conflict with the classical rationalists' view which has received further elaboration in recent work, that all necessity can be traced back ultimately to the *a priori*. The non-coincidence of the *a priori* and the necessary serves just to emphasize how much work any contemporary development of that rationalist view has to do in explaining its notion of the source of necessity.

To say that a proposition is *a priori* is also not to be committed to the view that it is true purely in virtue of meaning. Something can be both knowable in a way which is justificationaly independent of experience, whilst also being true in virtue of its truth condition holding, just like any other truth. Quine decisively refuted the idea that anything could be true purely in virtue of its meaning.

A priori justification is not infallible justification. Just as one may be justified in believing an ordinary empirical proposition that is subsequently revealed on empirical grounds to be false, so one may be justified in believing an *a priori* proposition that is subsequently revealed on *a priori* grounds to be false. It seems that *a priori* propositions cannot be defeated by wholly empirical information, i.e. that they may still be experientially infeasible.

In addition to proper names, says Kripke, a posterior nouns are found in certain simple terms which designate natural substances (such as water), some simple terms which designate natural *kind* objects and also to certain simple terms which designate natural phenomena (e.g. heat). Citing examples of all these three sorts - 'Water is H₂O' for natural substances, 'Whale are mammals for natural kind object and 'Heat is random molecular motion' - Kripke argues that all these are a posterior and is proved by the fact that they are scientific conclusions. We know that scientific conclusions are arrived at only taking recourse to a posterior means or appeal to sense experience. Moreover, all these facts could not have been otherwise and hence they are necessary. His reason for saying this is that a substance having a composition other than H₂O would not be called water also a non-mammal could not be whale and so on. Examples taken by Kripke are both from proper nouns and mass or common nouns.

SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATION ON ANTHROPOCENTRISM*

PANKOJ KANTI SARKAR

Environmental ethics is a kind of ethics in which the moral or ethical dignity of all biotic community, animate as well as inanimate, can be restored. According to Robin Attfield environmental ethics is not only concerned with the issues which finds independent value of sentient creatures, it is also equally concerned about the natural living creatures as well. The central question of environmental ethics is to locate independent value irrespective of valuers. Environmental ethics addresses the interests of future generations and of nonhumans. Environmental ethics, in fact, is not an isolated issue, rather it stands as an ‘umbrella term’ which incorporates many debatable issues interlinked with ethical traditions from Plato, Aristotle, Mill, Moore to Leopold and Peter Singer.

The objective of environmental ethics is contrary to the traditional or humanistic ethics. Environmental ethics in a sense is relatively a new slogan against the so-called traditional ethics where the domination of human beings over non-human beings has widely been recognized. Traditional ethics is predominantly man-centered. The relevance of anthropocentrism can further be strengthened with the influence of materialism in which, only instrumental values are considered to be moral values. This, in turn, paves the way for technological development in which only instrumental values are being desired. Environmental ethics just opposes traditional ethical approaches and thereby denies materialism, individualism, consumerism, and moral subjectivism which invite anthropocentrism. Instead of anthropocentrism, modern environmental ethics rather pleads for non-anthropocentrism in which the moral dignity of all species of whole biotic community can be restored.

Traditionally there are two basic theories prevalent in environmental ethics, such as anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism. Anthropocentrism means human centeredness. In environmental ethics the term describes the

* This paper is a subsection of my doctoral dissertation for which I express my deep sense of obligation to my supervisor Dr. Laxmikanta Padhi.

attitude, values, and practices which focuses only on human interest or position rather than the position and interest of other non-human species in the natural world. It places human being at the center of the universe, and looks upon him as a measurers of all things because only human have a soul, rationality and capacity for analyzing and expressing language. Human species have every right to use and manipulate nature according to their own needs and deeds. From a moral point of view it holds an independent value solely and predominately for human interests. Only human species are the sources of intrinsic value and all other non-human species exist to subserve the purpose of humans. Thus, anthropocentrism is concerned only with human interests, excluding the desire, goal and value of non-human species and interprets everything in the world in terms of human values.

Philosophical Arguments for Anthropocentrism:

Anthropocentric attitude towards nature was found in a prolonged philosophical and religious background as articulated by early stage of Western philosophy. In the mainstream of the Western cultural tradition, only human beings have been treated morally. John Passmore and Kristin Shrader-Frechette were among the first to advocate a strictly anthropocentric approach in to environmental ethics. Shrader-Frechette finds it “difficult to think of an action which would do irreparable harm to the environment or ecosystem, but which would not also threaten human well-being”¹. Augustine himself claims that humans alone have a rational soul, the image of God and thus of the trinity. An extreme trend of anthropocentrism is also reflected in Descartes’ famous dictum: mind-body dualism. The Cartesian Cogito-ergo-sum suggests, at the end, that the individual alone constitutes himself or herself and that all senses of relation and context remain accidental and external. For Descartes, non-human creatures lack not only rationality, but also even consciousness. Descartes conceived that since non-human animals do not use language, they are no longer conscious or sentient. The famous Protagorean view that “Man

¹ Shrader-Frechette, K. *Environmental Ethics*. Pacific Grove, CA: Boxwood Press, 1981, P.17.

is the measure of all things” captures the idea that only human can know what reality is for him. Calvin’s statement that “God created all things for human’s sake”² supports anthropocentric attitude. For Kant, Natural objects are incapable of planning, reasoning, analyzing and organizing, using or creating language. For Bacon the aim of science is to master over nature by following the dictates of the truly natural.³

Human in any sense rules over nature for which Passmore inevitably presumes that nature is not itself divine. We also witness an extreme form of anthropocentricity in Hegel’s writings in which he conceives man as God like. This trend reaches its extreme peak with the hand of Nietzsche who inclines to say that man has become the measure of all things. For him nothing is transcendental, eternal, beyond man’s purview. The world, therefore, is a storehouse of raw materials for the enhancement of man’s power. Passmore says, “.....for Hegelnature in itself is ‘negativity’. This does not mean, of course, that it does not exist. But it exists simply in order to be overcome, to be humanized. Man offers it liberty, frees it from its fetters, only by making it human. Nature is made less ‘strange’, by being converted into a tool, a language, a secret ally, an aspirant after humanity.”⁴

In his major work *The Summa Theologica* Aquinas followed the passage from Aristotle and made classification of sins. In the gradation of sins he has room only for sins against god, our neighbors and us. There is no possibility of sinning against nonhuman animals or the natural world.⁵ In the religious tradition like the Judaic-Christian tradition a kind of dualistic view is found where it is said that God is a supernatural and spiritual being who shares his spirituality only with human beings. In Roman Catholic, it has been said that ‘man is the only creature on earth that God willed for itself.’ Man is the

² Schwetchke, A. and Bruhn, M. *The Commentaries of John Calvin on the Old Testament* Calvin Translation Society: Edinburgh 1843-48, 1:96.

³ Keller, Evelyn F. *Reflections on Gender and Science*, Yale University Press, 1995. P.36-37.

⁴ Passmore, J. *Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1995.

⁵ Schwetchke, A. and Bruhn, M. *The Commentaries of John Calvin on the Old Testament* Calvin Translation Society: Edinburgh 1843-48, 1:96.

only creature that is end in itself rather than a means for others. All these remarks stated above run with the conviction that human beings have the legitimate moral right to dictate nature as well as others non-human beings.

Some Observations on Anthropocentrism:

It is often considered that anthropocentrism is a dominant and utilitarian approach towards nature. We can say that if utilitarian consideration dominates human thinking, then proper respect for other creature will not arise. And so long as human's relationship towards nature is valued by considering nature to be our utilitarian source, there will be no place for ethical consideration of the natural ecosystem. According to Mary Midgley, 'we may read the history of Western ethical theory, from Plato and Aristotle to Singer and Leopold, not as a series of formulations of and justifications for competing master principles of action, but as a series of illuminating insights into human ethical experience that can deepen our moral reflection and help us to make wise practical choices'.⁶

Despite the force and support of arguments justifying anthropocentrism, it is not without problems. It is a basic presupposition that human domination over nature is the product of just one sort of cosmology. But there are religions in the world which have a humbler estimate of human place within nature and greater solicitude for other living beings. Say for example, Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism. According to Jainism, the world is full of life, in which humans, animals, plants, and elements (earth, air, water, and fire) are all considered to be alive.

The rationality and humanity of a human actually differentiates a human from other classes. However, from this it does not follow that human is the architect of whole nature. It is absolutely ignorant or *avidyā* or *māyā* on the part of humans to think that everything in the biosphere should run according to their dictation or will. Nature has its own order. Humans are

⁶ Midgley, M. , 'Beasts versus the biosphere' *Environmental Values* 1(2): 1992, p. 113-121.

violating it for mitigating their greedy needs. It is quite ridiculous to claim that human beings are superior to other non-humans simply for the fact that unlike other non-humans, human beings can take moral decisions, can give moral verdict, can decide what is good and what is ought to be done by virtue of possessing rationality. If it is claimed that human beings by virtue of possessing rationality, a distinctive trait, are supposed to be superior to other living or non-living beings, then, at times, in other context non-human beings can also suppose to be more superior to humans for their distinctive traits absent in human beings. There is no question of doubt that human beings lack the homing ability of pigeons, they also lack the speed of cheetah, the ruminative ability of sheep and cattle. If distinctive traits are supposed to be the only criterion of determining the superiority of one species over another, then it can equally be claimed that there underlies no point of departure in claiming that other beings may be superior to humans at times. Thus, there is no logical ground in claiming that distinctive traits are the criteria of determining one's superiority over other species. What can be said is that the distinctive traits of humans are valuable to humans and the distinctive traits of other non-humans are valuable to themselves as the distinctive traits of each animal is the outcome of biological necessity and it can be acquired genetically. So any attempt to acquire the distinctive trait of one species by other species would not be possible, as it requires a genetic transformation, which could alter the original species. Sterba holds that it would have been possible only in fairy tales and in the world of Disney. Thus, from a non-question-begging perspective, it would be prudent to claim that the members of all species are equal as each of them contributes substantially for the better environment.

Human being as the possessor of rationality ought to realize that we are citizens of nature, logically bound up together through mutual understanding, love, care and respect. If this is to be the case, of course, we think, it ought to be the case, then why should only humans be morally considerable? Can

human beings survive by forfeiting eco-systems? Certainly, they could not. Therefore, it has been justified by saying that like human beings every citizen of the whole ecosystem possesses equal moral worth. Any attempt to degrade nature would change the environmental related systematic process, which eventually leads to human disaster. Environmental related systems, such as, oxygen, carbon dioxide cycle, are more valuable than the so-called instrumental value as desired by classical ethics. Thus, any environmental related systematic process is vital on nature and what is vital on nature should count morally.

Modern science also challenges anthropocentric attitude, which gives less importance of human being within nature. The idea of great chain of being was already revealed to be inadequate in the taxonomy of species put forward by Linnaeus in the 18th century. The evolutionary picture of inter species relation is not only more complex but also it is in principle different from the teleological view usually implied by the great chain of being. Darwin provides an argument in *The Origin of Species* that ‘natural selection cannot possibly produce any modification in a species exclusively for the good of another species’.

The capacity of reason, language and social relation are not entirely absent in the non-human world. It no longer a matter of serious scientific controversy that some animals like great apes have social relation and are capable of thinking, even manipulating symbols. Also having the capacity of *moral agency* is not a necessary condition for being morally considerable as a moral “patient”. There is today a growing tendency to believe that moral consistency requires us to avoid harmful treatment of non-human beings wherever the harm is similar to a harm that would be wrong if it is inflicted on a human being. As scientific evidence of common characteristics undermines the radical differences between human and non human, so the reasons for ethically privileging humans are also undermined. There is no longer any unavailable reason to assume that only what befall human are matters morally.

Everything in the universe is a part of the natural process. And, this natural process is something that is beyond the control of any species. This assumption provides a cosmic vision that promotes the thinking that human species are not the controlling authority of natural happenings and will give different picture of nature-human relationship. Once the thinking process is elevated to this broad vision that humans are just a part of the nature, a strong foundation for environmental ethics will be established. Because once we accept that we are part of an integral whole, we will also be able to develop a sense of sharing with others. Deep ecology by Arne Naess in fact looks for a foundation, which is based on this type of thinking. Biocentrism maintains that all life forms are ‘moral patients’ entities to which we should accord moral consideration. We therefore have a duty towards all forms of life. Albert Schweitzer opines:

The essence of goodness is to maintain and cherish life, and the essence of evil is to destroy and damage life. All living beings have the will to live, and all living beings with the will to live are sacred, interrelated and of equal value. It is, therefore, an ethical imperative for us to respect and help all life forms.⁷

L. W. Sumner argued that environmental ethics must take into account the rights of non-human animals in order to develop a genuine environmental consciousness⁸. Tom Regan goes beyond Sumner’s idea of an environmental consciousness and the rights of animals, and argues for inherent value, which requires that the value associated with another-than-human beings must derive from within it, not imposed upon it⁹. Regan and Sumner’s principles of environmental consciousness and intrinsic value are articulated through deep ecology, which claims that - all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live, blossom, and to reach their own individual form of unfolding and self-

⁷ Schweitzer, A. *Civilization and Ethics*. J. Naish trans. London, A & C Black, 1923.

⁸ Sumner, L. S. A Matter of Life and Death | *Nous* 1976, 10: 145-71.

⁹ ²⁹Regan, T. The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic, *Environmental Ethics*, 1981, 3.1: 19-34.

realization¹⁰, Deep Ecology has always asserted that wilderness must be defended for its own sake, not for human gain. Deep ecology argues that a being's value leads to the ideal of biocentric egalitarianism, in other words, the ideal that all beings have inherent value and right to life which results in equality between all beings, where no being is superior or inferior to another. As a result, deep ecology has broadened the domain of discourse between human interaction with non-human nature¹¹, allowing nature to take on value for itself which requires respect and protection from human harm.

We can think an understanding of nature is the key of non-anthropocentrism and in this regard the concept of eco-spirituality is mostly desired for understanding and protecting nature. In Western tradition, we can call upon Spinoza, who in his *Intellectual love of God* equates God with Nature and thereby gives a metaphysical or spiritual interpretation of environmental ethics.

The Indian philosophical tradition and civilization provides a solid foundation for adequate concern and deep respect for nature, thus nonanthropocentric in nature. Philosophical thinking in Indian culture has always been associated with spiritual practice. The philosophical speculations that were developed in the Indian tradition were deeply concerned with life in general. The intention was not just to understand nature and intellectual curiosity, but a kind of theoretical speculative thinking was associated with a strong insight that was guiding the ethical, theological aspect of human life.

Eco-spirituality therefore, means that the entire universe is an extended family. It is a means through which one can realize that all living beings in the universe are only citizens of the household. This concept is known as *Vasudhaiva kutumbakam*. It refers to all species on earth as the members of the same extended family of *Devi Vasundharā*. Thus, only by realizing the

¹⁰ Devall, B & George, S. *Deep Ecology In Thinking Through the Environment: A Reader*, ed. Mark J. Smith. London: Routledge.1999.

¹¹ McLaughlin, Andrew. The Critique of Humanity and Nature: Three Recent Philosophical Reflections| *Trumpeter*. 1987, 4.4: 1-7.

entire universe as one extended family, we can develop the necessary maturity and thereby respect for all other beings. Being the members of the extended family, humans do not willfully engender the lives and livelihood of others, instead they first think in terms of caring for others before taking an action. The welfare and caring, love and respect of all would be realized through spiritual understanding and cooperation at the global level. We think that the Hindu heritage of eco-spirituality would certainly control our base characteristics, such as, greed, exploitation, abuse, mistreatment, and defilement of nature. What is mostly required is to culture our inner thoughts and perhaps it is where the religious exhortations and sanctions may come into play for environmental stewardship. Eco-spirituality oriented environmental stewardship can be the mechanism that strengthens our respect for nature, gives rise to new ways of valuing and caring, promotes sustainable development. Eco-spirituality enables us to provide the values necessary for an environmental caring world by forfeiting a blind belief towards materialism, consumerism, individual and corporate greed, instrumental value at all cost. Thus we can achieve and justify the ethical relevance of nonanthropocentric approach on environmental ethics by love, care and respect and above all introspection.

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LANGUAGE AND REALITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN BETWEEN HEIDEGGER AND BHARTRHARI*

BAISHALI MAJUMDAR

There are various ways in answering the question: Why does language matter to philosophy? However, the most prominent one is that language matters to philosophy because language reveals reality or ontology for us. However, there we witness a divergence of opinions about the nature of language and reality. Linguistic philosophers over the years have engaged in a serious philosophical debate regarding the nature of language and also the nature of reality. Language, for them, may be either ordinary language or artificial language. The nature of reality again finds different interpretations in different linguistic philosophers. According to Locke, reality is the totality of experience¹; for Strawson reality is the totality of particulars²; for early Wittgenstein reality is the totality of facts³; for Quine reality is what there is⁴ and for Heidegger reality is the totality of equipment⁵. Accordingly, the relationship between language and reality takes different interpretations in different linguistic philosophers. Even though linguistic philosophers, over the years, have given different interpretations of the term 'reality', but from broader perspective we can classify reality into two categories, such as, empirical reality and metaphysical reality. According to some linguistic philosophers, particularly those belonging to Semantics, language is not relevant for knowing metaphysical reality because for them language in true sense would be ineffable to reach up to metaphysical reality. Thus, for them,

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¹ Locke, John, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (ed.) P. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975: III, ii, I.

² Strawson, P.F. *Individuals: an Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, London, Methuen, 1959, p.20.

³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. E. Pears & B.F. McGuinness, London and New York, 1995, p.5.

⁴ Quine, W.V. 'On What There Is', *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol.II,1948, P.21-38.

⁵ Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*, tr., J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, New York: Harper and Row, 1962, p.68.

language matters to philosophy because language reveals empirical reality for us.

The other important observation is that those who confine themselves within empirical reality would consider language and reality as independent entities. For them language is a tool or instrument for the medium of communication and reality has its own existence apart from language. For them the function of language is external. For example, according to the referential theorist, the meaning of a sentence would be determined on the basis of the reference of the sentence under consideration. If the sentence enables to refer something other than the sentence itself and there exists a referential connection between the sentence and what it refers to, this would in turn ensure the meaning of the sentence. In short, it can be said that the referential connection constitutes the meaning of the sentence under consideration. Even the pragmatists have given due importance on the *external* use of language. Strawson, for example, has emphasized on successful communication between the speaker and the hearers in knowing particulars. According to Strawson, successful communication between the speaker and the hearers is made possible if the hearers can perfectly identify the particulars being referred to by the speaker. Here Strawson gives importance on the external uses of language. What we can say here is that both the pragmatists as well as the semantists have given emphasised more on the external uses of language and for them language and reality, whatever their nature may be, are independent with each other.

Interestingly, Martin Heidegger in the West and Bhartṛhari in the East have attempted to revive the relevance of metaphysical reality by means of language. Reality, for Heidegger, is Being and language, for Heidegger, is poetic in nature. Reality, for Bhartṛhari, is *Brahman* and language for Bhartṛhari is *Śabda*. While developing the relationship between language and reality both Heidegger and Bhartṛhari have emphasised not only on the metaphysical reality but they also have conceived that language and reality are

same. Both of them have agreed that even though language reveals reality but language is reality and reality is language. Language and reality are not distinct entities. The *Śabdabrahman* of Bhartṛhari is a case in point. Similar to this, Heidegger remarks that ‘language is the house of Being’. The important resemblances between Heidegger and Bhartṛhari are as follows:

- a. Both of them have engaged in showing the relevance of metaphysical reality that has been completely forfeited by the semantists as well as the pragmatists.
- b. Both of them have shared the view that language reveals reality and language *is* reality. Both language and reality are inseparable and mutually correlated with each other. Reality is not independent from language. This again is an important deviation from the earlier linguistic tradition. Linguistic philosophers have claimed that language and reality are independent with each other and language can be used extra-linguistically to map or to picture or to hook or to represent reality having independent existence.
- c. The ontological status of Being of Heidegger and *Brahman* of Bhartṛhari has remained the same. Both of them have emphasised on inner revelation of man.

Relationship between language and reality:

On the basis of the perceptions stated above, let us examine the relationship between language and reality after Heidegger and Bhartṛhari. We think that the question of Reality, Being and language are closely inter-related in the philosophies of Bhartṛhari and Heidegger. Bhartṛhari intuitively grasps reality along with his thinking of language just like as Heidegger reveals the question of Being along with his understanding of language. Both of them have attempted to transcend the periphery of human existence and thereby moved towards universality of thinking in the process of confirming the universality of human concerns. Their approaches, of course, are different. The approach of Bhartṛhari is *mokṣa-oriented* that springs from the practical interest of leading

man out of *duḥkha* into a state of bliss, from inauthentic to authentic existence, from absorption in the object to self-realisation. Heidegger claims that through *Dasein* one can transcend from being to *Being* by way of thinking. Being (*Sein*) as being is always sought for in Metaphysics and one can transcend being in the light of its Being.

According to Bhartṛhari, everyday life is inauthentic. One has to transcend it through the process of self-realisation. Very similar way, Heidegger also expresses his dissatisfaction over the ‘thrown fallenness’ of everyday life. For Heidegger, *Dasein* understands its own being in terms of the beings to which it attends and eventually transcends towards Being. Likewise, Bhartṛhari’s man through action gets involved and absorbed into the objects of everyday reality. Bhartṛhari, in this regard, claims that human condition as a fundamental alteration of attitude actually facilitates *awareness* of everyday life. This awareness eventually assists a man to realise the loopholes of everyday life and helps him to move forward from inauthentic to authentic life. Thus, it has been claimed by saying that Heidegger in rediscovering for the West man’s belongingness to *Ereignis* i.e. comes closer to Bhartṛhari’s man who dissociates himself from untruth through *Vāgyoga* and achieves union with the real, what Bhartṛhari termed as *Śabdatattva*. According to Heidegger ‘man is the neighbour of Being’ in the sense that ‘man of all beings stands in a privilege relation to Being’. Likewise, Bhartṛhari claims that an analysis and reflection on the nature of the self is a means of knowing Brahman, the *Śabdatattva*.

Thus, we think that the Being (Reality) of Heidegger is at par with the *Śabdatattva* of Bhartṛhari. According to Heidegger, the question of Being is authentic and we can come to the discovery of Being through the understanding of There-being (*Dasein*). Even though There-being is not man as such but that ‘place’ where the essence of man has its abiding ground, i.e. the ultimate source out of which man comes-to-presence as man. Thus, in the real sense, *Dasein* has a relation to its Being because *Da-sein* is gifted with

awareness of its own Being. Therefore, he is the *Da* of *Sein*, i.e. the *Da* where Being (*Sein*) shines forth. *Dasein*'s 'essence' lies in its existence, in its 'drive-to-be' (*Zu-sein*)⁶ According to Heidegger, the Being of beings is not something that is just 'out there' all by itself, or even 'out there' in beings, rather it implies the meaningful relatedness and the intelligible presentness of things for man understood as *Dasein*. Accordingly, the question of *Dasein*, Heidegger considers is a prologue to the question of Being. To make this standpoint more sharpen, Heidegger in his "The Way back into the ground of Metaphysics" says, "To characterise with single term both the involvement of Being in human nature and the essential relation of man to the openness ('there') of Being as such, the name of 'being there' (*Dasein*) was chosen for that sphere of Being in which man as man stands."⁷ Man as a questioning of being is the way to the questioning of Being. Thus, Being (reality) for Heidegger is always Being as it enters into *Dasein*'s understanding of Being. Being is understood in terms of *Dasein* and there is Being only insofar as it is understood by *Dasein*⁸ Thus, *Dasein*, for Heidegger, is the place of disclosure of Being.

Like Heidegger, Bhartṛhari characterises *Śabdatattva* as Being distinguishes from all beings. According to Bhartṛhari, Being is not one object amongst others; rather it is that in the light of which everything else is manifested and which is itself self-manifesting. In this regard, Bhartṛhari conceives existence (*sattā*) as a universal substance (*dravya*), a timeless, simple substance underlying in all things and permitting them to borrow their existence claims from their 'association' with it. Thus, Bhartṛhari interprets the nature of *Brahman* in terms of *Dravya*. *Dravya* or substance, for Bhartṛhari, is the universal in particular things which is at par with *Brahman* as existence. *Brahman* as substance is also called *tattva* (*thatness*) which is

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.67.

⁷ Heidegger, Martin. "The Way back into the ground of Metaphysics", tr., W. Kaufmann in *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Satre*, ed. W. Kaufmann, NY: World-Meridian, 1956, p.213.

⁸ Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, op.cit.p.225.

further referred to as *para* (the highest one).⁹ The *tattva* of *Śabdatattva* actually means eternal existence and it is made known to us through non-existent forms (*ākāra*). As an eternal existent or the highest one the *tattva* of *Śabdatattva* transcends or excels all spatial and temporal determinations, differentiations based on the concepts like identity. Thus, like Heidegger, Bhartṛhari equally envisages transcendental and immanent aspects of reality by emphasizing on the fact that *Brahman* as the basis of differentiated aspects is of the nature of *Śabda* which Bhartṛhari calls *Śabdatattva*, one undifferentiated reality, the whole. Such undifferentiated reality, the Absolute whole, the eternal existence whom Bhartṛhari considers as the great universal (*Mahāsāmānya*), the great Being (*Mahāsattā*) expresses itself in all words.

Both Heidegger and Bhartṛhari hold that reality (*Brahman* in Bhartṛhari and Being in Heidegger) is one. In his book *Being and Time*, Heidegger conceives Being (reality) in terms of Time. Likewise, Bhartṛhari construes *Brahman* (reality) in terms of *Kāla*. According to Bhartṛhari, all objects and the whole cosmos are manifested from *Brahman* and according to Heidegger, all beings are manifested from Being. Being is self-reveller just as *Brahman* is self-reveller. Thus, the ontological locus of Being of Heidegger and *Brahman* of Bhartṛhari remains the same. The power of Being as a reveller of other beings and also as a self-reveller requires energy just as *Brahman* as the manifesting agent of all objects and the whole cosmos requires *Śakti*. Bhartṛhari treats *kālaśakti* as the supreme of all the powers of the Absolute *Brahman* because it controls all the powers of *Śabdattava* by permitting them in a particular temporal order. Just like *śakti* or *kālaśakti* of Bhartṛhari, Heidegger also brings the relevance of Time as a power of Being. According to Bhartṛhari *kāla* which he termed as *kālaśakti*, is not different from *Brahman* and it is very similar to Heidegger who claims that Time is not different from Being. According to both Heidegger and Bhartṛhari, time or

⁹ Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, III.I.20.

Kāla is a manifestation in the sequence of coming into being. The journey from being to Being is a process of becoming, the manifestation or revealing Being (*Brahman*) through beings. It is an upward sequence that can be measured with regard to time (Heidegger) or *kāla* (Bhartṛhari). This does not, however, make sense to say that Time of Heidegger and *kāla* of Bhartṛhari limits Being or *Brahman*; rather the eternal timeless appears as changing in view of the working of time factor.¹⁰ Being and Time, says Heidegger, determine each other reciprocally in such a manner that neither can be the former or later than the other. Being is determined, as presence, by Time and therefore, Being and Time, Heidegger opines, are inseparable. Being and Time belong together just as *kāla* and *Brahman* belong together. As Being and Time are only there and given in *Ereignis*, it is this event that brings man in to his own as that being which grows aware of being by standing in genuine Time.

The other notable similarity between Bhartṛhari and Heidegger is that the *Brahman* or the Being is revealed through language. According to Bhartṛhari, *Brahman* (Reality) transforms or manifests itself into speech without affecting the true essence of reality. That is why, Bhartṛhari uses the term *Śabdabrahman*. *Śabda* (speech) is Brahman. Here the verb 'is' is used in the sense of Identity. *Śabda* is One; *Brahman* is One. There is oneness relationship between the *Śabda* (Om) and the Brahman. Very similar to Bhartṛhari, Heidegger claims that 'language is the house of Being', Being dwells in language. However, language does not affect Being. Being is the guardian of language, Being takes care of language because Being is manifested by means of language, passing its time in the language as a house. According to Bhartṛhari, all knowledge intertwined with *Śabda*¹¹. In this sense, the object is not different from the word because it is the word which has become the object. Similarly, all activity of consciousness has *śabda* as its medium. Bhartṛhari, in this regard, brings the concept of *Vāgyoga* as a kind of

¹⁰ Raja, K. *Indian Theories of Meaning*, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Adyar, Madras, 20: 1963, p.146 -147.

¹¹ Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, I.123.

meditation which ultimate objective is to raise the level of the consciousness of words to the highest stage of the Word-Principle. The *Vāgyoga* demands a kind of *Śabdasaṃskāra*, i.e. the purification of words consists in discarding the corrupt words (*apabhraṃsa*) and this in turn adherence to correct words (*sādhuśabda*) which eventually culminates the attainment of the ultimate reality what Bhartṛhari has termed as *Śabdabrahman*. Thus, Bhartṛhari does not rule out the purification of words. If we carefully examine the language of Heidegger, there we observe a similar sort of purification of language. When Heidegger talks about language, he thereby means a kind of language which is creative in nature. Language, for Heidegger, is creative. Creativity is the essence of language. Not all language fulfils this criterion. In this regard, Heidegger calls for poetic language which according to him is creative in nature. The *Da* in *Dasein* is being itself revealed or brought out of concealment into disclosure by means of creative language. For Heidegger, *Dasein* is the truth of Being; it is the place of the truth of Being. Heidegger says, There (presence) of Being; human existence is, in the final analysis, the openness to Being, “the standing in the lighting process of Being.”¹² For Heidegger, the human being dwells in the light of Being and the lighting process actually paves the way to grant ‘the nearness to Being’¹³ The light of Being is poetic language where Being dwells. It is Being’s house and the fundamental feature of this house is that it is creative in nature.

Concluding Remarks:

In this sequel I myself primarily deal with the questions, such as, why this paper deserves worthy of philosophical consideration and why the philosophical community would be interested to read this paper. I think this paper is worthy of philosophical consideration on two important accounts. First, it engages in exploring the metaphysical relevance of the relationship between language and reality which I think has been boiled down by the

¹² Heidegger, Martin, ‘the Letter on Humanism’, *Basic Writings*, edit., D. F. Krell, New York: Harper Collins 1993, p. 229.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.223

linguistic philosophers. Secondly, it attempts to make an East-West comparative study with reference to two great original thinkers, namely, Heidegger and Bhartṛhari. In one respect, this paper brings a different message to the linguistic philosophers who have engaged themselves in exploring the relationship between language and reality by conceiving both language and reality as separated entities. Contrary to the earlier tradition, both Bhartṛhari and Heidegger, I think, have conceived language at par with reality. For them language is reality. The other important aspect that needs to be taken care of at this juncture is that linguistic philosophers, in general, have given importance on the external uses of language. Contrary to this, both Bhartṛhari and Heidegger have given emphasised on the internal uses of language, i.e. the essence of language. Both of them have adhered to the view that the essence of language is all about of reality. We think that from an ontological perspective, *Brahman* stands for true Reality (Being). *Brahman* as true Being makes the truth of the world possible. Thus, a reflection of the reality of *Brahman* eventually brings us closer to Heidegger's concept of Being. It is non-being as Radhakrishnan has pointed out. It is not the being which we attribute to the world of experience. That is why, Heidegger considers Being as the groundless ground and Abyss of all human understanding. When Heidegger calls man the 'shepherd of Being', he wants to indicate the special relation There-being has to Being. From Bhartṛhari's point of view we can say that man alone is endowed with the capacity to envision *Brahman* and thus upswings beyond all living creatures.

The other important aspect that I can mention here is that Bhartṛhari denies the causal nexus between *Brahman* and the world on the ground that the effect, i.e., the world is a mere appearance (*vivarta*) of the cause. Heidegger also rejects the thought of Being as the cause of the world. Heidegger holds that cause and effect are entwined just like as Being and Time are entwined together. Likewise, Bhartṛhari holds that *kāla* and *Brahman* are entwined together.

Both Bhartrhari and Heidegger hold that language is reality or language itself is reality. I think that the reality of Bhartrhari (i.e. *Brahman*) and the reality of Heidegger (i.e. Being) are very much same or alike. However, I have a little bit of reservation regarding their understanding of language is concerned. According to Bhartrhari, language (word) is One that has been created within; but according to Heidegger language would be poetic in nature and the fundamental feature of language is that it would be creative. Creativity is the hallmark of language. Thus, we think that Heidegger was more specific than Bhartrhari regarding the interpretation of language is concerned. Having said this, it is language or word through which reality is revealed and revealed not as a separate entity but as an integral part of language. In this sense, both Bhartrhari and Heidegger have claimed that language is reality. However, Bhartrhari elsewhere in his *Vākyapadīya* talks about *speech-potency* as an essential trait of human consciousness which perhaps would be cognitive in nature. Speech-potency as an essential trait of human consciousness exists within. Very similar way, Heidegger claims that language becomes the concrete presence of Being rather than mere articulation. Language, for Heidegger, is the foundation of human being. The essential function of language is the *Sage*. It shows. In short, language as Saying is the mode of commandeering (*Ereignis*). Language, for Heidegger, is not a mere tool rather language grants the possibility to stand in the midst of the openness of beings. We find ourselves in the midst of language. Thus, we can conclude by saying that the metaphysical interpretation of the relationship between language and reality as expounded by both Heidegger and Bhartrhari not only opens up a new dimension in the philosophical arena, but at the same time it shapes the concept of language and reality as a unified and non-dualistic manner which eventually nullifies or boils down the *problem of surrogacy* in the domain of linguistic philosophy.

A SPIRITUALISTIC OUTLOOK IN VALUING NATURE *

PINKI DAS

In the ancient spiritual traditions, man was looked upon as part of nature, linked by the eternal spiritual and psychological bonds to the elements around him. This is very much marked in the Hindu tradition, the oldest living religious tradition in the world. The Vedas, the oldest hymns composed by great spiritual seers and thinkers which are the repository of Hindu wisdom, reflect the vibrancy of an encompassing world-view which looks upon all objects in the universe, living or non-living, as being pervaded by the same spiritual power. Hinduism believes in the all-encompassing sovereignty of the divine, manifesting itself in a graded scale of evolution. The human race, though at the top of the evolutionary pyramid at present, is not seen as something apart from the earth and its innumerable life forms. India is a vast network of sacred places. There are seven sacred rivers; seven sacred mountains, sacred trees and plants, sacred cities. The sacredness of the land of India gives a sense of unity to this country of so many religions, cultures, races and languages. The Indian tradition is strongly cosmo-centric, where man lives as a part of a system in which everything is related to everything else. Creation and destruction take place simultaneously. But today, rapidly drifting from our traditions of sustainable use and co-existence, we seem to be entering a man-centered world that implies the decimation of nature.

The civilization of India had grown up in close association with nature. That's why a good environmental sense has been one of the fundamental features of India's ancient philosophy. There has always been a compassionate concern for every form of life in the Indian mind. This concern is projected through the doctrine of *Dharma*, preached by every religious school that flowered in our land. The Hindu *R̥sis* of the Vedic era perceived the value of maintaining a harmonious relationship between the needs of man and

* This paper is a subsection of my doctoral dissertation for which I am thankful to my supervisor Prof. Kanti Lal Das.

spectacular diversity of the Universe. To them, nature was not only the mother that sustained their life; it was the abode of divinity. Sanctity of life to them included not only the efforts to seek salvation, but to seek it by developing a sacred attitude towards spiritual significance of nature. Man, in Hindu culture, was instructed to maintain harmony with nature and to show reverence to the presence of divinity in nature.

An Indian's relation with nature differs from that of a Western man. In the West, human has separated himself from nature, mastered it, he believes, and used it to serve his own purpose. Love of animals and of nature in the West is a personal attitude, not a natural law. As the vine embraces, the tree, and cloud not live without it, so the Hindu unites himself with nature. From nature he came; to nature he returns, as ashes. The relationship between a Hindu and nature is one of adaption and co-existence rather than of mastery and subjection. Hinduism is a remarkably diverse religious and cultural phenomenon, with many local and regional manifestations. Within this universe of beliefs, several important themes emerge. The diverse theologies of Hinduism suggest that: The earth can be seen as a manifestation of the goddess, and must be treated with respect. The five elements - space, air, fire, water, and earth - are the foundation of an inter-connected web of life. *Dharma* - often translated as “duty” - can be re-interpreted to include our responsibility to care for the earth. Simple living is a symbol for the development of sustainable economies. Our treatment of nature directly affects our *karma*. *Pan̄ca Mahābhuta* (the five great elements) create a web of life that is shown forth in the structure and interconnectedness of the cosmos and the human body. Hinduism teaches that the five great elements (space, air, fire, water, and earth) that constitute the environment are all derived from *pr̄kṛti*, the primal energy. Hinduism recognizes that the human body is composed of and related to these five elements, and connects each of the elements to one of the five senses. The human nose is related to earth, tongue to water, eyes to fire, skin to air, and ears to space. This bond between our

senses and the elements is the foundation of our human relationship with the natural world. For Hinduism, nature and the environment are not outside us, not alien or hostile to us. They are an inseparable part of our existence, and they constitute our bodies. Denuding, polluting, or otherwise damaging the environment was considered such a serious offense in Hinduism a person could be excommunicated for killing trees. Hindus have worshipped trees, we have tied sacred threads around them, and we have taken shelter under them, have held social ceremonies around these, offered this water, milk and sometimes even cow dung. Development destroys trees, these are often chopped mercilessly, and the eternal search for firewood threatens their limbs.

In the Vedic period the Vedic Aryans were children of nature. They studied nature's drama very minutely. Sand-storm and cyclone, intense lightening, terrific thunderclaps, the heavy rush of rain in monsoon, the swift flood in the stream that comes down from the hills, the scorching heat of the sun, the cracking red flames of the fire, all witness to power beyond man's power. The Vedic sages felt the greatness of these forces. They respected these activities. They valued these forces. They worshiped and prayed them due to regard, surprise and fear. They realized instinctively that action, movement, creation, change and destruction in nature are the results of forces beyond men's control. And thus they attributed divinity to nature. *Rigvedic* hymns could be divided into many parts, but their main part belongs to natural hymns, the hymns related with natural forces. Yet Vedic gods are explained in different ways by the scholars in India and West, but speaking generally, the hymns addressed to the deities are under the influence of the most impressive phenomenon of nature and its aspects. The word deity or *Devatā* means divine, dignity which is bright, strong, donor, and powerful. In these hymns we find prayers for certain natural elements such as air, water, earth, sun, rain, dawn etc. The glorious brightness of the sun, the blaze of the sacrificial fire, the sweep of the rain-storm across the skies, the recurrence of the dawn, the steady currents of the winds, the violence of the tropical storm and other such

natural energies, fundamental activities or aspects are glorified and in material form as divinities (*Devatā*). The interaction with nature resulted in appreciation and prayer but, indeed, after a good deal of observation. Attributes assigned to deities fit in their natural forms and activities, as soma is green, fire is bright, air is fast moving and sun is dispenser of darkness. The characteristics of these forces described in the verses prove that Vedic seers were masters of natural science.

The *Vedas* are the first texts in the library of mankind. They are universally acknowledged to be the most precious Indian Heritage. The antiquity to the Vedic civilization is debated to a great extent but indeed there is no civilization known to humanity with such antiquity as Vedic Aryan civilization. In Vedic view, this world consists of *Agni* i.e., fire or heat and soma i.e. water. *Surya* is the soul of all which is moving and also of which is not moving. Vedic seers pray boldly to these natural forces and aspects for bestowing plenty and prosperity on them. *Aditi* is praised as *Devamātā*, the mother of all natural energies and she symbolizes the Nature. The *Vedas* deal with knowledge, the knowledge of all sorts. They cover knowledge both physical and spiritual. They are source of all knowledge according to *Manusmṛti*. Especially the Vedic views revolve around the concept of nature and life. The visions of the beauty of life and nature in the *Vedas* are extremely rich in poetic value. Perhaps nowhere else in the world has the glory of dawn and sun-rise and the silence and sweetness of nature, received such rich and at the same times such pure expression. The symbolical pictures projected there remain close to life and nature.

The *Vedic* hymn to the Mother Earth, the *Pr̥thvi Sukta* in *Atharva Veda* is indisputably the oldest and the most evocative environmental invocation. The Hymn is redolent with ecological and environmental values:

Earth, in which lie the sea, the river and the other waters, In which food and cornfields have come to be, In which lives all that breaths and moves, May she confer on us the finest of her yield. Earth, in which the waters, common to all, Moving on all sides, flow unfaillingly, day and night, May she pour on us milk in many

streams, And endow us with luster. May those born of thee, O Earth, Be for our welfare, free from sickness and disease, Wakeful through a long life, we shall become, Bearers of tribute to thee, Earth, my Mother, set me securely with bliss, in full accord with heaven, O wise one, Uphold me in grace and splendor.

An analogous interpretation of holistic perception is given in the traditional system of *Advaita Vedānta* in India, as the acme of spiritual realization, in which the entire physical world appears identical with oneself and *Brahman*. If, as the cosmology of the Upanishads tells us, everything has come out of *Brahman* and is non-different from *Brahman*, and if *Brahman* has entered into all things as it has entered into all human beings, and has stayed there as the *antaryāmi* of all, then it will be no wonder that all this should verily be *Brahman*. This is the highest knowledge. This is the *summum bonum* for man to be achieved as psychological and epistemological process of apprehension of reality by degrees and by stages. The cosmic vision of our planet earth is based on the fundamental concept of *Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*. The way forward will require a turn towards restoration and renewal. Vedic profundity re-affirms the importance of justice, prudence, humility and reverence for life and nature. To live within such a holistic relationship requires our rediscovering the spiritual connection that unites us to the land and that nourishes our souls as well as our bodies. The affirmation of the ‘intrinsic worth’ and something like ‘rights’ of each individual person and all animal and plant species and in some ways nature and ecosystems carries the correlate of recognizing our own limits in calming the fruits of the earth and in managing and manipulating nature. The invocation to the *Īśavāsya Upaniṣad*, while stressing upon the intrinsic value of nature, emphatically declares. *That is Whole, This is Whole, The Whole comes out of the Whole, Taking the Whole from the Whole, The Whole remains.*

The Vedic hymns are full of statement, ideas and unusual images which contain truths of all sciences. Here, knowledge is couched in symbolic language and unless the symbols are decoded, the real purport of the *mantras* cannot be understood. The only point is that *Vedas* need to be studied and

interpreted, not in a pedantic manner, but in their proper perspective and in relevant context. The tripartite model of knowledge at the basis of the hymns helps in their understanding. Generally indication of most of the principles is there in their earliest form. Often expressions of ideas are enveloped with the shade of symbolism. The approach of Vedic seers is truly comprehensive. They do not visualize in parts. They do not elaborate subjects as is done in current education. But at the same time, grandeur and brevity of the *Vedas* are not found in the disciplines of modern science. The *Vedas* and disciplines of modern science are rather complementary and not contradictory. In recent days, environmental science and ecology are disciplines of modern science under which study of environment and its constituents is done with minute details. As science, they are established in 20th century, but their origin can be seen long back in the Vedic and ancient Sanskrit literature. The concepts of environment differ from age to age, since it depends upon the condition, prevalent at that particular time. In this paper, an effort is made to find out the awareness of ancient Indian people about the environment. As Sanskrit literature is so wide we refer here mainly to Vedic texts, particularly the *Vedic Samhitās*. The Environment Protection Act in 1986, defines the environment as follows: ‘Environment includes water air and land and the inter-relationship which exists among and between water, air and land and human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro organisms and property’. From the above definition, it can be briefly said that environment consists of two components namely biotic and abiotic factors. The living organisms can be grouped into three types - those living mainly on land, in water and in air. The non-living materials of the environment are land, air, water, property etc.

In modern Sanskrit, the word *Paryāvarāṇa* is used for environment, meaning which encircles us, which is all around in our surroundings. But in the *Atharva Veda* words equivalent to this sense are used; such as *Vṛtavṛta*, *Abhivarah*, *Avṛtah*, *Parivṛta* etc. Vedic view on environment is well-defined in one verse of the *Atharva Veda* where three coverings of our surroundings

are referred as *Chandamsi*: ‘Wise utilize three elements variously which are varied, visible and full of qualities. These are water, air and plants or herbs. They exist in the world from the very beginning. They are called as *Chandamsi* meaning ‘coverings available everywhere.’ It proves the knowledge of Vedic seers about the basic elements of environment. According to one indigenous theory established in the *Upaniṣads*, the universe consists of five basic elements viz. 1. Earth or land, 2. Water, 3. Light 4. Air, and 5. Ether. The nature has maintained a status of balance between and among these constituents or elements and living creatures. A disturbance in percentage of any constituent of the environment beyond certain limits disturbs the natural balance and any change in the *natural balance* causes lots of problems to the living creatures in the universe. Different constituents of the environment exist with set relationships with one another. The relation of human being with environment is very natural as he cannot live without it. From the very beginning of creation he wants to know about it for self protection and benefit.

The concept of the *Pr̥thivi* form of the earth in the *Ṛig Veda* is most fascinating. It is mostly addressed along with the heaven into a dual conception. There is one small hymn addressed to *Pr̥thivi*, while there are six hymns addressed to *Dyavap̥r̥thivi*. *Pr̥thivi* is considered the mother and *Dyau* is considered the father in the *Vedas*, and they form a pair together. One of the most beautiful verses of the *Ṛig Veda* says, ‘Heaven is my father, brother atmosphere is my navel, and the great earth is my mother.’ Heaven and earth are parents: *Mātara*, *Pitara*, *Janitara* in union while separately called as father and mother. They sustain all creatures. They are parents of all gods. They are great and widespread. Earth is described as a goddess in *Ṛig Veda*. In the *Atharva Veda*, the earth is described in one hymn of sixty-three verses. This famous hymn called as *Bhumisukta* or *Pr̥thivisukta* indicates the environmental consciousness of Vedic seers. The seers appear to have advanced understanding of the earth through this hymn. She is called *Vasudhā* for containing all wealth, *Hiraṇyavakṣa* for having gold bosom and *Jagato*

Niveshani for being abode of whole world. She is not for the different races of men alone but for other creatures also. She is called *Visvambhara* because she is representative of the universe. She is the only planet directly available for the study of the universe and to realize the underlying truth. This is wide earth which supports varieties of herbs, oceans, rivers, mountains, hills etc. She has at places different colours as dark, tawny, white. She is raised at some place and lowered at some places. The earth is fully responsible for our food and prosperity. She is praised for her strength. She is served day and night by rivers and protected by sky. The immortal heart of earth is in the highest firmament (*Vyoma*). Her heart is sun. 'She is one enveloped by the sky or space and causing the force of gravitation. She is described as holding *Agni*. It means she is described as the geothermal field. She is also described as holding *Indra* i.e., the geomagnetic field. The earth is described then as being present in the middle of the oceans (sedimentary rocks) and as one having magical movements.' The hymn talks about different energies which are generated from the form of the earth. 'O *Pṛthivi*, Thy centre, thy navel, all forces that have issued from thy body- Set us amid those forces; breathe upon us.' Thus, the earth holds almost all the secrets of nature, which will help us in understanding the universe. She is invested with divinity and respected as mother i.e. 'The earth is my mother and I am Her son.' The geographical demarcations on this earth have been made by men and not by nature.

Modern Indian scientists should be astonished and also feel proud of our ancestors for their knowledge and views about environment. Ancient seers knew about various aspects of environment, about cosmic order, and also about the importance of co-ordination between all natural powers for universal peace and harmony. When they pray for peace at all levels in the '*Shanti Mantra*' they side by side express their belief about the importance of co-ordination and interrelationship among all natural powers and regions. The prayer says that not only regions, waters, plants trees, natural energies but all creatures should live in harmony and peace. Peace should remain everywhere.

The *mantra* takes about the concord with the universe peace of sky, peace of mid-region, peace of earth, peace of waters, peace of plants, peace of trees, peace of all-gods, peace of *Brahman*, peace of universe, peace of peace; May that peace come to me.

According to *Gītā*, he who prepares food for himself, he who seeks nourishment from his own selfhood - he verily eats sin. Such is the beautiful exhortation of Sri Krishna to Arjuna. According to Him, it is the sacrifice, which is the sustaining force of all creation. One has only to turn to *Agnipurāṇa* to have an insight into the minds of the ancient seers for their curiosity and anxiety to preserve the forests and wild life. *Agni Purāṇa* says: *Equal to ten wells is a tank, Equal to ten tanks is a son, and Equal to ten sons is a tree.*

The verses are devoted to glorifying Earth as sacred and inviolable. *Prithvi Sukta* talks about the human dependence on nature and the respect for the same that follows naturally.

“*Mātā bhumiḥ putro ahaṃ pṛthivyāḥā*” - *Prithvi Sukta, Atharva Veda* (12.1.12)

Here the *Prithvi Sukta* proclaims Earth as the mother, and humanity as her children. Mother Earth is celebrated for all her natural bounties and particularly for her gifts of herbs and vegetation. Her blessings are sought for prosperity in all endeavours and fulfilment of all righteous aspirations. The concept of the motherland pertaining to Earth is unique to the *Vedas*. According to *Prithvi Sukta*, Mother Earth is adorned with mountains, hills, plains, heights, slopes, forests, plants, herbs and treasures. She takes care of every creature that breathes with, things strength-giving and nourishing. She gives shelter to all the seekers of truth, who are tolerant and have understanding. She gives us joy, health, wealth, prosperity, and glory. The source of the creative spirit, we depend upon Mother Earth, The Vedic Hymn to the Earth, the famous *Prithvi Sukta* in the *Atharva Veda* (XII.I), is unquestionably the oldest and the most evocative environmental invocation. It is rightly called the first national anthem in the history of mankind. In one of the hymns, a prayer is sung for the preservation and conservation of nature and

its gifts. A covenant is made that humankind shall secure the Earth against all environmental trespass and shall never let her be oppressed.

Not only in the *Vedas*, but in later scriptures, such as the *Upaniṣads*, the *Purāṇas* and subsequent texts, the Hindu viewpoint on nature has been clearly enunciated. It is permeated by a reverence for all life, and an awareness that the great forces of nature - the earth, the sky, the air, the water and fire - as well as various orders of life including plants, trees, forests and animals, are all bound to each other within the great rhythms of nature. The divine is not exterior to creation, but expresses itself through natural phenomena. Thus, in the *Mundaka Upaniṣad* the divine is described as follows:

“Fire is head, his eyes are the moon and the sun; The regions of space are his ears, his voice the revealed Veda, The wind is his breadth, his heart is the entire universe, The earth is his footstool, Truly he is the inner soul of all.”

The *Mahābhārata*, *Ramāyaṇa*, *Vedas*, *Upaniṣads*, *Bhagavad Gītā*, *Purāṇas* and *Smṛti* contain the earliest messages for preservation of environment and ecological balance. Nature has never been considered a hostile element to be conquered or dominated. In fact, man is forbidden from exploiting nature. He is taught to live in harmony with nature and recognize that divinity prevails in all elements, including plants and animals. The *Mahābhārata* hints that the basic elements of nature constitute the Cosmic Being - the mountains His bones, the earth His flesh, the sea His blood, the sky His abdomen, the air His breath and *Agni* His energy. The whole emphasis of the ancient Hindu scriptures is that human beings cannot separate themselves from natural surroundings and Earth has the same relationship with man as the mother with her child. Therefore planting and preservation of trees are made sacred in religious functions.

From the above detailed discussion, some light is thrown on the awareness of our ancient seers about the environment, and its constituents. It is

clear that the Vedic vision to live in harmony with environment was not merely physical but was far wider and much comprehensive. The Vedic people desired to live a life of hundred years and this wish can be fulfilled only when environment will be unpolluted, clean and peaceful. The knowledge of Vedic sciences is meant to save the human beings from falling into an utter darkness of ignorance. The unity in diversity is the message of Vedic physical and metaphysical sciences. Essence of the environmental studies in the *Vedas* can be put here by quoting a partial *Mantra* of the *Īśavāsyopaniṣad* ‘One should enjoy with renouncing or giving up others part’. From the above Spiritualistic messages it is clear that environment belongs to all living beings, so it needs protection by all, for the welfare of all. Thus, the study proves the origin of environmental studies from the *Vedas*.

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**THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ‘OTHER’ IN THE PORTRAYAL OF
WOMEN CHARACTERS OF SALMAN RUSHDIE
IN *MIDNIGHT’S CHILDREN*
MAHALAKSHMI BH.**

Feminism appears to have begun with the mission to emancipate woman from the clutches of a patriarchal institution in which woman is oppressed and viewed as the ‘Other’. This universal desire to liberate women has been articulated in various forms by the feminist writers and the same is manifested in the contemporary fiction. Feminism and theories relating to it perceived the male/female binary as a mere social construction. Feminism began as a political movement in the 19th century and fought for the equality of sexes and to end discrimination against women. The gender perspective is oriented towards questioning issues like education, marriage, economics, sexuality and morals. Social biases see woman as only the ‘Other’ of the male and the woman’s identity is never separate but is subsumed under that of the male. The woman is typecast as “Mother Nature” who is perpetually giving and all-forgiving that demands nothing and is willing to suffer. This ‘Otherness’ is feigned by the patriarchal world as a positive attribute by terming it the ‘feminine principle’.

Woman is the ‘Other’ of man as she is subjected to discrimination, subdued and manufactured on the stereotypes like weak, vulnerable etc. The Post-colonial woman is also the ‘Other’ of the European counterparts, as she is viewed as one without education, independence etc. hence, the Third-World woman faces double jeopardy in the hands of the male chauvinists as well as their European counterparts, who deem themselves to be a class apart from the Post-colonial women.

Consciousness of the ‘Other’ has always been an important position that Rushdie has taken in his fiction. There is no exception to this even in the case of the novel *Midnight’s Children*. The female characters of the novel, like Padma, Amina Sinai, Mary Pereira, Naseem Ghani, Rani-of-cooch-naheen and Parvati-the-witch can be viewed as the possessors of unconditional love,

which can be said to be the feminine principle, which makes the consciousness of the Other complete.

A feminist interpretation of the portrayal of the characters of *Midnight's Children* may help in the evaluation of the making of the Post-Colonial narrative. At one point in the novel, the protagonist Saleem announces that women have made him and also unmade. If Post-Colonialism is one major aspect in the analysis of the novel, feminine principle forms another basic aspect of the novel.

A woman is always perceived as a domesticated being that does the daily chores while running the family and is expected to be a bundle of love, care and is branded as the one who is highly emotional and attached. In other words, she ought to work like a slave who serves the family. The more mundane things like cooking, cleaning the house etc. are said to be a woman's work while the things relating to intelligence and intellect are branded as a man's domain which includes earning for the wellbeing of the family. Contrary to men, a woman is always expected to be a giver, one who offers paramount love to her partner and children and the other members of the family. This attitude of love and care of a woman can be defined as the 'feminine principle'. Giving birth to babies and taking care of them comes naturally to a woman as she is biologically built in that fashion. This makes woman service oriented and imparting love becomes her primary prerogative.

The feminist writer, Simone de Beauvoir's statement from *The Second Sex* (1949), "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman", is pivotal to the writings of many feminists. A woman is not born: she becomes, is made a woman, she is 'manufactured'. A woman is made as the embodiment of qualities like weakness, feeble-mindedness, patience and so on. De Beauvoir's statement is justifiable since the patriarchy or phallogocentric male suggests that a woman is not strong enough to go out into the world and that she is to be protected. A woman's sexualities are made and treated as subservient to that of the male. This aspect is evident in the novel *Midnight's Children*. The

description rightly fits the character of Jamila Singer, when this tomboyish girl who had been educated in the metropolitan city of Bombay, which stands for secularism, turns into a docile and conservative woman following the system of *pardah* when she emigrates to Pakistan.

The relation between Feminism and Post-Colonialism is to be defined at this juncture. Feminism and Post-Colonial theory, up to a point have followed a certain 'path of convergent evolution' (Ashcroft et al. 1995: 249). Both feminism and Post-Colonialism follow a similar theory in their defense of the marginalized 'Other', within the dominating repressive structures. These bodies of thought have attempted to invert the prevailing hierarchies of gender, culture and race. At one point of time a collision occurred between the native or third-world women and the imperial feminists. The third-world woman or in other words, the Post-Colonial woman has become a victim of both imperial ideology and native and foreign patriarchies. As Gayatri Spivak writes, 'marginality' (1988) has become the buzzword in the cultural critique. The consciousness of difference had set up a cultural hierarchy and created a difference between the western feminist and her native counterpart as I-who-have-made-it and you-who-cannot-make-it. The Post-Colonial or the third-world woman underwent double colonization. She was labeled as the 'Other' who is ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domesticated and family-oriented while her western counterpart was described as educated and modern. The Post-Colonial woman was seen as one who cannot represent herself and that she must be represented. As Gayatri Spivak elaborates,

Between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but a violent shuttling which is displaced figuration of the 'third-world woman' caught between tradition and modernization. (1988: 306)

The imperial feminist thus fractured the potential unity between Post-Colonialism and feminism by belittling her sibling - the native third-world woman or the Post-Colonial woman.

In the novel *Midnight's Children*, along with Saleem, the character of Padma, the wife-to-be of Saleem evokes much interest among the readers. She remains one of the principal female characters who contribute towards the shaping of the entire narrative with her curiosity and 'whatnextism'. In other words, she is the female audience to whom the entire narrative is addressed. She is very loyal and faithful and a great devotee to Saleem, who loves him from the core of her heart. Despite her loyalty, Padma has been subjected to gender injustice. Her sexual urge is voiced when she asks the writer Saleem to see if his 'other pencil works'. Saleem derides her for illiteracy. She is the feminine 'Other' who lacks education and is seen primarily as a mere stereotype. Gender prejudice is generated by the male power in a Post-Colonial society. One's role in the society determines one's gender. Cooking food, washing clothes, giving birth to children, making beds for the husband are considered women's trades and the rest are superior works and hence are supposed to be done by men. This indicates that man has power over women.

Saleem takes Padma's loyalty for granted; he thinks it his male prerogative to put her down, as she pines for his love and union, thinking that Saleem must be physically fit. Saleem being an impotent fails to satiate her physical urge and even emotionally he is detached to her. He looks at her only as a servant and he prefers to parade his masculine power. Politically, Padma could be taken as a representative of the gullible people of the subcontinent who are easily duped by the demagogues in the Post-Colonial country.

Padma is depicted mostly through her animal instincts, Saleem talks of her as: "Padma - our plump Padma...sulking magnificently (she can't read. Padma strong, jolly, a consolation for my last days. But definitely a bitch in the manager)" (1981:24)

Saleem further says,

"Padma snorts, wrist smacks against forehead. 'Okay, starve, starve, who cares two pice?' Another louder, conclusive snort....Thick of waist, somewhat fairy of forearm, she flounces, gesticulates, exists. Poor Padma" (*Ibid*)

Besides being portrayed as illiterate and ignorant, Padma is compared to a witch. This derogatory term is once again used by Saleem when he says

that Padma “*really- truly was a witch*” (1981: 381). This is enough proof of Saleem’s male attitude towards his female partner. Padma’s love for Saleem, despite his attitude towards her, can be seen as the eternal feminine principle. Padma is portrayed in a better fashion in her absence than in her presence. She can be taken as the symbol of the ‘*Other*’. She is a prey of illiteracy; Salman Rushdie presents this paradigm for female characters in general. The gap that belies Saleem’s elitist education and Padma’s illiteracy sadly reflects the existing social reality. Padma is sketched out as a stereotype, as a character representative of her gender. The novel fails to offer any details particularly in relation to Padma. Her past is not presented to the reader, she is shown as a comic caricature and is attached to the very mundane or material things while Saleem poses in front of her as the one who is quite superior and constantly puts her down as one who possesses low intellect. Padma nurtures Adam, the son of Saleem and instantly becomes Adam Sinai’s mother when they enter the pickle factory; she takes care of him as her own son. She stands for the eternal feminine principle like any other Post-Colonial woman. Padma becomes the ‘*Other*’ of Saleem.

Salman Rushdie is a fine crusader of women’s strength and rights. The freedom and oppression faced by women in their traditional roles are delineated and a diversity of strong women who create their own space is portrayed by him. They reach out and control their own destinies despite the traditional codes of conduct. Uma Parameswaran, aptly states that one could,

Bring forward Robert Graves and Leslie fielder, Edward Said and Jacques Lacan, Derrida and Kristeva, to show that Rushdie is indeed weaving patterns mythic, historical, anticolonial, psychoanalytic, deconstructionist, semiotic - which delineate women with an authenticity of detail. (2007: 111)

Rushdie incorporates women as the redefined ‘*Other*’, mostly in control of themselves and at times of others as well. Saleem Sinai, it is understood, has three mothers, Vanita, the biological mother; Amina Sinai, the one who takes him for her own baby ignorant of the baby swapping done by the nurse Mary Pereira in the Narlikar Hospitals; and Mary Pereira herself

who nurses him by becoming his ayah to get rid of her guilt. Amina Sinai and Mary Pereira compete with each other in loving baby Saleem. Both these women, it appears, have been prey to male chauvinism. It can be observed that the sexist bias operates against nearly all women characters in the novel. The situation of woman is that, she, an autonomous being like all creatures finds herself living in a world where men compel her to assume the status of the Other. Women fall prey to the male ego and masculine might. Amina Sinai (Mumtaz) is portrayed as graceful, modest and obedient. She loves her father dearly and always tries to be of comfort to him which he does not get from her mother. She surrenders to her father's wish and marries Nadir Khan, who later declares divorce and leaves, despite this situation she maintains her calm and faces the pain with fortitude. When Mumtaz remarries Ahmed Sinai he chose her a new name Amina. She accepts this new name along with the new life with him without complaints of any kind. She understands that a husband deserves unquestioning loyalty and whole-hearted love. She trained herself to love him bit by bit; Amina possessed all the qualities of a good housewife, she proves to be a dutiful mother too. She offers unconditional love to Saleem despite knowing the fact that he is a changeling and not her biological son. Amina Sinai can be seen as the eternal mother who embodies the feminine principle. Though Rushdie suggests that Amina Sinai is getting adulterous with her reunion with her former husband, it does not seem really important to the reader as Nadir Khan is already declared impotent, for which reason he divorces her and escapes. The strength of Amina is once again evident when she takes up the burden of running her family. When her husband Ahmed Sinai gives into taking alcohol as his business goes off the track, Amina rises to the situation and does not think twice to enter into Horse-racing, to earn for the smooth running of the family. She appears to be a modern woman while she drives a car, which is normally a man's thing. This modernity of Amina Sinai juxtaposes with the imperial concept of the Post-Colonial woman. Amina emerges as a strong woman who is no less when compared to any

European woman, she is educated, modern and takes liberties while making decisions when it comes to her family and also in situations which include her emotions and sexuality.

Amina, at a particular point in the novel, separates from her husband Ahmed Sinai and moves to Pakistan along with her son Saleem and daughter Jamila on the insistence of her reverend mother Naseem. She lives in the house of her elder sister. Amina's womanly vulnerability allows her mother to take the situation into her hands and force her daughter to leave her drunkard and womanizer husband behind in India as they move to Karachi, Pakistan.

Amina Sinai becomes the epitome of the feminine principle when she proves to be highly accommodative despite knowing the fact that her husband had become a drunkard and is having extra-marital affairs with his secretaries. Amina forgives him and forgets all his adulterous acts. She appears to be a representative of any Post-Colonial woman who accepts the male ego and domination; she gives up her individuality besides being educated and sensible. She prefers to adhere to her marital relationship and accepts life as it comes. Rushdie makes the character of Amina both modern and conservative. She does not walk out of her husband's life forever as her imperial counterpart would have done under her circumstances. She undoubtedly stands as a representative of the feminine principle.

Saleem's another mother, Mary Pereira, can be considered as another embodiment of the feminine principle, her very act of swapping babies is done to please her communist lover, Joseph D'Costa whom she admired dearly. This Joseph D'Coata has problems with the rich becoming richer and the poor becoming much poorer. As a reaction to his Marxist thinking Mary swaps babies at birth and gives a poor man's son into a rich household and gives the baby of the rich a life of penury. Later she feels guilty and regrets her action but since she is helpless, she joins the Sinai family as an *ayah* for their son Saleem. She lives in the household of the Sinais and takes care of Saleem as her own son. Saleem receives the love and attention of two mothers as his

mother and the *ayah* compete with each other to show how much they care for the little one. Towards the end of the novel Saleem ends up as a worker in Mary Pereira's Pickle factory, and once again receives unconditional love. His son Adam is also offered enough affection by Mary as well as Padma.

A very vulnerable and weak NaseemGhani, the grandmother of Saleem, is introduced in the novel as the shy daughter of Ghani, who remains in Veil. She falls in love with Adam Aziz, the European returned doctor who frequents her house to treat her as she is presented to him for treatment through a perforated sheet. Even after marriage she attaches herself to conservatism and is transformed into a bloated and imposing figure. She becomes threatening and masculine just as her husband Dr. Aziz becomes weak and submissive. Naseem develops a 'fearsome ability to invade her daughters' and husband's dreams.' This change or transformation in her character can be understood in the light of the portrayal of women characters in a Rushdie novel. Repression leads to resistance and sometimes violence in Rushdie's women. Naseem Ghani is rightly addressed as Reverend Mother; the transformation of mothers into witch-like figures reflects an aspect of Indian psyche, as Ashis Nandy states,

In terms of organization of personality... the Indian lives in his inner world less with a feared father than with a powerful, aggressive and unreliable mother. Manifestly, he idealizes her and sees her as the repository of all nurture and motherliness. Underneath this, there are deep doubts about the nature and the way she might use her powers to aggress. Contrarily, the father is seen as non-interfering, inefficacious, distant and a co-victim of the castrating mother figure (1983: 107)

The Reverend mother alters her roles between a nurturing woman and a destructive woman. She appears to have developed a love-hate relationship even with her daughters and occasionally becomes uncommunicative if something disagreeable crops up. At times she appears to be a comic figure evoking laughter. In Rushdie's world, women appear to be the redefined 'Other', in control of their personal space and at times of others as well. The veil adheres to a concept of negative traditionalism. The foremost rule that Dr.

Aziz sets to his new bride is to give up purdha, for which Naseem reacts with dismay and objects to do it. Dr. Aziz sets fire to her purdha veils and asks her to shed her traditional inhibitions in favour of modernity. He insists his wife to “forget about being a good Kashmiri girl” and “start thinking like a modern Indian woman.”(1981:33). This is the point at which disagreement enters the lives of Dr. Aziz and his wife Naseem which sets the tone for their marriage and Dr. Aziz perpetually loses his every battle with his wife. He starves as she rejects him food and water for days together to prove her supremacy and power over him in the domain of kitchen. He loses his health and apparently recovers with the love and service offered by his daughter Mumtaz (Amina). Naseem is seen as a typical Indian mother-in-law who nags her ex film-actress daughter-in-law Pia. Naseem dreams of migrating to Pakistan and owning a petrol pump. Her wishful thinking comes true as she migrates to Pakistan along with her daughter-in-law Pia where she owns a petrol pump. She adheres to the business and spends much of her time in the glass chambers of the petrol pump listening to the sufferings of her customers and giving them motherly suggestions. She enjoys her job as a consultant and advisor. The veil is shed as she gets old and she becomes quite accommodative. Even earlier, Dr. Aziz’s mother sheds her veil or purdha to rise to the exigencies of being a businesswoman, while taking care of the family’s Gemstone business in the absence of her husband due to his ill health. This aspect of purdha forms the core of Rushdie’s delineation of woman characters. Purdha or the veil defines the Muslim woman to which she adheres as an act of purity and respectfulness. All his women are more extreme in their response to the world than the males around them. He bestows most of his females with far more power and more survival capacities than his male characters. Despite the strength, his women characters are exploited.

Feminism seeks to retrieve the sense of self of the female, it endorse that a woman should be a controller rather than the controlled. In this paradigm, Rushdie portrays women characters that consciously shrug off the

traditional role and gender-traits, they are individuals who are independent and control others. Rani of Cooch Naheen is a minor character in the novel who happens to be a patron of Mian Abdulla and Nadir Khan in support of the cause of Indian Patriots who were opposing partition of India as demanded by the Muslim League on the ground that carving out a pure land for the Muslims will not serve the poor people among the community. She is a constant giver who selflessly bestows money for a cause. She appears to be very feminine and respectable.

Parvati-the witch is a crucial character in the novel who is one of the 1001 midnight's children born on the midnight of August 15th 1947. She possesses magical powers and is said to be good at witch craft. Saleem returns from Pakistan to the Magician's ghetto in India with the help of Parvati-the witch. She tries to convince Saleem to marry her but he rejects her and claims to be an impotent. Parvati casts a spell on Shiva, the rival and changeling brother of Saleem; she seduces him and gets impregnated. This is one character in the novel which approaches her sexual freedom openly. She later marries Saleem and thus her son becomes the son of Saleem too.

Rushdie's women are powerful forces and his girl characters are high spirited, always in control of their own world despite their traditional environment. In the novel, we have three girls- Evie Burns, Jamila and ToxyCatrack. Out of the three girls, two can be labeled as rebels, tomboys and brats, not signifying any female traits like gentleness, docility or physical weakness. Jamila who is aptly called by her family as the 'brass-monkey', grows up to be Jamila Singer, Pakistan's most popular and patriotic radio voice. Her character grows from a brat and a modern-educated child in Bombay who constantly fights with her sibling and especially her male friends to a much docile and feminine Jamila Singer who always lives in a *purdha* veil covering her entire body except her eyes.

Pia the daughter-in-law of NaseemGhani, the wife of HanifGhani is shown in the beginning as a career oriented woman, who is very modern and

fashionable and a heroine in the Bombay film world. After marrying Hanif, a director of movies, she loses financial independence and is made to live like a typical housewife. She is found to be unable to adjust to this more down-to-earth life and the lack of attention from the outside world as well as her husband makes her a mere stereotypical nag of a wife. She ends up having a brief extra-marital relationship with a rich producer. For a period of time, Saleem is left with his Hanif uncle and aunt and at that point she takes care of Saleem as she would do if it were her own son. She becomes extremely motherly and gentle to him.

Rushdie makes this responsible daughter-in-law stick to her mother-in-law even after the death of her husband Hanif. She moves to Pakistan along with the Reverend Mother. Her frustration and depression and her want for attention make her end up in numerous liaisons with the Pakistani cricketers and actors. She is so vulnerable that she constantly pines for attention and security. Rushdie fails to hold at least one example of an independent strong-minded woman who proclaimed sexual freedom except for Parvati-the-witch. Apart from Evie Burns all the women characters in the novel are portrayed in very traditional or stereotypical roles. Evie is definitely the opponent of the Other in many ways; she is an American and can be taken as the symbol of the new Imperialism, opposing the Post-Colonial natives and their feminine principle.

Yet another portrayal that fails to go with the feminine principle is that of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Rushdie's description of Mrs. Gandhi trespasses the norms that define the feminine principle as she is shown as a woman who superimposes an entire Post-Colonial nation. Indira Gandhi, who, in this novel is repeatedly called 'widow', is the mother of Emergency. The appellation 'widow' might be said to signify the drying up of emotions, the harshness etc. which might have led to her uncontrolled power over the country. She was a dictator during the period of Emergency. The media which was state controlled, projected her as Devi or Mother Goddess, and the slogan "Indira is

India” (1981: 427) is relayed over the media. Rushdie makes Saleem exaggerate when he records,

We the magical children of midnight, were hated feared destroyed by the widow who was not only prime minister of India but also aspired to be Devi, the Mother Goddess in her most terrible aspect, possessor of Shakti of the Gods, a multi-limbed divinity, with a centre parting and schizophrenic hair. (1981: 522)

Rushdie’s exaggeration in the portrayal of Indira Gandhi makes her character ridiculous. The widow in the novel remains a part of history and outgrows the feminine principle to the extent of Mother Goddess.

To conclude, feminist theories can be seen as a part of the Post-Colonial consciousness in the work of Rushdie. The work can be juxtaposed with the notion of Simone de Beauvoir, as stated in *The Second Sex* that one ‘becomes a woman’ and is not just born. It sinks with the theory of the post-structuralist feminist thinker, Judith Butler, who deconstructs the stereotypes of male and female stating that gender can be “flexible and free-floating”. Rushdie successfully imparts the notion of ‘Other’ to most of his characters. The protagonist Saleem, who is central to the novel, can also be read as a follower of the feminine principle despite his chauvinistic attitude. He can be termed effeminate owing to his sensitivity, both physically and psychologically. Besides, Saleem is an impotent which makes him unfit to be called anything close to masculine or macho. He becomes both father and mother to Adam, who is not his biological son. He imparts motherly love to that child and accepts him unconditionally. Despite his disintegrating and troubling body he lives only for the sake of his son. Saleem thus becomes a contributor to the feminine principle. Salman Rushdie successfully weaves feminine patterns in his characters. He rejects the masculine above feminine category because he recognizes the violence inherent in their hierarchical composition. He creates strong woman who can withstand all circumstances and finally end up successful apart from being discriminated as uneducated or weak by their male counterparts. The lives of his women characters are less dominated and

more successful when compared to his male characters like Saleem or Dr. Aziz. Salman Rushdie's pen is double edged as he creates his female characters that fall within two extremes. His women characters can be labeled into four categories as far as the novel *Midnight's Children* goes. The first category comprises of women such as Amina Sinai, Padma etc. who offer love unconditionally besides being belittled by their partners. Characters like the Reverend Mother, her daughter-in-law Pia, Parvati-the-witch etc. fall into the second category where docile women become stronger by the day due to their circumstances. Pia and Parvati go one step ahead and reach out their sexual interests. The third category comprises of Jamila Singer, a brat who turns religious and conservative as she leaves the City of Bombay for Pakistan, the land of the pure. Circumstances carve her into being very feminine. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, enters this historical metafiction as a superimposer and thoroughly commands and dictates an entire nation, she can be uniquely categorized, unmatched to any other Rushdie women. Though Rushdie vehemently detests Indira Gandhi, he indirectly proclaims that the Post-Colonial woman or the 'Other' need not be represented, as her European counterpart talks of her, since she can successfully open new avenues beyond just being recognized. If circumstances demand she can become supreme and jeopardize democracy to meet her ends. The representation of Indira Gandhi can be seen in the backdrop of Gayatri Spivak questioning the authenticity of the Europeans to patronize and represent the Third World women as the weak and vulnerable 'Other'.

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BOOK REVIEW

Indian Philosophy in English: From Renaissance to Independence, edited by Nalini Bhushan and Jay Garfield, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp 644. ISBN 9780199769254.

The title and the subtitle of the book under review have a contextual significance. The title signifies the context with the language 'English' whereas the subtitle signifies the context with the period of work.

The context of the book as mentioned by the editors is Daya Krishna's provocative remark which they consider to be deeply mistaken, that 'anybody who is writing in English is not an Indian philosopher'. This statement raises a serious question that needs to be addressed, the question being: 'Is there any Indian philosopher in the modern period that can fit into the parameters of Daya Krishna?' This provocation shoves into oblivion the whole of the modern philosophy that has been taught for the past one hundred years and also that which is being written. This also prompts us to look at another broader issue of serious concern regarding the relation between language, culture and philosophy since it addresses the issue of the relation between language and philosophy.

The context of the title 'Indian Philosophy in English' has a couple of aspects to be considered. The title presents the discontinuity of the classical Indian philosophy *done* in Sanskrit with Indian philosophy *written* in English. It also presents a distinction between philosophy done and produced in the form of various systems which is an outcome of continuous debates from the one developed as an academic discipline in modern India with the establishment of the university system in the country (during the 1850s); the origin and development of Philosophy as an academic discipline and the introduction of Indian Philosophy as a part of the curriculum.

The context of the subtitle is the period from 'Renaissance to Independence'.

While arguing that ‘philosophy was central to the renaissance’ the editors rightly point out that ‘Anglophone Indian philosophy is coeval with and contributes to the Indian renaissance.’ (xv) This renaissance was ‘more than a revival of Indian cultural, artistic, and intellectual life.’ The editors inform us that the renaissance shaped a new trajectory for India, construction of which is required for Indian nationalism – ‘a trajectory that is grounded in historical narrative and aimed at an independent future.’ (xvi)

These are a few contexts which prove the relevance of the present volume which stands as a signpost showing the way towards the much neglected philosophical literature of colonial India.

The collection consists of 27 philosophical essays written by major scholars of the period, along with four articles written by the editors in addition to the introduction and discussion of a symposium of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Amalner in 1980. The editors' efforts in selecting this small sample from the vast philosophical literature produced during the period from ‘renaissance to independence’ must be appreciated as the collection effectively serves the purpose of reinvigorating interest in the philosophy of colonial India and demonstrates that Indian intellectuals actively and creatively merged with both their past and the intellectual currents of the broader world. (xv)

The present work is an attempt to show that ‘important and original philosophy was written in English, in India, by Indians’ from the late 19th c through the middle of 20th c. (xiv). In fact, it tells us that these works ‘sustained the Indian philosophical tradition and were creators of its modern avatar.’ (xiv) The authors of these works ‘pursued Indian philosophy in a language and format that could render it both accessible and acceptable to the Anglophone world abroad.’ (xiv)

This small selection is appropriately grouped under four themes – National Identity, Aesthetics, Vedanta, and Metaphysics and Epistemology - as each of these themes exerted a significant influence on the Indian psyche in general

during colonial-independence times. Except five essays – two by M. Hiriyanna on Aesthetics (1951,54), one each by V.S. Iyer (1955) G. R. Malkani (1949) and A. C. Mukerji (1950) – all others were either written or published before India attained independence.

Instead of reviewing each of the edited essays included in the volume, I prefer to look at the articles written by the editors themselves as they provide the context for the volume. These essays have already been published elsewhere and individually they speak of the context to which they were reactions. They were authored between 1904 and 1955. The earliest essay included in the volume was published about 108 years ago and the most recent one was published about 57 years ago. Though it is difficult to provide a context for the essays written during such a long period, the editors have provided useful background by their well-written articles. Their collective existence will give us more meaningful insights into the recent past of the history of Indian philosophy which the editors attempt to offer in their articles. However, the grouping and contextualising of the edited essays attempted by the editors needs a careful and critical reading to draw insights from their collection.

The ‘secular modernity’ bequeathed by the Anglophone intellectuals of India facilitated a public discourse embodying an Indianness grounded in India’s diverse religious traditions, while transcending that very diversity and religiosity celebrated by the editors in their article “Pandits and Professors: The Renaissance of Secular India.” In this article the authors have attempted to show that Indian nationalism was prompted more by secular thinking and attitude than religious one by taking examples of various scholars. This article prepares the platform and background for the essays written by Rabindranath Tagore, Aurobindo Ghosh, A. K. Coomaraswamy, Lajpat Rai, Bhagavan Das and K. C. Bhattacharyya which depict divergent views on the idea of nation that are included in this volume. Each of these authors provides varied versions of looking at India’s past while contributing to global discourse on

the concepts of nation and identity.

In their article “An Indian in Paris: Cosmopolitan Aesthetics in Colonial India” which is included in the second part of the volume devoted to Aesthetics, the editors explicate in a striking manner the politics of authenticity in Indian aesthetics. The authors have explained the use of authenticity and creativity in evaluating Indian art by the art critics. The art and artistic sensibility of Amrita Sher-Gil was distinguished from that of Ravi Varma and Abanindranath Tagore. The distinctions that were brought out with regard to the Soul of Indian art (materialistic or spiritualistic); training lineage (Bombay and Madras versus Calcutta schools of art); appropriation of the styles (European versus Japanese and Mughal) along with the success with the masses versus elite have been brought out well in this essay which future researchers can probe further. This essay concludes Part Two of the volume which includes the essays of A. K. Coomaraswamy, Aurobindo Ghosh, Rabindranath Tagore, B. K. Sarkar, K. C. Bhattacharyya and M. Hiriyanna.

How Aurobindo’s *Lilavada* interpretation of Vedanta made so much sense in India during the renaissance period as a vehicle of modernity has been explained by the editors in their article “Bringing Brahman Down to Earth: *Lilavada* in Colonial India” which forms a part of the section on Vedanta. It is argued that the pressing need of the time for a theoretical foundation for modernity in India was highlighted by Indian philosophers of that time by ‘erecting a metaphysical foundation that at once unifies a modern vision of India with a classical tradition and breaks with that tradition to forge a creative vision of future philosophy.’(436) Aurobindo gave a ‘startling, realistic twist’ to Vedanta by basing its metaphysical foundation on *Lilavada*. The authors contend that *Lilavada* provided ‘the framework and the metaphors that allowed India to construct its ideological identity and its engagement with modernity on its own terms.’ (450) This article of the editors encompasses the significance of the articles included in Part Three of the volume devoted to

Vedanta. The essays of R. D. Ranade, Vivekananda, A. C. Mukerji, Ras Bihari Das, S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, V. S. Iyer and P. T. Raju which discuss various aspects of Vedanta such as the problem of ultimate reality, Jnana yoga, theory of consciousness, world, causality and scepticism which are aptly chosen to depict the varied and rich literature on Vedanta.

By showing the contribution of A. C. Mukerji as an example of the authentic and creative work produced during the colonial period, the editors in their article “The Plato of Allahabad: A. C. Mukerji’s contributions to India and to World Philosophy” argue that ‘there was in fact a renaissance under way in Indian Philosophy during this period which is still not recognised.’ (457) The authors rightly point out that ‘there were many others working in the universities of India during the British period who did not themselves see tradition and innovation as mutually exclusive categories, who creatively and successfully overcame this divide but who were not, and still are not, recognised for their efforts.’(459) This essay precludes Part Four of the volume devoted to Metaphysics and Epistemology. This part includes the contributions of Hiralal Halder, K. C. Bhattacharyya, M. Hiriyanna, G. R. Malkani along with that of A. C. Mukerji on such themes as realism, idealism, truth, epistemology and concept of philosophy.

Part Five of the volume includes a very fascinating discussion on ‘Has Aurobindo Refuted Mayavada?’ with brilliant expositions by Indra Sen, N. A. Nikam, Haridas Chaudhuri and G. R. Malkani. This discussion was the subject of a symposium organised as a part of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Amalner in 1950.

The editors' efforts at collecting and providing a rich bibliography of the significant works in Indian Philosophy produced from the colonial period and the immediate post-Independence period are praiseworthy. Keeping aside the issue of comprehensiveness of the list, this would definitely help the future researchers interested in ‘philosophy during colonial India’ in understanding

the rich diversity of the philosophical literature produced by Anglophone academia of India.

The editors lament that ‘there is no recovery effort under way to restore to public consciousness the high quality work of the philosophers of that period’ and further that tragically ‘the dichotomy of the authentic versus the creative as it applies to philosophy is as unbridgeable as ever in the attitude of the present-day Indian philosophers.’ (458) The editors aptly point out the ‘urgency’ of detailed research into the work of Anglophone academia so that these can be ‘stitched together to provide a comprehensive history of Indian philosophy in English.’ (468)

What we can learn from the present volume is that there is a huge pile of philosophical literature of colonial India contributed with equal enthusiasm by academia and public figures of the time which can be thematically grouped, not necessarily in the way presented here. The volume must be taken as a takeoff point to further analyse and discuss concepts such as ‘secular modernity’, renaissance in Indian philosophy; and the distinctions brought out between public and private in practice; math and the academy, authenticity and creativity and various types of nationalisms in India by the editors in their articles.

However, one would be surprised by the fact that none of the essays of Sarvepalle Radhakrishnan, who is mentioned as ‘a prototype of philosophy’ (457) by the editors could find a place in the volume. While dealing with diverse and unclassified material, one would face many difficulties with regard to inclusion and exclusion of essays. It must be noted that the editors' objective was to bring order to the material, the volume of diversity, variedness and richness of which is incomprehensible. There may be many works of authors who have contributed substantially to Indian philosophy during and after the colonial period which still have to see the light of day. The editors' pioneering efforts at dealing with this incomprehensible literature

must be appreciated and taken up further to bring as much comprehensiveness, as much diversity and as much clarity as possible to the philosophical literature of colonial India.

The present work should spur the growth of interest in the history of Modern Indian Philosophy with a concern to locate the unrecognised and ignored aspects of the study of history of Indian Philosophy. The work both by challenging the critics of the Anglophone Indian philosophy and by encouraging further probing into the works of early Indian academia should serve as the platform for reconsideration of the arguments of the critics by the future researchers.

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